"Really Existing" Scriptures: On the Use of Sacred Text in International Affairs

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On the Use of Sacred Text in International Affairs

—John A. Rees

As is often quoted, Andre Malraux (may have) once said, “The twenty-first century will be religious or it will not be at all.” If this sentiment is even partly true, then the reading of scriptures will once again become as important for diplomacy as it is for devotion. Yet as anyone with a sense of history knows, political claims of biblical proportion have almost always failed to satisfy temporal aspirations, let alone eternal ones. So how do we avoid manipulating scripture for opportunistic political ends and still allow the voices of sacred text to have a constructive role in political discussion? This, I believe, is one of the central questions to address if Malraux’s new post-secular century is to turn out better rather than worse.

The Ideological Manipulation of Scripture

An introductory example illustrates the saliency of the issue. U.S. President George W. Bush has lavished the U.S. mission in Iraq with the ancient words of Isaiah 61, “to the captives come out, and to those in darkness be free.” Whether the second Iraq War is justifiable or not, many would intuit that the president is simply “proof-texting” from the Bible to support the American campaign. They are well-known words, and most commonly read in the president’s own religion of Christianity as a messianic text, as the universal promise of peace with justice fulfilled in the life of Jesus of Nazareth (see Luke 4:14-21). And therein lies the problem: to attribute the American presence in Iraq with a messianic quality is to equate, however inadvertently, the enforced peace brought by U.S. troops with the pax Christi (peace of Christ), a Christianization of the Jewish notion of shalom, when from every angle it appears more like the ancient pax Romana—an empire managing lesser powers for its own self-interest. Richard Bauckham warns of “the ideological manipulation of Scripture” in political religion, and the president’s exegesis may illustrate the problematic use of sacred text in what Clifford Geertz similarly terms the “rising tendency to ideologize faith” in international affairs today.

Yet the recognition that sacred text, Christian or otherwise, can be abused for ideological ends does not negate the possibility that these same scriptures can also be used to achieve positive political goals in international affairs. Such a possibility, it seems to me, depends upon the saliency of three principles: (1) scriptures "really exist" as a political resource; (2) scriptures contain a diversity of political ideas, not a single political agenda; and (3) scriptural texts can contribute to open political discussion and the development of open political systems.

"Really Existing" Scriptures

Understanding the increased profile of religion in international affairs raises what Scott Thomas calls the need to "take cultural and religious pluralism seriously." At the frontline of any faith-based diplomatic activity lies an age-old problem: how does my particular religious tradition contribute to a universal agreement on matters of human conduct and political community? The problem of "the other" has always been a contentious one for any pluralist society, whether the Roman Empire of the ancient world or the civil societies and global villages of today. It is also the central challenge for a functioning democracy. Amartya Sen argues that meeting this challenge into the future requires a notion of democracy, broadly understood as "open public discussion," that is sourced in the history of cultures the world over. He writes,

The championing of pluralism, diversity, and basic liberties can be found in the history of many societies. The long tradition of encouraging and protecting public debates on political, social, and cultural matters in, say, India, China, Japan, Korea, Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, and many parts of Africa, demand much fuller recognition in the history of democratic ideas. If we take seriously Sen's argument for the global roots of democracy, then researching how global democratic development can occur in what the late Edward Said called "the bewildering interdependence of our time" requires the (re)inclusion of cultural traditions, many of which have been formed by religious texts, beliefs, and practices.

One acclaimed effort at imagining the future of international political culture is Andrew Linklater's study The Transformation of Political Community. Central aspects of Linklater's work are described as the pursuit of "greater moral and economic equality whilst remaining sensitive to cultural difference" and "the idea of an inclusive intercultural dialogue" which will "provide a foundation for a new cosmopolitan community of humankind." There is much to be commended in Linklater's book. However, as in the work of most theorists of international relations, it has been observed that religion remains the missing dimension in his thesis. In a powerful critique, political scholar Jean Bethke Elshtain observes that Linklater's study neglects entirely "the already extant international communities that command transnational attachment, namely, those grounded in universal religions." To counter this oversight Elshtain characterizes issues of identity and loyalty in "really existing" religious communities as follows: "A plurality of forms of membership, loyalty, and identity are recognized. At times, commitment to a particular community may take precedence. But one is also a member of an international, plural body consisting of trans-national forms of membership." An example of this trans-national community is carried in the Islamic concept of umma, defined by Hasan Hanafi as "a
nation without boundaries, a community of believers . . . [an] ideal community irrespective of geography."\textsuperscript{13}

