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European Identity and Other Mysteries — Seeking Out the Hidden Source of Unity for a Troubled Polity

Identidad Europea y Otro Misterio — La Búsqueda de la Fuente Oculta de la Unidad para una Política en Problemas

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Abstract: The economic crisis in Europe exposes the European Union's (EU) political fragility. How a polity made of very different states can live up to the motto “Europe united in diversity” is difficult to envisage in practice. In this paper I attempt an “exegesis”—a critical explanation or interpretation of a series of published pieces (“the Series”) which explores, first of all, if European unity (and what kind) is desirable at all. Second, it presents a methodology running throughout the Series —analogical hermeneutics—to approach the problem of unity. Third, it conceptualises the source of unity as political identity (and solidarity). Fourth, it advances that such identity could be found in a shared, analogical language: the political culture of human rights which is arguably common to all EU present and potential member states. Fifth, it submits the conditions under which such political culture could ground political identity (through an open public sphere). Notwithstanding that the economic crisis can be solved by means of a sound economic strategy (which is not the main object of my work), any successful economic strategy requires—as a precondition—a certain degree of political unity (the central concern of my research).

Keywords: analogical hermeneutics, analogical language, European Union, human rights, political culture, political identity, political unity, public sphere, relational interculturalism, religion, secularism, solidarity, suprastatism.
The economic crisis has exposed the fragility of Europe’s political building—the European Union (EU). In this political building, every “brick” (or member state) is different and claims respect for its singularity. In the EU motto: “Europe united in diversity,” the “diversity” part is most evident. Tallinn and Dubrovnik attest to very different cultural, political, artistic and historical traits. But what can keep Tallinn and Dubrovnik—Estonia and Croatia—together as part of the same polity?

This paper follows a series of publications (“the Series”) on European political identity. Five published journal articles; a chapter in an edited book and a journal article approved for publication; and one article that has been submitted for publication and is awaiting response from a journal. In order to make it easier for the reader to follow the referencing in the text, a shorthand name has been given to each of the pieces: European Identity, Cosmopolitan Communitarian, Political Identity, Normative Conceptions, Analogical Identity, Liberal Democracy, Cultural Riddles, Rethinking Neutrality, Worth Fighting, and Europe United. All the papers are available online.

The Series, I put forward here, represents a body of research about one problem (the wobbly political unity of the EU), using a specific methodology (analogical hermeneutics), with a coherent conceptual framework which hopes to contribute to the study of the topic, presenting a plausible avenue to address the problem (building political identity around the common political culture of human rights, or PCHR) and pointing to areas of research in need of further development.

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2 An earlier version of this paper was presented as a Public Lecture at the Australian National University Centre for European Studies, Canberra, on the 3rd of July 2012. I am indebted to HE Mr Andrzej Jaroszyński, former Ambassador of Poland to Australia, for his very insightful comments, to Dr Matthew Zagor for questions that helped a further elaboration of these ideas, to the Director of the Centre, Professor Jacqueline Lo, and to all of the attendants for their insights and participation. Thanks to Professor Tom Campbell, Professor Simon Bronitt, Professor Kim Rubenstein, Dr Ben Wellings, Dr Lina Eriksson, Dr John Besemeres, Dr Michael Casey, Dr Antonio Missiroli, Dr José Manuel Sobrino Heredia, Dr Héctor Velázquez and Professor Peter Hill for very useful orientation during the writing of the Series and/or feedback on subsequent versions of this piece.

3 Complete bibliographical reference for each of them will be given throughout the paper.


5 “Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading.”


8 “EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding),” Australia National University Centre for European Studies Briefing Paper Series 1, no. 2 (2010).


10 “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific.”


12 “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited.”


A glance at the foundational ideals is contrasted with the current situation of the European Union, and some thoughts are advanced about the significance of political culture, participation, and solidarity among European citizens.\(^\text{15}\)

These days, however the cause for European unity has become less popular—to put it mildly. In some instances it faces not only scepticism but even blunt hostility. The case for European unity is not as obvious and clear as it might have been at the time of the Schuman declaration in 1950. This will be discussed in the following section.

**Is unity desirable at all, and if so, what kind?**

The point of departure of my research is the undemonstrated assumption that the peoples of Europe, symbolised and expressed, among other elements by their languages, have an intrinsic, self-evident value that should be known, fostered and preserved. If Lithuanians—who form a state—or the Welsh—who are a nation—or Neapolitans—who possess a language regardless of their being considered today a nation or not—were to disappear, something of intrinsic and immense value would be lost.

The day, in other words, when the Swedish people, their way of life, their love of coffee and nature, their history and music, their openness and sense of egalitarianism—conveyed and synthesised in the Swedish language—ceased to exist, that day would signify a terrible and irreparable loss for Europe and for the world, which although different, is comparable to a certain extent to the disappearance of an animal species or a large section of rainforest.\(^\text{16}\)

I should like to warn the reader about three possible misunderstandings surrounding this idea.\(^\text{17}\) The first one is the naïve suggestion that all Swedish people are morally good from the simple fact of being Swedish. That is certainly not the case of the Swedish people—or of any other people for that matter. In any human group certain individuals behave in ways that are considered good (think of the honours, medals, distinctions and other forms of reward from society towards certain outstanding people in their midst); others may behave in ways that are considered morally bad, not exemplary, reprobate (for example someone convicted of rape or of human trafficking).

Second, the obtuse thought that appreciating Swedish people and culture is somewhat equivalent to affirming their **superiority** over other human groups and cultures, for instance Russians or Norwegians. This is absurd because every people and their culture – symbolised and expressed in their language – are unique. The Swedish culture is related to other human cultures but has its own facets that are different to the others and enrich them—as much as it may be similarly enriched by the particular features of other cultures.

Third, that arguing for the value of the Swedish peoples and their cultures equates to arguing for a particular state. Because among other things, that would ignore those Swedish peoples who do not live in the Swedish Kingdom (for instance those who reside in Finland). And in the event that a state may become totalitarian or plainly dangerous, that does not make the peoples and cultures living in them necessarily part of the state’s atrocities. Think of Russians (or Georgians)

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\(^{15}\) Jiménez Lobeira, “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited; Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific; Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe.”

\(^{16}\) For me the hypothetical extinction of the Swedish people and their culture would be even worse. But I do not intend to elaborate an argument about it here.

\(^{17}\) Note that these possible misunderstandings could very well be just descriptions of at least some forms of nationalism along history—eminently in Europe. My position however is closely tied with peoples and their culture, rather than to abstract “nations” (unless the term is used to designate concrete peoples and their language and culture), or even less to “nation-states” (i.e. states).
in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or of innocent Germans (and Jewish Germans) living in the Third Reich under Hitler.

The assumption does not ignore that peoples and cultures, if we take their language as an icon, mix and change. In a complicated and intricate history which would be impossible to summarise in a few paragraphs, languages evolve. Uralic, Slavic, Germanic and Romance languages (among others) developed over centuries in Europe into the current languages that are spoken today. In other words, they mutate, there is a sort of relativity to them. Their value is intrinsic and self-evident, but not absolute. 18

For all their wrong-doings and mistakes, for all their history of wars and imperialism, the peoples and their cultures in a continent that Mazower has called “dark”—and not for the most flattering of reasons 19—have nonetheless enriched the world in many positive ways. Abstract terms such as “western” (ideas, culture, mentality, and so on) or “the west” would mean nothing without a strong reference to Europe.

From the middle of the XIX century to the middle of the XX century, Europe faced self-destruction due to the immense power of its increasingly assertive nation-states. From the aftermath of World War II to the end what Hobsbawm calls the XX “short century” (1914 - 1991), 20 Europe faced a different kind of danger, being as it was the front stage of a conflict—the Cold War—between the two world superpowers. In the XXI century, with emerging powers represented in the G20, seven of the ten fastest growing economies located in Africa, and a general shift of interest in the planet towards Asia (as China gains economic, military and political prominence) 21 the least of the challenges that Europe is facing is irrelevance.

And if this is true for Europe as a whole, it is so, a fortiori for individual European countries such as Luxembourg or Portugal, and even more for nations and peoples living within one state or across several of them: Scots in the UK, Ukrainians in Latvia, or Romani in France, Spain and other countries. If these and other peoples of Europe, as well as the richness of their languages and cultures are to survive and continue to flourish, peace is a first pre-requisite. But it is not enough. A pooling of resources, skills and labour is also needed.

This realisation is obvious in countries of the Baltic region, for instance, for which reason Latvia is poised to join the euro in 2014, while Lithuania and Poland are in line to adopt the European currency in the coming years. It is also why Croatia worked through a hard agenda (including solving border issues with neighbouring Slovenia) that lasted several years, to become a member of the EU in 2013, as other Balkan countries continue to advance towards membership as well,

18 Groups obviously change with time. The Romance languages in the Iberian Peninsula, for instance, developed from vulgar Latin, and progressively differentiated and formed what today we know as Portuguese, Galician, Castilian, Catalan and other languages. In the XIII century Alfonso X (the Wise) set the Toledo School of Translators who conveyed texts from Arabic, Greek, and Hebrew into Castilian, which was promoted to state language. At the same time, nonetheless Alfonso writes poetry (e.g. the Cantigas de Santa María) in Galician-Portuguese, and calls to his court varied artists whose mother tongue is Occitan, Galician-Portuguese, Catalan, French (the langue d’oil from northern France) and Italian (originally Tuscan). The evolution of languages in the former Yugoslavia is another, more recent example. Tomorrow the cultural and linguistic landscape in Europe may change, with the return of Arabic and Turkish as important languages again. People, every concrete human being (unlike abstractions such as “nations”) have an absolute value. But as long as certain languages represent those peoples and their cultures, they possess an intrinsic value—if always subordinated, conditional and in evolution.


often undergoing painful economic reforms and swallowing their pride in order to solve historical conflicts and thus qualify (just think of Serbia’s arrangements with Kosovo, under the EU’s auspices).

The intrinsic value of each European nation is showcased by its language as a vehicle of expression for a certain group of people and their culture. Unity is desirable in order to preserve those cultures and the viability of the states which host them. Unity is a means to preserving diversity and enabling it to flourish.

These ideas motivated the creation of the European communities (the first one of which was dedicated to the production of coal and steel). With the years those communities became what today is the EU. However the preservation of peace required constant attention and the pooling of resources was critically reliant on a certain unity of the peoples of Europe. The need became evident for a common authority which could mediate between different peoples in the face of potential conflicts of interest, and which was able to set certain rules and goals for the common work. Some sort of legal and political unity was therefore desirable.

