Causation and the Epistemic Basing Relation


The epistemic-basing relation is the relation that holds between a reason, or one’s grounds, and one’s belief when the belief is held for that reason. As I will explain, understanding this relation is crucial for epistemology since basing a belief on a reason seems necessary (but not sufficient) for epistemic justification to obtain.

But what is the nature of this relation? Is it, at least in part, causal as one might assume? Or, due to problems with causal accounts, are rival accounts of the basing relation motivated? That depends whether causal theories are really subject to the standard objections made against them. I will discuss what I take to be the most fundamental objection here.




At the time of this conference Brent J C Madison was affiliated with the Department of Philosophy, University College London, UK.

Further information about this conference may be accessed here