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The Next Big Thing? Why religion may (not) shape international relations in the 21st century

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ABSTRACT
The exponential growth of IR studies in religion and the rise of religious actors and agendas in the minds of international policy makers suggest that religion will be an organising force in world politics of the future. This paper explores from an open critical position the assumption that religion will shape the evolving borders of world affairs. As modern international relations was partly borne of the need to contain the borders of religion, it is argued that the reemergence of religion in contemporary world politics may, paradoxically, reinforce that same system. Twenty-first century policy makers may thus take a neo-Westphalian turn in search of a broad-based secular polity that utilises yet also contains religio-political energies.

Secularism, sacralism and the evolving borders of world politics

The study of religion in international relations (IR) is now as prominent as it was once neglected. André Malraux’s famous prognosis in 1962 that the “twenty-first century will be spiritual or it will not be” holds particular resonance in a field that has rapidly turned from questions of whether religion is a legitimate topical concern for IR scholars (e.g. Wuthnow, 1991; Berger 1999; Esposito & Watson, 2000; Petito & Hazopolous, 2003) to the more difficult task of knowing what to do with it now that religion has ‘arrived’ (e.g. Thomas, 2005; Haynes, 2007; Leustean & Madeley, 2009). I begin with working definitions and assumptions that situate the present paper. Charles Taylor in the seminal work A Secular Age suggests that religion defies general definition “because the phenomena we are tempted to call religious are so tremendously varied in human life” and wonders whether attempts to make a hermeneutical linkage between ancient beliefs and contemporary society is “a hard, perhaps insuperable task” (2007:15). Taylor opts for the “prudent (or perhaps cowardly)” distinction of reading religion across transcendent and immanent understandings of human society (2007:15). This basic starting point reflects that of IR scholar Jeffrey Haynes who defines religion via three commonly held characteristics:

…the idea of transcendence, that is, it relates to supernatural realities; with sacredness, that is, as a system of language and practice that organizes the world in terms of what is deemed holy; and with ultimacy, that is, it relates people to the ultimate conditions of existence. (2006:223).

Whist acknowledging the multiple definitions of religion that exist in IR (eg: Lausten & Waever, 2000:738; Hanson, 2006:73; Mandaville, 2009:98) Haynes’ framework will serve our purposes here. One addition to make to the emphasis on ‘language and practice’ is the role that religious communities play, thus emphasising what Scott Thomas calls a “social definition of religion ... as a ‘community of believers’ rather than as a ‘body of beliefs’.” (Thomas, 2005:24)

Two concepts summarise advancements in IR religion scholarship in recent years and help frame the elaborations to follow in this paper. The first is Martin E. Marty’s notion of the “religio-secular world” as a descriptor for the global political realm that is “neither exclusively secular nor exclusively religious, but rather a complex combination of both” (2003:42). Such a view forms part of the emerging consensus in

1 Working paper to be presented at the American Graduate School of International Relations in Paris, Evolving Borders: Identity and Affiliation in a Volatile International Landscape, Graduate Conference, June 1-2, 2010.
2 “Le XXIème siècle sera spirituel, ou ne sera pas” (cited in Mathy, 2004:415)
the social sciences around ‘desecularisation’ to the extent that “a straightforward narrative of progress from the religious to the secular” as a way of interpreting modern societies “is no longer acceptable” (Asad, 2003:1). Such a view is expressed in a variety of ways in IR, from a general discontent at leaving “religion on the sidelines” (Tickner, 2006:390; also Keddie, 2003) to critiques of the secular assumptions that shape the discipline itself (Phillipps 2002; Keohane, 2002:29; Hurd, 2008). Empirical studies have also led to a more dynamic assumption about religious agency, summarised by Jonathan Fox thus:

A fuller picture of the world’s religious economy would show secularisation – the reduction of religion’s influence in society – occurring in some parts of the religious economy, and sacralisation – the increase of religion’s influence in society – occurring in other parts. (Fox, 2008:7; also Berger 1999:18)