In the same way that Elshtain appeals to the "really existing communities" of religion as a vital element in international affairs, I wish to argue for the existence of "really existing" sacred texts as an important and under-utilized resource in open political discussion. Those who practice or observe faith-based politics know instinctively that religious texts do function in this way. For instance, in reference to the Abrahamic religions, Brian Cox and Daniel Philpott acknowledge that "God reveals his vision for how his people are to live together through scriptural texts" and that these texts "emanate principles that prescribe the nature and purpose of government . . . the duties of citizens . . . the distribution of economic wealth, the treatment of the poor, punishment, war, and other matters."\textsuperscript{14} Beyond stand-alone ethical principles, scriptures have long provided what Thomas sums as "narratives that shape the identity of a community."\textsuperscript{15} These narratives are not simply retold for posterity's sake, but rather, to adopt the words of Stanley Hauerwas, have been remembered in a way that has "formed the soul and determined future direction" of local and international communities of faith.\textsuperscript{16}

Hauerwas would insist that because different faiths tell different stories, they therefore produce particular (i.e., unique) community dynamics.\textsuperscript{17} True enough, but the faster one asserts this point the sooner one bumps into an important universal: through the process of interpretation and tradition building, all sacred texts help generate community narratives of potential political consequence. It is not until we experience the doing of those narratives—what Brazilian theologian Clodovis Boff calls the "imperative that praxis addresses"\textsuperscript{18}—that really existing political commonalities and differences between religious narratives may be truly understood.

I am not arguing for the replacement or usurping of the secular texts of international relations, such as Western-style constitutions or international charters, by religious texts. Rather, I am arguing that sacred texts be read alongside their textual "others" as really existing sources of ethics for the building of real political outcomes.

Texts create institutional regimes. Texts constrain and recreate political behavior. Texts are read as sources of moral authority in the rough realities of international conflict. Texts give content to dialogues regarding human values and rights. While this understanding of texts is a given in respect to the constitutions of nation-states and charters of international law, religious texts have been reduced to function only as sources of ethical principle. It is certainly true that sacred scriptures shape some of the highest (and lowest) principles of human conduct, however I would argue they also help satisfy what Elshtain sees as the need to focus on "concrete structures and institutions of political power."\textsuperscript{19}

And the need is real. At the time of this writing there is a potentially explosive stand-off over whether the new Iraqi constitution should be influenced by Islamic or secular principles. Also, only weeks ago the French government passed laws to inhibit religious freedom for the sake of upholding the secular foundations of the Republic.\textsuperscript{20} Finding ways to include scriptural resources, and the cultural traditions that these texts have helped form, as part of global political discussion is fast becoming one of our central challenges: how can we conceive political religion as a positive force in international affairs?

Of course, behind such a project exists a complex, longstanding tension in human political experience, namely, the degree to which we can, and should or should not, separate
the “sacred” from the “secular” when promoting ethics and building institutions that can
govern us all. As a way of approaching this challenge I wish to apply the words of Jonathan
Sacks that “sometimes it is helpful to simplify, to draw a diagram rather than a map, in order
to understand what may be at stake in a social transition.” What follows is an attempt
to draw two diagrams, to introduce two basic principles, that outline how “really existing
scriptures” might begin to function in the open public discussions of world politics.

The Plurality of Scripture

The political theorist and biographer John Keane claims there is a need in modern politi-
cal theory to break the “bad monist habit” of constantly referring back to a “grounding
principle” in order to validate a theoretical idea. He argues, for instance, that the concept
civil society is a “signifier of plurality” and therefore has a “polysemic” rather than a
singular or fixed quality. Keane’s “monist habit” is of particular relevance to political
theorists from monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. After all,
it is an axiom of any monotheistic worldview that all truth emanates from One God. It
would therefore appear a maxim of monist logic to also believe that the scriptures of each
monotheistic faith promote a singular coherent view on matters of temporal authority and
political life. But they do not. In the same way that Keane understands political theories
to be “signifiers of plurality,” monotheistic scriptures contain a diversity of political ideas,
not a single political agenda. I wish to illustrate this point from the Christian and Islamic
traditions, and begin with a simple, if not simplistic, survey of New Testament ideas about
political authority.

