St Thomas Aquinas on Affectivity: A Way Forward for Seminary Formation

Bernard Lagan Gordon
BTh, STB, STL

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School of Philosophy and Theology
Sydney Campus
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DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP

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BERNARD L GORDON

Monday, 13 January 2020
ABSTRACT

*St Thomas Aquinas on Affectivity: A Way Forward for Seminary Formation*, is a theological argument that St Thomas’ teaching can be applied to the affective formation of men preparing to be Catholic priests. St Thomas’ teaching provides a very helpful understanding of affective maturity and its integral importance for a truly Christian and priestly life in the service of others. It flows from a theological anthropology that recognizes proper affective growth as an integral part of human life and interpersonal relationships. Affective maturity is an essential attribute for the seminarian to acquire because he is preparing to be a priest who has to fulfill his responsibilities to others in a loving, mature and virtuous way. The thesis is divided into three major sections. The first section lays the theological and anthropological foundation for the thesis. Since Pope St John Paul II called for the promotion of affective maturity in seminary formation, the influence of St Thomas’ teaching on St John Paul II’s understanding of affectivity is analyzed. Then, it is argued that St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity in Christ gives a firm foundation for affective formation in the life and example of Christ. Finally, through a discussion of St Thomas’ teaching on the passions such as love, hope and anger, a set of principles is set before the seminarian to reflect upon and articulate his affective experiences so that he may be understood and guided by his formators. The second section argues that St Thomas’ teaching on the Cardinal and Theological virtues can be applied as principles of affective formation. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and the Fruits of the Holy Spirit are presented respectively as principles of affective development and a pattern by which affective maturity is recognized and assessed. The third section analyzes how St Thomas’ teaching on the capital vices, such as pride and vainglory, can help the seminarian to respond to his affective inordinateness. It also examines how St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue can be applied as a principle of affective growth to order his desires and affections to the good. As a test case, chastity is examined as a virtue that enables him to properly form his sexuality in relation to others and responsibly love and care for others as a pastor. A significant finding of this thesis is that affective formation needs to be given a proper theological and Christological foundation. Only in this way can the seminarian become a man and a priest who reflects the life of Christ the Good Shepherd to those entrusted to his pastoral care.
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The impetus for this research began in the heart of Fr Tony Percy, the Rector of the Good Shepherd Seminary in Sydney, Australia, for some years during my time there as First Year Director. He saw the need to help seminarians mature emotionally so they could be true shepherds of God’s people and how a study of St Thomas’ teaching could contribute to their affective formation. I also thank Fr Danny Meagher, Rector of Good Shepherd Seminary in the later part of my time as First Year Director for his encouragement and the Archdiocese of Sydney for the chance to do some sabbatical work in Rome on the thesis. I give my very affectionate gratitude to the formation staff and the seminarians at Good Shepherd seminary who were part of the First Year Programme for the eight years I taught St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity as part of the Spiritual Year programme. Many of the young men who participated in the Spiritual Year have since been ordained as Deacons and Priests – your dedication and your desire to serve God and his people remains an inspiration for me to this day.

The life of the mind and the heart is precious to us but without those who provide the material resources necessary we cannot achieve the good works set before us. Therefore, I gratefully acknowledge the funding of the Australian Government under the RTP scheme, which has made this research possible.

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CONCLUSION

BIBLIOGRAPHY
INTRODUCTION

My desire to present this research on the teaching of St Thomas Aquinas on human affectivity, and its relevance to the affective formation of seminarians, flows from my work as First Year Director at Good Shepherd Seminary in Sydney, Australia, from 2009 to 2016. One of the courses I taught the First Year seminarians, the men commencing their preparation to become Catholic priests, was about St Thomas’ understanding of human affectivity. This work was undertaken in the conviction that a man who is affectively mature will become a better shepherd for God’s people.

On a number of occasions St Thomas appeals to Psalm 83.3 as the theological source of his reflections on the importance of affectivity: “My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God: where by heart we are to understand the intellectual appetite, and by flesh the sensitive appetite”.\(^1\) St Thomas applies this to the fervor or “intensity of the inclination of the lover for the beloved”.\(^2\) In regard to God fervor involves both the will and the passions “so that both the heart and the flesh in some way praise God”.\(^3\) St Thomas also appeals to this principle to justify his position that it is proper for our passions to contribute to our “moral or human good”.\(^4\) It belongs to our moral perfection, no less, that we be moved to the good not only in respect of our will but also in respect of our passions.

This brief example indicates St Thomas’ conviction that human affectivity ought to be included in a serious theological study. His thought on affectivity is grounded in a theological anthropology which studies the human person in accord with the truth that God is our Creator. It respects the body/soul unity of the human person who has an inherent need for personal relationships.

The more complete development of this affective capacity in the Christian’s heart, in our present case, the heart of the seminarian, is affective maturity. By affective maturity I mean the virtuous

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\(^1\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.24, a.3, resp. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981). The sensitive appetite is the faculty for the affective acts we experience in response to what our senses and our minds perceive as suitable or unsuitable for us, such as joy, delight, hatred or anger. Please also note that all Latin and Greek words and titles will be in italics.


\(^3\) *On Evil*, q.VII, a.2, ad 17.

\(^4\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.24, a.3, resp.
development of the seminarian’s affections and passions in order to responsibly love others. This affective maturity is a basic condition for the seminarian’s future priestly life, relationships and pastoral service. Without such maturity he cannot conduct himself in a manner that is caring and respectful of those entrusted to his pastoral care.

1. The Main Parts of the Argument

The aim of this thesis is to unfold the teaching of St Thomas on affectivity and show that it is profitable for the formation of men who are preparing to be priests in the Catholic Church. It is chiefly in this way that St Thomas’ insights into affectivity provide a way forward for seminary formation. To focus the study of this thesis I have chosen three main areas of St Thomas’ teaching. There is much more material I could have included. I have excised, for example, a chapter on the main principles of the passions in created things which would have acted as a metaphysical background to the appreciation of passion in the human person. This is not, however, directly related to the present task of reflecting on the development of human affectivity for the sake of seminary formation. The following topics are most clearly applicable to the seminarian’s affective development and what he can teach others as a priest.

The first section (Chapters 1-6) analyses the general principles of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. To set the context of the thesis, Chapter 1 will discuss three points. First, a summary of what the Church teaches about the importance of affective maturity in a sound preparation for the priesthood. Second, a brief study of the relationship between Pope St John Paul II’s teaching on affective formation and St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. Third, as a point of comparison, the chapter will also consider the difference between the teaching of the Theological Manuals and that of St Thomas.\(^5\) Chapter 2 will then reflect on the theological basis of affective formation by considering St Thomas’ teaching on affection in God and in Christ, the incarnate Son of God.

Chapters 3 to 6 will focus on the basic principles of affectivity, especially the two basic sets of affective acts, the concupiscible and the irascible passions, together with their causes and effects.\(^6\)

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\(^5\) The Manuals were books used up until the 1960’s to prepare seminarians to give moral guidance to the faithful.

\(^6\) Craig Steven Titus describes the first set of passions as “desiring”, from the word concupiscible which refers to a desire for pleasure. He calls the second set of passions “initiative-taking”, from the word irascible which comes from
This will be done for the purpose of educating the seminarian in a more complete view of his own affective life. More specifically, Chapter 3 will analyze St Thomas’ teaching on the nature of passion and how the external and internal senses are integral to the seminarian’s affective growth. Chapter 4 will consider the formation of love, desire and joy with the aim of helping the seminarian to learn how these are to be developed in his various relationships. Chapter 5 will consider the formation of hatred and sorrow. Chapter 6 will consider the passions that respond to the good that is difficult to attain or the evil that is difficult to avoid: hope, despair, fear, daring and anger. The seminarian can draw upon these passions as inner resources that help him grow in affective resilience and so cope with personal and pastoral challenges. The passions listed by St Thomas and discussed in this thesis as the main passions are not exhaustive. They are offered as affective responses that are basic to our human experience and which need to be formed if someone is to become affectively mature. In studying these passions the seminarian acquires an understanding of what is particular to each passion, what causes it, what effects it has on him, and the moral principles that form passion for his own good and the good of others.\(^7\)

The second section (Chapters 7-9) deals with how the virtues act as formative principles of affective growth. As abiding perfections of the seminarian’s affective capacities, the virtues bring affective acts to their proper perfection both in himself and in his relationships with others. This process of maturation, to be considered in Chapter 7, is mainly accomplished through the cardinal virtues. Prudence develops his capacity to make good judgments about the welfare of himself and others. Justice forms in him a determination to look to the true need of his neighbor and express his affectivity accordingly. Temperance perfects his desires so that he may avoid that which

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\(^7\) An example in the modern psychological literature of a basic list of affective experiences is found in a book by Erika Hunter, written to help the reader become more emotionally articulate, grow in a capacity to listen and speak in a more helpful manner about emotional experiences with others, and work through emotional blockages. Hunter writes: “There are five basic emotions: anger, fear, gladness, sorrow, and shame”. Erika M. Hunter, *Little Book of Big Emotions: How Five Feelings Affect Everything You Do and Don’t Do* (Center City, Minnesota: Hazelden, 2004), 19. While there are very good reasons for Hunter’s order of emotions, such as anger being mentioned first because it is such a problematic emotion for many people, St Thomas’ approach is more balanced. By mentioning love, desire and joy first he establishes the proper understanding of affectivity and its development upon the basic principle that love of the good is fundamental to a healthy affective maturity. The other passions that respond to the experience of evil can only be fully understood in light of the experience of evil as what interferes with the culmination of love and the desire of the good in its enjoyment.
undermines pastoral relationships. Fortitude moderates his fear and strengthens his sense of daring to attain more difficult pastoral tasks. Chapter 8 will examine three examples of how virtue forms affectivity: friendship, *eutrapelia* and beauty. In Chapter 9, the study will move to an analysis of the role of the theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity, the Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit, and the Beatitudes, as principles of affective formation.

The third section (Chapters 10-11) analyzes how the seminarian can respond to his disordered affections and how they can impact upon his pastoral ministry. The first step in this section of the study - Chapter 10 - is to follow St Thomas’ analysis of these inordinate affective acts in their root causes, what he calls the Capital Vices. Some examples are pride, vainglory and envy. These proceed from an essentially good affective faculty; however, it is a wounded faculty which can obscure the perception of both human needs and the acts necessary to fulfill them. In Chapter 11, the analysis will move to a consideration of how infused virtue - the Christian’s capacity to act for the good that flows from the life of grace - can be a principle of renewal. As a test case we will look at the role of infused virtue in relation to the inordinate desire of lust and the renewal of the seminarian’s capacity to live a chaste life.

As well as its detailed treatment of affectivity, the importance of St Thomas’ teaching for affective formation is its healthy realism. As Nicholas Lombardo explains, St Thomas’ teaching avoids two extremes. It avoids an overly suspicious concern about human emotion that “seeks to guard against it, restrain it, and prevent it from taking control”.8 It also avoids an exultation “in emotion and desire” that “glorifies following wherever it might lead”.9 St Thomas recognizes both the inherent goodness of human affectivity and “that, in a fallen world, human affectivity is prone to distortions”.10 This is both a helpful approach for the seminarian’s affective development and it provides a detailed body of reflections that will help him to guide others when he becomes a priest.

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9 Ibid, xii.
10 Ibid.
2. The Main Sources of Literature

A number of scholars in recent years have brought to light St Thomas’ interest in affectivity as an integral element of human development. The main contribution of this thesis is to apply both St Thomas’ teaching and the insights of these scholars specifically to the seminarian’s affective formation.

The primary sources in St Thomas’ works are extensive. In the First Part of *Summa Theologica*, St Thomas considers the spiritual affections, such as love, that can be attributed to God who is the source and exemplar of human affectivity. In *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.q.22-48, St Thomas offers a detailed treatise on the main human passions, their causes, effects, and their morality. His treatment of the role of the virtues in forming human passions and actions follows in *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.q.49-70. In the Third Part of *Summa Theologica* St Thomas offers his reflections on Christ’s affectivity as an integral element of his true humanity through which he saves us. Another important source is St Thomas’ treatise on the sensitive appetite as the source of the passions in *De Veritate* q.q.25-26. In *De Malo*, furthermore, St Thomas examines the main dynamics of affective distortions that incline the human heart to sin.

Certain contemporary works have greatly assisted the research of this topic. Robert Miner’s *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologae 1a2ae 22-48* provides a fine study of St Thomas’ teaching. The strength of this work is that it concentrates on explaining the *Treatise on the Human Passions. The Logic of Desire* by Nicholas Lombardo complements Miner’s study by making more explicit the wider theological context of St Thomas’ thought on affectivity. The significance of Lombardo’s treatment for affective formation is that he brings to light how the principles of grace form affectivity. Paul Crittenden’s, *Reason, Will and Emotion: Defending the Greek Tradition against Triune Consciousness*, provides a crystal clear defense of St Thomas’ understanding of human affectivity as both intellectual and sensitive love. In *Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude: Aquinas in Dialogue with the Psychosocial Sciences*, Craig Steven Titus examines St Thomas’ teaching on the affective capacity for coping with the difficulties of life. Titus’ study offers a clear explanation of St Thomas’ understanding of the formative role of virtues such as fortitude. This can be applied to the development of the seminarian’s affective growth through personal and pastoral challenges.
The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St Thomas Aquinas, by Paul Gondreau, is a thorough investigation of St Thomas’ thought on human affectivity. It makes clear St Thomas’ deep respect for affectivity as an integral dimension of the truth of the Incarnation. The most important implication is that the goodness of affectivity in the human person is affirmed in the Incarnation.

Basil Cole’s The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood: The Contributions of St. Thomas Aquinas, is a careful application of St Thomas’ teaching to the issue of how inordinate desires interfere with the priest’s ability to live his vocation. In Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and their Remedies and Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice, Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung brings to light St Thomas’ insights into the affective dynamics of the main principles of human sin. In particular, DeYoung shows how vice truly harms individuals and their personal relationships.

Conrad W. Baars, a psychiatrist and counsellor, sought to place the insights of St Thomas at the service of the emotional development of priests. He lamented the neglect of St Thomas’ teaching in seminary formation which deprived seminarians “of what should be one of the most important sources of maturity and priestly identity - the authentic anthropology of St Thomas Aquinas”.11 I will apply Baar’s consideration of such afflictions as the inability to delight in the good, and how that person can be healed, to the seminarian’s affective formation.

This study draws together insights from these works, according to a close reading of St Thomas, so as to find direct applications for the formation of seminarians. It involves an overlap between the affective development common to any responsible Christian and that which is specific to the seminarian. One reason for this overlap is that the seminarian should have the same level of affective maturity as anyone else entrusted with the welfare of others. Another reason is that while the seminarian should possess a maturity specific to his future role as a shepherd he also has a basic right to an education which contributes to the development of his own affectivity. This is the solid basis for him to understand the affective life and then to guide others in its virtuous development.

I wish to make it clear, from the outset, I am not arguing that the study of St Thomas’ teaching alone enables the seminarian to become affectively mature. Human beings, as persons of flesh, blood and feeling, do not develop according to the neat structures of academic works because each person has his own unique experiences, capacities and temperaments. However, the argument of this thesis is that St Thomas’ teaching on human affectivity and its development can make a very positive contribution to affective formation. Since it provides both seminary formators and seminarians with a sound body of knowledge to guide the seminarian’s affective development.

Furthermore, this thesis does not employ the method or form of dialectical argumentation found in *Summa Theologica* where St Thomas posits a question, outlines various objections, gives his response, and then replies to the objections. In this respect, it should be noted that there is more than one method of developing an argument in St Thomas’ theological writings. He wrote commentaries on Sacred Scripture and a number of them are integral to this thesis. For example, this thesis includes discussions about St Thomas’ *Commentary on the Gospel of John* in which he develops a line of argument for how we understand Christ’s affectivity and human relationships. The argument here is more direct in its exposition and does not use the structure St Thomas uses in *Summa Theologica* as mentioned above.

St Thomas also employs a different method in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, which is a theological account of the truth of the Christian Faith and includes refutations of any errors that oppose that Faith. It is divided so that each chapter discusses a point of reflection about Christian belief, worship and morality. The chapters are divided into subsections that explain the truth of Christian belief and at times clarify misunderstandings that would inhibit someone assenting to it. It is true that some chapters deal explicitly with objections to the Christian faith to be followed by another chapter which responds to these objections, for example, in relation to the doctrine of the resurrection of the body. However, the general method is to systematically explain and argue for the truth of the Christian faith and not in a way that adheres to the structure of *Summa Theologica*. This thesis does not follow any one of these methods in particular. Rather, it develops a theological argument about the elements of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity that can be applied to help our seminarians become affectively mature priests.

Furthermore, the focus on St Thomas’ teaching in this thesis should not be misconstrued as a dismissal of other voices on affectivity in the Catholic theological tradition. This thesis briefly
refers to writers such as St Augustine, St Gregory the Great, St Bonaventure, Blessed Duns Scotus and St Francis de Sales. In a different kind of study these writers and others such as St John of the Cross, who provided light on the relationship between Christian holiness and the reordering of affectivity through grace, would have been given a greater say in the discussion. Moreover, as a canonized saint and Pope, Karol Wojtyła (1920 - 2005) is another voice in the tradition who makes a significant contribution to the understanding of affective formation. His reflections on affectivity will be explored in some detail because they help us to better understand how important it is to study St Thomas’ teaching on affective development. However, the main focus of this thesis will remain the study of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity and how his insights can be applied to the benefit of the seminarian’s affective formation.

On another point, it is not within the scope of this thesis to consider in detail the question of St Thomas’ Aristotelianism or his Augustinianism. It will become apparent during the thesis that St Thomas carefully studied Aristotle, for example, by writing a commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics and quoting him extensively in Summa Theologica. However, in his treatise on the human passions in Summa Theologica St Thomas also demonstrates knowledge of St Augustine’s work, namely, his reflections on human affectivity as an integral part of authentic human life in De Civitate Dei. The salient point to note here is that apart from the various times St Thomas refers to both these authors in his treatment of human affectivity, on issues such as applying remedies to ameliorate sorrow, St Thomas has appropriated their respect for the importance of affectivity. For them, as for St Thomas, the proper development of human affectivity is an integral part of the overall moral development of the human person according to a life of love for God and for one’s neighbor. This treatment includes not only investigating the nature of different experiences of affectivity, such as love and anger, but also seeking to articulate the moral principles that guide the discernment of the morality of these experiences.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{12} See Mark D. Jordan, Rewritten Theology: Aquinas After His Readers (Malden, USA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 60-88, for a discussion of this issue. Jordan makes the point that Aristotle is only one of a number of philosophical and theological authors that St Thomas draws upon to develop his own position on various issues of ethics. Jordan refers to the fact that St Thomas’ commentaries on Aristotle’s works add up to 13% of St Thomas’ corpus. Still, St Thomas sees it as very important to write extensive commentaries on Aristotle’s works and in particular, his Nichomachean Ethics, whereas his other commentaries are on such topics as the exposition of St John’s Gospel. This shows that St Thomas thought it very important to reflect upon Aristotle’s works and, where possible and helpful, incorporate them into his theological reflections on the ethical life of the Christian.
Finally, one worthwhile line of future enquiry would be to review the current affective formation programs of various Catholic seminaries in light of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. I have not taken this approach here. Instead, I have concentrated on the theological argument that St Thomas’ teaching offers a way forward for seminary formation because it can help seminarians to understand how to become more affectively mature shepherds in the service of others.
SECTION 1

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF AFFECTIVITY

Section 1 examines St Thomas’ general teaching on affectivity in its relevance to affective formation. Chapter 1 reflects on the Church’s requirement that the priest be affectively mature, the influence of St Thomas on Pope St John Paul II’s teaching on affectivity, and a comparison between St Thomas’ approach to affective development and that of the Theological Manuals. Chapter 2 examines St Thomas’ teaching on affections in God and affectivity in Christ to establish a theological basis for affective formation. Chapter 3 reflects on the nature of human passion and how the seminarian can develop his capacity to feel appropriately in response to good and evil. Chapter 4 discusses the first three concupiscible passions - love, desire, and joy - and their importance for the affective development of the seminarian. Chapter 5 examines St Thomas’ teaching on how hatred and sorrow can be integrated into the seminarian’s affective maturity. Chapter 6 reflects on how the proper formation of the irascible passions of hope, despair, fear, daring and anger can help the seminarian to cope with challenges.
CHAPTER 1

ST THOMAS AND ST JOHN PAUL II ON AFFECTIVITY

This Chapter will set the context for the study of St Thomas’ theology of affectivity and its contribution to the seminarian’s affective formation. The aim is to show that affective formation is important and to open a way to investigate how St Thomas’ teaching can help its development. This chapter first briefly explains why affective formation is a requirement of the Church for someone preparing to be a priest. Then it considers the link between St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity and that of Pope St John Paul II, who gave a major impetus to affective formation in the Church document Pastores Dabo Vobis. A final consideration concerns a short comparison between St Thomas’ approach to affectivity and that of the Moral Theological Manuals to highlight the specific nature of St Thomas’ approach.

1. The Church’s Teaching on Affective Formation

The Church views affective formation as an integral part of developing the seminarian’s human qualities of mind and heart. It is within the context of the communities of formation (seminaries) established by the Church that this formation normally occurs. To be admitted to the seminary the Church requires that the individual candidate possess the physical and psychological health to dedicate himself permanently to the sacred ministry. He is to cultivate the virtues which are highly valued in human relationships so that there is a harmony between the human and supernatural values of Christian life. The specific aim of affective formation is to foster the development of both the seminarian’s affective life and its role in his personal and pastoral relationships.

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13 A further question is: how much of the seminarian’s formation should also take place in a setting outside the seminary? For example, should there be an extended time of formation in a parish, under proper supervision, to see how the seminarian can relate to others in a context outside the confines of seminary life? However, that is a question that is not addressed here because it is not directly relevant to our present consideration.

14 See Ernest Caparros, Exegetical Commentary on the Code of Canon Law, Volume II/1, Canons 244-245, English Language Edition (Montreal, Canada: Wilson & Lafleur, 2004). This thesis is concerned with the formation of those in the major seminary, that is, those who have entered formation for the priesthood. The minor seminary, on the other hand, is an institute that promotes vocations by providing a religious formation in connection with the overall education that is appropriate to those who are still very young. See Canon 234, n.1.
The importance of affective formation is drawn from the vocation and life of the priest. *Presbyterorum Ordinis*, the Second Vatican Council’s Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests, teaches that by ordination, and according to their mission, priests are incorporated into the service of Christ as teacher, priest, and king. Through this threefold service priests share in Christ’s ministry to build up God’s people by preaching God’s Word, interceding for the people, and guiding them to the fullness of Christian maturity. They are chosen for this ministry from among their Christian brothers and sisters to act on their behalf before God, offering sacrifice for them and interceding for them. Yet, in imitation of Christ they are also called to live among them and so both witness to the life of Heaven and serve their flock.

For this task priests need to cultivate “those qualities which are rightly held in high esteem in human relations; qualities such as goodness of heart, sincerity, strength and constancy of mind, careful attention to justice, courtesy”.¹⁵ The logic here is straightforward: without such qualities the ministry of the priest lacks the power to form the relationships underpinning his role as teacher, sanctifier, and shepherd. For example, if he is not able to control his excessive anger, the priest can preach in a way that fails either to appeal to the reason of the congregation or to win their hearts to the love of Christ.

Moreover, the Second Vatican Council’s Decree on the Training of Priests, *Optatam Totius*, requires the Christian education of the seminarian to be supplemented by the findings of sound psychology and pedagogy. A properly formed formation program will develop in the seminarian “a proper degree of human maturity, showing itself in a certain stability of character, in the ability to make carefully considered decisions, and in a sound judgment of events and people”.¹⁶ *Optatam Totius* also mentions habits of self-control, strength of character, fidelity to promises, modesty, charity in speech, and the wise use of personal freedom.

Furthermore, *Optatam Totius* recommends St Thomas as one who holds the “principal place” among the Doctors of the Church, on account of his sincere love of truth and his great wisdom in

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investigating the deepest truths and linking them together. This principle of seminary education is also referred to in the Code of Canon Law, which recommends St Thomas as the seminarian’s “teacher” in penetrating the mysteries of salvation in Sacred Scripture and Sacred Tradition. Following St Thomas’ approach, therefore, this study will respect the connection of truths between the development of affectivity, the life of virtue and the preparation of the seminarian to live as a priest after the example of Christ.

More recently, in Amoris Laetitia Pope Francis referred to the need for seminarians “to explore their own psychological and affective background and experiences”. The Pope acknowledged that seminarians can come from families that are “troubled, with absent parents and a lack of emotional stability”. Thus the formation process ought to help seminarians achieve “the maturity and psychological balance needed for their future ministry”. Thus, Pope Francis recognizes the serious challenge posed to seminary formation, if the seminarian comes from a family background that has not provided him with sufficient emotional stability.

Another recent Church document on priestly formation emphasizes the importance of the seminarian’s human growth. The Gift of the Priestly Vocation: Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis Sacerdotalis, was published by the Congregation for the Clergy in 2016. It sees the integration of the various dimensions of the seminarian’s formation in terms of helping him to be configured to Christ in his attitudes, feelings and characteristic ways of relating to others. The goal of formation is that the seminarian should form in himself a heart, and a life, that enables him to be a sign of God’ love for each person. In this context, the seminarian’s human development is “the

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17 Ibid, n.11, f.n.36. These qualities of St Thomas’ thought are drawn from Paul VI, Address in Gregorian University, 12 March 1964: AAS 56 (1964) p.365.
18 Canon 252, n.3.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid. In the same passage, Pope Francis also mentions that families ought “to be part of the seminary process” and that family bonds deepen a “healthy self-esteem”. Moreover, for the sake of their future work with families, seminarians ought to have “greater contact with the concrete realities of family life”.
22 See Congregation for the Clergy, The Gift of the Priestly Vocation: Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis Sacerdotalis, Introduction (Vatican City: L’Osservatore Romano, 8 December, 2016). See also n.39: “The priest is called to have within himself the same feelings and attitudes that Christ has towards the Church, loved tenderly through the exercise of the ministry.”
23 Ibid, n.40.
foundation of all priestly formation”. In developing such virtues as justice and fidelity, the seminarian is aiming to become a priest who is “a living reflection of the humanity of Jesus and a bridge that unites people to God”. In this way the document highlights the connection between the seminarian’s human formation and his call to represent Christ to others as an ordained minister.

The seminarian also needs to manifest “a gradual emotional development, openness to live in community, capacity for cultivating brotherly friendships, a sense of responsibility”. He needs to maintain healthy relationships with his families and peers, so as to foster “a healthy psychological development, especially where the affective life is concerned”. He needs to integrate his gifts and talents, as they are shaped by grace, with a proper response to his “limits and frailty” so that he may personally mature. To become “a man of communion, mission and dialogue” he needs to overcome “every form of self-promotion or emotional dependency”. He ought to set aside such vices as vainglory, ostentatious display in the Sacred Liturgy and instead form the virtues of “simplicity, sobriety, serene dialogue and authenticity”. Forming his faculties of mind and body, he ought to act with prudence and judge well of the consequences of his actions, discern his motivations and set aside disordered affections.

Formators should help the seminarian to grow humanly as well as spiritually, recognizing that this growth is fostered by personal relationships with his family and peers, within the community of the seminary, and in the various meetings with others in social, educational and pastoral settings. He should not progress through the various stages of seminary formation without attaining the necessary human maturity as well as a proper Christian and priestly maturity. In terms of forming a disciple’s heart in the seminarian, so that he can learn to follow Christ, the document writes: “Special attention is given to the human dimension, in harmony with spiritual growth, so as to help the seminarian mature in his definitive decision to follow the Lord in his ministerial priesthood.”

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24 Ibid, n.94.
25 Ibid, n.64.
26 Ibid, n.20.
27 Ibid, n.23. Also, n.148 mentions the importance of family bonds for emotional maturity.
28 Ibid, n.28.
29 Ibid, n.41.
30 Ibid, n.42.
31 Ibid, n.43.
32 Ibid, nn.46, 49, 50, 58, 59, 60.
33 Ibid, n.62.
However, the strongest statement the Congregation for the Clergy makes is in relation to the seminarian’s suitability for ordination. “For priestly formation”, the Congregation explains, “the importance of human formation cannot be sufficiently emphasized. Indeed, the holiness of a priest is built upon it and depends in large part upon the authenticity and maturity of his humanity. The lack of a well-structured and balanced personality is a serious and objective hindrance to the continuation of formation for the priesthood.”

This is an emphatic statement about the fundamental importance of human maturity for the seminarian to be ordained to the priesthood.

The development of the seminarian’s human maturity is not to be conducted in isolation from his spiritual formation. “Growth in human maturity” is not a matter of the seminarian relying on his own resources without the help of God. It is, rather, “assisted and brought about by divine grace, which gives direction to the growth of the spiritual life”.

In seeking to configure himself to Christ the seminarian needs to contemplate the life of Christ, as “the beloved Son of the Father, sent as the Shepherd of the People of God”. Christ thus becomes, as “the perfect man”, the model and source for developing the seminarian’s personality. This is the basis for the proper integration of the human and spiritual dimensions of formation. As the document states: “A correct and harmonious spirituality demands a well-structured humanity”. And here St Thomas is appealed to, in his assertion that grace does not supplant nature but perfects it (Summa Theologica 1, q.1, a.8, ad 2). It is for this reason that the cultivation of human virtues such as “humility, courage, common sense, magnanimity, right judgement and discretion, tolerance and transparency, love and truth and honesty” should be cultivated. In Chapters 7 we will turn to St Thomas’ teaching on virtue to argue that it can make a substantial contribution to the seminarian’s affective formation.

The need for developing the seminarian’s humanity is referred to in others ways by The Gift of the Priestly Vocation. There is a call for the development of the seminarian’s psychological maturity through a “stable personality, characterized by emotional balance, self-control and a well integrated sexuality”. The seminarian should become a responsible person with “an objective perception of persons and events”, a proper sense of self-respect, and a capacity for social

34 Ibid, n.63.
35 Ibid, n.64.
36 Ibid, n.68.
37 Ibid, n.93.
38 Ibid, n.93.
39 Ibid, n.94.
interaction. Another sign of the seminarian’s maturity “is a mature capacity for relations with men and women of various ages and social conditions”. Also, the Congregation for the Clergy views the seminarian’s ability to relate well to women “in a positive light”, given his future pastoral role in parish life and “many ecclesial contexts”. Indeed, the document sees such “familiarity with the feminine” as “beneficial and essential”. In relation to this point, in Chapter 11 we will consider St Thomas’ teaching on virtues such as chastity, which help the seminarian to relate to members of the opposite sex in a mature way.

Another issue addressed by *The Gift of the Priestly Vocation* is the use of digital media. While this can be used to bring people together and help them to know Christ, the seminarian should avoid the risk of “various forms of addiction”. Beyond the study of technical proficiency, it is necessary “above all to familiarise seminarians with their balanced and mature use, avoiding excessive attachment”. The need for the virtue of temperance, as a formative principle of the seminarian’s desire to use created things, is apparent here. Thus, St Thomas’ teaching on the virtue of temperance, in its role of forming the desire for pleasure, will be considered in Chapter 7.

In relation to celibacy, the document refers to the need for the seminarian to “enjoy free and serene affective maturity”. It “would be gravely imprudent to admit to the Sacrament of Orders a seminarian” who is immature in this matter. The seminarian “must be faithful to celibate chastity through the exercise of human and priestly virtues, understood as openness to the action of grace, rather than the mere achievement of continence by will power alone”. The reception of the gift of celibacy from God requires “a proper emotional formation, understood as a journey towards the fullness of love.” This makes clear that emotional maturity is essential for a life of celibacy, a point that will be reflected upon in Chapter 11.

A last point to be noted concerns the role of psychological experts in the human formation of the seminarian. Psychological expertise can be a valuable help “in the assessment of personality, expressing an opinion as to the psychological health of the candidate; and in therapeutic

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40 Ibid, n.94.  
41 Ibid, n.95.  
42 Ibid, n.95.  
43 Ibid, n.95.  
44 Ibid, n.99.  
46 Ibid, n.110.
accompaniment, in order to shed light on any problems that may emerge and to assist in human maturity”.47 The seminarian ought to co-operate with such help in his affective development. However, when seeking the help of such experts the seminary needs to ensure that, as well as their human qualities and their professional competence, “their faith must also be taken into account”.48 Also, in giving advice, such experts are to limit themselves to their “field of competence, without making judgments as to the suitability of the seminarians for the priesthood”.49 Moreover, they should share an anthropology that reflects the Christian vision of the human person, sexuality, priesthood and celibacy.50 An important implication here is that the person who counsels the seminarian must always advise him in a way that respects the moral teaching of the Church.

2. St Thomas and Pope St John Paul II on Affectivity

In the Introduction of The Gift of the Priestly Vocation the Congregation points to Pope St John Paul II’s Post Synodal Apostolic Exhortation Pastores Dabo Vobis as a “ground-breaking” document.51 While the Congregation does not state why Pastores Dabo Vobis is ground-breaking, one reason for this statement could be that the Church became more keenly aware that the human crises of the time required a greater emphasis on the human formation of the seminarian. St John Paul II himself points to problems such as an “individualism”, which closes someone in on himself and renders him “incapable of true human relationships”. The flight from loneliness leads young people to find refuge in “hedonism” or a “flight from responsibility”. And, St John Paul II also mentions the impact of “the breakup of the family and an obscuring or distorting of the true meaning of human sexuality”.52 All these issues touch upon the seminarian’s understanding of himself as a human person, his experience of himself as a human being and his capacity to properly express his emotional life and build true relationships. It is clear from such

47 Ibid, n.147.
48 Ibid, n.146.
49 Ibid, n.146.
50 Ibid, n.192.
51 The Gift of the Priestly Vocation, Introduction.
challenges that the human formation of the seminarian should not be neglected but be developed with great care.

In *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, a response to the reflections of the 1990 Synod of Bishops, St John Paul II reflected on the identity of the priest and the various dimensions of the formation process that would help seminarians to be shepherds after the heart of God. He insists that the human formation of the seminarian is essential to his overall preparation for the priesthood. While the spiritual, intellectual and pastoral dimensions of formation are clearly indispensable, the seminarian’s human maturity also needs to be developed in accord with the priest’s vocation to reflect the human perfection of the Good Shepherd. This Christologically centered “human formation” is the “necessary foundation” of preparation for priestly life. It follows that such human qualities as affability, generosity and forgiveness enable him to relate well to others and so make it easier for them to know the Lord Jesus.

It is within this context that St John Paul II discusses the development of the seminarian’s “affective maturity” which requires “an education in true and responsible love”. This affective maturity is an integration of the priest’s emotional life with the true good of those entrusted to his pastoral care. Such qualities as chastity and the capacity for true friendship, prudence and esteem for women, are necessary for the seminarian to truly express his love for others.

Now, to set the work of this thesis on a solid foundation we need to consider the Thomistic background to St John Paul II’s thought on affective maturity. If a connection can be established between the reflections on affectivity of St Thomas and St John Paul II, it will give credence to the application of St Thomas’ teaching to the formation of seminarians. Granted, there is no explicit reference in *Pastores Dabo Vobis* to St Thomas’ teaching on the process of affective maturity. However, a study of St John Paul II’s writings before he became Pope indicates a significant knowledge of St Thomas’ thought on the principles that form a person’s affectivity.

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53 Ibid, n.3. St John Paul II quotes Jeremiah 3.15 early in *Pastores Dabo Vobis*: “I will give you shepherds after my own heart” – connecting it to the Church’s renewed “pastoral commitment to care for vocations and the formation of priests” (n.4). The end of the quote from Jeremiah 3.15 is “who will feed you with knowledge and understanding”. The context is that God is calling the straying children of Israel and Judah to return to God (3.11-18).

54 Ibid, n.43.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid, nn.43-44.

57 Ibid, n. 43.
This is important, because it indicates that St John Paul II’s teaching on affective formation can be complemented by a study of St Thomas’ thought on affectivity and its development.

This line of reflection is also in harmony with the teaching of St John Paul II who as Pope strongly recommended the study of St Thomas’ works in relation to the human person. For example, in *Inter Munera Academiarum*, in which he gives St Thomas the title *Doctor Humanitatis* (Doctor of Humanity), St John Paul II reaffirms the study of St Thomas’ philosophy. This recommendation especially refers to the study of St Thomas’ reflections on human culture, the human person, human dignity and human reason. For the sake of the present discussion, it is pertinent to note that for St Thomas human affectivity and its proper development is included as an important dimension of his consideration of the human person. It seems reasonable to conclude that the study of this dimension of St Thomas’ anthropology is in keeping with St John Paul II’s vision of the study of the human person. It also seems reasonable to consider its application to the affective formation of seminarians.

To establish a connection between the teaching on affectivity of St Thomas and Karol Wojtyła before he became Pope John Paul II, the following analysis will be considered under two headings: a) Karol Wojtyła on Affectivity; b) St Thomas on the Subjectivity of the Person. It is hoped that it will become clear there is a real connection between St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity and those of St John Paul II. Another goal is to introduce some basic tenets of St Thomas’ teaching on affective development that will be discussed in detail as the thesis progresses.

58 See *Inter Munera Academiarum*, n.4. This document is included in full in *Thomas Aquinas: Teacher of Humanity*, edited by John P. Hittinger and Daniel C. Wagner (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2015), xxi-xxiv. It could be asked whether St Thomas has a philosophy in the proper sense in contradistinction to the use of philosophy within the context and at the service of theology. While it is not within the scope of this thesis to decide this question, I think it should be noted that St Thomas’ philosophical works, such as his commentaries on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* and *Ethics* are genuine attempts to engage in a philosophical discourse as an effort of reason to understand the greater questions of human life. For a discussion of the difference between philosophical discourse and theological reflection in St Thomas’ thought, see Ralph McInerny’s “Introduction” to St Thomas’ *Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima*, trans. Kenelm Foster, O.P., and Silvester Humphries, O.P. (Note Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1994) xi-xv. McInerny comments that St Thomas’ view of philosophical discourse is that it needs to genuinely proceed by the light of reason. Theology, however, proceeds by the light of faith which accepts as its starting point what God has revealed and which reason can then reflect upon.
a. Karol Wojtyła on Affectivity

Karol Wojtyła’s treatment of affectivity concentrates on the relationship between the self-governing nature of the human person and his emotional life. From Aristotle and St Thomas, Wojtyła gained the insight that the person becomes more perfect through his acts, when they are truly good acts. In such acts the person experiences the fulfilment of himself. This contrasts with Max Scheler’s “emotional intuitionism”: the feeling of moral values and the arrangement of these values into a hierarchy of importance by the person who feels them. Wojtyła rejects this as a principle of moral development, because emotion is only properly formed when it is integrated with the willing of the person’s true rational good. Even though Wojtyła accepts that emotion is a significant factor in ethical experience, he asserts that the element of willing, as it is guided by reason, is central to forming that experience.

The fundamental background to Wojtyła’s approach to ethics is that of a philosophical realism that he shares with St Thomas. For Wojtyła, ethics must be based in reality otherwise actions do not bring about the true perfection of the human person. It is only in this context that a true discussion of the ethical importance of affectivity can be fruitfully undertaken. As Thomas Petri writes, Wojtyła’s approach reveals that he has “a fundamental trust … in the ability to grasp reality. As a Thomist, he is a realist moral theologian, that is, a theologian who believes that the human mind can know objective reality.” The capacity to know reality extends to a knowledge of how the human person’s capacities can be properly developed, including the capacity of the person for emotion.

Wojtyła’s insistence on the importance of how choices move the human person from potency to actual fulfilment is also relevant here. The will, guided by reason, develops the person through actions that accord with both objective and subjective reality. This concerns a correct judgment about the person who is the object of our attention and what kinds of acts promote his true good. It also concerns making truthful judgments about my own inner affective life, and avoiding a proud and self-absorbed attitude, that fails to seriously reflect on sound moral teachings that would properly develop that affective life. This concerns the proper integration of emotion with truthful judgments and good acts of the will.

To show how Wojtyła explains this principle of affective integration and how he draws upon St Thomas’ teaching to develop it, the following discussion reflects on three points: i) Wojtyła’s Teaching in Love and Responsibility; ii) Connections with the Teaching of St Thomas on Affectivity; iii) the Virtues and Sexuality.

i. Wojtyła’s Teaching in Love and Responsibility

Wojtyła took a keen interest in trying to explain the Church’s teaching on human sexuality in a coherent fashion to help people more deeply appreciate it in a time of great cultural upheaval. For example, he was very conscious of the Church’s need to give a better explanation of the teaching of the goodness of marital sex and how contraception was damaging to a married couple’s personal union. His concern to give a more adequate account of sexuality, and the formation of the affective dynamics it involves, is evident in such writings as Love and Responsibility, where he

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63 For a discussion of Wojtyła’s understanding of how choices move the human person from potency to act and how this must be in accord with objective and subjective reality for the true good of the person, see Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 105-110.

