Heidegger: The Forgottenness of beyng

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Heidegger: The Forgottenness of beyng

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DECLARATION

I certify that this thesis as submitted for examination for the award of Master of Philosophy (MPhil), is entirely my work and has not been taken from the work of others, save and to the extent that such work has been cited and acknowledged within the text of my work. This thesis was completed according to the regulations for postgraduate study by the Research Office of the University of Notre Dame Australia and has not been submitted in whole or in part in any other institution.

Emile Alexandrov
19 June 2021
ABSTRACT

Martin Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)* is the first of a series of seven works centred on his concept of the Event (*Ereignis*). It is also considered to be his second major work after *Being and Time*. Written in a form often cited as not fit for publication, it nevertheless exhibits the blueprint for Heidegger’s famous Turn (*Kehre*). The emphasis of this historical study lies in recognising the contemporaneous manifestation of the “Abandonment by beyng” in its destructive capacity. The nihilistic individual is at the core of this Abandonment, which showcases Heidegger’s description of the individual during the twentieth century. From here, the overcoming of nihilism is envisioned through the uncovering of the “Forgottenness of beyng” in its hiddenness in the Abandonment by beyng. So, the starting point of this thesis and its explication of the Event is in the Forgottenness of beyng and its historical foundation in the “first beginning”. The Event as such is a call for the thinking of beyng, an assessment of the thinking out of an “other beginning”. Taking this into account, the first and second chapter serve as a foundation for the core of the thesis; first by exploring Heidegger’s controversial Turn (*Kehre*) and second, by providing a reconstruction of the *Contributions*.

This thesis will then demonstrate the two-fold consequence of the Forgottenness of beyng, namely: the Abandonment by beyng and the Question-worthiness of beyng.

A separate chapter will be dedicated to each of the three main concepts; the Forgottenness, Abandonment and the Question-worthiness. The hidden nature of the Forgottenness will be the main focus to begin with, which includes its historical background in the first beginning and complementing its ‘continuance’ in the
Abandonment by beyng. An exposition of the Abandonment by beyng where the age of machination and lived experience coupled with the human being’s ignorance of Being within this age are ushered in as a result. This will be demonstrated in its final form in nihilism and its creation of an opening for the Question-worthiness as a response. Effectively, this is an exploration of the other beginning’s thinking of beyng and its necessity for overcoming the first beginning and its foundation in the Forgottenness.

This paper will conclude with a comprehensive analysis of this tripartite exposition; showing the deficiencies in Heidegger’s study of Plato and the Pre-Socratics coupled with the lack of attention being placed on Hegel’s similar call for another beginning in philosophy. Using real world examples, Heidegger’s Abandonment by beyng will be shown to be his strongest exposition within the Contributions, although the historical narrative that is portrayed within the text proves problematic. This is most evident in Heidegger’s reading of Plato, to whom he attributes the distortion of truth and the beginning of the Forgottenness of beyng. Finally, the uniqueness of the Question-worthiness will be shown to be crucial for overcoming the Abandonment’s inherence within the Forgottenness.
DEFINITION OF TERMS

Abyss – The vacuum of undecidability and simultaneously, the space as such.
Appropriation – To allow for, or the occurrence of the Event.
Being - That which determines entities as entities.
Beingness - A particular characterisation of beings or a being.
Beings - Entities as represented within a world.
Beying – An archaic German definition of Being (Sein), where the ‘I’ is replaced with the ‘Y’ in beyn (Seyn). Beying is to differentiate from the Being of the first beginning, as such, beying represents thinking of the Event apropos the other beginning. Beying will not be capitalised in this thesis to avoid referring to it as a ‘thing’ or an entity.
Clearing – The space for beyn’s essential occurrence.
Concealment/Unconcealment – The necessary hidden and unhidden nature of the disclosure of beyn.
Dasein – a being’s Being that is an issue for it. This is how one cares for the world as inhabited and always remaining conscious of such a world. Essentially, it is how and in what way an individual or collective is.¹
Da-sein – “there-being” or the most fundamental question of Being human. Da-sein as historical, essentially occurs only as belonging to the Event which is based on the human being, the gods and the history of metaphysics.
Earth – The foundation or background out of which a world arises as a world.
Historicality – the understanding of the historical ideas and events through the grounding of Da-sein. A signification of inceptual thinking and thereby, as the grounding of history in opposition to the historicality of Being and Time.
Historiography – That which never reaches the level of history. An accumulation of ‘facts’ and ‘events’ as perceived by the human being.
History – The view of the essential occurrence of beyn through monumental shifts in modes of thinking. That which is more fundamental than the historiological.
Inception/Inceptually – The firm instituting of a way of Being or beingness of beings under a certain guideline of thinking.
Originary – The primordial nature (through the other beginning) of that which is discussed.
Projection – The human being as ‘freed’ from beings and into beyn.
Sheltering – The encapsulation of a particular ‘truth’ or ‘way’ in Being.
Thrown projection – The understanding of having been freed from beings into beyn and thus, accounting for how this happens inceptually. This is the understanding of the openness of the projector’s projection as thrown.
Thrown/Throwness – That which propels human beings unto beings.
World – The human being’s experience as dictated by their unique relationship with Being.
The Event (Ereignis) – the essential occurrence of beyn in its refusal or withholding. Beyn in its essence must acknowledge the danger of refusal and overcome it. The Event appropriates beyn through the other beginning and its overcoming of propositional thinking.²

INTRODUCTION

Martin Heidegger’s *Contributions to Philosophy* is his first demonstrative shift in thinking from *Being and Time* towards his later works. It is an attempt to portray the thinking of beyng as the Event, which for Heidegger, became a necessary transition from the hermeneutic phenomenology of Dasein in *Being and Time*. Richard Polt maintains that during the composition of the *Contributions* in 1936-1938, Heidegger only revealed them to a few of his close confidants. The *Contributions* were then only first published in 1989 Germany, with the first English translation following ten years later by Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. The second English translation subsequently followed by Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (2012), which is the primary source for this thesis.

There are two key differences between the two translations. The most important being the use of the word *Ereignis*. The Emad and Maly translation refers to *Ereignis* as “Enowning” whereas the Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu use the term “Event.” The second important translation difference is the word *Seyn*. The Emad and Maly text uses the word “Be-ing” whereas the Rojcewicz and Vallega-Neu text prefers “Beyng.” The differences may point to varied interpretations of the text, the choice of words, however, seem to be more based on personal preference rather than semantics. The central theme of the text regardless is consistent in both translations, namely, *Ereignis* and its essential occurrence through the six junctures.

The *Contributions* for Heidegger are demonstrative of the natural progression of his thought that was portrayed in *Being and Time* en-route towards thinking beyond...
systems and methodologies. This results in several themes that are central to the text and will later become a staple in Heidegger’s thought throughout his life. The Contributions have often been characterised as one of the more difficult in Heidegger’s repertoire, presumably in part, due to it not originally being intended for publication. The lack of a clear chronological structure, with repetitions and neologisms not always being consistent with the flow of ideas within the text, are often mentioned. It is, however, important to take into consideration that the work was a form of meditation, perhaps even a brainstorming exercise on Heidegger’s behalf, which does result in ideas that will come into fruition in his later works. The Contributions then can be seen as the groundwork for his progress as a philosopher and monumental thinker of the twentieth century, a sort of preparatory-transitionary exercise on Heidegger’s part.

The central focus of this thesis is the Forgottenness of beyng. The Forgottenness results in, as this thesis will show, the birth of western metaphysics and therefore, the Contributions is to be a historical recognition of this Forgottenness. The predominant effort is then seen to be an envisioning of thought that goes beyond the Forgottenness of beyng and its foundation in western metaphysics, which will consistently be referred to for the intimation of the other beginning. The main obstruction to overcoming the tradition of western metaphysics is in the Abandonment by beyng. This then reveals the strategy of this thesis; a demonstration of the two-fold consequence of the Forgottenness of Beyng as that which results in its ‘continuance’ in the Abandonment by beyng and its simultaneous allowance for the emancipatory potential of the Question-worthiness of beyng. Before proceeding into the core of the thesis, however, the first chapter will delve into the contentious topic of Heidegger’s Turn (Kehre) in order to place this thesis within contemporary Heidegger scholarship. To do so, the significant polarity within Heideggerian studies concerning the meaning of his works post Being and Time are be discussed. This will form an important background for the reader’s understanding of the aforementioned Turn. The second chapter will subsequently reconstruct the Contributions with an emphasis on the six junctures and their portrayal of the Question-worthiness of beyng. This is essential in familiarising the reader with the key terms and concepts that are expounded upon as the thesis progresses. Chapter three through to five will subsequently focus on the three main themes that represent the thesis’s core respectively, namely, the
Forgottenness of beyng, the Abandonment by beyng and finally the Question-worthiness of beyng.

Beginning with the third chapter, priority will be placed on the hidden nature of the Forgottenness which reinforces its historical progression into the Abandonment by beyng. It is important to grasp this historical progression to reveal the emergence of the Abandonment. This will set the stage for the Forgottenness’ dichotomous exhibition in the Abandonment by beyng and Question-worthiness of beyng as the foundation for the history of metaphysics. The first consequence of the Forgottenness in the emergence of the Abandonment will become the focal point of the fourth chapter. Here, the full spectrum of the Abandonment will be observed, as well as its inevitable emergence out of its foundation in the Forgottenness. Machination and lived experience as well as other key themes are to be explored as part of this emergence. This cumulative effect will be shown to have a final manifestation directly in the characterisation of the human being as nihilistic. The Abandonment will then initiate the Resonating of beyng, which creates the potential for the Question-worthiness of beyng, the subject matter of chapter five. The Question-worthiness of beyng is a way of imagining the thinking of the other beginning, whilst also representing the emancipatory solution to the Abandonment. Furthermore, this emancipation involves a comprehensive historical excavation of the history of western philosophy and its ideas. This will involve chapter five being centred on four core themes; the gods, the history of metaphysics, the human being and finally the thinking of beyng. These four concepts will be shown to concurrently inaugurate the emancipatory potential needed for the thinking and inception of the other beginning.

The sixth and final chapter analyses the main ideas that Heidegger develops within the Contributions. The strengths and weaknesses will be explored in detail, with a clear affirmation of the importance of the text within the philosophical tradition of the twentieth century. This thesis affirms the Contributions’ call for another beginning based on the Question-worthiness of beyng as a solution to the Abandonment by beyng. Notwithstanding the discrepancies that are to be observed within this chapter, the core project will be shown to be pertinent. The ideas of the text are, therefore, an important addition to contemporary philosophy, whilst also showcasing a unique alternative to the current worldview.
CHAPTER I: CONTEMPORARY SCHOLARSHIP

Heidegger’s View Of The Turn – *(die Kehre)*

Contemporary scholarship of Heidegger’s *oeuvre* commonly acknowledges a shift in his thought that is known as the “Turn.” This marks a reorientation of Heidegger’s philosophy that first surfaces in the 1930s, post *Being and Time*, and becomes fully pronounced in the 1940s. While the Turn itself is most widely accepted as an important stage in Heidegger’s philosophical trajectory, there is widespread disagreement amongst scholars on the meaning of the Turn itself. Generally, in affirmation of the Turn, the concept of Being from *Being and Time* is transformed in the *Contributions*. This transformation is foreshadowed by Heidegger in *The Essence of Truth*, written between *Being and Time* and the *Contributions*.

This position is held by Daniela Vallega-Neu and Richard Polt and is to be discussed in the next section. This interpretative trend in the Heideggerian scholarship reads the Turn with an emphasis on the uniqueness and the new qualities in Heidegger’s thought after the Turn. The new conception of the Event that emerges in the *Contributions*, for instance, marks an entirely new phase in Heidegger’s philosophy. The Event also comes with “beyng,” which is central to the *Contributions* and in *The Essence of Truth* is first defined as the “holding sway” between Being and beings. As will be explored in this thesis, beyng is inseparable from the Event, which in itself represents a more “originary” conception of Being. The opposing view led by Thomas Sheehan and Mark Wrathall among others which will be presented in the third section - refutes a change in Heidegger’s project *per se*. Instead, this scholarly interpretation attempts to demonstrate Heidegger’s thought as exclusive to the field of phenomenology all along, more specifically – Being pursued “phenomenologically as the meaningfulness of things.” From within this point of view, Heidegger’s pursuit remained consistent with regard to the meaning of Being, a phenomenological project that was founded on *Being and Time*. This came with major terminological changes in order to adjust to the shift in approach on Heidegger’s part. The opposing camp does acknowledge a

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change in approach, albeit without Heidegger having to abandon the original intent of *Being and Time*. In light of this, starting with Heidegger’s personal views on the Turn, it is important to explore this division to fully ascertain this thesis’s position within contemporary Heideggerian scholarship today.

The general context of scholarly disagreement concerning the Turn in Heidegger’s thought is his 1946 *Letter on Humanism* in which he coined the phrase ‘*die Kehre*’ to describe a change in his philosophy and its inevitable occurrence as a result of the subjective nature of *Being and Time*.\(^9\) The Turn is Heidegger’s attempt to go beyond the limitations of metaphysics and the hurdles that it creates in the form of subjectivity, which this thesis will show, is a result of the Forgottenness of beyng in the *Contributions*. The *Contributions* can then be seen to be the first major work post *Being and Time* that demonstrates this new form of thinking in full affirmation of the Turn. From the point of view of the *Contributions*, the thinking of Being must be an appropriation, and as such, the Event must come to be the predominant approach to overcoming the limitations of metaphysics. According to William J Richardson, this realisation by Heidegger marked the Turn and subsequently formed a pre and post Turn Heidegger, a Heidegger I and Heidegger II respectively.\(^10\) Coming back to the *Letter on Humanism*; Heidegger will state that *Being and Time* is not to be discarded in light of the Turn, “but in it the thinking that was sought first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* experienced, that is to say, experienced from the fundamental experience of the oblivion of Being.”\(^11\) It is important to point out here that “oblivion” is a term that Heidegger uses interchangeably with his conception of the “forgottenness,” a historical presupposition that will evolve historically into several issues that are to be explored further in this thesis.\(^12\) This is also a clear allusion to the *Contributions* and its designation of *Being and Time* to the Interplay, that is to say, thinking that serves as a point of reference, a compass for the overcoming of metaphysics. This also demonstrates the inherent limitations of *Being and Time* and its position as a necessary precursor to the Turn that can be seen as emergent from within the *Contributions*.

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The Turn of the *Contributions* will unfold more comprehensively in Heidegger’s *Basic Concepts* – a series of lectures delivered during 1941. Here, Heidegger will explore the truth of Being instead of the existential structures of Dasein customary of his previous works. The truth of Being in *Basic Concepts* exhibits how the appropriative Event allows beings to come into their own Being as “essencing.” By showing this essencing – Heidegger is demonstrating the Turn from beings toward their own Being. However, this is only possible through a historical return to the foundation of this ‘coming into Being’. The Turn within the appropriating Event, must in this historical return, determine the origin of thinking that Marius Johan Geertsema describes as “homecoming.” This historical thinking or homecoming for Heidegger is inextricable to the Event as “the happening of a decision about truth,” and in this decision; “the manner in which the whole of beings is revealed.” This marks the first fundamental feature of the Turn, the historical becoming of Being, which Heidegger will use the more archaic term beyng to portray throughout the *Contributions*. Effectively, this signifies the shift from the fundamental ontology of Being to the beyng-historical thinking of the Event.

In so doing, Heidegger alters the form of expression into the structure that surfaces in the *Contributions*. In other words, the beyng-historical thinking that comes with the Turn must include another expression that is to overcome the representational thinking of the first beginning. This ‘poetic’ shift that Heidegger takes up for the *Contributions* onward is an attempt at the language of the appropriative Event which cannot be expressed through metaphysics and the *rationale* of the human being. Rather, it must be expressed through Being and its projection as a “self-saying” that is representative of the history of a people. This is also the reason why Heidegger confronted Anaximander in *Basic Concepts* – another method to uncover the first beginning of western metaphysics and synonymously, inaugurate the other beginning. Moreover,

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18 Heidegger, *Basic Concepts*, xi. For Heidegger, the first inception of western thinking began with Anaximander. Effectively, the historical repetition must involve a confrontation with Anaximander’s
the coming to be of beings from within the historical context has to be appropriated for overcoming the traditional uses of language as a tool. This then marks the second intrinsic feature of the Turn – the change from the language of the first beginning to the poetic expression of the other beginning via the appropriative Event.

So the Turn from Heidegger’s perspective is less a change in terminology and method, rather, more a paradigmatic move to the philosophy of the appropriative Event. This as shown, necessitates two fundamental features: the beyng-historical thinking and the poetic expression of the other beginning. This is also evident in comparing the analytic structure of *Being and Time* to the lack of structure and flow of the *Contributions*, coupled with its very difficult and often cryptic expression. The *Contributions*, therefore, is Heidegger’s first explication of the Turn *qua* the Event.

**Affirming The Turn**

Richard Polt determines the Event as intrinsic to the Turn that is beyond a minor terminological adjustment on Heidegger’s part. This is a project that differs from the phenomenological structures of *Being and Time*, as Polt explains that “instead of describing the temporal structures that allow us to understand being, as he intended to do in *Being and Time*, he now looks to the happening in which we come into our own as those who stand in the truth of being.”

In abandoning the temporal structures of *Being and Time* – Heidegger now dives into the history of beyng where Dasein now becomes historicised. This is important to consider that even though there is a motivation on Heidegger’s part to overcome the subjectivity of *Being and Time*, Dasein does continue to play a central role from the *Contributions* onwards, however, Dasein now becomes the Da-sein of *Contributions*. In other words, the selfhood and collective selfhood get a renewed focus post the Turn, a result of his attempt to think historically and move beyond the subjective nature of the history of metaphysics. For Polt, this marked change in Heidegger’s thinking motivates his involvement in the

“saying,” which in *Basic Concepts*, Heidegger attempts to do by going beyond the literal translation of the fragment.

19 Richard F. H Polt, *Time And Trauma: Thinking Through Heidegger In The Thirties* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International Ltd, 2019), 2. This is synonymous to Heidegger’s explication of the truth of Being in *Basic Concepts* that was discussed in the previous section.


political climate of Germany during the 1930s. As Polt will show in his study of Heidegger during the 1930s, Heidegger was compelled to the Turn by late 1929 as is evidenced through a cluster of lectures all centred around a political-philosophical worldview that is bound to his metanarrative of western history as the history of beyng.\textsuperscript{22} Beyng, therefore, marks the shift to the historical in the Turn.

Concerning the poetic expression of \textit{Contributions}, Polt explains is a result of beyng’s “simplicity.”\textsuperscript{23} This is also Heidegger’s attempt to overcome subjectivity and simultaneously, the transcendental thinking of \textit{Being and Time}.\textsuperscript{24} In other words, the \textit{Contributions} are an attempt to think beyng without having to rely on beings (avoiding complexity), which leads Heidegger to his new poetic style as part of the Turn and hence, Polt’s characterisation of simplicity. Simplicity, therefore, represents the inaccessibility of the Event to direct thinking, a call for the propositionless thinking that is first proposed in the \textit{Contributions}.\textsuperscript{25} For Heidegger to pronounce the importance of this trend of thought, the \textit{Contributions} will have to show the inherent limitations of metaphysics and its historical narrative. These limitations are described within the \textit{Contributions} as “words failing us” and in this failure; there is “the event as intimation and incursion of beyng.”\textsuperscript{26} The failure of propositional thinking must be overcome through the naming of beyng, as it is only by recognising the inherent limitations in language will the poetic expression produce the inceptual condition.\textsuperscript{27}

The poetic shift does not merely reflect a shift in language, as the end goal of the \textit{Contributions} unlike \textit{Being and Time} is not directly proposed, it is not based on a systematic approach that aims to achieve a temporal structure of Being. On the contrary, the \textit{Contributions} can be seen as an attempt to imagine philosophy anew, a return to the beginning of western history and in so doing; go beyond itself.\textsuperscript{28} Hence,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Polt, \textit{Time And Trauma}, 2.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Polt, \textit{The Emergency of Being}, 17.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Polt, \textit{The Emergency of Being}, 160.
\item \textsuperscript{25} In the \textit{Contributions}, Heidegger asserts that simplicity reflects the utter simplistic nature of beyng as the “between” in the strife of the gods and humans. Importantly, the \textit{Contributions} show this to be the first time that Heidegger will attempt to ‘speak out of’ beyng. Later in the thesis, simplicity will be shown to be one of the eight ways that determine speaking out of beyng as the essential occurrence of the Event.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu (Indiana University Press, 2012), 30.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 30.
\item \textsuperscript{28} Martin Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 31.
\end{itemize}
Heidegger’s declaration of philosophy as sovereign but useless knowledge. Furthermore, where *Being and Time* can be seen as a historical work that is inclusive of the history of metaphysics - the *Contributions’* new conception of history does not ground philosophy immediately. As such, the philosophy of the *Contributions* as representative of the Turn is always groundless in its ground, and is always a beginning which, therefore, can “be suspended for a long time and can apparently disappear.”

It can be shown then that the Turn is unique to the *Contributions*, a conclusion that is also reached by Daniela Vallega-Neu: “the notion of the turning is central for Heidegger and I believe that the reason we find this notion in *Contributions* but not in the subsequent two volumes is due to the way Heidegger introduces the event in departure from *Being and Time*." Importantly, however, Vallega-Neu cites a letter from Heidegger addressed to Richardson in which he points out that the Turn is not merely a change in viewpoint on his part, rather, more a situating of the Turn concerning the occurrence of the truth of Being. So in effect, Heidegger’s Turn aims to reorient the project that begun with *Being and Time* and as such has become intertwined with the Event and the truth of beyng. For Vallega-Neu, the thinking of *Being and Time* transforms into the relation between Being and thinking - the word “of” beyng in the *Contributions*; the essential occurrence of the Event. As mentioned earlier, this was foreshadowed in *On the Essence of Truth*, where Heidegger raises the issue that to remain within the realm of representational thinking results in beyng’s withdrawal. This for Vallega-Neu shows that Heidegger was already thinking differently to the temporal structures of *Being and Time* well before the *Contributions*. This will ultimately lead to the *Contributions* and its move “from the transcendentental approach to beyng (in the project of *Being and Time*) to the thinking of beyng in its historicality.” So, even though *Being and Time* poses the question of Being more originarily than ever before, it remains bound to the history of metaphysics.

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29 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 30.
30 Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 31.
31 Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event) to The Event, Studies In Continental Thought* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 76.
32 Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*, 76.
Vallega-Neu and Polt do share the view that the focal point for Heidegger shifts towards the truth of Being. However, while the poetic shift signifies an approach to speak out of the Event, Vallega-Neu will assert further that the poetic shift is also in line with the notion of artistic creation as historical inception. This is not limited to poetizing, but other forms of art such as painting, sculpting etc. In the creation of art, truth is led to Being and therefore, prepares the ground for the other beginning through another historical epoch and thinking. Geertsema similarly shows that in “its appropriation, Being projects, founds and heralds itself anticipatorily through poetry” which Geertsema labels “onto-poetology.” So the poetic shift in the Turn also aims to project a new historical inception, an attempt on Heidegger’s part to shift not just his thinking and philosophy, but to initiate a paradigmatic shift in history and philosophy. Furthermore, Vallega-Neu explains that this creation of truth is not the sole responsibility of a human agent, rather, it is a prerequisite for the Event to occur as part of the human being’s response to the call of beyng. This again is not limited to a singular individual such as Heidegger himself, but collective peoples rising to the inauguration of the other beginning. This new trend in Heidegger’s thinking is unique to the Turn, such that the call for another beginning in history is something that transcends the phenomenological structure of his previous works. The Turn, therefore, is to be seen as an incipent project, an attempt at a paradigmatic shift not just in Heidegger’s thinking alone, but an epochal shift that comes with the other beginning.

Against Heidegger’s Turn

The notion that Heidegger’s work shifts from the question of Being to the Event as appropriation is central to the Turn, however, for Thomas Sheehan, they are the same thing. Sheehan argues that from Being and Time onwards, Heidegger is guided by the “thing itself,” which requires a new interpretation of the Turn. Essentially, Ereignis translated as the “Event” for Sheehan is problematic due to two misconceptions, namely in to “appear” and to “appropriate.” In the case of to appear;

37 Geertsema, Heidegger’s Poetic Projection of Being, 5.
38 Vallega-Neu, Heidegger’s Contributions To Philosophy, 96.
39 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 231.
40 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 231.
41 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 233-4.
what is to appear has already appeared, for it always already has. Appearing can only be viewed non-temporally – a coming to be that is inherent to the thrownness of Dasein. As for to appropriate, it is less about an “owning,” more an allowing for a thing to come into its “own proper state.”42 The Event cannot be viewed as a temporal occurrence where it happens at certain moments, it is “that which is always already done (fac-tum) and thus always already operative.”43 Therefore, Heidegger’s project always remained phenomenological and with the predominant focus on the meaning of things apropos the human being. To appear and appropriate are consistent within Heidegger’s works post Being and Time, regardless of a methodological shift in his expression. The poetic expression of the Contributions, therefore, is Heidegger’s attempt to explore the a priori human being, without ever leaving the phenomenological tradition. At its core, Heidegger’s phenomenology remains in pursuit of the origin of meaningfulness – the implicit drive for the groundless ground that makes sense of everything that the human being will encounter.44 Sheehan’s concern regarding the popular misconceptions of Heidegger’s Turn is also based on the term Event (Ereignis). The commonly accepted translation as the “Event” is fallacious as again, nothing ever happens, rather, it would be more accurate to see it as a commingling of “to eye something” and “to own it.”45 This is relevant for understanding Sheehan’s perspective on the Turn as this shows that the Event is more in line with a phenomenological description as opposed to quasi-poetic verbiage. To “see” and to “own” are processes used to understand that which appears within the context of meaning. So, Ereignis as appropriation means that the “human being, in its essence, has always already been brought into its “own” as the open space for meaningfulness.”46 Having been brought into this space of meaning, the human being sustains this space in its being-in-the-world. Hence why, for Sheehan, the experience of the world is a wondrous one and as such, for Heidegger, it remains phenomenological in the “personal claims it makes on you.”47 Therefore, the Contributions must be read as a phenomenological pursuit of the meaning of Being based on the a priori human being.