Today economic and legal unity has been attained—to a certain degree. True, the euro crisis has revealed that a lot still remains to be done. But the political aspect has been more difficult to develop. What the EU is in political terms continues to be debated. Famously it was described by Jacques Delors, a former president of the European Commission as “an unidentified political object.” Also debated is the nature and quality of the EU in terms of the political culture which prevails in its member states and which includes the rule of law, democracy and human rights its most important elements and symbols.

As many as the achievements of the EU have been in terms of continental peace and prosperity more than sixty years after its beginnings, it becomes ever clearer that the project cannot continue to grow unless economic and legal unity are matched by unity in the political realm. The rise of Eurosceptic parties all over Europe at a time of economic crisis is no coincidence. But even if the effect of those parties were ignored, most European citizens today—regardless of their political persuasion—perceive that this political underdevelopment—or in the jargon of political European studies this “democratic deficit”—requires attention for the EU to survive and grow—and for “European citizenship” to mean anything at all.

Therefore the main question I have attempted to address in the Series is how political unity can be envisaged and made more stable. This is closely related to political culture in particular and cultural diversity in general. It is never a question of form only, but also one of substance, hence the importance of culture and its implications for politics—or political culture.

There are two sides to political unity: the polity considered as a community of citizens; and the polity considered as a legal entity. Unity from the first point of view can be promoted through relational interculturalism in an inclusive public sphere. The second side can be fostered through supranationalism, exemplified by the principle of constitutional tolerance.

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23 Ibid., 515.
24 Ibid.
26 I take the term relationality from Pierpaolo Donati, see: Jiménez Lobeira, “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited,” 6. See also de last section of this exegetic introduction (below).
27 Ibid., 8-9.
Political unity is, in the face of an increasingly globalised world—and one that has Europe less and less at its centre—a necessity in order to preserve and enhance peace, prosperity and the flourishing of the peoples of Europe. United, the European peoples can more effectively mitigate internal conflict, face external threat, and continue to matter in the changing world of the XXI century.

Yet, unity has many forms. The United Nations, the United Arab Emirates, the African Union, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of South American Nations all express unity, but of different kinds.

In Europe, the debate regarding political form or regime has revolved around three main possibilities. First, the EU as an international organisation with economic purposes and no political coordination. Second, the EU evolving into a federal state similar to the USA (or to Germany or other federal states), which position has been proposed and endorsed by philosophers such as Habermas. Finally, the EU as a mixed commonwealth, an arrangement that pushes for some political unity but stops short of becoming a state itself.

This third possibility conceives of the EU as a polity formed by states but itself remaining stateless. Among others, proponents of this position (each with different nuances of course) include Neil McCormick, Joseph Weiler, Richard Bellamy and others. In the Series I have argued in favour of this third possibility, which is in my opinion the regime that is best suited to the unity that the peoples of Europe need (see above).

Unity for the peoples of Europe is a means rather than an end (the ends being their preservation, prosperity and flourishing). And the sort of unity more convenient for that end to happen—not only the flourishing of “Europe” in abstract but of its peoples (Romanians, Estonians, Danes, and so on)—should be one that allows the greatest space possible for each of those particular peoples to prosper and flourish.

Desirable outcomes of European political unity are, therefore, the preservation of the distinct peoples and cultures, and their flourishing. Subordinated to that goal and as part of its attainment, would be (social) peace and (economic) prosperity; and civic friendship (or solidarity) as part of both. Much attention from the media has focused on the economic prosperity (or its compromise: the dire situation of the finances, high unemployment, the risk of a break in the euro zone, and so on). My perspective seeks to address aspects which—if attended—can ground a prosperous economy. But prosperity is not enough, and hence the importance of speaking about social peace, civic friendship, and cultural flourishing.

Further, derived outcomes from a social, economic and political healthy Europe can be its significant contribution to world prosperity and peace through the EU’s economic clout, its commitment to promote peace in different regions of the planet, and enrich international relations by sharing its political culture of human rights.

Outcomes such as the ones I have just mentioned can come—I submit—from a Europe united in diversity as a stateless, analogical polity, an relational, intercultural society, a flexibly integrated economy, and an inclusive and open public sphere.

Before engaging those topics, however I would like to present some notes on the methodology that I have used throughout the Series to approach the problem of political unity and other issues related to it.

Approaching the question: analogical hermeneutics

The approach I undertook was a theoretical one, though trying to bear in mind the latest empirical research. As a theoretical work, the research dealt both with descriptive (conceptual, analytical) matters—how things are—as well as with normative ones—how things should be, and why.

However my analysis used an underlying methodological approach along virtually the whole Series. A tool that allows for the weighting of difficult and contrasting choices in the investigation of the EU's political unity.

The methodology to engage with the problem is called analogical hermeneutics. Analogical hermeneutics is used as a key methodological concept throughout the Series, 29 both to understand the problem and as a tool to evaluate possible solutions.30 It provides a path to conceptualise the European polity, citizenship and identity. It helps to ease the tension between the (EU) as a whole, and the individual parts (member states), unity and diversity.31 Analogical hermeneutics not only helps to understand (or interpret) what European polity, citizenship and identity are, but also what they should be.

The reason for this is that analogical hermeneutics, of itself, privileges diversity over unity (without breaking it). It can aid in approaching normative issues when the desirable outcome is prioritising diversity over unity.32 Such is the case of the EU’s political unity.33 Hence analogical hermeneutics suits that problem, following the initial premise (explained above) that the goal of unity is subordinated to the flourishing of the peoples of Europe, to its diversity—the whole is less important than the parts. In order to understand why this method is suitable, a little more must be said about the method’s nature.

Intuitively, analogical hermeneutics could be summarised as a methodology of interpretation. Initially “hermeneutics,” a name apparently related to the god Hermes of Greek mythology,34 was a way of interpreting texts, of finding or discovering their meaning, a meaning that the texts certainly had and could be discovered. Hermeneutics can go beyond and reach out to reality: not only of the texts themselves, but also of what the texts refer to—meaning and reference.

Analogical hermeneutics is an attempt to navigate between the “one meaning” interpretation of scientific positivists, and the “infinite meanings” (which often leads to meaninglessness) of at least some “postmodernists”.35 For the latter there are in fact so many interpretations that it is practically impossible to know which of them is true.

From Aristotle, Beuchot takes the terms univocal, equivocal, and analogical. A univocal word or term has only one possible meaning: it is unambiguous. For instance the word “chess.” There is

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30 "Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach," 168.
31 Cf. "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)."
34 Part god and part man, who was in charge of conveying messages—serving as link of understanding—between the gods and men. Mauricio Beuchot, En El Camino De La Hermenéutica Analógica [On the Path of Analogical Hermeneutics], Aletheia (Salamanca: San Esteban, 2005), 14-15.
35 Think for instance of Derrida’s “deconstruction,” which, admittedly, does not necessarily imply that concepts are meaningless altogether, but at least that they have multiple—and sometimes conflicting—meanings. See, among many other possible examples: J. Derrida, Limited Inc (Northwestern University Press, 1977), 61-62. See also Vattimo’s “weak thinking” proposal which tends to lead to equivocal positions, e.g. in: G. Vattimo and P.A. Rovatti, Il Pensiero Debole (Feltrinelli, 2010); G. Vattimo, A Farewell to Truth (Columbia University Press, 2013), 7-13.
no additional meaning other than the name of the game. An equivocal term is one with more than
one possible interpretation: it is ambiguous. For instance “case,” which may mean “example,”
“circumstance,” “set of arguments,” “difficulty,” “eccentric person,” “container,” “legal action,” “set
of grammatical categories,” etc. Note that one of the meanings does not always keep a link, even
remote, with other meanings.

In upcoming paragraphs I will explain analogical terms. But before I would like to mention what
Beuchot’s purpose is in undertaking these distinctions. His idea is to break the impasse between
the rigid ontology of modernity (univocality of interpretation) and the wobbly relativity of
postmodernity (equivocality of interpretation). Clearly his intent goes beyond texts and embraces
reality and different fields of knowledge.36 From the beginning, it occurred to me that his method
could be of great value for dealing with the problem of unity and diversity in Europe. But I did not
realise its full potential until the end of my research, to the point that I would advance analogical
hermeneutics, one of the original contributions of my work to the field of the social and political
philosophy of EU studies.

Analogical hermeneutics has one of its roots in Paul Ricoeur’s interpretative model based on
metaphor. Beuchot points out, however that metaphor is only one of the many forms of analogy.
Metonym, for instance, is another.37 Analogical hermeneutics, through proportionality, navigates
between two extremes: on the one hand univocal hermeneutics—typical of scientific positivism—
and on the other hand equivocal hermeneutics—common in postmodernity (or, as Beuchot calls it
sometimes, “late modernity”). Analogical hermeneutics is a form of meaning that is neither univocal (as is
the meaning of “platypus”) nor equivocal (as in that of “light,” which can be “medium of illumination
that makes sight possible”, “not heavy,” “not fattening,” etc.). An analogous term has a
referent and in any case always keeps some similarity with it, even if the similarity is very far from
the referent.38

Beuchot mentions several kinds of analogy: of simple inequality (as in “life,” which can be
vegetative, sensitive, or rational); of attribution (as in “healthy,” predicated properly of an
organism, and less properly of “healthy food”—in reality food that makes an organism healthy—or
a “healthy habit”—same reasoning); of proper proportionality (as in “instinct is to animals what
reason is to human beings”); of improper proportionality or metaphoric as in “flowers are to
meadows what smiling is to human beings”).39 Note how the first kind of analogy just reviewed is
closer to univocality and the last one is closer to equivocality.

Beuchot’s method has as another of its sources Charles Sanders Peirce’s pragmatism, in
particular his concept of “abduction” which Beuchot uses to enhance his analogical
hermeneutics.40 He side with Peirce in asserting that there is a reality independent from a
conceptual frame—even if only knowable through such a frame—in disagreement with Kant.41 He
positions himself as a “relative relativist,” since analogical hermeneutics pulls away from
univocality, hence relativising truth (especially our possibility of knowing it fully), but only to a

36 Beuchot, En El Camino De La Hermenéutica Analógica, 16-17.
37 “La Naturaleza De La Hermenéutica Analógica,” in La Hermenéutica Analógica, Hacia Un Nuevo Orden De
Racionalidad: Círculo De Hermenéutica, Diálogos Con Mauricio Beuchot, ed. Alejandro Gutiérrez Robles (Plaza y
38 Ibid., 11-12. Note that some of the examples necessarily change as words that are equivocal or univocal in the
original Spanish may not be so in English. So “vela” in Spanish may mean “candle,” “sail,” “wake.” The explanation of
the concept however does not change even if the examples are different.
40 See, among other sources: M. Beuchot, Estudios Sobre Peirce Y La Escolástica (Servicio de Publicaciones de la
41 “La Naturaleza De La Hermenéutica Analógica,” 15.
certain degree, therefore not subscribing completely with the “absolute relativity” of equivocal positions.