Example 1: A Plural View of the State

The text of Romans 13:1-7, written in the reign of the Emperor Nero, commands Chris-
tians to “diligently obey the governing authorities” because such authorities are “servants
of God.” In radical contrast, the text of Revelation 13, written in the reign of Domitian,
evens the persecuting imperial power of Rome as a beast lurching out of the primor-
dial sea. In between these extremes lies the famous words of Jesus, who seems to take a
middle road between eternal and temporal authority when he commands a deputation of Pharisees to “render unto Caesar what is Caesar’s, and render unto God what is God’s”
(Mark 12:17).

So what is the New Testament position on the role of temporal political authority? While there exists a plurality of interpretations for each of these texts, when taken together it also seems that notions of political/state authority in the New Testament vary according to context and author. One might assume from this that scripture is self-contradictory on the issue, or that one of those texts must act to override the others in the interests of canonical or ideological unity. However, against these options a third alternative is possible: when taken together, the diversity of views about governing authority constitutes a dynamic understanding of state power that reflects the full spectrum of state behaviors: states can provide order and so should be obeyed (Romans 13); states can act with mal-
cious intent and so should be vilified (Revelation 13); state power is temporal in relation
to our eternal hopes and so should be relativized (Mark 12). This plural, “polysemic” view
of state authority reflects what Walter Wink has described as a dynamic theology of the
spiritual “powers” that exists behind political reality:
Temporally: the powers were created, they are fallen, and they shall be redeemed. This can be asserted as a belief in the final triumph of God over the forces of evil. But this schema is also simultaneous: God at one and the same time upholds a given political or economic system, since some such system is required to support human life; condemns that system insofar as it is destructive of fully human life; and presses for its transformation into a more humane order. Conservatives stress the first, revolutionaries the second, reformers the third. The Christian is expected to hold together all three.  

The politico-legal philosopher Martin Krygier likewise argues for a dynamic understanding of the concept of the state when he writes, “States differ... Since ‘the state’ is not one thing, indiscriminate opposition to ‘it’ is as foolish as it is in some quarters popular.” Notice how Wink’s dynamic view of political power in relation to both God’s activity and human participation resonates with Krygier’s perspective below on the power of states and our rightful response toward such power:

States protect us from terrible evils and so they should be valued. They have potential to do special evils of their own, so they must be restrained. And there are goods that only they can do, and these should be encouraged. None of these propositions is inconsistent with the others, so one can respect them all.

Both Wink and Krygier break the “monist habit” of needing to justify state power via one immovable definition, and opt instead for a “polysemic” perspective that helps shape political action across the full range of state behaviors, from the open and free to the despotic and authoritarian. That one of these views is sourced in the reading of sacred text illustrates the potential for scripture to be used in open political discussion.

**Example 2: Interpretation and Political Evolution**

Whatever the variable nature of biblical perspectives on political issues, one might assume, given stereotypes about the inflexibility of Islamic political regimes, that the Qur’an is more likely to contain a singular and explicit political theory or agenda. Not so, according to international relations scholar Sohail Hashmi who criticizes the notion of Islamic political unity in the same way others have attacked the “civilizational” division of world politics:

As critics of the “clash of civilizations” thesis have pointed out, the greatest danger of such an emphasis on civilizations is to make them into holistic, nonporous units. There is nothing, of course, more porous than the boundaries of civilizations. Islamic civilization is no exception... It is utterly meaningless today to speak of an Islamic “tradition” or “civilization” as a monolithic force operating in international politics.

The ethics of Islam are diverse. Hashmi in part traces this diversity back to differences between the early schools of Islamic jurisprudence, one of which emphasized that “revelation could be supplemented by reason,” the other that “ethical value was derived entirely from God’s command.” The former approach (Mutazilite) seeks to open Qur’anic interpretation to “human reason guided by principles of equity and public interest.” The latter approach (Ash’arite) emphasizes “the literal interpretation of the Qur’an and predeterminism.” Both ethical approaches “can be derived from the Qur’an” thereby emphasizing
the diversity of political ideas and practice that could potentially stem from devout Islamic interpretation.

The importance of Hashmi’s views, echoed in the work of other theorists such as Hanafi’s “reflective Islamic approach” to the notion of civil society, is that the political views that are read out of sacred texts are dependent upon traditions of interpretation. In this sense, no text can generate its own fixed and unchallengeable political reality. This is an important point, because it addresses perhaps the gravest fear concerning the role of sacred text in international affairs, namely, that it will inevitably encourage a closed and backward-looking political system.