42 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 234.
43 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 234.
44 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 201.
45 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 232.
46 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 234.
47 Sheehan, Making Sense of Heidegger, 236.
It is important to note that Sheehan does acknowledge the Turn as a term that Heidegger coins, it did not, however, denote a change in the approach of his thinking and philosophy. Furthermore, Heidegger’s exclamation that the Turn is a mere reorientation in his thinking is what Sheehan will point to for further evidence to reinforce his argument. Sheehan will also draw our attention to Heidegger’s ostensibly perplexing choice of the term “Turn,” and due to its ambiguity within contemporary Heidegger scholarship – he will prefer “oscillation” as a more appropriate fit.\footnote{Sheehan, \textit{Making Sense of Heidegger}, 239.} A repeated swaying within a coterminous happening happens to be more demonstrative of an oscillation as opposed to a Turn. Again, this is taking into account that Sheehan believes that the Event is the same as the Turn. Following Sheehan, Philip Tonner will elaborate further that “it is the reciprocity between ‘needing’ and ‘belonging’ that constitutes Ereignis, and Kehre names this reciprocity \textit{qua} movement back and forth between the two terms ‘needing’ and ‘belonging’.”\footnote{Philip Tonner, \textit{Heidegger, Metaphysics And The Univocity of Being} (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing Group Ltd, 2010), 60.} The change of thinking is based on Heidegger’s change in method, a bringing of the inner movement of the Event to language whilst remaining within the same fundamental question of \textit{Being and Time}.\footnote{Tonner, \textit{Heidegger}, 58.} Inevitably for Sheehan and Tonner then, the question of Being is preliminary to the Event.\footnote{Tonner, \textit{Heidegger}, 58.} The Event, therefore, is the opening which the historical human being meaningfully inhabits, which makes it imperative for beings to be understood as they appear and what they are.\footnote{Tonner, \textit{Heidegger}, 60.} This leaves the human being to allow itself to be ‘taken up’ by the Event and in so doing, embrace a quest of meaning. This is the fundamental phenomenological undertone that Sheehan and Tonner postulate as pervading Heidegger’s works from \textit{Being and Time} and onwards.

Mark Wrathall holds a similar view in regards to the Turn, although reaching a different conclusion. For Wrathall, Heidegger’s works from 1925 to 1945 were all centred on the essence of truth.\footnote{Mark Wrathall, \textit{Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History}, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 11.} Truth as unconcealment is reflective in all of Heidegger’s works and Wrathall is adamant that Heidegger never stops investigating
this throughout his entire corpus. Even though the poetic style that Heidegger adopts in the *Contributions* can be seen as a new phase of his thought, unconcealment nevertheless, persists as one of the dominant themes. To be sure, unconcealment is a topic that Heidegger will pursue in detail in other works post *Being and Time* such as his *The Essence of Truth* published in 1930-1931. So for Wrathall, Heidegger’s Turn is really a shift to language, and similar to Sheehan’s position; was “dependent on and derivative of the meanings we encounter as we inhabit an intelligible world.” The Turn is to be seen as a ‘terminological’ shift, and can only be understood as “language” replacing “discourse” within the context of truth as unconcealment. This is one way of explaining Heidegger’s difficult expression within the *Contributions*.

For Wrathall therefore, the excessive emphasis that has been placed on the Turn and its supposed indication of a new train of thought is simply misguided: “despite the appearance of a change from Heidegger’s earlier to his later work on the role of language, Heidegger’s view remains remarkably consistent in its broad outlines.” The terminological shift for Wrathall is based on Heidegger’s recognition of the metaphysical tradition’s incapacity for experiencing truth as unconcealment. In other words, the essence of unconcealment (*alêtheia*) is reflective of the shift in language and expression on Heidegger’s part, which also doubles as the shift from propositional truth to truth as unconcealment. Whereas the propositional truth is bound to the processes of traditional metaphysics, unconcealment is only experienced through the human being’s involvement with the world. This demonstrates the necessity for Heidegger’s quasi-poetic expression, for to speak about truth necessitates living through the unconcealment as the human being is coterminous with this unconcealing as it occurs essentially. So, *Being and Time* serves as an important stepping stone to the later Heidegger without it being abandoned, for it is only in recognising the limitations of metaphysics does Heidegger reach this conclusion. In other words, for Wrathall, a Turn is less a shift in thought, more an advancement on ideas already formulated within *Being and Time*.

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54 Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, 12.
56 Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, 130.
57 Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment*, 12.
Richardson who was one of the earlier scholars to engage in a comprehensive study of Heidegger remained ambivalent, however, he did see benefits in naming a Turn as such. For Richardson, there is enough evidence to suggest that significant change has occurred in Heidegger’s works as part of the Turn, and for practicality, he thought it useful to characterise it as such:

As for my own proposal—the essentials of which are that there was a Kehre (by Heidegger’s own testimony) and that there was, therefore, a pre-Kehre (what I took to be Heidegger I—typified by Being and Time) and a post-Kehre (what I took to be Heidegger II—typified, say, by Time and Being)—I would still defend its cogency as a plausible hypothesis for appreciating the whole of the Heidegger phenomenon taken in the sum.59

According to Richardson, the Contributions is the significant text that marks the Turn, and consequently, the distinction is a useful one and at the very least, is beneficial for heuristic purposes.60 This is not to say that Richardson affirms a complete change in Heidegger’s thought, for all that it is worth, Sheehan and Wrathall may hold a valid point of view on the problem. After all, Heidegger does state that the Turn is another attempt at the problem that began with Being and Time through a “reversal,” as opposed to complete rejection. This reversal remains within the context of the sense of Being which inevitably had experienced a metamorphosis that “is as much controlled by an internal unity as it is dictated by an intrinsic necessity.”61 This process Richardson explains, is a transformation of what it means to think of Being. Evidently then, Richardson’s depiction is very much in line with the Event as opposed to a “sense” of Being. When discussing the need for an understanding of the Turn, Richardson will point to the then unpublished Contributions. Richardson here, seemingly undecided, explains that there are several key features of the Turn in which the “analytic of Dasein” is retained even as the “fundamental ontology” is abandoned.62 The abandoning, however, is through the Event which he describes as “the turning-relation-in Being itself.”63 So when Richardson depicts the Turn as

59 Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
60 Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
61 Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, 16.
62 Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
63 Richardson, Heidegger Through Phenomenology To Thought, xxxvi.
representing a significant change, he remains nebulous on the specifics, for instance, on the one hand, the structures of Dasein are maintained, whilst on the other hand, the Event comes into full frontal view and taking the lead of emphasis.

The conclusion to be drawn from this is a problematic one, as Richardson’s depiction is at odds with both an affirmation and refutation, for the Event cannot be discussed from within the structures of Dasein nor the analytic of Dasein. Dasein of Being and Time becomes the Da-sein of the Contributions, a historical becoming, a ground for being human that is “sheer moment and history.” As such, Richardson’s case unlike Sheehan and Wrathall’s remains inchoate. The Turn may exhibit certain new formulations on Heidegger’s part, however, Richardson may be deliberately choosing to avoid a deeper analysis. Needless to say, the exposition here does provide enough support to affirm a Turn at the very least as a tool to navigate Heidegger’s expansive corpus. The Contributions helps provide clarity on the issue, but Richardson nevertheless leaves a more conclusive take on this issue for others.

**The Emergence of The Forgottenness of Beyng From Within The Turn**

The two opposing camps represent a rather minor disparity, as it is generally accepted that the Turn did actually occur, the question is, however, what did it represent? Sheehan and others are adamant that it was merely based on language, meaning or method and the primary goal remained consistent. This, however, downplays the relevance of Heidegger’s decision to discontinue the project of Being and Time. Should the Event have been approachable from within the context of Being and Time, there would be little reason for Heidegger to abandon its structure in its entirety. Moreover, to read and assert that Being and Time and the Contributions are the same processes that pursue the same end would prove difficult. Beyond their style and composition, they reach a different end entirely, with no actual system or process being envisioned within the Contributions. The Contributions, as opposed to Being and Time, lack structure and a system as such, for it is Heidegger’s conscious decision to go beyond the tradition of metaphysics.

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64 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 256.
Taking this into account, the thesis affirms the Turn both for practicality as in the case of Richardson as well as for a monumental shift in Heidegger’s focus and thought. The Contributions firstly, do not engage in an anthropocentric view of Being as in the case of Being and Time, which Heidegger characterises as still founded on the history of metaphysics. The history of metaphysics as constituted in the Contributions is founded on the Forgottenness of beyng, a consistent eventuation that begins with the Pre-Socratics and Plato toward its end in Nietzsche. This represents a unique outlook that had not been pursued by Heidegger in his previous works, a shift from the thinking of Being to beyng-historical thinking. In essence, in the Contributions, the Forgottenness is a recognition of a deeply instituted overlooking of the question of beyng, such that it pervades the work’s entire structure which results in the entire historical process requiring a ‘repetition’ from the Ancient Greeks to their inheritors.

Secondly, the Contributions much in contrast with Being and Time is Heidegger’s attempt to overcome the propositional thinking that has come to dominate western philosophy, as this thinking is what perpetuates the Forgottenness. Furthermore, the consistent reliance on this framework of thought evolves historically into the Abandonment by beyng. Here, all of the symptoms that surface within the Abandonment in the Contributions are based on this historical ‘forgetting’. In perhaps what is the most central point in support of the Turn per se, is Heidegger’s assertion that this will include Being and Time, as it also relies on the same historical foundation with its ‘systems’ approach. So, should Heidegger have remained within the framework of Being and Time, the Turn would not have happened, and therefore, the Forgottenness would not be recognised. Be that as it may, Heidegger does delegate Being and Time to the Interplay, of which more on in the next chapter, it nevertheless is hindered by the Forgottenness as is all of western philosophy. So in other words, it would prove problematic to profess the Turn as a misconception that is merely a terminological shift in language and meaning as in the case of Sheehan and Wrathall.

In the Contributions there is also the inception of the new term beyng that Heidegger will exclaim is due to the “originary turning in the event” and is that which brings Da-sein to itself.65 So the Being of Being and Time failed to serve as the liberation from

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65 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 323.
the history of western metaphysics as originally intended – as it relies on being a system: “since the end of metaphysics, has to happen ever more decisively, namely, the fact that the thinking of beyng must not become a “doctrine” or “system.””

66 Being and Time is vulnerable to being read anthropologically instead of being the reverse; being read in light of the essential occurrence of beyng.

67 The question of Being in Being and Time as such must include a more originary questioning that does not remain constricted to western metaphysics, but must simultaneously incorporate it without being hindered by it. Mark Sinclair will state this succinctly: “To fail to see that Being and Time leads, in a historical retrocession, metaphysics back to its own presuppositions would be to read the text metaphysically, in what I have termed a positivistic fashion.”

68 So the Turn in Heidegger’s thought incorporates Being and Time not as a system or doctrine, but the “self-preparing beginning of the essential occurrence of beyng itself.”

69 Furthermore, Sheehan’s characterisation of the Event and the Turn being the same present too many issues when reading the Contributions.

The Turn as reflective of Heidegger’s shift can be seen to be synonymous with the Event undoubtedly, but to see them as bound together will negate the emergence of the historical in the Contributions and thereby, the Forgottenness itself. The Event as appropriation must be a historical conception of philosophy and expression whilst also receding in its portrayal of them. Additionally, Vallega-Neu shows that towards the end of the Contributions, Heidegger is already leaving the thinking of the Event along with the notion of the Turn behind in favour of the Event’s connection between the gods and humans.

70 This shows that the Event cannot be thought solely out of the Turn in Heidegger’s thinking, on the contrary, it can be said to be that which perpetually questions the ground of all thinking and critically, remains free in its appropriation. The Turn, therefore, signifies the recognition of this monumental shift in Heidegger’s thought without grounding this recognition in its perpetual questioning. This Question-worthiness of beyng will then be intertwined with this recognition as the

66 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 68.

67 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 70. This reversal is Heidegger’s way of stating that Being and Time is not to be completely rejected as discussed in the previous section, as it does represent a unique event in the history of western philosophy.


69 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 191.

70 Vallega-Neu, Heidegger's Poietic Writings, 77.
historical prerequisite and will be the predominant feature of the Turn that is left out of Heidegger’s previous works. To finalise all of this with further clarity: the Turn marks a shift based on Heidegger’s realisation of *Being and Time* as inherently limited which subsequently, necessitates the emergence of the poetic expression as a methodological reversal. In so doing, the historical roots of the Forgottenness are uncovered, and thusly, the essential occurrence of the Event.

It becomes clear from this that the Turn is based on the beyng-historical thinking that emerges from within the *Contributions*. The historical precondition for all thought is a factor that is unique to the *Contributions*, for all notions of progress and advancement are inseparable from the historical foundation of western metaphysics. The history of western metaphysics Heidegger insists, is characterised by the Forgottenness of beyng which calls for the beyng-historical thinking that is missing from all his previous works. The Turn marks this shift in emphasis without a need for a change of focus on particulars such as language or meaning. Scholars such as Sheehan and Wrathall are not necessarily and entirely fallacious in their approach, although they overlook the predominant historical motivation behind the Turn. This is sufficient enough to label Heidegger’s development from *Being and Time* and onwards as a post Turn Heidegger; “for thinking no longer possesses the advantages of a "system"; thinking is historical in the peculiar sense that beyng itself as appropriating event bears all history and therefore can never be calculated.”

The lack of ground (whilst actually presupposing a ground) that has persisted from the Forgottenness is central to the essential occurrence of the Event which is what the *Contributions* aim to make evident. The inauguration of the six junctures is Heidegger’s way of determining the Turn, an undulating process that overcomes the systematic approach of his previous approach in *Being and Time*.

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71 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 191.
CHAPTER II: RECONSTRUCTION - CONTRIBUTIONS TO PHILOSOPHY

Prospect

Heidegger in the Contributions states that where Being and Time “still has an appearance that is “anthropological,” “subjectivistic,” “individualistic,” etc.,” the “opposite of all this is in view there.”72 There is a need for the transformation of the question of Being, which involves the repudiation of all systems, worldviews or any anthropological outlook of Being.73 Essentially, this is an attempt to begin philosophy anew, to go where Being and Time failed to go, namely, a new beginning for western philosophy. This theme is one that pervades all of Heidegger’s subsequent works, one that can be traced to the platform of thought developed within this text.

In the Contributions, “beyng” as the Event demonstrates the recognition of the need for a “Question-worthiness” as opposed to an adherence to a “worldview.”74 Before moving ahead, it is important to dissect Heidegger’s use of the word beyng. This is opposed to ‘Being’ and is based on the archaic German word Seyn instead of the commonly used Sein. Charles E. Scott suggests that Heidegger’s choice of Seyn emphasises its unthought dimension and origination, a happening of what is, an elusive concept that cannot be grasped propositionally.75 Essentially, beyng’s etymological inception marks an important phase in Heidegger’s thought which characterises an intimation of the Event (Ereignis). This will ultimately give rise to his conceptual landmark in western philosophy’s thinking and will be explored in detail as the groundwork of this thesis is laid, but for now, the Event can be viewed as how beyng essentially occurs.76

Heidegger contends that the Contributions ought not to be seen as another scholarly contribution to philosophy. Rather, it is an attempt at a transition from metaphysics to

72 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 233.
73 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 15.
74 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 34.
76 Scott, et al., Companion To Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy, 82.
the thinking of beyng.\textsuperscript{77} Therefore, “the thoughtful speaking of a philosophy within the other beginning must be attempted, in the manner of a preliminary exercise.”\textsuperscript{78} The \textit{Contributions} are in effect, a preliminary attempt at this transition, a groundwork for thinking that does not describe, teach, explain, or promulgate, as that would recede into the history of metaphysical thought. It is also not an ‘act’ \textit{per se}, as this would also prove problematic, for it cannot be approached from an individual or communal perspective. This preliminary exercise is before all acts or purposes, it is a questioning of what is most Question-worthy, a “detachment from every “personal” domain.”\textsuperscript{79} Hence, the necessary imposition of the concept of beyng and its transitional nature.

The difficulty in this transition lies in the reinvention or “disentanglement” (of which more on later) of thought, a move from propositional thinking to the “appropriated over to the appropriating Event.”\textsuperscript{80} This must include an overcoming of the age of “systems” and a move toward the elaboration of beings from within truth as the essential occurrence of beyng. Therefore, thinking must occur through the Event, through beyng as the essential occurrence of truth. This occurrence, historically speaking, happens as a transition from the thinking of the “first beginning” (as the guiding question – what are beings) starting with the Pre-Socratics culminating in Platonism, to the thinking of the “other beginning” (how does beyng essentially occur?). For this transition to occur as this thesis will show, it must be grounded in history or a deeper reinterpretation of metaphysics which finds its end in Nietzsche as “the last great philosophy.”\textsuperscript{81} It is important to note that the \textit{Contributions} places great emphasis on the historical influence of western philosophy, for philosophy is never to be viewed as a firmly grounded body of thought, but a ductile process that begins from western philosophy’s earliest roots in the Pre-Socratics.

The outline of this process occurs through six junctures which serve as a “preliminary sketch of the temporal-spatial playing field:”

\begin{enumerate}
  \item the Resonating
\end{enumerate}

\textsuperscript{77} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 6.
\textsuperscript{78} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 6.
\textsuperscript{79} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 6.
\textsuperscript{80} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 6.
\textsuperscript{81} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 32.
2. the Interplay  
3. the leap  
4. the Grounding  
5. the Future Ones  
6. the last God.⁸²

This process demonstrates the positive emergence of the Question-worthiness of beyng as the alternative to the Abandonment by beyng. This will be important for the reader to grasp the two-fold occurrence of the Forgottenness of beyng.

**The Resonating**

The six junctures begin with the Resonating, which bears the consequence of the “Abandonment by being through the compelling plight of the Forgottenness of beyng.”⁸³ The Resonating denotes the call for this transition, it is humanity’s self-inflicted Forgottenness that results in the Resonating. It is important to note, however, that the Resonating is not a sudden event that occurred as a result of the contemporary human condition, it is rather the historical signalling that begun with the Forgottenness of beyng. This signal was broadcasted from within the influential power of Ancient Greek philosophy as the bedrock of western philosophy. Therefore, the Resonating is of Beyng that progressively intensifies historically.

An important feature of this Forgottenness is the negative alternative in the Abandonment by beyng. Here, the alternative in the Resonating is the consequence of an age “of a complete absence of questioning” which showcases “mediocrity as status symbol.”⁸⁴ Mediocrity is based on the current western paradigm of thinking as one of blind acceptance, complacency, and a lack of deeper meaningful pursuit of Being through beings. The *Contributions* will go into further detail, characterising the features of this predicament that society finds itself in by asserting that everything is made, can be made and is all dependant on the “will” to do so.⁸⁵ Nothing remains sacred or mysterious and all is representable by way of propositional thinking. Therefore, the contemporary human being is ignorant of being in any crises

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⁸² Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 7.
⁸³ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 85.
⁸⁴ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 85.
⁸⁵ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 86.
whatsoever, humanity marches forth absolving itself of the need for deeper meditation on Being since everything important is replicable by way of propositional thinking. Moreover, the absence of questioning also fails to allow room for meditation, a facsimile of solitude is demonstrated through “talk,” or society’s milieu of creativity as exploited in “picture and sound.” Therein lies the plight of the age, a distortion of being in the world that is promulgated through the very lens that is used to interpret beings through beingness and beyond.

This in turn becomes the “greatest plight,” which is the plight caused by the lack of a sense of plight. Essentially, ignorance of being within the plight causes the Resonating out of the “essential occurrence of beyng in the Abandonment by being.” The plight is a description of living in a world deprived of meaning or essence. This further descends into “machination” and “lived experience.” The Resonating, therefore, as the first stage of the response to “the age of the complete absence of questioning,” dictates the need for the transition from the “guiding question” of the first beginning to the “basic question” (the historical question of Being) of the other beginning.

Beyng as such, becomes the essential occurrence of truth, it becomes the Event and through this, it must also become historical; it “must undergo history in an essential upheaval, must be able to both know and say the moment of this history.” In effect, a historical reinterpretation of the ideas of western philosophy becomes the decisive moment of the Resonating of the truth of beyng. Otherwise, the source of the Forgottenness will be overlooked as it has historically. Therefore, the Resonating exposes the limitations of the descriptive, explanatory, or objective-representational forms of thinking. For this form of thinking only allows for access to beings as based on calculation and repeatability, whilst what is needed is a more primordial experience of beings. The assertion here is clear, to respond to the Resonating of beyng, the Question-worthiness of beyng must become the foci and subsequently, historical.

86 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 90.
87 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 85.
88 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 86.
89 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 86.
The Interplay

The Resonating leads to the “Interplay,” where the transition from the first to the other beginning is set in motion. This ‘leading on’ is not to be understood as a step by step process where one juncture is left behind for the other such that it is composed quasi-linearly, rather, it is a unificatory process where all junctures are simultaneously involved. Again, the bridge for the transition is being built on the foundation of a historical essence. The Interplay’s link to the Resonating of beyng is historical, and only through this link can the Interplay’s destination be decided. This history is not to be interpreted as the historiological, or a foundation for a new “system” of thought, it is a return to the historical foundation of the ideas that have formed the basis of western philosophy. Here, Plato (and his influential domination of history within the guiding question - what are beings?) must be indicted as the first to demonstrate the separation between Being as beingness and thinking as representational. Critically, the Interplay is not a transition to another beginning starting from the critique of this first beginning, it is rather “itself the essential transformative preparation of the other beginning.” This necessarily entails a historical meditation on the ideas of the first beginning, as only through this process can the questioning form the basis for the thinking of the other beginning. In other words, the very process of this historical revisiting of the first beginning necessarily propagates thinking out of the other beginning, and as such, links the Resonating of beyng to the Interplay.

The other beginning does not start from beings or Being as beings, rather it “leaps” into the truth of beyng itself, or what it is that allows for beings to appear in the first place. The historical meditation then is to be taken on the ground of the thinking of beyng, and as such, overcomes “logic” and metaphysics. Again, the Interplay is the overcoming of all metaphysics of the first beginning through the historical grasping of “a foothold in the other beginning.” This must make the Question-worthiness of beyng primary again, of which Being and Time intended to do. However, due to the

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90 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 154.
91 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 133.
92 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 135.
93 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 136.
anthropocentricity of *Being and Time*, it serves as an example of the Interplay as a “self-preparing beginning of the essential occurrence of beyng itself.”

The limitations of *Being and Time* are in its inherent capacity for being mischaracterised as a work of existentialism or phenomenology. This is due to its structure being more akin to a system of philosophy, much like the prominent philosophers of the past. Even though the work itself was an attempt at a fundamental questioning of Being, it nevertheless proceeds from a framework or system of thought that was built from within the text. Therefore, it is the first attempt and the Interplay as the bridge from the first beginning toward the ‘shore’ of the yet to be decided thinking and questioning of the other beginning. There are no further mentions of any other prominent philosophers or their works as other examples of the Interplay in the *Contributions*, which presumably, is due to their neglect of the Question-worthiness of beyng in which this thesis will explore in more detail later. This is especially important when taking into consideration the deeper meaning behind the call for a questioning of beyng, which is difficult to conceptualise due to its ambiguous and mysterious nature.

**The Leap**

From the Interplay, the Resonating of beyng transitions through the “Leap” into the other beginning - a re-examination of the historical treatment of Being. This entails the “most daring venture in the course of inceptual thinking,” which “leaves behind everything conventional.” As a reminder, this process is unificatory, not to be mistaken as a linear progression through the Resonating to the Interplay and then the Leap. The Leap is a leap into the truth of beyng, the abyss of the fissure, a transcendence of metaphysics whilst being engaged with its history. This historical imposition is central as mentioned before, as without this historical background there is no Leap. The Leap is also not an engagement with beings, nor does it expect anything from them. Heidegger is envisaging a recklessness, a leap into beyng as the Event that is anything but smooth. This jarring demonstration that is symptomatic of

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94 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 191.
95 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 179.
the transition from the first to the other beginning means “to step into a wholly other domain of history.” Therefore, the history of the first beginning will linger on, it will not be overcome in the sense of being left behind or forgotten as an age past, but will persist and “carry over into the transition and indeed even into the other beginning.”

