Publication Details
Ramm, B.
(2021).
Panpsychism and the first-person perspective: The case for panpsychist idealism.
Mind and Matter, 19 (1), 75-106.
Abstract
In this paper I argue for a version of panpsychist idealism on first-person experiential grounds. As things always appear in my field of consciousness, there is prima facie } empirical support for idealism. Furthermore, by assuming that all things correspond to a conscious perspective or perspectives (i.e., panpsychism), realism about the world is safeguarded without the need to appeal to God (as per Berkeley's idealism). Panpsychist idealism also has a phenomenological advantage over traditional panpsychist views as it does not commit perceptual experience to massive error by denying that perceived colors are properties of things. Finally, I argue that the subject combination problem for panpsychism has been motivated by the problematic assumption that consciousness is in things. Thinking about subject combination from the first-person perspective is fruitful for reframing the subject combination problem and for seeing how subjects could potentially combine for the idealist.
Keywords
Panpsychism, Consciousness, Idealism, Theology, Philosophy