By way of an illustration, consider the Iranian political situation. Iran is often held up as proof that Islamic theocratic politics are retrograde, a point re-emphasized by the recent elections which seemed far more fixed than free. In fact, the closer one looks at the politics of Iran, the more one sees not the fixed fundamentalism of religious political control, but rather, a very dynamic process of political evolution within the interpretive tradition of Shi’a Islam.

The stereotype of fundamentalism implies rigidity and a disengagement from contemporary culture. And, if the erroneous judgments and oppressive eccentricity of the Iranian regime were our only focus, there is plenty of rigidity to be found. Just ask Iranian women forced to wear the veil under threat of violence including death, or children sent into the battlefield against Iraq, or Salman Rushdie, himself a foreign symbol of the oppression against Iranian poets, playwrights, and journalists. Yet it was Rushdie who, on another subject, wrote, “These are hurried, sloganizing times, and we don’t have the time or worse, the inclination to assimilate many-sided truths.” So it is that Iranian political religion is a many-sided phenomenon, and Qur’anic interpretations and religious traditions play a central role in the unfolding of events. Let us consider five aspects of the drama.

Firstly, the religious foundations of the revolution in Iran can be understood as undergirding an indigenous political uprising against an imperial power. The popular support for the 1978 revolution was the direct result of oppression under the Shah, a puppet to Western interests in the region, installed through a CIA coup that the U.S. no longer even bothers to deny. It was under this oppression that the Qur’anic scholar Ruhollah Khomeini expressed dissent and was eventually sent into exile. In the consciousness of ordinary Iranians Khomeini therefore became like the Hidden Imam of the Shi’ite tradition who would one day return and restore justice. A political expectation was thus born from a grassroots religious tradition.

Secondly, Khomeini was not a traditionalist in Shi’ite religion, but an innovator. His interpretive theory of Velayat-i-Faqih (Mandate of the Islamic Jurist) controversially called for Shi’ite involvement in government as a means of upholding God’s Infinite Justice in the face of tyranny. This doctrine was opposed by conservative mullahs who took the more traditional approach of quietism and withdrawal from politics. Khomeini’s nationalism was also different from the pan-Islamic polity implicit in the concept of umma where the faith community is not organized within the fences of any state. “In an Islamic context,” writes religious scholar Karen Armstrong, “Khomeini’s message was modern.”

Thirdly, French researcher Olivier Roy claims that Iranian political institutions and law are influenced by, but not controlled by, Islamic principles. “It is clear that Islam is not
the basis of the whole system. In fact it is the constitution which defines the place of Islam. It is more the law which defines Islam than Islam defines the law."36 The implication here is that even in a so-called fundamentalist state, influences additional to religious text and interpretation are necessary for any political system to function. (Indeed one might argue that religious fundamentalism can only occur once an external ideological influence, such as nationalism or racism, is imposed upon religious texts.)

Fourthly, the 1997 election of moderate president Mohammad Khatami reflected the scope for a democratic process of political change within the “Islamic” system, not against it. As Armstrong astutely observes, “President Khatami is seeking a more democratic and liberal interpretation of Islam. . . . But Khatami is not reneging on Khomeini or his revolution: Iranians want to come to modernity on their own terms.”37 Similarly, the Iranian lawyer and human rights activist Shirin Ebadi, winner of the 2003 Nobel Peace Prize, has called for reform by using the interpretations of Islamic tradition as her starting point.

Fifthly, Khatami’s inability to wrest power from the conservatives, and the recent shut-out of reformers from the parliamentary system, does not imply a victory for purer or truer political religion. Akbar Rafsanjani and the Council of Guardians may destroy the democratic process but this may only mean they have stopped the natural political evolution seeded in the modern and innovative interpretations of the revolution for the age-old reasons of power and wealth.38

Political scholar H. E. Chehabi wrote in 1991, “[F]or better or worse, change will come from within the regime.”39 Time will tell which one—better or worse—it is. We can hope, indeed pray, for an eventual victory of moderate Islamic forces. The interpretation and reinterpretation of Islamic political ethics will play a crucial role in keeping open public discussion alive during this ongoing crisis. The re-imposition of some sort of secularism upon Iran would itself be retrograde.

Scripture in Open Political Discussion and Systems

As the hopes of the reformers in Iran illustrate, part of believing that sacred text can play a constructive role in open public discussion is the degree to which it can be employed in the creation of open political systems. What follows are two examples of scripture informing open pluralistic political visions, one from the Hebrew Bible, the other from the Qur’an.