Effectively, this is not presenting a complete rejection of the history of western philosophy as it may seem initially. The first beginning’s history proves just as important for the philosophy of the other beginning, a component of the transition that is intrinsic to the whole process, and as such, naturally entangled with beyng as the Event. The criticisms of Platonic philosophy and its forebearers are essential to the process.

The historical imposition of the Leap is in its “thrown projection” or the “carrying out of the projection of the truth of beyng.” In thrown projection, the Leap is not a performative act, rather the Leap is a happening – the appropriation by beyng. The Leap is co-dependent with history as that which comes through the immediate leap over the historiological and through beyng. Therefore, the “Resonating and Interplay are soil and field for the first run-up of inceptual thinking to the leap into the essential occurrence of beyng.” Being and Time is the foundation for the Leap, unless Being and Time is understood as a form of existentialism, which would inevitably obstruct the Leap. Furthermore, the “stewardship” is carried out by grounding and sheltering the truth of beyng in beings themselves. Therefore, the final precondition for the Leap is the stewardship of the human being as the ground of another history. This demonstrates the two factors that are imperative to the Leap: Being and Time as the Interplay and the human being’s thrown projection as the ground of history.

As discussed earlier, Being and Time presents the essential questioning, but does not go far enough, and also relies on too much, in the sense of not seldom being characterised as a system. The historical human being, on the other hand, is to gather “into a nearness to beyng” as preparation. This, being the stewardship, is distinctive

96 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 179.
97 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 179.
98 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 188.
99 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 65.
100 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 190.
101 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 179.
of “going-under” or the preparation for the “uniqueness and non-repeatability of beyng.” Therefore, the human being in its thrown projection plays a critical role within the transition, although not through the representation of being a subject or individual. Beyng is bestowed upon the human being independent of culture, progress, or regress and utterly opposed to “anthropologism.” The historical human being is intrinsic to the transition, the human being is history and as such, essential to the Leap instead of making the Leap. The human being’s stewardship, therefore, points to a form of retreat, a succumbing to the Event as beyng, and through this, the Leap will occur.

The Grounding

The human being’s belonging to the Event as portrayed in the Leap is now understood in its complete essence in Da-sein concomitant with the Grounding. This human being is developed within Da-sein and the ground of:

1. the seeker of beyng (Event).
2. the preserver of the truth of Being.
3. the steward of the stillness of the passing by of the last god.
   Stillness and origin of the word.

Da-sein here has its most fundamental character as care (Sorge), which draws on the ideas in Being and Time - such as care beyond the care for others, but care for one’s own Being. However, as Susan M. Schoenbohm notes, this notion has now changed radically, where care doesn’t only entail standing amidst beings but also means not being entangled by them, instead, allowing their determinations to come through beyng. This points to the dichotomous nature of Da-sein and its care, such that it is subsumed within the Event in beyng as the granting and simultaneous sheltering

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102 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 180.
103 It is important to note that Heidegger is highly critical of the liberal conception of the individual that he sees as responsible for the emergence of positivism, of which more on later in the thesis. Therefore, it is critical not to visualise Heidegger’s thrown projection anthropocentrically.
104 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 232.
105 Scott et al., Companion to Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy (Studies In Continental Thought), 20.
character. Also, the original nature of Dasein is now universalised further within the *Contributions*; such that the Dasein that comes out of itself and Being which can be assigned to things, animals, time, humans is to be overcome. So, the Da-sein of the *Contributions* is so different that there is no link between the two. Instead, the Grounding as Da-sein and “the ground of the future human being” is simultaneously the ground of the truth of beyng where the human being is transformed and the *animal rationale* of Aristotle and Descartes collapses. Furthermore, Da-sein is rooted in care with the “Da,” as the “there,” or the openness of beings and the originally conceived αλήθεια (unconcealment). So, Da-sein in its care is grounded in its creation of the space for the unconcealment of beings. The “sein” points to the “steadfast enduring” of this Grounding of the “there.”

This steadfast enduring is the “seeking, preserving and stewardship carried out by that human being who has self-knowledge as one appropriated to Being and belonging to the Event.” This is an allusion to the Future Ones of which will be observed later. Essentially, Da-sein is the opening up of the horizon or space for where, here or there first comes into play. Where in *Being and Time* Dasein is commonly understood within the fundamental ontological interpretation rather than the historical, here, Da-sein is the “site” and the concealing “between” where the truth of beyng occurs. Therefore, as the site, Da-sein is *the* between of the strife of “Earth and World” and the mode or process of the human being’s transformation. This leads to the subject of truth as correctness (correspondence theory of truth) being critiqued, such as Plato’s Cave allegory utilising truth as the ‘look’ that ends in Nietzsche’s truth as the will to power.

106 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 233.
107 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 234.
108 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 232.
109 Another way of observing this; is in the care of Da-sein that creates an “opening” or “space” that is prior to a ground for a world. This is demonstrative of truth as unconcealment and its simultaneous concealment that occurs in the formation of such a world as a world.
110 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 235.
111 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 232.
112 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 27.
113 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 220.
114 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 283-4.
Da-sein essentially represents the key difference and shortcomings of the philosophy of *Being and Time*. The other beginning cannot be encountered within the systematic approach of *Being and Time* and its characterisations of beings, such as their being present-at-hand etc. This is merely an attempt to portray the world of beings and their relationship to Dasein from within a foundation that lacks the deeper questioning that is needed. Instead, the ground of this relationship and its portrayal of such a world must be brought up into question in the context of Da-sein and the human being. This also means that Da-sein is not a characteristic of the human being either, as that would also suffer a recession. Instead, the human being and Da-sein are “essentially related” in Da-sein’s signification of the ground of all possibilities, whether the stewardship of beyng is undertaken or not. Also, the only encounter with Da-sein is within this Leap into the Grounding of the openness that Da-sein provides in such a way that “the human being to come must stand in order to keep it open.” The deliberate obfuscation of Da-sein presents its most critical nature, for if we are to categorise or describe Da-sein, the other beginning is not intimated, neither is beyng as the Event. Therefore, Da-sein’s occurrence only happens within the nature of steadfastness in the domain of the human being and its fourfold character of strength, decisiveness, mildness and simplicity in the other beginning.

**The Future Ones**

This chapter presents Heidegger’s most Nietzschean influence, the notion of an envisioned human being (Übermensch) that is to guide humanity towards the future of the other beginning. In the Grounding chapter of the *Contributions*, Da-sein was the focus, with steadfastness as the core attribute of the human being as also belonging to the process. These attributes are characterised by the Future Ones as those who are to undergo this Leap into the Grounding of Da-sein in the transition to the other beginning. In other words, as Vallega-Neu notes, the grounders of Da-sein are the Future Ones or those who are amidst the abscending and nearing of the Last God ground Da-sein through words, works, and deeds. This response to the call of the “Last God” is not theological, instead, it is an “attunement” and determination by it.

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115 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 234.
116 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 235-6.
There is a clear allusion here to poets, thinkers and artists, with Hölderlin being a prime example that Heidegger consistently refers to. The Future Ones are also those who “bear the staff of the truth of beyng,” and resist the confusion and potential mayhem that is caused by the “calculatively correct findings.” In addition, the Future Ones are martyrs in the era of “downgoing” or those who make the sacrifice by being steadfast and expose themselves to consistent questioning. Moreover, it is only the Future Ones that are capable of resisting the “extreme wrath of the Abandonment by being” as they have “no acquaintance with bleak “resignation.”

The Future ones are those who cannot fall prey to the age of calculation, as they stand in “sovereign knowledge as genuine knowledge.” Those who sacrifice themselves as always questioning are simultaneously exposing themselves to the invisible ground and are intrinsically “futural.” This transition to the other beginning can only involve the Future Ones, a reimagined form of the human being that is shaped by poetry, philosophy and art. This theme is not seldom present in Heidegger’s future works and for the Contributions, it is critical to the whole process. To be clear, in the age of science and technology where beings have been overcome through calculation and the like, only the Future Ones will present the alternative. They will be those who are essentially futural and allow for the mystery of Being to become central again. Given the specific criticism of modernity as characterised by the age of the Abandonment by beyng, the Future Ones are to make questioning outside the realm of propositional thinking central again. This questioning is a form of “restraint,” allowing for where the truth of beyng may be sheltered and grounded. This also mirrors the notion of “seeking,” an “advancing into the domain in which truth opens itself or withholds itself.” To recap, the Future Ones in their steadfastness are to sacrifice themselves in the era of downgoing by always questioning. This questioning is restraint and seeking the truth of beyng, which is sheltered in the characterisation of truth in the arts, philosophy, and poetry.

118 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 313.
119 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 314-15.
120 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 315.
121 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 314.
122 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 315.
Finally, the notion of the Future Ones is closely tied to the Last God, which will be the focus of the next section. It is important, however, to point out that the Future Ones are characterised by their succumbing to the Last God in the sense of allowing for the truth of beyng to permeate through themselves, which is somewhat synonymous with the attunement concept in *Being and Time*. The Last God then, represents a particular disclosure of a world as a unique feature of individuals and peoples. The Last God that permeates through the Future Ones is to play out in a strife, which is what initiates the coming of the other beginning.

**Last God**

For the Future Ones, the Last God serves as a compelling force in its cathartic expression of the people. Specifically, the ‘people’ are to receive their history in finding their own most God which will bring them back amid beings.\(^{123}\) It follows then that the people of history are to be guided by the sacrifice of the Future Ones, as it is they who are to allow for the coming of the Last God and therein, usher in the other beginning. Therefore, a people can only be *a people* by being amidst beings again and in the overcoming of the age of the Abandonment by beyng. The Last God, then, signifies this process of overcoming in which, the essence of the people must be grounded in history and their belonging to the God. The essence of the God personifies the strife of earth and world, where the earth is what beings are unconcealed out of and the world is their necessarily unique unconcealment and simultaneous concealment; “World and earth, in their strife, will raise love and death to their highest level and will integrate them into fidelity to the god and into a capacity to endure the confusion, within a manifold mastery of the truth of beings.”\(^{124}\) This strife will be played out by the “Future Ones of the Last God” that will expose the uniqueness and non-repeatability of being.\(^{125}\) As mentioned earlier, this must involve restraint, which is “the most intimate celebration of the last god” that will allow for the simplicity of experience with beings.\(^ {126}\)

\(^{123}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 316.
\(^{124}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 316.
\(^{125}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 316.
\(^{126}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 317.
It is important not to attribute the Last God to an event as such, and yet, it requires the Event for the Grounding to occur. This means that amidst the most extreme Abandonment by beyng, the truth of Being may surface, an unconcealment that arises out of the necessary concealment, and thereby the Last God in its seclusion from the Event, simultaneously requires it. Here, the Event can only be appropriated at humanity’s crisis point, where the Abandonment has reached its threshold of significance which results in the “simplest strife,” where earth and world meet at a new level of maturity. This maturity is the consideration made for the negativity of beyng, namely, the questioning that lies outside the realm of the merely logical and calculative in an engagement with “nothingness.”

The final juncture being the Last God, therefore, is not to be interpreted as anything theological, metaphysical or spiritual. Rather, the gods are that which overwhelm or assail the human being and are the “extreme venture of the truth of beyng.” Therefore, the Last God necessarily occurs through beyng as the Event and as such occurs as a mode of exposing the human being’s horizon and being in the world. The “Last” is what is beyond any form of calculation and therefore, “must be able to bear the burden of the loudest and most repeated misinterpretation.” Essentially, human beings are not in control of the gods, as they occur through the human being and are meaningful in that they present a world as the world that appears. So, in the act of disclosing a world, the gods necessarily recede into the background and remain hidden, such that their intrinsic role as “world-revealers” necessarily includes concealment. There is no ignoring the eschatological theme in this chapter, particularly the reference to the most extreme Abandonment which leads to the simplest strife. However, the pervading theme of this chapter that compliments the Contributions as a whole is one of restraint and allowing for things to be, to unconceal themselves without the all-pervasive worldview that is symptomatic of Abandonment. The Last God signifies such restraint in its remaining absent in the mystery and beyng.

127 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 325.
128 Martin Heidegger and David Farrell Krell, Basic Writings (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2008), 89. Heidegger develops an entire lecture entitled “What is Metaphysics?” in 1929 at Freiburg University, in which he engages with this conception of “the nothing.” The nothing will be a very important aspect of Being in Heidegger’s later works which can only be addressed external to metaphysics or science.
129 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 326.
130 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 321.
Beyng as the Event

The six junctures that begin with the Resonating of beyng climaxes in the essential occurrence of beyng itself through a monumental change in philosophy and thinking as a whole.¹³¹ Philosophy will now create a “hearing” which corresponds with the Question-worthiness of beyng.¹³² This paradigmatic shift in thinking and especially philosophy is to overcome all historiological comparisons in traditional literature and poetry to grasp the thinking of beyng. There is a consistent reference to Holderlin’s poetry as the primary source for the “hearing of words,” such that the task is to “ground the projection of truth of his poetry in the meditation and disposition wherein future Da-sein oscillates.”¹³³ This hearing represents the ability to speak out of the Question-worthiness and is the prerequisite for the creating of a space for the word. In this way, it is aiming at a precursory foundation of language, utterance and expression.

In choosing the poetry of Holderlin, Heidegger is demonstrating the thinking of beyng as per the other beginning. Firstly, the thinking of beyng must never “flee into a form of beings,” neither can it “pursue dissolution into formlessness.”¹³⁴ Vallega-Neu will explain that beyng as such, occurs independently of beings whilst also allowing for their rising and declining.¹³⁵ Therefore, the other beginning represents the thinking of beyng as inseparable from that which is being thought, it is in itself the essence of truth. Secondly, this truth as appropriated by both the gods and humans involves the creation of genuine history, and thereby the Grounding of philosophy anew. From here, beyng that is explicatory in the intertwinemnt of thinking and Being is to define philosophy and issue its disentanglement which was formerly bound to science, culture, worldviews and metaphysics in its beginning.¹³⁶ This does not mean that there is to be a complete discord between the aforementioned areas of human endeavour and philosophy, rather, it is the more original appropriation of the essence of philosophy which simultaneously arises out of beyng and this disentanglement.

¹³¹ This will be detailed through eight ways in the fifth chapter.
¹³² Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 334.
¹³³ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 334.
¹³⁴ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 334.
¹³⁶ Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 344.
Philosophy of the other beginning then must proceed from the truth of beyng, which overcomes all calculation, propositional thinking, and explanations between beings and Being. Metaphysics will not be disregarded, neither will it be opposed in the historicality of beyng. Instead, the questioning of beyng projects the very ground for where an overcoming or opposition of metaphysics must adhere; “such projection brings this questioning altogether outside of that difference between beings and being.”137 An understanding of the history of metaphysics is imperative to this whole process, which as covered earlier, is essential to the Interplay. This thinking is outside the framework of logic or metaphysics, such that the word beyng is chosen for indicating this form of thinking and in its withdrawal - is traceless in beings.138 The difficulty presented with this idea – is the thinking that is to “grasp the abyss of the neededness of beyng,” which is to think of the necessity of the Grounding whilst not receding into a form of absoluteness.139 Again, this is a thinking that is removed from all other forms of worldview such as theology or its counterpart in atheism, so in effect, is not reducible to an absolute, i.e., God. This thinking engages with the historicality of beyng to necessitate the Grounding as based on what is Question-worthy, namely; the gods, the human being, the history of metaphysics and the thinking “of” beyng.140

It is important to note that the Contributions attempts to speak out of the Event and Heidegger, nevertheless, is also wary of the text being mischaracterised as a system approach much like Being and Time. However, as it has repeatedly been made clear within this chapter, the age of systems has passed and to speak out of the Event is impossible from within the presuppositions of metaphysics. As Vallega-Neu explains clearly: “Heidegger’s attempt at speaking of the Event, at letting his thinking be guided by a response to how beyng eventuates, is fundamentally exposed and without fundament in the metaphysical sense.”141 The thinking that is of the Event, is one that is kindled from within the history of the unique moment where thinking finds itself emerging in the first place. The emergence is out of the Abandonment and the Forgottenness of beyng, for it is this plight that ignites the Resonating of beyng.

137 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 344.
138 Vallega-Neu, Heidegger's Poietic Writings, 81.
139 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 346.
140 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 345.
141 Vallega-Neu, Heidegger's Poietic Writings, 24.
Richard Polt shows that it is Heidegger’s position that Plato’s *idea* lures us away from the “Event of the emergence” in its eternalising how what is given presents itself.\footnote{Polt, *The Emergency of Being*, 241.} To conclude by way of a summary of this chapter then; the Resonating of beyng that refuses the absence of questioning of the first beginning - is the first sign of the call of beyng, indicating the need for a transition to the other beginning.\footnote{Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 86.} This begins with an engagement with the Forgottenness of beyng in its hidden modes which is the subject matter of the next chapter.
CHAPTER III: THE FORGOTTENNESS OF BEYNG

The Hidden Mode of the Forgottenness of Beyng

The Contributions’ fundamental criticism of the history of philosophy and metaphysics is based on the contingency of the Forgottenness of beyng. This Forgottenness is not something blatantly obvious to even the more prominent thinkers of times past and as a consequence, has been mostly overlooked. This is due to its remaining undetected historically which also simultaneously demonstrates its ability to perpetuate historically. Prima facie, science and technology’s notion of progress exhibits more accurate calculations and efficient processes. However, in actuality, the foundation for this scientific and technological progress is avoided, such that this notion of ‘progress’ in itself is a presupposition due to its lack of questioning and proper grounding. From this perspective of advancement, technology consistently produces better health care, more efficient industries, and the like - which ostensibly enhance the human being’s quality of life whilst also neglecting the deeper questioning that is needed in enacting a grounded understanding of progress. For, as humanity marches forth within the dominance of science and calculation, the era of machination and lived experience are ushered in through “the disenchantment of beings, which grants power to an enchantment that is carried out precisely by the disenchantment itself.”\textsuperscript{144} This can be observed contemporaneously \textit{vis-à-vis} ecological destruction, climate change, resource exploitation and international conflicts, etc. It is important to note, however, that the Forgottenness is an essential feature of the essential occurrence of beyng and one of the fundamental prerequisites for the Resonating of beyng that is beyond the human level at this point, which Heidegger describes as:

\begin{quote}
of the essential occurrence of beyng 
out of the Abandonment by being 
through the compelling plight 
of the Forgottenness of beyng.\textsuperscript{145}
\end{quote}

Heidegger here is indicating that the aforementioned negative consequences that are symptomatic of the Forgottenness are essential to its recognition, and as such, are

\textsuperscript{144} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 85.  
\textsuperscript{145} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 85.
intrinsic to the Resonating of beyng. Through this recognition, the overcoming of the plight is possible, and thus, its belonging to the Abandonment can be simultaneously exposed.

Critically, the most devastating aspect of the Forgottenness is its hidden nature, one that progresses further into the Abandonment by beyng whilst remaining hidden within its metamorphosis. It is out of this ignorance that the “greatest plight” will emerge out of in the Resonating of the truth of beyng. As stated earlier, this can only begin upon the recognition of the Forgottenness, for the Forgottenness cannot know itself in its very nature. Evidently then, the Forgottenness is dependent on three fundamental conditions; firstly, it's surfacing out of the first beginning as a plight, secondly, its hidden nature that doubles as humanity’s ignorance of being within this plight as the ‘greatest plight’ and lastly, its persistence within the Abandonment by beyng in a mode of deeper disguise. Ultimately, these hidden modes surface in a wide array of consequences in the Abandonment by beyng which will be observed in more detail in the third chapter of this thesis. On a whole, this points to the Forgottenness and its exclusivity within the realm of beings and their presencing.

Therefore, for the Resonating to “sound out” and the unfolding of the Abandonment by beyng (in the hidden mode of the Forgottenness of beyng) to occur, the history of the first beginning and its alternative potentiality – the Question-worthiness of beyng must be explored. So, the Forgottenness of beyng presents a two-fold potentiality out of the first beginning; firstly, in its hidden progression within the Abandonment by beyng and secondly, its simultaneous demonstration of the need for the Question-worthiness of beyng. This points to the essential occurrence of beyng as a necessary historical return to the first beginning that exposes the primordial cause of the Forgottenness, which then needs to be understood and grounded anew. Should the Forgottenness in its hidden mode be uncovered and the age of complete absence of questioning be overcome, history must be revisited only in light of this Forgottenness.

146 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 92.
147 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 90.
148 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 90-1.
149 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 91.
150 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 91.
As such, the Forgottenness has its foundation in the human being’s historical attempt at transcending beings, a neglect of the appreciation and practicality of beings as beings. Carol J. White explains that Anaximander, Heraclitus and Parmenides for Heidegger recognized this necessity, whilst Plato neglects this background in pursuit of the unchanging, immutable idea as the being of what-is. So, the Forgottenness at its core denotes an overlooking and transcendence of beings in an effort of neglect which begun with Platonic philosophy, or more specifically, Plato’s idea as depicted in the Cave allegory. This criticism carries over to the sciences and technology prominently, which analyse, calculate, and exploit beings with the sheer purpose of contextualising them into a worldview. The central issue in Heidegger’s account of history lies in Plato’s positing of the world of Forms as a presupposition. Effectively, Plato is aiming to reject the world as it is unconcealed with his intellectualising of a more perfect and harmonious world. As such, truth is in the Platonic sense, always in relation to an immutable idea. This overlooking of the asking of the question of Being is what characterises Heidegger’s historical foundation for the world of science and technology. Because Plato overlooked the question of Being in his philosophy, the question of Being remains unasked and as such, forgotten. The Forgottenness will then perpetuate historically from Plato beginning with the Aristotelian refutation of Platonic metaphysics, whilst remaining constricted to the Forgottenness.

It is important to consider that Platonic philosophy represents the Forgottenness’ early-stage manifestation in the history of metaphysics, so the overarching influence would take over two millennia to fully form into the Abandonment by beyng in its expansive modes. The Forgottenness, therefore, which has its roots in Platonic philosophy, still contained thinking as “unconcealment,” creativeness that is in awe of beings, and yet, it still allowed for the degeneration of beings “in which the

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152 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 284.
153 Heidegger’s idiosyncratic reading of the history of metaphysics and its role in objective-representational thinking is founded on Plato and his positing of a higher truth based on knowledge and understanding. Accordingly, the world as unconcealed is overlooked and simultaneously denigrated to a mere appearance. Truth, therefore, lies in its scientific and technological exploitative potential that comes with knowledge and understanding. The world is then something imperfect and as such, is to be overcome through a presupposed intellectualising of truth as correctness. Heidegger’s reading of the history of metaphysics that he sees as a result of the influence of Plato will be analysed further in the last chapter.
Abandonment by being then unfolded in ever-greater concealment.”  

The idea then is that even though Plato and Aristotle represent the primary historical culprits of the Forgottenness in Heidegger’s account, the more specific cause lies in the interpretation or perhaps even the mischaracterisation of their respective philosophies. Moreover, the Abandonment only surfaces in its position within the scientific and technological worldview, the age of machination and lived experience long after Plato and Aristotle.

The Forgottenness of beyng as the cause for the Resonating, therefore, is only possible within this metamorphic process throughout the history of metaphysics, such that the Platonic influence can only be envisaged fully in its ripening into the Abandonment by beyng. It will follow then, that this transformation can only be addressed in its full capacity in the later stages in machination and lived experience. Effectively, this represents the Forgottenness’s historical hiddenness, such that its transformation throughout history only truly surfaces within the overwhelming influence of the age of science and technology, and only then can the Forgottenness allow for the Resonating of beyng in its full historical significance. This is of critical importance with respect to the beginning of the Forgottenness, as its initiation was wholly dependent on the ambiguity of the Platonic influence. This ambiguity pertains to whether Plato’s inception of the idea was solely responsible for the Forgottenness or rather more a victim of distortion by the inheritors of his philosophy. Heidegger remains vaguely undecided in regard to this, as is noted in his statement on Plato as “specifically (the interpretation of the cave allegory) as that thinker in whom a last glimmer of ἀλήθεια becomes still clear in its transition to truth as located in assertions (also Aristotle, Metaphysics IV).”

What can be drawn for certain is that in attributing Plato’s philosophy to the beginning of the Forgottenness, regardless of whether this is entirely a result of Platonic philosophy or rather a distortion of his work, contributes to an important historical springboard figuratively speaking. Parallels can be drawn between this issue and Heidegger’s Being and Time, which he deems as largely misunderstood as a work of existentialism or phenomenology, which subsequently led him to designate it as the

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154 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 51.
155 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 284.
Interplay. The historical continuance of the Forgottenness starting with Plato is marked by its second preeminent position in Nietzsche as the last carrier who “grasps “being” entirely in the sense of the oldest Platonic tradition.” This can be observed in Nietzsche’s Apollonian-Dionysian dichotomy and its criticism of Greek tragedy and particularly, Platonism. Nietzsche’s rightful criticism here is focused on Plato’s overemphasis of reason and its neglect of the mysteries of Being through the myths and arts that were customary of the age. However, this historical process must be observed in detail to understand how it is that the Forgottenness would transform throughout the ages as obligatory for the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event.