This presents us with an integrated and possibly co-constitutive picture of secular-sacral relations in contemporary world politics. Importantly, if we accept the premise that international affairs exist in a religio-secular world, then what we are trying to avoid are methodologies intent on vindicating the religious over the secular or visa-versa. Placing secularisation and sacralisation within the same global process requires an important modification to our terminology, and I appeal to a well-known article on globalisation by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye as a way of doing this:

Globalisation implies that something is increasing: there is more of it ... Our definitions start with ‘globalism’, a condition that can increase or decrease. Globalism is a state of the world involving networks of interdependence ... Globalisation or deglobalisation refer to the increase or decrease of globalism. (Keohane & Nye, 2000:105-107; see also Kitching, 2001)

In the same way, I suggest that what the work of IR scholars such as Marty and Fox attest to are the co-existing conditions of secularism and sacralism in world politics. Religion is not on the march in the form of sacralisation (ie it is not uniformly increasing in influence), but sacralism is a condition that constitutes the political in fundamental ways. Similarly, although secularisation (as the lineal expansion of modernity leading to the diminishing of religion in the public sphere) has limited evidence to support it on a global scale, secularism (as the strategy to contain or co-opt religious actors and interests for extra-religious political purposes) remains a central element in international politics today. Building on these notions I suggest that the secular sphere of international relations is one where religious actors and interests are subordinate to more dominant structures and ideologies. Similarly, the sacral sphere is one where religion is a primary element in the formation of a given polity.

The second concept is R. Scott Appleby’s notion of the “ambivalence of the sacred” and the political implications of the dual possibilities of life and death that “reside within the holy” (2000:30). That is to say, religion brings multiple often contrasting dynamics into the political sphere such as conflict (2000:57ff) on the one hand and peace-making on the other (2000: 121ff). This marks a corrective to the lingering habit of restricting the dynamics of religion to zero-sum conflicts involving terrorism, violent religious nationalism and clashes between ‘civilisations’. Instead, the notion of ambivalence ascribes to religion a ubiquity that leads to connections with peace-making as much as conflict (Johnston & Cox, 2003), liberalism as much as terrorism (Dunning, 2003), democracy as much as despotism (Keane, 2005).

Secularisation is a topic of “staggering diversity” (Tscannen, 1991:396) principally because the secular is “neither singular in origin nor stable in its historical identity” (Asad, 2003:25; see also Taylor, 2007:1-22). A full exploration is thus well beyond the scope of the present paper.
1998:25-31; Rees, 2004) and theoretical considerations of security and identity that go beyond *realpolitik* (Lausten & Waever, 2000). Therefore, as religion was once well-contained within the conceptual borders that considered it only to be a threat in a world of industrialised nation-states and modern global interests, the notion of ambivalence has helped see those borders change and evolve. This process does not jettison the religion *problematique*, but incorporates it into a new basic assumption of how “really existing” religion functions in the political sphere (Elshtain, 1999). Such a view of religion as offering both life and death has long been familiar to those who have belonged to religious communities, held religious beliefs or studied religious traditions. As the 19th century Hindu mystic Ramakrishna remarked, “Religion is like a cow. It kicks, but it also gives milk.” (Sharma, 2006:xiv) So it is that the life-giving milk of religion is being increasingly offered among networks of IR scholars and international policy-makers\(^4\) many of whom have only digested a discourse on religious violence and disruption. Whilst the new taste remains an acquired one, rates of consumption are increasing.

An increased focus on religion in IR redefines the international realm as one that a) accommodates the conditions of secularism and sacralism (religio-secular world) and b) is animated by both constructive and destructive religious influences (ambivalence of the sacred). This poses a significant challenge for a discipline that in large part still “takes the Euro-American definition of religion and its separation of politics as the natural starting point for social-scientific inquiry” (Hurd, 2008:23). I shall now explore some possible implications of this challenge for an understanding of the evolving boundaries of international relations in the twenty-first century. It is often said that IR is not a predictive science, and in this vein what follows is not intended to forecast the future. In keeping with the exploratory trajectory of the AGS conference, I suggest what may appear to be an unexpected theme of the evolving borders of world affairs. The arguments are broad in scope, intended to open conversations rather than resolve them, as notable for the spaces that need to be filled as for the contents that are provided. In this I follow the view of Rabbi and political theorist Jonathan Sacks who wrote: “sometimes it is helpful to simplify, to draw a diagram rather than a map, in order to understand what may be at stake in a social transition” (1997:55).