64 See, for example, Wojtyła’s careful analysis of Humanae Vitae, in which he sees Pope Paul VI presenting the issue of conjugal love within the larger reference of the source of all love which is God. Thus the married couple need to see their relationship as a sharing in the “plan of love” that God has for them and the child they could conceive. Conjugal love is also treated as a deeply human love that encompasses the couple’s spirituality, sensuality and emotionality, which requires such characteristics as the capacity for true friendship, the ability to enrich one’s spouse with the generous gift of oneself, and to strive faithfully for the mutual human perfection that is the fruit of such love. It is within this context that Wojtyła sees contraception as a negation of the meaning of sexual intercourse as a gift of one spouse in his or her love to the other. Contraception sunders the personal union between the spouses that is signified and deepened through sexual intercourse. See Karol Wojtyła, “The Teaching of the Encyclical Humanae Vitae on Love”, in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 301-314, with the quote above on 303.
writes: “The present book was born principally of the need to put the norms of Catholic sexual morality on a firm basis”. The aim was to help the spiritual advisor “not only to command or forbid but to justify, to interpret, to explain”.⁶⁵ The motivation behind Wojtyła’s interest in exploring this theme, as Petri explains, is that he “clearly believed that the Church’s difficulty in defending Christian sexuality was due not only to cultural trends but also to what might be described as the rigid objectivistic method of the manualist tradition.”⁶⁶ The Manualist tradition will be discussed below in relation to appreciating St Thomas’ approach to affectivity. For the moment, however, the aim is to clarify how Wojtyła’s reflections on sexuality includes the experience and formation of affectivity in our inner life and relationships.

In *Love and Responsibility*, Wojtyła carefully analyses various kinds of love, such as friendship and betrothed love, describing the various forms of emotional involvement connected with them. The overall aim is to study the truth of human affectivity, in the context of integrating it into a deeply personal understanding of human sexuality and the relationships that express it. The theme of integration is of great importance in Wojtyła’s reflections. It refers to the harmonizing of the various dimensions of the person’s capacities and desires for the true good of the person and those he relates to.⁶⁷ This is a very Thomistic theme. As will be discussed below, Wojtyła draws upon St Thomas’ notion of moderation and temperance, which forms the human person’s desires for pleasure through the guidance of reason.

The deeper source of this Thomistic influence flows from St Thomas’ fundamental anthropological tenet about the unity between the body and the soul in the human person. Let us spend some time outlining St Thomas’ position on this issue, so that its importance for Wojtyła’s thought on affectivity can become more apparent. For St Thomas’ position on the possibility of forming human affectivity, through good reasoning and good acts, stands upon the unity of the human person in body and soul. This, as we will see below, is fundamental to Wojtyła’s insistence on the integration of reason and emotion in willing the good of another person.

⁶⁶ *Aquinas and the Theology of the Body*, 127.
For St Thomas, the mutual influence of reason, will and passion, testifies to the intimate union between the body and the soul, and hence the intimate link between the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite.68 For example, a person who is angry is inclined to actions he would not consider when he is calm. St Thomas argues for the unity of the human person even though he differentiates the activities of the body and the soul: “it is one and the same man who is conscious both that he understands, and that he senses”.69 Yet, intellectual activity is the distinctive operation of the human person. This activity points to the reality of the soul, because “the nature of each thing is shown by its operation”.70 The activities of the senses, such as seeing, operate for the sake of this intellectual activity.71 It is the distinctive intellectual operation of the human person, and the fact that it is the one person who both thinks and feels, that leads St Thomas to conclude: “the intellectual principle is united to the body as its form”.72 The importance of this truth for the formation of the person is that while the intellectual principle is the distinctive principle that makes us human, the body is integral to our dignity. In Petri’s words, “the body is neither unimportant nor a mere instrument of the human person.”73 It is in and through our body that we learn about the world, and other people, and through our body that we express ourselves, our thoughts, affections, intentions, and choices.

68 See also Maria Carl, “St. Thomas Aquinas: The Unity of the Person and the Passions”, Proceedings of the ACPA, Vol. 86 (2012): 201, who reflects on St Thomas’ argument that while the soul is a substance capable of an independent existence, it is not a complete substance because “it cannot exercise fully its essential activity of knowing apart from the body”. Thus, Carl explains, for St Thomas the soul is not like a sailor on a ship or a person who is clothed in garments, rather the person is a soul/body unity, so that in reference to the passions it is the person who is angry or loves, not the body alone that experiences anger and love. As such, the passions engage the whole person as acts that have the distinctive character of being acts of the body and soul together. See St Thomas’ discussion of the soul as the form of the body, that is, as the principle of the person by which the body actually exists, in Questions on the Soul (Quaestiones de Anima), q.1, resp., trans. James H. Robb (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1984). Here St Thomas rejects the Platonic view of the soul as fully identified with the human person. For St Thomas, rather, the soul is a part of the human being, and it is the body and soul together that constitutes the human being.


70 Summa Theologica I, q.76, a.1, resp.

71 See Summa Theologica I, q.76, a.2, resp.

72 Summa Theologica I, q.76, a.1, resp.

73 Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 198.
Yet, the intellectual principle of the soul attests, for St Thomas, that the soul is greater and more enduring than the body, so that St Thomas writes of the soul’s capacity to exist after death. Yet, it also affirms that the proper mode of the human soul is to be the form of the body, so that it exercises its proper operations through the body. Think, for example, of the mind which requires the proper operations of the senses to perform its activities. For instance, we need to see many things to gain knowledge of them.

That the soul is the form of the body influences how St Thomas views the passions, which are the acts distinctive of this intimate union of body and soul. As he writes: “certain modifications affect soul and body together, not the soul alone”. The passions are acts, then, that are caused by the awareness produced by the external senses, such as sight, and the internal senses, such as imagination.

This is the basis for recognizing the development of affectivity, as an integral dimension of the person’s overall perfection as a rational person, as one who understands and governs himself. Thus, ultimately, the work of integration is to express, in a true perfective unity, the capacities of the person in his body and soul, both within himself and in his personal relationships. Wojtyła explicitly affirms St Thomas’ appreciation for how this work of integration is grounded in the unity of the human person. The sensitive faculties, both cognitive and appetitive, make their own contribution to the development of the human person’s psychological and moral personality. As Wojtyła observes:

St Thomas is well aware of this reality and formulates his characterization accordingly. The spiritual aspect, he says, is eminently suited to unite into a substantial whole with the corporeal, and thus also with the sensory. This union must, therefore, also play a special role

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74 See *Summa Theologica* I, q.76, a.2, ad 2: “Now it is clear that the intellectual soul, by virtue of its very being, is united to the body as its form; yet, after the dissolution of the body, the intellectual soul retains its own being.”

75 See *Summa Theologica* I, q.76, a.5, ad 2: “A body is not necessary to the intellectual soul by reason of its intellectual operation considered as such; but on account of the sensitive power”, which needs a bodily organ suitable to the task.

76 After death, St Thomas maintains, mind and will remain but the acts of the senses do not, except by way of being rooted in the soul. They are, however, deprived of their acts because they require a bodily organ. See *Summa Theologica* I, q.77, a.8, resp.


78 For a discussion of Wojtyla’s understanding of the interior life of the human person, as it is constituted by the mind and will, and who develops himself, see *Aquinas and the Theology of the Body*, 110-114.
in shaping the human personality. According to St Thomas, all the faculties of the human soul work to perfect the human being, and so they all contribute to the development of the person.\textsuperscript{79}

This clearly states Wojtyła’s appreciation for St Thomas’ anthropology, which lays a solid basis for understanding the directive role of reason in relation to the various human faculties, and yet recognizes the importance of these faculties in the development of the person’s character. An implication is that the affective faculty is not to be negated, but properly developed by reason to make its own particular contribution in each person’s life and personal relationships.

Wojtyła’s discussion of integration refers to such affective experiences as sensuality, which is an experience embedded in the physical beauty of the person, and sentimentality, which is an emotional love for the whole person. Wojtyła’s abiding principle is that these experiences need to be integrated with the willing of the true good of the person who is loved. This person is to be loved for her own sake and not to be used as a mere means to an end.\textsuperscript{80} As Wojtyła writes in Thomistic Personalism: if love is to be worthy of the human person it must subordinate “our sensory energies and desires” to “a basic understanding of the true worth of the object of our love”.\textsuperscript{81}

In his reflections on the psychological experience of love, Wojtyła analyses the difference between sense impressions and emotional reactions. Sense impressions are the sensory reactions we have to external objects when we see, hear, touch, taste, or smell something. Sense impressions are closely connected with the cognitive power of the senses, by which we gain knowledge of particular objects in the world. Now, a particular sensory impression is often connected with a particular emotional response. The content of a sensory impression reflects the image of an object, “whereas in an emotion we are reacting to a value which we find in that object”.\textsuperscript{82} Emotional reaction relates, not just to the objects experienced in sensory experience, but to their value for us.\textsuperscript{83}

A consideration relevant to the proper development of the affective life is found in Wojtyła’s rejection of “situationism”, a moral theory that teaches each situation is unique and of itself

\textsuperscript{79} See Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 168-169.
\textsuperscript{80} See Love and Responsibility, pp.96-129.
\textsuperscript{81} See Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 173.
\textsuperscript{82} Love and Responsibility, 102-103.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibid, 103.
supplies us with a norm for action. Hence, it is argued, there are no general principles guiding the particular experience of love between two people. Wojtyła explains: “This view proclaims the primacy of experience over virtue”. That is, the particular emotional experience of love is appealed to as a self-justifying principle, without the evaluation of general moral criteria. This entails the rejection of moral absolutes which, prior to any particular experience, prohibit certain kinds of actions as intrinsically evil, such as fornication and adultery. Wojtyła’s point is that these kinds of immoral actions always embody a disregard for the human person and human relationships. For this reason they always harm the proper development of a person’s affectivity.

ii. Connections with the Teaching of St Thomas on Affectivity

Wojtyła’s investigation of the experience of human love gives us an approach to affectivity which is akin to St Thomas’, in no small part because it has Thomistic foundations. His description of emotion is consonant with St Thomas’ description of the role of the senses in affectivity and its capacity as a felt response to good objects. The balanced appraisal of love, as the fundamental affective experience, reflects St Thomas’ reflections on love and its varied expressions, such as the love of friendship. Wojtyła’s rejection of situationism is also in keeping with St Thomas’ teaching that the development of the emotional life is brought about by actions that accord with right reason. These are all points from St Thomas’ teaching that will be discussed in the following chapters.

More to the present point, on particular occasions Wojtyła refers to the teaching of St Thomas. For example, in his discussion of the relationship between the will and the passions, Wojtyła references *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.9, a.2. Here Wojtyła notes that while the will is defined as “a rational appetite” by St Thomas still he recognizes how feelings can influence reason’s focus on certain objects of desire. Also, in his analysis of “carnal concupiscence”, a strongly felt desire which

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84 Ibid, 119.
86 Ibid, 14. Another example of Wojtyła’s direct reading of St Thomas’ works is found in: “In Search of the Basis of Perfectionism in Ethics,” in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 48-49, 55, f.n.5, where Wojtyła gives over thirty references to St Thomas’ discussion of the nature of the good from *Scriptum in IV Libros Sententiarum, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, Summa Contra Gentiles, Quaestiones de potentia Dei, Quaestiones disputate de*
arises in the body and “has as its object the body and sex”, Wojtyła draws upon St Thomas’ teaching on the sources of affectivity. He refers to St Thomas’ understanding of two major affective “forces: appetitus concupiscibilis (desire) and appetitus irascibilis (the urge to act)”.

These are the sources of the feelings - passiones animae (passions of the soul) - that are closely connected with “sensual cognition”. Wojtyła gives thirst as an example of the first set of passions and anger as an example of the urge to act. Petri observes that for St Thomas appetitus is a foundational concept related to the notion of love. Appetitus is the tendency to perfection in all things that moves them to go out of themselves to be completed by other beings. This tendency is expressed as love, which is the principle that moves each thing to seek certain ends or goods that perfect it through the acts that achieve union with this good. It is this principle of appetitus and love that underlies the affectivity of the human passions, as an inclination to act for the good and avoid the evil in personal relationships.

Wojtyła perceives a possible problem in the experience of carnal concupiscence. If the main object is satisfaction of a person’s desire for the enjoyment of the body and sex, it fails to be a true willing of the other person’s good. It falls short of loving the person for her own sake and it fails to properly incorporate the value of the emotional responses to her body, in accord with this personal love. This is the “non-integration of love”, that is, the impelling of man and woman to sexual union without a true personal ethical union. Rather, the development of love requires a process of integration - the establishing of “correct connections between all that originates in sensuality or emotion, so that it is part of an ethically complete relationship between two persons”.

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Yet another example of Wojtyla taking care to draw upon the teaching of St Thomas as an instrument in setting the right context to understand the nature of the good for the human person and proper emotional fulfillment is found in “The Role of Reason in Ethics”, in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 58-61, 70-71, f.n.2, 4-9. These examples show Wojtyla’s serious attempt to compare St Thomas’ view of ethics, proper emotional development in accord with reason and the true human good with that of other writers such as David Hume. These examples show Wojtyla’s striving to make an in-depth reading of St Thomas’ works.

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87 Love and Responsibility, 148. Wojtyla does not directly quote St Thomas’ works at this point but gives summary points he has gleaned from that teaching.
88 Ibid, 149. Italics added.
89 Ibid.
90 See Summa Theologica I, q.19, a.1, resp; I-II, q.26, a.1, resp.
91 Love and Responsibility, 150.
92 Ibid, 150-151.
93 Ibid, 153.
notes, St Thomas articulates such a principle when he writes of the need to avoid isolating the goods of pleasure from the overall rational good of the person.

It is for this reason that St Thomas carefully considers virtues such as prudence and temperance, which guide love according to the true nature of the human person as a unity of body and soul, as a person of reason and emotion. As Petri observes, St Thomas’ understanding that love can be disordered is what Wojtyła refers to as disintegration, and it is the capacity for virtue and self-mastery that integrates love in accord with the good of the person.94 Chapter 7 on the formative role of the virtues will reflect upon St Thomas’ articulation of this integrative process through prudence and the moral virtues.

Like St Thomas, then, Wojtyła finds the integrating principle in acts of the will guided by reason, which “impose a shape on all the material that sensual and emotional reactions provide”.95 The aim is to avoid the distortion of subjectivism, the over concentration on one’s own experience of love to the detriment of an objective attitude. This objective attitude directs one’s attention to the true good of the other person. The result of subjectivism, to the contrary, is a fixation with pleasure, and an egoism which preoccupies a person with his own emotional experience of love.96

### iii. The Virtues and Sexuality

In his reflections on the moderating role of the virtues Wojtyła refers to St Thomas’ teaching in *Summa Theologica* IIa-IIae, in which “there are certain main virtues which assist the functionings of the main faculties of the human psyche”.97 Moderation (*temperantia*) in St Thomas’ view, forms the passions for the true good of the person, so that he is not fixated on goods based upon the responses of the senses and emotions. Wojtyła applies this teaching to the moderation of affections

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94 See *Aquinas and the Theology of the Body*, 248-235.
95 *Love and Responsibility*, 153. Also see: “On the Directive or Subservient Role of Reason in Ethics: In the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant”, in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 58-61. Here Wojtyła discusses St Thomas’ understanding of the satisfaction the human person achieves, “from a good in keeping with our rational nature, a *bonum honestum*, whose nobility and spiritual beauty are worthy of deep esteem”. It is by willing such goods, and harmonizing all other desire and impulses in accord with it, that the human person is truly fulfilled.
96 See *Love and Responsibility*, 153-158.
97 *Love and Responsibility*, 168.
through the virtue of chastity, which gives a certain equilibrium to the person in matters of sexuality.\(^98\) Chastity directs the emotional life in its connection with the value of sex to the good of the person. In this way, it helps someone to properly love other people by infusing his capacity for affectionate gestures with the guidance of reason. The result is that the person’s internal feelings and external acts emotionally connect him to the true value of another, so that it is properly felt.\(^99\) St Thomas’ approach to this issue will become clear in Chapter 7, where a major point of discussion will be his teaching on modesty, by which someone harmonizes his words and deeds with respect to proper relationships and circumstances.

An example of how Wojtyła applies this teaching is found in his approach to the co-ordination of affectivity and external acts, in relation to the role of tenderness in personal relationships. Tenderness refers to our awareness of the emotional ties with the inner affective world of another person. It concerns our need to make that person aware that we want to enter into his interior world of feelings and spiritual life. This tendency of one person to communicate his feeling of close involvement to another, has “certain outward actions which of their nature reflect this inner approximation to another ‘I’: pressing another person to one’s breast, embracing him, putting one’s arms round him … certain forms of kissing.”\(^100\) St Thomas discusses such gestures in his consideration of the virtue of purity, by which we moderate our actions in accord with chastity and due social custom.\(^101\)

Thus, Wojtyła applies St Thomas’ teaching on moderation to the formation of tenderness. Continence, the virtue by which someone exercises self-control in matters of sexuality, moderates the impulses of concupiscence when they are contrary to reason and the dignity of the other person. Continence is the capacity to maintain an emotional equilibrium in the face of the strong stirrings of passion, so that a person may still act for the true good of another.\(^102\) It is the role of the virtue of continence to ensure that tenderness and its gestures do not become “merely forms of sensual and sexual gratification”.\(^103\) Continence serves to bestow “a perfected inner control” and an “inner

\(^{98}\) Ibid, 166-169.
\(^{99}\) See Love and Responsibility, 199.
\(^{100}\) Love and Responsibility, 202.
\(^{101}\) See Summa Theologica II-II, q.151, a.4, resp. This will be considered in Chapter 11, in relation to the effects of the vices and the role of virtues such as chastity.
\(^{102}\) See Love and Responsibility, 196.
\(^{103}\) Love and Responsibility, 203.
refinement” which enables the person to be delicate in his attitude to a person of the opposite sex.\textsuperscript{104} Thus, continence is vital to forming proper personal relationships.

In the effort to grow in the virtues of chastity and continence, Wojtyła writes that “a certain diplomacy” is involved, by which the elements of a person’s sensuality and sentiments are deployed to the good of his affective life.\textsuperscript{105} Wojtyła does not explain how they can be so persuaded. This principle of diplomacy is very important, nevertheless, because it avoids doing violence to one’s affective inclinations by merely negating them. Instead, the strategy is to find ways to develop what is best in one’s emotional life through what elicits and moderates them according to the true good. Thus, the passions can make their proper contribution to the person’s moral life and be brought to their proper perfection. This is really St Thomas’ idea of the politic rule of reason over the passions, which does not tyrannize over them but respects their proper nature as spontaneous acts of the sensitive appetite.\textsuperscript{106}

There are other elements of St Thomas’ teaching that, in Petri’s judgment, either give a proper philosophical underpinning to St John Paul II’s understanding of affectivity or introduce concepts that complement it. The fundamental point of the philosophical background is St Thomas’ insistence on the unity of body and soul in the human person, which is the source of the passions as will be discussed in chapter 3. For the present, it is sufficient to take an example of how this principle influences St Thomas’ view of the goodness of the body as it is involved in virtuous acts, namely, the goodness of marital sex. Given St John Paul II’s reflections on the human body as having a spousal meaning, that is, as possessing the capacity to express the gift of the person in love to another, Petri discusses St Thomas’ reflections on the importance of the body in sexual love.\textsuperscript{107} As he writes: “A Thomistic anthropology is unable to separate the physical from the

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{105} Ibid, 200.
\textsuperscript{106} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.81, a.3, ad 2, where St Thomas writes of the intellect properly ruling the passions, which still maintain a certain spontaneous freedom. St Thomas likens this to the politic rule in a state which respects the proper dignity and freedom of its citizens. The opposite is the despotic rule of a tyrant. The implication is that the proper guidance of the intellect respects the nature of the passions and does not improperly stifle them.
\textsuperscript{107} St John Paul II introduces a central concept of this theology into \textit{Pastores Dabo Vobis}, n.44, in reference to the seminarian’s need to understand the nuptial meaning of the body as the capacity to give and receive love.
spiritual.” We will see in this line of reflection that St Thomas perceives the great importance of the human body in human relationships.

St Thomas sees the love of marriage in terms of friendship, a virtuous sharing of life so intimate that it binds the husband and wife together for life, in a mutual affection that opens them to the gift of a child as the fruit of their marital relationship. Such a union is natural, in the sense that it is virtuous as a free and mutual offering of the spouses to one another in the sharing of domestic life and the education of their children. For Petri, it is both the unity of body and soul, and the concept of marriage as friendship, that can give greater depth of meaning to the idea that the body can be an expression of the gift of the person. Petri writes: “Since the human person is a body-soul composite, the body is not simply the soul’s biological or physiological tool.” Rather, we could state, the whole person expresses himself in his actions in the body and this is the basis for him to communicate his affections to another, especially in marital intercourse. For Petri, this is a higher example of St Thomas’ understanding of love as an inner need of every being to reach out of itself to others and thus attain perfection through experiencing the good.

Moreover, reflecting Wojtyła’s thought, Petri explains that the sexual act has such profound personal meaning because “the body and soul mutually implicate each other in action and in thought”. This is shown in the need for man and woman to complement each other in the sexual union for it to have its proper meaning, as an act of self-giving and as an act that is open to the gift of a child. This line of reflection is seen clearly in St Thomas’ deep appreciation for the fidelity and the respect that married couples should have for each other, as an expression of their marital friendship. In relation to the union between spouses, St Thomas comments that “nothing is more expressly significant of consent than carnal intercourse”. St Thomas’ language here is very

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108 See Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 306.
109 See Summa Theologica III, q.29, a.2, resp.
110 See Summa Theologica, Suppl., q.41, a.1, resp.
111 Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 306.
112 Ibid.
113 Summa Theologica, Suppl., q.46, a.2, resp. On the respect that a husband should have for his wife and vice versa in the conjugal act see Summa Theologica, Suppl., q.64, a.1, resp.; a.. In St Thomas’ view, neither spouse should be unreasonable in their request for the conjugal act nor regard their spouse with lustful motive or do things that degrade the dignity of their spouse. See Summa Theologica III, Supp., q.41, a.4, resp.; q.64, a.1, ads 2, 3. As Petri points out, St Thomas’ understanding of the marriage debt as a free gift of the spouses to each other is personalist. It really concerns the realisation that free commitment involves an enduring responsibility to love one’s spouse in an intimate union. See Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 304.
significant: the marital act itself has a profound personal meaning as an act of deliberate and intimate union with one’s spouse. As an act of faithful love in marriage, which sets aside lust, it is holy and meritorious.\textsuperscript{114}

In other words, the physical sexual act has personal meaning because it is the act of a person, which expresses himself in union with another. It has personal significance, furthermore, because it is an intimate act between two persons who profess their love for each other. This is in keeping with Wojtyła’s reflections on \textit{Humanae Vitae}, where he considers marriage in terms of human love, which requires the capacity for a genuine friendship, a true sharing of life and a genuine selflessness.\textsuperscript{115}

It should also be noted that, by presenting marriage in terms of friendship, St Thomas paves the way for an understanding of human sexuality as a capacity for relating to others, which involves a language of self-giving. This principle is seen in St John Paul II’s understanding, Petri explains, that “the body communicates the person, and it communicates love.”\textsuperscript{116} This point is implicit in St Thomas’ understanding of modesty, for example, where he reflects upon the capacity of the person to communicate the truth of their affection through appropriate words and deeds. This, as noted above, will be discussed in Chapter 7 on the formative role of the virtues.

All of these points form a background to the seminarian’s affective formation because, not only are they teachings that the future priest can communicate to others, they are also truths that he needs to appropriate for himself. He needs to understand himself as a person who is capable of love and called to give love to others. This is the context in which St John Paul II mentions the spousal meaning of the body in relation to the seminarian’s affective maturation. For St John Paul II, the seminarian needs to give and receive love in accord with this spousal meaning of his body in a way that truly expresses his vocation to serve others as a shepherd after the Heart of Christ.\textsuperscript{117}

\textsuperscript{114} See \textit{Summa Theologica} III, Supp., q.41, a.3, resp; a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{116} \textit{Aquinas and the Theology of the Body}, 308. This point from St John Paul II can be seen, for example, in \textit{Pastores Dabo Vobis}, n.44.
\textsuperscript{117} See \textit{Pastores Dabo Vobis}, n.44.
It is a genuinely human love which imitates the example of Christ, who truly loved others in his earthly life with a human heart.\footnote{We read in Austin Flannery, O.P., Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et Spes, n.22, 7 December, 1965, in Vatican Council II: Constitutions, Decrees, Declarations: The Basic Sixteen Documents, (Costello Publishing Company, New York, 1996): “He acted with a human will, and with a human heart he loved”.
\footnote{Karol Wojtyła, “Thomistic Personalism,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, p.171. For one account of this line of thought see Richard A. Spinello, The Genius of John Paul II: The Great Pope’s Moral Wisdom (Lanham: Sheed & Ward, 2007), 74-78. Spinello writes (75): “Aquinas does a great job of unfolding the objective dimension of the person, but he falls short in describing the interior, self-creative dimension”.}

\section*{b. St Thomas on the Subjectivity of the Person}

Wojtyła is even more indebted to St Thomas than Wojtyła realizes. A criticism Wojtyła makes of St Thomas’ teaching is that he does not pay sufficient attention to the “lived experiences” of the human person. St Thomas, Wojtyła contends, concentrates on an objective description of the existence and activity of the person.\footnote{See Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q.24, a.6, ad 4., trans. Robert W, Schmidt, S.J., under the title Truth, Volume III (Albany, New York: Preserving Christian Publications, Inc., 1993). Wojtyła discusses the close connection between the faculties of reason and will in “Human Nature as the Basis of Ethical Formation”, in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 95-99. He refers to St Thomas’ teaching that the will is the rational appetite of the person so that it “has a natural and most intimate connection with reason and its natural relation to the truth” (97). It should be added that this includes the truth of the emotional life and the need to form it in accord with the true good of others and oneself.} However, this does not do justice to St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity, because there are clearly elements of St Thomas’ teaching that refer to subjective and lived experiences. As will become clear in the following chapters, St Thomas’ understanding of virtue respects the inner dynamics of the human person’s development. He does not see affectivity as a loosely connected part of the rational person’s being. Rather, he understands the rational person as having two distinctive spiritual faculties of intellect and will which are intimately related. Both faculties are characteristic of the human person so that it is the knowing person who is also capable of loving what and who he knows. Thus, affectivity of the will as the capacity of the person to love, desire and enjoy the rational good is integral to the life of the human person.\footnote{It should be added that this includes the truth of the emotional life and the need to form it in accord with the true good of others and oneself.} These are points with which Wojtyła agrees and which he develops in light of his philosophy of the human person.

Also, St Thomas recognizes that the role of the virtues is to form the faculties and acts that are intimate to the person so that these acts attain their proper perfection. In this formative role the
virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude shape the person’s higher and lower affectivity, that is, the affections of the will and the passions of the sensitive appetite. Now, if the virtues form the affectivity of the person they form his subjectivity, that is, his self-determining choices and the responses of the passions. This is made clear in St Thomas’ recognition of the self-perfective nature of the acts of the mind, will, and the passions, when he discusses the development of the person through the self-mastery of free choice, intention and the like. These are points that St John Paul II would readily accept.

Again, the importance of the interior impact of the passions, and their influence on a person’s perception and external acts, is a major concern for St Thomas. Of many possible examples here are a few. One example is St Thomas’ application of the principle that the affective state of the person colors the way he sees other people and how to respond to them. The angry man, for instance, considers a course of action he would not when he is calm. Another example is afforded by St Thomas’ discussion of the passion of love, which consists in a change wrought in the person’s capacity to appreciate the fulfilling power of a good and thus be moved to take pleasure in it. Again, there is St Thomas’ analysis of love as a mutual experience of indwelling, which brings about an intimacy with those who love and a propensity to share in the joys and sorrows of one’s friend.

St Thomas also appeals to lived experience when he observes the moderate fear of a man who walks on a plank a little above the ground, in comparison with the greater fear of the man who walks on a plank very high above the ground. A last example is found in St Thomas’ discussion of the virtue of eutrapelia, which forms the passion for fun, games and witty conversation. In defense of this virtue, St Thomas appeals to the experience of a holy person dedicated to the religious life who is observed in a moment of recreation with his disciples.

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121 See Karol Wojtyla, “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination,” in Person and Community: Selected Essays, 191-193, where Wojtyla discusses St Thomas’ understanding of the acts of the will as acts that determine the person, who chooses them, as a self-possessing and self-governing person.

122 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.18, a.1, resp.

123 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.9, a.2, resp.

124 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.2, resp.

125 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.2, resp.

126 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.44, a.4, obj.2.

127 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.2, resp.
This is not an exhaustive examination of the connection between St Thomas’ theology of affectivity and the teaching of Pope St John Paul II, but it sufficiently indicates a real connection between the two. The way is now open to discuss, in the following chapters, what specific contribution St Thomas’ teaching can make to the project of affective formation that St John Paul II calls for in *Pastores Dabo Vobis*. Before proceeding to this discussion, however, there is one point left to examine, that is, a comparison between the teaching of the Moral Theological Manuals and St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity. This will bring to light that St Thomas’ teaching provides a more integrated approach for affection formation.

3. The Manuals and St Thomas on Affectivity

As noted earlier, Petri refers to Wojtyła’s concern to develop a more personalist view of Christian teaching on sexuality, in part because the Manualist approach seemed too rigid and objectivist. In developing a more adequate approach to moral development Wojtyła, as we have seen above, appealed to various elements of St Thomas’ teaching. Examples we have given are St Thomas’ teaching on the unity of body and soul in the human person, and how the faculties of the person, such as affectivity and sexuality, can be integrated with reason and right choices. Now, the aim of this thesis is to argue for the application of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity to the seminarian’s affective formation. Moreover, its aim is also to show how this teaching complements Wojtyła’s project to argue for a proper formation of affectivity. So, it will be helpful to explain the Manualist teaching on affectivity in contrast to that of St Thomas, in order to highlight some fundamental differences between the two. This will serve to show how St Thomas’ teaching can make a positive contribution to affective formation.

The approach to moral theology found in the Manuals has its roots in the reorganization of moral theological studies offered to seminarians by the Jesuits in the 16th century. Servais Pinckaers refers in particular to the *Institutiones Morales* of Juan Azor (1536-1603) in which there is a shift from organizing the content of moral theology according to the virtues. Instead, the content is organized around a study of the external obligations imposed by the commandments, the sacraments and the states of life. Azor, furthermore, omitted important dimensions of the moral life that refer to the inner transformation of the Christian such as grace, the Beatitudes, the gifts
and the fruits of the Holy Spirit. His study of morals concentrated on external human acts, habits, virtues, law, conscience and sin.128

Given this emphasis on external acts it is understandable that Azor diminished the consideration of the person’s inner affective life in moral theology. Pinckaers observes that in Azor’s Institutiones Morales the study of passions and affections, habitus and virtues “were confined to a small section in Book III of the first part: chapters 1-19 for the passions, chapters 20-24 for habitus, chapters 25-30 for virtues. These elements played only a secondary role in moral theology, as helps or hindrances to free action”.129 Azor’s approach to moral theology and affectivity is reflected in moral texts of the following centuries. The following discussion refers to some of the texts from the twentieth century.

In Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, Tom Ryan examined four Manuals from the thirty years prior to the Second Vatican Council (1935-1963). As Ryan explains, the Manuals were used until the 1960’s to prepare the seminarian to care for souls by providing him with “the knowledge and skills to be a wise minister of the sacrament of penance”.130 Hence the importance of the Manuals for forming the seminarian’s view of affectivity and its role in both his development and that of those he is called to guide as a pastor.

Ryan found that there were positive elements in the Manual’s teaching on affectivity. The Manuals taught, for instance, that emotions consequent on a good act of the will can increase its goodness.131 They had a positive approach to the development of affective virtues, which form the passions that concern love, desire and pleasure (temperance) and those that concern fear and daring (fortitude). Such virtues increase the goodness of the person and make his acts good.132 For instance, the virtue

129 Ibid, 265.
130 Thomas Ryan, S.M., Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, Thesis for University of Notre Dame, Australia (Fremantle, Western Australia: Research Online@ND, July 1999), 14.
131 In Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions, 180, f.n.36, Ryan quotes Prummer as an example. Prümmer writes: “et sic passio animae addit ad bonitatem actionis”. That is, by co-operating with the good act of the will the passion of the soul adds to the goodness of the action. D. Prümmer, P.P., Manuale Theologiae Moralis, 3 vols., (Friburg: Herder, 1935), 61.
of decorum forms a sense of what is appropriate in social relations and a sense of shame helps to form a respect for personal privacy.133 The Manuals also showed an increasing awareness of the psychological pathologies that can interfere with someone’s responsibility for evil acts.134

However, Ryan also observed that the Manuals gave “a relatively brief space” to a consideration of the emotions.135 The Manuals regarded the emotions as gifts from God to help preserve the human person. Nonetheless, they emphasized the propensity of the emotions both to distract someone from the judgment of reason and to incline his will against the good. Moreover, the primary focus was not on the positive development of emotions but on how they affected moral responsibility in terms of divine, human or ecclesiastical law.136 There was “no development of the relationship between emotions, virtue and character.”137 The virtues were seen mainly in a function of “restraining the emotions”.138 Another shortcoming was a narrow focus on the emotions as “obstacles”, “impediments” or “enemies of the human act”.139

135 Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions, 15.
136 See Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions, 185. Germain Grizez criticizes the inability of the Manuals to “pay less and less attention to intrinsic reasons for accepting Christian moral norms as true”. Rather, moral norms are treated as rules that ought to be obeyed just on the authority promulgating them. Furthermore, “the detailed specification of duties” involved a neglect of clarifying “the meaning of good and bad in terms of the total Christian vocation”. Grizez’s point is not to denigrate Church authority, which he upholds as founded by Christ to teach moral norms. Instead, he is pointing to a way of moral thinking which lost sight of St Thomas’ grounding of morality in the true good of the human person. See Germain Grizez, The Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 1: Christian Moral Principles (Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 12-13. See Chapter 35 and, in particular, 854-856, for a summary of Grizez’s understanding of Church authority in moral matters.
137 Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions, 205. Pinckaers observes that one of the dangers of this approach is a certain objectivism, which focuses too much on the material elements of the act “as opposed to all that emanated from the agent”. The Sources of Christian Ethics, 271. The problem with this approach is that it does not seek to understand and educate the moral agent in the development of his inner life of desire and affection. Thomas Petri refers to this point as part of his discussion of the background to Karol Wojtyla’s development of an explanation of Church teaching on sexuality in terms of the volitional and emotional development of the person. See Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 3, 31, 41-43.
138 Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions, 205. Petri observes that the Manuals had an excessive focus on the will controlling the passions, especially sexual passion. This attitude flowed from an attitude that the will needs to be controlled by the law and the person must be stoical in controlling emotion. See Aquinas and the Theology of the Body, 43.
In contrast, St Thomas gives a positive place to affectivity in *Summa Theologica* I-II where he considers the passions after man’s last end, happiness and voluntary acts. After the section on the passions he reflects upon the role of the virtues, the Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit, Sin, Law and finally Grace which is the New Law. Sin and Vices are only considered “as failures to respond” to God after the role of grace, virtues and the guidance of the Holy Spirit are studied. As Ryan concludes, a key working assumption of St Thomas’ teaching is “that emotions are crucial to psychological, spiritual and moral well-being and growth.” In the Manuals, conversely, the treatment of conscience, law, sin and vice “take centre-stage” after the treatment of happiness and human acts. For example, in the Noldin-Schmitt Manual the consideration of human acts and passions is followed by the study of Laws, Conscience and then the Cardinal Virtues. The effect of this approach is to focus too much on both the avoidance of sin and adherence to external laws. This brings about a lack of due attention to the dynamism of “human flourishing” and the personal growth that ought to take place from the “inner sources” of affectivity.

Pinckaers comments that the Manualists’ concentration on the external elements of an act pertaining to the regulation of law inclined them to “the danger of objectivism”, that is, “the reduction of the moral act to its material object as opposed to all that emanated from the agent”. As Petri explains, the Manualists tended to identify the ends of human nature with the physical structure of the body and they described human action as it could be observed exteriorly, neglecting to look to the interior dimension of the moral act. There is less focus, therefore, on the development of the person’s interior life of thought, desire, willing, emotion, and how these inner riches are to

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Rauch, 1956), 56; and, D. Prümmer, P.P., *Manuale Theologiae Moralis*, 3 vols., (Friburg: Herder, 1935), 49. Ryan notes that Prümmer “expresses the disclaimer that passion and habit are not always the enemies of the human act” and quotes Prümmer’s work (49): “Passio et habitus non semper sunt hostes voluntarii”. Ryan’s point remains that the general tenor of the treatment of the passions is negative. See *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 174.

140 *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 208.
141 See Tom Ryan, “Positive and Negative Emotions in Aquinas: Retrieving a Distorted Tradition”, *The Australasian Catholic Record* 78 (2): 146. Ryan describes this as a retrieval of a tradition that has been distorted and in which the true importance of the emotional life for moral development was obscured.
142 *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 208.
143 See *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 207. Ryan notes that a similar structure is found in the Manuals written by Davis & Aertnys-Damen and Prümmer (Ibid, 207).
144 *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 209.
145 The Sources of Christian Ethics, 271.
be shared with other people. Consequently, the importance of the person’s inner affective disposition and its formation can be overlooked and undervalued.

Along with an abiding impression of negativity, a lack of references to Sacred Scripture, and the neglect of Christ’s affectivity as a model for human affectivity, there is also a mechanistic imagery associated with the emotional life in the Manuals. In this regard, Ryan refers to Davis’ description of the emotions as “part of a delicate machine directed by reason – a power extrinsic to them”. This sharply contrasts with St Thomas’ “organic” model which respects the “internal relationship of mutual interdependence of powers [as opposed] to one that is mechanical, inanimate, where emotions are controlled by an external power. Human growth is through conformity to an external criterion (Law) rather than through interiorization and inner transformation.” The advantage of St Thomas’ teaching, as Ryan concludes, is that he portrays affectivity as a part of human life that is “essentially positive and healthy”. When the emotions are properly formed they help the human person to do what is good and to avoid what is evil. The Manuals, on the other hand, seem to struggle with seeing the constructive role that emotions can play in the development of a healthy psychological and moral maturity. The significance of this comparison between the Manuals and St Thomas’ teaching is that the latter clearly affirms affectivity as an integral principle of a person’s life that is worthy of positive development.

St Thomas, moreover, situates that development within the living sources of the Christian’s moral life, which transform his inner faculties of thought, willing and feeling, and their expression through external acts. These sources are Grace, Virtue, the Beatitudes, the Gifts and the Fruits of the Holy Spirit, and the Law as an articulation of God’s wisdom to guide us as we grow as human persons. St Thomas places the development of the passions within this overall development of Christian life and accords them an extensive treatment within it. Assimilating this teaching enables

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146 See *Aquinas and the Theology of the Body*, 3, 31.
147 Ryan points to the need for a more adequate account of emotionality in light of the Second Vatican Council’s call for a moral theology based on Sacred Scripture and the life of Christ. The affective life is apparent, for instance, in Christ’s anger, capacity to weep, and fear. The life of Christ, then, becomes “the central image to organize and interpret the affections”. See *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 22-23.
148 *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 213.
149 *Comparison and Evaluation of the Moral Significance of Emotions*, 134.
150 Ibid, 216. Ryan further writes that unlike St Thomas, who views emotions as affective acts that “are principally meant to be friends”, Manualists “seem to work from the assumption that emotions are either obstacles to, or destructive of, the truly human”.

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the seminarian to better grasp how important it is to properly develop his affectivity, both for the enrichment of his own person and his capacity to relate well to others. The seminarian is thus better prepared to guide those who will be entrusted to his pastoral care as a priest. He is equipped with a sound and helpful teaching which is grounded in the principles of Christian life.

The point, it should be added, is not that Law is unimportant to affective formation. In St Thomas’ understanding law is an articulation of reason to properly guide human acts.\(^{151}\) It therefore also concerns the guidance of acts that express affectivity in its impact on others.\(^{152}\) For this reason, St Thomas meticulously analyses the various levels of law because they form our social relations.\(^{153}\) Rather, the point is that without neglecting external obligations the seminarian needs to develop his affectivity and its expression through the formative influence of grace and virtue.

**Conclusion**

Three points have been considered in this chapter to set the context of the thesis. First, the importance of affective formation as a Church requirement flows from the vocation of the priest to reflect Christ’s human perfection in his personal relations. Second, that Pope St John Paul II’s approach to affectivity is influenced by St Thomas’ teaching on affective development. This opens the way to consider how that teaching provides a framework and an answer to St John Paul II’s call for affective formation. Third, the comparison of the teaching of the Manuals on affectivity to St Thomas’ more integrated view of emotion makes clear that St Thomas’ teaching is better suited to affective formation. Now, the task in the following chapters is to examine St Thomas’s teaching on affectivity and the advantages it offers for the maturation of the seminarian’s affectivity. This work is a development of both St Thomas’ and Pope St John Paul II’s thought about affective formation, particularly as it can impact on the formation of men for the priesthood.