The Beginning of the Forgottenness of beyng

The Forgottenness of beyng’s main attribute lies in the foundational truth - ἀλήθεια and its transformation into correctness historically. Even though the two most important positions in western history for Heidegger are marked by Plato at the beginning and Nietzsche at the end, the transformation of truth began with the Pre-Socratics. This can only be grasped by a more developed meditation on history, which shows that ἀλήθεια guided the Pre-Socratics questioning of ὄν (Being) and yet, still allowed for the introduction of the ἴδεα (idea). To be clear, despite the aphorisms of Heraclitus and the didactic poem of Parmenides, they “accomplished neither this instituting or grounding” of their Greek thinking. From here, truth as correctness is introduced through the philosophy of Plato where priority is given to ψυχή (soul) and inevitably, the subject-object relation. Moreover, truth as correctness is pointing to a “derivation of beings as possible productions of other beings,” a consistent attempt to

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156 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 284.
157 Nietzsche’s *The Birth of Tragedy* produces a symbiosis of the rationality of the Delphic God Apollo with the chaotic, musical and winemaking insanity of the God Dionysus. This is Nietzsche’s attempt at overcoming the stale and stringent way of life based on the rationality that comes to dominate the Ancient Greeks through to the modern age. For Nietzsche, there is a fundamental human need for a ritual catharsis, a projection of the most carnal human desires in order to truly have a ‘life’. The Ancient Greek way of looking at the eternal idea or salvation in the Gods as a way to ease the suffering of the times was for Nietzsche, a perversion, a distraction from the true value of human experience. Suffice it to say, Nietzsche’s shortcomings here are based on his insights on the will and life that still neglects the deeper questioning. In other words, Nietzsche’s will and life are still bound to the foundation set by Plato’s idea. This will be demonstrated through three reasons in the next section of this chapter.
158 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 284.
159 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 284.
reproduce, repeat and exploit beings based on their usefulness.\textsuperscript{160} When things are not capable of being explained in such a way, they are designated as “not a being.”\textsuperscript{161}

The resulting Presocratic failure to ground the questioning of Being as the foundation distorts truth into assertion in “one of the strangest occurrences in the history of truth.”\textsuperscript{162} This is due to its seemingly ordinary conception historically, for it is widely accepted as a perfectly natural and rational notion of progress which, for the most part, makes it extemporaneous. Truth in the scientific and technological world view can only be truth should it be replicable and representational, otherwise, it is a regression into the ostensible archaic myths or mysticism customary of the prescientific age. Therefore, the most difficult task is to “seek and preserve” the truth of the Presocratic thinking whilst accompanying it by the “veiling of the essence of beyng.”\textsuperscript{163} This veiling of the essence of beyng constitutes the beginning of the Forgottenness and the necessary historical excavation and subsequent Grounding of it. This is not a complete disregard of technological and scientific progress to allow for the Question-worthiness of beyng. Beyond being critical of technology and science, this rather is a more meaningful interpretation of them that necessarily \textit{includes} as opposed to excluding the unitariness of thinking and Being that was characteristic of the Pre-Socratics. It is only through this appropriation that the Forgottenness can be recognised in its full essence and therefore, the Abandonment be addressed.

So, it is important to account for the appropriation of the Forgottenness involving the two most important landmarks of philosophy and metaphysics, which as discussed earlier, are in Plato and Nietzsche. Beginning with Plato, \textit{ἀλήθεια} becomes correctness specifically in “an interpretation of the cave allegory which is complete and rooted in the question of truth,” as it “occupies such a key position, then we can indirectly fathom what it means to establish truth as \textit{ἀλήθεια} for the first time in thought.”\textsuperscript{164} From here, there are six important considerations:

\textsuperscript{160} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 282.
\textsuperscript{161} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 282.
\textsuperscript{162} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 283.
\textsuperscript{163} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 283.
\textsuperscript{164} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 284-5.
1. ἀλήθεια guided Greek thinking whilst simultaneously allowing for the introduction of the ἱδέα as the collapse of truth.

2. This collapse was due to the lack of institution and grounding of Greek thinking.

3. Only in recognising this transformation from ἀλήθεια to ἱδέα allows for truth as unconcealment to be recovered or at the very least, maintained.

4. Understanding the Cave allegory’s central position historically also allows for truth as ἀλήθεια to be unfolded and grounded in its essence.

5. This Grounding of the essence of truth must include the clearing for self-concealing of truth itself - a clearing concealment that must ground itself in Da-sein. This necessary self-concealing is the essential occurrence of beyng itself.

6. Finally, only by taking this long and complex historical interpretation into account can the interpretation of the Cave allegory be grounded in the essence of truth, and therefore, in the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event.165

Nietzsche’s role in this is somewhat ambivalent, especially when contrasted with that of Plato. Plato’s chief concern was the overcoming of beings by positing the world of Forms, which inadvertently led to the abolition of the mystery of beings. Nietzsche, on the other hand, questioned truth passionately, although not in an originary way.166 Nietzsche’s rejection of Platonic philosophy was the right approach although, he remained constricted to the very tradition he attempted to transcend. Therefore, Nietzsche’s intention for questioning truth necessarily omits the fundamental Question-worthiness of the essence of truth for three reasons:

1. Nietzsche's lack of originary questioning is founded on questioning that is based on “life” as a biological-idealistic approach.

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165 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 284-5.
166 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 286.
2. “Being” for Nietzsche is still tied to the Platonic tradition in its notion of truth as “what is true.”

3. From here, this notion of truth as oriented toward life and the Platonic conception of Being is still questioning based on representation, and therefore, impedes the originary Question-worthiness of the essence of truth.167

The history of the Forgottenness then, is merely a perpetuation of Platonic truth, never truly approaching the Question-worthiness of beyng. Immanuel Kant, prominently, will advance beyond the conception of “biological realism” in the sense of it being more than an “I,” yet itself being grounded in self-lawgiving and therefore, remaining within the Platonic tradition.168 The problem here then, is as follows, the rejection of the “I” by postulating a unity of “spirit-soul-body” or its reversal is still evading a fundamental questioning.169 In effect, it still makes advances that include unquestioned presuppositions.170 To prevent this, the questioning of the self or the “I” must stand outside theory or metaphysics in the general sense. This necessitates a beginning which grounds itself whilst reaching ahead, in that it “reaches ahead insofar as it grounds and is therefore unsurpassable.”171 Due to its being unsurpassable, this return must be repeated consistently and only then can the uniqueness of its inception be original, and in this way, be another beginning.172 This represents a malleable state of history and ideas, such that nothing is solidified in the sense of having a consistent foundation. The groundless nature of the historical-grounding itself is what founds the other beginning in its consistent historical repetition. Kant’s important position within the first beginning does however, show a more enhanced conception of metaphysics, which will also be observed in detail in the next section.

167 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 286.
168 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 43.
169 Here, Immanuel Kant’s depiction of the phenomena and neomena remains subjected to the Platonic idea for this reason: the transcendental idealism of his Critique of Pure Reason postulates that objects are in themselves “appearances” rather than objects in themselves. The issue here is that – prior to asserting that there is no way of ascertaining whether anything is knowable about the noumena – the appropriate foundation for questioning must be grounded. The notion of appearances and things in themselves needs to be open to questioning outside of metaphysics and correlated back to its Platonic roots. Kant’s neglect of this is resultant of a system that makes groundless propositions such as space and time being mere forms of our intuitive processes among others. See Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W Wood, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 338-353.
170 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 43.
171 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 44.
172 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 44.
By way of recap then, the return to the history of the Forgottenness in Plato must repeatedly begin anew, for only from here is the deeper questioning possible through the essential occurrence of byng as the Event. It is crucial to present byng’s centrality within the transition from the first beginning to the other beginning for the Grounding of Da-sein in the advent of the Last God. This transition through the six junctures is preceded by the Forgottenness, which necessarily includes the recognition of the influential power of Plato leading up to Nietzsche. For it is here that the most important issue in philosophy has been neglected and misrepresented through epistemology and ontology and ultimately, metaphysics.\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 32.} By overlooking the questioning of Being in the Forgottenness and thereby ushering in an era of lived experience and machination, thought itself descends into a worldview that suffers from further degeneration as a “scholastic quibbling of churches” or “the indifferent pursuit of philosophy as erudition.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 32.} As a result, the questioning that is needed through meditation and self-contemplation in itself becomes incongruous, which also demonstrates the lack of true goal setting and meditation on Being. This is also the lead up to the need for the Future Ones as martyrs in their perpetual questioning of the first beginning.

\textbf{The First Beginning}

The historical inception of the Pre-Socratics leading up to Plato signifies Heidegger’s first beginning and is based on the guiding question. This guiding question (“What are beings?”) is the most important issue in philosophy and has been misinterpreted through various fields of philosophy.\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 32.} The basis of this questioning is what should be the scaffold of philosophy and yet, it has mostly been forgotten. The misinterpretations that the guiding question has endured as a result are symptomatic of philosophy’s position in society as a “cultural asset” or “cultivation” tool.\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 32.} This then results in a particular worldview that seeks to be above philosophy, especially in Nietzsche, who will attempt to disavow philosophy as a form of erudition. This effectively depicts Nietzsche’s subscription to a particular worldview, that of a poet-
However, this is an inherent form of self-contradiction, in that Nietzsche’s rejection of philosophy as an erudition is a subscription to an alternative worldview. This would inevitably prove ill-equipped to expose machination *qua* lived experience, as will be shown in greater detail below. The main issue here is as follows: philosophy and worldview – a particular philosophical outlook or system, are entirely incommensurable, as philosophy always reverts to that which it grounds and subsequently, forms the basis of its questioning from there. Philosophy as such must be “groundless in its ground” to maintain a sovereign openness that is free from any obstructions to its thinking. So, if philosophy is grounded in Nietzsche’s worldview as the “poet-philosopher’s,” it would then result in its being constricted to this very ground, of which machination at its early stages is free to manifest. From here philosophy is condemned to being merely a tool of wisdom or cultivation as another worldview in society as based on Nietzsche’s idiosyncratic insights, regardless of its rejection of Platonism. Therefore, Nietzsche, who recognises the detrimental effect of Platonism as nihilism in disguise, still eschews the Question-worthiness of beyng in his grounding of philosophy in a worldview. This can be illustrated in Christianity’s opposition to Nietzsche’s worldview; the obsolete “domination” of the churches and their worldviews that substitute the spirit for the *ἰδέα* in guiding public opinion. Effectively, the lack of questioning persists within Christianity, although applied differently.

This predicament does not demonstrate philosophy’s end or its final position within society. On the contrary, the first beginning’s current paradigm is what enables its true essence to surface through its encounter with the other beginning. Philosophy must find itself in its essence by questioning the truth of beyng as its “grounding centre,” which designates the groundless abyss of philosophy. Philosophy is groundless in its very nature, and any subscription to a particular worldview is entirely opposed to this nature which is to “bring into the free domain of its meditation the fissure and the “beyond itself,” the strange and the perpetually unusual.” So, the first beginning does not impede philosophy in the general sense despite its historical infusion initially.

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177 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 32.
178 The strength of Heidegger’s criticisms of Nietzsche mostly lie in the lack of uptaking of his philosophy of the will or life. Machination and lived experience persist without any Nietzschean impediments to their perpetuation.
179 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 34.
The first beginning and its overlooking of the question of Being in the guiding question is preparatory in its confrontation with the other beginning and jump-starts the subsequent revival of philosophy’s true essence. This also means that the philosophies of the Pre-Socratics and Plato all leading up to Nietzsche are not to be viewed as an obsolete thought process, rather, they represent the Resonating of beyng, a call for the Question-worthiness of beyng. In other words, the thinking of Plato and Aristotle which are still bound to the first beginning is still responsible for the domain of thinking as representation and play a critical role in this transitionary process.180 This also includes the later transformations of Platonic philosophy, such as in the case of the transcendental idealism of Kant and his path to the ground as space and time which is still obstructed by his preconception of the “I” and “consciousness” as the preconditions for Being, a questioning that begins at consciousness.

So, to provide further clarity, the constitution of the first beginning is structured by five main episodes which are critical for a concise determination of the Forgottenness and subsequently allowing for the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event:

1. The first beginning showcases the true essence of philosophy as that which is beyond and more fundamental than a worldview. They are necessarily incommensurable, and therefore, demonstrate the abyssal nature of philosophy. Philosophy here must be recognised in its full capacity as the groundless historical meditation that grounds the Question-worthiness of beyng.

2. The first beginning was initiated by the Pre-Socratics especially Anaximander and encompasses the entire history of the guiding question leading up to Nietzsche.181 This must place specific emphasis on the importance of Plato’s role within the distortion of truth, specifically with the introduction of the Cave allegory and its conception of the ἴδεα.

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180 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 51.
181 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 183. For Heidegger, Anaximander is the first of the Pre-Socratics to speak of Being. In the only fragment we have of Anaximander, the notion of truth is depicted as - the origin of things also being the source of their destruction which is for Heidegger, descriptive of the concealment and unconcealment notion of truth. The aphorisms of Anaximander are, therefore, the first stage of the first beginning and the guiding question. In other words, the first to question the Being of beings is Anaximander, albeit insufficiently. In the Contributions, Heidegger will not go into further detail on Anaximander’s shortcomings, apart from the lack of firm grounding of the truth of Being much like the Parmenides and Heraclitus.
3. The first beginning that signifies the historical overlooking of beyng that transforms into machination and lived experience in its most current form is an intrinsic component of beyng as the Event. Only by being within the plight and recognising it as the greatest plight (in the Abandonment by beyng) is the first beginning going to be meaningfully engaged with the other beginning. Also, in the first beginning’s positing of the truth of beings without asking about truth as such, makes space for the other beginning. The other beginning as such will then represent the truth of beyng in the ground of the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event.

4. It follows from this that the deeper repetition of history is imperative, as is clearly shown within the first beginning, such that its essential character and essence are to be placed historically. Necessarily, the basis of the first beginning in the guiding question must be understood and anchored, which will then allow for the repetition of history’s reinterpretation by engaging with this anchorage. A sense of direction and planning in this recognition must be implicated for the transitionary process to occur.

5. Most fundamentally, the first beginning in its essence as the guiding question exposes the Forgottenness of beyng. From this, the two-fold character of the Forgottenness is visible; firstly, in its proverbial metamorphosis into the Abandonment including its multitudinous modes and secondly, in the opening for the Question-worthiness of beyng. This also means that the first beginning is also inherent in the Resonating of beyng, only in its later historical stages in Nietzsche however, where the age of machination and lived experience are in full effect.

The transitionary process is critical, not inevitable. These are the mere precursory conditions for the transition, although, “the transitional is the genuine battle.” The main reason for this is due to the positing of the guiding question as to the primordial fundament of the first beginning. However, to characterise the entirety of the history of the first beginning in the guiding question exclusively is also a gross oversimplification, as it merely serves “the sake of a rough, first instruction.”

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182 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 141.
183 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 141. So by Heidegger’s account, even his particular reading of history is subject to deeper questioning and reinterpretation. Presumably then, the Contributions are merely initiatory towards greater questioning. This will be addressed further in the last chapter of the thesis.
Therefore, it is obligatory in the deeper meditation of the history of philosophy to develop the guiding question which up to Nietzsche has been largely ignored, for only then can “the inner movement of this thinking can be seized.”\textsuperscript{184} There is an added benefit to drawing on the unique interpretation of the Pre-Socratics in asserting that the question of the beingness of beings is all grasped unitarily in thinking. In doing this, the final hurdle involves the grounding of thinking, such that the animal rationale that evolved out of Plato’s philosophy is to be overcome by a unique reinvigoration of the unitary composition of thinking and Being by taking the Pre-Socratics into account. This involves the necessary excavation of the complex historical evolution of the first beginning up to Kant as based on thinking as certainty and objectivity as beingness.\textsuperscript{185} This historical process is based on these necessary steps:

1. The origin of modern thought up to Kant.

2. Understanding this as the foundation for Kant’s originality.

3. How the Christian tradition co-dependent with its abandoning of Kant led to the absolute thinking of German Idealism.

4. The evident incongruence of metaphysical thought with technology, industrialization and liberalism of the nineteenth century which inevitably, led to positivism.

5. How a semblance of Plato and Kant is maintained and an attempt at its reappropriation is repeatedly made.

6. The final cumulative effect of all these steps in Nietzsche’s building on Schopenhauer’s ideas in an attempt to reject Platonism whilst remaining constricted to it.\textsuperscript{186}

This further demonstrates that only through understanding this long and complex history of the first beginning that a confrontation with the other beginning can occur. Again, this is not a counter-movement, as that would mean being codetermined by that

\textsuperscript{184} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 141.

\textsuperscript{185} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 142.

\textsuperscript{186} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 142-3.
which it is counter to.\textsuperscript{187} So, the only ‘attachment’ that the other beginning is to have to the first beginning is based on the recognition of its complex historical position and the guiding question. This also means that the future in the other beginning will not be made from within or grounded in the first beginning, rather, it will be grounded in the “opening up of the truth of beyng in the uniqueness of beyng.”\textsuperscript{188} This is an opening that allows for that which is beyond mere opposition and refutation of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{189}

The other beginning henceforth can only be intimated rather than grasped. Given the very little we can say of the other beginning, the most we can intuit about it is based on its confrontation with the first beginning. Effectively, the other beginning cements the genuine originality of the first beginning in the truth of its history and its authenticity in active engagement with its thinkers, as has been explored thus far.\textsuperscript{190} An attempt at envisaging the other beginning will be made in greater detail later on in conjunction with the essential occurrence of beyng. Before this, the two-fold consequence of the Forgottenness of beyng will be demonstrated.

**The Two-Fold Consequence of the Forgottenness**

Having established the first beginning’s role in playing into the Forgottenness, the two resulting potentialities will now become the focus. Firstly, it’s important to acknowledge that the Forgottenness acts as “the compelling plight” that is codependent with the Abandonment by beyng.\textsuperscript{191} In this sense, the Abandonment is intrinsic to the Forgottenness and as a result, will persist unperturbed unless recognised as such. As observed earlier, the recognition of this plight is what brings forth the Resonating of beyng and simultaneously, the potential for a transitionary process through the six junctures in the essential occurrence of beyng as the Event. Given the historical evolution of the Forgottenness and its predisposition to the guiding question, the Abandonment by beyng is what signifies the Resonating in the

\textsuperscript{187} Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 146.
\textsuperscript{188} Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 146.
\textsuperscript{189} In reappropriating the history of the first beginning a space for the truth of beyng is created. Here, the Forgottenness can be uncovered, engaged with and subsequently, allow for the overcoming of metaphysics. This is what Heidegger explains as “beyond opposition and refutation” of metaphysics. This will be elaborated comprehensively in the fifth chapter.
\textsuperscript{190} Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 147.
\textsuperscript{191} Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 85.
first place. Therefore, should the “highest plight” or the ignorance of the plight as a plight continue unabated, the Resonating will remain unheeded. What stands in opposition as the current crisis is; western metaphysics and its historical neglect of the question of beyng. The neglect of this questioning results in the ungrounded interpretation of beings that are abandoned by Being, which simultaneously creates the potential for the positive occurrence of beyng. The other significant potential hindrance to the recognition of the Forgottenness lies in its hidden mode. The age of technology, machination and lived experience mask the Forgottenness so effectively that humanity’s progress is measured only in respect to them. Also, the attempt to depict this as “inauthenticity” in Being and Time suffers shortfalls in its lack of the deeper questioning of beyng. Therefore, the Forgottenness’ potentiality in its continuance in the Abandonment is possible due to a lack of recognising its plight as the “highest plight” that causes the succumbing to the age of machination and lived experience. This shows the lack of deeper meditation on truth and the Question-worthiness of beyng and marks the first potentiality of the Forgottenness of beyng. It will then perpetuate throughout history into its current manifestation as the Abandonment and thereby, the Resonating of beyng.

The alternative (and simultaneous) potentiality in the Question-worthiness of beyng is what involves the deeper meditation on the history of metaphysics and philosophy, with special obligatory emphasis on the excavation of the guiding question. From here, the guiding question as the foundation of the first beginning must be developed through the historically relevant thinkers in a confrontation with the other beginning. This, as observed in the previous section involves a very expansive and comprehensive exploration of their ideas and even more significantly, their influential evolution throughout history. Furthermore, the Question-worthiness of beyng is demonstrative of this confrontation between the first and other beginning. The Question-worthiness signifies the confrontation on a fundamental level, whilst alluding to the mystery of beyng. In other words, “only questioning and the decision in favour of question-worthiness can be set in opposition to “worldview.”

192 Also, the genuine battle that was also described in the previous section would be relegated back to the Abandonment by beyng should any mediation or concessions be made regarding a

192 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 34.
worldview (a presupposition as a ground). For example, as in the case with Christianity, despite its teachings being seemingly dogmatic, it is in actuality a form of compromise concerning the political that results in “propaganda” and “apologetics.” Christianity then remains constricted to a particular worldview in this compromise to maintain its influence. So, for philosophy to be freed from the shackles of worldview in the Question-worthiness of beyng, a genuine battle will involve finding its inceptual essence and ground for the question of the truth of beyng. Thus, revealing philosophy as abyssal and thereby, freeing philosophy “into the free domain of its meditation the fissure and the beyond itself, the strange and the perpetually unusual.” This process is only possible through the Question-worthiness of the essence of truth and beyng as the Event.

So, the Question-worthiness of beyng as the alternative positive potentiality of the Forgottenness has two roadblocks. Firstly, machination and its foundation in truth as correctness are what stands as the fundament of the unquestioning, and yet, it is simultaneously inherent to the essential occurrence of beyng. As discussed earlier, the Abandonment which sounds out the Resonating is intrinsic to the Forgottenness, however, the contention here is in its progressive mode. It is important to note that in the prescriptivity of correctness to truth in its unquestioning of beings “the more decisive becomes the antipathy toward the Question-worthiness of beyng.” The more machination dominates and the further it gets left unquestioned in the Grounding of its essence, the further “machination itself withdraws, and thus beyng itself withdraws,” since they are essentially intertwined. This leads to the second roadblock; should machination withdraw to the extent that it is to take a definite form, as in modernity, its “distorted essence” will be shrouded in lived experience. Therefore, the second critical consideration needs to be made in the “non-simultaneity and through a dispelling of the semblance of their extreme oppositionality.”

193 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 34.
194 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 34.
195 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 101.
196 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 101.
197 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 101.
198 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 101.
Essentially, the problem here is in the difficulty of recognising the lived experience from within the “drawing back” of machination and subsequently, its expression of the guiding question as beingness (Being) and thinking (representational). For this reason, it is important to make a distinct separation between the two features of the Abandonment so that machination will not be recognised as the sole bedrock of the Abandonment because, in actuality, it is reinforced in its shrouded nature by lived experience. To reiterate then, the allowance for the Question-worthiness of beyng necessitates the unfolding of the Forgottenness in its continuance in the Abandonment by beyng and further still, in the modes of lived experience and machination. This is one of the central expositions of the thesis, the two-fold relationship between the Forgottenness and the Abandonment, for it is in the Forgottenness that we find the deeper essence of the Abandonment. However, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters, it’s occlusion is a result of lived experience and machination as advanced by the Abandonment: “the more lived experience is unconditionally prescriptive for correctness and truth (and thereby for "actuality" and constancy), all the more hopeless does it become that from here a knowledge of machination as such could be acquired.”

199 In the next chapter, this will be expounded in detail to further illustrate the intricacies involved in overcoming them through the Question-worthiness of beyng.

On a final note and summary of this chapter then, it is important to grasp that the greater danger of the Forgottenness of beyng is evident in its hidden modes, which exhibits its complex multiplicitious area of action. This emphasises the critical importance of dealing with the hidden nature of the Forgottenness which has been the focal point of this chapter. This is also why the Forgottenness has persisted historically, as it is masked by a multitude of symptoms that often remain shrouded and it is no wonder as to why it has been overlooked. The sheer difficulty in explicating from its expansive modes often leads thinkers of the past astray, and hence why, it is important to recognise the entire historical tradition and its neglect of the questioning needed to overcome the Forgottenness of beyng. This is further evidence for

199 This perhaps is one of the central expositions of the thesis, the two-fold relationship between the Forgottenness and the Abandonment, for it is in the Forgottenness that we find the deeper essence of the Abandonment. However, as will be shown in the subsequent chapters – it’s occlusion is a result of lived experience and machination as advanced by the Abandonment itself.; “the more lived experience is unconditionally prescriptive for correctness and truth (and thereby for "actuality" and constancy), all the more hopeless does it become that from here a knowledge of machination as such could be acquired.” Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 101.
acknowledging Nietzsche’s philosophy as the last great philosophy, for he is the closest in recognising but a semblance of the Forgottenness in Plato, but fails at the deeper level of the questioning needed for its complete uncovering.
CHAPTER IV: THE ABANDONMENT BY BEYNG

From the Forgottenness of Beyng to the Abandonment by Beyng.