**Reinforcing Borders: religion and the return of the state in international affairs**

I shall adopt an open critical position on the issue of religious agency and its impact on the borders of world politics into the twenty-first century. The general argument I wish to explore follows that as modern international relations was partly borne of the need to contain the borders of religion, the reemergence of religious agency in contemporary world politics may, paradoxically, reinforce the same need once more. To elaborate, I shall revisit the meaning of the Westphalian system of international relations, distinguish between two co-existing levels of religion at work in this system, and suggest two

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contexts where the rise of religion may well lead to a neo-Westphalian turn and the strengthening of secular politics.

**a) Westphalia: blurring the secular-sacral distinction**

I begin with the argument that at the origins of the modern world order of nation-states lies a complex interaction of secularism and religion. Via “the great multidimensional conflict” (Kennedy, 1988:36) of the Thirty Years War the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648 granting secular political authorities determining powers over the role of religion in their domains. Yet in this context the primacy of secularism comes not at the expense of sacralism *in toto*, but in its re-appropriation. Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan mark the mid-seventeenth century as the time of decisive break between the theological and rationalist traditions of political thought:

The key to this interpretation lies in the reading of Hobbes and Grotius side by side. Grotius, for all his embrace of the program of a humanistic science, was a true heir of the theological tradition; Hobbes, for all his wealth of theological opinions, broke with the structure of Christian political thought (1999:787).

The Treaty of Westphalia, one of the cornerstone documents at the origin of the modern secular state, comes only two years after the death of Grotius and mid-way through the life of Hobbes. It could therefore be argued that Westphalia marks the beginning of a politically secular European international society. Yet Casanova suggests that although the Westphalian principles were “institutionalised throughout society so that the social realm itself was dualistically structured” between the religious and the secular there was also “ample ambiguity, flexibility, permeability, and often outright confusion” between such a boundary in the political formation process (1994:12-17). This ambiguity blurs our understandings of the secular-sacral distinction at the foundations of the international system. Even as the fabric of secular society was being created, the thread of religio-political thought remained unbroken and was being woven into the texture of a new European modernity. Grotius was more than the ‘last’ political theologian of his time. Via readings and misreadings of his doctrine of natural law he became, as it were, at once the founding father of natural law theory, a contributing member of the just war tradition and one of the mid-wives of international law (Jeffrey, 2006:14-16). Grotius thus embodies both the *divestment* and *reinvestment* of religion in political thought. Marked by a similar complexity, Westphalia can be considered secular but also sacral of a sort. According to Thomas, “the Westphalian settlement established a political theology for modern international relations...a doctrine that prescribes what the role of religion and political authority should be in domestic and international politics that has lasted 300 years” (2005:55). The Westphalian milieu is thus replete with the agencies of religion (Philpott, 2000) the dynamics of which have since animated international affairs in foundational ways until the present day.

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5 “Five Latin words isolated from the ‘Prolegomena’ of *The Right of War and Peace* are still found – as they have been found for generations – quoted in every encyclopedia article: *etiamsi daremus Deum non esse*, ‘even were we to accept that God did not exist’; and on the basis of these five words Grotius is marked out as a pioneer of ‘secular’ natural law theory...But such a thing was not Grotius’s purpose...to understand Grotius as a legal and political theorist implies understanding him also as a lay theologian.” (O’Donovan & O’Donovan, 1999:788).
b) Religionism: cosmopolitan and community