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151 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.90, a.2, resp.
152 For example, in *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.95, a.1, resp., St Thomas writes that some need to be restrained by fear so that “they might desist from evil-doing, and leave others in peace”. This can serve to habituate their behaviour that they "might be brought to do willingly what hitherto they did from fear, and thus become virtuous”.
153 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, qq.90-114. See also *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.90, prol., where St Thomas writes that God “both instructs us by means of His Law, and assists us by His Grace”.

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CHAPTER 2

THE THEOLOGICAL BASIS FOR AFFECTIVE FORMATION

Having discussed the connection between the thought of Pope St John Paul II and St Thomas, this chapter will consider affectivity, first in the Trinitarian God, then in Christ, and then, more specifically, how it has a role in the life of the seminarian. The discussion will mainly draw upon St Thomas’ reflections on God and on Christ’s humanity in *Summa Theologica*, but it will also draw upon his reflections on Christ’s humanity in his *Commentary on the Gospel of John*. The goal is to provide a theological basis for the seminarian’s affective formation and motivate him to it as a necessary dimension of his preparation for the priesthood. Therefore, this chapter will examine how St Thomas’ teaching on affection in God helps the seminarian to recognize the importance of properly formed affection and personal relationships. It will also examine how St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s affectivity help the seminarian to recognize that relating to others in an affectively mature way is essential to a life that makes present the pastoral charity of Christ.\(^{154}\)

This accords with St John Paul II’s teaching that human formation should prepare the priest to reflect Christ’s attitude to others in his personal relationships.\(^{155}\)

On a point of method, it could be argued that the reflection on Christ’s affectivity should be left until after a consideration of human affectivity, because this is the order that St Thomas follows in *Summa Theologica*. In *Prima Secundae*, St Thomas first considers affectivity as a part of our effort to live a life that would lead us to beatitude. Christ’s affectivity is then considered in *Tertia Pars* as a part of St Thomas’ consideration of the truth of the Savior’s humanity. In terms of presenting a course to the seminarian on affectivity, there would be an advantage of following this order so that he would reflect profoundly on his affective experience. This could dispose him to see the importance of affectivity in Christ as a sign of the truth of his humanity. However, the order chosen in this thesis is to consider Christ’s affectivity first, so that it is clear that affective formation has a

\(^{154}\) This approach respects the two basic principles of a valid theological anthropology, which, as Beáta Tóth explains, looks to the Creator as “an ultimate source of meaning and an ultimate ground of interpretation” for the human person. It extends to our awareness that we live in a relationship with “the divine community of the Trinity.” Beáta Tóth, *The Heart has its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart* (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2015), 67.

sound theological and Christological basis. In support of this, it should be noted that St Thomas’ approach in *Summa Theologica* is not the only one he employs. In *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, as we will see below, St Thomas begins with the life of Christ and draws implications from it. The relevant point for the present discussion is that the contemplation of Christ’s life sheds light on the proper expression of human affectivity. This makes a more persuasive case to the seminarian that he needs to become affectively mature in order to properly represent Christ to others.

We now turn to the main discussion of this chapter, which will involve five topics: 1) Affectivity in God; 2) Christ’s Humanity is our Way to God; 3) Christ’s Affectivity; 4) Christ and Friendship; 5) Christ and Pastoral Charity.

### 1. Affectivity in God

The study of affectivity in God sheds light on the importance of affection in the seminarian’s life. As a priest he will be called to bear witness to the mystery of God’s life, which includes the spiritual affections we will discuss below. This understanding of affectivity is deepened by St Thomas’ teaching on how we are created in the image of the Blessed Trinity. The truth that love and personal relations are essential to God’s life require that these two affective characteristics be reflected in the seminarian’s life. The reason being that he should reflect God’s life in his future priestly ministry. Now, when we conduct this discussion it needs to be recognized that some seminarians may be unmoved by certain points of it because they may relate more readily to the consideration of Christ’s human affectivity as a model for their own. Nevertheless, the language of affectivity is part of the way we approach the mystery of God, it pertains to how we are made in his likeness, and how the seminarian is to reflect God’s affectivity in his life and relationships.

To set this discussion in its proper context, the seminarian needs to reflect on how we can speak of affection in God. There is a need for care in how we approach this issue because God exceeds our capacity to comprehend him. This applies to the issue of affection in God because the word

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156 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.4, a.3, ad 1., where St Thomas explains that the created human intellect cannot comprehend or encompass God. We can understand something of God but never exhaust his infinite mystery. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981).
affection in human experience bears a sense of a change from one state to another. For example, when we feel loved, this changes us to a state of feeling love in return. On this point, some theologians argue that in God’s capacity for affections such as pity there is a certain passibility or an ability to suffer. For them, Marcel Sarot writes, “God has a capacity for great distress and for intense suffering” that flows from his love for us.\footnote{Marcel Sarot, “God, Emotion, and Corporeality: A Thomist Perspective”, \textit{The Thomist} 58, no. 1 (1994): 91.} Sarot, however, disagrees with the passibilist position, on the grounds that it ascribes to God a suffering that implies an imperfection in the Divine Nature.

The passibilist view raises a valid concern, though, to the extent that if we do not affirm a certain affectivity of God our perception of the divine goodness will be diminished. God will seem disinterested, distant, and, perhaps, uninvolved in our lives. It is important to note in respect of this issue that Scripture speaks of a generosity in God who loved the world so much that he gave us his only Son (John 3.16). However, there is no need to postulate an affectivity in God which diminishes his perfection. It is precisely the infinite nature of God that ensures so great an outpouring of love for us. Thus, while St Paul affirms that God is the Lord of all things he also teaches that this same God gives all good things to us (Acts 17.24-25). It is because God’s love is of a far higher order that he responds so generously to our need.

Yet, there is a particular way of speaking about God’s affectivity. St Thomas argues that we can use sensible images and metaphors to raise our minds to the knowledge of divine truths.\footnote{St Thomas explains that Scripture “puts before us spiritual and divine things under the comparison of corporeal things”, such as height being connected to “the transcendence of his [God’s] excelling power”. \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.3, a.1, ad 1. St Thomas sees this as a principle of Scriptural teaching to help us understand great truths about God in a way that is adapted to our created human capacity. See \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.1, a.9, resp. This kind of language is based upon the way all things bear a resemblance to God because they have been created by him and reflect his goodness. See \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.6, a.1, ad 2.; \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.93, a.7, ad 4.} For example, Scripture sometimes describes God as angry (Exodus 4.14). However, the passion of anger cannot be ascribed to God because it is an experience we have as persons composed of body and soul, whereas God is infinite spirit.\footnote{\textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.3, a.1, resp.} Thus, passions like anger are attributed to God in Scripture only in a metaphorical sense by which we take the purpose of a human passion and compare it to the purpose of God’s action. In relation to the passion of anger, we see that its purpose is to incline us to punish an offender. Now, while God cannot feel anger he does disapprove of evil...
and punish it. In this sense we speak of God being angry.\textsuperscript{160} An important implication for affective formation is that anger has an appropriate place in the life of the person who seeks to imitate God, but this anger needs to reflect God’s disapproval of evil in a way that is truly moderate and just.\textsuperscript{161}

Moreover, there are truths we can affirm of God, aware “that these exist in him in a more excellent way”.\textsuperscript{162} In this way, we attribute acts of the will to God, what St Thomas calls spiritual affections, such as love, desire and joy. These are willed affirmations of the good. We too have these affections of the will but in a more limited fashion according to our created nature.\textsuperscript{163} The idea is that as God knows the good, wills it, loves it and rejoices in it, we too know the good and can will, love and rejoice in it, according to our human nature.\textsuperscript{164} This analogical language is based upon our relationship to God, in which we are created in his image and therefore reflect something of his knowing and willing of the good.

This leads us to another point about how this affectivity is expressed in relation to others. To form an adequate understanding of God and how to reflect that love to others, the seminarian needs to contemplate how love is essential to the life and action of God. Love exists in God as the willing of his own good.\textsuperscript{165} Yet, God also loves all things inasmuch as they exist and are good. For God’s will is the cause of all things and whatever good they have. This truth illuminates God’s love for all things and the nature of our love. God’s love “infuses and creates goodness”, while our love is called forth by the goodness of things and out of this love we act to attain their goodness.\textsuperscript{166} God’s love is creative, in other words, and our love is ultimately a response to what is good. In addition, God loves irrational creatures, “only on account of his goodness, and of the services they render to us”, but God offers us, as rational creatures, the love of friendship.\textsuperscript{167} This understanding of God is fundamental to affective formation because it recognizes God as one who seeks the good of all

\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.3, a.2, ad 2. St Thomas repeats this point in I, q.19, a.11, ad 2: “punishment is not a sign that there is anger in God; but it is called anger in him, from the fact that it is an expression of anger in ourselves”.

\textsuperscript{161} We will develop this point about the just moderation of anger in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{162} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.13, a.6, resp.

\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.19, a.1, ad 2.

\textsuperscript{164} Tóth offers the view that St Thomas does not ascribe passions to God because they can be a sign of our “weakness and vulnerability and are therefore defective”. \textit{The Heart has its Reasons}, 121. However, the basic reason that St Thomas refuses to ascribe passions to God is that they are specific to us as creatures of body and soul and God is infinite spirit.

\textsuperscript{165} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.20, a.1, ad 3.

\textsuperscript{166} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.20, a.2, resp.

\textsuperscript{167} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.20, a.2, ad 3.
things but especially each person. The seminarian is called to receive this love and communicate this same kind of love to others. We will explore this point below.

St Thomas also refers to the affective experience of joy, which is a resting of the will in the object it loves and desires. He applies this principle to God who loves his own superabundant good and therefore rejoices in himself. 168 From this point St Thomas argues that God also takes joy in all that is good because it reflects his own goodness. 169 An implication we can draw for affective formation is that God takes joy in the seminarian’s good and any good that he does. This encourages the seminarian to rejoice in his own proper good and the good that he does for others. An example of doing good for others is found in the performance of acts of mercy. St Thomas mentions mercy because it is “especially to be attributed to God” and it “most properly belongs to him to dispel … misery”. 170 This is essential to the affective formation of the seminarian because one of the principal works of the priest is to communicate God’s merciful help. Pope St John Paul II mentions in Pastores Dabo Vobis that the priest, who is responsible for the community entrusted to him, must be “quick to understand, forgive and console”. 171 We see here that a reflection on God’s affectivity can instill in the seminarian how important it is to reflect the affective disposition of God to those in need.

These examples of how we speak of affectivity in God lead us to an integral dimension of affective formation: God is the model for how we understand ourselves and how we relate to others. 172 This is pertinent to affective formation, in that the seminarian’s understanding of God heavily influences his view of how he should respond to others. For example, if God is thought of primarily in terms of anger then it is more difficult to think of his love and mercy and to communicate these

169 “Moreover”, he writes, “each thing takes joy in its like as in something agreeable … Now, every good is a likeness of the divine good, as was said above, nor does God lose any good because of some good. It remains, then, that God takes joy in every good”. See Summa Contra Gentiles Book 1, Chapter 90, nn.4, 5.
170 Summa Theologica I, q.21, a.3, resp.
171 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.43.
172 St Thomas describes God as our “exemplar”. Summa Theologica I-II, Prologue to the Treatise on the Last End. He articulates the metaphysical foundation for this in Summa Contra Gentiles where he writes that all things receive their being from God and bear his likeness. See Summa Contra Gentiles, Book 1, Chapter 93, n.8. The human person bears this likeness in a unique sense as a rational creature who can direct himself/herself freely to attain happiness. See Summa Theologica I-II, Prologue, to the Treatise on the Last End.
affective characteristics to others. Instead, the seminarian needs to contemplate the various affections of God so as to gain a more balanced view of how he can reflect them in his life.

Another implication is that God is a model for the seminarian, in that love and personal relations are essential to God’s Trinitarian life. The basis for developing this line of reflection lies in the truth that we are created in God’s image and we are called to share in God’s goodness and love. It is true that St Thomas sees human intelligence as a reflection of the “Supreme Wisdom” of God through which we imitate God by wisely ordering our lives. Yet, this wisdom is deeply connected to the importance of personal relationships and how they are ordered to the good. This becomes apparent when we recognize that we are created not only in the image of God’s Divine nature but also in the image of the Blessed Trinity. The implication for the seminarian is that he needs to view himself, not only as a rational being, but also as someone who is in need of conducting personal relationships well, if he is to be faithful to his vocation to reflect the life of God.

A point to observe, in relation to this issue, is that St Thomas’ understanding of grace is deeply relational. St Thomas sees the indwelling of the Divine Persons in the Christian as a special mode of presence. Through sanctifying grace God is in the Christian as the known in the knower and the loved in the lover so that through his knowing and loving he “attains to God himself”. St Thomas emphasizes this indwelling by teaching that the Divine Person of the Holy Spirit is given to us so that we may “enjoy also the divine person Himself”. It is clear, from the way St Thomas writes that he thinks of grace as a relationship of personal love. Thus, at the heart of St Thomas’ theological understanding of our relationship with the Trinity, the importance of affectivity is

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173 Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.2, resp. St Thomas explains that an image is whatever bears a likeness to another and while the human person is made to the image of God, the Son of God “is the perfect Image of the Father”, like the image of the King is found in the son. Summa Theologica I, q.35, a.2, ad 3. See Colossians 1.15 and Hebrews 1.3 for Scriptural passages that use this term of Christ. St Thomas describes the human person, on the other hand, as made “to” the image of God because this expresses our innate need to become evermore perfect. As Jean-Pierre Torrell explains, the human person “is a being in the process of becoming”. Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas: Volume 2: Spiritual Master, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 81.

174 Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.2, ad 4. See also I, q.93, a.1, resp. and a.3, resp.

175 See Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.5, resp.

176 Summa Theologica I, q.43, a.3, resp.

177 Summa Theologica I, q.43, a.3, ad 1.
affirmed. In drawing upon the language of affectivity to speak about the Divine mystery St Thomas applies a very Scriptural approach: “God is Love” (1 John 4.8).178

Moreover, St Thomas’ vision of the meeting between God and the human person is one of profound intimacy which bears fruit in an affective experience. From the experience of God’s presence in grace, St Thomas writes of the Christian tasting “God’s sweetness”, enjoying a “complacency in God’s will”, and that the “taste” of these divine realities “produces love for God”.179 Now, if this is the way God deals with us then we ought to make a like return of knowing and loving God. St Thomas refers to this point when he reflects upon Christ’s call: “Come and see” (John 1.39). This is a call not only to believe and act in a certain way but also to experience God in Christ, and this kind of knowledge is achieved, in part, by tasting the divine sweetness.180

The seminarian needs to reflect on this sweetness, living so that he can experience it and help others to do the same.

Moreover, St Thomas writes of the Trinitarian relations in terms of the connection between the intellect and affection, which impresses on the seminarian’s mind the need to keep together these two principles in his understanding of God. St Thomas writes of the relationship of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit in terms of the Word and of Love. The Word proceeds from the Father - “the Speaker” - and he breathes Love.181 “Thus”, St Thomas explains, “the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual perfection, but according to the intellectual

178 Jean-Pierre Torrell writes: “As aware as he is of the necessity for theological wisdom, which alone allows the experience to be correctly expressed, Thomas, without denying that wisdom, utilizes the vocabulary of experience that alone seemed appropriate to him for suggesting something of that fulfilling totality where affectivity is necessarily joined with understanding. For God is not solely grasped as true, but also as good. Saint Thomas Aquinas: Volume 2: Spiritual Master, 98.
179 Summa Theologica II-II, q.97, a.2, ad 2. See I, q.64, a.1, resp.
180 Commentary on the Gospel of John: Chapters 1-5, Chapter 1, Lecture 15, nn.292-293, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010). To show that this is a teaching in accord with Sacred Scripture, St Thomas quotes Psalm 33.9, “Taste and see that the Lord is sweet”.
181 Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.7, resp. St Thomas sees the image of the Trinity in the procession of the word from the human intellect and the procession of love in the human will. Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.6, resp. Our knowing too can “break forth into love”, St Thomas writes. Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.7, resp. Furthermore, our acts toward others are meant to mirror the relations of the Three Divine Persons for we are to imitate God as his beloved children (Ephesians 5.1). In this way, Gilles Emery writes, the Trinitarian mystery, “insofar as it rests on the doctrine of the Word and of Love”, is the ultimate foundation for theological anthropology and spirituality. Gilles Emery, O.P., “The Thomistic Doctrine of the Triune God and Spiritual Life”, Nova et VETERA, English Edition, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2014): 1293.
illuminations, which breaks forth into the affection of love”.\textsuperscript{182} The Word, St Thomas continues, “is born of God by the knowledge of himself; and Love proceeds from God according as he loves himself”.\textsuperscript{183} Moreover, the Holy Spirit is the procession of Love from the Father and the Son.\textsuperscript{184} The point for affective formation is that we are created, not only in the image of the Divine Nature, but, also of the Trinity of Persons. For, St Thomas writes, “in God himself there is one Nature in Three Persons”.\textsuperscript{185} In light of this truth, the seminarian needs to develop his capacity for loving relationships to reflect the Trinitarian life in his priestly ministry. The main way in which he will do so is by becoming Christ-like. This may mean that his focus is primarily on the Second Person of the Trinity. However, reflecting on the Trinity as such will make him more aware of the relational and affective dimensions of his humanity.

These reflections on God’s Trinitarian life can influence the way the seminarian approaches the study of theology in general and how it applies to his affective formation. St Thomas’ reflections on affection in God and the Trinitarian relations point to the distinctive nature of theology as a study that engages human affectivity. Theology, he explains, is a study of God and all things inasmuch as they proceed from God and find their fulfilment in God.\textsuperscript{186} This includes the affective acts inasmuch as they lead us to Beatitude.\textsuperscript{187} Furthermore, since it “is established on principles revealed by God”, theology must respect what is revealed about God and how we are created in God’s image.\textsuperscript{188} Essential to this Revelation is that God is a Trinity of Persons related through love. Theology is a study, therefore, that requires affectivity be ordered to a loving union with God, because we are created in the image of the Trinity of Persons who are in a relation of Love. Unlike other sciences, for example, geometry, the truths of theology have “to be approved through

\textsuperscript{182} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.43, a.5, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{183} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.93, a.8, resp.
\textsuperscript{184} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.93, a.7, resp; also a.8, resp.
\textsuperscript{185} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.93, a.5, resp. See \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.93, a.8, resp., where St Thomas explains that the human person is created in the image of the Divine Nature.
\textsuperscript{186} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.1, a.7, resp.
\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.1, a.4, resp. St Thomas’ Treatise on the Human Passions, which analyzes affectivity as an integral dimension of moral development and the attaining of happiness in \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, qq.22-48, makes this abundantly clear. In Chapters 4-6, in particular, we will consider this Treatise and its implications for the seminarian’s affective formation.
\textsuperscript{188} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.1, a.2, resp.
The affection” so that the theologian aims to become “perfect according to understanding and affection”.\textsuperscript{189} Theology requires the seminarian to grow in his ability to love God and others.

The seminarian’s study of theology requires him to pray and act so that he will obtain a wisdom that flows from a loving union with God. The virtuous man, St Thomas teaches us, judges well of what pertains to the virtue he exercises.\textsuperscript{190} This especially applies to Wisdom, the Gift of the Holy Spirit. By this Gift, through our union with God in charity, the Holy Spirit disposes us to judge well of divine things, leading us into all the truth (John 14.26). The implication is that the Christian who loves God orders his life according to that love.\textsuperscript{191} Thus, the question of the seminarian’s affectivity is found at the very heart of his openness to the truth and wisdom of God.

From our study of St Thomas’ teaching on affection in God the seminarian can be moved to open his heart to a God who loves him, rejoices in his good, and regards him with mercy. God, moreover, as St Thomas affirms, exercises a providential care “by reason of the abundance of his goodness”.\textsuperscript{192} It is a generous love precisely because it gives out of a complete love for our good. This acts as the background to the seminarian’s understanding of God. Thus, through these reflections on affection in God the seminarian can grow in his awareness of the “personally involved divine love”, as Anastasia Scruton writes.\textsuperscript{193} God is truly interested in the seminarian’s welfare and desires his love and friendship.

Furthermore, a language drawn from human affectivity can help the seminarian to make sense of certain Scriptural descriptions of God’s acts. For example, we feel anger in response to injustice. When something is important, such as a deep friendship, we are angry at someone who damages it. This can help us to understand Scripture when it presents God as angry because we have turned away from the Covenant with him (Exodus 32.7-10). The inspired text uses the language of anger to communicate that God is deeply concerned about our relationship with him and disapproves of any action on our part to harm it.

\textsuperscript{189} Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, trans. Chrysostom Baer, O. Praem., Chapter Five, Lecture Two, n.273 (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2006). The point is that some studies, like geometry, can be undertaken in a purely theoretical way without worrying about their impact on one’s personal and moral life.
\textsuperscript{190} Summa Theologica I, q.1, a.7, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{191} See Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.5, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{192} Summa Theologica I, q.22, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{193} Anastasia Philippa Scruton, Thinking Through Feeling: God, Emotion and Passibility (New York: Bloomsbury, 2011) 188.
In a similar way we can talk of God’s hatred. In relation to this, St Thomas mentions God’s love for sinners in so far as they have existence from him and yet God’s hatred for sinners in so far as by sinning they “fall short” of their true good. These words are not to be misunderstood as a tendency to a lack of mercy but as a disapproval of what harms the goodness God loves in us. This is an example of how the study of affection in God helps the seminarian to nuance Scriptural language and clear away misconceptions of it when he will be called upon to preach as a priest.

From his study of affection in God the seminarian can also acquire a basic disposition for speaking in a fashion that is aimed at reaching the hearts of the faithful. St Thomas writes that the one who speaks in the Church not only instructs the intellect. He also speaks “in order to move the affections” and “please his hearers” so that they listen willingly to the Word of God. In this way the preacher seeks to lead the people to love God and do his will. In other words, the preacher needs to present the truths of Scripture in a way that affectively engages the congregation to live in accordance with them.

2. Christ’s Humanity is our Way to God

Having considered affectivity in God we will now examine St Thomas’ teaching on how the Incarnation assists the seminarian to appreciate the importance of affectivity. The goal is to set the theological background for the consideration of Christ’s affectivity by first contemplating the humanity of Christ. For, it is in Christ’s humanity that the seminarian has the perfect revelation both of God’s love and of his own life. Accordingly, this section will consider three elements of St Thomas’ teaching on the Incarnation that are relevant to affective formation and the importance of entering personal relationships. First, we will consider the fittingness of the Incarnation. Second, that God’s desire for friendship motivated the Incarnation. Third, that the Incarnation encourages us to imitate God by communicating his goodness to others.

194 Summa Theologica I, q.20, a.2, ad 4.
195 Scripture also speaks of this same Divine Love overcoming our sinfulness: “I shall cure them of their disloyalty, I shall love them with all my heart, for my anger has turned away from them” (Hosea 14.5).
196 Summa Theologica II-II, q.177, a.1, resp.
The first point concerns the fittingness of God’s action in saving us through the Incarnation. In his treatment of the virtue of devotion, St Thomas explains that the Incarnation is the greatest of God’s ways to draw us to himself in love. For, we need “sensible objects” to help us to love “Divine things”, which we cannot see, and the greatest of these means “is the humanity of Christ”. The Incarnation is thus essential to St Thomas’ understanding of how we come into union with God. In the *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, he writes: “the humanity of Christ is our way to God”. Moreover, St Thomas maintains that we come to our beatitude through the humanity of Christ who revealed in himself “the way of truth” by which we can come to “eternal life by rising again”. Therefore, the work of theology, and for our present purpose this includes the consideration of affectivity, is only complete when Christ is contemplated as our Savior.

At the center of this view of theology is the contemplation of Sacred Scripture, especially the Gospels. “We ought not to say about God”, St Thomas states, “anything which is not found in Holy Scripture either explicitly or implicitly”. Therefore, in the Third Part of *Summa Theologica* St Thomas plumbs the depths of the various mysteries of the Life, Death and Resurrection of Christ. He examines, for instance, Christ’s conception, manner of life, prayer and temptations. The aim is to more accurately understand Christ as a pattern for human life and acquire wisdom from the way Christ responded to the challenges set before him. This includes, as we will see below, the consideration of Christ’s affective responses to challenges, people and sufferings.

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197 Devotion is “the will to give oneself readily to things concerning the service of God”. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.82, a.1, resp.

198 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.82, a.3, ad 2. St Thomas writes in *Summa Contra Gentiles*: “to get greater familiarity in friendship between man and God it was helpful for man that God become man, since even by nature man is man’s friend; and so in this way, while we know God visibly, we may [through Him] be born to love of things invisible.” *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four: Salvation, Chapter 54, n.6, trans. Charles J. O’Neil (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975/2012). Torrell notes that St Thomas is here quoting the Christmas Preface: “Dum usibiliter Deum cognoscimus, in inuisibilium amorem rapiamur”. Torrell’s translation conveys its affective impact: “knowing God under a visible form, we might be enraptured by him into love of the invisible”. *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Volume 2: Spiritual Master*, 109.

199 *Commentary on the Gospel of John: Chapters 6-12*, Chapter 7, Lecture 4, n.1074, trans. Fabian Larcher, O.P. and James A. Weisheipl, O.P. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2010). Christ is also essential to the theological vision of *Summa Theologica* which St Thomas constructs of three major parts: God; human happiness; and, Christ “who as man, is our way to God”. *Summa Theologica* I, q.2, prologue.

200 *Summa Theologica* III, Prologue; *Summa Theologica* III, q.9, a.2, resp.

201 See *Summa Theologica* III, q.36, a.2, ad 1.

202 See *Summa Theologica* III, qq.21, 31, 40, 41, for the examples I mention in the main text above.
When considering, for example, the temptation of the Lord in the wilderness (Matthew 4.1-11), St Thomas observes the method employed by the Evil One, which is to manipulate human desires. Satan suggests a way of action that arises according to the affective inclination of each person and leads them from one sin to another. For the first man this involved a threefold movement which St Thomas gleans from the account of Genesis 3.1-5. First, Adam is enticed to eat the forbidden fruit. Second, there is an appeal to Adam’s vainglory. Third, Satan leads Adam “to the extreme height of pride”.\footnote{Summa Theologica III, q.41, a.4, resp. Emphasis added.} The movement proceeds from a disordered desire for corporal goods, to an undue desire for acclaim, then to a desire for “worldly riches and fame to the extent of holding God in contempt”\footnote{Ibid.}. These are considerations that are applicable to affective formation inasmuch as they analyze the impact of our desires on our ability to do God’s will. An encouraging point for the seminarian is that Christ suffered these temptations, as St Thomas writes, “in order to fill us with confidence in his mercy”\footnote{Summa Theologica III, q.41, a.1, resp.}. For “we have the supreme high priest” who is compassionate toward us because he “has been put to the test in exactly the same way as ourselves”, though he is without sin (Hebrews 4.14-15). This reflection encourages the seminarian to persevere in times of trial and to trust in God for mercy and help.

The second point concerns God’s desire for our friendship as a motivation for the Incarnation. The striking nature of St Thomas’ approach can be seen by contrasting it with the way we often think of human friendship, which requires a certain equality and similarity. Equality refers to the benefits that flow from friendship which need to be in some way proportionate between those involved.\footnote{In connection with this equality between friends, Donald Burt comments: “The eyes of friendship neither look down nor look up to a friend; they look \textit{at} the friend.” See Donald X. Burt, O.S.A., \textit{Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical Philosophy} (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999) 62.} Similarity refers to a likeness between the two friends, for instance, a similar temperament. Now, given these two principles, we can ask: is there any possibility of friendship with God? Aristotle’s answer is: “where there is a great gulf, as between God and man, friendship becomes impossible”.\footnote{Aristotle, \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, Book VIII, vii, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (Allen & Unwin, 1953), revised by Hugh Trendennick (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Classics, 1976/1983).} St Thomas’ answer is that through Christ, God draws us into friendship with himself (John 15.15).
In *Summa Contra Gentiles*, St Thomas argues that we could have despaired of being united to God on account of the “unmeasured distance between” the Divine and human natures. But, he goes on to argue, “the fact that God was willing to unite human nature to himself” in the Person of the Word “points out to men with greatest clarity that man can be united to God”. This is both an affirmation of human dignity and an incentive to strive for our greatest good so that we will be fulfilled “in the enjoyment of God”. Without this incentive we would rely too heavily on earthly pleasures because we would lack the hope of a greater good, namely, eternal Beatitude. Thus, for St Thomas, God chose the most effective way of proving his love for us by being united to us in person, “for it is proper to love to unite the lover with the beloved so far as possible”. God appealed to us through the humanity of his Son because we are moved to love someone when we see that he loves us enough to share our life.

Moreover, St Thomas presents this union of love in terms of a friendship between God and us, which is made possible by the Incarnation. In uniting to himself our human nature God overcomes the great difference in nature and goodness between himself and us, establishing a certain equality and similarity between us. In this way, “to get greater familiarity in friendship between man and God it was helpful for man that God became man, since even by nature man is man’s friend”. That is, there is a natural affinity between human beings and, in his Incarnate Son, God has entered this common ground, as it were, to draw us into his friendship. For the seminarian, there is an important point about the establishing of relationships by which he enters the lives of others so

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209 *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four: Salvation, Chapter 54, n.2.
210 St Thomas links this truth to Christ’s intention that we may have life abundantly (John 10.10). *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four, Chapter 54, n.2.
211 *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four: Salvation, Chapter 54, n.3.
212 St Thomas argues similarly in *Summa Theologica* III, q.1, a.2, resp., that the Incarnation is the most fitting way for God to restore the human race. In this way God showed how deeply he loves us because his own Son became a partner with us in human nature. As well as giving us an example of how to live, God also became man in order to instruct us about the greatness of human dignity and so encourage us to avoid damaging it through sin.
213 *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four, Chapter 54, n.5.
214 *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four, Chapter 54, n.6.
215 In these reflections St Thomas does not first mention satisfaction for sin as the reason for the Incarnation. He places, as Torrell writes, “the emphasis on a desire to see God, which is the emptiness left in man by his Creator”. *Saint Thomas Aquinas: Volume 2: Spiritual Master*, p.110. This is not to understate the need for redemption from sin, which St Thomas certainly considers as necessary because sin interferes with our beatitude. However, it does make clear that it is God’s love for us which motivates him to heal the damaging effects of sin. See *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Four, Chapter 54, nn. 8-9; Chapter 55, nn. 14, 22-30.
that they know they are important to the priest. This makes present the same willingness to share
human life that God showed in the Incarnation.

The third point flows from a reason for the fittingness of the Incarnation that St Thomas writes in
*Summa Theologica*. St Thomas explains that what belongs to something by reason of its nature is
fitting to it. Now, God’s nature is goodness and therefore what belongs to the essence of goodness
is fitting to God. Since “it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others”, St
Thomas argues, it “belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest
manner to the creature”.\(^\text{216}\) This is accomplished in the assumption of human nature into union
with the Person of the Word. In this line of theological reflection, the generosity of God is at the
forefront of St Thomas’ mind. It is a theme that can be developed in terms of the dignity of the
human person as a cause of good for others.

Our capacity to contribute to the good of others is a share in the Providence of God, by which,
through “the abundance of his goodness”, God imparts “the dignity of causality” to creatures.\(^\text{217}\)
All beings “tend toward the divine likeness” by acting as a cause of other beings.\(^\text{218}\) In a greater
way, however, God constitutes human beings as intelligent and free persons who can act for the
welfare of others. God “shares his goodness with” others, “not only so that they will be good and
perfect themselves, but also so that they can, with God’s help, give perfection to others. Now, to
give perfection to other creatures is the most noble way of imitating God.”\(^\text{219}\) This is a guiding
principle of affective development, by which the seminarian can learn, like Christ, to communicate
his goodness through appropriate gestures of love.

We see this in the central principle of Christian life: to follow the example of Christ who is “the
way by reason of his human nature, and the destination because of his divinity”.\(^\text{220}\) St Thomas
links this truth to Christ’s gesture of washing the feet of his disciples, an act of affection that is an

\(^{\text{216}}\) *Summa Theologica* III, q.1, a.2, resp.

\(^{\text{217}}\) *Summa Theologica* I, q.22, a.3, resp.

\(^{\text{218}}\) *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Three: Providence, Part 1, Chapter 21, n.1, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame,


For St Thomas, this includes the ability to “follow” in Christ’s “footsteps” in his sufferings (1 Peter 2.21).
example for Christians to serve each other (John 13.12-15). In this regard, St Thomas meditates on the way Jesus gives the disciples “an example of humility and love” through washing their feet. Jesus knew that the Father had given all things into his hands and that he was from God and was going to God (John 13.3), “and he still did not neglect to do what was humble”. By leading others to God, “especially by humility and love”, Christ gives good example for the seminarian to do likewise. This too is a communication of goodness to others by which the seminarian gains a very outward looking attitude to serve their true good.

St Thomas’ reverence for the humanity of Christ, considered as a pattern for how we live, is in harmony with the teaching of the Church. This is why in the present day what he says about Christ’s affectivity, as well as human affectivity in general, is valuable for considering the problem of affective maturity in seminary formation. The Church’s view of Christ’s humanity is that it is integral to the salvation God offers us. On the Feast of Mary’s Nativity, for example, the Church prays that we “be given strength by the humanity” of God’s Son. Thus the Incarnation proclaims the love of God who “wonderfully created human nature and still more wonderfully redeemed it”. Essential to our contemplation of God is, therefore, an adherence to Christ, the Word Incarnate, “who is himself both the mediator and the sum total of revelation”. This is a guiding light for the seminarian’s affective formation which we will explore in the next section.

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221 St Thomas explains that a good example “has more influence than words” and links this to how, as the Eternal Word, Christ is the pattern for all good things. He writes: “Note that the Son of God is a fitting and sufficient example for us. For he is the art of the Father, and just as he was the model or pattern for everything created, so he was the model for our justification. Commentary on the Gospel of John: Chapters 13-21, Chapter 13, Lecture 3, n.1781.

222 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 1, n.1743.

223 Ibid.

224 Ibid.

225 Alternative Prayer over the Offerings from the Mass for The Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 8 September, The Roman Missal: English Translation According to the Third Typical Edition (London: The Catholic Truth Society; distributed in Australia by St Pauls Publications, Strathfield, NSW, 2010), 1000. This accords with the teaching of Scripture that God saved us by truly sharing our flesh and blood (Hebrews 2.10-18).

226 Alternative Prayer for the Psalm after the First Reading for The Easter Vigil, The Roman Missal, 398.


228 The Second Vatican Council refers to this personal connection established between the Incarnate Son of God and us. Gaudium et Spes teaches: “Christ the new Adam, in the very revelation of the mystery of the Father and of his love, fully reveals humanity to itself ... For, by his incarnation, he, the Son of God, has in a certain way united himself with each individual. He worked with human hands, he thought with a human mind. He acted with a human will, and
St Thomas’ contemplation of the Incarnation gives the seminarian four principles to guide his affective formation. First, the Incarnation is a fitting instrument of human salvation because we are drawn through love of Christ’s humanity to love the God we cannot see. By implication, it is through the humanity of the priest that others can be drawn to Christ. Second, various experiences and acts of Christ’s life shed light on the meaning of the seminarian’s life. For example, Christ’s response to the temptations of Satan in their appeal to desires for glory and power, and, the affectionate gesture of washing the feet of his disciples. Third, the Incarnation is motivated by God’s desire to draw us into friendship with himself. Thus, at the heart of St Thomas’ understanding of the Incarnation is the importance of love and friendship, a theme we will consider in Chapter 8. Fourth, to be like Christ the seminarian needs to communicate his goodness to others and this includes the goodness of his affectivity.

3. Christ’s Human Affectivity

This section will concentrate on St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s affectivity in *Summa Theologica* and how this will help the seminarian to appreciate the importance of forming such passions as sorrow, fear and anger. St Thomas considers Christ’s affective experience as an integral dimension of his human nature. He writes that the passions “were in Christ, even as all else pertaining to man’s nature” and he properly desired pleasures such as “food, drink and sleep, and all else that is sought in right reason”. The basis for Christ’s affectivity is found in his body which is formed by a human soul in which he was “passible”, that is, subject to change and suffering and the affective experiences that correspond to this. Thus, he “truly hungered”,

[229] St Thomas writes: “the Son of God assumed an entire human nature, i.e. not only a body, but also a soul, and not only a sensitive, but also a rational soul”. *Summa Theologica* III, q.9, a.1, resp.; see also *Summa Theologica* III, q.9, a.4, resp. As Nicholas Lombardo explains, since Christ was truly human “everything that can be attributed to our nature must also be attributed to Christ’s human nature”. Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., *The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion*, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 205. For St Thomas, this is integral to the authenticity and trustworthiness of the Incarnation. Since Christ is the Truth it is not becoming that there be “anything fictitious” about his life. *Summa Theologica* III, q.5, a.1, resp.

[230] *Summa Theologica* III, q.15, a.4, resp. See *Summa Theologica* III, q.15, a.2, ad 2.

[231] *Summa Theologica* III, q.5, a.2, resp.
“thirsted”, and suffered “His passion” and “death”. A major reason for St Thomas’ insistence on these points is that if Christ did not have a true affectivity he did not share the whole of human nature, which needs to be redeemed in its totality.

While St Thomas affirms the full range of Christ’s affective experience, in *Summa Theologica* he focuses on Christ’s negative affective experiences, which he calls “defects”. The Latin for defect is *defectus* and, as Paul Gondreau notes, it “implies a lack or a privation of what should be present”. St Thomas denies that Christ had the defect of sin but he affirms that Christ suffered other defects that are a part of human life as a result of the Fall. These defects include the experience of sorrow by which we feel sadness on account of the effects of evil. For St Thomas, Christ’s vulnerability to sorrow is part of God’s saving action, by which Christ, the sinless one, bears the effects of sin and gives his life to save us.

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232 Ibid. Thus, St Thomas argues against heretics such as Arius and Apollinaris who thought that the Son of God only took to himself human flesh, “without a soul, holding that the Word took the place of a soul to the body”. *Summa Theologica* III, q.5, a.3, resp. St Thomas rejects this position because Sacred Scripture witnesses to Christ’s affective experiences such as sorrow (Matthew 26.38); if Christ lacks a true human soul and body this impedes the purpose of the Incarnation which is to liberate the whole of human nature; and, due to the structure of human nature, there cannot be a body without a soul that gives it is particular form of life as the body of the human person. See *Summa Theologica* III, q.5, a.3, resp.


234 In harmony with his role as Savior, Christ suffered certain defects such as vulnerability but, as St Thomas explains, not others that “are incompatible with the perfection of knowledge and grace, as ignorance, a proness towards evil, and a difficulty in well-doing”. *Summa Theologica* III, q.14, a.4, resp. Moreover, in Christ, there is no original sin and hence no internal disorder of the life of the passions that would cause him temptation. See *Summa Theologica* III, q.15, a.2, resp. *Summa Theologica* III, q.15, a.2, ad 3. Gondreau writes that St Thomas “examines Christ’s passions under the rubric of ‘defects of soul’, where defect signifies not moral weakness but a deficiency or limitation of nature, as death and hunger are counted as defects”. *The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 27.

235 As Gondreau writes: “Ultimately, what Aquinas wishes to underscore through his designation of passion as a defect of soul is the fundamental notion of affective vulnerability that results from living in a world beset with evils, evils that were nonexistent in the prelapsarian state. To be subject to the psycho-somatic impact of evils, especially sense evils, is in effect to live under the burden of sin, and ultimately under the burden of original sin … It is this susceptibility to affective movements, particularly as it follows upon the burden of sin or upon passion as defect, that Aquinas wishes to affirm in the case of Christ’s own existential human condition.” *The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 232-233.

236 St Thomas’ argument for why Christ remains unaffected by sinfulness is that sinful behaviour cannot help to make up for the sins of the human race which Christ came to heal. Some may argue that being sinful is part of human experience and therefore Christ would be subject to it. St Thomas’ reply to this is that “sin does not belong to human nature”, inasmuch as human nature is created by God. *Summa Theologica* III, q.15, a.1, resp. Moreover, if Christ had sinned he would not have given an “example of virtue, since sin is opposed to virtue”. St Thomas’ point
St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s sorrow includes a consideration between properly formed and improperly formed affective experiences. In considering Christ’s words, “My soul is sorrowful even unto death” (Matthew 26.38), St Thomas distinguishes between “perfect passion”, a passion that “dominates the soul, i.e. the reason” and “a propassion”, a passion which “has its beginning in the sensitive appetite, but goes no further”. In the first case, the affective experience leads one to act in a wrongful manner. In the second case, the passion is formed in accord with one’s true good. In this context, “propassion” is the passion of someone who responds virtuously to an intense trial, which Christ exemplifies.