The inception of Ancient Greek philosophy and its primordial role in the inauguration of the first beginning serves as the foundation for the later developmental stages of the Forgottenness in the Abandonment by beyng. However, this “continuance” of the Forgottenness in the Abandonment requires a detailed exposition. Having cemented its historical position in the guiding question, what remains of beyng regardless are its:

1. Universality, a “most general” manifestational experience.

2. Obviousness, a hollow or emptiness that is non-questionable and therefore, unproblematic.200

Universality and obviousness are the two predominant features of grasping beyng as opposed to its experience from within the mode of the horizon of beings.201 Beyng is never experienced in its historicality and its essential Grounding nature here, and subsequently, withdraws from beings. This withdrawal also lets beings appear as what “is” and “is more eminently” in its conception of truth as representational.202 Alternatively, to overcome this representation of beyng and intuit its universality and obviousness, an apprehension of the essence of the Abandonment is necessary. As mentioned in the first chapter, the “lack of a sense of plight as the greatest plight” denotes the Abandonment’s interdependent relationship with the Forgottenness.203

Therefore, the second stage of recognising the Forgottenness is in its leading on as “the continuance of the abandonment by being in the hidden mode of the Forgottenness of being.”204 The Forgottenness here becomes shrouded in the Abandonment’s manifestation and as such, allows for later stage concealment that must be recognised. This later stage-recognition is based on a disclosure of beings as

200 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 92.
201 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 92.
202 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 92.
203 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 7.
204 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 92.
nothing more than that of calculation, manipulation and exploitation which hitherto, had not surfaced. A view of the sense of the mystery of beings is replaced by their technological, scientific and metaphysical representations.

The first stage of recognising the Abandonment is in how it “announces itself,” which is observable through a cluster of conditions. The Abandonment firstly announces itself through “culture,” or the general tendency to be absorbed into particular value systems such as in organised religion. This cultural imposition is first, a neglect of the deeper understanding of its essence and historicality in what is a “complete insensitivity to the ambiguity.”205 This leads to a secondary manifestation; the inherent lack of what it is that defines a condition, an ‘idolising’ that is unconditioned, such as in ethnocentrism. The establishment of these values and ideas are groundless, a complete subscription to a worldview that is unalterable in the sense of lacking a structural ground for questioning these very impositions.206 The Forgottenness that has its history in the overlooking of this questioning of beyng is now announcing itself through a groundless progression of ideas, values and cultural impositions. This leads to a system that is uprooted and prone to further issues.

To begin with, the uprootedness of this system will be exposed in two fundamental areas; “art” and the “not” regarding beyng itself.207 Firstly, art’s essence is left to a form of utility, an entertainment piece for the masses.208 Detrimentally, art’s key potential for the Grounding of the essence of truth (a cathartic expression of the artist and the work as inseparable) is overlooked.209 This has a deeper level of neglect that can lead to a distortion of the expression of peoples. A need for overcoming this essence of art lies in a confrontation with aesthetics and its particular conception of beings apropos western metaphysics. This overcoming is necessary for retrieval of the

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205 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 93.
206 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 93.
207 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 93.
208 Heidegger, Basic Writings, 139. In 1935 at Freiburg University, Heidegger delivered The Origin of the Work of Art lecture that discussed the greater importance of art. Here, art is seen as that which portrays a particular world whilst simultaneously appropriating the earth. The earth provides the physical material for the art itself, whilst the art portrays a world. This generates a strife of world and earth that results in a positive account of truth through art’s creation. Effectively, earth becomes the sheltering-concealing that opposes world in its the self-opening. Herein lies the more primordial truth – that which is exposed through art and the artist in the strife of world and earth. The Forgottenness is a neglect of this primordial essence of art and relegates it to a mere form of entertainment.
209 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 396-7.
more originary essence of truth in art, and thereby history. Art, therefore, can become historical and as such, overcome the priority of the beingness of beings and its historiographical conception. Secondly, in the case of the *not*, specifically through its subset in the *negative* - that which is unfavourable, evil or counterintuitive is dictated by a worldview and consequently misinterpreted as a form of negation or absence. This is symptomatic of assertions based on objectivity, a determination of the beingness of beings. The Abandonment’s conception of the *not* as a mere nullity is proof of the self-imposed limitations that it inadvertently succumbs to in its framework of thinking. Essentially, in the *not*, beyng’s uniqueness and finitude are left unexamined in its lack of recognition of the negative’s belonging to the *not* and subsequently, to beyng itself. The *not*’s inherence in Being dictates its essential occurrence, the mode of Being and non-being in their simultaneity. Therefore, the *not* is what is most foundational in beyng. This neglect as such, points to the limitations of language and representational thinking’s incapacity to discuss the *not*, a metaphysical constraint that is to be overcome in the thinking of the other beginning. Critically, art and the *not* are two fundamental features that inhere in beyng and are demonstrative of the other beginning’s thinking which is not possible from within the Abandonment’s manifestation. This characterisation demonstrates a comprehensive debilitation in the first beginning’s contemporaneous influence. Fundamentally, the core of the Abandonment announces itself in the rejection of the essence of truth. This rejection is demonstrated in the lack of *Grounding*, a “blind mania for “what is true” with a semblance of serious willing.” This is where the Abandonment can first be recognised in its real essence,

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210 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 80.
211 Heidegger, *Basic Writings*, 89. From a scientific or metaphysical point of view, the *not* cannot be discussed. However, the *not* for Heidegger, is experienced through the complete negation of beings as a whole. It is not possible to experience beings as a whole from the standpoint of an “I” or subject, nevertheless, human beings do in fact find themselves amidst beings as a whole. For instance, the *not* can be experienced through boredom and especially anxiety in their negation of beings as a whole. Effectively, the *not* can be elucidated from within the context of an experience or mood rather than a being. Again, this is not to understand the *not* as a negation either, rather, it is the disclosure of beings as beings with regard to anxiety or boredom. In other words, in the disclosure of beings as beings, the *not* is beyond beings and as such, can be experienced rather than propositionally explicated.
212 Art and the *not* are also two important features of Heidegger’s later thinking. In *Introduction to Metaphysics* the *not* gets a comprehensive conceptualisation in which the genesis of Heidegger’s thoughts on the subject can be seen in the *Contributions*. Similarly, the *Origin of the Work of Art* was composed around the time of the *Contributions* of which clear inferences can be drawn from.
213 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 93.
an announcement that is shown in the insurgency of machination, unquestioning, and the eschewal of deeper meditations. Here, all restraint is viewed as inactivity and counterintuitive, a desperate need for perpetual involvement in lived experience. These symptoms will be observed in detail in the subsequent sections of this chapter but for now, this foundation still needs to be explored further.

Before the surfacing of the Abandonment’s symptoms, there is a deeper element that is precursive to the initial transitionary phase of the Forgottenness into the Abandonment; the lack of self-certainty or the “inability to wait.” Human beings here are essentially always in the mode of looking ahead and disregarding the uniqueness of the essence of beyng as rarity, momentariness, restraint, freedom among others. Adding to this, there can be an even deeper misunderstanding in the questioning of the Christian God in the West, where Nietzsche’s reinterpretation can represent another falsehood, also in its uprootedness. So, the inability to wait and the alternative in Nietzsche’s uprootedness showcase the “darkening” of the world to its true uncovering. This proceeds further as the Abandonment becomes more prominent in the lack of the sense of plight, such that the “will to get out is lacking.” For the Abandonment to complete its surfacing in the “destruction of the earth” – a “simultaneous “reign” of both the powerlessness of mere attitude and the brutality of institutions” will occur.

Importantly, the continuance of the Forgottenness in the Abandonment by beyng, therefore, was not set in stone. Rather, its existence was enabled due to perpetual historical neglect on a human level, which will also be a determining factor in its final form as nihilism, which will be covered in the final section of this chapter. This is not to disregard the historical impositions of the first beginning, but rather a failure based on the lack of meditation, restraint and recognition of these crises. This will perpetuate further as will be observed in the subsequent chapter. However, as a precautionary measure, this is a problem that can be and should have been addressed on the human level. Recognition, meditation and restraint are ways of exhibiting this capacity, of

214 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 94.
215 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 94.
216 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 94.
217 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 94.
which will be observed later in the Future Ones. Again, this is not to negate the historical influence of the Forgottenness and its ostensible beginning with Plato, rather, this points to the need for it to be recognised in its earlier perpetuation.

The Abandonment by Beyng

Nietzsche was the first to recognise the crisis amidst the Abandonment as nihilism. For this reason, Nietzsche’s philosophy is the denouement of the historical study of philosophy and the more fundamental conception of nihilism in his reaction to Schopenhauer’s often characterised pessimism. However, Nietzsche’s recognition of the Abandonment does not lead him to develop the required questioning and “it still must be said that he did not and could not grasp the essence.”218 Nietzsche’s shortcomings showcase the potency of this crisis within the Abandonment as that which depicts everything being calculable, nothing as impossible and the obstruction of truth that leads to “where truth has long since ceased to be a question.”219 The Abandonment displays the need for a more appropriate dissection of itself within this greatest plight as firstly, in its disclosure as the lack of Grounding of Da-sein and then, in its important relation to history. This is the predominant imperative which Nietzsche overlooks in his lack of questioning.

The Abandonment then, will “cloak” itself in a threefold manner; “Calculation,” “Speed” and “The burgeoning of the massive.”220 Calculation, as hinted to before, is the reducibility of all things towards the scientific and mathematical, which leaves no room for anything outside of the realm of the sciences and metaphysics. Speed marks humanity’s obsession with “record-breaking performances; purely quantitative increase, blindness to the truly momentary.”221 The human being’s current state of existence is characterised by losing itself in the drive for what comes next, a perpetual effort to increase productivity, be it economical, technical or scientific. The burgeoning of the Massive, which is dependent on Calculation and Speed, denotes the motivation for achieving quantity over quality, allowing everything to be accessible

218 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 71.
219 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 9.
220 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 95-6.
221 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 96.
to everyone, anytime and anywhere: “number already reigns, as does the calculable, i.e., what is accessible to everyone in the same way.”222 The threefold cloaking of the Abandonment ultimately results in a distortion of beings in the guise of non-beings, culminating in an inner disintegration as “the denuding, the making public and common, of every disposition.”223 Here the human being experiences the Abandonment in its full spectrum, an “era of the complete unquestionableness of all things and of all machinations.”224 Words lose their deeper insight and meaning, meditation or self-contemplation becomes “something strange and impotent.”225 Furthermore, the denuding denotes a cumulative effect, where the deeper the venture within the era of unquestionableness, the more problems will accumulate and compound on each other. The denuding will then characterise the human being’s way of being amidst machination and lived experience. This is an over-emphasis on a techno-scientific driven society and that which has discarded all “bewitchery” in the spiritual-mystical tradition as a means of the unquestionableness which remains disguised. However, on the contrary, the mystery that has been replaced by technology is in actuality; “the hex cast by technology and by its constantly self-surpassing progress is only one sign of this bewitchery that directs everything towards calculation, utility, breeding, manageability, and regulation.”226 Therefore, the true bewitchery is in its essence, “from the unbridled dominance of machination.”227

Calculation here, also plays a significant role in the ascertainment of the “average.” The average offers an illusionary notion of progress in its complacency. The above-average as such appears to be achievable and surpassable, whilst complacency is discreetly enforced, reassured and justified. This complacency demonstrates the capacity to achieve the above-average, although it is not needed, since the status of the average is consistently elevated. Consequently, the Abandonment will then cement truth as correctness in disguise through machination and lived experience. Here, even the perspective of spirituality is affected, such as the former creator God being

222 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 96.  
223 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 97.  
224 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 97.  
225 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 97. Contemporaneous examples of the denuding will be demonstrated in order to show its relevance and importance in the final chapter. The threefold cloaking of the Abandonment that results in the denuding represents the key theme of the machination dictated experience that Heidegger will be critical of.  
226 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 98.  
227 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 98.
sidestepped for Being withdrawing from beings in the era of machination and lived experience. The historical influence of the Forgottenness and its transformation is now fully evident and all-pervasive. The cumulative effect of the denuding is then enforced by lived experience and machination that progresses further and subsequently, the concomitance of the Forgottenness with the Abandonment simultaneously exposes its historically hidden nature within the plight and accordingly, the transition to the other beginning.228

**Machination and Lived Experience**

The Forgottenness’ interdependence with the Abandonment is aggregated in machination (Machenschaft) and lived experience (Erlebnis).229 As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the concealment of machination within the beingness of beings demonstrates its withdrawal, and as such – the actualisation of lived experience. Therefore, machination conceals its essence and takes a definite form amidst lived experience, which is where the difficulty in grasping its true essence is exhibited. This form, particularly prominent in modernity denotes the era of complete “unquestionableness” of all things where priority is given to the “making” [Machen] (ποίησις, τέχνη).230 Lived experience, as coexistent with machination, presents the human being as the calculating subject (animal rationale), “beings as represented to oneself as the relational center.”231 This showcases the importance of recognising the belongingness of machination to lived experience. Their common ground must be understood to unfold machination in its true essence and thereby, grasp the formula that constitutes the original version in the guiding question of the first beginning.

Machination and lived experience are a disguised co-dependent manifestation that belongs to the Abandonment itself. The Abandonment that has completed its

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228 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 89.
229 Heidegger’s choice of the term “lived experience” is peculiar. Lived experience (Erlebnis) was used extensively by Edmund Husserl to determine the conscious state as it is lived through in the first person perspective, which very much differs from the negative connotations as per Heidegger’s account. Husserl attempts to define lived experience as a science of psychic phenomena through the “facts of consciousness, of the facts of internal experience, of experiences in their dependence on the experiencing individual.” For a detailed account of Husserl’s view, see Edmund Husserl and Dermot Moran, *Logical Investigations: Volume I* (London, UK: Routledge, 2001), 46-55.
230 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 100
231 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 102.
announcement from within the Forgottenness of beyng, is now expropriating its influential power. Before proceeding deeper into the modes of the Abandonment, it is important to uncover this common ground as based on:

1. Machination and lived experience belonging together.
2. Their sharing a common root.
3. The understanding of the extent of their disguise within the Abandonment.
4. Nietzsche’s nihilism and its inadequacy as a prerequisite.
5. The origin of the Abandonment and its meaning for beyng itself.
6. The direction to take to recognise the plight through the Abandonment.
7. Da-sein’s role in the overcoming of the Abandonment.
8. Why Hölderlin’s poetry is futural.232

Here, the Abandonment’s portrayal through machination and lived experience can be understood more primordially, with particular emphasis being placed on its foundational structure. This effectively allows for the uncovering of machination in its occlusion within lived experience. Additionally, lived experience can now also be understood in its nature. On a fundamental level, lived experience is a relation of beings as a representation to “oneself as the relational center” which incorporates this experience into “life.”233 This is dependent on the historical influence of Ancient Greek philosophy of the first beginning and its inception of the subject-object dichotomy. As a whole, therefore, lived experience represents the outer shell of the deeper rootedness of machination. Machination which takes its form in lived experience is drastically more complex. Machination expresses the distorted essence of beyng apropos truth as correctness in the primacy of the beingness of beings. Driven by a limitless capacity to expand, such that “in accord with their lack of limits and impasses, everything is open and nothing impossible.”234 It is clear then, that this two-fold dependency is the

232 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 101-2.
233 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 102.
234 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 102.
true face of the Abandonment, such that it is in its “true actuality” in them. Therefore, machination in its hidden nature within lived experience demonstrates the true manifestation of the Abandonment.

Machination shows itself in the human being’s capacity and sovereignty of the making in the realm of what is made, a specific human engagement in an activity of the beingness of beings. Beingness is the human being’s objective representation of beings as correctness that becomes a demonstration of self-certainty. From the philosophy of Descartes as the first decisive step into certainty and correctness – machination takes form. In the opposing context of Christianity, an alternative interpretation is presented which is still constricted within the same lived experience as ens creatum; all things subservient to God as merely the reverse of the scientific and rationalist model presented in Descartes. The Cartesian manifestation of subject and object will persist concurrently with the monotheism of western society, and therefore, form the two opposing views and basis for metaphysics in the modern age. Machination, therefore, is omnipresent and unsurpassable from within lived experience. This also includes mathematics and its systematic approach coupled with technology in a more advanced manifestation. Correctness becomes all the more influential in the truth of what is true and subsequently, reinforces lived experience. A scientific point of view then, is no different, which is also intrinsic to machination and in its lack of questioning, which only supports lived experience.

It is not a unique approach, however, to be critical of lived experience, as historically, it is not a seldom occurrence. The issue at stake is the approach. There have been numerous attempts at resolving lived experience that fail to question what is most important, namely beyng, such as Science, Christianity, Marxism, Bolshevism etc. For instance, in the case of Marxism, of which there lies no shortage of valid criticisms of lived experience which is coupled with a sound economic alternative to boot, such as

235 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 102. The Protestant Reformation and its influence on the techno-scientific world certainly played a part in this paradigmatic shift in thinking. Francis Bacon (often compared to Descartes as his contemporary) and others for instance, played a significant role in machination by disregarding Plato and Aristotle in favour of the Pre-Socratics. This account is at odds with Heidegger’s historical reading.

236 It is important to note that Rene Descartes never abandons the Christian God as the foundation for his Meditations on First Philosophy. This will form the basis for his conception of the Cartesian dualism such that God’s benevolence is proof for one’s belief in the world as perceived through the senses. This is demonstrative of Descartes’ subscription to lived experience that conceals machination.
labour theory of value, alienation, commodification (all as symptoms of machination) – yet they still signify the western European rise of industry, technology etc.237

Parallels can be drawn from Nietzsche’s critique of nihilism as a “slave revolt in morals” where Christianity is the ostensible liberator. This critique, however, is still being rooted in the Platonic inception. Machination, therefore, can only be unfolded in its essence by appropriating its ground in the Abandonment and subsequently the Forgottenness of beyng. Otherwise, machination remains concealed within lived experience, and thereby, unengaged with.

The Denuding and the Gigantic in Lived Experience

The denuding (die Entblößung) shows the lack of meaning and genuineness that is symptomatic of lived experience. The overarching influence of the denuding is evident in the human being’s general unawareness of “what is genuinely happening” in the “cloaking of the expanding emptiness” of the plight.238 The human being’s way of being in the world is, therefore, characterised by the denuding. Also, the denuding is not to be considered separate from machination, rather is symptomatic of a machination dictated existence. This milieu corresponds to several dispositions that are all cumulative in their effects. To begin with, the lack of “genuineness” in every attitude demonstrates the human being’s enforcing a subsequent debilitation of words.239 Words or utterances become mere sounds for representational purposes, leaving no possibility for a deeper meaning in their essence.240 This leads to a lack of self-contemplation or inner meditation, as this has become “strange and impotent,” which is unconducive to lived experience. Additionally, the denuding is inherently progressive within lived experience, such that in its actuality, it becomes less recognisable and consequently, will continue to become more pronounced. This also means that it gets “cloaked” within various modes and processes of the lived experience such as in its institutional forms. The denuding, accordingly, represents the central modus operandi of the human being within lived experience and is exemplary

237 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 44.
238 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 97.
239 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 97.
240 Heidegger’s Turn towards a “poetic” expression is motivated by his intention to overcome the Denuding and its predisposition for objective-representational thinking and saying. Also here, Hölderlin’s supposed future thinking is demonstrated in his poetry that bears the “staff of beyng” in its immunity to the calculative and representational thinking of the Denuding.
of the main path of resistance to the recognition of the plight and its role within lived experience.

The denuding’s progression will lead on to its most devastating inception in the “era of the complete unquestionableness of all things and of all machinations.”241 Here, the lack of questioning that has been all-pervasive historically reaches its most current form in the interdependent relationship with machination amidst the lived experience. Beings are self-concealed in such a way that their self-concealing is not recognised as a determination of lived experience. This will accumulate in such a way that any questions that do arise, are devoid of meaning, much in common with human discourse and as such, will lack the capacity to be addressed. This is highly dependent on the technological age during the writing of the Contributions, in that machination only matures with scientific progress. The machination dictated existence will then be strengthened further in its foundation, such that all that is to be observed and achieved are dictated by a “matter of number applied to time, space, and force.”242 In this “bewitchery,” the unquestionableness that is of the “hex” that is cast by machination is so effective amidst lived experience that it allows for the unfolding of a subsequent feature of lived experience, namely, the gigantic.

The gigantic (Das Riesenhafte) shares a close affinity with machination, such that it may incur popular misconceptions. The gigantic is dependent on machination rather than vice versa or in other words, the machination dictated existence propels itself as the foundation for the gigantic. Its true form is only possible within the modern calculative-technological age of modernity. Critically, truth as correctness or beings viewed as objectively present that is symptomatic of the Abandonment on a foundational level does not pertain to the gigantic’s fundament. The gigantic instead, is unique as “quantity as quality.”243 Essentially, quantity is a determinate principle in its own right, such that it sets its limits and is oriented as such. These self-imposed limits are dependent on the grounding of the overabundance that “arises out of the hiding of a lack.”244 Moreover, in its concealment amidst lived experience, its

241 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 97.
242 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 98.
243 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 106.
244 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 108.
simplicity is a mere semblance of its true form. The true essence of the gigantic symbolises the “nothing is impossible” attitude of lived experience, there are no limits of the given or rather, nothing that is limited may be given.\textsuperscript{245} From within the quantitative representation of beings, everything must be grasped in particulars or individuals which in its essence, must transcend limits in its foundational structure amidst lived experience. It is important to note that the descriptive nature of beings as quantum – “parts of the same kind” is another form of representation that was inherent in Hegel and Aristotle’s philosophy.\textsuperscript{246} So, the gigantic can also find its historical roots in the first beginning (not fully formed at that stage) and the grasping of the gigantic as such will then present it as incalculable and an inherent belonging to the “plight of the lack of sense of plight.”\textsuperscript{247} The recognition of the aforementioned issues is all-inclusive to the revealing of the plight which marks a cataclysmic occurrence in the human being’s being in the world. The two predominant features that are consistent in their exposition are their progressive tendencies and hiddenness. The latter points to an even greater core issue, namely, the greatest plight as a consequence of the lack of the sense of plight. Essentially, the lived experience’s later stage announcement is a double effect of progression and ever-increasing concealment which subsequently, results in total mobilization.

\textbf{The Greatest Plight and Total Mobilization}

The human being’s self-certainty here becomes the dominant characteristic of being in the world, where truth has ceased to become a question and consequently, an obstruction of the ground of Da-sein and history is inevitable.\textsuperscript{248} lived experience then, exerts its influence on the human being in such a way that hinders the path towards the recognition of the shrouded nature of machination and the gigantic, with the human being’s blindness to what is ‘truly going on’ as an inherent manifestation of the denuding. Hitherto, the various modes of the Abandonment have catalysd a more entrenched plight (\textit{Die Not}) as the greatest plight and the denuding’s manifestation exerts a complacency that allows for the blinded pursuit of progress in every domain.

\textsuperscript{245} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 107.
\textsuperscript{246} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 107-8.
\textsuperscript{247} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 108.
\textsuperscript{248} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 99.
of calculation and representation. The resulting state of Being manifests in a total mobilization or the general enclosure of the masses towards the services of further progress. Total mobilization (totale Mobilmachung) then is “the mere setting in motion and undermining of all previous contents of still-enduring formations.” Therein lies the encapsulating nature of the original Abandonment: “the rallying of all the masses and pressing them into service.”

The impersonal stance hitherto has been directed toward the analysis and subsequent dissecting of the Abandonment and its modes of expression. Now that the historical foundation has been explored, the focus now shifts towards the more direct influence of the Abandonment on a collective and individual level. This nevertheless remains intrinsic to the whole process of the recognising the Abandonment in the ascertainment of the greatest plight and its function in total mobilization. The greatest plight, therefore, must first be addressed to recognise the all-inclusive mode of total mobilization, for its priority signifies the concealment of itself. Expressed differently, in the recognition of the greatest plight, total mobilization would cease to be in effect; for it only exists as a consequence of the hiddenness of the greatest plight. total mobilization, therefore, forges the ignorant human being as a counter-result, never as its goal or primary motive. As will be discussed in the next section, the new human being as a nihilist is ignorant of this.

Before moving on, however, the notion of positing goals must be explored from within the context of total mobilization. At first, conceptualising a process of total mobilization in its inherent nature seems to propose a goal and yet, this is not to the case. This substantiates the effectual blindness of the greatest plight, such that in its natural concealment a forced total mobilization propagates the directionless human

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249 Die Not in German can also translate to the misery, or distress. It is important, therefore, to keep in mind the explicitly negative essence of the plight and its interdependency with the denuding that Heidegger is clearly demonstrating.