Example 1: Scripture in Open Political Discussion

The political writer Michael Ignatieff once praised a book by the Israeli philosopher Avis-hai Margalit as “a model of how philosophers, using only a fine attention to distinctions between similar sounding moral terms, can help to clarify . . . our moral language.”40 A similar recommendation could be given regarding Rabbi Jonathan Sacks’ astute study of the origins of “political and civil society” in Western thought.41 Sacks seeks to distinguish each “society” by contrasting Greek from Hebrew understandings of what it is that “leads individuals to form associations and sustain them.”42

Of particular interest is the foundational role Sacks gives to two understandings “both implicit in the Bible, but quite different in their application.”43 The first is seen in Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan, which seeks to describe the “state of nature” in a way that “closely resembles the biblical description of the era of the Flood.”44 In this world where Hobbes
famously described human existence as "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short," it is the social contract that makes human togetherness function: "This, the social contract, brings into being the 'great Leviathan' of the state, and thus is born political society—the central repository of power to bring about a social order." The second understanding is illustrated by the union of Adam and Eve in the garden—another "state of nature"—but one held together by a covenant not a contract, by a marriage not by the state. It is the story of civil society.

What kind of bond is this? Clearly, given the way the Hebrew Bible describes it, it is not a Hobbesian contract between two independent individuals, each seeking their own interests. It is instead—in a key word of Jewish thought—a covenant (brit in Hebrew), and this is neither an alliance of interests nor, strictly speaking, an emotional state. It is a bond of identity, as if to say: "This is part of who I am."... How then does this narrative differ from that of Hobbes? Its central figure is not "I" but the "We" of which I am a part... On this account, our affiliations and attachments are not irrelevant, but essential, to the structure of the obligations we form. We owe duties to others because they are a part of who we are.46

Sacks' contrast between the contract of political society and the covenant of civil society is powerful, particularly for those whose social and political commitment grows out of biblical narratives read among Jewish and Judeo-Christian communities the world over. Yet rather than use this distinction in a triumphalistic way, as if to trumpet the moral ascendancy of covenant over contract, of the civil over the political, Sacks instead affirms the complementarity and interdependence between these elements. In this way, he resists the temptation to pit secular and religious perspectives, as well as realist and liberal ones, against each other in a zero-sum fashion but instead strives to tell an integrated story where each element remains important.

So there are two stories about human associations, one told in our political classics, the other in our great religious texts. Clearly they are not mutually exclusive. Civil society requires the institutions of politics for the resolution of its conflicts and the maintenance of peace and defense. Political society, according to most of its theorists, needs the undergirding of civil virtue. Both stories represent enduring truths about the human situation and both need to be told if people are to live together peaceably for any length of time.47

Thus we have cast before us a combined vision of the real and ideal, of security and aspiration, of organization and relation, each in an open dialogue with the other, and all grounded with definitional precision in a sacred text considered to be "one of the great meta-narratives of Western civilization." It is a fine example of how to employ sacred text in a way that informs and encourages the open political discussion necessary for the achievement of democratization in a post-secular global order.

Example 2: Scripture and the Development of Open Political Systems

J. R. Gibbins and B. Reimer describe the current state of international affairs as one where "postmodernization and globalization processes are changing the nature of the territorial nation state as well as changing the values of institutions." For various scholars and
public thinkers this is producing new visions of civil society, that realm of free association independent of (and in partnership with) state power that also reaches across international borders. It is not surprising, therefore, especially in light of Elshtain’s “really existing” international religious communities, that Keane observes the global trend of “Muslim actors intent on developing and redefining civil society.” Keane argues that in some contexts fledgling civil societies “are best nurtured and protected by renewing religious faith” and that “these emergent post-secular civil societies not only pose a challenge to political despotism,” they also promise the transition towards the rule of law. Keane cites the “path-breaking” work of Tunisian Qur’anic scholar Sheikh Rachid al-Ghannouchi in the following way:

Just as the followers of the Prophet lived the relationship between ad-dini (the religious) and as-siyasi (the political), so Ghannouchi insists that the laws and institutions of a modern political community should nurture and honor the dignity of its citizens. . . . He insists that Muslims must also use their human capacity for reason (‘aqīqa) and ijtihād [context-bound judgments] and work to create, renew, and nurture civil society institutions (al-mujtama‘ al-ahlī). Not all commentators consider Ghannouchi to be as progressive as Keane suggests. In a conversation with journalist and author Robin Wright, Moroccan scholar Abdou Filali-Ansary contrasts the work of Ghannouchi with Iranian philosopher Abdul Karim Soroush: “Ghannouchi is a main representative of Islamist attitudes and thought (and faces persecution for that); Soroush is a formidable intellectual opponent of Islamism (for which he, too, faces persecution from his government).” Filali-Ansary sees Soroush as the “true reformer” of the two because his views “are closer to modern humanism” in the cause of “open religion” and not simply “radical innovation.” Filali-Ansary doubts the reformist credentials of Ghannouchi because “the community [of faith]—not the individual—remains the ultimate reality and objective” of his work.

But a politics shaped by religious texts and interpretive traditions need not lose itself, as Filali-Ansary seems to suggest it must, to the universal story of “modern humanism” (or any other contemporary narrative) in order to function as a constructive democratic influence in international affairs. If politics and democracy can be drawn from cultural traditions (as Sen argues) and narratives of identity (as Thomas argues), then Ghannouchi’s explicit and particular use of Qur’anic interpretation might in fact save Islamic post-secular politics from forcing itself into an alien (and imperial?) story of modern individualism. In concert with the work of Soroush, it might also help Islamic political ethics reclaim its own humanistic narrative in the process.

Conclusion

In this article, I have drawn on examples from the Abrahamic faiths and on the work of leading theologians and philosophers to sketch some starting principles for thinking about how religious scripture can contribute positively to international affairs. Scriptures “really exist” as a political resource, they contain a diversity of political ideas (not a single political agenda), and they can contribute constructively to open political discussion and the development of open political systems.
The great challenges that we now face in global affairs demand more than conventional thinking and resources; one vital resource is religious scripture. Indeed, without community text-based approaches—like that of Ghannouchi, and indeed many others across different religious traditions—there may be nothing to mediate between reactionary traditionalism (the seedbed of religious fundamentalism) and tradition-less individualism (the seedbed of economic exploitation). There is therefore much at stake over this issue in the post-secular century that awaits.
Notes to pp. 84–110


11 Niebuhr: Augustine’s Political Realism

1 De Trin., 15.22.
2 De Civ. Dei, 14.5.
3 De Civ. Dei, 19.7.
4 De Civ. Dei.
5 De Civ. Dei, 19.5.
6 De Civ. Dei, 19.21.
7 De Civ. Dei, 19.15.
8 Sermon ccclxii, ix, 9.
9 Sermon ccxiii, vii, 7.
10 Comm. on Ps. cxi, 9.
11 Comm. on Ps. cxx, 3.
12 Comm. on Ps. cxxvi, 3, 4.

12 Rees: “Really Existing” Scriptures


10 On the need to rediscover religion in international relations scholarship see Daniel Philpott, “The Challenge of September 11 to Secularism in International Relations,” World Politics 55 (October 2002): 66–95.


12 Elshtain, “Really Existing Communities,” 143.


19 Elshtain, “Really Existing Communities,” 144. On the argument for “symbolic and concrete” forms of political authority in Christian political theology see O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 25.

20 The subtext of national security against Islamic terrorists must also be recognized.


23 Keane, Civil Society, 53.


26 Martin Krygier, Between Fear and Hope: Hybrid Thoughts on Public Values (Sydney: ABC Books, 1997), 106.

27 Krygier, Between Fear and Hope, 101.


30 Hashmi, “Islamic Ethics,” 152.

31 Hashmi, “Islamic Ethics,” 152.


33 Hasan Hanafi in Chambers and Kymlicka, Alternative Conceptions, 171–89.


41 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 55–65.

42 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 55.

43 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 58.
Notes to pp. 115–122

44 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 58.
45 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 59.
46 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 61, 62.
47 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 64.
48 Sacks, Politics of Hope, 57.
50 Keane, Civil Society, 28.

13 Thomas: Isaiah’s Vision of Human Security

1 Martin Wight, “God in History,” sermon preached in Great St. Mary’s Church, Cambridge, February 4, 1951 (unpublished MS, LSE Archive).
14 Seitz, Isaiah 1–39, 76.
16 Similarly, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, on a recent series on the BBC World Service, “Who Runs Your World,” responded in the same way Isaiah did—it is God’s world, regardless of what we think we see happening in world politics.