St Thomas also mentions fear, wonder, and anger as authentic affective experiences of Christ. In Gethsemane Christ felt fear, which is caused by the anticipation of a future evil, as he contemplated his impending sufferings (Mark 14.33). In regard to wonder, St Thomas observes that Christ marveled at the centurion’s words of faith (Matthew 8.10). “Wonder properly regards what is new” and unusual, St Thomas explains, which Christ could experience according to his acquired knowledge, “in regard to which new things could occur to Him day by day”. Wonder is a desire to understand and this “affection” of wonder was assumed by Christ “in order to teach us to wonder at what He Himself wondered at”, the work of God and the goodness in people. Christ also felt anger, St Thomas writes. Anger flows from the sorrow an injured person feels, which moves him to desire a just punishment for the offender who caused the sorrow. The kind of anger that Christ

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237 Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.4, resp. Italics in text.
238 Thus sorrow was not in Christ, St Thomas writes, “as a perfect passion; yet it was inchoatively in Him as a propassion”. Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.6, ad 1. Christ “began to grow sorrowful” rather than being completely overcome by a sorrow that would have lead him to act against reason’s proper judgment. Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.6, ad 2.
239 See Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.4, resp.
240 Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.7, ad 3.
241 Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.8, resp.
242 Ibid.
243 St Thomas is here quoting his Treatise on the Human Passions which occurs earlier in Summa Theologica. He thus reveals that the examination of human experience earlier in Summa Theologica has ramifications for his reflections on Christ’ experience: there is a true continuity between our humanity and Christ’s humanity. See Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.9, resp., referring to I-II, q.46, a.3 and II-II, a.158, a.2. See also Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.9, resp.
demonstrated was moderated in accord with justice, as when he expelled the moneychangers from the Temple (John 2.14-17).²⁴⁴

In pointing to the human experiences of fear, wonder, and anger in Christ, St Thomas is emphasizing that Christ truly shared the limitations of our life and its vulnerability to sorrow. Yet he is also helping us to meditate on Christ’s life so that we will reflect on how we respond to similar experiences. Like Christ, the seminarian should not let his fear lead him to avoid God’s will; he should wonder at the good in others and God’s work in them; and he should moderate his anger in response to injustice. This line of reflection becomes more evident in St Thomas’ treatment of the different wills in Christ. Here St Thomas considers Christ in Gethsemane, where he accepts the Father’s will even though he is repulsed by the suffering it involved.

The basic distinction St Thomas makes is between the “will of sensuality” and the “will of reason”. The “will of sensuality” is a response of passion, the “will of reason” refers to an act of the rational will. The crucial point is that human sensuality (the passions) participates in rationality when it performs its proper role in accord with true reason. It is not against reason that the sensuality should act according to its proper mode. However, it is against reason if sensuality should dominate the spiritual faculty of the will of reason. As St Thomas explains: Christ possessed a true sensuality and “allowed all the powers of His soul to do what belonged to them”.²⁴⁵ It is in this sense that he felt repugnance at suffering, while he accepted it for the world’s salvation.

For St Thomas, this does not imply a contradiction in Christ, even though he wished “what the Divine will did not wish”.²⁴⁶ Rather, the different principles of Christ’s humanity, his affective response to evil and his capacity to follow the Father’s will, operated as they should. Christ knew how to properly express and co-ordinate these two principles.²⁴⁷ In Gethsemane, St Thomas is

²⁴⁴ St John describes this action of Christ in the words of Psalm 69.9: “Zeal for your house will consume me.” In Chapter 6 we will consider, in detail, the human passion of anger and what St Thomas means by the word revenge.
²⁴⁵ Summa Theologica III, q.18, a.5, resp. St Matthew’s gospel records that three times Christ prayed that the cup should pass him by and then, each time, expressed his desire that the Father’s will be done (26.39, 42, 44).
²⁴⁶ Summa Theologica III, q.18, a.6, resp.
²⁴⁷ There is a certain spontaneity involved in this experience, whereby the suffering person both feels and then announces a desire that accords with this feeling, while deciding for the right course of action. This is true to our experience, for we often say we do not want to do something on account of its difficulty and yet we still do it because it is good and right. A mother, for instance, may be repulsed by the pain of childbirth, yet she accepts her child. A soldier may feel great fear and yet performs his duty in the defence of his country. A parish priest may feel
arguing, Christ experienced a true agony as he contemplated his coming Passion (Luke 22.43). This was not an agony in that he was making two different willed decisions in which he “wishes one thing, and on its considering another, wishes the contrary”. Rather, Christ desired to fulfill the Father’s will that the human race be saved through his suffering. Nevertheless, there was a true affective agony in Christ who was fearful in the face of his approaching suffering.

In writing of this issue, St Thomas affirms that Christ prayed according to his sensuality. That is, Christ gave voice in his prayer to what he experienced in the face of suffering. By this St Thomas means that the affective experience can be made an act of prayer by being incorporated into the expression of our “desire [for] something to be fulfilled by God”. In this sense, we place before God our affective experience. In this way, Christ voiced his affective suffering and desire that it be avoided before his Heavenly Father. St Thomas sees Christ teaching us three things through this experience: that he had a true human nature, “with all its natural affections”; to show that we may wish “what God does not wish”; and, “to show that man should subject his own will to the Divine will.” These three truths show the seminarian how to respond in similar situations: to bring before God his desire to avoid evil and to accept the Father’s will, enduring the Cross for the sake of the joy to come (Hebrews 12.2).

St Thomas also takes great care to consider the various affective experiences of Christ on the Cross. He writes of Christ’s pain and sorrow on the Cross as “most bitter”. He mentions the

exhausted and uncharitable at 2am, when he is called to attend the dying, but he goes to someone in need of the Sacramental support of the Church.

248 *Summa Theologica* III, q.18, a.6, ad 3.
249 *Summa Theologica* III, q.21, a.2, resp.
250 Ibid.

A consideration here is that the seminarian’s affective maturity can be shaped by his prayerfulness. Affected by the real nature of sin, as a rejection of God’s love, he can be moved to change his life so as to avoid offending God. The results of contemporary research into the way the brain is formed, not only by new activities, but by new ways of thinking should give us a renewed confidence in the benefits of prayer. See Nicholas Carr, *The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to our Brains* (New York/London: W.W.Norton & Company, 2011) and Richard J. Davidson Ph.D. with Sharon Begley, *The Emotional Life of your Brain: How its Unique Patterns Affect the Way you Think, Feel, and Live – and How you can Change Them* (London: Hodder and Stoughton Ltd, 2012), for accounts of how various ways of thinking and reflection can open new pathways of feeling and acting. Of course, there is more to prayer than our mental and affective activity. However, thinking about the way Christ suffered and experiencing affective acts such as compassion for him predispose us to be more compassionate to those who suffer.

252 *Summa Theologica* III, q.46, a.6, resp. Contrary to Coolman’s claim, that St Thomas does not invest Christ’s sorrow with soteriological significance, St Thomas recognises that the whole of Christ’s affectivity is integral to the salvific meaning of his humanity. See Boyd Taylor Coolman, “The Salvific Affectivity of Christ According to
pain Christ felt in highly sensitive areas of his body such as his hands and feet, the weight that presses down on him as he hangs from the cross, and how long it takes him to die. He also mentions Christ’s immense sorrow because he grieved for the sins of the human race and the loss of his life. St Thomas sees in these sorrows something truly virtuous because sadness is praiseworthy when it flows from a holy love, such as a sorrow on account of the sins of others.253 Moreover, if a man did not grieve over the loss of goods such as his own life he would show, not virtue, but indifference or even a hardness of heart.254 The key point for St Thomas, however, is that Christ suffered on account of his love for us.255 Even more than the virtuous man who exposes his beloved life “for virtue’s sake … Christ laid down His most beloved life for the good of charity”.256 Christ’s love for us in his passion and death was truly immense.

The strength of Christ’s charity for us radiates through his painful experience of abandonment. St Thomas gives three ways in which it could be said that the Father abandoned Jesus. The first way is that God the Father “preordained Christ’s Passion for the deliverance of the human race”.257 The second way is that the Father delivered his Son to the Passion “inasmuch as, by the infusion of charity, He inspired Him with the will to suffer for us”.258 The third way is that God the Father allowed Christ to be taken by his persecutors. For this reason Christ cried out “My God, My God, why have you abandoned me?” (Matthew 27.46). The first and third reasons take their true

Alexander of Hales”, The Thomist 71 (2007): 31. St Thomas refers to Christ’s true experience of sorrow in Summa Theologica III, q.15, a.6, resp and III, q.46, a.7, resp., where he states “that Christ’s whole soul suffered” in spite of the fact the union of his soul with the Divine nature. And, the sorrows Christ endured are closely linked by St Thomas to the Cross through which we are saved. As well as the examples of sorrow given in the main text of this thesis, St Thomas also writes of Christ’s rejection by the people of his time, “friends abandoning him” as well as the damage done to his reputation, as part of the saving act of his Passion. Summa Theologica III, q.46, a.5, resp.

253 Another example is that sorrow for sins leads us to repentance and is thus helpful in reconciling us to God (2 Corinthians 7.10). See Summa Theologica III, q.46, a.6, ad 2.

254 St Thomas comments that Christ rightly mourned the loss of his own life because his bodily life was so excellent, “especially on account of the Godhead united with it”. Summa Theologica III, q.46, a.6, ad 4.

255 A guilty man grieves doubly when a penalty is inflicted upon him, due to the penalty and “also because of the crime”. However, the innocent man who is unjustly punished especially grieves “by reason of his innocence, in so far as he deems the hurt inflicted to be the more undeserved”. Summa Theologica III, q.46, a.6, ad 5. As the Innocent One, Christ’s suffering is thus intensified as for no other. Also, Christ “grieved not only over the loss of His own life, but also over the sins of others”. Christ’s grief over the sins of mankind “surpassed” all the sorrow in the hearts of those who mourn for their sins because his grief “flowed from a greater wisdom and charity” and “because He grieved” for the sins of all. Summa Theologica III, q.46, a.6, ad 4.

256 Summa Theologica III, q.46, a.6, ad 4.

257 Summa Theologica III, q.47, a.3, resp.

258 Ibid.
meaning from the second, the infusion of the Father’s charity into the heart of his Son to give his life for us. For this infusion of charity indicates the truth that the Son lovingly and willingly co-operated with the Father in saving us.259

Christ’s gift of love amidst the pain and sorrow of his sufferings points to the greatness of human affectivity in the context of self-sacrifice. St Thomas’ detailed treatment of this dimension of Christ’s affective experience points to his conviction that Christ chose the greatest act of friendship possible to a human being, as the way to reveal the full depth of his love for us (John 15.13).260 It indicates an important point for the seminarian’s affective formation: affective maturity comes to its greatest perfection in the most demanding experiences.261 Perhaps, like no other affective experience, sorrow challenges the seminarian to express his honest desire before the Father. Yet, like Christ, he needs to integrate his desires in accord with a generous love for God and his neighbor.

There is another important point that emerges from St Thomas’ contemplation of Christ’s affective responses in the face of suffering. At no time does St Thomas understate or explain away the prayers that flow from Christ’s heart in his agony and abandonment. This has an important implication for the seminarian who is preparing to help those who suffer. If Christ expressed his desire to avoid suffering and questioned why he was abandoned by God, then the Christian, who seeks to conform his life to the mystery of Christ’s life, rightly does likewise. This requires the

259 St Thomas quotes the prophet Isaiah - “The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all” (53.6) - to highlight the redemptive plan of God the Father. St Thomas then quotes verse 7: “He was offered because it was His own will”. St Thomas’ point is that Christ personally accepted the Father’s plan for our salvation. St Thomas contrasts the role of the Father in the Passion with that of others, to highlight how the Father acted with charity in giving his Son for our salvation: “The same act, for good or evil, is judged differently, according as it proceeds from a different source. The Father delivered up Christ, and Christ surrendered Himself, from charity, and consequently we give praise to both: but Judas betrayed Christ from greed, the Jews from envy, and Pilate from worldly fear.” Summa Theologica III, q.47, a.3, ad 3.

260 St Thomas comments: “Here he shows the efficacy of love, which is that one undergo death for his friends; this is a sign of the greatest love.” Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 15, Lecture 2, n.2009.

261 Lombardo writes: “Christ shows us what virtuous affectivity looks like, and therefore what it looks like to be truly human, so that we can imitate him, both by striving for virtue and by accepting as fully compatible with virtue – and even necessary for virtue – those aspects of human affectivity that otherwise might seem like moral imperfections. In this way, Christ’s human affectivity helps bring about our salvation. Aquinas maintains that his passion provides a particularly salvific example of virtuous affectivity.” The Logic of Desire, 223. Lombardo refers us to Summa Theologica III, q.46, aa.3-4, where St Thomas writes of the salvific example of virtue given by Christ’s Passion.
seminarian, as a future priest, to understand the impact of suffering on a person’s affectivity and to respect his need to express to God his deep pain and bewilderment.

4. Christ and Friendship

Friendship is a major part of an affectively mature person’s life because it is through such personal relationships that we form emotional bonds of mutual support. That Christ shared such friendships, in which he felt a genuine and deep love for some who were especially close to him, is a great affirmation of the value of friendship for the seminarian. Pope St John Paul II mentions friendship as an important factor of priestly life. The seminarian, he teaches, needs to bring “to human relationships of serene friendship and deep brotherliness a strong, lively and personal love for Jesus Christ”.262 We could add, that contemplating the life of Christ will help the seminarian to understand how he can appreciate the goodness of friendship and how to love his friends.

These reflections will prepare for the consideration of the seminarian’s desire for friendship in Chapter 8. The discussion of this section, however, will involve St Thomas’ reflections on three moments of friendship for Christ: his love for Lazarus, Martha and Mary; the expression of his friendship for the disciples at the Last Supper; and, the way he called Peter to a more humble love. This third consideration will refer to Peter’s personal experience of being tempted, which enabled him to become compassionate to others in their struggle with temptation. It will lead into a discussion of the significance of personal experience as a dimension of affective formation.

St Thomas’ reflections on Jesus’ love for Martha, Mary and Lazarus highlight Christ’s compassion, his anger in the face of death and the trust that his friends placed in him. Jesus himself openly professes this love for Lazarus and his two sisters. Upon deciding to go to Lazarus, he says: “Our friend Lazarus is at rest: I am going to wake him” (John 11.11). St Thomas comments: “This was to say: He was a friend because of the many things and favors he did for us; so we should not neglect him in his needs.”263 This was a dangerous course of action because some in Judea intended to kill him, but Christ revealed his love by visiting and consoling his friends in distress (John 11.8).

262 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.44.
263 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 3, n.1494.
John’s gospel witnesses to Jesus’ distress at the tomb of Lazarus when he sees Mary and others weeping: “Jesus wept” (John 11.5, 33-35). Christ was deeply moved in spirit, which revealed “a certain anger and resentment of the heart”, on account of the “pain and sadness” caused by “the cruelty of death”. St Thomas, at this point, rejects the Stoic position, “that a wise man is never sad”, because “it seems very inhuman not to be sad at the death of another.” To the contrary, Christ reveals his profound human feeling, for he “was a well-spring of compassion, and he wept in order to show us that it is not blameworthy to weep out of compassion”. This is a great example for the seminarian of how St Thomas sees Christ as a model of true humanity.

The depth of the friendship between Jesus and Lazarus, Martha and Mary, is revealed by the great confidence the sisters showed in approaching Jesus. They simply inform him: “the man you love is ill” (John 11.2). They do not request that Jesus come to Lazarus because it is sufficient to state a need to a friend, who “wills the good of his friend as his own good”. Nor did the sisters personally deliver their message to Jesus. This also reveals “the confidence they had in Christ due to the special love and friendship which he had shown for them”. They trusted that he would be particularly concerned for their sorrow. The implication is that the sisters must have known him to be both caring and trustworthy in his affection for them.

St Thomas’ teaching on Christ’s sorrow for his friends teaches the seminarian about important affective characteristics that should mark the life of the shepherd: affection, trustworthiness, generosity, compassion, and the ability to appropriately express emotion. In particular, Christ’s capacity to respond to the sorrow of others enables the seminarian to see how important it is that he respond likewise. In this regard, Richard Schenk argues for a theology of mourning, which draws upon St Thomas’ ability to recognize in the Gospel account a portrayal “of the psychological

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264 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 5, n.1534.
265 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 5, n.1535.
266 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 5, n.1537.
267 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 1, n.1475. Accordingly, St Thomas notes, we read in Sirach 6.11 that a steadfast friend will be to us as ourselves.
268 Ibid.
269 St Thomas writes: “Indeed, he who is the Consoler of the sorrowful loved the sorrowing sisters, and he who was the Savior of the weary loved the weary and dead Lazarus”. Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 1, n.1479.
reactions of Jesus to the events that he experiences”. St Thomas explains that when Christ is troubled within himself, as he sees Mary weeping, he gives example of a moderated sorrow. Thus he avoids an inhuman indifference because we should be sad for those who die. As Schenk explains, the example of Christ, who shares the grief of Mary and Martha, encourages Christians to share the grief of others. If the seminarian is to represent Christ to others he needs to be able to respond with compassion to the grief of others and console them.

The second consideration is related to Christ’s words to the disciples when he calls them friends at the Last Supper (John 15.13-15). St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s command, that the disciples love one another as he has loved them, is helpful to understand the generosity required in this friendship (John 13.34; cf. 15.17). This is a command, St Thomas observes, that they exercise the “mutual love” that is necessary for the “true and firm friendship” that Christ wanted for his disciples. The standard for this love is found in the “ways” in which “Christ loved us”. He loved us gratuitously and so we ought to love our neighbor without waiting for him to love us or “do us a favor”. Christ loved us, according to the love of a friend, by giving himself for us and we too ought to love one another “in deed and in truth” (John 15.13; 1 John 3.18). Christ “loved us rightly” according to his love for the Father and we too ought to love in one another, “not so much the pleasure or benefits the loved one gives to us”, but “what pertains to God”. The seminarian can learn from this consideration of friendship that he ought to love his friends selflessly and in accordance with how God wills their true good.

Another point about Christ’s offer of friendship is how he contrasts it with a servile attitude. He tells the disciples that he will no longer call them servants but friends (John 15.15). Instead of serving God out of a servile fear, which inclines one’s heart to obey God on account of the fear of

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271 See Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 11, Lecture 5, n.1535.
272 See And Jesus Wept: Notes towards a Theology of Mourning, 228. Schenk draws the conclusion that the same love we have for the good of life in those we care about moves us to mourn their loss. He writes: “The same love that teaches us to mourn the losses of humankind teaches us to hope for the salvation of human goods. A hope for goods whose loss would not be mourned would be hollow.” (237).
273 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 7, n.1837.
274 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 7, n.1838.
275 Ibid.
276 Ibid.
punishment, they should love God. Charity gives the friend of Christ a filial fear, that is, a fear which flows from his love for Christ and which makes him avoid losing Christ’s friendship (1 John 4.18). This involves the friend of Christ in a loving freedom, by which he unites himself to “the interests of Jesus” and the goal of seeking his neighbor’s salvation. Without this intention the Christian becomes a bad servant, who is “darkened by the pride in his own heart” and “attributes to himself what he does”, rather than recognizing God as the source of his goodness. In this way, he ceases to see what God is doing because he is too caught up in himself.

Christ, however, gives the disciples the “true sign of friendship on his own part”. All that he has heard from the Father he makes known to his disciples (John 15.15). Thus, “God reveals his secrets to us by letting us share in his wisdom”. In this context, St Thomas quotes Wisdom 7.27, which speaks of Wisdom passing into “holy souls” making them “friends of God and prophets”. Among the qualities attributed to Wisdom are lucidity, benevolence, beneficence, friendliness and dependability (Wisdom 7.22-23). These are virtues, firm dispositions of character, which enable the seminarian to will and act for the good of others, as Chapter 7 will consider.

The third consideration, of how Christ expresses his affectivity through friendship, is brought to light when the resurrected Lord asks Peter three times: “do you love me?” (John 21.15-17). St Thomas comments that in doing this the Lord examined Peter, according to the spirit of 1 Timothy 5.22, that the bishop not be hasty to ordain a man. As St Thomas explains: “For just as he ought not to punish swiftly, so he ought neither to promote unduly, that is, easily ordain men to sacred orders”. St Thomas observes that Jesus asks these questions for the sake of Peter, to make him more conscious of his love for the Lord and those entrusted to his pastoral responsibility. St Thomas draws some very sobering implications for priests. They should not be “self-lovers”.

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277 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 15, Lecture 3, n.2015.
278 Ibid.
279 Ibid.
281 Ibid.
282 Ibid.
284 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 21, Lecture 3, n.2617.
285 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 21, Lecture 3, n.2618. The phrase “self-lover” here has the negative moral connotation that the priest inordinately loves himself at the expense of those entrusted to his pastoral care. It is
Given the importance of the pastoral ministry, the Church ought to choose the best candidate, that is, the one “who is better educated, more competent, more discerning, and chosen unanimously.” St Thomas gives “the honor of God and the benefit of the Church” as the guiding principles for making such a decision. Now, these comments require a spirit of humble self-examination in the seminarian about his character, and his motives, for becoming a priest. He must think like a true friend of Christ, exercising a realistic judgment about how he is to promote the true interests of Christ.

The priest, moreover, should avoid arrogance and be humble like Peter, who learned not to be overconfident in his love. At the Last Supper Peter stated that he would lay down his life for Jesus and be faithful even if everyone else fell away (John 13.37; Matthew 26.33). Now, in answer to the resurrected Lord’s question, “do you love me more than these”, he simply replies: “Yes, Lord, you know I love you” (John 21.15), without further elaboration. Peter has been “conquered by his own weakness”, but now he humbles himself before Christ and before “the apostles”, by not claiming to have a greater love than they have. This shows the Lord’s chosen “are always better after they are corrected”, St Thomas concludes. We are thus taught “not to rank ourselves above others, but others before ourselves”, as St Paul teaches in Philippians 2.3. Yet, Christ allowed Peter to be tempted, in order that “he would have an unpretentious opinion of himself and have

not a condemnation of the proper self-care that is appropriate to the priest’s personal dignity as a human person. The proper development of self-love is discussed in Chapter 4 in relation to friendship and Chapter 10 discusses how inordinate self-love is the source of a disordered affectivity.

Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 21, Lecture 3, n.2620.

Ibid.

This attitude is akin to that of St John the Baptist who considers himself the friend of the Bridegroom and feels a deep responsibility to do only what is required of him out of love for Christ and the people he has come to save (John 3.27-30). See St Thomas’ reflections on this theme in Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 3, n.519, where he presents St John the Baptist as “the friend of Jesus” who “seeks his friend’s interests out of love and faithfulness”.

Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 21, Lecture 3, n.2621. St Thomas holds that Peter’s promise was earnest and sincere: “He really meant this and was not pretending”. Yet, he adds with a sober realism: “Still, we do not know the strength of our own love until it meets some obstacle to be overcome”. Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 8, n.1843. Peter was confident of his strength but Jesus wanted him to reflect carefully. St Thomas explains: “It is like saying: Think what you are saying. I know you better than you know yourself; you do not know how strong your own love is. So do not assume that you can do everything.” Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 8, n.1845.

Ibid.

Ibid.
compassion for his subjects when they sinned”. To be like Christ the high priest, Peter must also be able to sympathize with human weakness because he has been tempted (Hebrews 4.15).

This leads us to an important principle of affective and pastoral formation: personal experience, when the seminarian responds to it in a mature fashion, enables him to become a better person.

We will pursue this point through a consideration of St Thomas’ reflection on Hebrews 4.15, which helps us think of Christ as a compassionate high priest, because he was tempted like us in all things but did not sin. Christ acquired this disposition through his incarnate human life. “He knows our misery through experience,” St Thomas explains, “which as God, He knew from eternity through simple knowledge”.

Psalm 102.13-14 speaks of God’s compassion for those that fear him because he knows of what we are made, but the experience of temptation causes Jesus, in his humanity, to have compassion. “For if He would have been without temptations”, St Thomas explains, “He would not have known them by experience, and thus He would not have been compassionate.”

The depth of painful experience involved in being tempted formed in the Heart of Jesus his compassion for us.

Now, in Peter’s case, the experience of having to acknowledge his weakness in failing to remain faithful to Christ, made him humble and compassionate in relation to others. Yet, this principle needs to be respected as a general principle of affective formation. We are well guided in this

292 Ibid.
293 St Thomas returns to this important point when he reflects upon Peter’s denial of Christ in John 18.17: “Our Lord permitted Peter to deny him because he wanted the very one who was to be head of the Church to be all the more compassionate to the weak and sinners, having experienced in himself his own weakness in the face of sin. Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 18, Lecture 3, n.2309.
294 These two dimensions of formation are closely linked, in that the capacity to form affectively mature relationships facilitates the priest’s ability to serve people in the various acts of pastoral service. For example, the priest’s ability to be courteous enables him to establish a friendly relationship with those who approach him for the Sacrament of Reconciliation.
296 Ibid, n. 237. Boyd Coolman argues that St Thomas does not sufficiently consider Christ’s compassion. He points out Scriptural references to Christ’s experience of compassion which St Thomas seems to overlook. For example, Matthew 9.36 and St Paul’s reference to “the tender compassion of Christ Jesus” (Philippians 1.8). See Boyd Taylor Coolman, “The Salvific Affectivity of Christ According to Alexander of Hales”, The Thomist 71 (2007): 1-38. However, St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s compassion, in The Letter to the Hebrews, and in his Commentary on the Gospel of John, as related in the main text above, show that he thought it to be of great importance in the mystery of salvation.
matter by St Thomas’ point about the art of politics and making laws, which can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the seminarian’s formation. St Thomas writes that even though experience is not enough, it still “contributes not a little towards making a man a statesman”.297 People with experience are better able to make “correct” judgments about things, like the appropriate means to achieve certain results and the activities that are suited to different persons to do things well. “But the inexperienced are understandably ignorant whether a work is done well or badly on the basis of what they read in books, for they do not know how to put into practice what is in the books.”298 This does not deny the importance of other areas of formation, such as a proper academic education.299 However, personal experience exerts a major influence on the seminarian’s capacity for practical wisdom, emotional maturity and caring for others.

Craig Steven Titus’ comments on the importance of experience for moral maturity will help the seminarian to understand why experience is so necessary for his affective and pastoral formation. “‘Experience’”, he explains, “etymologically finds it roots in the practical knowledge, skill, or competence (peritia) that we draw from a trial or danger (periculum) once overcome.” Furthermore, we need to listen to the experience of others:

The dialogue between our own experience and that of others is made possible through (1) being in relationship with others; (2) understanding the other person as another self; (3) having confidence that other human being’s experiences are real and can be critically integrated to

299 John Grabowski rejects an improper primacy of experience that would not respect the proper role of Scripture, Tradition and reason in evaluating the significance of our experiences and how to act in response to them. See John Grabowski, “Catechesis and Moral Theology: Toward a Renewed Understanding of Christian Experience”, Nova et Vetera, English Edition, Vol. 13, No. 2 (2015): 459-487. Grabowski’s most important point is found on p.477: “that the encounter with the Person of Christ is made the hermeneutical key to understand experience – both human and Christian. Christ reveals the contents of the human heart to those who encounter him”. Yet, it is also clear from human experience that we need it to develop an accurate understanding of ourselves and how we respond to Christ. Experience tests our abilities so that we learn their limits and how to develop them. There is a certain range for trial and error here that is necessary for the seminarian to really know what he can do and how he can do it. For example, the seminarian who assumes that he can use the same method of presenting the Gospel to varying kinds of people, learns through hard experience that he has to respect the capacity, background and emotional state of the person he seeks to help. On this point, St Gregory the Great exhorts the pastor to first praise the good qualities of the proud man, before correcting him, so that he will be more inclined “to listen”. See St Gregory the Great, The Book of the Pastoral Rule, Part III, n.17, trans. George E. Demacopoulos (New York: St Vladimir’s Press, 2007).
serve as a source for one’s own moral judgments; and (4) believing that we share a common humanity between people of all genders, cultures and times.300

This is relevant to the seminarian’s affective and pastoral formation, because he needs to experience various forms of pastoral work and relationships to grow in his ability to work well with people.301 Such experiences also help him to grow in self-knowledge about how he responds to others, for example, when they are suffering or angry. This will enable him, with the help of formators, to reflect on why he responds as he does and what he can do to respond in a more mature and helpful manner. For example, when someone is angry with him does he react with great anger in return? If so, can he understand that either such a response only further inflames the situation or that he is dealing with a person who needs a calm response to help him become more reasonable? Through sustained and supervised experiences, like the visitation of the sick in hospitals, the seminarian’s mettle will be tested. Also, he will be enabled to see the struggles of others, which challenge him to refine his ability to apply pastoral principles with emotional balance, wisdom, and humility.

In this section we have considered three moments in which Christ exercised a tender capacity for friendship with Lazarus, Martha and Mary; his disciples at the Last Supper; and, Peter after the resurrection. He demonstrated to them compassion, generosity and the ability to call a dear friend to a renewed friendship. These are all qualities that the seminarian needs to practice if he is to be a true friend of Christ and those entrusted to him by God. Moreover, Peter’s experience of being humbled and becoming compassionate highlights the general principle that the seminarian needs to be formed through personal experience to become a more effective shepherd.

301 Pope St John Paul II writes of the need for the seminarian to have “pastoral experiences” in a programme of “pastoral training” over “a considerable amount of time”, which needs “to be checked in an orderly manner”. He also mentions the need for pastoral theology, which he describes as “a scientific reflection” on the pastoral service of the priest through such activities as preaching the word, celebrating the sacraments and serving others in charity. Pastoral theology “receives from the faith the principles and criteria” to guide it. Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.57.
5. Christ and Pastoral Charity

To extend our reflection on Christ as a model for affective maturity, we can turn to a consideration of how the seminarian needs to imitate the love of the Good Shepherd. In this regard, Pope St John Paul II recommends to seminarians a “strong and tender” devotion to Christ’s Sacred Heart, so that they can “lead lives that are a response to the love and affection of Christ the priest and good shepherd”. The goal of this devotion is to help the seminarian grow in his pastoral charity for Christ’s disciples. The affective dimension of this pastoral love is shaped by the seminarian’s attitude to how he is to love others as a shepherd. In relation to this, there are three points we can develop from St Thomas’ commentary on John’s Gospel. The first concerns how the shepherd needs to care for the sheep. The second relates to how the shepherd needs to see that the sheep are entrusted to him in a relationship of belonging. The third is about having the right motive in being a shepherd and avoiding an undue love of money.

The first line of reflection concerns the “solicitude” of the good shepherd who loves and cares for the people entrusted to him. St Thomas quotes Paul’s Letter to the Philippians 1.7 to demonstrate this attitude: “I hold you in my heart”. The evil shepherd, on the other hand, does not feel such a bond with the sheep, he “has no care for them”. Furthermore, there is a difference “in their affections”, for the good shepherd, who “loves his flock” is prepared to expose “himself to dangers that affect his bodily life”. He defends the faithful when they are threatened by the devil’s temptations, the deceits of heresy and the raging tyrant. The evil shepherd, to the contrary, abandons the faithful when he is put to the test: “he is not willing to endure any inconvenience for them.” The challenge for the seminarian here is to have an attitude of great generosity in his service of God’s people. This generosity will enable him to serve others, even if it is at a cost to himself.

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302 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.49. The Pope writes of pastoral charity as a sharing in the charity of Christ the Good Shepherd. It “is the virtue by which we [priests] imitate Christ in his self-giving and service. It is not just what we do, but our gift of self, which manifests Christ’s love for his flock.” (n.23). The Pope is here quoting: Homily at eucharistic devotion, Seoul (Oct. 7, 1989), 2: Insegnamenti XII/2 (1989), 785. Pastoral formation encourages the seminarian not only to acquire certain skills but to live “in communion with the very sentiments and behavior of Christ the good shepherd” (n.57).

303 See Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 10, Lecture 3, n.1404.

304 Ibid, n.1405.

305 Ibid, n.1408.
The second line of reflection relates to how the seminarian needs to see the people of God as personally entrusted to him. Christ’s command to Peter was: “Look after my sheep” (John 21.17). This pertains to the “office of a good shepherd”, who is to love Christ’s people and give his life for them in imitation of Christ (John 10.11; 1 John 3.16). This attitude of love will lead him to exercise the authority of the shepherd with charity. The sheep “must belong to him and he must love them; the first without the second is not enough”, St Thomas comments. Here, St Thomas is pointing to a true relationship of personal belonging in which the priest sees himself as someone who has a responsibility to care for others. He is someone whose identity is explained in terms of the relationship of love and care for Christ’s people.

Moreover, drawing upon the example of Christ, St Thomas refers to four actions proper to a good shepherd who understands this relationship. First, the good shepherd “knows his sheep” and he is familiar with them, “for we call by name those whom we know familiarly”. Second, he leads them out “from the society of those who are evil”. Third, he brings “them into the sheepfold” and guides them to walk the path to eternal life. Fourth, he goes before Christ’s faithful “by the example of a good life”. Thus the good shepherd does not domineer over those in his charge (1 Peter 5.3) but imitates Christ who gave good example and “was the first to die for the teaching of the truth”. This marks out a basic part of the affective formation of the seminarian. He ought to become a man who can know and understand his people so that they know they are cared for by Christ.

The third line of reflection is about how Judas was corrupted by avarice, to the point that he gave himself to following Satan’s suggestions to betray Christ for thirty pieces of silver (Matthew 26.16). In this connection, St Thomas reflects on Judas’ response to Mary who bought ointment worth three hundred denarii and anointed Christ’s feet with it. Judas stated that the money should have been given to the poor, but, unfortunately, he used to steal from the common purse entrusted to him (John 12.1-6). St Thomas draws the lesson, remarking that Judas was one of the disciples, and “that no one should presume on himself no matter to what dignity he has been raised”. Judas

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306 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 10, Lecture 3, n.1399.
307 Ibid.
308 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 10, Lecture 1, n.1374.
309 See Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 13, Lecture 1, n.1742; Lecture 4, n.1810-1811. In these passages St Thomas describes the different levels of co-operation with Satan, by which Judas’ heart is given over to evil until Satan possesses him “more completely … to lead him to accomplish the evil” (n.1811).
310 Commentary on the Gospel of John, Chapter 12, Lecture 1, n.1601.
“died spiritually from the aroma of the ointment”, because he was “displeased” that it was “poured out as an act of homage to Christ” rather than being sold.\footnote{Ibid, n.1602.} He was “pained” to be deprived of the “opportunity to steal, and it was this avarice that led to the betrayal”\footnote{St Thomas adds cleverly, “whatever was donated by the faithful for Christ’s use and for the poor he carried as a duty, but carried off as a thief”. Ibid, n.1603.}.\footnote{St Thomas adds cleverly, “whatever was donated by the faithful for Christ’s use and for the poor he carried as a duty, but carried off as a thief”. Ibid, n.1603.} The implication for affective formation is that the seminarian needs to approach his vocation with a right motivation. He ought to love Christ and his people first and put aside an inordinate love of money.

**Conclusion**

The significance of this chapter, in the overall structure of the thesis, is that it establishes the importance of the seminarian’s affective formation on a theological basis. St Thomas’ consideration of God’s affections and Christ’s human affectivity lays the groundwork for a reflection on some key affective dispositions the seminarian needs to develop. These include the capacity to: love and rejoice in the good; show mercy; justly moderate zeal, fear, anger and hatred; express compassion for those who are suffering; set aside the inordinate desires of avarice, ambition, pride and arrogance; develop friendships of abiding trust and fidelity with men and women; generously love others in imitation of the Good Shepherd. These are all necessary qualities in the priest, who is called to reflect the goodness of God and the perfection of Christ’s humanity both in his personal relationships and in his acts of pastoral service. Now, the next step in the analysis of St Thomas’ teaching, and its relevance for the seminarian’s affective formation, is to examine St Thomas’ teaching on the human passions (Chapters 3-6). This will lay the groundwork for a discussion of how the virtues form the seminarian’s affectivity in Chapters 7-9.
CHAPTER 3

THE SENSES AND AFFECTIVE FORMATION

The wise person puts all things in order, so that they can be properly connected and then developed for the good. This is as much the work of reason in the development of affectivity as in any other field of study. So, before examining each of the concupiscible passions it is necessary to consider both the nature of passion and what causes it. This will help the seminarian to focus on the particular field of personal experience he is studying. Attending to these basic principles of affectivity assists the seminarian to avoid leaping over necessary steps of self-knowledge. This would leave him with untested assumptions about the affective life that would hinder his understanding of how to achieve affective maturity.

How does St Thomas’ teaching on the human passions further Pope St John Paul II’s call for affective formation? St John Paul II does not use the term “human passions” in his treatment of formation in Pastores Dabo Vobis but he does write that the affections and instinctive impulses of the seminarian remain intact. He writes of the love of the seminarian being of a physical, psychic and spiritual nature. Also, he writes of love as an expression of the nuptial meaning of the body, that is, the capacity of the person to give and receive love. In this regard, St Thomas’ teaching provides a treatment of the faculties that are involved in the seminarian’s affective responses to the good and evil he experiences. By attending to each faculty involved in his affective experience the seminarian can more consciously seek to perfect its acts and so develop his affectivity in a responsible way for his own good and the good of others.

One aspect of this issue is the seminarian’s ability to identify the cause of his affective experience, which can in turn be modified to cause a different affective experience. For example, if an evil is the cause of sorrow to him, he can try to rectify the situation so that he can return to a state of enjoying what is good. Now, to understand the causes of affective responses, the seminarian needs to know about both the external and the internal faculties involved in this process, such as his sense

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of touch and his sense of imagination. Especially relevant here too, as will be explained below, is St Thomas’ teaching on the relationship between the senses and the particular reason.

The deeper issue is one of acquiring an accurate self-knowledge so that the seminarian can understand the influence each affective experience exerts on his desires and attitudes. Affective experiences provide emotional energy and incline us to think and act in various ways. To become articulate about the sources of his affective responses within himself and in the way he is acted upon by external events or the actions of others, enables the seminarian to better understand why he responds in a particular way. Such articulateness is also necessary to deciding how he should respond. For example, out of his love for someone he desires to speak with her and enjoy her company. Knowing the cause of this love and how it affects his attitude to this person, is part of the information needed to properly discern why the seminarian wants to be with her, in what circumstances and how to respond to her with courtesy and sensitivity. If he is not sufficiently and wisely aware of his real desires, for example, for a romantic attachment in a dishonest fashion as opposed to a friendship in a proper setting, he will act in an inappropriate way.

The knowledge of what causes his romantic love for this person also provides helpful knowledge about how he can respond to his feelings for her and seek to develop a healthy relationship with her. For example, imagining being with her to an excessive degree or communicating with her excessively will inappropriately promote his romantic love for her. Instead, the seminarian can seek to moderate his affective experience of love by moderating both his thinking about her and his communication with her. This will increase his ability to relate to her as a friend rather than as a prospective romantic partner when he is committed to living in formation for the priesthood.

On a deeper level, the concern to develop an accurate knowledge of his affective responses touches upon the seminarian’s need to understand who he is and how he can present himself in a truthful manner to build appropriate relationships of trust. The capacity to say to another person, in the appropriate circumstances, what he in fact is in need of, how he is affected by what another does to him, and his desire to avoid what may harm himself or another, enables him to present a truthful picture of himself to another person. This kind of honesty becomes the platform for good decision making about how those involved in various personal relationships, such as friendship, work, and pastoral care, can be properly informed about how to respond to each other. It is the kind of
truthfulness that builds trust because the parties involved know that they are dealing with someone who seeks to give an accurate picture of themselves, their capacities, and their intentions.315

Accurate knowledge of oneself and appropriate openness with others is an integral part of affective maturity because it is essential to the development of personal relationships of trust. Without such maturity the seminarian lacks a basic element in his ability to relate well to others in the pastoral situation. If he cannot be seen to be truthful about himself he will not be trusted by others when they approach him for help and advice. They will lack confidence that he can be trusted and so they will avoid seeking his help in those moments of doubt and confusion when they need the pastoral care of the priest. The aim to help the seminarian achieve such self-knowledge is also an important reason for the following chapters (4-6) which investigate the main passions.316

This present chapter, however, covers the general nature of the passions, their basic causes and the role of the external and internal senses in the development of the seminarian’s affectivity. The discussion will be divided into two parts: 1) What is Passion? 2) What Causes the Passions?

1. What is Passion?

In the most general sense St Thomas uses the word passion to refer to the capacity of each created thing to receive the action of another. This involves a change of the receptive being’s state for the better or for the worse. For example, someone can become warm by standing near a fire or a person can lose his state of good health.317 Through this power of receptivity a being can both receive

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315 In arguing for an education that fosters a better emotional awareness as the basis for better self-knowledge and better personal relationships, Erika Hunter writes: “How can we answer the question ‘Who am I?’ if we don’t have the words? How can we avoid destructively acting out if we do not have the vocabulary for discussing emotional issues? What if we could learn early on to express our emotions, value them, and take responsibility for them?” Erika M. Hunter, Little Book of Big Emotions: How Five Feelings Affect Everything You Do and Don’t Do (Center City, Minnesota: Hazelden, 2004), 15.