250 Ernst Jünger, The Worker: Dominion And Form, trans. and ed. Laurence Paul Hemming and Bogdan Costea (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2017), 104. Heidegger here seems to be drawing on Ernst Junger’s Total Mobilization in Technology as Mobilization of the World through the Form of the Worker chapter from his The Worker Dominion and Form. Heidegger will call Junger the only true Nietzschean, which is important considering the lead up from machination to nihilism that will be observed in the upcoming sections.

251 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 112.

252 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 112.

253 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 113.
being amongst the collective. This effect demonstrates several characteristics, of which all manifest concordantly. There is no way of tracking all its expansive manifestations and as a consequence, its recognition lies in the greatest plight or overcoming the human being’s ignorance of being within a plight in the first place. Lived experience’s dominant exertive power, therefore, negates this in its goalless total mobilization. This is also demonstrated in the ostensible counter-intuitiveness of meditation and deeper questioning, as this is incongruent amidst the calculative view of the beingness of beings in total mobilization. There must always be an overcoming of beings only through propositional thinking and its subsequent distortion of the essence of truth, as these among others characterise the denuding’s way of being amidst lived experience. The meaninglessness of words as is characteristic of the denuding, further demonstrate this in total mobilization as another self-reinforcing tool of the human being’s incompetency. Language, therefore, as a method of expression within total mobilization inadvertently negates the possibilities for deeper questioning, meditation and consequently, the greatest plight’s concealment will persist and unfold in its essence. The conclusions that can be drawn from the goal of total mobilization, therefore, are; the goalless nature that exerts its influential power of concealment within the lived experience and secondly, the greatest plight’s persistence is inherently dependent on the directionless human being as a subset of this encapsulation. The denouement of the aforementioned processes will result in the exploitation of the inherent lack of a foundation and beginning as concomitant with the goallessness. The first beginning and its recognition through a more grounded repetition of history are devoid here and as such, will remain ungrounded within the distortion of truth. Beings are, therefore, abandoned by Being and what is most Question-worthy, namely, beyng. Beyng’s Question-worthiness in the essential occurrence of the Event is not within Nietzsche’s philosophy as discussed in the previous chapters, even though Nietzsche’s philosophy remains falsely prominent in its portrayal as conducive to change. So, this particular mindset will be of fundamental ignorance and is demonstrative of the individual’s place in the total mobilization of lived experience. This includes its semblances in Nietzsche's lack of questioning as a response to his recognition of Platonic philosophy as nihilism in disguise.

Nihilism
The Abandonment and its expansive modes of progression have thus far, focused on a negatively influenced and impersonal ontology of beyng. The apex of this process, however, manifests directly in the human being and specifically, within total mobilization and lived experience. The first beginning and its characteristics, therefore, must be finalised by regressing to its foundation in the human being’s interdependence with the Abandonment by beyng. From this foundation, the meaningful repetition of history is symptomatic of the first beginning’s engagement with the other beginning which presupposes an interpretation of the human being’s “noisy intoxication” with lived experience.\(^{254}\) Having arrived at this decisive point in the historical chronology, the human being’s way of being in the goallessness of total mobilization is accordingly, fundamentally nihilistic. It is important to note here, however, that this exposition of nihilism differs from Nietzsche’s. To begin with, Nietzsche’s nihilism is a form of cultural psychology, a lacking of all goals that transform the human being. In positing this, Nietzsche neglects the historical account of the first beginning and the Question-worthiness that is the obligatory prerequisite. Consequently, Nietzsche’s nihilism presupposes the Platonic idea coupled with an idealist outlook – a provisional moral sentiment that is in itself groundless. However, Nietzsche is justified in assessing the human being’s condition as nihilistic and yet, this “has remained ungrasped to this day and, above all, has not compelled meditation.”\(^{255}\) Additionally, Nietzsche’s assessment doesn’t just get overlooked, it gets “shunned as diabolical” in his attempt at overcoming it.\(^{256}\) This is due to Nietzsche’s failure to address the human being’s comportment towards beings which directly results in the ignorance and unwillingness of the lack of goals. This ignorance is effectively concealed in its nature, such that the human being is transformed into one who is in the general pursuit of “cultural assets.” From here, the human being derives the means towards achieving this groundless comportment towards beings (goals) as itself being a goal, of which Nietzsche’s nihilism contributes by representing an alternative that also has its roots in the Abandonment. Therefore, the human being’s engagement with the world in the form of cultural assets and blinded goal-setting is

\(^{254}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 109.
\(^{255}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 109.
\(^{256}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 109.
the greatest nihilism.\textsuperscript{257} This is aided by the distractions of lived experience and its deliberate obfuscation of true nihilism in its goalless nature.

This is demonstrative of the “dread” of beyng as having “so radically abandoned beings” to lived experience and cultural politics.\textsuperscript{258} A genuine nihilism is not Nietzsche’s nihilism as based on the will or life, instead, it must know nihilism and the Abandonment by beyng as its essence.\textsuperscript{259} Also, this dread of beyng has reached its greatest potency contemporaneously, as demonstrated in the gigantic.\textsuperscript{260} Other characteristics that go beyond this are evident in a religious commitment on one end and the crude nihilism of Bolshevism on the opposite end as an example. This battle is doomed from the start, as both oppositional forces “will lead in one way or another to the victory of nihilism.”\textsuperscript{261} Heidegger may be inferring to Soviet-Bolshevist Russia and its suppression of Christianity in its early stages, which inevitably, resulted in its subsequent collapse before the turn of the twentieth century. The resulting spiritual resurgence within Post-Soviet Russia demonstrates this victory whilst remaining within the machination dictated existence that both political regimes were always constricted by. Evidently then, nihilism results in beyng’s abandoning beings to machination and lived experience which includes all the antiquarian approaches aimed at preserving culture. Even though nihilism manifests within the human being, it is not a process that is constricted to the individual exclusively or their actions, rather, it is the ground for the inner essence of nihilism for it to propel itself.

The meditation that is required to overcome this in itself involves a deeper understanding of the human being’s position within lived experience. This is an exhibition of the comprehensive understanding of the ungrounded history of beyng in the first beginning and its progressive distortive capacity that has persisted throughout history. From this position, a deeper meditation that is disdained within lived experience must ground itself anew in Da-sein, where beyng will first occur in the appropriating Event. This is not to overlook the human being as inessential, as this

\textsuperscript{257} Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 109.
\textsuperscript{258} Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 110. Heidegger here relates cultural politics to lived experience, again, in contrast to Husserl’s view. This is to show the negative light of the ‘cultural’, which for Heidegger, determines just one feature of lived experience.
\textsuperscript{259} Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 110-11.
\textsuperscript{260} Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 109.
\textsuperscript{261} Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 110.
necessarily involves a preparation that is “paved by the basic experience that the human being, as the one who grounds Da-sein,” and is intrinsic to the Last God.\(^{262}\)

Thus far, this chapter has shown that the greatest challenge in achieving this lies in the recognition of nihilism that has its roots in the Forgottenness of Beyng. Given that true nihilism is so deeply entrenched in its essence in lived experience, machination and the subsequent human being’s comportment towards beings, the Abandonment by beyng therefore, remains concealed and all-pervasive. As covered earlier, Nietzsche’s philosophy provides evidence for this assessment, and as such, must be used as a historical example of the procedure necessary for overcoming this true form of nihilism that is beyond mere opposition. To conclude then, the beginning of the Forgottenness of beyng’s co-dependency with the Abandonment by beyng will exhibit the human being’s role as one of fundamental ignorance – a lack of recognition of its goalless nature. So, the final manifestation of the human being amidst the Abandonment and its predisposition within the plight is in nihilism. For the human being to extricate the machination dictum, this fundamental nihilism must be recognised and acted upon through the Question-worthiness of Beyng.

\(^{262}\) Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 110.
CHAPTER V: THE QUESTION-WORTHINESS OF BEYNG

The Plight in the Essential Occurrence of the Question-worthiness of Beyng

The plight serves as the impetus for the thinking of beyng and its inherence to the originiary mode of questioning. As such, the human being’s recognition of this plight results in the needed originary mode of questioning, which concurrently reveals the concealed power of the Forgottenness and thereby, the Resonating of beyng.\textsuperscript{263} The plight’s hidden crisis for beings in its unquestioned negative manifestation can only be intimated rather than experienced directly - which is now recognised as the Abandonment. This discovery of the all-pervasive Abandonment that was initially hidden amidst the greatest plight is concomitant with the essential questioning of the foundations of the Forgottenness of beyng.

This response to the plight cannot be initiated through the notion of progress, neither will a reinterpretation of the existing systems of thought suffice. Progress can have no future, as “it merely takes things that already are and expedites them “further” on their previous path.”\textsuperscript{264} So, the plight must be grasped and understood rather than avoided, which in itself already requires the need for questioning and deeper meditation. This means that the recognition of the plight must happen from outside of the current manifold of thinking or in other words, out of the other beginning. The denuding and lived experience cannot be held accountable from within themselves, otherwise, the plight will remain hidden and the Forgottenness subsequently unacknowledged. Furthermore, the plight will signify an occurrence that is not a “lack” or “evil” in the objectively present sense, as its recognition also resides external to these characterisations. It is that which “compels” and is “retained” by receding from all representational thinking without remaining fixed objectively that will recognise the plight.\textsuperscript{265} This compulsion will also require a transformation of the human being in its response to the plight and the Question-worthiness of beyng. For, the human being’s residence within the plight is characterised by an unsurpassable self-certainty based on calculation and unquestioning that is descriptive of nihilism. The human being’s

\textsuperscript{263} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 85.
\textsuperscript{264} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 89.
\textsuperscript{265} Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 89.
blindness to the hidden nature of the plight will result in not questioning the essence of truth, an obstruction of the ground of Da-sein and the necessary Grounding of history.\textsuperscript{266} To overcome this then, the recognition of the greatest plight necessitates an “anticipatory interpretation” of thinking the historicality of beyng in four ways:

1. On the basis of the gods.
2. On the basis of the human being.
3. With regard to the history of metaphysics.
4. As the thinking “of” beyng.\textsuperscript{267}

This groundwork’s implementation of the Interplay is the deliberate preparation for the confrontation between the first and other beginning in response to the Resonating of beyng. The Resonating, therefore, is the signal that is broadcasted from within the greatest plight, and its detection results in the Interplay and its implementation through the four ways. The Resonating can only be engaged through the recognition of the need for questioning in “an age of that simple solitude” where the truth of beyng as the foci will overcome the complete absence of questioning.\textsuperscript{268} This questioning of beyng lies in the historicality of its projection of the very ground for which the questioning itself must adhere to.\textsuperscript{269} Effectively, this is a questioning external to metaphysics and is beyond Being or beings and begins with the strife of world and earth.

**The Strife of World and Earth**

The Question-worthiness that arises in the Resonating within the plight necessitates a hidden event in either the advent or the absconding of the gods. This is due to what is salvageable of the earth being utilised in the creation of truth and its sheltering in beings. So, the strife of world and earth is founded upon the Question-worthiness’ inherent belonging to the gods. This inevitably clashes with the Abandonment as that which destroys all forms of questioning and solitude. It is important to recall, however,
that both consequences serve within the plight: “something of the essence of beyng is Resonating and the abandonment of beings (as machination and lived experience) by beyng is dawning.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 87.} This protrusion sheds light on the transition to the other beginning through the Question-worthiness of beyng and the strife of world and earth, the guiding question and the basic question.

The strife of world and earth represents the opening to the mystery of beings, the positive occurrence that is a surrendering to the truth of beyng in its sheltering of beings. Effectively, the earth as that which founds a world is fundamental even within the Abandonment and its expansive modes. In its revealing of a world, the earth necessarily conceals itself, which is critically, entirely unacknowledged and hidden due to the lack of questioning in the Abandonment. Alternatively, in the Question-worthiness of beyng, the advent of the gods play a critical role in liaison with the transformed human being in revealing a world that is recognised in its concealment and unconcealment. The transformed human being and the gods are the “playing out” of the strife in Da-sein, a mode in which truth is “sheltered out of the securing of the cleared-concealed event.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 26.} As observed in the previous chapter, this sheltering and concealing is revealed through art’s relation to the essence of truth. This can only happen in beings and their standing in beyng; “Beings are. Beyng essentially occurs.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 26.}

As will be observed later in the chapter, the response to the strife must be one of restraint in the face of the stillness and the stewardship of the gods. However, the strife must first be invigorated and then embraced by the Future Ones as those that create Being anew in the strife itself. The questioning of beyng is what grants this through its compulsion of the plight, a response to the call of the Resonating. The earth, therefore, plays the role of that which is historical, the foundational platform where the history of metaphysics will be developed resulting in its formation of a world.\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 216.} The history of metaphysics must then be seen as an inherent coextensive element of the essential occurrence of beyng. The significant obstacle to the strife of earth and
world is the neglect of earth in its creation of a world. The Abandonment is only pertinent within its own world, secluded and ignorant of earth. The Abandonment, therefore, cannot be apprehended directly and exclusively from within its world, there must be strife. machination and lived experience remain unquestioned within the Abandonment’s world which traces its historical roots to the first beginning. The Abandonment’s recognition will be based on the human being’s playing out of this strife in response to the Resonating. The advent of the gods will then percolate through this transformed human being in the sheltering of the truth of beyng in beings and consequently, the strife will shelter the truth of Event, a rescue of the earth and a renewal of a world.

**On the Basis of the Gods**

The alternative potentiality of theForgottenness in the Question-worthiness of beyng is conceptualised through a pre-determination of philosophy. Philosophy in this sense belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng and as a result, is historical. Here the distinction between the historiological and the historical is made; where the historical belongs to the recognition of the plight as opposed to the linear progressive observation of events in the historiological. The historical, therefore, is inherently bound to both the essence and the essential occurrence of history itself and subsequently, prepares philosophy for the future human being. This can only be achieved through the Grounding of language in Da-sein and its “construction of the most proximate foyers in whose spatial structure the words of Holderlin can be heard.” Holderlin’s poetry as observed earlier “corresponds to an ability to say which speaks out of the Question-worthiness of beyng,” a real-world intimation of thinking and saying out of the other beginning.

The missing link in speaking out of the Question-worthiness of beyng however, is in the gods and its relation to the essence of truth. At its core, this thinking cannot be relayed back to the scientific thinking and the “literary-historiological,” as it must

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274 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 333.
275 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 333.
276 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 334. In the last chapter, Hölderlin’s capacity to speak out of the other beginning will be shown to be unfounded given the limited foundational support that Heidegger gives within the Contributions.
belong to that which is being thought and as such, is itself the essence of truth.  

Truth, which is that which opens the space for the concealing and self-concealing, allows for the coterminous nature of humans and the gods to be appropriated. This is critical, as only through this appropriation can the Question-worthiness and its inherent capacity provide for thinking out of the other beginning. The Question-worthiness “thinks” history which “ordain future humans to the stewardship of the indigence of the gods.”  

Essentially, the gods in their role as world-revealers will demonstrate thinking as questioning and simultaneously, undecidability. This indication of the gods as divinity is not a form of affirmation or point of departure, it is instead, their very undecidability. This undecidability of the Being of the gods is a questioning that acts as a decision “from which originates either what has been decided or complete undecidedness.”  

So the gods are not to be posited from the notion of the beingness of beings, rather, it must come from decision *qua* indecision. This is to be understood as the overcoming of metaphysics and its notion of God or gods as representative of the most perfect or highest Being. Alternatively, the gods require beyng for the gods to belong to themselves, a “neededness of beyng” that necessitates the essential occurrence through themselves.  

To avoid being tautological here, the gods are revealed by the neededness of beyng, which is the foundational stepping stone for thinking “the gods.” This means beginning with the thinking of the historicality of beyng in active engagement with the first beginning *en route* towards the other beginning.  

To provide a closer look at what it means to think out of the other beginning given the obsequious nature of the human being concerning the gods; the gods will serve as that which allow for this new thinking. However, the gods do not demonstrate this thinking themselves. They must be grounded in Da-sein, and subsequently the future human being. Three requirements are evident in the thinking out of the other beginning based on the gods:

1. The gods must be grasped through the neededness of beyng.
2. This leads to a Grounding of the truth for beyng.

3. This grasping also entails thinking of the historicality of beyng, which in its essence means thinking on “the basis of the human being.”

The gods are an inherent occurrence of beyng, which allows for inventive thinking as philosophy in the other beginning. So the gods coexist with philosophy and need philosophy to occur “because there must be philosophy if “the gods” are once again to come into decision and if history is to attain its essential ground.”281 This formulation of thinking out of the other beginning is inventive thinking on an unrestricted basis apropos the gods, which holds little in common with divinity. This thinking is removed from all worldviews and demonstrates thinking that Richard Polt describes as “a vibrant center of our interests and interpretations, a re-legion that would bind a community together and bind it back (re-ligare) to the world at large.”282 This marks the first stage of the thinking out of beyng as the Event and leads to the human being’s place in its appropriation.

On the Basis of the Human Being

The determination of beyng’s occurrence presupposes the historical human being not as the animal rationale of Descartes or the will to life of Nietzsche, as these are what will be overcome in the other beginning.283 The historiological representation of the human being is defined by its relationship to the beingness of beings and as such, is descriptive of the ‘rational’ living being. To proceed beyond this limiting characterization in the thinking of the first beginning; a transformational requirement of the human being is essential. The historical human being is one that is transformed through the thinking of beyng and is intertwined with its transformation.

As is common within the history of metaphysics and its relationship to the gods, they do not serve as the point of departure for the questioning of beyng, for the questioning

281 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 346.
283 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 347.
itself involves this very transformation. Otherwise, any questioning that begins with the human being and its metaphysical representations as such, remain forgotten. The history of the first beginning imposes a complex and a “rapidly increasing perplexity over the “metaphysical” essence of reason” that Nietzsche will erroneously encapsulate into life. Here we see a manifestation of reason as a secondary quality of the human being or the Nietzschean life which will found the basis for thinking. Thinking will then inadvertently succumb to lived experience and machination, for it lacks the required grounding to penetrate deep enough into the true essence of the questioning needed. This thinking is constricted in its comportment to beings as based on reason, with all its priorities being relegated back to life. By understanding this latest manifestation of the human being and its capacity for thinking and reason, the thinking of beyng can essentially occur as the Event. This effectively is the uncovering of the Forgottenness of beyng, a recognition of its historical nature and its consistent transformation throughout the first beginning into the Abandonment by beyng.

To achieve the originary essence of the human being which catalyzes the essential occurrence of beyng - an unfolding-transformation of the human being must be an intrinsic part of this process. This transformation is the thinking of beyng that includes the history of the essential occurrence of the Event. Philosophy, therefore, is only to be determined by the originary-historical human being. The historical human being is hidden within the historiological representation of the first beginning and metaphysics which then, must be overcome in its self-recognition. This will materialize in the thinking of the other beginning and the essential occurrence of the Event. The thinking through philosophy as what is most question-worthy namely, the truth of beyng will be inherent to the whole process. Philosophy then, as sovereign knowledge will overcome propositional thinking and represent the inceptual thinking of the transformed human being. Moreover, philosophy will exhibit the Grounding of the transformed human being in Da-sein, the “essential intervening incidence, i.e., the incident of that “between” into which humans must be dis-lodged in order to first be themselves again.” The human being, therefore, in its necessary transformation must

\[284\text{Heidegger, } \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 346-7.\]
\[285\text{Heidegger, } \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 347.\]
\[286\text{Heidegger, } \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 347.\]
\[287\text{Heidegger, } \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 251.\]
ground itself in Da-sein as that which will free the historical human being from within the Abandonment (machination, lived experience) and unto the Question-worthiness of beyng. Importantly, Da-sein needs Being to ground the human being and is necessary for the truth’s essential occurrence, a releasement from the shackles of total mobilization and its nihilistic dispositions. Consequently, the Being of the human being will be free to be grounded in Da-sein and thereby, the appropriating Event.

From here, the process will then signify a releasement towards what is most originary in the human being, namely, thrownness. This is beyond the conception of thrownness in Being and Time, which was misinterpreted as an accidental occurrence.288 Thrownness here is beyng’s neededness of the human being and as such, a Grounding in Da-sein. To clarify further, the human being can only be a self in an overcoming of the liberal “I” and its inheritance to the Abandonment. Therefore, the human being as a self is “attained only through the steadfastness in Da-sein.”289 Steadfastness denotes the capacity for the human being to become historical, a movement towards the “there,” a Grounding of Da-sein. So, the thrownness of the human being is only possible in the steadfastness that allows for a historically belonging to the truth of Being. Finally, steadfastness will designate the restraint needed for the Grounding in Da-sein and the historical becoming.

**On the Basis of the History of Metaphysics**

To fully appreciate the thrown nature of the human being within the other beginning, the human being must allow for restraint in belonging to beyng as the essential occurrence of the Event. Again, this is beyond any conceptions of “I” or “we,” instead, it is a historical recognition of the first beginning and its lack of Grounding in Da-sein, which characterises the history of metaphysics.290 This is before a self can be attained, for a meaningful return is what first allows for the Grounding of any such inceptions.

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288 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 251.
289 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 252.
290 Martin Heidegger, *Being And Time*, trans. John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (Bodmin, Cornwall: Blackwells Publishing Group, Bodmin, Cornwall, 2001), 312. Heidegger’s notion of the self in *Being and Time* is characterised by a “way of existing” as opposed to an actual defined entity. The ‘I’ of the self is then something that is beyond conceptions of a ‘who’, instead, it is already bound to its coextension with the world as Dasein. The key change here in the *Contributions* is on the historical becoming of Da-sein and the simultaneous grounding that occurs in this transformed human being. This overcomes the limited anthropocentric approach of *Being and Time*.
This precedes all propositional thinking in its attempt to think inceptually and thereby, ground itself in Da-sein. This is questioning that is not a refutation or counter to metaphysics, as this would be constrained to the very opposition it is attempting to overcome. Therefore, the restraint in the presence of beyng is not a replacement of the metaphysical interpretation of Being (as by Aristotle or Hegel), rather, it is the opening for the Question-worthiness of beyng. The history of metaphysics starting with Plato (specifically the Cave allegory) and the Pre-Socratics must be unfolded in its inherence to the Question-worthiness of beyng.

To begin with, the history of metaphysics hides implicitly through beingness as presence, which results in beyng as self-concealment and beings having the priority. Beingness then becomes subsequent and therefore “apriori.”291 This articulation is to be addressed as per the historical human being’s Grounding in Da-sein and is what shields the transformed human being’s thinking from the propositional thinking of the first beginning. This conceptualization of the other beginning’s confrontation with the first beginning also explores the history of metaphysics rather than the individual ideas and theories. From this development, the gods in their neededness of beyng and their subsequent Grounding of the truth for beyng, think out of the historical human being. This will facilitate a more originary approach to the history of metaphysics, a priority given to the main questions of metaphysics and their historical influential interpretation. Upon this realization, history is grasped in its essence, “a beginning along with its derivations and its advancements” which will cast a new light over all the previous ideas and works of metaphysics.292 The history that is grasped and made more visible can now be interrogated based on a more originary questioning. This will lead to the opening for beings as beings and determine the human being with this opening. The human being will concomitantly open this historical relation to the questioning of metaphysics and thereby, allow for this historical inception of the futural thinking in the other beginning. This can only be done through the opening of

291 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 137.
292 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 138. This grasping of the history of the first beginning also shows that a complete negation of it is not intended, rather, a re-appropriation of the ideas in their historicality as the essential occurrence of the truth of beyng that will be discussed in the next section.
the questioning of the history of metaphysics and must simultaneously be grounded in its “refusal” in the essence of beyng.293

The refusal denotes the grasping of the history of metaphysics and its more originary questioning that will not allow for a particular human being as fixed amidst this questioning. Rather, the refusal pertains to a “renunciation” as beyng’s essential occurrence, a consistent capacity to allow for the opening of the Question-worthiness of beyng.294 This is not a form of indecisiveness or rejection of various modes of interpretation of the history of metaphysics, but a “highest form of possession” that creates the opening for the Grounding of the transition from the first to the other beginning.295 Therefore, the refusal designates the human being’s true historical nature as per the history of metaphysics. In its renunciation, the human being ceases to become a human being in the traditional propositional sense, neither will there be a definition that comes with this particular transformation, it will instead grant the belonging of the human being to the Question-worthiness as the essential occurrence of the Event. From here, the Grounding of the human being in Da-sein will simultaneously become the steward for the advent of the Last God. Returning to the transformation of the human being of the previous section, here we see the process unfold essentially in its interdependency with the history of metaphysics and its subsequent refusal. This ultimately, is what constitutes the Grounding of the essence of beyng and thereby, inaugurate its thinking.

As the Thinking of Beyng

The thinking that characterised much of western history and the first beginning is propositional and has been guided by “beingness and thinking” (guiding question). This hitherto has been an obstruction towards the inventive thinking of beyng. In its overcoming, the guiding question must be recognised as the dominant factor of much of western society’s thinking and the subsequent history of ideas. Recognition of this also entails the need for another approach; inventive thinking as the “highest elevation

293 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 138.
294 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 20.
295 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 20.
of the predominance of thinking." Inventive thinking is the question of the truth of beyng, thinking that is out of beyng itself and simultaneously, the Event. This for the first time, will ground the history of metaphysics, the human being and the gods all conterminously with the thinking of beyng. The confrontation of the other beginning with the first beginning is what demonstrates this inventive thinking as the grasping of what is most question-worthy, namely, the truth of beyng.