Beyond Apel’s transcendental pragmatics and Putnam’s conceptual frame, there is a reality that exists and can be known—even if under ideal conditions. However, just as Putnam and Apel claim to have been inspired by Peirce for their theories of truth as consensus and of pragmatic realism—respectively, so Beuchot says to have taken inspiration from Peirce to present a way of analogical universalisation. This happens within what Peirce calls abduction, abductive abstraction or hypostatic universalisation: a hypothesis presented to others in order to be tested; an iconic hypothesis, nevertheless, since its truth does not depend on mere convention, but on its representation (however imperfect) of reality.42

From the departing point in philology and epistemology, analogical hermeneutics has been developed and applied to a number of fields in the humanities, social sciences and culture,43 such as philosophical anthropology,44 legal philosophy,45 political philosophy,46 human rights,47 philosophy of history,48 and psychoanalysis,49 among others. It has not been applied to the problem of political unity and identity, and even less to the case of the EU. It is a contention in the Series that analogical hermeneutics can bring fresh insights and approaches to the problem of the EU’s political unity on its varied facets.

Before showing how I use analogical hermeneutics along the Series—for it is a tool to deal with every topic developed in it—I would first like to illustrate briefly how Beuchot himself applies his concept to three well known areas of study in social and political philosophy. The first one is the discussion between formal and material ethics. The second one regards the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. The third one is an interesting analysis that he undertakes on the notions of prudence in Aristotle, reflective judgement in Kant, and reflective equilibrium in Rawls.50

First example: in the context of the renewed interest in the connection between ethics and politics (which is relatively obvious in Classical and Medieval philosophy, but relatively foreign in Modern philosophy from the Renaissance onwards), Beuchot speaks about a contest between “justice” and “the good” similar to that between formal v material ethics.

Formal ethics, contrary to its initial promise, eventually ends up adopting at least some material, axiological contents. Contemporary formal ethics, for instance discursive ethics (Habermas, Apel), is full of logical, methodological, ontological and anthropological assumptions—of a substantive or “material nature”.51 In agreement with Dussel, Beuchot mentions as some of those material elements the value of life, and respect for others.52 And drawing from Lévinas, Beuchot

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42 Ibid., 15 - 16.
43 Puente Hermenéuticos Hacia Las Humanidades Y La Cultura [Hermeneutical Bridges towards the Humanities and Culture] (México, D. F.: Eón-Universidad Iberoamericana, 2006).
44 M. Beuchot, Antropología Filosófica: Hacia Un Personalismo Analógico-Icónico (Fundación Emmanuel Mounier, 2004).
45 Mauricio Beuchot Puente, Filosofía Del Derecho, Hermanéutica Y Analogía (Universidad Santo Tomas).
46 M. Beuchot, Filosofía Política (Torres, 2006).
47 Mauricio Beuchot, Interculturalidad Y Derechos Humanos [Interculturality and Human Rights], Filosofía (México, D. F.: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México; Siglo XXI, 2005); M. Beuchot, Filosofía Y Derechos Humanos: (Los Derechos Humanos Y Su Fundamentación Filosófica) (Siglo XXI, 2004).
48 M. Beuchot and Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Hermenéutica Analógica Y Filosofía De La Historia: Del Fragmento Como Símbolo Del Todo (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2011).
49 J. Tubert-Oklander and M. Beuchot, Hermenéutica Analógica Y Psicoanálisis (Torres Asociados, 2008).
50 All of them taken from his book on political philosophy: Beuchot, Filosofía Política.
51 Ibid. Chapter 5: “Hermanéutica y política”.
points out how a person can only enter in dialogue with someone else if the other one is prepared to respect their life, if he is not going to kill them. Other presuppositions have to follow: for instance that the other one is not lying and that in the discussion she will follow some rules of logic or argumentation.53

But the link between formal and material ethics does not go in one direction only. Consider the most basic material element: that of respecting each other’s life. “Life” has to be defined: there is biological life, but also concepts as “good life,” or “quality of life”. These notions have to be discussed through deliberation and argumentative dialogue, in other words making use of formal ethics.

Neither is formal ethics exempt of material or axiological contents, nor can material ethics claim complete independence from formal ethics to clarify its axiological contents. From an analogical hermeneutics perspective, confluence of those two partial positions ends up in a more comprehensive point of view that includes both.54 I could develop a little further that in this case univocality would be given by material ethics; equivocality, by formal ethics. Analogical hermeneutics would see both as part of ethics, considering that some elements are material and cannot be ignored; while other elements are formal and are built discursively. In the end, both positions have learned from and enriched each other.

The second example concerns the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. Analogical hermeneutics will attempt a balance, taking each position to their limit—to their “proportional limit”—in order to attain harmony, so that liberalists recognise some community rights and communitarians give full importance to individual (human) rights. The way to achieve such a harmonious new situation is through the analogical exercise of prudence or phronesis, in order to discover where conflicting positions can be compatible and how to attain the lesser pain or loss to each of them when some loss is unavoidable. Such “proportional balance” attained through phronesis (Beuchot calls it “analogy in action”) brings about justice.55

Analogical hermeneutics should then bear both proportional freedom and proportional equality. Proportional freedom would mean that always, within the framework of the rule of law, individuals should be allowed to enhance their potential, their skills, their effort, and to be in that way different from others to a certain extent (for instance in the amount of wealth they accumulate). At the same time, proportional equality would translate into minimum life standards for all people (a minimum wage perhaps), welfare for the less fortunate in society (those suffering from sickness, accidents, a troublesome family situation, or an unfortunate upbringing). Funding for those needs could come from (reasonable) taxation of the most fortunate in society, with incentives or offsets in case they undertake solidarity initiatives to help others.

Beuchot brings to mind that the third postulate of the French Revolution—fraternity—is often overlooked: unlike freedom and equality, fraternity could be, in Beuchot’s mind, the key to mediating between and harmonising liberal and communitarianism.56 At any rate, the process of harmonising is again a task for analogical hermeneutics, with univocality being an unchecked communitarian position, and equivocality an unchecked liberal (individualistic) stand. Following Gadamer,57 Beuchot emphasises again that the way to interpret a reality in order to achieve its improvement is phronesis or political prudence.58

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53 Beuchot, Filosofía Política, Chapter 5.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., Chapter 5: Hermenéutica y política.
56 Ibid.
58 Beuchot, Filosofía Política, Chapter 5: Hermenéutica y política.
A third example of analogical hermeneutics at work can be the following. Closely connected with the debate between liberalism and communitarianism are the ideas of one of the most prominent political philosophers of the XX century, John Rawls. In the discussion regarding the power of the state vis-à-vis that of the individuals or civil society, Beuchot compares Aristotle’s concept of prōnēsia (practical or moral wisdom), with Kant’s reflective judgement, and Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, finding some parallels. Phronēsia in Aristotle ponders what is good in different possible actions. Through reflection (deliberation with oneself) and deliberation (with others), a prudential judgement is arrived at, which illuminates the best course of action. Phronēsia is therefore essential for moral and political life: it is in Aristotle’s system of ideas practical wisdom, the wisdom that is concrete and contingent (changing). It changes therefore according to circumstances, and it always depends on the context.

Kant’s reflective judgement is a regulative ideal which balances different courses of action in tension with each other. For Beuchot, the reflective judgement—along with Kant’s conceptions on teleology and aesthetics—deals with the dimension of the concrete. This dimension could remain on the merely subjective realm (as is the case with judgements of taste). Yet the reflective judgement also has the capacity to acquire universality through the atmosphere that the conditions of possibility of action provide. And through the categorical imperative, this possibility extends not only to individual but also moral action. Since individual action, once it fulfils that maxim, comes to acquire objective and universal validity. Kant’s reflective judgement presents a systematic regulative ideal, which can pass from partial actions to a systematic practicality.

Beuchot sees a close relation between the former two kinds of judgement (Aristotle’s judgement of practical wisdom and Kant’s reflective judgement), with Rawls’s reflective equilibrium. As seen above, the validity of the aesthetic judgement is subjective, yet it becomes objective through the fulfilment of the maxim or categorical imperative of objectivity or universality in the individual action. In other words, individual action should be able to be universalised through what Kant called “enlarged mentality”. In Beuchot’s view Rawls builds on Kant’s enlarged mentality and understands his reflective equilibrium as a mediator, combining teleology and autonomy for the achievement of justice and of a good life (since Rawls seeks to integrate duty and happiness). As Arendt had done in her own way, Rawls combines Aristotle and Kant and sees their theories not as opposing but complementary.

62 Beuchot, Filosofía Política, Chapter 6: Estado de derecho y sociedad.
64 Which for Arendt opened the way “to a revaluation of judgment as a specific political ability, namely, as the ability to think” representatively, “that is, as the ability to think in the place of everyone else”. “Hannah Arendt.” Kant presents this idea in the section corresponding to sense of community in The Critique of Judgement. See an introduction to the idea on: Garrath Williams, ”Kant’s Account of Reason,” in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (2013).
Beuchot concludes that phronesis is the sense of balance and measurement we give our actions. Phronesis provides an idea of proportion, of the amount of strength that must be given to actions conducive to the good. Reflective judgment, in its turn, seeks for a balance or mediation in actions, so that they do not remain in a particular, individual good or taste, but rather enlarge its scope in order to achieve the common good. And reflective equilibrium combines, again, concreteness and universality, principles and contingency. Aristotelian phronesis—Beuchot concludes—is proportional; it is analogy put into practice. Kantian reflective judgment is, similarly, an exercise in weighing or proportionality, of “living analogy”. And Rawlsian reflective equilibrium seeks to moderate, nuance and bring proportion to the discussion on distributive justice. Even Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” is a resource to universalise, through the use of analogy or similarity, in order to connect to the position of the others with whom one is in dialogue.

Though the use of analogical hermeneutics will become clearer in the following sections, here I would like to sketch out how the method is used on the main parts of the Series, namely the problem of unity, the content of unity, the language for unity, the stage for unity, and the building of unity.

Regarding the problem of unity in the EU, one possible extreme view could be that of regarding Europe as one country or even one nation (univocality). Political control becomes central. A common language is chosen either by a majority of native speakers inside the EU (with German as a possible winner) or by a majority of non-native speakers (perhaps English). A single banking, finance, fiscal and monetary system is adopted.