316 For a discussion of the importance, difficulty and way to achieve an accurate self-knowledge from the perspective of an experienced psychologist and in relation to the improvement of one’s character and ability to relate well to others, see Rudolf Allers, M.D., Ph.D., Self Improvement (Fort Collins: Roman Catholic Books, 1939), 22-49.

from the action of another what it needs to develop and be drawn into a response to the one performing that action.\textsuperscript{318} In other words, the principle of passion or receptivity is a basic principle of relationships between things inasmuch as they act on each other for their good or harm.\textsuperscript{319}

In St Thomas’ understanding, all of the faculties of the human person are receptive (passive) to some degree.\textsuperscript{320} The mind needs to be open to reality as its measure and be ready to receive instruction from others as it moves from a lack of understanding to a grasp of the truth.\textsuperscript{321} This principle is shown in St Thomas’ understanding of prudence, in which a diligent person seeks good advice so that he can make good decisions about his own welfare and that of others. To the contrary, as St Thomas writes, “the imprudent man despises counsel”, and this is “negligence in striving to have prudence”.\textsuperscript{322} It is the mind therefore that guides the development of affectivity.

The will is also passive in the sense that it relies on the understanding of the mind to open up possibilities for the good. As St Thomas explains: the will relies on the intellect such that “good which is understood moves the will”.\textsuperscript{323} In other words, what you know is the basis for what you love and desire. St Thomas calls the will the “higher affective power”, which is moved to respond to the good by spiritual acts such as love, joy and delight. In doing this the will also has the role of integrating “the lower affectivity” of our passions with the good of the human person.\textsuperscript{324}

It might be objected that the will is not passive in any significant sense. This objection assumes an understanding of the human will as the power of choice or the capacity to decide between one

\textsuperscript{318} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.9, a.2, resp.

\textsuperscript{319} Beginning his discussion of the passions in \textit{Summa Theologica}, St Thomas writes that “a thing is said to be passive from its being drawn to the agent”. \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.22, a.1, resp. Again, in \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.22, a.2, resp., St Thomas writes: “the word \textit{passion} implies that the patient is drawn to that which belongs to the agent”.

\textsuperscript{320} As Craig Steven Titus explains the matter: “In the larger sense, Aquinas uses \textit{passio} to analogously refer to different capacities inasmuch as they involve receptivity”. Craig Steven Titus, “Passions in Christ: Spontaneity, Development, and Virtue”, \textit{The Thomist} 73 (2009): 57. \textsuperscript{321} \textit{De Veritate}, q.26, a.3, ad 16. See also \textit{De Veritate}, q.26, a.3, ad 17. St Thomas writes, in \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.79, a.2, resp., that the intellect is “a passive power”, in “that at first we are only in potentiality to understand, and afterwards we are made to understand actually”. In regard to reality being the measure of the human mind, St Thomas writes that the being of things causes “truth in the intellect”. \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.16, a.1, ad 3. Also, truth “is in the intellect in so far as it is conformed to the object understood”. \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.16, a.1, resp.

\textsuperscript{322} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.53, a.1, resp.

\textsuperscript{323} \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.82, a.3, ad 2.

\textsuperscript{324} \textit{De Veritate}, q.26, a.3, resp., ad 3. Also, \textit{De Veritate}, q.25, a.4, resp. In \textit{Summa Theologica} I, q.20, a.1, ad 1, St Thomas refers to the spiritual affections of love, joy and delight in comparison to the passions of the same names.
course of action and another. Without denying the importance of this understanding it also should be stated that without the underlying intellectual awareness of the good, that is, the capacity of a certain object or activity to fulfill the person, there is no rational motivation to make decisions. In this respect, it is very important to note St Thomas’s definition of the will as the “intellectual appetite”.

In other words, St Thomas sees the rational person who is capable of understanding the good as consequently capable of experiencing an affective desire to experience that good as loved and desired. None of this affective experience can occur without the intellect which “moves the will, as presenting its object to it.” In the first step of its affective act the intellectual appetite is passive in the very significant sense that it is informed by an intellectual apprehension of the good in its capacity to fulfill the human person. Without this informing act of the intellect the will cannot be aware of the good and so cannot decide for it. In this sense there is a true passivity in the human will as the intellectual appetite.

This is true of our experience of willing in which we are first drawn to the goodness and beauty of another person and then have to make deliberate choices about how to develop a relationship with that person. For example, one could love another person and desire to share her life and enjoy her presence. Yet, practical questions need to be answered about how to conduct that friendship for the true good of the other person, such as how does this friendship harmonize with one’s vocation to the priesthood and the other’s vocation to marriage?

There is another significant sense in which the will is passive. The capacity to will the good that is understood can be heavily influenced by the human passions which will be discussed below. One outstanding component of human affectivity is that passions change us so that we feel disposed to things, situations, and other persons in a certain way. St Thomas gives the example of anger which disposes someone to regard another in a way that is different when he is calm. We could offer many other examples, such as the hope we feel that a difficult situation will turn out well for us. With such hope we can engage in a more energetic commitment to obtain a certain good. The will is passive in so far as passions can influence the way we think and draw our

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325 Summa Theologica I-II, q.24, a.3, resp. In Summa Theologica I-II, q.8, resp. St Thomas defines the will as “rational appetite”, explaining that appetite is “an inclination of a person desirous of a thing towards” something else that is apprehended as good.

326 Summa Theologica I-II, q.9, a.1, resp.

327 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.9, a.2, resp.
attention to certain objects and regard them in a certain way. Certainly, this influence needs to be moderated by the will in terms of making wise decisions that integrate affective experiences with our good and the good of others. Nevertheless, the will is passive in the sense that it is influenced by the passions in the way described above. We will return to this point a number of times throughout the thesis by way of a discussion of how the seminarian is to form his affective life in accord with the relationships that are appropriate to his vocation as a future priest. For example, in Chapter 7 there will be a discussion of how virtue forms the passions according to prudent decisions and Chapter 10 will discuss how strongly felt and disordered passions can incline the will to evil behavior.

In a more particular sense, St Thomas writes of the passions as passive acts of the human soul. As Etienne Gilson explains, using the word “emotion” where St Thomas uses “passion”, an emotion “is an activity which consists in the soul’s undergoing something”. St Thomas describes this passive act as an alteration of the sensitive appetite. The sensitive appetite is also called “sensuality”, because it is the capacity to feel in response to things inasmuch as their impact is perceived by the senses as positive or negative, pleasing or displeasing to us. This perception disposes us a certain way in regard to the object of the passion which is a particular good or evil, person or situation. Robert Miner writes that examples of this kind of experience are found in statements like “I am delighted” or “I am frightened”.

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329 St Thomas identifies “sensuality” with the “sensitive appetite” in *De Veritate*, q.25, a.1, resp., and in *Summa Theologica* I, q.81, a.1, resp. As Paul Gondreau explains, the sensitive appetite is our capacity to respond to “that which is perceived as suitable or harmful to the senses”. For example, seeing a beautiful sunset we can feel delight and seeing a snake we can feel fear. Paul Gondreau, *The Passions of Christ’s Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Scranton: University of Scranton Press, 2009), 334. The word “sensible” is used in the *Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church*, q.370 (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005/Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications, 2006).

330 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.4, a.2, ad 2. Also, *Summa Theologica* I, q.81, a.1, resp.: For “the sensual movement is an appetite following sensitive apprehension” and it “is a certain inclination to the bodily senses, since we desire things which are apprehended through the bodily senses”. St Thomas gives a similar explanation in *De Veritate* q.25, a.1, resp.

The nature of this experience of passion is explained by St Thomas in his commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima. St Thomas writes that the distinctive characteristic of passion is that “certain modifications affect soul and body together, not the soul alone”. This is the basis of affectivity, the capacity to be acted upon (affected) and drawn to respond to the good or bad impact of another person, thing or situation. A simple example is a person blushing when he is embarrassed. When some circumstance makes him feel self-conscious, uncomfortable or ashamed it causes a spontaneous reddening in his face which reveals his emotional state of awkwardness.

There are different ways of referring to this experience of passion. According to Pierre-Marie Emonet, the manner in which someone has an affective experience determines it as a sentiment, an emotion or a passion. A sentiment is a balanced and mature affective movement which is grounded in the truth. An emotion is an intense and extreme affective movement, such as panic, which disturbs a person’s clear judgment, bodily equilibrium and behavior. A passion is a crisis of emotion that lasts and narrows his focus. Such passion can end in an obsession, like that of the greedy man who thinks only of money. “Passion jumbles the sentiments,” Emonet writes, “draining them of all psychic energy of the soul for its profit. It dominates, subjugates, and finally kills affectivity”.

Emonet’s description of these affective experiences highlights the difference between properly formed and disordered affective experiences. In these pages, nonetheless, the word passion will be used in St Thomas’ sense. St Thomas would readily agree with the essential point that disordered emotions are not to the good of the person experiencing them. However, he has a way of speaking of this matter that differs from Emonet’s. For St Thomas passion is an act of a person’s sensitive appetite which is in itself a good faculty. The question is whether the passion is or is not moderated.

333 D.P. Simpson writes that in Latin *affectio* is related to the word *adficio*, “to influence, to work upon”. The passive participle of *adficio* is *adfectus* meaning “affected, influenced”. *Adfectus* as a noun refers to “a condition, disposition; esp. of the mind, a feeling … ; often friendly feeling, good will”. D.P. Simpson, M.A., *Cassell’s Latin Dictionary*, 5th ed. (London/New York: Continuum, 2000), 12. Hence the evolution of the word *affectio* into the English word affection.
according to the human good by true judgment and right choices. As St Thomas writes: “it belongs to the perfection of man’s good that his passions be moderated by reason. For since man’s good is founded on reason as its root, that good will be all the more perfect, according as it extends to more things pertaining to man.”336

In fact, for St Thomas, human acts can lack something important when they are not enhanced by due passion. In De Veritate, for instance, St Thomas defines pity “as sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil”, which shows love for the other person by sharing his sorrow.337 In St Thomas’ judgment, the person who helps someone in need “with a certain compassion of pity” merits more.338 In his explanation for this conclusion he argues that a passion can be a sign of the will’s dedication for the good and it can enable the person to perform a virtuous deed “more promptly and easily”.339 So, the performance of a properly charitable act with the compassion of pity merits more.

2. What Causes the Passions?

Passion is an act of the sensitive appetite in response to good or evil, but what causes this kind of change in a person’s affectivity? To discuss this issue the following reflections will be broken into two parts: a) The Causes of the Passions; b) The Causes of the Passions and Affective Formation.

a) The Causes of the Passions

The basic cause of the passions is a love for objects inasmuch as they are perfective of the one who loves them. St Thomas writes that the passion of love is a response to a good which causes “a

336 Summa Theologica I-II, q.24, a.3, resp.
337 De Veritate, q.26, a.4, resp.
338 De Veritate, q.26, a.7, prol.
339 De Veritate, q.26, a.7, resp. St Thomas makes the same point in On Evil (De Malo), q.3, a.11, resp., trans. Richard Egan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003): “one who gives alms with greater compassion earns a greater merit”. St Thomas qualifies this by stating that the meritorious passion follows from, and is in accord with, a proper deliberation and willing of the good. If the person is only moved by the passion he “can sometimes err by being unduly compassionate”. Also see Summa Theologica I-II, q.77, a.6, ad 2.
certain inclination, aptitude, or connaturalness in respect of good”. In particular, connaturalness refers to a certain proportion between the object loved and the one loving it. As Paul Crittenden explains: connaturality “points to the inclination of one type of thing towards a certain outcome, along with the idea of a ‘natural fit’, and of (pleasurable) satisfaction in the outcome in the case of sense and intellectual love”. Furthermore, the affective experience of the good involves complacency which is a certain satisfaction in the good. Each of these terms, most of all, connaturality, points to the fulfilling nature of relationships that involve love for the good.

This basic experience of love engenders the passions of desire and joy. St Thomas explains that the good loved but “not yet possessed” causes desire. Then, “when the good is obtained, it causes the appetite to rest, as it were, in the good obtained: and this belongs to the passion of delight or joy”.

The apprehensive powers of the soul – the human faculties by which someone is aware of other beings - activate the passions. St Thomas writes of sensation as the power to feel according to the senses of sight, touch, hearing, taste and smell. The “common sense” is the capacity to integrate

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340 Summa Theologica I-II, q.23, a.4, resp. In De Veritate q.22, a.12, resp., St Thomas writes that “an inclination is the disposition of something that moves other things”.
341 Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.1, ad 3; Summa Theologica I-II, q.27, a.1, resp.
342 Paul Crittenden, Reason, Will and Emotion: Defending the Greek Tradition against Triune Consciousness (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 204. St Thomas describes the complacency in the good of the senses as “sensitive love” and complacency in the capacity of the intellectual capacity (the will) as “intellectual love”. See Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.1, resp.
343 “Generally,” Peter A. Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin, O.S.B., and Joseph Bolin, explain, “complacentia names the affective reaction to a good that is found, felt, or ‘taken’ to be suitable, right, worthy of acceptance”. On Love and Charity: Readings from the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, trans. Peter A. Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin, O.S.B., and Joseph Bolin (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008), 27. St Thomas writes that things “are loved by a love of complacentia, according to which we are said to love that which we approve and wish to exist”. In I Sententiarum, Distinction 17 (Paris Version), question 1, article 5, response, in On Love and Charity, 27.
344 See Beáta Tóth, The Heart has its Reasons: Towards a Theological Anthropology of the Heart (Eugene, Oregon: Cascade Books, 2015), 41-42, where Tóth discusses Ricoeur’s idea that feeling “not only establishes connectedness to the object in knowing, it also binds us to other persons in the interpersonal realm of human action”.
345 Summa Theologica I-II, q.23, a.4, resp.
346 Ibid. See also Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.2, resp., where St Thomas writes that a particular passion results from an apprehension (awareness) of the good and evil as “present, or absent”. If the object is present “it causes the faculty to find rest in it; whereas, according as it is absent, it causes the faculty to be moved towards it.” For instance, if the good is apprehended simply as pleasant there is love.
347 See Summa Theologica I, q.78, a.3, resp. As Diana Fritz Cates explains: “We have the power to be moved by various objects that we apprehend via our exterior and interior senses.” Thus we “feel changed by objects that strike
the information of the five senses to discern “between various sense objects”, such as “sweet” and “white”. By the common sense a person distinguishes the different sensory qualities of an object and yet have a unified experience of it. As Diana Fritz Cates explains: “the common sense makes it possible to discern sensible qualities of multiple kinds so that an object can appear as white, sweet, soft, and fragrant, all at the same time.”

There is also a faculty by which the person interiorizes the data gained from the senses. St Thomas describes the “imagination” as the internal sense that receives the forms of sense objects and retains them. Imagination is “the image forming faculty”. When we imagine something we “state that such and such seems or appears to us”. Moreover, imagination is a power to “retain a distinct image of things” even when the one imagining is “not actually sensing things”.

These images, also called “phantasms”, can be deceptive. Just as the senses arouse various passions the images of the sense impressions retained by the imagination likewise arouse the passions. However, the higher faculty of the intelligence sometimes does not properly form the imagination. This can happen on account of a passion such as anger, fear or desire or a person may be of unsound mind “through delirium or insanity”. Thus, the faculty of imagination can help or hinder a person’s faculty of judgment. St Thomas gives the example of a man who fails to walk on a plank high above the ground because he “suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination”.

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349 See Summa Theologica I, q.78, a.4, ad 2.
350 Love: A Thomistic Analysis, p.113.
351 See Summa Theologica I, q.78, a.4, resp.
352 Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book Three, Lecture IV, n.615.
353 Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book Three, Lecture IV, n.632.
354 Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book Three, Lecture V, n.644.
355 Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book Three, Lecture V, n.645. As St Thomas explains, phantasm comes from the Greek word phos which means light and from this comes phanos, “i.e., ‘appearance’ or ‘enlightening’, and phantasía”. Just as sight is more closely aligned with the mind and knows “a wider range of objects than any other” sense, “therefore imagination, which arises from actual sensation, gets its name from light, without which nothing can be seen”. Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book Three, Lecture VI, n.668.
356 Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, Book Three, Lecture VI, n.670.
357 Summa Theologica I-II, q.44, a.4, ad 2.
All the information gained through the senses and held in the imagination needs to be sifted in terms of its positive or negative significance for the person. The “cogitative sense” is the ability to judge the evidence of the senses in relation to a particular thing as to whether it is helpful or harmful. St Thomas also refers to this as the “particular reason” which performs a task similar to universal reason but on the level of sensation and the sensitive appetite. Robert Miner explains that the function of universal reason is to abstract “universals from concrete objects perceived by the senses”. Particular reason, on the other hand, is a capacity to collate information about individual objects beyond what is “directly perceivable by sensation or imagination” so as to estimate a particular object’s usefulness or danger.

The memorative power acts as “a storehouse” of experiences which activate the passions by recalling particular reason’s judgment about the usefulness or danger of an object, person or event. The memory stores the impressions of the senses, subsequent imaginations and the judgments of particular reason and associated affective responses. It is through this process that negative experiences can damage a person’s affectivity. Passions, however, can be “modified and excited” through the universal reason, as St Thomas explains. That is, good reasoning can help someone to better understand and respond to a memory and its associated passion. Miner gives the example of a woman who was abused by her uncle and felt fear every time she saw a man. With the help of a counsellor she gradually realized that she need not be fearful of every man. This process of rational reflection was facilitated through a focus on her experience of the virtuous men in her life. Thus her fear gradually subsided.

358 St Thomas calls this an “estimative power”. In animals this is called the “estimative sense”. The example he gives is that the sheep is aware that the wolf is “a natural enemy”. Summa Theologica I, q.78, a.4, resp.
359 See Summa Theologica I, q.78, a.4, resp; q.82, a.3, resp.
360 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 77.
361 Ibid, 78.
362 Summa Theologica I, q.78, a.4, resp.
363 Miner writes about the imprint on a person’s neurological system through the association of “sensible patterns and estimations of usefulness and danger”. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 80.
364 Summa Theologica I, q.81, a.3, resp.
365 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 81.
b) The Causes of the Passions and Affective Formation

The development of the seminarian’s external senses is necessary for his affective growth. The affective responses are caused by the good that is loved, desired and enjoyed. This orientation to the good needs to be nurtured in order for the seminarian to grow in a healthy contact with the world and other persons. The senses are channels of communication. They inform the mind about reality and so lead the mind to ponder the nature of reality. The senses are also formed by the particular way each object draws them into act. For example, the experience of touching a tree is a particular way of feeling that is different to the holding of a person’s hand. Each act leads the mind into contact with the particular nature and the specific significance of the being that is sensed.

The seminarian’s practical intelligence cannot be formed without the data the senses provide. Without these sources of information he cannot have the basis for judging whether or not his affective responses are in proportion to the reality of a situation. For, the development of the sense experience of the seminarian is a basic step in the process of grounding him in the external world and the lives of other people. It gives him an orientation that is objective; that is, by it he looks outward to the reality of things, persons and events with the aim of really meeting, receiving and understanding them. This kind of experience is a first step in educating him in the reality of relationships, which require him to look carefully at the other person and seek the information necessary to understanding his or her real needs. This is necessary for knowing how to respond to another and help him or her in the various pastoral situations the seminarian will encounter in his life as a priest.

The faculty of imagination also needs to be developed for the sake of the seminarian’s affective growth. Through the imagination the mind can take images and rework them to explore possible courses of action. The associated benefit is that the passions connected to these images can also be produced. An example of how this assists in affective formation is that the seminarian can imagine himself going back to the place where he failed to act virtuously. At this point the seminarian can imagine himself responding in a more virtuous way to the moral challenge. For instance, if he has

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366 Emonet notes the relational nature of the objective order of knowledge. The word object “comes from the Latin ob, which means ‘athwart,’ ‘across the path of,’ and jacere, ‘to place’. In order to be known, all realities are placed ‘within,’ and at the same time ‘in front of,’ consciousness”. The Greatest Marvel of Nature, 9-10. Since knowing is the basis for loving an affective stance that looks to the other person as the object to be properly understood is the necessary basis for loving her properly.
a problem with becoming unduly angry during conversations he could in times of reflection imagine himself being silent and content to listen to others without overreacting. One benefit is that this process enables him to have an anticipatory experience of the joy that occurs when he has respectful and friendly interactions. Thus affectively engaged he will feel a greater impetus to act with calm and courtesy.

The particular reason is the nexus between the senses, universal reason and memory. The salient point is that the particular reason can be distorted by negative experiences that impede the seminarian’s accurate view of a situation and the appropriate affective response. If, for instance, he has experienced undue criticism by significant people in the past so that he feels he is not a person to be relied upon, he may find it difficult to confidently engage in pastoral work. This requires a careful effort on the part of seminary formators. They need to form the seminarian’s particular reason through positive experiences of pastoral work, constructive criticism to help him be more effective in his work, and the generous offering of praise for work well done. These experiences form the seminarian’s affectivity by giving him memories that instill a deeper sense of his self-worth, competency and trustworthiness. They instill a proper self-confidence for future and more challenging forms of work. They also give him the emotional resilience to engage in an open conversation about how to improve the way he relates to others as he works.

The study of the senses in affective experience steers the seminarian away from a false intellectualism, which seeks to exalt the life of the mind but neglects the principles that are necessary for its true development. Vaguely aware of his affective inclinations and the role of the senses as their causes the seminarian would be deprived of a basic part of his self-knowledge. Without such self-knowledge he cannot judge well about what he is inclined to do, why he is doing it, and its impact on another person. This is in fact a lack of practical intelligence about the human person and his relationships. In this state, he could do violence to his affective life because he

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367 This idea was given to me by Fr Tony Percy, V.G., S.T.D., the Vicar General for the Archdiocese of Canberra & Goulburn. He advises people to develop their imagination when they feel a great difficulty with overcoming morally bad habits which involve a deep affective disturbance. For example, there is damage inflicted on the emotional capacity of the person who has viewed pornography from a young age. Part of the way to help someone in this plight is to encourage the exercise of his senses, imagination, and the consequent formation of his feelings, to increase his affective capacity to enjoy good relations and set aside what is evil.

368 There will be a discussion of St Thomas’ view of the practical intelligence and its importance for the development of affectivity through the virtues in Chapter 7.
grasps neither its personal significance nor its laws of growth. This would constitute a serious lack of knowledge in someone who is called to be a source of wise guidance for those seeking to live a virtuous life.\footnote{St Gregory the Great points out that as physicians would be embarrassed to be ignorant of the principles of medicine so too should pastors be embarrassed to be ignorant of the precepts that promote the soul’s growth. This growth includes the proper development of their emotional life. Rather, seminarians should seek to become priests who are wise “physicians of the heart”, recognizing that “the care of souls is the art of arts.” St Gregory the Great, \textit{The Book of the Pastoral Rule}, Part 1, n. 1, trans. George E. Demacopoulos (New York: St Vladimir’s Press, 2007).}

**Conclusion**

The main concern of the present chapter has been to reflect upon the various meanings of the word passion and how this influences our understanding of affective formation. St Thomas sees the principle of passion in the nature of created things as a capacity for receiving the good. This principle of receptivity is found in a higher way in the human person’s capacity to be open to the truth and form his choices by truthful judgements. It is in this context that the seminarian needs to develop his affectivity in response to objects, situations, and other persons inasmuch as he perceives them to be for his good or against it. This is achieved by first intelligently reflecting on the significance of his affective responses and how to shape them. This process of reflection then needs to be put into action by making decisions that accord with the truth. Now, the next chapter will begin to unfold St Thomas’ teaching on the passions that first concern the good, namely, love, desire and hope, and their importance for affective formation.
CHAPTER 4

THE FORMATION OF LOVE, DESIRE AND JOY

The purpose of the previous chapter was to discuss the basic principles of the passions that are involved in the experience and formation of affectivity. This chapter will reflect upon the formation of the concupiscible passions of love, desire and joy as a necessary first step in laying the groundwork for a discussion of the formative role of the virtues. The term “concupiscible” points to the relationship between the experience of loving a good and desiring the pleasure of attaining it.370

Before we proceed further it is helpful to ask about what is the advantage of looking in detail at each of these passions and the other passions we will study in subsequent chapters? Studying St Thomas’ teaching on each passion educates the seminarian to carefully reflect on his experience of its particular causes and effects. That is, the seminarian learns to reflect on what is the source of the particular affective state he experiences and he also learns to discern how this affective state inclines him to certain attitudes and actions. It enables him to understand himself more accurately as to why he feels as he does and to be careful of what he does on account of this affective experience. As Robert Miner explains: “to acquire real knowledge of the multiple ways in which I am acted upon, I will gain little by simply thinking about the passions in general. Rather, I must pose specific questions”. For example: “What do I love? What causes me to experience desire? How do I respond to sorrow?”371 This is the first step in evaluating the significance of the passions and how to form them.

In the analysis below there will be a description of each particular passion in terms of its nature, causes and effects and then a reflection on how it can help the seminarian’s affective formation. The order of topics will be: 1) The Passion of Love; 2) The Strong Desire of Concupiscence; 3) Pleasure and Joy.

1. The Passion of Love

The experience of love is fundamental to the seminarian’s affective maturity. As Pope St John Paul II states in *Pastores Dabo Vobis*: “Affective maturity presupposes an awareness that love has a central role in human life”.372 This involves understanding the various dimensions of this love in terms of the “physical, psychic and spiritual” dimensions of the person, which are expressed through the “‘nuptial meaning’ of the human body”.373 This “nuptial meaning” refers to the capacity of the seminarian to give himself “to another” and take another person to himself in love.374 However, without the affective maturity that enables the seminarian to appropriately show love, and receive it from others, he lacks the wherewithal to develop chaste relationships, which is a prerequisite for his future life as a celibate priest.

St Thomas’ teaching on the passion of love (*amor*) enables the seminarian to understand in greater depth how this experience of love influences how he relates to others. This is shown in the following parts of St Thomas’ reflections on love: a) St Thomas’ teaching provides a language for the analogical nature of love, which enables the seminarian to perceive how different kinds of love operate in his heart; b) St Thomas’ teaching on the love of concupiscence (*amor concupiscentiae*) and the love of friendship (*amor amicitiae*) presents the seminarian with a principle of review about what motivates him in his relationships; c-d) a study of St Thomas’ reflections on the causes and the effects of love gives a sharper awareness of how a person comes to love and what real impact that love has upon him; e) this section will end with an analysis of the implications for affective formation.

a. The Analogical Nature of Love

Love is an analogical term for the study of human affectivity.375 It refers to experiences that flow from both the will and the passions. In a general sense, St Thomas writes that love “consists in a

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373 *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, n.44.
374 Ibid.
375 Josef Pieper observes that a careful consideration of the vocabulary associated with “the phenomenon of ‘love’” will help us to learn much about it. Josef Pieper, *Faith, Hope, Love* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997), 151. In
change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object”, that is, the capacity for love is activated by a desirable and suitable good.\footnote{Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.2, resp.} Love thus refers to the capacity of one being to appreciate the goodness of another and strive to be fulfilled by it or contribute to its fulfilment. This sense of union with a suitable good is present in the human person’s affective experience of love.

St Thomas sees a certain reflection of the passion of love in the will’s affections. While sensitive love is a passion in the sensitive appetite, he writes that love is called a passion “in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will”.\footnote{Ibid.} “Complacency” is an example of an act that is analogously present in the two levels of affectivity of the will and of the passions. If complacency is the pleasure taken in a good that is loved due to the “affinity” between the lover and the good that is loved, then analogically there is a certain complacency in the will. As Etienne Gilson explains: “The complacency of a will in its object is called intellectual love … Intellectual love is the soul’s complacency in a good decreed by a free judgment of the reason.”\footnote{Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L.K. Shook, C.S.B. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1994/2010), 273. Gilson also comments: “The inadequacy of language to express the complexity of the real is nowhere more noticeable than in the analysis of the life of the soul. Love, as the root of all the passions, is many-sided. It changes its aspect according to the various activities of the soul with which it can be associated” (272).}

The analogical nature of human love is relevant to the seminarian’s self-knowledge, his ability to discern between various affective experiences, and his capacity to judge well of the actions that express his affective state. The question for the seminarian’s discernment is: would this suggested action be in harmony with the properly willed good of the other person? To answer this question another more fundamental question needs to be answered: what is the nature of this love and what kind of affective bond does it forge? The affective content of the experience indicates something important both for its proper interpretation and the discernment of the proposed course of action.

St Thomas’ understanding of the analogical structure of love is found in his articulation of the four basic kinds of love: sensitive love (the passion of \textit{amor}), dilection, friendship and charity. The
affective experience of amor as an appreciation for the good of another person is seen as the foundational experience for the next levels of love. Thus St Thomas writes about dilection (dilectio) which implies, in addition to amor, a choice (electio) and as such is an expression of love in the will. Then there is friendship (amicitia), which implies an abiding habit of regarding another as one loved as oneself. Here there is the idea of love as a virtue. Charity (caritas) is next and this is derived from the Latin word carus meaning “high-priced”, “dear” or “costly”. Charity denotes a certain perfection of love, “in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price”. St Thomas’ recognition of the analogical experience of love is also linked to his understanding of how God draws the human person to himself through the passion of love. For St Thomas, love as a passion is “more Godlike than dilection”. This is so from the point of view that through love the human person is “as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason”. To make sense of this the reader needs to refer to St Thomas’ teaching that the affective state of the person predisposes him to see matters in a certain light. As St Thomas explains, given “that the sensitive appetite is a particular power, it has great influence in disposing man so that something seems to him such or otherwise, in particular cases”. For a man is changed “to a certain disposition” by the sensitive appetite, and thus “something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected”. One thing will seem good to a person when angry, for example, “which does not seem good when he is calm”. Thus “in this way” passions influence the will.

St Thomas’ point about the divine quality of amor pertains, then, to how we are drawn to God through our passion of love, which disposes us to will according to a love for God. St Thomas is highlighting a basic human trait that is manifested in personal relationships: we are inclined to love others when they touch our hearts through love. Even more so, God moves us to him by amor. St Thomas is insisting on the power of amor to overcome the lethargy of a person and incline him to love God. In this regard, Miner touches on an essential point of authentic spirituality: “Allowing

380 Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.3, resp.
381 Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.3, ad 4.
382 Summa Theologica I-II, q.9, a.2, resp.
383 Ibid.
384 Ibid.
385 Ibid.
oneself to be passively helped by God is the precondition of dilectio, of inclining oneself toward God by rational means. Amor sensitivus turns out to be the seed out of which the highest amor rationalis grows.”\footnote{Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, p.121.} Indeed, Miner notes, without the proper development of sensitive love the intellectual love of God “will be weak”.\footnote{Miner’s full explanation is: “Thomas does not shrink from the conclusion that the most passive form of amor is also the most potent. Far from being collapsible into rational love, the amor proper to the senses has a function of its own. The power of God to draw creatures to himself by sensible means exceeds the power of human reason. Amor sensitivus cannot be neglected by the rational creature in its motion toward God: ‘The highest cannot stand without the lowest.’ Lacking the energy of the sensitive appetite, the amor intellectualis Dei will be weak.” Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 122. Inner quote from C.S. Lewis, The Four Loves (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1960), 20, 32.} Every kind of intellectual love involves this dimension of passion. Friends, for example, often have to take the initiative and show affection for another for their bond of affection to develop. A principle relevant to this context is found in St Thomas’ statement: “it is not possible for the will to be moved to anything intensely, without a passion being aroused in the sensitive appetite”.\footnote{Summa Theologica I-II, q.77, a.6, resp.} This is an affirmation of the need to appeal to the heart and feelings of someone so that he can more easily respond to the one who loves him.\footnote{This in harmony with St Thomas’ theological anthropology which respects the profound unity of body and soul in the human person. He writes: “In perfect happiness the entire man is perfected, in the lower part of his nature, by an overflow from the higher”. Summa Theologica I-II, q.3, a.3, ad 3. St Thomas also affirms that the soul of the human person is more like God when it is united to the body in accord with the proper perfection and integrity of human nature. Quaestiones Disputate De Potentia Dei: On the Power of God, q.5, a.10. ad 5, trans. English Dominican Fathers (Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1952/1932), Html ed. Joseph Kenny, O.P., https://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdeP. The implication to be drawn for the present consideration is that the passions in their nature as acts of the body and soul are a proper part of the human person’s perfection and how he is drawn to and reflects the goodness of God.} 

\section*{b. Amor Concupiscentiae et Amor Amicitiae}

St Thomas’ treatment of amor leads him to consider the distinction between the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) and the love of friendship (amor amicitiae). For St Thomas, “that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else”.\footnote{Summa Theologica I-II, q.26, a.4, resp.} In love of concupiscence a person apprehends the beloved primarily as being of help to his well-being. Gilson explains that amor concupiscentiae “arises then out of the
The fact that two beings are complementary, or to speak in technical fashion, out of the fact that one is in potency what the other is in act”.  

St Thomas further specifies *amor concupiscentiae* in terms of “usefulness” and “pleasure”.  

In friendship of use, one person can obtain something through another’s agency and as long as this lasts there is friendship. In friendship of pleasure, while there is enjoyment between the two parties there is companionship. Friendship based on usefulness or pleasure “preserves the character of friendship” to the extent that the friend wishes “some good” to his friend. St Thomas, nevertheless, qualifies the perfection of these two experiences of *amor*. He writes: “But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character of true friendship.”

The affective experience of friendship in the fullest sense, St Thomas continues, is found in *amor amicitiae* in which the object of a person’s love is loved “simply and for itself”. In *amor amicitiae* someone wills the good to his friend “as to himself” and thus the lover sees the one he loves “as his other self”. In *Commentary on the Gospel of John*, St Thomas refers to the love of friendship in terms of the sharing of oneself. He writes:

> With the love of concupiscence we draw external things or persons to ourselves, and we love these others insofar as they are useful to us or give us pleasure. But in the love of friendship we have the opposite, for we draw ourselves to what is external to us, because those we love in this way we treat the same as ourselves, sharing ourselves with them in some way.

The deeper affective experience of *amor amicitiae* inclines a person to share the good of himself with another and thereby he more richly participates in the good of friendship. The question that

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392 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.26, a.4, ad 3.
393 Ibid.
394 Ibid.
395 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.26, a.4, resp.
396 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.28, a.1, resp.
arises for the person experiencing *amor* is: what is my chief motivation in this particular relationship, to look to either what can be received from another or what is shared with him?

c. The Causes of Love

The basic idea of this section is how one might encourage the seminarian to reflect on what causes the love he experiences. This will help him to develop his rightful love for others through recourse to the appropriate causes. St Thomas outlines four major causes in his analysis of the experience of love: the good, knowledge, likeness, and other passions.

St Thomas affirms the good as the basic cause of love because love implies a certain connaturalness for the thing beloved. He writes: “to everything, that thing is a good, which is akin and proportionate to it”.\(^{398}\) Christopher Malloy explains this connaturalness in terms of similitude and compatibility. He writes: “The union of similitude is the fittingness or compatibility of one thing for another, without which love is not possible.”\(^ {399}\) There is also a certain incipient pleasure taken in the loved object. As Gilson writes: “Such pleasure or complacency is, so to speak, an immediate experiencing of natural affinity, of the fact that the living being and the object it is meeting are somehow complementary.”\(^ {400}\) Even the person who loves evil, St Thomas argues, does so “under the aspect of good, that is to say, in so far as it is good in some respect”. Iniquity is only loved inasmuch as it is a means to gain some good like “pleasure, for instance, or money”.\(^ {401}\) Thus, even in the love that involves evil actions the person is motivated by his love of a good, albeit in a disordered fashion.

A basic principle of human affectivity is that good only appeals to us when we are aware of it.\(^ {402}\) However, something “is loved more than it is known; since it can be loved perfectly, even without being perfectly known”.\(^ {403}\) St Thomas gives two examples: loving a science even though we know it imperfectly and loving God even though he is incomprehensible. Some love the sciences, St

\(^{398}\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.1, resp.


\(^{400}\) *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, p.272.

\(^{401}\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.1, ad 1.

\(^{402}\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.2, resp.

\(^{403}\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.2, ad 2.
Thomas writes, “through having a certain general knowledge of them: for instance, they know that rhetoric is a science that enables man to persuade others; and this is what they love in rhetoric.”

Also, we can never comprehend God even though we can know him to a certain degree. By love, nonetheless, we are in union with God and gain an understanding not otherwise accessible to us. St Thomas’ idea is that there is a resemblance of minds through the union of love and by which those who love order their actions to the good of the people they love. As Walter Farrell and Dominic Hughes explain: “Likemindedness is the climax of true love. Those who love each other find ever fewer moments when their minds fail to meet. In the communion of their affection they discover a deeper communication and a more intimate conformity of thought.” Thus, love forms a personal unity of mind and will.

There are two kinds of likeness that cause love. The first arises from each thing having the same quality. The second “arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually”. St Thomas explains that “the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship”. Since the friends share some quality they are inclined to a unity of affection by which one friend wishes good to the other “as to himself”. The second kind of likeness “causes love of concupiscence”. For in this case one desires to have and enjoy for himself the quality that the other possesses. If, however, he sees the other as a hindrance to “gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good.” St Thomas gives two examples: that potters quarrel among themselves “because they hinder one another’s gain”, and that the proud contend with others “because they hinder one

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404 Ibid.
405 In *Summa Theologica* I, q.12, a.7, resp., St Thomas writes: since God “is infinitely knowable … no created intellect can know God infinitely”.
406 St Thomas writes: there is “a certain connaturalness or union with Divine things, which is the effect of charity”. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.45, a.4, resp.
408 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.3, resp.
409 Ibid.
410 Ibid.
411 Ibid.
412 Ibid.
another in attaining the position they covet”.\textsuperscript{413} Thus, the experience of likeness can be a cause of either unity or discord, depending upon the affective disposition of the persons concerned.

A final point is that every passion implies either an inclination to something that fulfills us or an inclination to avoid something that is harmful to us. In this way, each of the passions is a cause of love, in the sense that it either contributes to our good or helps us to respond to what harms our good. For example, St Thomas writes that “hope strengthens desire, since we do not desire so intensely that which we have no hope of receiving. Nevertheless hope itself is of a good that is loved”.\textsuperscript{414} One implication of this truth is that the seminarian needs to identify the good that he loves because this love is the basis for his other affective responses. By considering the good that he desires he refocuses his affectivity on the reason for a worthwhile course of action. For example, by considering how he helps others to rediscover their dignity by being patient with them, he deepens his affective desire to conduct his pastoral work in a charitable way.

d. The Effects of Love

St Thomas writes about six effects of love: union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, zeal, and the wound of love, as well as the four proximate effects of love: melting, enjoyment, languor and fervor. These effects act as indicators of what the seminarian is in fact experiencing in relation to others and therefore they are very helpful for the seminarian to grow in his self-awareness. They witness to both how love changes the seminarian and influences the way he relates to the people he loves.

“Union” refers either to the affective bond between people when they are in each other’s presence or the tendency to desire the presence of the beloved when that person is absent.\textsuperscript{415} Thus St Thomas points to love as an abiding experience within the person. As Gilson comments: “To appreciate the closeness of this union, it is well to observe the curious transference of personalities which naturally accompanies love. In some way the personalities can be said to pass into each other.”\textsuperscript{416}

\textsuperscript{413} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{414} Summa Theologica I-II, q.27, a.4, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{415} Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.1, ad 1. For “love itself is this union or bond”, St Thomas comments. Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{416} The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 276-277.
“Mutual indwelling” refers to the desire to “gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul”.\footnote{Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.2, resp.} St Thomas gives the Holy Spirit, “Who is God’s love”, as the greatest example of this indwelling because he searches all things, even the depths of God (1 Corinthians 2.10).\footnote{Ibid.} St Thomas describes this indwelling as “intimate” from the Latin \textit{intimus} meaning “inmost”.\footnote{Ibid.} The effects of mutual indwelling and intimacy witness to the profoundly shared emotional involvement of love.

“Ecstasy” implies the affective experience of being “placed outside oneself”.\footnote{Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.3, resp.} In regard to love, ecstasy refers to the way the lover’s attention is directed beyond himself to the person he loves.\footnote{Ibid.} Zeal “arises from the intensity of love” and inclines the lover to remove whatever hinders the union of love.\footnote{Ibid.} For example, St Thomas mentions envy, which regards the good of others as a hindrance to the envious person’s own excellence. However, St Thomas also writes about a zeal which in the “love of friendship seeks the friend’s good”.\footnote{Ibid.} When this love “is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend’s good”.\footnote{Ibid.} St Thomas gives Elijah and Jesus as examples of those who were zealous for the worship of the true God (1 Kings 19.10; John 2.17).