One such dynamic is what I shall call the tension between two co-existing expressions of political religion, or to be more precise, religion operating at two co-existing levels of political society. The first is cosmopolitan religionism and exemplified in the enlightenment republicanism that arose in France 150 years after Westphalia. At the core of the cosmopolitan project lay a Westphalian strategy to transform independent sacral interests into civil religion subordinate to the state. Napoleon Bonaparte once wrote, “In religion I do not see the mystery of the Incarnation, but the mystery of the social order” (cited in Lyons, 1994:85). For Bonaparte, himself a staunch defender of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Contrat Social*, the maintenance of such an order did not require the suppression of religion as others had done, but its re-appropriation as a second-order yet important attribute of a cosmopolitan secular polity (Horne, 2004:33). Such a view was antithetical to the community religionism of the romantic movements that originally arose from the Pietism of post-Reformation Germany (Berlin, 1965/1999:36). By the time Napoleon’s forces conquered Prussia the philosopher Fichte would decry cosmopolitans as “a mere annex to life” in contrast to the “the *Urvolk*, the primal people”. The latter point, as Berlin suggests, is characterised more by an emphasis on community within a broad ranging idea of the Germanic peoples (including the French) than by primary ethnic prejudice associated with later movements of German national chauvinism (1965/1999:96).

Of interest here is the level at which such a conception of primordial identity operates, and its implication for understanding where religion resides: in contrast to the existence of civic religion operating at the universal level for cosmopolitans, community religionism was found in organic and unique cultures (Smith, 2001:33-39). Such brevity, of course, does no justice to these historical movements that are as complex as religion itself. My intention, however, is simply to suggest contrasting expressions of religion, operating at different levels of the political sphere – cosmopolitan religionism at the universal level and communal religionism at the particular level. The distinction in the levels at which religionism operates in international affairs is not necessarily unique to the late twentieth century and beyond. For instance, religious structures have arguably operated at the international and communal levels for over a millennium (e.g. Bennison, 2002). I have offered a Euro-centric example in order to draw a continuum from Westphalia, which is so fundamental to the origins of the discipline of IR, even though the basic contrast of cosmopolitan and communal could be applied to multiple contexts and traditions. In so doing I assume, both at the normative and empirical levels, that forms of cosmopolitan and communal religionism continue from the early modern centuries until the present day.

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6 I am indebted to Dr. Isabel Yaya from the Departement de la Recherche et de l’Enseignement, *Musée du Quai Branly* for introducing me to these insights, drawn partly from her working paper “Napoleon as lawgiver: the renewal of an enlightened political motif for the iconographic program of the Louvre’s Cour Carrée” (2010).

7 I am not making this claim for Fichte particularly, whose philosophy translated Rousseau’s *Contrat Social* “into the terms of the Kantian ethical system” (Adamson, 2001:34). Johann Georg Hamman would be a closer subject (see Berlin, 19965/1999:40-45).
c) Toward a neo-Westphalian turn in contemporary international relations

I shall now briefly explore why the twenty-first century may see, at least in some contexts of international affairs and despite the rapid rise of religion as a focus of world politics, new forms of Westphalian control in order to deal with the tensions between the different forms of religion described above. I begin with one expression of cosmopolitan religionism, namely, the growing emphasis on religious actors and interests within the policy domains of international organisations (IOs). The United Nations, World Health Organisation (Thomas, 2005:25), World Bank (Marshall & Van Saanen, 2007) and the International Labour Organisation (Peccoud, 2004) are among some of the most prominent IOs to launch specific engagements with religion in the past two decades. Religious institutions have also taken the form of IOs from state coalitions such as the Organisation of Islamic Council, international faith networks within the same tradition such as the World Council of Churches, international inter-faith forums such as the Parliament of the World’s Religions, and transnational networks on issues of shared concern such as the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (Palmer & Finlay, 2003). It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore specific programs in detail as I have done elsewhere. I intend instead to pose a more general and exploratory argument, namely, that the increased prominence of religion at the international level by necessity perpetuates forms of cosmopolitan religionism and this creates inherent tensions at the level of community. When religious actors and interests are engaged at the cosmopolitan level the emphasis is on the cooperative potential of faith politics to contribute to what Hans Kung describes as “the human values and standards which, in our contemporary and globalising world, can be regarded as universally valid and acceptable” (2003:152). In other words, IOs require a certain kind of multilateral religionism that is palatable to mainstream global interests to the possible exclusion of more dissident religious views that challenge such interests. When religion operates at this level and within these conditions it must take a subordinate role to universal interests that are more secular than sacral.