On the other extreme (equivocality) Europe is dismembered so that countries (member states) stand by themselves and if anything carry out some trade with each other and cooperate occasionally on issues such as educational exchange or military alliances. Each of them keeps their own language and manages their own internal and external-internal affairs. The euro is dismantled and each country assumes responsibility for its own fiscal, financial, and social problems.

Those positions do not exist as such, but some come very close, with the EU becoming an international organisation for trade (on the equivocal side) or a federal state (on the univocal one). In the series I use analogical hermeneutics to propose a kind of unity that translates into a polity (the EU at present is one, after all), away from a loose international organisation. At the same time I argue that the EU should not become a state. That would go too far towards univocality.

The initial assumption about the intrinsic value of the peoples of Europe (and their culture and language) provides a framework in which unity is promoted to allow their protection, but enough freedom is maintained so that they may continue to flourish in their diversity (see above). The main referent of unity is a state, with the EU interpreted only in an analogical way, as a quasi-state—short of becoming one—and yet maintaining links that hold the peoples of Europe (at least those in the EU) together.

I try to approach in a similar way the related matter of political belonging symbolised by “Citizenship of the Union,” a concept that seems even more difficult to grasp than the already abstract question about the political form, the regime (kind of polity) of the EU. As I try to show in Cosmopolitan Communitarian and above all in Political Identity, analogical hermeneutics proves

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especially adept to deal with this particular problem. Indeed, EU citizenship is like state citizenship but not quite. On the univocal side citizenship is directly related to a concrete state. (Hence the EU should become a state.) On the equivocal side EU “citizens” are already citizens of their respective states—in fact EU citizenship can be granted only to nationals of member states. EU citizenship is therefore superfluous.

Yet from the point of view of analogical hermeneutics, EU citizenship is an analogical way of interpreting (or understanding) citizenship. The main or original referent is belonging to a “city” (polis), i.e. ordinary state citizenship, for instance citizenship of the sovereign state of Portugal (officially the “Portuguese Republic”). With this in mind, the univocal conception would be one of citizenship of, say, the “United States of Europe”.69 The equivocal understanding would have space for no EU citizenship at all. The analogical perspective presents EU citizenship as placed along the spectrum between univocality and equivocality.

Political belonging to the EU can be viewed then as a weaker form of citizenship—in part similar to “proper” citizenship but in part different—but nevertheless not devoid of meaning. It is a subordinated belonging in comparison with “national” (member state) affiliation, but still existing and real. It is possible to be a citizen of the Romanian state and of the European polity. And “citizenship” in either case may mean something different—if not completely unrelated. I developed this explanation in Political Identity.70

As for the “content” of unity, its substance, its binding force, along the series I have called it “European identity”. Its specific nature has been and continues to be debated. Its result from the institutional point of view is political unity. And from the social perspective one of its clear fruits is solidarity or civic friendship. At the beginning of my research I found several definitions of what European identity was—and positions about what it should be. Often they were in conflict with each other. Analogical hermeneutics was useful here to analyse each of the different claims, assess their validity and attempt harmonisation with the other positions. In the end I proposed an analogical identity which took elements from each of the stands on the subject, ordered them and gave a more comprehensive and nuanced view of European identity—one which could take part of each position without having to renounce to the contributions of other positions.

Analogical hermeneutics also appears in the treatment of a difficult problem closely connected with the building of identity (and therefore with the attainment of political unity): political culture. In Worth Fighting71 I argue that culture in general and political culture in particular was not an issue in the foundational years of the European communities. But the reason was not that it is not important in the formation of identity and the consolidation of unity in any successful polity. In Liberal Democracy72 I try to show how even the apparently more value-aseptic political organisation—liberal democracy—possesses some implicit values that make its existence possible and without which it would collapse.

Rather, the reason was that political culture was very similar among the first six member states; similar enough not to be an issue. As the European communities grew into a Community and then a Union, the cultural diversity of the peoples inhabiting the member states grew too. Immigration has only accelerated this process. Social and political cohesion have become more challenging, to put it mildly.73 Culture—that set of elements expressed in language that convey a

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70 Jiménez Lobeira, “EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems.”
71 “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited.”
72 “Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe.”
73 One recent example is the riots that occurred in one of the most open, tolerant, and welcoming countries in the EU, Sweden. See: Richard Orange, “Swedish Riots Spark Surprise and Anger,” The Guardian/The Observer(2013), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/may/25/sweden-europe-news.
way of life and a world view, an at least tentative answer to the search for meaning that every human being experiences—influences not only the social texture but also the political one. It is obvious why: the _politeia_ (polity) is conformed of _politai_ (citizens). And citizens are human beings, therefore inevitably susceptible to having a culture, to being cultural in this sense.

To this situation I bring again analogical hermeneutics in the form of relational interculturalism in the social atmosphere and secularity in the public sphere. Relational interculturalism will be explained in more detail in the last section (below). But the role of analogical hermeneutics is to mediate and harmonise between two extremes.

On the univocal side, monoculturalism is the idea that new, culturally different citizens should conform to the culture of the host polity. In order to belong, they must leave their own culture (as defined above, including their worldview and their language) and assimilate to the culture of their new country. Different forms of ostracism or outright expelling from society follow if the newly arrived do not assimilate.

On the equivocal side is multiculturalism, understood as the push towards diversity with a peculiar view of tolerance, meaning respect so that each group can develop in their own culture. Groups compete for recognition, minorities grow vocal. Society becomes more fractured, as tolerance of groups with particular cultural backgrounds brings respect but little interaction. In the extreme, parallel societies inhabit the one polity, with undesirable results.

The referent for an analogical interpretation (hermeneutics) of this situation is culture. Analogical hermeneutics tends more towards the equivocal side, but without renouncing the referent, i.e. a culture for the polity. This political culture cannot be a strong one—as monoculturalism would have it. But it is not a fragmented landscape of parallel cultures either. Relational interculturalism creates a way for different cultures not only to tolerate each other, but to mix to a certain degree; something that Beuchot (when speaking about the problem) has called _mestizaje_ (blending).

The terms should be no surprise as the particular context of his analysis concerns the co-existence, dialogue and blending to a certain degree of different strands of Mexican culture and society that were once different but which over half a millennium have become a more or less stable feature of the country's (its groups' and individuals') character. “Western” (European) culture was conveyed mainly by Spain at the height of its power in the XVI century, but thereafter is also derived from English culture (directly from Britain or indirectly through the United States), and French culture.

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74 The term inspired in Donati’s _relational sociology_, has been exposed in a copious literature. Prominent titles in English are: Pierpaolo Donati, “Beyond the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism: Recognition through ‘Relational Reason’,” _International Review of Sociology_ 19, no. 1 (2009). And also: _Relational Sociology: A New Paradigm for the Social Sciences_ (Taylor & Francis, 2010).

75 And the human being, “an analogically blended creature” (“un mestizo análogo”). Beuchot, _Interculturalidad Y Derechos Humanos_, 92.

76 Two examples are the influence of the United States in Mexico’s federal system, which was never the natural organisation Mexico had had in the past, but that was imposed by the governing elites in the XIX century. Admittedly often with shame for many Mexicans who learn about it, the official name of the republic is “United States of Mexico”. The other example is the French influence regarding the specific style of arrangement in the public sphere. Mexico’s political culture shadows closely that of France, confusing two different features of the public sphere—what here I have distinguished as secularity and secularism. In a country with an overwhelmingly religious citizenry, up to the end of the XX century, the Mexican Constitution, in Article 130 stated that: “[Mexican] law does not recognise any personality whatsoever to the religious organisations called churches.” Congreso Constituyente, “Constitución Política De Los Estados Unidos Mexicanos” (5 February 1917 1917). As with many other historically rooted issues, a balanced perspective about both Mexico’s federal system and the setting of its public sphere cannot be acquired without knowledge of the historical reasons—and excesses—that gave way to certain legislations and to the political regime. Such weighting escapes the goals and field of my thesis. Excellent literature to this respect is, however, not
European culture entered in contact sometimes violent, sometimes respectful and productive, with pre-European cultures (some of which survive to this day—the language of the Aztecs, Nahuatl, still counts around two million speakers in Mexico, Central America and Southern United States). This subject is highly relevant in most of Latin America, as a region of the world which seeks on the one hand to develop (and therefore adopt more western ways such as for instance democracy and economic growth) while on the other hand keeping its cultural diversity and its cultural mix alive and flourishing.77

Though I take from Beuchot the idea of analogical hermeneutics to attempt tackling the cultural problem, my study differs from his in at least two counts. Firstly, his analysis is focused on the conflict between the western culture that largely informs Latin American culture today, and the cultures of peoples who were there before the arrival of the Europeans, which have mixed to a certain extent with them, and yet remain in other ways distinct and independent from the main, dominant western culture. My application, though concerned with peoples that have been in Europe for a long time (for instance the Roma people), is trying to address mainly the pressing difficulties that have arisen from immigration. Note how the French riots of 2005, the English riots of 2011 and the Swedish riots of 2013 have been associated, at least partially, with the situation of immigrants in the respective countries (lack of opportunities, social exclusion, and others).78

The second difference in my application of analogical hermeneutics to the intercultural problem is the additional charge of tension in the problem of immigration caused by the newly arrived European residents’ (some having attained citizenship, some remaining in a civic limbo even for two or three generations, like large groups of Turks in Germany) cultural background with unmistakable religious tints. The level that this feature reaches in Europe has no equal in the Latin American situation. Why religion causes so much scandal in a subcontinent that throughout history has been deeply religious is an interesting matter that I try to address mainly in Rethinking Neutrality and in Worth Fighting.79 It is also commented on in the corresponding section below.
Let for the moment the idea suffice that cultural stands, worldviews concerned with meaning (of life and the afterlife, of suffering, of the material and immaterial realms, of what a good life is, and other such metaphysical questions) can either be religious or secular. For as long as people holding religious or secular views know that theirs is a belief system—which for them provides the best explanation and light to their search for meaning which however may not be accepted by others—and as long as they acknowledge that respect, dialogue, and mutual learning is the way ahead, a constructive atmosphere will prevail. When, however, people possessing a particular religious or secular worldview believe themselves to have the only possible answer, and exclude from the public sphere or mainstream society those who think differently, then a big problem arises.

Undeniably, different brands of religion (and in particular of the Christian religion) have been guilty in the past of intolerance and even persecution in Europe and elsewhere. Think of the importance that the founders of the United States of America confer to religious freedom, as part of their reasons to emigrate west was religious persecution in their original homeland, Britain or other European countries.