To annunciate what would be involved with this inventive thinking out of the other beginning would prove difficult, as human beings are still bound to the guiding question’s historical reflection and therefore, would provide a mere semblance. To avoid this, two distinctions must be made:

1. Thinking is signifying the mode of questioning which is explicated through the interdependent relationship of the human being and the Being of beings. Thinking here is inextricably bound to that of which is being thought – thinking as the questioning of Being.

2. Thinking as the guideline and fundamental employment of the human being’s capacity for the asking of the question of Being. Thinking, therefore, is what projects the horizon of that which beings are in respect to Being and beingness.

It is from here that the other beginning can be projected, as based on the essence of the questioning through philosophy. Philosophy, therefore, as the most essential of that which allows for thinking is a binary application; questioning the Being of beings and questioning the truth of beyng. From this framework of thought, we have a complete surrendering to the mystery of beings. Freedom from that which represents thinking as an object of representation “so as to leave entirely to beyng itself the disposing-determining power in the essential characterization of thinking (inventive thinking).” The historical reference for this can be examined in the ancient Greek’s unity of thinking and being i.e., in the λόγος of Heraclitus, which was the guideline for thought before any interpretation of Being. Still, as observed earlier, this thinking

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296 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 359.
297 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 360.
298 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 360.
299 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 361.
lacked the proper Grounding and resulted in the Platonic inception which for Heidegger is the root of the distortion of truth.\footnote{Heidegger’s historical account of Plato here will be analysed further in the last chapter of the thesis.} Therefore, the other beginning’s Question-worthiness is even more primordial than this unity, such that this unity itself becomes question-worthy.

The resulting Grounding of the “presence” will serve as “that this which is the most self-evident harbors the most alienating decision.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 362.} Presence as the present will then be prioritized as the basis for the decisional character of the uniqueness of beyng. Herein lies the crux of the thinking of beyng, a releasement towards the uniqueness of beings as beings in the essential occurrence of the Event. This is also why the description of this entire endeavour is marred with so many obstructions, such that the very act of descriptively grasping it - is always already a presupposition. Instead, it is to be abyssal of time-space in its essential occurrence which empowers it as the appropriating Event. In other words, time points to the questioning of the unity in the Pre-Socratics whilst appropriating the ground of this unity. This futural thinking of the other beginning is the “between” for the appropriation of the gods and the stewardship of the human being. Finally, the inventive thinking is not to be an act or measure that can be undertaken, rather it must be an orientation in preparation for the advent of the gods as they allow for the truth of beyng. Another way at perceiving this could be in the notion of a unique predetermination of that which is being thought and yet, still not something fixed or absolute. This entails an overcoming of Heidegger’s observation; “who bothers about beyng? Everyone chases after beings.”\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 349.} The thinking of beyng therefore is not a replacement for Being, it is what stands in the recognition of the failed attempts to provide proof of its correctness or beingness.\footnote{Heidegger, \textit{Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)}, 350.} Approaching the impossibility of providing a descriptive account of beyng showcases this thinking of beyng as prefatory.

\textbf{The Other Beginning and the Event}

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It is not possible to present an accurate and concise account of the thinking out of the other beginning especially as that would be framed in the descriptive and objective-representational thinking and saying of the first beginning. The other beginning must attempt to think and speak out of the truth of beyng itself and as such, maintain a constant re-interpretation and confrontation with the first beginning. This link in the confrontation with the first beginning is the first step towards gaining a foothold in the other beginning and becomes demonstrative of the historical Interplay. So, rather than a refutation or counter to the first beginning – the other beginning is the freeing from the guiding question of the first beginning to the basic question of the other beginning. This freeing is a transition, a historical grasping of the overcoming of the entire history of metaphysics in its essence. An overcoming that recognises the history of metaphysics and its foundation that is based on beings and its transformation into beingness or ἰδέα. From here, the transition to the other beginning is grounded in Da-sein as the truth of beyng, which is sheltered in beings. The other beginning will then let Da-sein arise out of the truth of beyng as the Event in its refusal and finally, prepare for its overcoming. In preparation for the Event, beyng must be placed in question and the Forgottenness of beyng must be appropriated in its recognition. As such, the Event is what determines and unfolds the coming of the other beginning and therefore, must be grasped in its essence.

Beyng is the appropriating Event and as such, grounds its essential occurrence. This essential occurrence, for Heidegger, is demonstrated as follows:

1. Ap-propiation, beyng’s compulsion of Da-sein to the Grounding of the truth of beyng. The ap-propiation demonstrates the gods’ need for beyng and Dasein’s assignment to the gods.

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305 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 369.
306 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 9.
308 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 369-70.
2. De-cision, an allowance for the abyssal ground so the gods and humans comingle freely as a result of the appropriation.

3. En-counter, the ap-propriation and de-cision create the bridge over the abyssal ground that is the “most extreme against.” This bridge is the en-counter of the neededness of beyng and the world of beingness.

4. Un-settling, a demonstration of the en-counter’s initiation of the strife that consequently occurs, and thereby, frees beings from their lostness in beingness. The strife here is of the gods and humans of the de-cision.

5. With-drawal, as the withdrawal from calculative and representational thinking. The with-drawal only occurs with the simultaneous un-settling’s allowance for the clearing of the “there” of the Event.

6. Simplicity, the utter simplicity of beyng as more than a relationship between the gods and humans. The simplicity is instead the ground of this strife and “between” the gods and humans as surfacing from the en-counter. Beyng subsequently, essentially occurs and rests in this simplicity.

7. Uniqueness, beyng that occurs in a rich and structured way in its simplicity is not labelled as a being. The uniqueness of beyng is in its inherent impossibility to be differentiated from beings.

8. Solitude, the occurrence of beyng only through the strife of world and earth which is predicated by beyng’s intertwinement with nothingness; “beyng casts around about itself only nothingness, whose neighbourhood remains the most genuine one and the most faithful guardian of solitude.”

The eight ways “wholly” think the Event’s essential occurrence interdependently with the thinking of beyng that was discussed in the previous section. The impossibility in ascertaining a concise formula or signification of this process represents the thinking out of the other beginning and its overcoming of the thinking of the beingness of beings. Prima facie, the eight ways seem to dictate a system or linear procedure that contradicts Heidegger’s earlier assertion in the text that the age of systems has passed.

Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 370-1.
However, it is important to note here that the eight ways much in line with its inauguration in the six junctures are precisely what characterises the lack of systems, a flux-like co-dependency of factors that all play an interlaced role in intimating what it means to think out of the other beginning. Despite the radicality of envisaging such a potential thought process, by using the eight terms that Heidegger lays out, imagining this ‘process’ can actually be achieved with clarity. This begins with the ap-proprietion as beyng’s need for Da-sein, and the resulting de-cision of the humans and gods. Here, the call for an allowance or space (ap-proprietion) is made for this other form of thinking, resulting in a liberative-settlement (de-cision) in the free exchange between the gods and Da-sein. This leads to the essential occurrence of beyng that is non-objective in its bipartite de-cision of the gods and humans and its subsequent assignment to Da-sein. This path being traversed is not odd or peculiar in the traditional sense, rather, it en-counters the abyssal ground and un-settles the thinking of the first beginning. In other words, propositional and calculative thinking are left behind (un-settled) in the engagement (en-counter) with abyssal thinking.

The finality of this process is intimated when beyng is essentially thought out of the un-settling that is achieved in the subsequent with-drawal from all calculative thinking and their view of systems. This is the en-counter that must be experienced, the creation of the bridge from the beingness of beings (built on the history of metaphysics) onwards to the thinking of beyng (the other beginning). It is evident, however, that the other beginning can only really be propelled from out of the first beginning and in its current inhibiting framework such that, to truly think out of it means to have experienced it; a transformation of the human being through the gods and the history of metaphysics. The culmination of this in the thinking of beyng, is experienced as a ‘new’ thinking characterised by simplicity, uniqueness and solitude. A thinking that is free from the limitations of the first beginning, without having negated them in their entirety. By imagining this process, it becomes clear why an exclusively propositional and representational thinking cannot similarly achieve this, it remains, however, an essential prerequisite to the call for an ‘other beginning’. It must be concluded, therefore, that the Contributions serves as the call for the recognition of the Forgottenness and in response to this call – a succumbing to the essential occurrence of beyng. This is but, a mere attempt or semblance of the desired outcome in namely; the Event, and the other beginning.
CHAPTER VI: ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS

Heidegger’s History of Metaphysics and the First Beginning

From a historiological standpoint, Heidegger’s description of the history of metaphysics may seem overly simplistic, although this is his attempt to avoid the preoccupation with dates and events which exhibits a facsimile of the true influential power of history. What should be studied instead, are the central ideas that have shaped the history of western philosophy. The issue in Heidegger’s assertion, however, is that the paradigmatic shift in thinking and saying occurs in the Platonic inception of the idea, which he denotes as the beginning of the devastation from the Ancient Greek thinking that was customary of Parmenides, Heraclitus and Anaximander. This will form the entire basis of Heidegger’s historicality, such that the entire reinterpretative power of history lies in the significance of this first beginning’s inception. This presents two inconsistencies: first, in the Presocratic “thinking and saying,” and second, in Heidegger’s reading of Plato.

Heidegger’s assertion that the thinking and saying of the Pre-Socratics signify a unique composition of thought and expression as unificatory is not unfounded, however, its lack of instituting or grounding is not obvious. There is ample evidence to suggest that Plato was influenced by Parmenides which can also provide a plausible assessment of Platonic philosophy as a continuation of the Parmenidean thought process. The lack of instituting or grounding of Parmenides, for instance, would seem to reflect Parmenides’s influence on Plato and would consequently form the foundation of Platonic thought. This thinking and saying that was customary of the Pre-Socratics, therefore, would surface in a reimagined form in Plato’s dialogues. Perhaps this is what Heidegger was insinuating in the lack of grounding, it is not, however, clearly outlined in the Contributions. From another point of view and staying with Parmenides - he is not seldom referred to for an example of the first sustained argument in western philosophy. Karl Popper presents such an argument in his The World of Parmenides Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment, where Parmenides was in fact, the first philosopher of nature.\(^{310}\) Popper here credits Parmenides with the discovery of the

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spherical shape of the earth and Heraclitus with phases of the moon. Popper will go into significant detail outlining the poem of Parmenides in a series of propositions to prove his point, which provides a unique alternative to Heidegger’s study of the Pre-Socratics. Taking this into account, Parmenides and Heraclitus can then be credited for not making proposition-less statements, but sustaining arguments in a unique expression that is representative of the times they inhabited. To take another example, the Italian theoretical physicist Carlo Rovelli in his The First Scientist Anaximander And His Legacy credits Anaximander with being the first to pave the way for physics, geography, meteorology and biology through his “rethinking our worldview – a search for knowledge based on the rejection of any obvious-seeming “certainty,” which is one of the main roots of scientific thinking.” This is in complete opposition to Heidegger’s view of Anaximander, in that Rovelli’s interpretation is based on Anaximander as a scientist in the modern sense, an objective thinker per excellentiam. This paves the way for another entirely different historical account of the Pre-Socratics and thereby the first beginning, with numerous other examples than can be drawn from. Also, it makes the clear-sighted notion of the transition from the Pre-Socratics to Plato anything but clear, with the notion of truth as correctness, not necessarily a Platonic distortion, if there even ever was a concise and exclusively dominant account of truth as unconcealment in the Pre-Socratics.

This brings the analysis to the next important point, namely, the historical evidence of the Pre-Socratics. Only fragments of the key Pre-Socratics remain that Heidegger includes in his first beginning, such as Parmenides, whose only known work On Nature survives in a fragmentary state. Heraclitus does not fare much better, in his work also existing in fragments, with further difficulty in deciphering its highly cryptic expression, which can lead to equally idiosyncratic interpretations of it. In Anaximander, only one fragment survives, with much of what we know about his philosophy being transmitted historically through others. So, given the very limited availability of primary sources, it proves difficult to ascertain any certainty in the framework of thinking to these thinkers. This also leads to the second major critique; Heidegger’s interpretation of Plato.

311 Popper, World of Parmenides, 70-73.
As noted in the second chapter, Heidegger charges Plato specifically in his Cave allegory with the transformation of truth from unconcealment to the idea. It is important to consider that Heidegger expands on this in more detail in his work *The Essence of Truth on Plato’s Cave Allegory And Theaetetus*. The *Contributions* does not go into the same level of detail, the premise, however, is the same. Given the lack of evidence in the Pre-Socratics’ establishment of truth as unconcealment, and Plato as likely influenced by the Parmenidean thought process – this also will prove problematic. Plato does demonstrate his Forms theory in detail in the Cave allegory, however, to attribute the entire distortion of truth to it is to neglect the entire Platonic corpus within a narrow focus. Heidegger’s thinking of beyng as through the advent of the gods in what Thomas Sheehan calls the “appropriated thrown-openness” that cannot be known also parallels Plato in some cases. For example, in the *Timaeus*, Plato describes “prophetic insight” as active only when reason and sense are asleep and the “power of divination” is always the product of some chaotic disorder that is unintelligible and only decipherable by the “interpreters of prophecy.” This resembles the Future Ones as those that cannot fall prey to calculation and propositional thinking but yet, think “out-of” the other beginning. Furthermore, Francisco J. Gonzalez shows that the transformation of truth from unconcealment to correctness is not demonstrated sufficiently in the Cave allegory, such that the transformation itself is dependent on truth as unconcealment as the foundation. So

313 Martin Heidegger, *The Essence of Truth on Plato’s Cave Allegory And Theaetetus*, trans. Ted Sadler (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing), 2013. Heidegger remains silent on the expansive corpus of Platonic dialogues that have been inherited throughout the ages in contrast to other Ancient Greek philosophers. In other words, a comprehensive and detailed criticism of Plato is possible and has been conducted throughout history much in contrast to other Ancient Greek philosophers. Philosophers would beg the question to do the same for other Ancient Greeks, especially in the case of the Pre-Socratics where only fragments remain. This also presents further problems with Heidegger’s reading of the Ancient Greeks and their respective influences on the history of philosophy in that Heidegger may in fact be misinterpreting the Platonic influence on the history of the Forgottenness.


316 Francisco J. Gonzales, *Plato And Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue* (University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009), 172-3. This also shows the Pre-Socratic influence on Plato mentioned earlier in the chapter. For Gonzalez, the Pre-Socratic truth as unconcealment is what Plato bases his entire conception of truth on. Plato in the Cave allegory then is building on this foundation with a more detailed exposition that is expressed idiosyncratically by way of allegory and myth. Moreover, the allegorical expression of Plato also presents further problems with Heidegger’s reading of Plato considering Heidegger’s assertion that Plato’s philosophy is ‘less Greek’ than the Pre-Socratics and Aristotle, and more a demonstration of objective-representational thinking.
in effect, more correctness for Heidegger is concomitant with more unconcealment—an inherent contradiction that requires a deeper analysis. Plato’s projection of truth by all accounts then, represents a continuation of the Presocratic truth, a natural metamorphic process that was inherent in the Presocratic thinkers, such as Parmenides, as discussed earlier. Should unconcealment be demonstrated by the Pre-Socratics, it will be even more prominent in Platonic philosophy.

The transformation of truth and thinking did occur historically, however, Heidegger’s oversimplified outlook is enmeshed with problems. The first beginning is a good representation of the history of philosophy, it does, however, seem that the distortion of truth is more symptomatic of Plato’s historical interpretation. Plato and the Pre-Socratics for that matter held similar views regarding truth— with enough evidence to suggest that propositions can be drawn from both sources whilst also showcasing a unificatory exposition of thinking and Being. This could be proven otherwise theoretically, should we have access to more material in the case of the Pre-Socratics, however, in the case of Plato, it is quite clear that Plato’s philosophy is influenced by the Pre-Socratics. Moreover, Aristotle is more akin to a philosopher of logic and science with very important discoveries attributed to him in those areas and is mostly contrasted with the often mystical characterisation of Plato. So, should correctness as objectively present be the source of the distortion of truth and thereby the foundation of the Forgottenness; Aristotle should essentially be held more accountable than Plato. However, Carol J. White shows that “Heidegger thinks that Aristotle is “more

317 One particularly important influence on Plato would be the Pythagorean school, which is also left out of Heidegger’s reading of Plato and the history of philosophy. It is difficult at this stage to definitively claim (due to limited evidence) that Plato was an initiate of the Pythagorean order given the influence of mathematics in Plato’s philosophy. It would, however, not be inappropriate to suggest it as a possibility and at the very least, a significant influence on Platonism. For example, it is commonly accepted that the transmigration of the souls that Plato supports could have been a direct affirmation of Pythagorean teachings. Furthermore, the Ancient Egyptian influence on Pythagoras and subsequently on Plato are also unacknowledged. See Philip Sidney Horky, Plato and Pythagoreanism (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013), 171.

318 Hubert L Dreyfus and Mark A Wrathall, A Companion To Heidegger (Malden, Mass: Blackwell Publishing, 2005), 137-39. Heidegger here states otherwise. Aristotle deviates from Plato’s course in his assertion that “beingness” although eternal—is nevertheless ungraspable. Beingness on a fundamental level is related to its essence, however, the essence itself is everlasting. Aristotle’s essence, according to Heidegger, however, does not exist external to being as in Plato’s Forms, it is instead grounded in logos. From this, Heidegger claims sufficient evidence to exhibit truth as unconcealment in Aristotle that he sees as more in line with the Pre-Socratics. Heidegger, however, does not take into account Aristotle being credited as the earliest practitioner of formal logic in his Prior Analytics. Aristotle would also be credited with a variety of syllogisms which would influence much of the history of philosophy and was also the precursor to mathematical logic. In other words, Aristotle’s philosophy
Greek” than Plato because his thinking is closer to that of the Pre-Socratics than is Plato’s.”319 In other words, the first beginning may prove an important historical reading of philosophy, however, the clear account of the Platonic projection is less the foundation for the Forgottenness, rather, more an inception that may have been a victim of Heidegger’s historical interpretation. The two manifestations of Platonic philosophy that Heidegger shows as historically responsible for the Forgottenness are the Platonic Forms, and secondly, the subsequent reliance on knowledge and understanding in pursuit of them. For Heidegger, this means that beings are neglected in pursuit of the immutable world of Forms, and as such distorts truth from unconcealment in favour of correctness and representation in as part of knowledge and understanding. Such is the history of metaphysics and philosophy that founds the Forgottennesss. This chapter has shown thus far, however, that this is largely a mischaracterisation of the history of philosophy that is a symptom founded on Heidegger’s particular interpretation of Plato. Therefore, on Heidegger’s account of the lack of instituted grounding of the Pre-Socratics; he may have made a valid point in that regard, although one that he ironically appears to have fallen victim to.

**Analysis of the Forgottenness of Beyng**

The *Contributions*’ account of the Forgottenness is the foundation for the breakdown of truth and for Heidegger, are “basically the same.”320 However, as the Resonating is sounded out, there must be an engagement with them separately to make sense of the greatest plight and thereby, “resound for the first time the most remote nearness to the absconding of the gods.”321 Heidegger’s position on the Forgottenness of beyng has merit in its uniqueness, which includes his assertion of the need for its Question-worthiness. Yet for Heidegger, this overlooking of the question of beyng has much deeper historical significance, such that the entire history of western philosophy is shaped by this lack of questioning and its subsequent distortion of truth, a Forgottenness that transforms into the Abandonment by beyng. This is what shapes the historicality of beyng, the first beginning in its guiding question and his prophesied

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320 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 90.
321 Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, 90.
other beginning through the basic question. As observed in the previous section, the foundation for the first beginning’s distortion of the question of truth in Plato is problematic, however, the Forgottenness of beyng concept remains a pertinent historical occurrence.

It is Heidegger’s position that the guiding question “What are beings?” is asked in its most general form by Aristotle and has inevitably guided the beginning of western philosophy and its history up to its end in Nietzsche.322 This is questioning that overlooked the basic question in the questioning of beyng – a leap into the truth of beyng itself.323 As such, the entire history of western philosophy is an engagement with Platonic philosophy moving within the same neo-Kantianism and not grasping the question of beyng.324 Here two critical points need to be assessed and to begin with, the lack of deeper questioning of beyng is relevant with one particular exception that Heidegger only mentions in brief, “From the Greeks to Nietzsche, the guiding question determines the same mode of asking about “being.” The clearest and greatest example attesting to this unity of the tradition is Hegel’s Logic.”325 The first of the Contributions shortcomings, therefore, is based on the lack of deeper engagement with Hegel’s The Doctrine Of Being in his The Science of Logic and as such, a different historical account of the Forgottenness of beyng.326 This represents a significant hiccup historically en route to the other beginning and an alternative view of the first beginning, which according to Hegel:

left unconsidered, a matter of indifference, and consequently also the need to ask with what a beginning should be made remains of no importance in face of the need for the principle in which alone the interest of the fact seems to lie, the interest as to what is the truth, the absolute ground of everything.327

Hegel’s starting point, like Heidegger’s, is that all western philosophy is grounded in unquestioned propositions and as such, equally demonstrate a Forgottenness. The

322 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 60.
323 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 60.
324 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 58.
325 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 61.
327 Hegel, The Science Of Logic, 45.
more unique approach of the *Contributions*, however, is based on the conception of the questioning, and what the Forgottenness itself is a Forgottenness of. This may be the reason for the lack of focus that Heidegger places on Hegel’s *Doctrine of Being*, in that it remains constricted to the Platonic Being and its forebearer in the Neo-Kantian tradition. Hegel’s position is based on the perplexity of the beginning’s lack of method and logic. Abstract thought for Hegel is limited to content, which drives the culture of philosophy through a study of the cognitive process, subjectivity, form and their foundation on principle. So, for Hegel “the principle ought to be also the beginning, and that which has priority for thinking ought to be also the first in the process of thinking.” This forms the basis for logic and its Forgottenness of logic historically. Furthermore, Hegel will reject inner revelation, faith or intellectual revelation in the face of logic, which also reinforces his unique determination of the first beginning. Herein lies the divergence in the two respective thinker’s assessment of the beginning; Hegel’s as based on the lack of rigours of logic and method which is instead replaced by the abstractive philosophy of Being, whilst for Heidegger, the overlooking of the basic question that constitutes the need for an entirely different approach, a succumbing to the truth of beyng, which is an overcoming of the rigours of logic and method etc.

The purpose of the *Contributions* is to demonstrate the thinking of the other beginning in the Event as a reinvention of thought, expression and potentially language. Hegel’s position presents no such alternative and will remain constricted to the very framework of thinking that the *Contributions* is attempting to overcome. Hegel’s other beginning is to be logical in an “element of a free, self-contained thought” which inevitably is the “absolute truth of consciousness.” Therefore, Hegel’s study of consciousness and pure knowledge does not make the required break from the Platonic and the Kantian tradition whilst also making presuppositions. For even in the sense of logic which presupposes objective thinking, is an investigation of Being that in itself is

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331 It is important to consider that the implications for both approaches have a real world relevance. Heidegger’s motivation is based on the overcoming of the machination dictated existence symptomatic of the Abandonment. Hegel similarly, aims to move philosophy from the abstract world of Being to a more practical purpose in service of humanity.
332 Hegel, *The Science Of Logic*, 47.
presupposed as a consequence. So, Hegel’s position is most worthy of consideration amidst the historical narrative as that which acknowledged the lack of questioning, a Forgottenness and a need for another beginning, although, not providing an alternative in his logic. This, nevertheless, shows another viewpoint of Heidegger’s inconsistent history of the first beginning, in its neglect of Hegel’s relevance within the Forgottenness. Heidegger places a greater emphasis on Aristotle, whom he credits as the first and last to approach the question of Being, albeit insufficiently. This is misleading, considering Hegel’s place in this historical tradition, as Hegel did progress further than Aristotle, although along the same lines. This will lead to another important historical occurrence that needs further investigation in Heidegger’s assessment of the Forgottenness, a return to Plato once more.

Heidegger’s representation of the other beginning within the Contributions will undoubtedly find no parallels in the history of western philosophy, yet its surfacing in the Resonating due to the Platonic distortion is fallacious. If there are to be any similarities or closeness in thought that Heidegger envisions within this other beginning, it must be from the Platonic foundation. There are several ways that this can be demonstrated more comprehensively of which would be the subject of another thesis altogether, however, several points can be demonstrated concisely that the Contributions fails to appropriate fully in its assessment of the first beginning and its ostensible role in the Forgottenness of beyng:

1. Plato’s philosophy cannot be assessed entirely by his one conception of the theory of Forms and especially, its inception within the Cave allegory. Numerous dialogues discuss the Forms such as Phaedrus, Parmenides (of which Plato himself is doubtful of their instantiation) and Timaeus to name a few.333

2. Plato’s metaphysics is subject to change in his large expansive dialogues of which are worthy of further engagement with, as, in the Seventh Letter where Plato explains that the deepest truth and metaphysics cannot be

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333 Plato, John M Cooper and D. S Hutchinson, Complete Works (Indianapolis, Ind.: Hackett Pub., 1997), 388. In Parmenides, Plato talks about ‘the instant’ – a description of some point in between an object’s transition from one stage to the other. This instant is between motion and rest which also means that it is not in any time at all. So all change happens from within this instant, a coming to be that is analogous to Heidegger’s “juncture of truth” as the time-space of the moment of the Event. Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 26.
expressed in written form. This is again, comparable to Heidegger’s beyng as unknowable or indescribable. The *Timaeus*’ prophetic insight that was discussed in the previous section is also worthy of consideration in its closeness to Heidegger’s exegesis of thinking in the other beginning.