Not everyone agrees that this is the best way to understand religion or maximize the potential of religious actors to contribute to international society. For example, Tariq Ramadan has recently written of the problem in the West of insisting that Muslims be “moderate” which in essence requires that they “make their faith invisible” (2010:24). This kind of moderation sets the cosmopolitan subordination of religion against the community religionism of the faith itself:

In Western societies where the practice and day-to-day visibility of religion are close to zero...to speak of daily prayers, fasting, of religiously grounded moral obligations, prohibitions and dress codes is often seen as automatically verging on excess. (Ramadan, 2010:24)

What seems excess to the liberal cosmopolitan is core practice to some or many in the community. For scholars such as Thomas, who aligns religion more closely to Alasdair MacIntyre’s communitarian

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9 Italics added
emphasis on “virtues, practices, narrative and social tradition” (2005:219), the cosmopolitan understanding of religious agency is inadequate because the kind of identity required at the international level – in Ramadan’s example, moderation as invisibility in the West – is not always recognisable at the level of community practice. Thomas instead looks to the level of community in order to find the utility of religion in the building of political and social capital: “the ‘good’, therefore, of the Islamic, Christian, Jewish, Hindu, or Buddhist tradition, is the formation of a particular kind of community, one that inculcates those virtues and practices necessary for what it means to authentically live out life according to a particular religious tradition” (2005:238). In this context, religious particularity may challenge the demands of international universalism at the political level.

d) The Example of Hezbollah: community religionism, international terrorism, and the agency of the state

An example might be found when a group that has grass-roots political support is associated with a form of religious communalism that is also considered disruptive to security at the international level. This can be seen in Mona Harb’s recent study of Hezbollah as an important faith-based organisation in the post-war reconstruction of Lebanon (2008). Against the commonly held view of Hezbollah as a terrorist organisation, Harb considers Hezbollah to be “a Lebanese political party which has been in charge of the elaboration and dissemination of development policies for middle and lower-income Shi'i groups for over 25 years” (2008:214). This context adds depth beyond descriptions of the “moral logic” of Hezbollah’s association with terrorism (Kramer, 1998) and instead emphasizes the ambivalence of religion at work in this complex religio-secular space. Community is the starting point. Harb estimates the lower estimates of Hezbollah’s social base in which development is practiced to be no less than 300,000 (2008:220). The author attributes Hezbollah with a high level of agency not merely to work within Lebanon but to determine the very nature of a faith-based society (2008:222-226):

Hezbollah’s institutions disseminate codes, norms and values that produce a particular type of social and cultural environment, structuring daily life practices, as well as subjective and collective identities. This environment, or Hezbollah’s reference group, is referred to as the Islamic sphere (hala’ islamiyya) or the ‘Resistance society’ (mu’tama’ al-muqawama). (Harb, 2008:222)

One might, with good reason, disassociate such a description with an integrated religio-secular understanding of the political. However, Harb adds two additional elements that complicate this view. The first is that “Islamic sphere narratives have increasingly borrowed national references and symbols from Lebanese folklore...proposing a hybrid type of national discourse, mixing secularism with religiosiity” (2008:223). The second is that “there is considerable overlap between [Hezbollah’s] paradigms of development and those of international donors, and they are open to learning and improvement” (2008:234). When these elements combine, we may well situate Hezbollah as a development actor that holds to the primacy of religious identity but incorporates secondary secular state structures as well as the need to learn from “a type of knowledge that goes beyond [the] current

10 Thomas suggests he is operating from the perspective of “rooted cosmopolitanism” (2005:248) but this depends, in turn, on the relation of MacIntyre to cosmopolitan ethics. For the case against this link see Mulhall & Swift, 1992:92-101.