Notwithstanding, today there might be a different danger: that some might confuse secularity—the secular state and civic space that has been an achievement after hundreds of years and forms part of today's political culture of human rights (PCHR)—with secularism, and therefore ban people from mainstream society or exclude them from the public sphere on account of their culture being religious, or even only showing religious symbols as part of their identity. This is the case in the debate about banning people from universities or other public spaces just because they wear an Islamic veil.80

Analogical hermeneutics applied to the situation in Europe translates into a European cultural landscape that is on the one hand happy with the traditions, history and language of the peoples that have been (and remained) there for hundreds of years. In political culture, two powerful streams of richness in this sense are social democracy and Christian democracy, with corresponding parties that shaped the political culture Europe has today, also if Europe is thought of as only the EU. The result has been what I call the PCHR (see corresponding section below).

On the other hand, analogical hermeneutics means openness to the “new” cultural traditions including Islam.81 The process is not easy. But it needs more than just “respect” or “tolerance”. It requires nuanced engagement in both directions. This is what relational interculturalism brings about. And it entails necessarily facing a connected issue which must be dealt with as a task for analogical hermeneutics too: inclusiveness in the public sphere.

Though I treat to some extent the issue of the public sphere in Worth Fighting,82 Cultural Riddles83 and Liberal Democracy,84 it is in Rethinking Neutrality85 where I analyse this issue in greater depth with contributions to the discussion in the field that I shall explain further on. But here too analogical hermeneutics can be seen at work. The public sphere would be univocal when only one voice can be heard. Any belief system—be it religious or secularist—with

80 This matter is discussed at length in Rethinking Neutrality: “Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe.”
81 Islam, of course, is not new in Europe. Among the many pieces of evidence to attest it, consider that a big portion of today’s Portugal and Spain conquered and named “Al-Andalus,” a Muslim state established as early as the VIII century and existent until the very year in which Columbus arrived on the American continent (1492).
83 “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific.”
84 “Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe.”
pretension of exclusivity will create a univocal atmosphere in the public sphere. An equivocal situation would be one in which anyone has a voice without needing a connection with the others; a situation very likely to make “Babel” of the public sphere. And a very dangerous one, for real dialogue can be hardly attained.

The analogical situation will come if no voice is allowed to dominate excluding others (univocality). The different voices can express themselves in their particular opinions as much as possible, while the public sphere still maintains a common link that harmonises and serves as a means of communication. This element is secularity (which in the paper I distinguish from secularism to bring clarity to the debate on “the problem of religion”). Though I do not agree completely with Habermas in his outline, I use it as a grounding point, and complement it with contributions from Casanova, Taylor and Weiler, among others. Secularity is defined as an open atmosphere, a more or less neutral—or at least inclusive—medium, where views from different belief systems or worldviews can be expressed about the things concerning the polity. A medium, finally, that is not a belief system itself (therefore it is distinguished from secularism).

Secularity allows a plurality of voices, maintaining certain common elements through very basic rules and attitudes that must be followed by all. At the same time secularity is not one of the voices—a worldview—itself. It is in that sense a more or less neutral platform, an open framework for the different views to express themselves, while remaining a platform, not an agglomeration of parallel discourses.

A polity where every voice were respected and listened to seriously; where cultural diversity were valued; and where everybody was enthusiastic about unity; would still need a common language, even if one of sorts. In Cosmopolitan Communitarian I acknowledged that problem and explored a few options at the level of speculation. Concretely I pondered the possible value of Pera’s proposal about a “civic religion” for Europe, hypothetically fulfilling the needed role of common language. The idea however has shortcomings that come more clearly to light by applying analogical hermeneutics to this particular problem, also relevant and indeed essential for the main concern of the Series, the question about European political unity. The analysis becomes easier now that we have touched on the issue of the public sphere.

As I have explained (above), analogical hermeneutics aids understanding of the intricacies of the religion and secularism debate, and takes us to a situation where poles can be harmonised to a

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86 Admittedly, due to lack of space, I do not spell out the analogical hermeneutics analysis in the paper.

87 Which, in a similar way to what happens with the “Muslim problem,” can be misleading. The “Muslim” problem is in reality the problem that some in Europe have in accepting the relevance that Islam has for a significant number of European residents. Likewise, the “problem of religion” is the problem that some have with religious views or practices, or even appearances, as in the discussion around the Islamic veil, that for some European residents or citizens are meaningful or even deeply relevant.

88 For instance in his view about the language that has to be used in public debate. All religious categories for him, while having access to the political stage, must translate their claims into a language that everybody can understand. That common language is assumed to be secular. Admittedly, Habermas assigns to secular citizens the task of helping religious citizens “translate” their discourse into secular categories. Yet I do not see why, in a public sphere that is secular but not secularist, translations could occur in both directions. Under a relational interculturalist paradigm, secular citizens could be influenced by religious ones as much as religious citizens could be influenced by secular ones. The relationship goes both ways. There might be concepts in the secular language that enrich religious language, but there might be religious concepts too with no equivalent (no translation) in the secular language, that could however enrich it. But this is a task for further research, as I outline in: Jiménez Lobeira, “Conclusion: Europe United in Diversity — an Analogical Hermeneutics Contribution to the Social and Political Philosophy of the European Union”.

89 Because the analogical tool in this case is related to “secular,” it becomes acutely important that the terms “secularity” and “secularism” are properly defined and distinguished from each other. I take this task in Rethinking Neutrality and summarise it in this paper, in the section about the public sphere (below).

certain degree. I have called that situation “secularity,” defined as an open-frame atmosphere. Throughout my research I have come to think that a religion—even a civil one like Pera’s—is not a wise option if we visualise the belief-system spectrum with analogical hermeneutics.

The analysis differs from the one before in that we are not considering the spectrum of, on the one hand, a belief-system or worldview in (exclusive) charge of the public sphere—a belief-system that could be religious or secularist—and on the other hand a complete absence of order, with voices sounding in parallel and basically no dialogue in the public sphere.

Rather, the spectrum runs between two radically opposed belief-systems. Borrowing Taylor’s terminology we could call it the immanence-transcendent spectrum.91 On the one hand we have the univocality of an immanalist position—a position, this is, that states there is no other option apart from immanence (holding what Taylor calls a closed frame). On the other hand we have the equivocality of transcendent positions, offering each in its own way a connection with a divinity or a transcendent state, something that escapes the immanence of the here and now in which western societies largely live (Taylor’s “immanent frame”). Positions, at the same time, that point towards something difficult or impossible to define in “simple” (secular) words, and in the extreme, incapable of dialogue and compromise, Otto’s ganz Andere (the “wholly Other”).92

Along the spectrum there is a large number of people who are neither immanalist nor transcendentalist. As Davie has shown, most people in today’s Europe rather live somewhere along that spectrum.93 That is Taylor’s view too. Analogical hermeneutics will pull gently away from univocality, along the spectrum towards equivocality, but mindful of still keeping some unity of meaning. With analogical hermeneutics, a situation can be conceived which keeps weak resemblance with a clearly univocal position on immanence, yet with openness to the possibility of transcendence in different degrees. Note that along the spectrum there is space too for those—perhaps a majority—who do not have strong views in favour of immanence or transcendence, and prefer to regard the topic with a drop of scepticism—or simply indifference.

Under this scenario, it becomes easier to see why a religion of any kind could not be an element of unity in analogical hermeneutics terms. It would mean a position in one of the extremes of the immanence-transcendence spectrum, trying to impose (or sell) itself to all. Beuchot notes that (I would say paradoxically and perhaps ironically) in the extreme, univocality and equivocality sometimes coincide. This would be true of an extreme immanalist position or an extreme transcendentalist position. Both would contain the less attractive features of “religious” when that word is used to designate fanatic attitudes.94

94 For all their mutual animosity, religious and secularists fanatics may end up with very similar views about “the other”. Not even a “religion without God” would be advisable. Besides, from a common sense point of view, a religion could not in practice be inclusive of all. If it were “civic” as Pera wants, why bother calling it “religion” and put off so many citizens that are sceptical or even have an aversion—justified or not—towards it? Besides, the concept would put off even that camp supposed to feel sympathy for it, the religious one. For they could argue that such arrangement is but a caricature of religion (therefore showing disregard for the many citizens that are religious in different ways; or that religion should not be used as an instrument to temporary affairs; or that religion and politics must be separated to keep each other in check, rather than mixed. As I have shown in (Jiménez Lobeira, “Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe.”), a similar set of contradictions faces Beck’s “god of one’s own” idea. Finally, Pera’s idea is a “Christian civil religion” which brings one more degree of complexity to the issue, as religious citizens who are not Christian could feel excluded to a certain extent—think of Jewish and Muslim citizens for instance. Pope Benedict, Without Roots : The West,
If, however, a civil religion appears problematic as a candidate for the common language that the European polity needs to build its identity and unity, I argue that the political culture of human rights (PCHR) is a much more adept candidate. And so in this section it remains to be shown how analogical hermeneutics contributes to the understanding of this political culture as a common language for Europe.

Language is a vehicle of expression. It reveals ways of life, history, experiences, and worldviews. It communicates artistic creativity, technology, and opinions. Language could be seen as pure convention or as map of reality. Probably it is both. When we consider the Polish language, it is not only a system of symbols but a window into peoples who write, sing, discuss, trade, debate, teach and play using it. It is an entry to the realm of Slavic peoples. There are expressions, sayings, jokes, poems, that strictly speaking cannot be translated into another language without losing nuances that will only shine fully in Polish.

I do not pretend that the PCHR can be a language in the sense that Polish is a language. But I claim (see corresponding section below) that PCHR can connect Europeans, and express what the peoples of Europe are and think, to an extent sufficient enough to have a shared identity (if weaker than the one experienced among those who speak a common language, like Polish) and to aid European unity. But the explanation becomes simpler with the aid of analogical hermeneutics.

The PCHR inspired and motivated a growing body of positive law already existing in the EU and the Council of Europe.95 The reason why I do not speak simply of human rights, but of a PCHR is precisely to distinguish between the positive body of laws already in place with an institution in charge of interpreting and applying them the judiciary, and the original inspiration that made them be accepted in general terms by all state members of the EU and by many other European states. There is a shared awareness in Europe that does not exist in other parts of the world.96 An awareness shaped by common historical and sometimes dramatic experiences that are unique.

PCHR resembles a language, a vehicle of expression that reveals the culture of the people who “speak” it. But PCHR is not a language in the stronger sense of the word, the one given by the main or univocal referent, for instance Danish. It is rather analogical: less strong in its capacity for expression, yet more ductile, flexible and porous to accommodate different peoples and cultures, both those who have been in Europe since the beginnings of the European communities, and those who have arrived recently through immigration. PCHR can harmonise and receive contributions from every EU country, as well as from the historically strong political culture streams of Social Democracy, with roots in the Enlightenment, and Christian Democracy (which in turn has roots in Judeo-Christianity). But it can also stretch and receive new cultural influences in politics such as that of Islam.