Another effect of love is that it can be a wounding experience.\footnote{See Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.5, objs. 1-2.} To properly grasp St Thomas’ point the reader needs to first recognize that a love that perfects the person is a good.\footnote{See Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.5, resp.} As Gilson explains: “Taken in itself, love is not necessarily that destructive passion which the poets have so often described. Quite the contrary, it is natural, and therefore beneficial, to desire something we lack in order to attain our perfection. Love of what is good can only improve the lover.”\footnote{The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 278.} However, the corollary to this, as St Thomas explains, is that the “love of a good which is
unsuitable to the lover, wounds and worsens him”. He quotes the prophet Hosea: “They became abominable, as those things which they loved” (9.10). Thus loving wrongfully and excessively can damage the lover by wronging his affections.

e. Implications for Affective Formation

St Thomas provides us with a description of how amor impacts us and how it influences the way we relate to others. For St Thomas, love is the fundamental motivating power of all a person does. Accordingly, amor is a significant part of affective experience which must be rightly formed if the seminarian is to responsibly love his neighbor. The center of gravity in this consideration of love is the good that is perfective of the person who loves. This gives a starting point by which the seminarian can reflect on whether the love he experiences has a truly good object which he regards in a truly good way.

Moreover, love as a passion (amor), love as a deliberate choice (dilectio), love as an abiding friendship (amicitia), and love as it implies that another is very dear to the one who loves (caritas), involve different ways of relating to another person. By focusing on their respective objects the seminarian can be more perceptive about the kind of love he is experiencing in regard to another and the way it disposes him to relate to that person. For example, the seminarian can seek to know whether he is choosing according to the rationally judged good of the other person – dilectio or is he experiencing the very strong passion of amor for someone? It is not a matter of disregarding amor as an evil but recognizing that it must be brought into harmony with a proper judgment of how to conduct a personal relationship. Moreover, aware of his own experience of amor, he has the first step in discerning when he is being unduly driven by this emotional experience to a relationship that is contrary to his vocation to the priesthood.

St Thomas’ explanation of the two basic tendencies of amor, the love of concupiscence and the love of friendship, sheds further light on the seminarian’s affective experience in relation to others. The love of concupiscence is an affective inclination to love a good or a person for the sake of something else. It is more directly related to the seminarian’s desire for his own good. This is a

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428 Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.5, resp.
proper desire in terms of the seminarian’s self-care. He is inclined by the love of concupiscence to acknowledge his need and how it can be properly fulfilled.

Nevertheless, there is another important side of the seminarian’s affective development. *Amor*, in its inclination as the love of friendship, is an affective impetus to enjoy friendships with a view to the shared good of the relationship. It is, as St Thomas teaches, a sharing of oneself with the loved person. The experience of *amor* is only deeply fulfilled as a mutually shared experience in which each person wills his friend’s good as his own. Now, the seminarian will be far less capable of living a generous priestly service if he does not appropriate this inclination. If he relates to others primarily in terms of the satisfaction of his own particular desires he lives an impoverished affective life.

St Thomas’ discussion of the relational dimension of *amor amicitiae*, which looks primarily to the good of the friend, also points to how it is developed through the common good of the friendship. William C. Mattison III writes: “ultimately the good of self and the good of others cannot be rivals”.429 Rather, the common good is experienced through cooperation in accord with a true sharing of love. As Ezra Sullivan writes, in our generosity we can place the good of another person before our own. This is a particular fulfilment of our personhood. For instance, Sullivan writes of parents, who in loving their children “are dignified in their persons precisely because they are more greatly promoting their family of which they are integral members and for which they act”.430 Another example for the seminarian is that of a generous parish priest who faithfully serves his people.

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429 William C. Mattison III, “Movements of Love: A Thomistic Perspective on *Agape* and *Eros*”, *Journal of Moral Theology*, Vol. 1, no. 2 (2012): 40. In accord with St Thomas’ thought, Mattison gives God as the ultimate foundation for this sharing of the common good. Mattison focuses on the relationship between *agape* and *eros* but I am applying his comments to reflect on St Thomas’ sense of *amor* as a passion of love. The Latin *amor* often conveys the meaning of the Greek *eros*. This wider sense of *eros* as a passion for the unity of love is captured by Pope Benedict XVI in *Deus Caritas Est*, where he insists on the rightful importance of *eros* in human life. In comparing *eros* and *agape* as an “ascending” love and a “descending love”, or as a “possessive love and oblative love”, Benedict avoids calling *eros* intrinsically selfish. Rather, *eros*, flowing from our created need, strives to fulfill it, leading “us beyond ourselves” to seek personal union, even with God. Although, this striving needs to be complemented by *agape* if it is to come to its true perfection. See Pope Benedict XVI, *Deus Caritas Est: On Christian Love*, nn.5, 7 (Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2006/ Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls, 2006).

While there are goods specific to the individual, the common good is “a good that is shared naturally; it is mine and yours simultaneously”, as Sullivan explains.\textsuperscript{431} This is an outlook that is essential to the seminarian’s affective development because he is called to serve others as a priest. As Pope St John Paul II emphasizes, the seminarian’s capacity to relate to others “is truly fundamental for a person who is called to be responsible for a community”.\textsuperscript{432} The mature person recognizes that by extending his love to others he is more deeply participating in the good with them. As Sullivan writes: “Self-love perfects itself in giving itself away to the one most worthy of love.”\textsuperscript{433} In other words, the affective capacity for generously sharing in the common good of a relationship is perfective of the person who loves another. This capacity disposes the seminarian to share in the relationships and community life of the people he is called to serve. We can rephrase St Thomas’ statement from his \textit{Commentary on the Gospel of John}, which was quoted above, to refer to the affective capacity to share in the lives of others. Instead of drawing external things or persons to himself, and loving them insofar as they are useful to him or give him pleasure, the seminarian can draw himself to those he is called to love and serve as a priest.

St Thomas’ teaching on the causes of love can be taken as a program of action for developing the seminarian’s affectivity. St Thomas intends it as an explanation of what brings about the experience of \textit{amor}. It also serves to provide a pattern that enables the seminarian to reflect on what he is experiencing, why he is experiencing it, and how to better develop it. The seminarian ought to promote the causes St Thomas mentions so as to develop his capacity for loving others.

For instance, since knowledge of the good is a cause of love the seminarian needs an eager desire to both learn about the good and be open to experiences that develop his capacity to enjoy it. This is why, for example, working with those who are in need of mercy forms in the seminarian’s affectivity a capacity to love and relate to them. Through such experiences he grows in his awareness of the need for mercy and he acquires a greater ability to show mercy. Another example is to look at likeness as a cause of love which, in St Thomas’ view can encourage a love of friendship. By sharing some common interests with others, for example, in conversation about matters of everyday interest, the seminarian can learn to establish a relationship in which the other

\textsuperscript{431} Ibid, p.925.
\textsuperscript{432} \textit{Pastores Dabo Vobis}, n.43.
\textsuperscript{433} \textit{Natural Self-Transcending Love According to Aquinas}, 944.
person finds him approachable. This mark of approachability makes it easier for someone to talk with him about deeper matters when the need arises.

When St Thomas writes about the effects of love such as union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, and zeal, he is acknowledging the transformative power of *amor* and how it involves someone in the lives of others. Reflecting on these effects enables the seminarian to be aware of the experience of love as it both impacts upon his own affectivity and as it forges bonds with others. The effects of *amor* witness to its presence in the heart of the seminarian and impress upon him the real change that it causes in him, in terms of his passions and how these incline him to certain choices. By being attentive to these effects he can be more conscious of where his heart is leading him. He can see the signs of a love which is either in keeping with his vocation or is a corruption of it. If, for instance, he feels a deep zeal for someone’s friendship he will be inclined to spend much time with him. However, he must be careful not to neglect the other people who have a legitimate call on his attention and affection.

An extension of this self-knowledge is that the seminarian needs to be aware of the effects of love on others. The seminarian is more capable of adjusting his behavior in accord with both his circumstances and his responsibilities if he is aware of the effects of his behavior on others. St Thomas’ explanation of ecstasy, for instance, explains how someone is drawn into a personal relationship through focusing his attention outside himself on another person he finds loveable. Given the real impact of *amor* upon his affectivity, and the affective bonds it forges, the seminarian needs to be responsible about this inclination. St Thomas points to how an instance of *amor* can involve a wrongful object. Loving a person in a way that does not respect her person, affective balance, and relationships with others, harms both the person wrongly loved and the affectivity of the person who wrongly loves. Also, from the point of view of the bodily change involved in *amor*, too intense a love can give the seminarian an affective overload. By implication, his thoughts, imaginations, words and deeds, the time he spends with someone, can be more than is good for the other person concerned. Thus, from within the experience of *amor* arises the need for moderation, if the experience is to be to the true benefit of the people who love each other.

_Amor_ also plays a helpful part in the development of the seminarian’s understanding of how people are drawn into union with God. It pertains to the simple need of the human heart to be moved by
God’s love. For St Thomas, the more intellectual kinds of love, *dilectio*, *amicitia*, and *caritas*, cannot ignore the fundamental significance of *amor* as a love for the other person. What friendship or marriage, for instance, can last very long without appropriate expressions of sensitive love? *Mutatis mutandis*, the proper expressions of sensitive love also embody the priest’s affection for his people. Various expressions of kindness, gratitude and support, communicate the priest’s love for them and draws them into the love of God who is sacramentally represented by the priest.

2. The Strong Desire of Concupiscence

It is true that in this present life, which bears the wound of Original Sin, the desire for pleasure and joy can be experienced in a distorted fashion. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the faculty of concupiscence, (*concupiscentia* - a strong desire or craving), is a proper part of the human person’s affectivity, it energetically moves a person to seek fulfilment in the good he loves. It is thus a necessary affective principle which moves a person to act for his own proper perfection. It is this faculty that deserves to be rightly formed in the seminarian. To unfold St Thomas’ teaching on this issue and its implications for affective formation, the following topics will be presented: a) A Craving for the Pleasurable Good; b) The Implications for Affective Formation.

a. A Craving for the Pleasurable Good

St Thomas writes that “concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good”. It is a very strong desire for the good that is loved and will give pleasure when it is attained. Thus Gilson defines desire as “the form which love takes when its object is absent”. St Thomas does describe

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434 As St Thomas writes: “man should be moved unto good, not only in respect of his will, but also in respect of sensitive appetite; according to Ps. lxxxiii. 3: *My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God*. *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.24, a.3, resp. Italics in text.


436 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.30, a.2, resp. See also *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.30, a.2, ad 2.

concupiscence as an experience in the sensitive appetite where there is a craving “for a thing under the aspect of something delightful to the senses”. Yet, he also applies the term to what is experienced in the rational or spiritual appetite. As he explains:

The craving for wisdom, or other spiritual goods, is sometimes called concupiscence; either by reason of a certain likeness; or on account of the craving in the higher part of the soul being so vehement that it overflows in the lower appetite, so that the latter also, in its own way, tends to the spiritual good, following the lead of the higher appetite, the result being that the body itself renders its service in spiritual matters, according to Ps. lxxxiii. 3: My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God.

St Thomas further explains the difference between the desire for spiritual pleasures and the desire for sensitive pleasures in terms of natural and non-natural pleasures. By “natural” pleasures he means they are “common and necessary” to sustaining life, for example, sufficient food. By a pleasure being “not natural” he does not mean that it is anti-natural, that is, against a person’s good. Rather, he intends that it is pleasurable because it is “proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires”. Thus, St Thomas views the desire for pleasure as something appropriate to human affectivity. Although, as Chapter 7 will explain, he sees the virtue of temperance as a necessary formative principle which moderates the desire and experience of pleasure.

Since natural concupiscence concerns that which nature requires as common and necessary for the sustenance of life, it ever tends to what is “finite and fixed”. Someone can, for example, eat only so much at one meal for his enjoyment and good health. “Hence”, St Thomas concludes, “man never desires infinite meat, or infinite drink”. However, there is in this regard a succession of goods one after the other. After one meal a man will need another at a later point in time. St Thomas describes non-natural concupiscence, however, as “altogether infinite”. He is here

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438 Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.1, ad 3.
439 Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.1, ad 1. Italics in text.
440 Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.3, resp.
441 Ibid.
442 Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.4, resp.
443 Ibid.
444 Ibid.
445 Ibid.
referring to the open-ended way that non-natural concupiscence flows from reason, which enables us to think up pleasures beyond what is common and necessary to nature. This manifests a quality of reason “to proceed to infinity. Hence he that desires riches, may desire to be rich, not up to a certain limit, but to be simply as rich as possible”. As Gilson comments: “As for desire of goods not needed by nature, they are plainly infinite in all senses, for we control such desires by what reason tells, and our reason never wearies of conceiving beyond that which we already have”. This is a great gift, but, as we will discuss below, it can have serious pitfalls for the proper development of the seminarian’s affectivity.

St Thomas draws another reason for the difference between the two kinds of concupiscence from the difference between the end and the means of an action. The “concupiscence of the end is always infinite: since the end is desired for its own sake, e.g., health: and thus greater health is more desired, and so on to infinity”. Conversely, “concupiscence of the means is not infinite, because the concupiscence of the means is in suitable proportion to the end”. For example, the particular means to good health are geared to that end and only desirous to the extent that they are helpful in this regard. For St Thomas, then, the end is somewhat without measure, in the sense that a person desires as much of it as possible. However, the particular means to achieve this end is limited inasmuch as it is relative to and determined by this end. That is, the means is determined by its relation to the end.

St Thomas applies this to the way a person can appoint a particular end for himself and then orders the means to attain it. If a person places his end in riches he will “have an infinite concupiscence of riches”. The person who desires “on account of the necessities of life”, however, will “desire a finite measure of riches, sufficient for the necessities of life”. St Thomas’ point is that the capacity to desire riches beyond what is necessary can get out of control. It can become an affective disorder of the human capacity to proceed to infinity in desiring non-natural pleasures. This is an example of identifying a limited means to procure certain human goods with an ultimate end of

446 Ibid.
448 Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.4, resp.
449 Ibid.
450 Ibid.
human desire. This is an inversion of values, which engenders a disordered desire for certain goods at the expense of a proper desire for other greater goods.

On this point, it is good to keep in mind Gilson’s explanation of the kind of desire for goods that is distinctive of our capacity to reason. Gilson calls this “cupidity”, which “is proper to man. It extends to whatever knowledge, rightly or wrongly, represents to us as good.” However, Gilson makes a vital distinction for how a moral person should regard the desire of such goods: “Although acts of cupidity are reasoned acts, they are not always reasonable.” Therefore, there is a need for cupidity to be moderated in accord with a proper understanding of human need. For example, a parish priest should raise money to support the works of the parish family. However, he should not unduly give his time to thinking about raising money. Otherwise, he will neglect giving sufficient time to serving the spiritual needs of his parishioners.

b. Implications for Affective Formation

It is significant for the seminarian’s affective formation that St Thomas does not reject the inner goodness of concupiscence. Yet he does argue for a wider and more enriching perspective on what concupiscence involves. St Thomas extends the range of concupiscence to “spiritual goods”, such as “wisdom”, while still acknowledging the role of “the body itself” in rendering “its service in spiritual matters”. As Miner explains: “As part of our nature, concupiscentia, desire for things pleasing to the senses, is in itself good. It goes wrong only when it refuses to be subordinated to the rational appetite for the immaterial good. But even here, blame lies less in the passion itself and more in the will’s decision to choose the lower good as if it were the higher good.” The crucial issue is whether the person rightly desires goods.

St Thomas’ reflections on concupiscence do not undervalue the importance of desire for pleasure. Rather, they help the seminarian to better understand the psychology of his desires. There is a proper desire for experiences of natural pleasures, such as eating. However, the experience of pleasures that are generated by the exercise of reason are altogether infinite due to the power of

451 The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, 279.
452 Summa Theologica I-II, q.30, a.1, ad 1.
453 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 159. Italics in text.
reason to proceed to infinity. This is a manifestation of the greatness of reason and the way it can open the affectivity of the seminarian to a deeper and a wider range of experiences of the good. The point is to encourage the seminarian’s desires for true goods so that he can energetically develop his capacity to both enjoy and communicate what is good to others. Still, the seminarian must also be aware that in this capacity to stretch towards infinity lies the capacity for a profound weakness. For the human person can conceive of many pleasures that can, at times, overstretch his true and limited capacity for them. By the same power of reason he can focus too much on one desire to the neglect of another. He can also think that his experience of the common pleasures can fill the lacuna of his unfulfilled spiritual desires. Hence the desire for an activity like eating can become exaggerated due to feelings of loneliness or low self-esteem.

St Thomas’ teaching on how someone can set a particular end to life, and thereby adjust the means to attain it, opens the seminarian to a reflection on how he can integrate his desires with the ultimate goal of Christian life. He is in formation for the priesthood, which at its deepest level flows from a desire to love God and to share in Christ’s mediating role of bringing God’s children to the Father. All goods, of the sensitive or rational appetite, find their true unity in the seminarian’s vocation to love God, the source of all that is good, and to love his neighbor.

Moreover, concupiscence can be developed to help the seminarian strive for the noblest of goods, such as the virtues and the relationships these virtues develop. This disposes the seminarian to desire the completion of all these goods in the fulfilment of eternal beatitude, the ultimate aim of his priestly vocation. That is, his desire for the greatest good, God, is educated and exercised by properly desiring limited goods. St Thomas expresses this desire, in his prayer: “For the Attainment of Heaven”. Addressing the “God of all consolation”, St Thomas prays that “after this life has run its course”, God might grant him “knowledge” and “enjoyment” of the “divine majesty”. Then, he prays to God for “an abundance of Your riches, a river of delights, and a flood of other goods. So that I may enjoy Your solace above me, a delightful garden beneath my feet, the glorification of body and soul within me, and the sweet companionship of men and angels around me.” This prayer draws upon the goodness of many earthly desires, such as pleasure

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455 Ibid, 53-55.
taken in the good things of nature and the pleasure of being with others. From the experience of desiring these earthly goods, St Thomas leads us to desire the pleasure of enjoying them perfectly in Heaven.

Thus, concupiscence can be a kind of a ladder, by which the proper desire for lesser goods prepares the heart to ascend to the desire of greater goods. Accordingly, St Thomas sees beatitude in terms of the fulfilment of human desire. In his exposition of the Creed’s article on everlasting life he writes:

Eternal life is the perfect fulfilment of desires, since each of the blessed will have more than he desired or hoped for. The reason is that in this life no man can fulfill his desires, nor can any creature satisfy a man’s craving, for God alone satisfies and infinitely surpasses a man’s desire, which for that reason is never at rest except in God.\(^{456}\)

Furthermore, properly directed desire can draw the seminarian to engage in actions that fulfill him in the good. Yet, he needs to be aware that these limited experiences of goodness only partially fulfill him. There is a twofold affective experience at work here: a continuity of desire and a discontinuity of satisfaction. Desiring the good disposes the seminarian to seek a more perfect share in it. Yet, the same faculty that seeks satisfaction in created goods also educates the seminarian’s heart through their limited capacity to satisfy. God alone is the infinite good and only he can satisfy the seminarian for eternity. Consequently, God provides the ultimate unity for the seminarian’s desires, which come to their perfection when they are developed in harmony with the one great desire for God. It is this great desire which motivates the seminarian to set aside whatever is incompatible with his vocation and desire whatever promotes it.

Moreover, helping the seminarian to articulate his desires is one dimension of affective formation that relates to the discernment of his vocation. There are a number of factors involved in helping someone to decide whether he ought to enter or remain in formation for the priesthood. For example, a sufficient presentation of priestly life is needed to give a clear idea of what he is discerning. However, there is a basic question that can help the seminarian to focus his discernment: Do you experience a desire to be a priest? This basic desire and the ability to

articulate it is fundamental to discernment because it can witness to the seminarian’s awareness of the goodness of priestly life and that it attracts him. In this way it can be a witness to the call of God who prepares a person from within, according to the gifts of nature and grace, to desire and to do what he asks of that person. Otherwise, the seminarian may be forcing himself to follow a vocation that is not in accord with his true desires as they are given to him by God.

3. Pleasure and Joy

In a consideration of Christ’s life of prayer, St Thomas comments that Christ’s life of passion could ascend to the Living God. This would be done by Christ’s rejoicing, “not by the act of the flesh mounting to God, but by the outpouring of the heart into the flesh, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite follows the movement of the rational appetite”.\textsuperscript{457} St Thomas’ approach here is instructive for the seminarian. There is a proper sense of rejoicing in the good that is a hallmark of Christian life and it has physical, emotional, and spiritual dimensions. What does this have to do with affective formation? St Thomas offers a balanced treatment of the affective experience of pleasure, as it is based on a knowledge of the good, the actions of others, and our actions for them. He is also attentive to the beneficial effects of pleasure on our motivation to continue acting for the good. Yet, he is realistic too about the way excessive pleasure can interfere with our pursuit of greater goods such as virtue.

To unfold the importance of these themes for affective formation this section will consider the following topics: a) The Perfective Nature of Pleasure; b) The Pleasures of Sight and Touch; c) The Causes of Pleasure; d) The Effects of Pleasure; e) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. The Perfective Nature of Pleasure

For St Thomas, pleasure consists of “rest in the good, and perception of this rest”.\textsuperscript{458} That is, the person experiencing pleasure both experiences a union with the good that he loves and he is aware of this union. However, by “rest in the good” St Thomas does not mean there is a cessation of

\textsuperscript{457} \textit{Summa Theologica} III, q.21, a.2, ad 1.

\textsuperscript{458} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.32, a.8, ad 2.
activity, as though the pleasure is solely a matter of attaining an external good. Rather, St Thomas thinks of pleasure as an activity that can be perfective of the human person. To understand this, we need to see that acts such as “to understand, to feel, to will, and the like … are themselves a certain good of the agent”. That is, they are acts that perfect the one who acts. Thus, pleasure is experienced, not only from the external “objects” of actions, but when these actions are well-performed, so that they perfect the agent himself.\textsuperscript{459} Moreover, in writing of pleasure as a rest in the good, St Thomas means that the activity comes to its perfection in a way that is both properly suitable to the person and that the action is “unhindered”, so that “delight follows”.\textsuperscript{460} It is in this way that pleasure is a “state of completion”.\textsuperscript{461} For example, it is in the proper and unhindered activity of swimming that the swimmer enjoys it and is perfected by it.

St Thomas connects some delights with changes in the body (passions). However, by the word joy he refers to the act of taking delight “in those things which we desire as a result of reason. But we do not speak of joy except when delight follows reason”.\textsuperscript{462} Joy is a consent to the good that we want.\textsuperscript{463} Although, this joy can be expressed through one’s body and felt as a passion too, as is clear in the various effects of joy explained below. According to St Thomas, “intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures” because the acts of the spirit are greater.\textsuperscript{464} As an example he gives the greater pleasure we take “in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it” with our senses.\textsuperscript{465} St Thomas observes that we would rather “forfeit” our “bodily sight” than our “intellectual vision”.\textsuperscript{466} Thus, we have a greater love for “intellectual knowledge”.\textsuperscript{467}

Moreover, the goods of the spirit are greater and “incorruptible”.\textsuperscript{468} Thus, the enjoyment of the spiritual good is more enduring and of greater meaning. On account of the mind’s capacity to grasp “what a thing is”, St Thomas writes, there is a “more intimate, more perfect and more firm” union

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\item \textsuperscript{459} *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.31, a.5, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{460} *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.31, a.1, ad 1.
\item \textsuperscript{461} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{462} *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.31, a.3, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{463} *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.31, a.4, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{464} *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.31, a.5, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{465} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{466} Ibid.
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\item \textsuperscript{468} Ibid.
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with reality. These are greater pleasures than those “of the table” or “sexual pleasures” which are “passing away”. The implication of this is that intellectual pleasures more intimately shape the person. Our sense of honor also reveals how we treasure spiritual pleasures. “For… men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good”. Still, St Thomas grants that “in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement”. They are more easily known to us because they are “accompanied by some alteration in the body” and they are “sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles”. Thus bodily pleasures, due to the way they can follow “griefs … are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures”. This requires a careful discernment because the strength of a pleasure can often be more easily acknowledged, absorbing our attention and making it more difficult for us to perceive a spiritual joy. For instance, the seminarian could have an inordinate attachment to the pleasure of indulging in various forms of entertainment that can be accessed through the digital media. This can so absorb his attention that he can fail to see the joy which he can experience when he spends time with others in healthy forms of social recreation.

b. The Pleasures of Sight and Touch

Comparing the pleasures of sight and touch, St Thomas refers to pleasure on account of knowledge and pleasure on account of usefulness. Things give pleasure inasmuch as they are loved but to love them we first need to know them and know how to act so as to attain them. We therefore love the senses due to their role in acquiring knowledge of things and people. In regard to pleasure caused by knowledge, sight affords the greatest pleasure since it “is the handmaid of the mind”, helping us to distinguish many things. Sight, most of all the senses, makes the lover aware of the object so as to delight in it. Yet, it is our ability to reason and understand that endows our physical sight

\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{Ibid.} \]
\[ \text{Summa Theologica I-II, q.31, a.6, resp; ad 2.} \]
with personal meaning. In this respect, as Miner comments, we need to develop our “capacity for intellection, so that the pleasures of sight give way to the pleasures of insight”.476

In regard to usefulness, the pleasures of touch afford the greatest pleasure. Such pleasures regard things that are vital to the preservation of our bodily life, like keeping warm in winter. Therefore, these pleasures are felt strongly, often more so than the pleasures of sight. Food, for the preservation of the individual, and sexual union, for the preservation of the human family, are examples. St Thomas comments that “pleasure, especially that which is afforded by the touch, is the final cause of the friendship which is for the sake of the pleasant”.477 That is, gestures that involve touch are very important for encouraging the bonds of friendship between people who desire to share pleasant experiences. Such gestures of touch enable friends to give each other the pleasure of feeling close to each other in moments of mutual delight. For example, friends can delight in an embrace when they meet after a long time away from each other. Yet, we could extend this principle to other senses when we consider the pleasure that is sought and can be communicated in friendship. For example, there is a pleasure in seeing the face of a beloved friend and there is also a particular pleasure experienced upon hearing that person’s voice.

c. The Causes of Pleasure

St Thomas gives various examples of how pleasure is caused in us. He considers that knowing the good while we are united to it as the principal source of pleasure. If we did not know we had riches, for instance, we would not be able to enjoy them.478 And if what we seek to find pleasure in is not truly suitable to us we cannot enjoy it. Thus, “a certain measure” has to be respected if the good is to be enjoyed.479 If that measure is exceeded, it will become, not “proportionate or pleasant, but, on the contrary, painful and irksome”.480 Change is also a cause of pleasure because “that which

476 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 171.
477 Summa Theologica I-II, q.31, a.6, ad 2. St Thomas distinguishes the friendship that is primarily based on experiences of the pleasant, such as pleasant company and that based on love of the friend as oneself. These need not be mutually exclusive. The complete sense of friendship where the good of one’s friend is considered as one’s own ought to incorporate the proper expressions of the friendship associated with experiences of the pleasant.
478 Summa Theologica I-II, q.32, a.1, resp.
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid.
is suitable to us at one time is not suitable at another, - thus to warm himself at a fire is suitable to man in winter and not in summer”.481 Thus, it is important to have a sense of appropriate change so that we can properly benefit from the present circumstances.

St Thomas considers other causes of pleasure too. Hope causes an anticipatory pleasure by inclining us to look forward to obtaining the arduous good and memory causes pleasure by recalling the good that was received.482 St Thomas observes that sadness causes pleasure, both by bringing to our mind an object that was loved and by making us remember that a certain sadness has passed.483 Miner gives the following example: “a father is sad because his son has died. The absence of his son causes sorrow. Sorrow may prompt him to think about his son, which proceeds to give him pleasure. Thus does sorrow in actu cause pleasure.”484 In this way, even a sense of sorrow can be accompanied, to some degree, by an experience of pleasure.

The actions of others can also cause us pleasure. We can obtain goods through the action of others and they can make us aware of our own good. For example, one person can praise another for a good deed.485 Furthermore, through the love of friendship the good actions of a friend can be considered “as one’s own good, by reason of the power of love, which makes a man regard his friend as one with himself”.486 On the other hand, doing good to others can give us pleasure. For example, we can hope to receive some good by acting generously to another because he feels grateful to us on account of our love for him. Also, someone can think of himself as being generous, so that he has “an imagination of abundant good existing in him, whereof he is able to give others a share”.487 For instance, we see the way adults give to children, “on which they bestow a share of their own good”.488 Another way of experiencing pleasure is to act according to a good habit, so that performing a virtuous action is pleasant because it has become second nature to us to act in this way. As an example, St Thomas writes: “the liberal man takes pleasure in giving to others”.489 A final example of causing pleasure, is that a “a man is moved by one whom he loves,

481 Summa Theologica I-II, q.32, a.2, resp.
482 Summa Theologica I-II, q.32, a.3, ad 2.
483 Summa Theologica I-II, q.32, a.4, resp.
484 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, p.175. Italics in text.
485 Summa Theologica I-II, q.32, a.5, resp.
486 Ibid.
487 Summa Theologica I-II, q.32, a.6, resp.
488 Ibid.
489 Ibid.
to do good to someone; for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure”.\textsuperscript{490} Now, in these examples, we can see St Thomas’ awareness of the personal dimension of pleasure, which is felt due to actions that communicate the goodness and love of one person to another.

d. The Effects of Pleasure

When discussing the general meaning of delight in \textit{De Veritate}, St Thomas mentions certain effects of joy. Gladness (\textit{laetitia}) refers to “an interior expansion or dilation of the heart” connected with joy and “is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness (\textit{latititia})”.\textsuperscript{491} Exultation refers to the “bursting forth” of “inner joy” into “outward signs”, “for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy in a way outwardly leaps (\textit{exilit})”.\textsuperscript{492} Exultation is shown, “either in a change of countenance”, which is then called the passion of mirth, or it is called “cheerfulness” or “good humour”, “inasmuch as one’s words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy”.\textsuperscript{493} This line of thought is continued in \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, where St Thomas considers other effects of pleasure. Metaphorically, we can speak of pleasure effecting a certain expansion in the human soul by which a person’s “mind is said to be magnified or expanded by pleasure”.\textsuperscript{494} As Gilson explains: “pleasure has for its chief effect a kind of enlargement of the soul, which widens to gather in the good of which it becomes aware … So, pleasure guides an act, done by a power of the soul, to its full achievement”.\textsuperscript{495} The expansion of love also reaches out, St Thomas explains, so that man has “care, not only for his own interests, but also for what concerns others”.\textsuperscript{496} The development of this vocabulary, to describe these different experiences of joy, reveals St Thomas’ interest in how such affective experiences affect the human heart. They also show his awareness that emotional experiences communicate our affective state to others.

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{490} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{492} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{493} Ibid. St Thomas gives a similar list in \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.31, a.3, ad 3, in which the word “cheerfulness” is used instead of good humor.
\textsuperscript{494} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.33, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{495} \textit{Moral Values and the Moral Life}, 117.
\textsuperscript{496} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.33, a.1, ad 1.
\end{flushright}
Furthermore, pleasure can help reason because “we are more attentive in doing that which gives us pleasure, and attention fosters activity”. 497 Nevertheless, bodily pleasures can also hinder the proper functioning of reason. Since “we attend to that which pleases us”, pleasure can distract us from a necessary or noble task which may be difficult. 498 Furthermore, pleasures can be “contrary to reason” because they are either “in excess” or in themselves “contrary to the order of reason”. 499 These disordered pleasures can impede our ability to estimate the prudent course of action. This is “seen in the case of drunkards, in whom the use of reason is fettered or hindered”. 500 For reason, St Thomas explains, requires the proper use of the internal and external senses, such as the imagination and sight, which are adversely affected by a serious lack of good health. 501

Another point from St Thomas’ reflections is that pleasure can perfect an action, in the sense that every good “which is added to a thing and completes it” furthers its perfection. 502 A connected point is that when we take pleasure in an action, we are “more eagerly intent on it” and thus perform it “with greater care”. 503 To argue for the goodness of pleasure, St Thomas takes the temperate man as a model who “does not shun all pleasures, but those that are immoderate, and contrary to reason”. 504 Moreover, he quotes the exhortation of Psalm 36.4: “Delight in the Lord” and draws the conclusion that therefore some form of pleasure must be good. 505 And, against the Stoic position that since we are prone to immoderate pleasure virtue lies in abstaining from it, St Thomas replies that “none can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure”. 506 His basic point is that a good moral action can involve “a good pleasure” where the will and the passions are “in accord with reason”. 507 Such good pleasures are “akin” to the good action they accompany and complete it. 508 For example, the intense pleasure of marital intercourse is in accord with the love of the

497 Summa Theologica I-II, q.33, a.3, resp.
498 Ibid.
499 Ibid.
500 Ibid.
501 Summa Theologica I-II, q.33, a.3, ad 3.
502 Summa Theologica I-II, q.33, a.4, resp.
503 Ibid.
504 Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.1, ad 2.
505 Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.1, sed contra.
506 Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.1, resp.
507 Ibid.
508 Ibid.
married couple. For St Thomas, as Gilson explains, “the morality of pleasures does not, then, directly depend upon either their intensity or causes”. In fact, such good pleasures “only become better by being more intense”. Thus, the morality of a pleasure is decided by whether it accords with a virtuous act and not according to how great the pleasure is.

There is, furthermore, a pleasure that is the supreme good. Our supreme fulfillment lies, St Thomas writes, in “the enjoyment of God, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this sense a certain pleasure of man may be said to be the greatest among human goods”. As St Thomas explains, this is due “not to the mere fact that it is pleasure, but to the fact that it is perfect repose in the perfect good”. So, that pleasure is the greatest good which consists in the enjoyment of union with God, the Supreme Good. Aligned with this point is another: pleasure in a certain way is a measure of virtue. “Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will”, St Thomas reminds us, and so it is most of all from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Since the repose of the will and of the passions in the good is pleasure, a man can be “reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue”. As Miner explains: “... what we take pleasure in shapes our affections, and thus serves as the ultimate regula by which our characters may be judged”. In this way, a proper sense of taking pleasure in virtuous deeds is a sign of a person’s good disposition of character.

e. Implications for Affective Formation

St Thomas’ teaching challenges the seminarian to have a richer and a more mature view of the experience of pleasure, rather than a view which equates pleasure and joy with only a narrow band of physical or self-indulgent pleasures. The seminarian’s understanding of pleasure and joy needs

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509 Ibid.
511 Ibid.
512 Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.3, resp.
513 Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.3, ad 3.
514 Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.4, resp.
515 Ibid.
516 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, p.187. Regula is the Latin for a rule by which something is measured.
to be situated within the context of what truly fulfills the human person and enables him to enjoy truly fulfilling experiences with others. St Thomas affirms the goodness of pleasure and joy inasmuch as it is conjoined with good moral action. However, he establishes the affective experience of pleasure in the good of the whole bodily person. The change that is wrought in the person’s affectivity cannot be dismissed as an ephemeral event but rather as a change for the better of the “acting subject”. This entails a more accurate grasp of the matter, than in the approach of the Manuals of theology, of how pleasure is not so much an external object that is attained but rather pertains to the completeness of a good action.

St Thomas’ understanding of pleasure is that it can be a formative influence on the person, who is perfected by good actions that accord with right reason. The virtuous measurement of pleasure is not to unduly restrain it but to insist on a principle vital to its true personal experience. The principle of proper measurement is directly related to the sense of affective balance in the enjoyment of goods. In regard to the pleasures of touch, for instance, St Thomas provides the beginning of a necessary reflection for the seminarian on how to communicate affection appropriately through physical gestures. It requires a certain care for the form of one’s gestures, according to one’s role in another’s life and the true need of that person.

For example, during the Sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick the priest prayerfully lays his hands upon the patient’s head, then anoints his head and hands with the sign of the Cross. Such a gesture makes present the healing and consoling touch of Christ (Mark 8.22-25). Now, St Thomas observes in relation to the healing of the man born blind that our Lord performed some miracles by touch to reveal his humanity as the instrument of his Divinity’s healing power (John 9.6-7).

Thus Christ incorporated the gesture of touch into his messianic mission to heal “the entire

517 *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 256. This phrase is taken from Gilson’s consideration of a different point. This concerns the individual human person who is not just a pure substance nor a “schematic agent theoretically constituted by reason and will” but “is also influenced in his activity by certain ways of being which are proper to him”. Gilson refers to the fact that the person is also “affected … by permanent dispositions, the principles of which are called habits and virtues” (256). The point taken from St Thomas is that the acting subject is disposed a certain way by his affective experiences.

518 See *Pastoral Care of the Sick: Rites of Anointing and Viaticum*, nn.106-107, trans. Episcopal Conference (Sydney/Wellington: E.J.Dwyer, 1982).

The priest’s ability to show affection through this form of touch, in imitation of Christ, enables the recipient of the Sacrament to open his or her heart to God. The violation of this principle through inappropriate behavior subverts the communication of God’s goodness to the person concerned.

St Thomas’ point about the pleasure someone can take in an act of generosity is pertinent to affective formation. The affectively mature person takes joy in doing good to others that they may have a greater share in the good. St Thomas, as related above, gives the example of adults caring for children, but the implication is that these kinds of acts can be communicated to any person. This is something that the seminarian can develop by continuously acting with generosity for those he serves in his pastoral work. He can prepare the way for this kind of action by meditating upon the fulfilling nature of caring for others and asking God to maintain in him an abiding attitude of giving to others. Finally, he can look back on the moments in which he helped others and take grateful joy that he has positively contributed to the development of their character. This is an essential attitude for him to exercise as a priest, who by his vocation is called to make present the generosity of Christ.

Another point can be drawn from St Thomas’ teaching for the seminarian’s appreciation of the role of pleasure in Christian life. The seminarian is called by God to live according to celibacy which requires him to sacrifice the possibility of sexual love within marriage. Yet, he has to be careful to avoid a negative view of sexuality and the enjoyment of the sexual union as an expression of married love. For, he is called to guide the faithful in a proper understanding of what is truly good for them according to their vocation. Perhaps, he might be inclined to a negative attitude in this matter, on account of a defense mechanism to diminish the pain he may feel because he cannot experience such a union. Or, he may have acquired a certain negative attitude to sexuality through the influence of poor teaching.

St Thomas, however, affirms the inherent goodness of virtuous pleasure. He recognizes, moreover, the goodness of greater and more intense experiences of pleasure which accord with a right relationship. He sets this consideration within the overall good of the personal union of

\[520\] Ibid.

\[521\] As Gilson writes: “Thomistic morality is … frankly opposed to that systematic destruction of natural tendencies which is often considered characteristic of the medieval mind. Nor does it even include that hatred of sense pleasures in which some would find the specific difference between the Christian spirit and Greek naturalism. It is wrong,
marriage. For instance, in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book Three, he argues for the goodness of the sexual union from such reasons as the good purpose of the sexual organs as “instruments of the soul”, the goodness of giving life to other people, that Scripture affirms the goodness of marriage (1 Corinthians 7.28) and that “bodily things” are good and come from a good source, ultimately, God.\footnote{St Thomas writes of other constitutive dimensions of marriage such as friendship. This will be discussed in Chapter 11, when we consider a positive explanation of human sexuality, grounded in a deep reverence for the personal bond of marriage, as an integral part of the seminarian’s affective formation.}

Another point for the seminarian’s affective formation can be taken from St Thomas’ teaching that a person takes pleasure in being made aware of the good within him. The experience of such pleasure opens the mind to receive more of the good and it also inclines the person to give generously to others. Apart from the education of the seminarian to be more open to the more refined pleasures of the intellect, the arts and virtuous relationships, there is a further point that concerns the appreciation of his own good. Here we can note the affective need of the seminarian to experience a rightful pleasure in being praised for his good deeds. This will also help him to learn to praise others. This suggests a point for seminary formators.

It should not be overlooked that the formators need to know when and how to point out the good in the seminarian. The seminary is a demanding environment in which there is necessarily much challenging of the seminarian’s character. Yet, to encourage affective balance in the seminarian the seminary staff have to treat him in a balanced way. This includes telling him his good character traits to establish a positive relationship with him. Then, other necessary comments about the areas of formation in which he needs to improve have far more chance of being received in a spirit of respect and trust. The formators should also see if the seminarian has the ability to encourage others, through giving them the pleasure that comes from being praised for their good qualities. A spirit of criticism, to the contrary, reveals an excessive tendency to point out the negative qualities of others. This is a manifestation of a bitter zeal, an anger that proceeds from pride so that, as Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange writes, we “see the mote” in our “neighbor’s eye” but “do not see the...
beam” in our own eye. This kind of approach would only do harm to the seminarian’s ability to listen to advice when it is required for the improvement of his character.

St Thomas’ positive approach to the proper role of pleasure and joy as perfections of the person highlights the plight of those who are afflicted with a certain joylessness. This pertains to a state of affectivity in which someone has lost a healthy engagement with both the attitudes and activities that enable him to enjoy the good. It is clear from our discussion of St Thomas’ reflections on pleasure that affective maturity requires us to integrate, rather than unduly diminish, the delights of the sensitive appetite and the joys of the rational appetite. Yet, the seminarian can be affected by a sense of joylessness and this deserves some discussion about the nature of this state.

In Feeling and Healing your Emotions, Conrad Baars writes about Emotional Deprivation Disorder (EDD) which occurs when a person “has not been affirmed (i.e., strengthened by another human being)”, for example his parents. Thus he is “deprived of the gift of feeling his own unique goodness and lovableness”. His capacity to take joy in his own goodness has been wounded. He is “unaffirmed”, as Baars calls it, and thus may not know how to show and receive affection. Thus he may “attempt to affirm himself. This means he will try to attain by his own efforts and means what he did not receive as a gift from others.” This can lead him to act according to an exaggerated competitiveness to win affection. Enjoying affective experiences that nourish his heart are neglected. They fade into the background because he is fixated on proving his worth.