3. Heidegger’s reading of Plato was also precarious, in that the period between 1931-1934, the Cave allegory helped in grasping the “essence of *alētheia* as unhiddenness.” This will change at some point in the 1930s and by the time Heidegger’s *Plato’s Doctrine of Truth* is published in the 1940s, he makes a complete reversal in his view.

4. Heidegger’s disastrous political endeavour may have been influenced by his reading of Plato’s involvement with the tyrant of Syracuse as dictated in the *Seventh Letter*. This points to another potential discrepancy in the Contributions’ reading of Plato, which may also be the basis for the radical shift in his reading of Plato towards the end of the 1930s.

5. As shown in the previous section, the distortion of truth from unconcealment to correctness is fallacious, such that truth itself as correctness is founded on unconcealment. Plato’s philosophy, therefore, can be viewed as a Parmenidean perpetuation, especially when considering Plato’s *Parmenides* dialogue where the Forms are not left unchallenged.

6. Heidegger fails to take into account the Neoplatonists and their reading of Plato in his history of metaphysics. This includes a very comprehensive and detailed exposition of Platonic philosophy that encompassed a period of over three hundred years. The Neoplatonist interpretation, though too detailed to provide for here, nevertheless represents a unique reading of Plato. It is important to note, however, that Neoplatonism will have a substantial influence on the Renaissance era and Christianity therein. This will subsequently manifest in a renewal of theurgy, alchemy and magic that was exemplary of key thinkers such as Iamblichus and Proclus. Figures such as Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola and Giordano Bruno of the Renaissance were also very heavily influenced by this

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337 Ralkowski, *Heidegger’s Platonism*, 137.
tradition, and as such, certainly showcases an alternative reading of the history of philosophy and Plato.\footnote{338}

7. Heidegger does not take into account the influential power of the Protestant Reformation’s relationship with science, technology and its refutation of the philosophical tradition that preceded it. Francis Bacon, for instance, would praise the Pre-Socratics as materialists and utterly reject Plato and Aristotle in an effort to disclose all there is to be known about the world through science and technology. The Protestant Reformation, therefore, through its embracing of the Pre-Socratics and rejection of Plato and Aristotle plays a very important role in contributing to modern science and technology.\footnote{339} In other words, it can be said that Heidegger’s Abandonment from the perspective of the Protestant Reformation is more a result of the change of historical emphasis from Plato and Aristotle toward the Pre-Socratics as opposed to the inverse in Heidegger’s account.

On a final note, Kant also plays a significant role in the first beginning’s history as shown in chapter two. Kant’s philosophy is for Heidegger a completion of the Platonic inception, in that it takes Platonism to its limits and subsequently results in the German Idealist tradition and therefore, remains within the first beginning’s framework of thinking. Hegel’s philosophy will subsequently demonstrate the catalysis of these Kantian limitations. So, the Forgottenness will have two main historical junctures in Plato and Hegel. Heidegger is rightful in demonstrating the Forgottenness as congruent with the lack of questioning within the western philosophical tradition, however, the inconsistencies are based on firstly, his idiosyncratic reading of Plato and his overlooking of the majority of the Platonic corpus and secondly, the lack of

\footnote{338}{The other beginning on Heidegger’s account as that which represents an overcoming of calculative thinking can be clearly observed in several Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus and Proclus. The limitations of thinking for Proclus for instance, are to be overcome through divinational practices, and their reliance on a unique expression that reflects the overcoming of calculative thinking.}

\footnote{339}{This also reinforces this thesis’ earlier assertion that the Platonic distortion of truth and its subsequent role in the foundation of the Forgottenness being more a consequence of a particular interpretation of Plato and less his actual philosophy. As such, Heidegger’s reading of history is also limited by his own unique interpretation of Plato, much like key figures of the Protestant Reformation, Neoplatonism and the Renaissance. It is worth noting that Neoplatonists such as Iamblichus explained that intellectual philosophising is inherently limited, similar to the limitations of metaphysics that Heidegger espouses. Instead, a unity of theurgy and contemplation are what is needed, and saw them as mutually inclusive rather than exclusive. Truth for the Neoplatonists, therefore, is multifaceted and suprarational. See Crystal Addey, Divination and Theurgy in Neoplatonism (New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2014), 41.}
affirmation of the Hegelian *Doctrine of Being* that also represents another significant critical historical questioning of Being worthy of deeper excavation. As such, the Forgottenness of beyng will need another historical reinterpretation to understand this historical narrative more concisely, taking into consideration these two important historical points. This is, however, intrinsic to the repetitive historical account of the other beginning that the *Contributions* envision.

**The Abandonment by Beyng**

The second chapter has shown that the Abandonment finds its historical roots in the thinking of Being as based on beingness, a demonstration of the guiding question that was elucidated most clearly and exclusively by Aristotle. This, of course, would lead to the Forgottenness and its continuance in the Abandonment of which its various modes are unveiled. It is this thesis’ position that the Abandonment is Heidegger’s stronger idea within the *Contributions* but because it is not exhibited succinctly, it requires further elaboration through contemporary examples to further demonstrate its importance.

Heidegger’s historical timeline is based on Aristotle as the first and last who posed the question of Being which presumably means that the Abandonment first arises post-Aristotle’s philosophy. However, the more pronounced modes that begin with machination only surfaces in Heidegger’s age, or presumably, around the time of the industrial revolution. machination, as observed in the second chapter, remains shrouded in lived experience and will often lead thinkers astray in recognising this deeper cause, of which symbolises the greatest plight. This can be demonstrated in the various historical approaches taken by thinkers before Heidegger’s time and beyond in their shortcomings in identifying this condition. The monumental thinker Karl Marx, who preceded Heidegger, devised a very articulate economic critique of Capitalism and its effect on the human condition and society as a whole which proved monumental. Terms such as alienation, commodification, relationships of commerce, estranged labour and others showcase Marx’s particular critique as measures of the detrimental effect of Capitalism that are not unlike Heidegger’s lived experience. There is no need for expounding on the influential and historical significance of Marxism because of this, however, it is important to show its constriction within the
beingness of beings and more specifically, a materialistic dialectic foundation. Marx and others fail to expose the historical foundation of the thinking that has guided the history of western thought that resulted in the aforementioned issues. So, in the case of Marxism, the critique has its roots in the Hegelian dialectic, albeit a physicalist reversal. Therefore, the criticism remains within the very same thought process that it is attempting to refute, a critique that is built on the beingness of beings to establish an alternative that is also founded on the first beginning and the guiding question. This is not an example that is exclusive to the Marxist condition, Heidegger’s Abandonment by beyng can be demonstrated equally across all philosophical frameworks of thinking contemporaneously, as they are all demonstrative of thinking that have abandoned Being and as such, allow for the greatest plight’s persistence in its hidden nature.

The thinking envisioned by the other beginning is yet to be sounded out through the Resonating - a paradigmatic shift in thought that begins with the recognition of the greatest plight and thereby, the Question-worthiness of beyng. The approaches hitherto have all been within the same tradition that began with the first beginning. Therefore, it is important to draw parallels between the varying modes of the Abandonment and its relevance today. A related issue can be brought up in the subject matter of the ecological crisis. Heidegger, through the concept of the machination, asserts that this is an inevitable occurrence of the Abandonment, in that beings as such are represented by their objectively driven interpretation. Humanity’s exploitation of the Earth for resource extraction or waste disposal, for instance, is an exhibition of the objective representative thinking of the first beginning – beings are to be viewed as that which are characterised by their usefulness, calculation, giganticism, etc. This lack of the opening to the mystery of beings is what showcases machination and its hiddenness amidst the lived experience, and such opens the world of beings to exploitation ecologically among others.

From here, human beings are characterised by lived experience. In discourse and expression, the human being will point to ecology as an area of study, exploitable resource potential or in a place for preservation due to its beauty, both approaches being characterised by the same framework of thought. Language and expression will then reflect this comportment towards beings, such that human beings cannot allow
for a more originary uncovering of ecology. This will further perpetuate in the human being’s lack of deeper meditative capacity and inner contemplation which allows the denuding to compound upon itself and perpetuate further, which language will then reflect in its ecological worldview. Here, beings are then enframed gigantically, such that their quality is descriptive of their quantity, i.e., the greater the resource potential, the greater the value. This will be reinforced by total mobilization, such that the human being’s comportment towards beings that are descriptive of the denuding, gigantic, lived experience and their root in machination will all be encapsulated interdependently. Ecology will never be viewed more than that which is to be preserved or exploited, all depending on the calculative potential of science and its determination of it. In the current reign of science and technology where all areas of study external to them are viewed as not lucrative for “progress” effectively repels future students from engaging in alternative areas of study and as such, are Totally Mobilized in their machination dictated existence.340

The final point to touch on regarding the Abandonment’s relevance would be in nihilism. Recall that the nihilism of the Abandonment is not comparable to Nietzsche’s, but a relation to the transformation of the human being due to the lack of goal setting and their distraction by cultural assets. The Abandonment’s nihilism will showcase itself in modernity as the human being’s drive for goals that are in themselves a goal. This hides the true nature of what it is that is being striven for, such that the machination and lived experience are never penetrated or exposed as they remain hidden within the goallessness of the human being and their engagement with the beingness of beings. Cultural assets will act as a distraction or facade, a demonstration of the supposed exposure to the cultural or aesthetic, whilst, these are still exhibited through total mobilization. In the context of modern cinema, the human being’s entertainment may showcase an alternative, invigorate a movement for change or enhance the appreciation for what is already existent. This, however, is all a form of reinforcing complacency in its illusory exhibition of the potential for change. For example, human beings will be comforted in their exposure to alternatives in a camping trip, a visit to a national park, a humanitarian aid mission or the exposure to

340 It is worthy of mention that at the time of writing of this thesis, the Australian government has more than doubled the cost of university tuition in the fields of philosophy, humanities and history, whilst lowering the fees for the sciences, nursing and others.
animals in captivity without really having the potential to uncover the foundational cause and accentuate real change. These are all examples of the lived experience, all determined by the machination’s allowance for human interaction through the denuding. Change is never possible, overcoming is never in sight, alternatives are always constricted to that which is to be refuted and most importantly, human beings are completely ignorant of this. This can be demonstrated infinitely, but for efficiency and to avoid being monotonous, this should suffice in the displaying the Abandonment’s manifestation contemporaneously.

Perhaps the Abandonment’s most relevant feature is in the lack of engagement with it, such that all the critiques of Being thus far, fail to enact real change. Ecological destruction and climate change persist and have consistently with little in the way. Numerous roadblocks have been constructed in the way of these crises, all of which fail at the deeper questioning needed to apprehend the true cause of humanity’s engagement with Being and beings. Therefore, the Abandonment is never more relevant than today, where the crises that the greatest plight exhibits are at its latest stage, and as such, is demonstrative of issues that are beyond a complete and comprehensive analysis. This will lead to proposed solutions that are more and more distant from the true cause, of which the denuding will perpetuate. The recognition of the denuding is key in understanding this by way of a return to the historicality of the Abandonment in the Forgottenness and the Question-worthiness of beyng that is needed to enact real change.

The Question-worthiness of Beyng and the Other Beginning

It is not this thesis’s position to propose that the issues raised in the last chapter are exclusive to machination. As mentioned earlier, total mobilization and the denuding represent particular facets of lived experience and at this stage, the human being’s comportment towards beings is manifesting in additional and more complex ways that are yet to be understood. However, the need for their exposure through the source in the Forgottenness remains obligatory. The recognition of the greatest plight that will allow for the Resonating must come in effect and then, the Question-worthiness of beyng can be envisioned in the other beginning. While this sounds somewhat mystical, there are several strengths and weaknesses in Heidegger’s Contributions that are
worthy of exploration. To begin with the relative shortcomings of the proposed solution; the notion of the Future Ones needs to be addressed.

The Future Ones in the Contributions represents the shortest chapter and additionally, provides a weaker exegesis in comparison to the other chapters. Working with what is briefly covered in the text, the problems do not stop there. The notion of those who cannot fall prey to the age of calculation, bear the staff of the truth of beyng and practice a sacrificial restraint in the advent of the gods - risks demonstrating the coming of a messianic figure. The obvious Nietzschean influence here can be seen to be the driving force behind Heidegger’s writings coupled with an eschatological narrative. This narrative can also give an elitist twist to the problem at hand, such that this is not to be viewed as a humanity at large issue, rather only for those who can withstand the task which inadvertently, establishes a human disparity. Building on this, the only example Heidegger gives of the Future Ones is in Hölderlin as who is “the most futural” in his poems, which again, is not based on anything apart from his being a poet.341 It is not entirely clear as to what it is about Hölderlin’s poems that separate him from the other poets, and Heidegger will not expound on this in sufficient detail to support this in the Contributions. There is no indication that Hölderlin will be steadfast in the mood of restraint and ground Da-sein either, and no further clarity being provided on what it is about the poetic style that distinguishes him from others in this potentiality. Be that as it may, the insinuations point to futural figures that practice poetry, thinking, deed and sacrifice, which as described in the third chapter are characteristics of restraint. Restraint is what is needed in the other beginning, a recreation of beings which again, gives no further indication as to how Hölderlin

341 Heidegger, Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), 160. For Heidegger, Hölderlin is the one who “poetized the furthest ahead” and overcame the desire for absolute knowledge. In other words, Heidegger’s assertion is that Hölderlin’s poetry is futural in its strictly non-representational expression, although not expanding beyond this. The other beginning may be characterised by a ‘poetic’ expression as was common with the Pre-Socratics, however, it is unclear on Heidegger’s part as to what Hölderlin’s poetry represents that had not been demonstrated before. Heidegger does go into further detail in a series of three lectures, namely, his Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine” of 1934-35, followed by his study of “Remembrance” and “The Ister” that were published during 1941-42 and after the Contributions. The Contributions however, do not provide this level of detail apart from the repeteated assertions of Hölderlin’s futural poetry as that which reaches ‘furthest ahead’ or whose words are to be grounded in the future human being. The Contributions can be seen as the beginning of Heidegger’s study of Hölderlin’s futural thinking, and as such, point to the lectures and studies he produced elsewhere. It is also important to note that there is a noticeable trend in relating Hölderlin’s poetry to ecology, aesthetics and the history of Being as of recent. This may provide some merit to Heidegger’s emphasis on Hölderlin as a future thinker beyond the Contributions. See Rochelle Tobias, Hölderlin’s Philosophy of Nature (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).
demonstrates this. The most that can be gained from Heidegger’s Future Ones is the concept of thinkers of the future who begin anew apropos beings. This is historical, a reinterpretation of the first beginning and its consequence for the transformation of western thought and its influence.

This leads to the strength of Heidegger’s disposition in the Contributions, which lies in the foundation of questioning and thinking. If these futural thinkers persist – the Question-worthiness of beyng will become the dominant mode of thought. This presents the more unique aspect of Heidegger's thinking and is also a path that has several relevant points. The historical return for a more original repetition of the history of western thought has its merits in allowing for an alternative approach in the engagement with ideas that have shaped metaphysics and science thus far. Western philosophy that is founded on the first beginning needs to be subjected to repeated study (as this thesis has done in its critique of Heidegger’s history in the previous section) to strive for the other beginning. This confrontation that the Contributions envisages, will inevitably allow for an overcoming of the beingness of beings, through beyng as the Event. Presumably, this is a prospect for a different foundation of the sciences and metaphysics, an opening that may present a way of inhabiting the world that overcomes the Abandonment. This foundation is ‘groundless’ in its essence, never constructing a particular framework of thought, and therefore, immune from being constrained within a worldview or system. This requires a paradigmatic shift in thinking and as such, will shape the human being’s comportment towards beings differently. So far, the Contributions displays a sound approach, relatively concise and free from further vagueness. This is the Contributions’ strength, a clear affirmation of the importance of history, a need for a more original repetition of it, and a challenge to the dominance of objective-representational thinking that has characterised much of the western philosophical tradition, metaphysics and science. However, the Future One’s role in this is what seems incongruent with the entire project and notwithstanding this, the Contributions showcase a very important and unique insight into the history of western philosophy and consequently, overcoming the Forgottenness’ continuance in the Abandonment.

By way of a final assessment of the other beginning and the Question-worthiness of beyng; this thesis affirms the need for deeper questioning and as such, a surrendering
to the mystery of beings. The historical component of this is crucial and as such, will allow for another way of engaging with beings, thinking that is not guided – but instead, focused on the basic question. The strength and validity of this are based on its uniqueness, for it has never been attempted before due to, as this thesis shows - the hidden nature of the plight. Having established the relevance of the Abandonment earlier in the chapter, this formulation is even more prominent in the plight. As such, by recognising a crisis based on the lack of questioning, the overcoming of the Abandonment can occur as a result. It is this thesis’s position that this is a path hitherto untraversed, which further adds to the difficulty in envisioning the inceptual thinking of the other beginning. To be more concise, the Event is in-itself inceptual and as such – its essential occurrence is the only indication of its coming to be. To conclude then, this chapter has attempted to shed light on both the strength and weaknesses of the Contributions. The Forgottenness is a sound foundation for the questioning that is needed, although, in contrast to Heidegger’s assertion; it cannot be shown to have originated solely in Plato, much less in his Cave allegory. Furthermore, to assert that this lack of questioning was largely non-existent within the Pre-Socratics is problematic given the primary material philosophers and historians have access to. This chapter also focused on the significant historical ideas that Heidegger has overlooked, particularly in Hegel who recognised the lack of foundation and similarly, envisioned another beginning, albeit a different one - based on the rigours of logic. This all has been shown to have little effect in addressing the problems of the Abandonment contemporaneously. Moreover, as per Heidegger’s account, this showcases some of the stronger ideas that he portrays in the text. Notwithstanding the Nietzschean quasi-elitist-messianic figure’s influence, the Forgottenness’ overcoming through the other beginning, as this thesis has shown, has never been more relevant as a historical and philosophical project.

On the topic of Heidegger’s difficult writing within the Contributions, it is important to note that this is an attempt to speak and think through the other beginning, inceptual thinking through the truth of beyng. This provides for some semblance of the proposed solution, which showcases the quasi-poetic and proposition-less verbiage within the Contributions. As addressed in the first chapter on the Turn, the shift in the expression on Heidegger’s part comes with his realisation that the impediments in the language of metaphysics are rooted in the first beginning. To overcome this limitation in the
Abandonment, the thinking and saying must go beyond the first beginning’s objective representational framework. A complete rejection of the first beginning and its entire philosophical tradition is not intended nor needed. Upon closer study, numerous terms and concepts from thinkers of the past are appropriated within the Contributions, i.e., Kierkegaard’s Leap, Ernst Junger’s total mobilization, Nietzsche’s God, Heraclitus’s Strife etc. This is an exhibition of the other beginning concomitantly with the first beginning - reimagine language and thinking beyond a mere dialectical process. As such, the Ancient Greek tradition onwards are reinvigorated anew, and are then propelled onto an ‘other beginning’. This process is to be subjected to repeated study and thought, such that Heidegger cannot represent the last word. This whole project is historical, and therefore, signifies what it means to engage with the Forgottenness of beyng and overcome the Abandonment by beyng through the Question-worthiness of beyng.

CONCLUSION

The Contributions prove useful for understanding the Turn (die Kehre) in Heidegger’s thought after Being and Time. This thesis has demonstrated the complete reversal (as Heidegger himself deemed it) from the systematic approach of Being and Time to “thinking the Event” of the Contributions. The predominant feature of the text that Heidegger will consistently and perpetually refer to throughout his later works is this Event (Ereignis) - with a substantial critique of the Contributions in a later work published as The Event (Das Ereignis).342 This is but one of a series of six articulations post the Contributions that are all centred on the Event that was conceptualised post the Turn. As such, the term proves to be of critical importance in understanding Heidegger’s later thought in light of the Contributions. This is a project that must be envisioned through the other beginning, the paradigmatic shift in thinking and philosophy. The Event, however, is still in need of inauguration by the Future Ones of the Last God. By all accounts then, the Abandonment persists in the modern age, cloaking its necessary precondition – the Forgottenness of beyng. Taking this into

account, the *Contributions* can be interpreted eschatologically in a sense, not unlike Hegel’s end of history, albeit envisioning a different purpose and outcome.

This thesis hitherto has shown that the *Contributions* demonstrates a monumental outlook of the contemporary age. The challenges that human beings face in the form of the machination, lived experience and others are not to be seen as strictly negative and a roadblock, instead, they are intrinsic to their own overcoming. Stated simply, the other beginning can only occur as the first beginning begins to succumb to its destructiveness. The point here is this; the challenges that humanity faces are an invitation for a different approach through the opening of a space. This space represents the focal point of the thesis – Being must become historical; “beyng historical thinking.” There needs to be a comprehensive return to the foundation of philosophy and thinking to create a space for a multitude of ways of being in the world. In so doing, that space must remain open to questioning to overcome the destructiveness of cementing a particular worldview and hindering further development.

This outlook shows the importance of understanding the historical becoming of Being *qua* beings. The Forgottenness has shaped the world in the way that is currently manifesting in the challenges posed whilst also calling for a return to beyng’s “unforgetting.” Importantly, Heidegger’s concerns within the *Contributions* are also to be open to questioning which this thesis has attempted to achieve. This thesis, therefore, is an invitation to make all thinking and Being question worthy in its historicality. This is exhibited by recognising the foundation of the Forgottenness and simultaneously reinforcing a repeated re-appropriation of human history. So, this is the essential ‘plan’; in the *Contributions* exhibiting the portrayal of the other beginning via a perceived recognition of the Forgottenness.

The difficulty in imagining the other beginning and the essential occurrence of the Event lies in understanding a system-less approach that is devoid of an event as such. The eight ways that were laid out in the fifth chapter is the closest intimation of what is involved. However, this is perhaps where the most important message of the *Contributions* resides; the need for a change in thinking synonymously with Being. This is also why Heidegger was engrossed by the Pre-Socratics, even though it led to
idiosyncratic interpretations of them, the motivation behind his study of them is what is important. Thinking and Being are to be unitary, there is no distinct separation, a rejection of the subject and object dichotomy that has characterised much of the history of western philosophy. An overcoming of this process of thinking can also be attributed to the other beginning, although, this is minor in comparison to what would be involved in its entirety. This does, however, demonstrate some of the key concepts of the text, such as in the historical repetition that is needed in overcoming the inception of the subject and object dichotomy, a historical reference point for that which is to anchor the first beginning for the repetitive re-engagement with the other beginning.

The historical ideas that have shaped the history of western philosophy have also shown to be following a certain trajectory, although Heidegger’s characterisation of this is not without its faults. It does, regardless, demonstrate a very useful interpretation of the historical process, which again, is not something set in stone. So, although Heidegger’s interpretation may suffer a few inconsistencies, his main assertion stands; a historical repetition is subject to an ebb and flow of ideas and their incorporative capacity with the future of philosophy and the other beginning. This abyssal ground that is symptomatic of the other beginning is useful for not cementing a framework of thought into a particular worldview, which in itself, is contrary to philosophy’s nature. Philosophy as inceptual thinking must be groundless in its ground to provide for thinking that is consistently free to make the aforementioned historical repetition - a very unique approach when compared to thinkers of the past. This quasi-anarchism of thought is what is needed to consistently make ground in philosophy, thinking and Being. Needless to say, the *Contributions* does not serve as a manual or guiding force for this process, as that would in itself contradict the very project being envisioned. This is also why the language within the text has proved difficult to decipher, along with the lack of structure among other factors. This thesis has attempted to show that the system-less approach provides true potentiality for change, as the Abandonment is in fact, real and concretely observable within the current era humanity finds itself in. By allowing for this flux-like status of thinking and the historically repetitive engagement with the first beginning, a new approach to the crisis of the Abandonment can be actualised. The other beginning that Heidegger imagines is yet to be imagined, as evidence by metaphysics and science being unable to discuss
the not and art in their limitations. This is to point to what would be needed in the thinking outside of these inherent limitations that are bound to the first beginning. It is important to note that the other beginning and the essential occurrence of the Event are not some mystical abstractions that reside within the thought of a particular thinker, but are already present within the thought of the Pre-Socratics, Plato and onwards. The history of philosophy does represent the opening in this sense, which shows that there is genuine practical potential behind the concept. Given the influence of the Abandonment, however, the Forgottenness of beyng must be recognised in its hidden nature. This can only be achieved through the Question-worthiness of beyng as a response to the Resonating of beyng.
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