Once again, PCHR is not the body of positive laws that today serve as reference to either the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights in the exercise of their specific

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96 This is not to say that it cannot exist somewhere else (other “western” democracies for instance).
work. PCHR is rather the inspiration behind them, an inspiration not very different from that which originated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations.

Therefore, using analogical hermeneutics, we are talking of PCHR as an analogical language. A language not equivalent to the body of positive laws today in use at the EU and in wider Europe (laws which may continue to multiply and which may be closer to or further away from the original values which inspired them). The original values in all of their purity could be the univocal end. The positive laws that multiply and may at some point contradict each other are the equivocal side. PCHR is an analogical way between one extreme and the other.

As I have tried to show, analogical hermeneutics runs through the whole Series, on each of the topics. It provides insights on how to conciliate between very different facets in a variety of problems. Unity, identity, political culture, and human rights can all be understood in a different way, and acquire new light by using this method.

Having reviewed in the first section the problem of European political unity and in this second section the general approach to the matter, the question about how and where to ground unity—the question about political identity must be undertaken. This is what I intend next.

The key to political unity: political identity

There is extensive literature about “European identity”. European identity is associated with “source of unity” for the polity. When I first tried to form for myself a general idea about it, I realised the complexity of the task. Even before getting to the second part of the term, the first one presented incredible problems. European is an adjective whose noun is Europe. But what is Europe? Not even geographically can it be defined neatly, as America (the American Continent, one huge piece of land surrounded by water and only divided by an artificial channel in Panama) or Antarctica. Besides “identity,” from the Latin “the same” can have a host of different meanings which vary depending on the field of study, from mathematics to metaphysics, from sociology to politics, from psychology to cultural studies, and of course political science and political philosophy.

Months after I started a literature review on the topic I was able to find certain patterns under which the many articles on the subject could be classified. Building on the work of researchers who had undertook this classification I took a few streams which would be pertinent for my own research. They must concern my field of interest—the social and political philosophy of European studies—and provide some answer to the main problem of my research, namely the political unity of Europe. In Normative Conceptions I carried out a conceptual analysis of the problem of European political identity, and of some of its more important aspects (political form, political culture, and political community). Over three articles on the subject I reviewed the terminology to designate each of the positions on European identity. Following some reflection I came to think that perhaps the most accurate names for the five “normative conceptions” could be “cultural,” “legal,” “social,” “international” and “cosmopolitan.”

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98 “Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach; “EU Analogue Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding); “EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems; “Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe.”

99 “EU Analogue Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding); “Normative Conceptions of European Identity - a Synthetic Approach.” The other article preceded Normative Conceptions and was published in the Proceedings of a conference in Sydney, but is not included in the Series.
They first one refers to the cultural heritage that is common to Europeans from different regions, and that includes elements like history, geography, religion, and art. The second one refers to the law which arguably all Europeans contribute to form. The third conception regards economic and social benefits, summarised as "the European way of life". The fourth looks at how Europe can have an influence in the international arena, and an image as a "normative power". Finally the fifth conception attempts to present cosmopolitanism as the feature that can unite Europeans.100

As much as all of them contain arguments to favour their case, each of them faces significant objections: Europe’s cultural heritage cannot determine—and it may be radically different from—cultural trends today, especially if immigration is taken into consideration; there is no “European Constitution,” and the way in which the laws that bind European countries together follows a process that it would be a stretch to call democratic; the budget necessary to maintain the “European way of life,” the welfare system (short working weeks, long paid holiday periods, early retirement schemes...) are being revisited and shrink by the day; Europe’s international image can be at times laudable,101 but at others less dignified;102 and cosmopolitanism, if truthful, embraces the whole world and does not especially distinguish Europe from other cosmopolitanly-oriented regions of the world.103

After some thought I submitted the idea that European identity—if there is one—might be rather conceived as a synthesis, a combination of the definitions above. There is no need, I think, to choose the legal aspect of identity and discard the cosmopolitan one, or to choose the international one and discard the cultural one. When it comes to political identity, those positions can actually become features of a single European identity, perhaps less defined and strong, but still real and flexible to cater for diversity.

I arrived at that conclusion at the end of Normative Conceptions104 and undertook the task of outlining what European identity could look like in Analogical Identity.105 I showed how the different facets of identity not only did not conflict with each other, but on closer analysis complemented each other and become richer once combined. With the aid of analogical hermeneutics, each aspect was taken neither under a univocal interpretation which would exclude others, nor under an equivocal one which gave place to incommensurable, parallel positions. An analagical interpretation enriched them with some plasticity so that each of them could be combined and harmonised with the others.

But European identity, in the realm of political unity calls for at least two questions. The first one is: who are the putative bearers of such identity? And the second: what is the institutional result of their unity? I pursued the answer to these questions in Political Identity.106 To the first question, the answer was the citizens of the polity, or the EU citizens. Their citizenship derives from being citizens of an EU member state. The political community of EU citizens is, on closer examination,
a sort of conglomerate of member states’ citizens. They are not “a people,” but rather peoples. Not, using the Greek term, a demos but rather a group of demoi.

This first aspect of political identity presents a number of very serious conceptual and practical difficulties, which I introduced above in this exegetic introduction, but in sum having to do with the apparent contradiction of being citizen of two polities. In Political Identity the answer was a nuanced approach to citizenship, considering the possibility of subordinate affiliations, allowing for differentiated allegiances—the one to the member state stronger than the one to the EU, but with the latter still existing. Therefore a subordinate identity which entails a weaker unity than the state (main referent) makes sense from the perspective of analogical hermeneutics, and rather than being a problem it becomes a feature of a polity of polities like the EU is.

The answer to the second question—that regarding the EU polity not from the point of view of the peoples integrating it, but the entity as a whole—reveals a puzzle that along the years of its existence has captured the attention of many researchers: what exactly is the EU? It is a question about the telos or end, the goal of the EU as a whole, and its regime.

In Cosmopolitan Communitarian I surveyed three different positions on this question. The EU for some should lean towards an international, free trade organisation. It needs to loosen the already excessive ties between the member states. A second position (sustained, among others, by Jürgen Habermas) advocates a postnational federation—the United States of Europe—a fully-fledged federal state. The third position suggests a hybrid: a mixed-commonwealth—a term coined by Neil McCormick and explained and expanded by Joseph Weiler, Richard Bellamy and Rainer Bauböck among others.

If this third position is not new, its relevance has in my opinion grown as the other two have proven insufficient or inadequate for “the nature of the beast”. The EU, due to its composition by demoi and the way it was formed and has unfolded throughout the years, and due to the importance that diversity has in Europe as I have stressed above, the EU, I say, can better fulfill its purposes and its functions serving the peoples of Europe by continuing to be a stateless polity. What my thesis brings to the study of this position is an original conceptual framework to visualise a regime that could otherwise appear chaotic or at least dysfunctional, and as way to help a decision between the three models based on analogical hermeneutics.

Analogical hermeneutics provides a way to see the importance of each member state (and national groups inside them), and seek a type of unity that maintains national diversity as much as possible, while still having some links between the different national groups. This understanding helps to envisage a mixed-commonwealth not necessarily as a transition towards a federal state, but as a possible regime in itself.

The stateless polity also makes sense if one attends to the historical reasons that motivated the founders and designers of the European project at its beginnings. The two world wars in the first half of the last century contained a very incendiary ingredient often called nationalism, but which I purposely denote as “statism”. Throughout the Series I tried to signal how slippery the concept of “nation” is, and how it could be better pinned down by using the related notion of “state” (much more concrete and definable in legal terms). The “nationalism” that created confrontation and the near destruction of Europe—and other regions of the world—in the XX century, is more a use of the idea of nation by states, than a real

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107 In the section explaining analogical hermeneutics.
109 “Exploring Cosmopolitan Communitarianist EU Citizenship – an Analogical Reading.”
110 Perhaps a similar case is seen in the concepts of political identity and citizenship. See: “EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems,” 511.
confrontation between nations. In part because nations do not coincide with states—there can be several nations (Scotland, Wales, etc.) in a state (the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) or a nation may be scattered along several states (e.g. Romanians in Moldova, Italy, Spain, Germany). When a state appropriates the idea of a certain nation and uses it to depict others as enemies or as inferior (therefore despicable), then “nationalism” becomes dangerous. But the phenomenon is rather the promotion of a state masquerading as a nation.

To be sure, national groups do conflict with each other from time to time. But it is only when nationalism is taken as the official ideology, an instrument of propaganda for a state, that it becomes damaging and destructive. It was this exasperation of the state that took Europe to fight internally and to bleed nearly to death in the XX century. Perhaps: Weiler recognises this nuance, as he points out how ironic it would be for a project created precisely to keep the power of states in check (through supranational, that is, suprastatal, authorities but also consensus and negotiation—the “community method”) should end up producing a massive state.

Thus, an idea that evolved as the Series unfolded was that the important contrast when studying the EU’s regime is not between “federation” and “commonwealth,” but between “state,” and stateless polity. The opposition between “mixed-commonwealth” and “federation,” was therefore better rephrased as one between a stateless polity and a (presumably federal) state, because both regimes contain varying degrees of federation.

Suprastatism is an alternative to (state-) nationalism or postnationalism. As mentioned above, statism is the reality hidden in the more catchy term “nationalism.” It is no secret that at the height of “nationalism” in the first half of the XX century, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, and many other European countries were hosts to different national groups—an eminent (though not the only) one being the Jewish People. The war waged in the name of nation was in practice carried out by states. Perhaps it was not “the German nation” but rather the state of the Third Reich the one promoted and exalted via Nazi propaganda.

Today this reality becomes apparent when from time to time discussions about “minorities” are sparked in countries like Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Ukraine, Germany, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, or even Sweden. Those minorities are at times formed by linguistic groups of migrants to Europe, but often they are just national groups associated with neighbouring countries. State borders (take for instance those of Austria or Hungary) change with wars and other historical events. They do not always coincide with national groups. A state may host several national groups (say Welsh, Scots, Irish and English in the United Kingdom), and a national group can be spread along three or four countries (e.g. Catalans in France, Andorra and Spain).