Moreover, in Healing the Unaffirmed: Recognizing Emotional Deprivation Disorder, Conrad W. Baars and Anna A. Terruwe give a description of their experiences with people who are afflicted with EDD. Some of the symptoms noted are feelings of inferiority and inadequacy. This includes

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524 An example of this is found in marriage where, as H.P. Dunn explains, the intimacy, pleasure and joy of marital union requires complete trust and loyalty in “this secret area of life where the deepest personal feelings are revealed”. H.P. Dunn, MD, The Doctor and Christian Marriage (New York: AlbaHouse, 1992), 22.
525 Ibid.
527 Ibid.
“a feeling that nobody loves them and that nobody could possibly love them”.\textsuperscript{528} It can extend to feelings both of physical inadequacy and intellectual incompetence.\textsuperscript{529} It is also manifested in a serious lack of development of the external and internal senses due to a lack of affectionate love communicated to the person. This affects the person’s capacity to relate to other people. For example, they note, while one woman could recall impressions of the touch and smell associated with others, she could not remember the sight of another person’s face.\textsuperscript{530}

Integral to the healing of this person’s affectivity is a sense of authentic pleasure and joy. This is connected to a regaining of his dignity as a person to be loved for himself and who therefore is called by God to take pleasure and joy in what is good. Baars gives a short list of some of the activities that help to restore the person who has fallen into this joyless state:

He must create opportunities and time for plentiful exposure to the immediate sources of nourishment of his ‘heart’: the beauty of nature; pleasurable activities (fishing, playing, swimming, skiing and many others), the arts, philosophy, the Scriptures, meditation, divine contemplation – in short, all that is good, beautiful and true. Such exposures stimulate his emotions of love, joy and desire.\textsuperscript{531}

In light of this, it can be recommended that the seminarian needs to inculcate St Thomas’ approach to the proper enjoyment of good activities. By enjoying good activities he perfects his humanity in the good and he is further encouraged to keep on this path. Without such an attitude his future priestly life will be diminished. He will be predisposed to overvalue work. He will feel empty of pleasure and joy in his relationships, chiefly because he does not enjoy being with people and sharing their lives in conversation and other activities. He will be inclined to give a jaundiced view of the role of pleasure and joy to the faithful in his dealings with them. However, a more balanced way of living nourishes his heart so that he is sustained to live his vocation for God and others with a greater vigor of soul.

\textsuperscript{528} Conrad W. Baars, M.D. and Anna A. Terruwe, M.D., \textit{Healing the Unaffirmed: Recognizing Emotional Deprivation Disorder}, edited and revised by Suzanne M. Barrs, MA and Bonnie N. Shayne, MA (Staten Island, New York: St Pauls, 2002), 31.
\textsuperscript{529} Ibid, 33-34.
\textsuperscript{530} Ibid, 53.
\textsuperscript{531} \textit{Feeling and Healing your Emotions}, 167-168.
Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to discuss the first three concupiscible passions and their importance for the affective development of the seminarian. St Thomas’ teaching on love enables the seminarian to be more articulate about his experience of love, how it affects him in relation to others, and the different kinds of love he can experience. His teaching on concupiscence is very positive about its place in striving for the pleasures and joys that perfect a person. However, a very significant part of St Thomas’ teaching concerns the need to differentiate between the desire for the goods of the sensitive appetite and the goods of the spiritual appetite. These need to be properly coordinated so that the seminarian learns to develop his desires for the greater intellectual and spiritual goods of knowledge and virtue. Furthermore, St Thomas understands authentic pleasures and joys as affective experiences that perfect the person’s capacity for understanding, willing and feeling. This encourages the seminarian to develop his capacity to engage in activities that fulfill him in the good. It also cautions him to deepen his understanding of what causes him joy so that he may truly grow in his appreciation for the good in himself, in others and in God. Now, the next chapter will reflect upon the application of St Thomas’ teaching on hatred and sorrow to affective formation.
CHAPTER 5

HATRED AND SORROW IN AFFECTIVE FORMATION

Having reflected on the passions of love, desire and joy, which are the fundamental passions that regard the good, it is necessary to turn to the passions of hatred and sorrow which regard evil. The central concern here is to understand the nature, causes and effects of the two main passions that register the affective experience of what is unsuitable or damaging to a person. A careful examination of hatred and sorrow is required both for the seminarian’s formation and to equip him to counsel others when they experience evil. In regard to hatred, there is need to distinguish between its nature as an affective response to evil and the sin of hatred. In regard to sorrow, the pastoral need is to help the seminarian grow in his capacity to communicate compassion and alleviate sorrow. The question for affective formation is, then: how can the experiences of hatred and sorrow be integrated into the project of attaining affective maturity?

1. Hatred

St Thomas’ teaching on hatred is helpful because he gives a balanced approach both to the affective and the moral significance of hatred. Certain affective experiences are geared to respond to the human experience of suffering evil. So, the question for affective formation is: can the affective response of hatred ever be a proper response to evil? To explore this question the following topics will be considered from St Thomas’ examination of hatred: a) Hatred is Opposed to Love; b) Hatred Properly Speaking; c) Hatred as a Vice; d) The Implications for Affective Formation.

a. Hatred is Opposed to Love

For St Thomas, while love is experienced as a harmony between the person who loves and what is loved, hatred is experienced as a “dissonance of the appetite from that which is apprehended as repugnant and hurtful.” As Miner explains: “Dissonance is not a thing in itself; it presupposes a

prior harmony that has been altered or distorted.” Hatred can only be understood in terms of what interferes with the good that we love. If love concerns what is suitable to our perfection in the good, then hatred concerns what is unsuitable and “bears the aspect of evil”.

A person hates something because he sees it as something that damages or hinders what he loves. An implication of this is that it is reasonable to expect a certain passion of hatred in the affectively mature person. The person who loves deeply ought to experience a hatred for that which harms what or who he loves. As Miner writes: “hatred is not simply an undesirable passion. Though hatred should not be cultivated as a good in itself, it is the legitimate corollary of love.” As such, hatred can motivate us to avoid, or alleviate, the damaging effects of an evil that is unwanted because it interferes with the good that we love. For St Thomas, this hatred is praiseworthy if it is rightly directed against what is evil. However, if hatred is a mistaken response, so that the good is hated, then that hatred cannot be good.

Moreover, St Thomas sees that hatred cannot be stronger than love “absolutely speaking”, because “turning away from evil”, which is the object of hatred, “is directed as a means to the gaining of good”. St Thomas does grant, though, that hatred can seem stronger than love because hatred “is more keenly felt than love”. Just as love can be “felt more keenly” when the object loved is not present, so too the object hated can elicit a vehement hate on account of its unbecomingness. This requires the seminarian to be careful when he experiences a deeply felt hate for another person, which will be discussed below.

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534 St Thomas writes that “a thing disagrees with another, through destroying or hindering that which agrees with it. Consequently love must needs precede hatred, and nothing is hated, save through being contrary to a suitable thing which is loved.” It is in this sense that “every hatred is caused by love.” Summa Theologica I-II, q.29, a.2, resp.
535 Summa Theologica I-II, q.29, a.1, resp.
536 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 149.
537 Summa Theologica I-II, q.29, a.1, ad 2.
538 Summa Theologica I-II, q.29, a.3, resp.
539 Ibid.
540 Ibid.
b. Hatred Properly Speaking

For St Thomas, it is impossible for a man to hate himself “properly speaking”. His reason is that “everything naturally desires good, nor can anyone desire anything for himself, save under the aspect of good”. In support of this he quotes Ephesians 5.29 where St Paul writes that no man ever hated his own flesh. In the case of suicide, St Thomas argues that the person who takes his own life is not willing evil to himself as such and therefore not hating himself directly. Rather, he desires his death under the aspect of a good, that is, he desires to end his “unhappiness or pain”. However, while it is impossible for a man to hate himself “properly speaking”, it is possible for a man to hate himself “accidentally”. In making this careful nuance St Thomas uses the phrases *per se loquendo* and *per accidens*. The contrast is between what is of itself (*per se*) and what is indirectly, but nevertheless, associated with it (*per accidens*). A man can hate himself “accidentally”, in St Thomas’ view, because he can choose a course of action that is good in one respect, yet evil in another. He may not intend evil directly, but due to some factor in the action evil is done. It is not, as St Thomas puts the matter, an action that is “good simply”. Rather, there is evil done to him through his action in spite of his desire for the good.

St Thomas suggests two ways in which a man can hate himself *per accidens*. “First, on the part of the good the man wills to himself.” In this case, “what is desired as good” is, “in some particular respect”, evil. Second, in regard to himself he doesn’t sufficiently appreciate that there is more to himself than his sensitive nature. He does not love himself as he really is in the completeness of himself as a body/soul unity. Thus, he neglects his spiritual good, and this constitutes “an

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541 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.29, a.4, resp.
542 Ibid.
543 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.29, a.4, ad 2.
544 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.29, a.4, resp.
546 As Robert Schmidt explains in his Glossary for *De Veritate* there are various connotations of *per accidens*: “Contingently; apart from an intention or essence; by reason of something else. As distinguished from *per se*, i.e., essentially, directly, intrinsically connected with an action, intention, or essence; by reason of what it is in itself”. See *Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate*, trans. Robert W. Schmidt, S.J., under the title *Truth*, Volume III (Albany, New York: Preserving Christian Publications, Inc., 1993), 485.
547 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.29, a.4, resp.
548 Ibid.
549 Ibid.
inordinate self-love, in respect of which, man desires temporal goods for himself more than he should”.\textsuperscript{550} In other words, he loves himself improperly because he seeks the accumulation of lesser goods at the expense of the greater good of a virtuous life.

For St Thomas, good is a description of being inasmuch as it is desirable and thus, in itself, good cannot be the object of hatred. In regard to the truth, he draws the implication that since truth is the good of the intellect we do not hate truth in itself. However, a particular truth may be the object of hatred, “in so far as it is considered as hurtful and repugnant”.\textsuperscript{551} One person can wish that some painful truth were not true, for instance, that a loved one has died.\textsuperscript{552} Another person could desire not to know the truth so that he can do what is sinful. Yet another person can hate that someone else knows what he has done, for example, that he has done something dishonorable. St Thomas concludes that while “knowledge of the truth is lovable in itself … the knowledge of truth may become hateful, in so far as it hinders one from accomplishing one’s desire”.\textsuperscript{553} In this way, what is desirable to an honest person becomes hateful to someone who is dishonest.

c. Hatred as a Vice

After considering hatred as a part of his reflections on the passions, St Thomas returns to the topic of hatred later in \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II where he focuses upon hatred as a vice opposed to charity, by which we love God and our neighbour. By hatred we regard God and our neighbor as evils because they are impediments to our good. God is seen as someone who hinders us by reminding us that we should not sin and who will punish us for our wrongdoing. Furthermore, hatred of our neighbor directly contradicts the goodness of our fellow human beings, by regarding them as evil and a hindrance to our own good.\textsuperscript{554} However, we ought to love in our neighbor what he has from God, that is, the gifts of nature and grace, while we rightly “hate the sin” our neighbor may commit.\textsuperscript{555} St Thomas gives two examples of what we rightly hate in another. First, that while

\textsuperscript{550} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.29, a.4, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{551} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.29, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{552} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.29, a.5, resp.
\textsuperscript{553} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.29, a.5, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{554} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.34, a.1, resp; q.34, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{555} Ibid.
we love our parents we hate that they might oppose our advancement in holiness. Second, that while we love those who have received goods from God, we hate that they “show hostility towards us”. For St Thomas, hatred as a willed disposition against the good is the worst sin against our neighbor. From the point of view of the external action and its effects on others, other sins are worse, for instance, murder. Still, St Thomas maintains that “hatred is a more grievous sin than external actions that hurt our neighbor, because hatred is a disorder of man’s will, which is the chief part of man, and wherein is the root of sin”. Hatred in this sense is equivalent to seeing one’s neighbor as an evil. Thus, “if there be anything sinful in a man’s outward sins against his neighbor, it is all to be traced to his inward hatred”. For without such a willful choice of harm there would be no expression of this hatred in outwardly harmful actions. Indeed, St Thomas sees hatred as a vice that is fundamentally opposed to our vocation to love others. Hatred is not so much the source of many other moral evils but the utmost point of moral corruption. This is so because, while it is most natural to us to love both the good in God and the good in our neighbor, hatred is directly opposed to such love.

556 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.34, a.3, ad 1.
557 Summa Theologica II-II, q.34, a.3, ad 3.
558 Summa Theologica II-II, q.34, a.4, resp. St Thomas’ teaching about the will as “the chief part of man” deserves further comment. We read earlier that he locates the distinctive capacity of the human person in the mind. Given St Thomas’ affirmation of the will as the spiritual appetite and higher affectivity we can see that for him the human person is distinguished precisely both by mind and will. The human person as rational is also by nature of that truth also affective. For a discussion of how St Thomas interrelates the various powers of the soul with the mind having an overarching connection to the will, the sense powers and affectivity see Paul Crittenden, Reason, Will and Emotion: Defending the Greek Tradition against Triune Consciousness (Houndmills, Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 220-221.
559 Summa Theologica II-II, q.34, a.4, resp.
560 St Thomas does not think that hatred is one of the capital sins because “a capital vice is one from which other vices arise most frequently” and hatred is for him the worst state of moral evil. Rather, his point is that the dynamic of sin is expressed in its worst form in hatred, in the sense that hatred is, most of all, a direct and deliberate repudiation either of the goodness of God or the goodness of one’s neighbor. In this way, hatred “is not the first but the last thing in the downfall of virtue resulting from vice”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.34, a.5, resp. In other words, someone has entered the most evil state of character when they intentionally hate another person. Whereas in other sins there is not so direct a rejection of the good itself but at least, as in the case of anger, an attempt to achieve a good end by righting an injustice. Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.4, resp.
d. Implications for Affective Formation

The affective experience of hatred is part of a valid response to evil. Once the seminarian loves the good he is rightly displeased with what harms it. Nonetheless, it is necessary to exercise a right judgment to ensure that he does not harm the good out of either a wrongful or an excessive hatred. St Thomas’s essential point on the vice of hatred is that it contradicts the human person’s vocation to love God and his neighbor. Nevertheless, loving the good in one’s neighbor is compatible with disapproving of what may be evil in any one of his attitudes and actions. Thus, the seminarian must be balanced in his assessment of how to respond to an evil, both avoiding a reaction that is disproportionate to the evil perpetrated and maintaining a truthful stance against it.

Another example of the need for an affective and moral balance concerns the seminarian’s response to St Thomas’ statements about loving, yet hating, family members who may oppose his vocation. St Thomas’ point is not to hate someone in the sense of the vice of hatred but to disapprove of a wrongful attitude or action. This point needs to be clarified for the seminarian who encounters major opposition from his family and may mistakenly think that he should cut ties with them. Rather, St Thomas’s teaching would lead him to love his family while not allowing their opposition to prevent him following his vocation.

St Thomas’ teaching about the human propensity for loving truth in general, but hating particular truths, is very relevant to the seminarian’s self-knowledge. As a general principle, the seminarian can sincerely love the truth and desire to study it. However, he needs to be cognizant that he can hate particular truths that pain him. This principle applies to himself but it helps him to have a better understanding of those he will serve as a priest. In regard to himself, particular truths can be experienced as demanding and, consequently, they can be hated. This can generate the passion of aversion, by which he would want to avoid whatever causes him pain. Given some hurtful experiences from his past, for example, he may avoid talking to his spiritual director about his affective wounds and shortcomings. This would diminish his ability to gain a proper explanation of the nature of his affective struggles and how to effectively respond to them.

Think, for instance, of the young man who was never allowed to disagree with his father and felt demeaned by him. Perhaps, this is at the source of the young man’s reticence to speak out in formal discussions, for example, about pastoral experiences, and so be a part of the group’s conversation.
In this case, the seminarian needs an education in principles that can guide his reflections and lead him to a deeper understanding of why he responds as he does. This reflection can become part of a conversation with members of the seminary staff, who will then better understand how to help him become more confident in making his own contribution to group sessions.

The humility the seminarian gains by being honest about his particular hated truths equips him with a deeper perception of the difficulties people can have to accept certain moral truths. Part of his future work as a priest will be to understand that the person before him may be grappling with his perception of what is good and what is evil. There are two points that the future priest can apply as he keeps in mind the affective dimension of the pastoral situation. First, to ask the question: why do you find this truth disagreeable? In this way the person he counsels can be given the chance to articulate his thought process and affective stance. Thus, the person can both communicate what he experiences and know that he is heard as a fellow human being who experiences the matter as a difficulty. The second point is to try to clear away the misunderstanding of the issue that makes the teaching appear injurious. By explaining the good of the teaching the person can be made aware of its fulfilling qualities and this can affectively engage him to seek the good through the proper moral course of action.561

Another implication comes from St Thomas’ teaching about the way a man can hate himself not directly but per accidens. One part of self-knowledge requires the seminarian to become aware of his affective inclination to overemphasize the importance of certain goods to the detriment of other more important spiritual goods. There is a second implication, however, relevant to the seminarian’s appreciation of the affective disposition of his neighbor. In particular, there is the plight of those who can experience an inclination to self-harm and suicide. In some way, according to St Thomas’ teaching, the person thus afflicted is not motivated by the direct intention to do evil.

561 For an example of a pastoral situation that concerns the affective engagement of others through a proper presentation of the truth, see Janet E. Smith, “Conscious Parenthood,” Nova et VETERA English Edition 6, No. 4 (2008): 927-950. Smith discusses how a more “conscious” awareness of the truth that marriage is a sharing in God’s own creative love, and that being open to the gift of children makes the married couple “more self-giving and loving”, can affectively move them to become generous parents (937). In this context, “conscious”, as Smith explains, “means being vividly aware of some reality; it conveys experiencing something with one’s emotions as well as one’s intellect” (946). This concerns an important point for the seminarian’s pastoral formation: a clear and opportune explanation of how the Church’s teaching on human sexuality can help married couples to become deeply fulfilled, will help them to experience an affective desire to live that teaching.
There is, however, a distorted affective motivation to see this course of action as a solution to a problem. While not affirming the self-hatred or its resultant actions the seminarian can develop in himself a merciful understanding of why the person is inclined thus. For example, the person may have endured great sufferings in life which exert a very negative pressure on his affective responses. The seminarian is required to develop a capacity for attentive listening and speaking words that instill in this person a sense of his dignity, to show support for him in a time of great trial.

Furthermore, the seminarian will often encounter pastoral situations that are uncomfortable due to the people, place or the kind of work he is called to do. This could also be due to his particular sensitivity and character, for example, that he finds it challenging to enter unfamiliar surroundings and learn a new regime of work. St Thomas’ teaching about the need to properly orient our sense of hatred so that it is directed at what is in fact evil is helpful here. The avoidance of what is hated can be a response that is not in keeping with the reality of the situation. The seminarian can learn to look again and see that there are good people involved in this pastoral work; that he will learn much about himself and acquire new skills; that he has perhaps misjudged himself and he is capable of entering new situations with confidence. In other words, he can look and see the good that is present rather than too quickly assuming that it is an evil to be hated.

2. Sorrow

In his treatment of human formation Pope St John Paul II writes of the example of Christ who “knew what was in humanity” (John 2.25). The Pope infers that “the priest should be able to know the depths of the human heart, to perceive difficulties and problems”, and that the priest should demonstrate “compassion” and “console” others.562 He also emphasizes that Christ the Good Shepherd felt “compassion for the crowds because they were harassed and helpless, like sheep without a shepherd”.563 The task of seminary formation, then, is to help the seminarian acquire these qualities in preparation for the pastoral ministry through various pastoral experiences.

563 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.22.
To help in this regard, we can look to St Thomas’ teaching on sorrow in *Summa Theologica* I-II, which is a significant part of his overall consideration of affectivity and its importance within the Christian’s development. It can be applied to the seminarian’s affective development to help him become a more compassionate person who recognizes the significance of suffering for the human person. St Thomas offers a description of the nature of sorrow and its effects on human affectivity. His reflections on sorrow present it as an appropriate human response to evil, which both needs to be expressed and is rightly ameliorated. To further explore how St Thomas’ teaching can contribute to affective formation the following topics will be examined: a) The Types, Causes and Effects of Sorrow; b) Remedies for Sorrow; c) Sorrow as an Appropriate Response to Evil; d) Implications for Affective Formation.

**a. The Types, Causes and Effects of Sorrow**

St Thomas writes that there are two things necessary for the experience of the passion of pain (*dolor*): “conjunction with some evil … and perception of this conjunction”. 564 He uses a different word “sorrow” (*tristitia*) to refer to the inward pain that is caused by “the interior apprehension of the intellect or of the imagination”. 565 Pain and sorrow are affective responses to evil which can have the benefit of helping someone to seek the good “more eagerly” to replace the pain and sorrow that is felt. 566 On the other hand, the desire for a pleasure can move us to cope with an experience of pain. St Thomas writes that “from a strong desire for a certain pleasure, one does not shrink from undergoing pain, so as to obtain that pleasure”. 567 By looking forward to the glory of Heaven, for example, a person can gain the strength to endure hardships to attain it. 568

St Thomas also compares the intensity of sorrow and pain. The “interior sorrows of the heart” are greater than outward pain. 569 Since the spiritual apprehension is greater than that of touch, inward pain is more keenly felt than outward pain. 570 Inward pain is “caused by a greater evil”, a violation

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564 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.35, a.1, resp.
565 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.35, a.2, resp.
566 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.35, a.3, ad 1.
567 Ibid.
568 Ibid.
569 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.35, a.7, resp.
570 Ibid.
of the rational order, and “evil is better known by” the apprehension of the intellect.\textsuperscript{571} That is why we can willingly undergo “outward pain in order to avoid inward pain”.\textsuperscript{572} It is also why we accept certain outward pains that become “in a manner pleasant and agreeable by way of inward joy”.\textsuperscript{573} A father, for example, takes joy in working to pay for the education of his children even though he endures stress and fatigue on account of that work.

St Thomas writes that “the proper object of sorrow is one’s own evil”.\textsuperscript{574} However, he applies this basic notion of sorrow to different objects, causes and effects. Pity “is sorrow for another’s evil, considered, however, as one’s own”.\textsuperscript{575} Envy is sorrow “for something that is neither evil nor one’s own, but another’s good, considered, however, as one’s own evil”.\textsuperscript{576} St Thomas further observes that the “proper effect of sorrow consists in a certain flight of the appetite”.\textsuperscript{577} Sorrow inclines us to flee from the evil that presently afflicts us. Anxiety and torpor are effects of sorrow. Anxiety “weighs on the mind, so as to make escape seem impossible: hence it is called perplexity”.\textsuperscript{578} When torpor is experienced the mind is so weighed down “that even the limbs become motionless”. The effect of torpor is so drastic that it can deprive a person of speech. This is such a profound effect because “of all the external movements the voice is the best expression of the inward thought and desire”.\textsuperscript{579} Here we see St Thomas’ awareness of how sorrow interferes with the human need for personal communication.

How quickly we forget joy when sorrow darkens our lives, St Thomas notes, quoting Ecclesiasticus 11.29: “A moment’s adversity, and pleasures are forgotten”.\textsuperscript{580} The effects of sorrow are real and mainly negative. Sorrow distracts us from good activities and enervates us so that we feel unable to act for the good. In light of these negative effects, Gilson describes “sorrow

\textsuperscript{571} Summa Theologica I-II, q.35, a.7, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{572} Summa Theologica I-II, q.35, a.7, resp.
\textsuperscript{573} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{574} Summa Theologica I-II, q.35, a.8, resp.
\textsuperscript{575} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{576} Ibid. Chapter 10 will give a detailed explanation of envy in the context of St Thomas’ teaching on the Capital Sins.
\textsuperscript{577} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{578} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{579} Ibid. Likewise, in De Veritate St Thomas mentions “distress”, defining it as “sadness that takes the voice away”. De Veritate, q.26, a.4, ad 6. St Thomas also mentions “boredom, which is sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything”.
\textsuperscript{580} See Summa Theologica I-II, q.37, a.1, obj.2.
or sadness” as “a veritable disease”.\textsuperscript{581} For example, given the finite energy of the soul pain absorbs our attention and makes it difficult for us to learn something.\textsuperscript{582} Another effect of sorrow is that someone can feel “depressed”. This refers to a state of feeling that someone is “hindered in his own movement by some weight.”\textsuperscript{583} Sorrow thus hinders the soul “from enjoying that which it wishes to enjoy”.\textsuperscript{584} The experience of contraction is akin to that of depression “because the soul, through being depressed so as to be unable to attend freely to outward things, withdraws to itself, closing itself up as it were”.\textsuperscript{585} Furthermore, an evil not only depresses but “is said to consume man, when the force of the afflicting evil is such as to shut out all hope of evasion”.\textsuperscript{586} It follows that sorrow weakens our activity for we never do actions “with sorrow, so well as that which we do with pleasure, or without sorrow”.\textsuperscript{587} Finally, St Thomas mentions that sorrow can be severe enough to deprive a person “of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness”.\textsuperscript{588} All these points reveal St Thomas’ keen awareness of the detrimental effects of sorrow on our psychological health.

b. Remedies for Sorrow

In alleviating sorrow and pain we rightfully care for ourselves and others. We must be careful not to confuse the Cross with a harsh or neglectful attitude. As Craig Steven Titus notes, a wrongful interpretation of the Christian doctrine of suffering has sometimes lead to “the glorification of suffering per se (dolorism)” and “the denial of any benefit from human effort”.\textsuperscript{589} To the contrary, St Thomas thinks it right to take appropriate action to assuage the effects of pain and sorrow. He gives five examples: pleasure; tears; the sympathy of friends; the contemplation of the truth; and,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{581} Etienne Gilson, \textit{Moral Values and the Moral Life: The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas}, trans. Leo Richard, from 4\textsuperscript{th} ed., Paris: J.Gabalda, 1925 (USA: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, no date given), 118.
\item \textsuperscript{582} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.37, a.1, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{583} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.37, a.2, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{584} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{585} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.37, a.2, ad 2.
\item \textsuperscript{586} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.37, a.2, ad 3.
\item \textsuperscript{587} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.37, a.3, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{588} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.37, a.4, ad 3.
\end{itemize}
the refreshment of sleep and baths.\textsuperscript{590} As Gilson explains: “Nothing in the line of soothing remedies is to be despised”.\textsuperscript{591} This is a balanced way of approaching the issue of self-care and is, as such, helpful to the seminarian, as we will discuss below.

The general principle is that pleasure alleviates sorrow.\textsuperscript{592} St Thomas writes that “all repose of the body brings relief to any kind of weariness ... so every pleasure brings relief by assuaging any kind of sorrow”.\textsuperscript{593} This is due ultimately to the deep union of body and soul in the human person. Tears and groans also have a relieving effect. As St Thomas explains:

> a hurtful thing hurts yet more if we keep it shut up, because the soul is more intent on it: whereas if it be allowed to escape, the soul’s intention is dispersed as it were on outward things, so that the inward sorrow is lessened.\textsuperscript{594}

Another consideration is that “an action, that befits a man according to his actual disposition, is always pleasant to him”.\textsuperscript{595} So, expressing one’s grief has a relieving effect because it is in keeping with one’s present affective state of sorrow.

Yet another remedy for sorrow is the great comfort afforded us by sympathetic friends. Sorrow has a depressing effect, “it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves”.\textsuperscript{596} Yet, when a man sees another saddened by his sorrow “it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him”.\textsuperscript{597} A “better reason” St Thomas offers for the assuaging effect of our friends’ sympathy, is that “when a man’s friends condole with him, he sees that he is loved by them, and this affords him pleasure”.\textsuperscript{598} Here, St Thomas reveals a keen awareness of the importance of the love and affection of friends for each other when they suffer.

\textsuperscript{590} To assure means to “calm or soothe (a person, pain, etc.) or to appease or relieve (an appetite or desire)”. It comes from the Latin word suavis meaning sweet. See Bruce Moore, \textit{The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary}, 4\textsuperscript{th} ed. (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2004), 79.

\textsuperscript{591} \textit{Moral Values and the Moral Life}, 119.

\textsuperscript{592} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.38, a.1, resp.

\textsuperscript{593} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{594} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.38, a.2, resp.

\textsuperscript{595} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{596} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.38, a.3, resp.

\textsuperscript{597} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{598} Ibid.
Below, in the section on the implications for the seminarian’s formation, we will apply the remedies of expressing one’s grief and the comfort of friends to the priest’s need for consolation.

The next remedy for sorrow concerns the role of contemplation in alleviating sorrow. Earlier in *Summa Theologica*, St Thomas reflects on human happiness, inasmuch as it consists especially in “man’s highest operation … of his highest power in respect of its highest object”.599 This is the contemplation of “the Divine Good”.600 In his reflections on the remedies of sorrow he returns to the theme of contemplation. For St Thomas, “the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of the truth”.601 Now, every pleasure assuages pain and this is more the case when, “in the midst of tribulations”, we rejoice to contemplate Divine things and our “future Happiness”.602 Indeed, contemplation can overflow into the body of the person experiencing pain.603 St Thomas gives the example of the martyr Tiburtius who was preserved from distress as he walked on burning coals.

Finally, according to the principle that “whatever restores bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it”, St Thomas recommends taking a bath and having sleep as remedies for sorrow.604 Such remedies “bring nature back to its normal state”, he comments, and as such are a cause of pleasure which ameliorates sorrow.605 One implication of this teaching is that the seminarian is right to seek proper remedies to restore his vitality in moments of sorrow.

c. Sorrow as an Appropriate Response to Evil

Since sorrow is an experience implying the hindrance of a person’s repose in the good, can it be considered as an evil?606 St Thomas’ view is that sorrow is an evil in terms of how it negatively impacts upon the person. However, it is a good in terms of it being a proportionate response to the

599 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.3, a.5, resp.
600 Ibid.
601 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.38, a.4, resp.
602 Ibid.
603 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.38, a.4, ad 3.
604 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.38, a.5, resp.
605 Ibid.
606 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.39, a.1, resp.
negative impact of evil. He gives the example of shame, which “is said to be good, on the supposition of a shameful deed done”. In other words, it is a fitting response to the evil of the shameful deed.

In fact, St Thomas regards the lack of pain or sorrow on account of an evil as evil. His reason is that such a response manifests a lack of proper feeling in response to evil or a lack of proper judgment about what is evil. To the contrary, “the perception and rejection of bodily evil is the proof of the goodness of nature”. Likewise, a sorrow which ensues from a correct judgment that something is evil is virtuous because it is in accord with reason. Sorrow is thereby a part of the mature person’s response to evil. As Gilson writes: “The grief which is a protest against evil is morally praiseworthy.” However, “excessive sorrow”, which “oversteps” the rule of reason, is not virtuous. This unreasonable response is found in those who are sorrowful over what is not of true importance. Another mistake is to be sorrowful for what is good as if it were an evil. For example, a man giving “alms sorrowfully”, as if generosity is a burden.

**d. Implications for Affective Formation**

St Thomas’ treatment of sorrow is an example of his attention to the wider spectrum of affective experiences. He perceives that affective responses to evil have a proper role to play in human life, inasmuch they are in accord with the truth that we suffer. The goodness of the sensitive appetite which registers love, desire, and joy in regard to the good also registers the affective dissonance of hatred and sorrow in response to evil. Thus, even though sorrow involves depleting effects, such as the feeling of depression, it is a truly human act by which a person grieves the loss of the good he loves.

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607 Ibid.
608 Ibid.
609 Ibid.
610 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.39, a.1, ad 1.
611 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.39, a.2, resp.
613 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.39, a.2, ad 1.
614 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.39, a.2, ad 2.
The seminarian is preparing for a ministry that is often deeply touched by sorrow. Anything from the normal setbacks in life to the worst tragedies of unforeseen death can be among the challenges he faces with the people entrusted to his pastoral care. He needs to acquire a wisdom about the importance of sharing the sorrows of others and consoling them. To persuade the reader that this affective formation is helped by St Thomas’ teaching, we will consider these background points: i) The Duty of Being a Consoler; ii) The Compassion of Pity; iii) The Benefits of St Thomas’ Teaching on Sorrow.

i. The Duty of Being a Consoler

This first point concerns the importance of being a consoler. St Thomas considers this in his reflection on the debate between Job and his friends - Eliphaz, Bildad and Zophar - about God’s Providence and Job’s suffering. St Thomas notes that Satan upset Job “through his friends, who, although they came to console him, nevertheless proceeded to words of rebuke”.615 They came as friends, consoling Job “by offering him their company”. They spoke no words, out of respect for his need for silence, “for when someone’s mind has been engrossed by pain he does not accept words of consolation”.616 Matters turn for the worst when Job protests his innocence and his friends argue that his misfortune indicates he has sinned, otherwise God stands accused of being unjust. After much argument, Job has had enough and he accuses his friends of being “sorry comforters” who do not understand his plight (Job 16.2-5). “For the duty of a consoler”, St Thomas explains, “is to say things by which pain may be softened. A burdensome consoler, then, is one who speaks the things which exasperate the spirit even more”.617 Job’s friends have become a burden to him when they should be a source of comfort and encouragement.

Job’s accusers fail to understand him because they are not in his place of suffering. As St Thomas explains, Job rebukes his friends, not from hatred or spitefulness, but “that they might be recalled from the cruelty which they were practicing in exasperating Job by their words when they realized

616 Ibid, Chapter Two, 96-97.
617 Ibid, Chapter Sixteen, 244.
that similar words would be rough on them if they were spoken to them”.

In the end, it is not the friends of Job who are pronounced righteous by the God they tried to defend. To the contrary, God rebukes them “for not having spoken correctly about me as my servant Job has done” (Job 42.7). This kind of insensitivity to the sorrow that someone could be experiencing is to be avoided by the priest, who is called to help the sorrowful through his kindness and prayerfulness. He needs to know the right order of responding to someone in sorrow and avoid taking the easy path of explanations that do not capture the painful mystery of suffering. He often needs to console first, and then later, when it is opportune, apply the light of Sacred Scripture to help someone understand a little more the ways of God.

ii. The Compassion of Pity

One implication that emerges from a consideration of St Thomas’ teaching on the human experience of sorrow is that the capacity for responding to the sufferings of others is an important part of a mature person’s character. Here is a very good example of the interpersonal quality of affective maturity. A major part of our consideration of affective development concerns the seminarian’s inner experience of emotion and how this can be formed. This concerns his own affective balance and the formation of his own life. But this focus on his own affective fulfilment should not neglect the development of his capacity to share the emotional experience of others and to form his affective capacity to respond appropriately to them. If he can properly share their experience he will be able to deepen his personal relationship with them and enable them to feel that their emotional need for support has been answered. If he cannot answer this need in an appropriate manner the person may feel that the seminarian is either indifferent or immature on a point where there is a reasonable expectation that he should be able to help.

This expectation flows from the interdependent nature of the human person and our need to engage in personal relationships of mutual help. It is true that many of our virtuous qualities relate to our ability to exercise our intellectual and physical capacities to achieve worthwhile and noble goals. However, on account of our vulnerability to sorrow, we also need to attend to the affective need for the human person to be supported and consoled. The ability to recognize and respond to this

\[618\] Ibid.
affective need builds personal bonds of respect, gratitude and trust because it is an ability grounded in a true respect for the human person. The ability to recognize and respond to the suffering of another through compassion is precisely a matter of affective maturity because it directly relates to helping another person when he is in a state that afflicts him and weighs him down. The maturity of the person who shares and responds to this sorrow is shown in that he is prepared to stand with someone who is weighed down by a certain loss of the good. Sharing this heaviness and loss weighs down the one who compassionately attends to the person suffering but who nevertheless supports a fellow human being. It is an expression of a genuine and practical charity.

This capacity for compassion finds it basis in a mature awareness of the seminarian’s own need for compassion, as he has experienced it in the past or as he realistically perceives that he will need help in the future. Acknowledging his own need enables him to acknowledge that people like him also need affective support. It is for this reason that affective formation has to help the seminarian to gain insight into his own vulnerability and need for compassion. One way to achieve this kind of insight is to help him review and discuss his experiences of difficulty and sorrow. But, his capacity for compassion also needs to be developed by placing him in situations where he will directly experience the sorrows of others. Such experiences will require a review of how he felt and responded to those who were suffering, how he could more deeply acknowledge that they were in need of his support, and how he could more effectively show them compassion.

St Thomas’ teaching brings to the fore the interpersonal quality of sorrow and this is something that can be applied to the seminarian’s capacity for communicating with those who suffer. In Chapter 3 there was a consideration of St Thomas’ principle that good actions which incorporate good passions are better moral actions. This principle can be applied to words and gestures that communicate affections and attitudes to another person. Such actions better express the humanity of the acting subject, and they enable him to better communicate and build relations with others.

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619 For an account of virtues that respond to our need for mutual support on account of our vulnerability see Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues (Open Court Publishing Company: Illinois, 2009). MacIntyre writes about the need for collegiality when making important decisions because we can be prone to faults in our reasoning processes, such as overlooking significant details of a situation, or on account of our dislikes for certain people which can obscure our capacity to make a just judgment (107-108). More specifically, MacIntyre writes about affective experiences and the virtues that properly form them in relation to others. For example, misericordia is the capacity to experience grief over another’s distress and then seek an appropriate way to respond to that person’s need (124-126).

620 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.24, a.3, resp.
They more clearly communicate the good will of one person to another and how he appreciates the plight of that person. An example of this is found in St Thomas’ teaching on pity. In *De Veritate*, q.26, a.4, St Thomas defines pity “as sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil”.\(^{621}\) Integral to this experience is the capacity to be aware of suffering in oneself and in the other person. St Thomas calls this capacity a “compassion of pity”.

In *De Veritate*, q.26, a.7, St Thomas asks: “who merits more, he who helps a poor man with a certain compassion of pity, or he who does it without any passion solely because of a judgment of reason?”\(^{622}\) St Thomas responds that a passion can be a sign of the will’s energy to do what is good and it can enable the person to perform a virtuous deed “more promptly and easily”.\(^{623}\) So, the performance of a properly charitable act with the compassion of pity merits more. In constructing this reply, St Thomas quotes St Augustine who asserts that “we do not live correctly” in this life if we have no passions. “For”, St Augustine explains, “not to grieve at all while we are in this place of misery … takes place only at the great cost of inhumanity in the soul and stupor in the body”.\(^{624}\) This applies as much to the grief we experience for others as it applies to the grief we feel on our own account.

The compassion of pity needs to be formed in the seminarian because it is a sign both that he respects the suffering of another person and that he wills that person’s good in a time of sorrow. This is an application of St Thomas’ teaching that someone who sees another sharing his sorrow, or a friend showing him love, feels that his burden is halved. He thus experiences the pleasure of knowing that he is loved and this is a great consolation to him. Such experiences can become a more perfect communication of compassion through appropriate gestures of consolation. Above we discussed the need to communicate sensitive love as an integral part of intellectual forms of love such as friendship. Likewise, there is a true need to communicate compassion by kind words and deeds. This enables the suffering person to receive compassion and be consoled. The

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621 *De Veritate*, q.26, a.4, resp.
622 *De Veritate*, q.26, a.7, prol.
623 *De Veritate*, q.26, a.7, resp. St Thomas makes the same point in *On Evil*, q.3, a.11, resp., trans. Richard Egan, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003): “one who gives alms with greater compassion earns a greater merit”. Thomas qualifies this by stating that the meritorious passion follows from and is in accord with a proper deliberation and willing of the good. If the person is only moved by the passion he “can sometimes err by being unduly compassionate”. Also see *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.77, a.6, ad 2.
seminarian’s capacity to experience such compassion and communicate it to others is essential. For, as a priest he will be called to reflect the attitude of Christ, who feels compassion for those who are harassed and helpless (cf. Matthew 9.35-36).

iii. The Benefits of St Thomas’ Teaching on Sorrow

St Thomas’ teaching on sorrow assists the seminarian in becoming a consoler and experiencing the compassion of pity to help those who are sorrowful. It first of all gives the seminarian a language to articulate his experience of sorrow and be aware of the indications of sorrow in himself and others. For example, the description of depression indicates an affective state of being weighed down and the reduction of the capacity to experience the good. This is the first stage of responding to alleviate the sorrow because the consideration of sorrow and its effects enables the seminarian to appreciate its real impact upon himself. It also enables him to see that a balanced approach to counselling someone in sorrow is to help him moderate that sorrow. That is, by looking at the truth of what has happened, we can seek to have a more proportionate response, rather than exaggerating the extent of the difficulty.