11 On the growing use of the acronym for faith-based organisations (FBOs) in the literature (e.g. Clarke & Jennings, 2008) a parallel and distinct emphasis on faith communities (FCs) should be added, as they are not the same.
scope and concern of [its own] institutions” (2008:234) in order to fulfill its development mandate. Therefore, Hezbollah is arguably defined as a sacral development institution with significant potential to contribute to the mainstream development agenda. The tension between the universal and local becomes immediately apparent when one considers how a group that still resides on UN and US State Department lists of terrorist organizations can possibly be included in the cosmopolitan international project of promoting human values and standards regarded as universally valid and acceptable.

The answer implicit in Harb’s engaging depiction lies in the instrumental pressures of statehood, both to further incorporate the religious dimension into the operations of the greater Lebanese state, and to subordinate religious interests to the broader agendas and methods of political development. In short, a form of neo-Westphalian strategy is required to contain excessive religio-political energies in the interests of a broad-based secular polity. To think that this or similar scenarios of state agency are not possible, is to misconceive the complex dynamics between secularism and sacralism at the origins of the nation-state. Westphalia and its consequences led to the subordination of religion to the purposes of the state, but in so doing, the architects of secular modernism often believed that faiths could adapt to these strictures, and thus could remain an important part of the political society. As Bonaparte once wrote: “How can a state be well governed without the aid of religion?” (cited in Horne, 2004:14).12 In the contemporary context, the realization is growing that religions can offer such “aid” because they are highly adaptable: “Religion is among other things, a complicated multifaceted social phenomenon that is constantly changing, evolving, and adapting to an ever-changing environment.” (Fox 2007:30) As a consequence, one impact of religion upon twenty-first century politics may be the embrace of neo-Westphalian forms of governance at the state level to maximize the potentialities of religion in ways that cosmopolitan and community level appropriations of religion cannot.

**Implications for Twenty-First Century Politics**

Several important consequences follow to arguing that the rise of religion in the world affairs will lead to a strengthening of state power. They become pointers to further research and discussion beyond the more substantial arguments I have attempted to construct above. The first is that the twenty-first century will continue to be provoked by a lack of religious freedom, notably where religious minorities do not have equal rights with those of the majority. In suggesting the possibility of a neo-Westphalian turn in world affairs I am not advocating for the virtue of the state per se. Indeed, were it to be true the forecast of this paper would set back the cause of transborder religious minorities significantly in some contexts. It might also produce new forms of excessive secularist repression of religion in other contexts.13 The second consequence is that sacralism operating at the state level will survive much longer than expected. For instance, Iran is a state that, at the ideological level at least, seems shaped by the primacy of a particular religio-cultural tradition. Because of this ideology the Iranian state has also been forecast to fall or collapse almost since the Islamic revolution began in 1979, yet has endured to this day. Whilst there are many possible explanations to this, some of which have little to do with...
religion, it remains true that for thirty years this great power of the Middle East has been governed by a religious council and inspired (particularly outside of the cosmopolitan cities) by a theopolitical vision (see Nasr, 2006). Iran is thus an example of the complexity of secular-sacral influences that were once considered retrograde to modern international relations but may emerge in new contexts and expressions into the future. The third consequence is that the combination of religionism and statism might yet produce new forms of religious expression in the contemporary world. James Clifford famously wrote that “cultures’ do not hold still for their portraits” (1986:10). It is equally true of religions and may be most interestingly seen in contexts where religious nationalism continues to impact religious community practice. The United States has arguably produced two new religions to date, namely, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter day Saints and the Nation of Islam. This should not surprise in a context that has historically fused the existence of the nation-state with the transcendent commission of Manifest Destiny producing an almost perfect accommodation of secularism and sacramism in the modern world.

Whatever can be said for these and other possible consequences of the rise of religion in a world of enduring nation-states, religion may yet continue to defy ultimate cooption by secular or sacral interests alone. What Berger notes of the present evidence I also wish to apply to the future: “those that have great hopes for the role of religion in the affairs of the world and those who fear this role must be disappointed by the factual evidence.” (1999:18) Such a view returns us to a necessary understanding of religion as operating in a secular-sacral world, and encourages an ambivalent view of the political effects of religious agency. The shift in perspectives to consider these as normal rather than exceptional dynamics in the study of international relations may yet prove to be one of the most valuable evolutions in our thinking to date.
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