Few people feel inspired by a state; many can be enthusiastic about a “nation”. In the XIX and XX century the hard sell (state) was dressed up with the much more appealing idea of nation. Yet, as mentioned above, wars were not fought between nations but between states. Robert Schumann, born in a region that historically has belonged to the states of Germany and France at different moments, understood this perfectly and from the beginning of the European project advocated for “supranationalism,” a concept that Weiler has grasped and developed. Supranationalism is a very important concept for understanding the notions of “mixed commonwealth,” and

112 That is still not clear in, for instance, “EU Citizenship and Political Identity: The Demos and Telos Problems,” 512. Yet it is better defined in [is something missing here?]
113 Ibid., 516.
115 Ibid., 8.
“community of states”. Along the Series I have reflected on the concept and come to deem it clearer if denominated suprastatism, to emphasise that it is intended to keep states in check.

Therefore the EU as it is today provides a way to harmonise different member states and their own state interests in an overarching political structure, which though suprastatal remains at the same time a non-state itself. The EU could be regarded as an “ugly duckling” case, characterised by an analogical telos (the mixed commonwealth) and an analogical demos (in reality a gathering of demoi sharing a weak common identity).\footnote{Ibid.}

Thus, political unity has its source in a common political identity, which is given on the one hand by the people that make up the political community—in the case of the EU the analogical demos integrated by several demoi from different member states—and in the other by a common regime, a political architecture that allows the different states and nations in the EU to form a stateless polity. But still the question remains about what can give sufficient cohesion to that polity in order to keep it together. Why the mixed-commonwealth regime and the political community of EU citizens will, for instance, be solidary with each other. This question takes us to the next section.

**The content of political identity: political culture**

Important normative premises outlined in this section are the value of national cultures (showcased by the corresponding languages) and the relevance of spiritual and moral values in the grounding of European identity.\footnote{Ibid., 513-14.}

According to Ratzinger, laws—even those attained democratically—can be unjust. Therefore neither democracy nor (positive law) by themselves can provide the standard for justice. A different point of reference, antecedent to positive law may be needed to provide such a standard. This antecedent has been called in different traditions “natural,” “people’s,” “moral” or “rational” law.\footnote{“Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe,” 45.}

Such antecedent conveys the idea that there is a more or less objective set of norms or juridical principles, manifest to all—even if in constant need of deepening, clarification and expression—that ground our everyday (positive) laws.\footnote{Ibid.} Human rights seem to be situated in this category of norms of principles. Even when not always enshrined in positive or quasi-positive law (charters), they are present in the original intuitions that inspired documents such as the Magna Carta Libertatum in England (1215), the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen in France (1789), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the European Convention of Human Rights (1950), among others.

For Habermas, legitimacy is generated by legality: if all citizens have participated in the elaboration of laws, or at least the core of all laws, the Constitution, the ensuing political system, and derived body of laws governing the state will be legitimate—accepted by all. Hence no source of authority or legitimacy is antecedent to the law.\footnote{Ibid., 49.} And yet, the source of the law—the political community integrated by people—is never in reality absent from cultural background and specific systems of belief. Each deliberant possesses a worldview that is normative and in this sense “moral”. Indeed, the law did not come into existence by itself, but was brought into existence by a body of people, the constituents or citizens, who in addition to being political agents are also human beings, and as such “cultured” (i.e. immersed in a specific culture—}
evident in their use of a particular language, for instance, and holding a certain worldview). Therefore the law possesses a moral antecedent or foundation.

When Ratzinger speaks of human rights he places them in the context of a law that is rational. Both secular and religious rationalities can and should participate in the human rationality of human rights which is universal, in the sense that it comprehends perhaps: every human being, individually and collectively.

Because of this, human rights potentially appeal to all and become a language of communication for every human being regardless of their particular cultural background, worldview or system of belief—whether religious or secular. Human rights would be, from this perspective, intrinsic human values, inherent to being human. These values (rights and duties) can be discovered, understood, and clarified, but not exactly invented. They are objective values, therefore, notwithstanding that they might always be imperfectly understood and subject to better understanding and explanation.

Yet human rights are regarded with varying degrees of acceptance in different parts of the world. For all the universality in their title they are in reality accepted without reserve primarily only in the West. In other words, a worldwide agreement on human rights is a long way off. Nevertheless, human rights can be common currency in smaller regions of the world, and it is advanced in the Series that the EU is one of such regions.

Now if “moral” (i.e. pre-positive) foundations are essential to successful democracies where human rights are upheld and the rule of law is the order of the day, then they should be considered as a plausible source of cohesion for the European Polity. In other words, the normative foundations for human rights, the rule of law (their guarantor), and democracy (their natural environment) are values held in all European countries (even if not fulfilled to the same extent in all of them) and are thus a source of mutual understanding. These values were present from the beginnings of integration.

For this reason I explored human rights as the possible common language of political culture, and a source of European political identity. Human rights (which imply also the rule of law and democracy) provide the content for a shared political culture in the EU. They constitute a common language which is recurrent throughout the Series.

This common language, with the potential to unify a very diverse polity runs from the first to the last article of the Series. Such language is in a way part of the content of European identity. Human rights are indeed a language capable of containing and expressing a common identity in the realms of culture, polity, the economy, international image, and cosmopolitanism.

The idea of human rights (and those related to democracy and the rule of law), when studied in their historical context, reveals itself as more than a purely formal concept. The political culture of human rights (PCHR) was born in a very specific normative ground rooted in Judaism, Christianity, and the Enlightenment. Today, human rights have been incorporated into the positive laws of all EU countries. But it should not be forgotten were they came from, in order to

122 Ibid., 51.
123 Ibid.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid., 46.
129 "Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe," 47.
avoid the illusion of thinking that these Western concepts are “value” free or devoid of any cultural background.\textsuperscript{130}

In fact human rights and its associated notions have sprung from (and at the same time constantly inform the content of) a political culture that pervades all of the EU member states. Awareness of an existing political culture in Europe (partly traceable back to religion) can help to deal with cultural (sometimes closely associated with religious) diversity, a situation (as mentioned above) caused by unprecedented immigration from other parts of the world and which has created tensions in the public sphere and a debate about the possibility of social cohesion in a more diverse Europe.\textsuperscript{131} New avenues for social understanding based on a relational paradigm\textsuperscript{132} and interculturalism\textsuperscript{133} are needed to meet the challenges that Europe faces today (see corresponding section below). But PCHR can serve as the common platform and starting point.

Since both the secular tradition of the Enlightenment and the religious tradition of Judeo-Christianity have been normative sources of the PCHR, both traditions deserve a voice in the debate about the common language for Europe. Both traditions must be present in the public sphere and enter into an enriching dialog with other increasingly important sources of political culture in Europe, such as Islam. Secularist worldviews, while rightly deserving their place in the public sphere, should not be allowed to monopolise the field of discussion, and even less should citizens holding religious views be banned from the public sphere.\textsuperscript{134}

Beuchot sees human rights as a key for the transcultural grammar, and his idea set me to think about human rights as a strong candidate to be the common language for understanding between Europeans.\textsuperscript{135} Human rights could perhaps be a good “exchange currency.”\textsuperscript{136} Not because human rights are exclusively European: they can be successfully used in other parts of the world. Rather, and in a very unpretentious manner, human rights could perhaps function as a common medium for communication, an analogical language in Europe.\textsuperscript{137}

The stage of political culture: the public sphere

If political unity is the problem that the Series focused on, the key concept to address it was political identity; the core of that concept was political culture;\textsuperscript{138} the stage in which it could be

\textsuperscript{130} Ibid., 53-57.
\textsuperscript{131} Cf. “Veils, Crucifixes and Public Sphere: What Kind of Secularism? Rethinking Neutrality in a Post-Secular Europe.”
\textsuperscript{132} “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific,” 6-7.
\textsuperscript{133} “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited,” 6-7.
\textsuperscript{134} “Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe,” 48. Of course, the same holds true for a hypothetical vice-versa: no religion should be allowed to monopolise the public sphere, nor secularist citizens banned from the public sphere on account of their immanent perspectives. But though this case scenario may have happened in the past (for Locke, neither Atheists nor Catholics were to be tolerated) it is nearly unthinkable today, at least in the west. John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration and Other Writings (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2010), http://oll.libertyfund.org/title/2375.)
\textsuperscript{136} “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific,” 10.
\textsuperscript{137} Admittedly, in other parts of the world, with different historical and cultural backgrounds, it would be nearly impossible to give human rights in their present form a similar use.
analysed was the political (or “public”) sphere; and the way to building identity through the creation of a common political culture in the public sphere, and consequently solidarity was relational interculturalism. In this section I would like to explain the importance of the public sphere for unity, and why the secularism v religion debate matters in this respect.

Given that culture entails views about meaning (of self, of the world, of the unknown), in the Series I touched on the discussion of secularism and religion. After all, secular and religious worldviews influence and inform cultural backgrounds.

Rather than pretending to be a purely formal polity (neutral in normative terms), the EU should recognise its sources and be aware of them when new Europeans with different cultural and therefore normative perspectives come to the public sphere. This suggestion runs through the Series and is one of its key proposals to generate a cohesive society and a workable European identity that contributes to its political unity.

If moral foundations are essential to successful democracies where human rights are upheld and the rule of law is the order of the day, then they should be taken into consideration as source of cohesion for the European polity.139

Ratzinger’s binary “reason-religion” (or secular v religious reason) is in reality shorthand for two different (but not mutually exclusive) kinds of rationality. The former is based on what Taylor calls “the immanent frame;” the latter on a transcendent frame.140 They are in my view just different types of rationality. The human capacity to reason, to argue in an intelligent way, to support rationally what one believes in, is present as much in individuals with an immanent frame of mind (say, Sam Harris), as much as in someone with a transcendent one (e.g. the Dalai Lama). Both can give a reasoned defence of their positions about life, human beings, the world, the polity and so on. Labelling either of them as unfit for public discussion only because they have an immanent or a transcendent worldview would be unfair.

A term that became clearer as the Series progressed was “secularism”. As I have mentioned above, it is sometimes taken as a way of arranging public affairs and sometimes as an immanentist worldview.141 The distinction between secularity and secularism,142 and the place of the second alongside other systems of belief (including religious ones), is an underlying concept throughout the Series, and is important for the idea of political identity based on a comprehensive (inclusive) political culture and contributing to the goal of political unity.

Secularity is rooted both in the Biblical and the Enlightenment traditions of Europe.143 The analytical contrast between “secular” and “secularist” is used throughout the whole Series, contributing to clarifying an often confusing discussion when “the problem of religion” is dealt with.144 Neutrality means inclusion and plurality of worldviews, and is equivalent to secularity but not to secularism.145 Intolerance, fundamentalism and exclusion are human tendencies and a

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145 Ibid., 13.
constant risk for human beings holding nearly any belief system (religious or secular), not a special feature of religion or religious people only.

Therefore complete emptiness or absence of worldviews in the public sphere is nearly impossible, and is a delusion when “neutrality” is taken to be a synonym of secularism – itself one of the many possible worldviews. Inclusiveness is a more realistic normative goal. It translates into a fair opportunity for every worldview to express a voice in the public sphere. A secular public sphere, open to all worldviews, is the desirable climate for relational interculturalism.146

There is a distinction or clarification in place when it comes to the term "secularism". In the case of religion, one thing is to have an extreme position that might entail the endorsement of, say, terrorism. We would label such a position as “fundamentalist”. Another, very different thing is to speak of religion as a respectable worldview, for instance the concept of history (or of law) in Judaism. When it comes to secular worldviews the same distinction applies. They may be respectable belief systems or philosophies of life, whereas other such systems could (and sometimes do) entail extreme attitudes of hatred or violence that fall into the category of fundamentalism. For fanaticism is not a latent danger reserved to religious people: it is a tendency into which any human being can fall if not careful (the motive need not be religious).

Accordingly, in both realms—the immanent or secular and the religious or transcendent—there are rational (and easier to reason with) positions and irrational ones (or positions with a violent rationality attached to them). The Series refers to the possibility of extremes both in secular and religious worldviews. It lacks a distinction between secularism as a sensible worldview, and secularism as a fundamentalist worldview.147 In part this is because there is not an equivalent distinction for sensible and fundamentalist religious positions either. As long as secularity and secularism are distinguished, then “secularism” is a generic term to denote immanent (secular) belief systems, with an open connotation (reasonable or fundamentalist) as happens with the generic term “religion,” which denotes transcendent belief systems with an open connotation too.

Another term for inclusiveness in the public sphere is pluralism.148 Even if I do not agree with him completely (as explained above) regarding his approach to the public sphere, I have taken Habermas as referent in the dialogue between religion and secularism because, in my opinion, he adopts an open immanent frame. He invites conversation not only about but also with each other.149 And he has been the first one to practice it. He has sat down to speak with prominent figures from both secular and religious circles (among others come to mind John Rawls, Charles Taylor, Joseph Ratzinger), has seriously pondered their arguments, and has come up with proposals to carry that dialogue ahead.

Furthermore, Habermas’s intuition of speaking not only about each other but also with each other sits well with a relational interculturalist paradigm and with an analogical hermeneutics approach, both of which seek to harmonise, to find solutions, and to think creatively about complex and often polarised situations such as the debate of secularism v religion in the public sphere (which is a recurrent theme throughout the Series).150

Europe living in a secular and yet “post-secularist” age is a good description of the cultural situation of the continent (following the distinction between “secularity” and “secularism,” see above). Europe seems to be entering an age in which—using Taylor’s terms—the frame is still

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146 Ibid., 4.
147 Ibid., 5.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid., 8.
immanent (in other words secular) but more open to the possibility of transcendence (i.e. not secularist).  

Habermas's position and approach to the problem contrasts with Beck's. The former clearly defines and acknowledges his perspective, and seems to have given a great deal of thought to perspectives different from his. Habermas gives a great analysis and sound guidelines on how to address the problem of equal citizenship and diversity of worldviews, or a united political identity in the face of multiple cultural identities.

Singapore's case, in many ways so far apart from the EU (and so difficult to compare with Europe), sheds some light however, for instance when it comes to the treatment of diverse cultural positions (with their corresponding worldviews), the pursuit of social coherence and the goal of political unity.

At any rate, Europe should not be afraid of its own cultural self-understanding from the past and present, including traditions such as Judaism, Christianity, the Enlightenment and Islam, among others, in order to build its future. The Bible and Enlightenment appear as strong referents of Europe's political culture from the beginnings of integration.

The only way to build and maintain a liberal democracy is by being “truly liberal and truly democratic”. The Series advocates respect for all worldviews, both secular and religious, in particular for Muslims, but also New Atheists, Jews, Christians and others. The recognition of and respect for different cultural positions is essential for social harmony and political unity.

Clearly, not everything is up for negotiation culturally, even in liberal democracies. Because democracy, the rule of law, and other elements of what I have called the political culture of human rights (PCHR) are substantive, not only formal. It is schizophrenic and dangerous to pretend that the political culture of Europe—that of human rights—is exclusively formal. It does not convince those newcomers who possess a different culture (especially if that culture contains a strong religious background), and it makes it difficult to explain the very fundamentals of western democracy and some of its limits.

154 “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific,” 9.
158 ibid., 14.
161 Intolerance, for instance, of the violation of human rights, disturbances to the rule of law, or the existence of democracy.
As can be seen along this exegetic introduction, my research has extended to five main fields: political unity, political identity, political culture, the public sphere, and relational interculturalism. Tangentially I have touched on the economic realm, submitting the possibility of flexible integration. The research is situated in the context of history and with awareness of the EU’s present challenges.162

Now desirable (and in my opinion feasible) results are: from a suprastatal political regime, analogical unity; from an inclusive public sphere, a common political culture; and from relational interculturalism, a sufficiently cohesive community of citizens,163 where solidarity or civic friendship can flourish. I intend to explain this last aspect in the ensuing section.

**Building identity and solidarity: relational interculturalism**

Interculturalism is another important concept throughout the Series. It constitutes a way to deal with diversity and build political identity based on a common political culture, in order to maintain and increase political unity to an acceptable level.164 Donati’s relational sociology helps interculturalism and links with the topic of the common language (also present in every article of the Series).165

Formally, political unity is built in an inclusive public sphere through relational interculturalism. The initial substantive element of the political culture is that of human rights.

I have connected Donati’s concept of relationality with Beuchot’s idea of human rights as a common language and with his cultural analogical pluralism. That connection could be developed further than it has been so far.166 I take up this idea again in *Europe United*.167

The term *relational interculturalism* did not appear as such in the Series. Rather, the concept developed gradually through reflection and it is only at the end of it that I have defined it, if only provisionally. Designating an invitation to blend, the idea itself is a blend drawing from Canadian (Bouchard, Taylor), Indian (Panikkar), Italian (Zamagni, Donati), and Latin American (Fornet-Betancourt, Beuchot) developments.168 Yet the intercultural trend is of course not limited to those regions. The forty seven member state Council of Europe (antecedent to the European Union and distinctly different to the EU) in 2008 published a *White Paper* on the subject.169 A common thread in the intercultural analyses seems to be the need to find alternatives to multiculturalism which are not regressive (that is, alternatives to the view that sees monoculturalism, or blind assimilation as the only possible forms of social integration). Relational interculturalism, as I have come to see it, is not so much a challenge to multiculturalism, as it is a constructive effort to improve the latter’s shortcomings.

Interculturalism needs to be qualified lest it become just another word for multiculturalism, at least moderate multiculturalism. Yet relationality in my view provides an adequate nuance which indicates how the social blending that interculturalism promises might come about.

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163 Ibid., 9.
164 “Liberal Democracy: Culture Free? The Habermas-Ratzinger Debate and Its Implications for Europe.”
165 “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific,” 6.
166 Ibid.
167 “Conclusion: Europe United in Diversity --- an Analogical Hermeneutics Contribution to the Social and Political Philosophy of the European Union .”
168 “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited.”
The two papers in which I dedicate several sections to speaking about Interculturalism are *Worth Fighting* and *Cultural Riddles*. Relational Interculturalism links with political culture, the public sphere, political identity and in the end with political unity, though it is none of them and requires a separate treatment.

Relational Interculturalism is the way in which political culture is formed in the public sphere to generate identity and eventually civic friendship or solidarity, and therefore unity. It regards the path through which very diverse societies (and political communities) can work towards a common identity, rather than to the cultural annihilation of the newcomers (monoculturalism) or the creation of cultural ghettos or parallel societies (present in at least some forms of multiculturalism).

In order to understand what relational means for Interculturalism, I would like to bring to mind the way in which Donati defines his semantics of difference. This is important because it clarifies how he proposes to deal with diversity. And as mentioned above, the key to the problem of cultural plurality is how to harmonise cultural diversity without, on the one hand cancelling it (monoculturalism) or on the other hand fostering the creation of cultural archipelagos with little interconnection between them, eventually leading to a fragmented society (multiculturalism).

In the dialectic semantics difference is "a gap (border) between Ego and Alter. Between them, there is no sharing of specific identities but rather an assertion of two identities comparing with each other." In this semantics "reciprocity does not require recognition of a common identity." Habermas’s discursive ethics is for Donati an example of this semantics of difference in which “Ego and Alter have divergent and clashing identities.”

In binary semantics difference is “conceived as a discrimination and incommunicability.” Accordingly, “Alter is a denial of Ego and cannot 'be included' by Ego (and vice versa).” An example of this semantics is for Donati self-referential systems of functional and mechanist nature such as that of Luhman.

Finally, in relational semantics, the difference itself—dividing Ego and Alter—is conceived as a relation. "The relation," claims Donati "is constitutive of both Ego and Alter." This is because each one’s identity is shaped through the relation to the other. Donati points out that relation implies on the one hand distance (non-identity between Alter and Ego) but on the other hand it brings about sharing of two uniquenesses. Relation envisages the other neither as alter Ego, nor as a totally Alter.

Here is where these thoughts from two different thinkers, in two different continents, and studying two different disciplines, can coincide. Indeed Donati’s relationality operates in a similar or corresponding way to the one Beuchot’s analogical hermeneutics would advise. And this position is at the core of the interculturalism that I have sought to submit in the Series. Hence I have called it relational interculturalism.

As already explained above, relational interculturalism will navigate between monoculturalism (where extrapolating Donati’s terms the other is accepted as long as it is an Alter Ego) and

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170 Jiménez Lobeira, “Is Europe Still Worth Fighting For? Allegiance, Identity, and Integration Paradigms Revisited; “Cultural Riddles of Regional Integration - a Reflection on Europe from the Asia Pacific.”
172 Donati, “Beyond the Dilemmas of Multiculturalism: Recognition through ‘Relational Reason’,” 69.
173 Ibid.
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid., 70.
176 Ibid.
multiculturalism (where the other becomes an incommensurable, totally Alter). Relational interculturalism can and should be tested in that subcontinent which Europe is, and used to address the challenge of socially integrating the peoples from very diverse cultural backgrounds who reside there.
References


Jiménez Lobeira, Pablo Cristóbal. "EU Analogical Identity - or the Ties That Link (without Binding)." *Australia National University Centre for European Studies Briefing Paper Series* 1, no. 2 (September 2010 2010).