It is very important to also acknowledge that St Thomas’s discussion of the remedies for sorrow impart to the seminarian an attitude of properly caring for himself and others. St Thomas’ explanation of various remedies gives a basic program that the seminarian can practice and also communicate to someone who is suffering. The essence of it is to ameliorate the suffering by the replacement of some kind of pleasure or joy, that is, the experience of a physical or affective good to restore the person’s emotional balance. The examples St Thomas gives indicate basic remedies from the physical, such as taking a bath, to the deeply spiritual, such as contemplating and trusting the promises of Heaven. It is important to communicate to the seminarian St Thomas’ attitude that the needs of the whole person are to be respected. It is true that the seminarian should not sacrifice the greater goods of the spirit, such as the moral virtues, for the sake of wrongful physical and emotional pleasures. Still, it is equally important that he be educated to respect his true physical and emotional needs. Therefore, he rightly seeks proper remedies to restore his vitality when he feels the enervating effects of sorrow.
Furthermore, St Thomas’ teaching that sorrow is in accord with the human need to affectively respond to evil steers the seminarian away from failing to respect his need to express his sorrow. As St Thomas notes, to express our sorrow is a relief to our soul. This is relevant to how the seminarian needs to learn to articulate his sorrow, for the sake of his affective health, when he faces shocking events or feels weighed down by the negative experiences of life. Our culture is now more aware of the effects of negative experiences on the emotional well-being of those who have to deal with very emotionally demanding kinds of work. For example, we talk about the experience of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), when people such as soldiers, medical practitioners, and emergency personnel encounter situations involving the effects of violence and great personal loss. Such people, who serve others at the worst moments of their lives, require counselling in which they can express the sorrow they feel in the face of human suffering. They are also greatly helped by friends who listen to them and console them with their affectionate support. St Thomas’ teaching on the need to express one’s sorrow is very applicable here and it is relevant to the life of the priest who often supports others to cope with the sufferings of life. The difficulty the Diocesan priest can have is that he will often be alone after being called to a tragic accident or attend to a grieving family. He can also experience a kind of PTSD that will shock, enervate, and unsettle his affective resilience. As a seminarian he needs to learn to give voice to his sorrow and not leave it pent up within himself. He needs the support of others such as a spiritual director and a psychological counsellor, who can listen to him when he feels stressed by the sorrowful experiences of life. He also needs to open his heart to his friends so that he is consoled by their love and affection in moments of such stress.

However, a counterbalancing point is that the experience of sorrow needs to be tempered by a consideration of the truth of a situation. Grieving past the point of due proportion can be the cause of a failure to receive opportunities for joy that would ameliorate the sorrow. St Thomas’ teaching on applying remedies for sorrow gives the seminarian a very healthy attitude for himself, an attitude that he can encourage in others who are too prone to concentrate on the sorrows of life. To the contrary, he can make the effort, encouraging in others the same positive attitude, to experience the consoling pleasures, delights, and joys he rightly receives with thanksgiving. This calls for an attitude of seeking the good and the joyful, while avoiding a morose obsession with what is sorrowful. One example of the difference in attitudes is afforded us in St Thomas’ teaching about the person who gives alms sorrowfully. The cause of sorrow here lies in the failure to understand
that performing a good deed for another can be a true source of joy. This attitude would spoil much of the seminarian’s future joy as a priest. For, in giving to others through his pastoral work with an exaggerated sense of sorrow he would be deprived of the joy of assisting them in their need. Rather, he can develop the attitude of seeing the delight and joy he can feel when he gives to others so that they can live a better life. This generous attitude will give him joy and be a consolation to him when he feels sorrowful, since he will be moderating his sorrow by being attentive to the joy that he gives to someone else.

**Conclusion**

The purpose of this chapter has been to seek a better understanding of hatred and sorrow so that these two affective experiences can be integrated into the seminarian’s affective maturity. The experience of the good is primary in affective development, but there is a need to develop the seminarian’s capacity to respond properly to the experience of what is displeasing and harmful. Hatred can have a positive role in affective development, in the sense that it can be a proportionate affective response to the experience of evil. However, hatred needs to be properly oriented to what is in fact evil and not become the sin of hatred which is a negation of charity for one’s neighbor. Sorrow too can be the expression of a mature person, who recognizes the significance of what is good for the human person and the damage caused by its loss. From St Thomas’ teaching the seminarian can acquire a language to articulate this experience of sorrow, and be aware of the indications of sorrow in himself and others. He can recognize in the remedies for sorrow a call to properly care for himself and others by communicating compassion and alleviating human sorrow. Now, having reflected upon these passions of hatred and sorrow the major concern of the next chapter will be to examine the formation of the seminarian’s affective resilience.
CHAPTER 6

THE FORMATION OF AFFECTIVE RESILIENCE

In *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, Pope St John Paul II writes about the qualities needed for the priest to be “a bridge and not an obstacle for others in their meeting with Jesus Christ”. One example he gives is that in carrying out his ministry the priest ought to be “capable of bearing the weight of pastoral responsibilities”. We should also take into account the Pope’s teaching that the seminarian needs to be formed in “interior discipline, a spirit of sacrifice and self-denial, the acceptance of hard work and of the cross”. An essential attribute required for this demanding aspect of priestly life is affective resilience. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how St Thomas’ teaching can contribute to its development. Resilience is the affective capacity of the seminarian to respond well to the inevitable stresses of priestly life. These stresses include the challenges of supporting people who must cope with painful experiences, such as injustice. As a priest he will help others by guiding them to harness their affective resources in such trials.

Craig Steven Titus notes that “resilience” is a term taken from the science of physics which refers to “a material’s quality to resist deformation or destruction”. Resilience is a measure of the “material’s capacity to return to its original form after being bent, compressed or stretched”. In psychology, resilience is the individual and social capacity to face the challenges of life. It is the “capacity to do well in adversity”. The aim is to help someone “to cope with hardship; to resist the possible deformation of the competencies and integrity of one’s community, family, and self; and to achieve a new proficiency out of the unfavorable experience.” This is a proficiency that will help the seminarian to fulfill his vocation as he responds to its inevitable challenges.

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626 Ibid, n.49.
628 Ibid., 6-7. Titus notes that the word resilience “has Latin roots meaning ‘to jump, leap or bounce back’: resliens, resilire, re-salire”. See 7, f.n.20.
629 Ibid, 3.
630 Ibid, xi.
St Thomas discusses the irascible passions which help a person to become resilient by resisting those things that either keep him from attaining what is good or cause harm. 631 Thus the irascible passions help him to deal with difficulties and “rise above obstacles”. 632 For example, the affective experience of daring can be shaped by the virtue of fortitude to develop resilience through “initiative taking and endurance”. 633 “Indeed”, as Titus writes: “human development depends upon challenges.” 634 People grow through challenges, acquiring new levels of skill, experience and virtue. Affective resilience is necessary to this growth and to show how St Thomas’ teaching can help to develop it in the seminarian the following will be discussed: 1) Hope and Despair; 2) Fear and Daring; 3) Anger. The consideration of each of these passions will include comments about its significance for affective formation. 635

1. Hope and Despair

St Thomas considers hope as the first irascible passion. It is an affective inclination to look forward to the future good that is desired but which remains difficult to attain. 636 Focusing on the good in this way gives a proper affective balance to a person’s life. It leads him to judge the worthwhileness

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631 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.23, a.4, resp. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981). Etienne Gilson writes: “When it (desire) takes an object agreeable to the body, or gets away from a painful object, the movement accomplished to seize it or to flee it is attributed to a faculty which is given the name concupiscible; but when it resists an object to destroy or neutralize it, we attribute it to a faculty which bears the name of irascible.” Etienne Gilson, Moral Values and the Moral Life: The Ethical Theory of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Leo Richard Ward, from the 4th edition, Paris, J.Gabalda, 1925 (USA: Kessinger Publishing, LLC, no date given), 96.


633 Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude, xi.

634 Ibid, 74.

635 For a clear and concise explanation of the irascible passions read Walter Farrell, O.P., A Companion to the Summa: II: The Pursuit of Happiness, Chapter VII (London and New York: Sheed and Ward, 1938), 133-154. Farrell describes the irascible passions as the “emergency” passions that are intimately linked to the concupiscible or “mild” passions by way of defending them or responding to what inhibits them (134).

636 Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.1, resp.
of his efforts by the good that they achieve. The significance of hope for affective formation can be explained with the help of St Thomas’ teaching that the affective state of the person influences him to act in accordance with it. As he explains: “when a man is affected by a passion, things seem greater or smaller than they really are; thus to a lover, what he loves seems better; to him that fears what he fears seems more dreadful.” Likewise, the person who has been formed in hope focuses on what can be done to make a situation better. With this hopeful stance the seminarian will possess, for example, a greater aptitude for challenging fields of apostolic work.

However, given the various levels of physical and psychological competence, the seminarian also needs to rely on the help of others. Expectation, from the Latin expectare (to wait) implies, St Thomas explains, “keeping one’s eyes on another (ex alio spectare)”. It is a form of hope through which a person attains the difficult good through the help of another. This requires the seminarian to progress from thinking in terms of his own affective life and looking outward to how he can be helped by others. Furthermore, he also needs to be more conscious of how he can encourage affective growth in others, by helping them to strive for the good of which they are capable.

Whereas hope moves someone to attain what is difficult but possible, despair is the affective response to what is impossible. Despair implies a feeling to withdraw from the good. In doing this it can serve to help a person avoid expending his energy on what is unobtainable. Miner offers this insight: “Rather than suppress despair, we should acknowledge that our efforts might be more profitably spent seeking a good that we can attain.” The affective response of despair is

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637 Robert Miner explains: “Of the irascible passions, hope bears the simplest and most direct relation to the good. The other irascible passions have a less direct relation to good: despair regards the good as impossible; fear and daring are responses to evil; anger aims for the good, but only when it perceives something as evil.” Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 216.

638 Summa Theologica I-II, q.44, a.2, resp.

639 Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.2, ad 1.

640 Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.1, ad 3. St Thomas writes: “The very name of despair (desperatio)” implies that it is contrary to hope (spes)”. Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.4, resp. If we separate desperatio into “de” and speratio we get St Thomas’ point. De in Latin can mean “down from, away from” and speratio is from the verb spero, “to look for, to expect” and hence hope for. D.P. Simpson, M.A., Cassell’s Latin Dictionary, 5th ed. (London/New York: Continuum, 2000), 166, 565.

641 Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.4, resp.

642 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 220.
proportionate to the nature of created reality.\textsuperscript{643} This enables us to make an important distinction about the moral quality of despair. We have limited resources to attain the good and finite reality has a limited capacity to fulfill us. Nonetheless, despair as a choice would be wrong when we give up pursuing a particular good without due reason.

In relation to God, however, we have every reason to hope in his promises for he is infinitely good and merciful. St Thomas locates the origin of the sin of despair in the appetitive movement that is “conformed to a false intellect”, that is, a false judgment.\textsuperscript{644} However, he continues, “the true opinion of the intellect about God is that from Him comes salvation to mankind, and pardon to sinners …”\textsuperscript{645} This is an enduring source of encouragement to turn to God for help and part of the priest’s service is to help people be convinced of God’s merciful attitude. He can recommend to those who experience doubts about God’s mercy, for example, Luke 15.11-31, which relates how the father generously welcomed home his repentant son. He can also recommend prayers such as the Act of Hope.\textsuperscript{646}

A person needs to be made aware of the good reasons for hope and the possibility of attaining the difficult good it strives for. As St Thomas explains: since hope regards the difficult but possible future good, something may be a cause of hope “either because it makes something possible to a man: or because it makes him think something possible”.\textsuperscript{647} Among the various resources that foster hope St Thomas mentions “experience: since by experience man acquires the faculty of doing something easily”.\textsuperscript{648} He also refers to “teaching and persuasion” which can help someone “think that he can obtain something”.\textsuperscript{649} As well as acquiring knowledge through experience, there

\textsuperscript{643} Miner writes: “With regard to the attainment of any particular, finite good, it is always possible that despair is a legitimate response.” \textit{Thomas Aquinas on the Passions}, 220.
\textsuperscript{644} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.20, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{645} Ibid. St Thomas then writes “it is a false opinion that He refuses pardon to the repentant sinner, or that He does not turn sinners to Himself by sanctifying grace. Therefore, just as the movement of hope, which is in conformity with the true opinion, is praiseworthy and virtuous, so that contrary movement of despair, which is in conformity with the false opinion about God, is vicious and sinful.”
\textsuperscript{646} “O Lord God, I hope by your grace for the pardon of all my sins and after life here to gain eternal happiness because you have promised it who are infinitely powerful, faithful, kind, and merciful. In this hope I intend to live and die. Amen.” \textit{Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church} (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005/Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications, 2006), 191.
\textsuperscript{647} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.40, a.5, resp.
\textsuperscript{648} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{649} Ibid.
is also the formation of someone in accordance with “a certain habit, by reason of custom, which renders the action easier”.\textsuperscript{650} Miner gives the example of a person who having perfected her knowledge of Greek will be encouraged to learn other languages.\textsuperscript{651} In regard to the seminarian, we can think of various experiences, such as engaging in pastoral challenges, which help him to gain confidence in dealing with difficult situations.

Hope engenders good relations and a confidence to perform good activities. By hoping for a good through another, “we are moved towards him as to our own good; and thus we begin to love him”.\textsuperscript{652} Furthermore, as Robert Miner points out, giving hope to others encourages them to love us.\textsuperscript{653} Moreover, hope promotes good activity. Miner comments that while smugness can “diminish action”, a proper confidence fosters good action.\textsuperscript{654} Otherwise, a man could be “paralysed by fear”.\textsuperscript{655} Hope also promotes good human activity because the perception that a good is difficult to attain “arouses our attention”.\textsuperscript{656} People often rise to the occasion when they see a challenge, especially those who are gifted. Also, hope causes pleasure by way of making us look forward to attaining the difficult good which requires greater effort and thus is more pleasing.\textsuperscript{657}

There is a point of realism, though, in St Thomas’ teaching on hope that is well recommended to the seminarian. False hope is based upon a poor judgment of the capabilities of both the person involved and the circumstances in which the action must take place. Youthfulness, for instance, can be a cause of hope because youths have little to remember of the past, and they have “much of the future” ahead of them and they look forward to it.\textsuperscript{658} Also, they “are full of spirit” and can feel uninhibited by a sense of failure or the consequences of certain courses of action. Thus youths, “through inexperience of obstacles and of their own shortcomings, easily count a thing possible”.\textsuperscript{659} Drunkards and foolish and thoughtless persons can attempt anything heedless of the consequences both for them and others, because “they are indeed unsteady in reality: but, in their

\textsuperscript{650} Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.5, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{651} Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 221.
\textsuperscript{652} Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.7, resp.
\textsuperscript{653} See Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 226.
\textsuperscript{654} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{655} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{656} Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.8, resp.
\textsuperscript{657} Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 227.
\textsuperscript{658} Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.6, resp.
\textsuperscript{659} Ibid.
A sober life, which disposes a person to a cautious judgment of what is possible, counteracts such imprudent behavior.

An important dimension of St Thomas’ discussion of hope is how it is properly formed by the virtue of magnanimity, by which a man has greatness of soul and stretches toward noble things. St Thomas distinguishes magnanimity from the theological virtue of hope, by which we are assisted by God to attain union with him. As a human virtue, which perfects the passion of hope, magnanimity leads a man to strive for that which is humanly greater. This also predisposes him to strive for the greatest good, union with God himself. In this regard Miner asks a very penetrating question: “Why should we suppose that persons who lack the habit of aiming for the arduous good in earthly matters are nonetheless well prepared to attempt the most difficult of goods?” Here is an example of how a proper love for what is proper to our earthly life disposes us to have a desire for greater heavenly goods.

The seminarian should strive for what is noble in human matters to dispose himself to work for God’s glory. Those lacking magnanimity often limit their horizon to lesser pleasures and do not see the fulfilling nature of spiritual goods. This has special relevance to the seminarian’s vocation. Impelled by magnanimity hope empowers him to strive for the difficult good of committing himself to the service of God and his people. This needs to be tempered by a realism about his true capacity to live such a life. However, without the disposition of magnanimity he will be too easily inclined to forego his vocation in the face of difficulties. In his way, he may fail to attain the noble character of which he is capable in the service of others.

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660 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.40, a.6, ad 2. The examples of false hope provided by Miner are neither to be admired nor imitated: “The drunk person at a party who hopes to jump from the eighth floor to the ground without injury has false hope, as does his drunken buddy who hopes to charm the girl who has always found him repulsive. Both hope to achieve a difficult good, but their hope is not governed by reason.” *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 224.

661 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.17, a.5, ad 4.

662 *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 228.

663 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.20, a.4, resp.
2. Fear and Daring

The human heart can be inclined to a disordered love for the things of this world and hence an inordinate fear to lose them. As St Thomas writes, we are often “more moved by fear than by love”. Yet Christ broke our greatest fear through giving his life for us and opening the way to eternal life. A major task of the affectively mature Christian is to reflect in his own life this victory of Christ over fear. The Christian does this by moderating his own fears, so that he is not intimidated into doing evil, and by developing the passion of daring that equips him to struggle against evil. An application of this truth to affective formation is that the seminarian needs to reflect on his experience of fear so that he can better understand how it affects his decision making. He also needs to understand how daring needs to be properly formed by due deliberation. In relation to these matters, the teaching of St Thomas will offer the seminarian both a more accurate way of describing his experience of fear and how to develop the passions of fear and daring.

St Thomas defines the object of fear as the avoidance of an evil that is difficult to resist. He describes various kinds of fear. Laziness is the shrinking from work out of fear that it is too much of a burden. This is not “simply disinclination to work”, Miner explains, but a “feeling of anxiety experienced by anyone confronted by an unavoidable labor that surpasses his inclination”. There is also a fear of disgrace about something still to be done – shamefacedness – or about something that has been done – shame.

Other fears flow from the feeling that an evil can surpass our capacity to resist it. If a person finds it difficult to estimate the magnitude of an evil he experiences amazement. The feeling of “stupor” is caused by something that is out of the ordinary and therefore appears great. Anxiety

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664 Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Chapter Two, Lecture Four, n.144, trans. Chrysostom Baer, O. Praem. (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2006).
665 Ibid.
666 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.41, a.2, ad 1, 3.
667 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.41, a.4, resp.
668 Miner translates laziness as “sluggishness”, taking this translation from the Latin for laziness - segnities. Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 235.
669 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.41, a.4, resp. The Latin for shamefacedness captures the bodily change that is associated with the passion: erubscentia or blushing. See Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 235.
670 Summa Theologica I-II, q.41, a.4, resp.
671 Ibid.
is a fear of unforeseen misfortunes.\textsuperscript{672} There is also a fear of being in the power of another. For example, when someone knows that we have committed a crime and may reveal it to others.\textsuperscript{673}

A person’s fear is intensified by an evil that takes him by surprise because it leaves him little time to consider what he can do to respond to it.\textsuperscript{674} Yet, while it helps him to think about the evil he will face, undue thought can diminish his capacity to respond to it, because the evil seems larger in his mind when he thinks too much about it.\textsuperscript{675} Fear is further intensified when it is not remedied. Due to the human person’s sense of time the fear of evil is very oppressive when it is long-lasting.\textsuperscript{676} However, the underlying cause of fear is love, inasmuch as we perceive that something or someone will deprive us of the good we love.\textsuperscript{677} Thus defects - our experiences of our lack of power to resist an evil - cause fear in two ways. First, “it is owing to some lack of power that one is unable easily to repulse a threatening evil”.\textsuperscript{678} Second, it is through “power and strength” that one man can cause fear to another, for example, by inflicting an injustice.\textsuperscript{679} This amounts to an abuse of power and a lack of charity. Hence it is an affective and moral defect.

Fear involves a contraction of the person’s affective experience, in the sense that fear implies a lack of power to overcome the threatening evil.\textsuperscript{680} However, paradoxically, fear can also make people flee from danger.\textsuperscript{681} Hence fear can provide a great energy for preserving a person’s life. Yet, the reaction of fear, if not moderated, can freeze a person in the face of a seemingly irresistible evil. Moderated fear, however, can help a person to respond well to a difficulty. Realizing that he has to deal with a painful problem, someone can seek counsel from another who is in a better state of mind than himself or of greater experience and wisdom.\textsuperscript{682} Conversely, a strong fear can interfere with someone’s capacity to give counsel.\textsuperscript{683}

\textsuperscript{672} Ibid. The Latin for anxiety is \textit{agonia}. See \textit{Thomas Aquinas on the Passions}, 237.
\textsuperscript{673} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.42, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{674} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.42, a.5, resp.
\textsuperscript{675} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.42, a.5, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{676} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.42, a.6, resp.
\textsuperscript{677} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.43, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{678} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.43, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{679} \textit{Ibid}.
\textsuperscript{680} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{681} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.1, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{682} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.2, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{683} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.2, resp.
Such is the effect of fear that it can cause a person to tremble in his speech and limbs.\textsuperscript{684} Fear can then hinder action because “the bodily members” are instruments of our choices when we act.\textsuperscript{685} However, even though fear can interfere with good judgment, if it is moderated, it can help someone to work with greater attention to escape what he fears.\textsuperscript{686} Furthermore, the moderation of fear entails the moderation of a person’s imagination, which can have a big impact on how he feels and acts. St Thomas gives the example of the man who walking on a plank on high can fall through his fear of being so high, whereas he would not feel such fear when walking on a plank that is closer to the ground. This happens because the man “suffers a disturbance of his imagination, through fear of the fall that is pictured to his imagination”.\textsuperscript{687} The main point for the seminarian’s affective formation is that he restrain his fear so that it does not lead him to make wrongful decisions.

Daring is the opposite passion to fear. Daring inclines someone to turn on the danger to defeat it.\textsuperscript{688} It ensues from hope, in the sense that there is a desire to defeat an evil and this would remove a threat to the good can be enjoyed.\textsuperscript{689} Some of the things that foster daring and help “us reckon victory as possible are” the power we have from “bodily strength, experience of dangers, abundance of wealth, … a great number of friends or any means of help, especially if a man trust in the Divine assistance”.\textsuperscript{690} St Thomas also notes that those of a particular physical constitution are more naturally inclined to daring.

St Thomas also refers to those who are drunk and feel more daring because the wine dilates their heart and makes them “think greatly” of themselves.\textsuperscript{691} A false knowledge of our abilities, or an illusionary imagination of our excellence, can also lead to a very imprudent daring. A wise person, however, duly deliberates about the circumstances and difficulties involved, as well as his ability to succeed in those circumstances. People who deliberate are at the advantage, because “they experience nothing unforeseen” and “sometimes the difficulty turns out to be less than they

\textsuperscript{684} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.3, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{685} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{686} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.4, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{687} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.44, a.4, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{688} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.45, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{689} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.45, a.2, resp.
\textsuperscript{690} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.45, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{691} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.45, a.3, ad 1.
anticipated; wherefore they are more persevering”. The impulsive, on the other hand, can face unanticipated dangers which therefore seem greater, or the dangers take them unprepared without time and means to cope. False daring is thus opposed to the virtue of fortitude, which moderates the passion of daring according to a judgment about a person’s capability to succeed.

St Thomas’ analysis leads us to appreciate that a proper understanding of fear is integral to the seminarian’s affective formation. Fear is not to be seen as a purely negative emotion because it manifests an awareness that one’s good and the good of others is to be cherished and preserved. Appropriate fear demonstrates a rightful care for one’s own safety and the welfare of others which is threatened by the presence of what may harm them. As Erika Hunter explains, fear “puts us in touch with our need for safety”. If properly moderated, fear serves to make the seminarian cautious and it inclines him to avoid harm. This is a legitimate part of the affectively mature person’s character, by which he properly seeks to avoid damaging experiences for both himself and others. The first step in the discernment of how fear affects him and the need to moderate it, is to be aware of its symptoms, such as coldness and the impulse to flee. However, instead of seeing this experience as a hindrance to good action, the seminarian ought to harness the energy of fear by allowing it to make him both careful and inclined to seek counsel.

These points are relevant to many kinds of possible harm but one in particular concerns how the seminarian ought to develop a proportionate sense of fear and caution in relation to his own emotional welfare and that of others. In view of his future pastoral role as a confidant for those who need to discuss aspects of their lives which are highly sensitive, the seminarian needs to develop a healthy attitude of respecting the limits of his own emotional balance. For example, in conducting interviews with those of the opposite sex he needs to take diligent care of when, for how long, and where he meets someone to discuss matters of a deeply emotional nature. On

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692 Summa Theologica I-II, q.45, a.4, resp.
693 The verb, “to deliberate”, comes from the Latin deliberare which is composed of two words, de which can mean “of” or “from” and librare which means “weigh”. Librare comes from the Latin noun libra which means “balance”. Bruce Moore, The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th ed. (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2004), 366. Hence, deliberare means “to weigh carefully, consider, consult about”. Cassell’s Latin Dictionary, 175.
694 Summa Theologica II-II, q.127, a.2, resp.
695 Erika M. Hunter, Little Book of Big Emotions: How Five Feelings Affect Everything You Do and Don’t Do (Center City, Minnesota: Hazelden, 2004), 23.
occasion he will need to ask someone to desist from her descriptions of what has happened to her or what she has done because enough has been said to make a reasonable person aware of the circumstances. For example, some married people can see in the priest someone who will be unaffected by detailed descriptions of a sexual nature. This is naïve and the seminarian has to acquire the confidence to guide the conversation on to another point. The seminarian needs to act so that it will be clear, if he had to make an account of himself to someone in authority, what was done and how he met with someone in circumstances that ensured her emotional security. This applies mutatis mutandis in many other instances involving highly emotional situations, such as meeting with those who are grieving or those who are vulnerable on account of their being very young or mentally unwell. In each case a healthy sense of fear for his own personal emotional welfare and the proper care of others will help him to act in an appropriate way.696

The passion of daring, on the other hand, provides the affective energy to combat whatever jeopardizes both our good and the welfare of the people we love. Properly moderated, daring is part of the affective makeup of the mature person. However, the seminarian needs to learn that daring should be governed by a deliberation on the reality of the situation he faces and his capacity to respond to it. Otherwise, he will act injudiciously and so both diminish his chances of success and even unduly risk harm to others. Moreover, the study of St Thomas’ reflections on how daring is caused, by looking at the reasons that give someone a hope of success, will help the seminarian to perform difficult tasks. For example, the seminarian needs to both consider his own personal competencies and seek the help of others when he faces pastoral challenges, such as the rejuvenation of a parish that has become indifferent.

696 Hunter gives a very good treatment of how fear can manifest itself in negative attitudes to others and shut down positive possibilities for personal growth. See Little Book of Big Emotions, 59-82. The point I would take from her reflections is that the seminarian needs to be careful of how fear can shut down possibilities not only for his own personal growth but for the development of his pastoral effectiveness. For example, Hunter mentions a fear of rejection that prevents some people from sharing deeper personal relationships. In something of the same say, the seminarian and priest, through fear of rejection and misunderstanding, can be afraid to reach out to others to invite them into a deeper relationship with Christ.
3. Anger

St Thomas’ consideration of the causes and effects of anger assists the seminarian to have a more mature grasp of anger’s role in his life, and how he needs to respect the difference between just vengeance and vindictiveness. By reflecting on the various tendencies to anger, the seminarian can learn to understand how he experiences it on account of his perception that he has been treated unjustly. An equally important point can be taken from St Thomas’ reflections on how showing contempt for others can provoke anger. As Pope St John Paul II teaches, the priest ought “especially, to be balanced in judgment and behavior”.697 This entails setting aside undue anger and the effort to avoid giving unnecessary offence.

A person becomes angry, according to St Thomas, when he suffers an injustice and desires some form of vengeance. Vengeance is the correction of the injustice and the imposition of a punishment on the unjust person.698 This movement of anger, as “a desire for vengeance”, involves an act of reason by which someone compares “the punishment to be inflicted and the hurt done”.699 In this case, anger follows reason, “in so far as the reason denounces” an injury.700 Unfortunately, St Thomas explains, anger does not listen perfectly to reason, “because it does not observe the rule of reason as to the measure of vengeance. Anger, therefore, requires an act of reason; and yet proves a hindrance to reason”.701 As Miner explains: “Immoderate anger leads a person to take a partial, distorted view of the situation, and thus to contemplate means of vindication that he would renounce in a cool hour.”702 Hence, the need for this issue to be addressed in the process of the seminarian’s affective formation so that he does not do harm, out of an immoderate anger, in his future pastoral ministry.

St Thomas is careful to distinguish between vengeance and vindictiveness. He uses the word *vindicta* for the vindication or, as Miner writes, “setting things right”, that anger aims at.703 St Thomas uses a different word, *ulciscor*, to refer to an improper desire for vengeance. *Ulciscor* is

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697 *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, n.43.
698 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.46, a.2, resp.
699 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.46, a.4, resp.
700 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.46, a.4, ad 1.
701 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.46, a.4, ad 3.
702 *Thomas Aquinas on the Passions*, 274.
703 Ibid, 271.
an inclination to vengeance which does not intend the good that comes from a just punishment, “for instance that the sinner may amend, or at least that he may be restrained and others not be disturbed”.704 The words “vindicate” and “vindictive” highlight the difference between vengeance and unjust revenge. Vindicate comes from the Latin vindicare, which means “claim” or “avenge”.705 In English vindicate refers to justifying a person by evidence or argument, for instance, in a courtroom.706 The word “vindictive”, however, refers to an attitude of “tending to seek revenge” and inflicting punishment to an exaggerated degree.707

St Thomas gives various descriptions of those who are prone to anger by temperament or habit. A bilious man becomes angry quickly. Anger caused by an increase in grief which stays in the memory for a long time is called ill-will. An increase in the desire for vengeance which never rests until it is avenged is called rancor. The choleric person is easily angered, the bitter person retains his anger for a long time and the ill-tempered person never rests until he has got revenge.708 Some can be angry over things of lesser importance. They can imagine wrongs against them and habitually respond with anger without reflecting on other more helpful responses.

We can also feel an injury done to another as done to us because we love him or her on account of kinship, friendship or our common humanity.709 Another cause of anger is to slight a person. To give someone a slight is to show disrespect for his excellence, contempt for his position or unduly hindering him from doing his will.710 For example, we can unduly forget others; not hesitate to give them pain by our remarks; or show “signs of hilarity when another is in misfortune”.711 A man can also be angry when someone despises something of “very great interest” to him.712 Moreover, keeping silence can provoke anger in someone if he thinks we are treating him with “contempt”.713 A man can be offended when he receives an unjust slight in a “matter in which he excels.” St Thomas gives the examples of “a wealthy man in his riches, or an orator in his

704 Summa Theologica II-II, q.108, a.1, resp.
705 The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1600.
706 Ibid.
707 Ibid.
708 Summa Theologica I-II, q.46, a.8, resp.
709 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.1, ad 2.
710 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.2, resp.
711 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.2, ad 3.
712 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.1, ad 3.
713 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.1, ad 4.
eloquence…” 714 Likewise, if someone possesses an excellent ability he can become angry with those who do not appreciate his greatness. 715 Thus we see the “susceptibility to anger displayed by talented artists, musicians, writers, actors, and athletes who lack the moral virtues”. 716 Another cause of anger is being despised by a friend because it is felt as “a greater indignity” when he hurts us or fails to help us. 717

One aspect of the experience of anger concerns the deliberateness with which an unjust action is committed. This is revealed in the fact that anger is often more easily appeased when a harm is not deliberately done, while we are particularly angry with those who deliberately cause us harm. 718 Another aspect of this issue concerns the need to make an apology to someone we have offended. An apology appeases anger when the offender repents of his evil and humbly asks for pardon. 719 For “they seem not to despise, but rather to think much of those before whom they humble themselves”. 720 Hence, the importance of the seminarian learning to express his sorrow to others when he has offended them, in order that they may know they are respected and esteemed. This will enable his future parishioners, for example, to know that he cares for them, he is humble enough to admit his mistakes, and he gives them good example to do likewise for others.

The seminarian needs to be careful of the fervor that anger induces. The angry person can experience great fervor and impetuosity to inflict vengeance. 721 Love increases this fervor of anger because when hurt is inflicted on “the excellence” we love, we therefore feel the hurt “the more”. 722 It is true that the fervor of love “has a certain sweetness and gentleness; for it tends to the good that one loves”. However, “the fervor of anger has a certain bitterness with a tendency to destroy, for it seeks to be avenged on the contrary evil”. 723 Although, the passing of time has an alleviating effect on the fervor of anger because the memory of the injustice tends to fade. 724 Also, “by reason

714 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.3, resp.
715 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 281.
716 Ibid, 281-282.
717 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.4, ad 3.
718 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.2, resp.
719 Summa Theologica I-II, q.47, a.4, resp.
720 Ibid.
721 Summa Theologica I-II, q.48, a.2, resp.
722 Summa Theologica I-II, q.48, a.2, ad 1.
723 Ibid.
724 Summa Theologica I-II, q.48, a.2, ad 2.
of its vehemence” anger “soon dies away”.\textsuperscript{725} The lesson here is that anger passes soon enough and the wise person waits until he comes to a point of emotional balance to make a better decision.

The major benefit of St Thomas’ teaching on anger for the seminarian’s affective formation is that he accords it a proper place in the development of human affectivity as a response to evil. In fact, St Thomas argues that if there is not a strong experience of the passion of anger it can indicate that the movement of the will is “altogether lacking or weak”.\textsuperscript{726} He sees this as a vice because it lacks a proper appreciation for the good that is harmed.\textsuperscript{727} Moreover, anger can be “useful, as being conducive to the more prompt execution of reason’s dictate: else, the sensitive appetite in man would be to no purpose”.\textsuperscript{728} That is, anger is a passion that can assist us to perform virtuous acts that rectify injustice and help us to endure evils. An example of harnessing anger for a good purpose is given to us by Dr. Conrad Baars who relates that anger helped him survive the concentration camp at Buchenwald. Shipped to Buchenwald with one thousand French prisoners, he was one of only six who survived the ordeal. He writes that after his faith in God, it was “his constant anger” at the Nazis for imprisoning him and “their inhumane treatment of their prisoners” that made him determined to survive.\textsuperscript{729} Baars describes anger as an emotion given to us by God to help us overcome great obstacles through our endurance and determination.\textsuperscript{730} The seminarian too has to learn to properly harness the energy of anger to help him respond well to injustices and endure times of difficulty.

The seminarian’s knowledge of the effects of his anger, such as the hindering of reason, urges him to acquire a realistic self-knowledge. The angry person can exaggerate what has been done to him and cease to see other factors that would moderate his anger. St Thomas’ teaching on how those gifted with a certain excellence can react strongly to a lack of appreciation for their gifts is pertinent here too. St Thomas’ observations can help the seminarian to see a profound psychological truth about the experience of anger, which “gives clues”, as Erika Hunter writes, “as to who we are,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[725] Ibid.
\item[726] \textit{Summa Theologica }II-II, q.158, a.8, resp.
\item[727] \textit{Summa Theologica }II-II, q.158, a.8, ad 3.
\item[728] \textit{Summa Theologica }II-II, q.158, a.8, ad 2.
\item[730] Ibid, 159.
\end{footnotes}
what we value, and how we prefer to live”.\textsuperscript{731} In the seminarian’s experience of anger or in the intensity of his anger he can find reflected an undue attachment to his own excellence and the need for it to be acknowledged by others. This touches upon the expectation he may have that others openly give him credit for the good he has done as worthy of special acclaim. This is a problem for the seminarian who is preparing to be a pastor of the Christian community. By virtue of his calling to reflect the selfless and dedicated love of the Good Shepherd, there is a certain self-effacement that is appropriate to his role as a friend and servant of God’s people. There is also a great patience required because he will often have to work quietly for the good of others without public recognition or without obvious and quick results. This is fitting because he shares in the work of Christ which is very often quiet and goes unappreciated.

It could also be that the seminarian’s anger, when he is not acclaimed, points to an affective stance by which he does not have his heart truly set upon the good of the people entrusted to his pastoral care. Rather, he may be given over to the acclaim that is given for doing good rather than doing the good for others to help them. A part of the answer to this anger is to reflect upon the joy of knowing that when he has performed his duty for others he has had a part to play in the personal growth of his fellow Christians. None of this denies the real need to be given due honor and the virtuous disposition to graciously receive praise when it is rightfully offered. I will address other aspects of this question about the need for acclaim and a balanced response to the question of how to distinguish true and false glory in Chapter 10.

Instead of denying and ignoring his anger the seminarian can act more intelligently by acknowledging it and measuring its appropriateness by the truth of a situation. Instead of doing nothing so that he becomes more frustrated he can learn to communicate his anger when it is appropriate. He should not be burdened with the incorrect assumption that all anger is wrong. He should ask: is this anger just and is the response it influences me to make in accord with justice? This is an essential question of self-knowledge because, as Titus explains: “Emotions are steeping-stones to action. Etymologically, emotion, which comes from motere, involves a movement or change in the person’s ‘action readiness’; we approach or withdraw from an object.”\textsuperscript{732} Thus, self-awareness is crucial to affective maturity because a person can act before being fully aware of the

\textsuperscript{731} Little Book of Big Emotions, 21.
\textsuperscript{732} Resilience and the Virtue of Fortitude, 36.
course of action to which the passion inclines him. As Titus notes: “A first step in educating emotional reaction involves self-observation.”  

So, the first step the seminarian needs to take in properly forming his anger is to grow in his self-awareness of when his anger is immoderate.

Additionally, the seminarian may be prone to anger in a way that reflects St Thomas’ description of the various tendencies to anger such as ill-will and bitterness. This requires him to reflect on why he is angry; whether he speaks in anger without need and by force of habit; whether he expresses his anger appropriately and in proportion to the cause of his anger. The seminarian’s self-knowledge in this matter will be deepened when he is attentive to the reactions of others to the way he speaks and acts. He will also be humble enough to learn that he may be too easily inclined to anger. Thus he will not trust his anger but refrain from responding until he is in a more balanced affective state.

There is a further consideration in relation to anger, which is best dealt with now rather than in Chapter 10, which will consider the other capital sins such as pride and vainglory. This consideration concerns both how anger can be sinful and what virtues help to purify it. It is true that St Thomas refers to the anger that accords with the proper judgment of reason as “zealous anger”. Anger, however, is sinful when it goes beyond what is just. For example, when an innocent person is punished or when an excessive punishment is inflicted. Anger is also attractive inasmuch as it appears to seek justice and because it “precipitates the mind into all kinds of inordinate action”. Motivated by the desire to correct injustice someone can convince himself that his proposed action is correct and he can act without reflecting about such factors as

733 Ibid, 41.
734 For a very helpful description of how learning to express anger well can help build better relationships and promote a deeper sense of affective balance, see Erika M. Hunter, Little Book of Big Emotions, 39-58. Hunter explains that acknowledging anger and learning to express it properly to others, instead of denying it and allowing it to overflow into inappropriate and sudden explosions of bad temper, enables us to become more responsible people.
735 Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.1, ad 2. See Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.1, ad 2. Since anger provides the affective impetus to complete acts of rightful vengeance, it is an example of how the passions are “conducive to the more prompt execution of reason’s dictate”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.8, ad 2.
736 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.2, resp.
737 Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.6, resp. DeYoung writes that when we experience anger we need to “broaden our scope of the situation, both to include the rightful claims of others and to put our own claims into perspective”. See Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and their Remedies (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press/Baker Publishing Group, 2009), 123.
ascertaining the relevant facts. Thus, he seriously limits his ability to respond helpfully to a situation.

St Thomas articulates six main expressions of sinful anger which the seminarian can reflect on as he learns to discern his propensity for anger. Indignation is anger with another because we think that he acted in a way beneath our dignity. By swelling of the mind our thoughts are filled with devising “various means of vengeance”. Clamor occurs when a man is disordered and confused in his speech. Blasphemy is when he “breaks out into injurious words … against God”, and contumely is when he speaks words “against his neighbor”. Quarrels occur when one man contradicts the statement of another out of a lack of love and courtesy. Ridicule (derision and mockery) is the expression of angry words to make another “confused and ashamed”. As Basil Cole explains, this is done “by making fun of his seeming defects” and with the intention to inflict private or public embarrassment on another. For the seminarian, the importance of avoiding these unjust forms of anger is that they undermine the trust and mutual esteem that the priest needs to build with others, through the courtesy and moderation of his speech.

The seminarian also needs to moderate both his external actions and his internal experience of anger. This has implications both for the good of the seminarian himself and the good of others, because internal passions are also principles of external actions. Thus, by the virtue of meekness the seminarian needs to moderate his desire for vengeance and through the attitude of clemency he needs to moderate the external punishment for wrongdoing. For St Thomas, these two virtues are appropriate to the love we ought to have for others and which inclines us to take no pleasure in punishment for its own sake. Rather, we ought to look with a proper sense of calm to correct the person concerned and mitigate the punishment when this is right to do so.

738 Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.7, resp.
739 Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.7, resp.
740 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.116, a.1, resp.
742 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.158, a.2, resp.
743 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.157, a.1, ad 1.
744 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.157, a.1, ad 2. Thus, while severity is the determination to inflict punishment “when right reason requires it”, clemency “mitigates punishment also according to right reason, when and where this is requisite”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.157, a.2, ad 1. As Garrigou-Lagrange explains, when a just severity is
Clemency and meekness help the angry person to remain “self-possessed” and therefore more capable of judging well of what to do in difficult situations.\textsuperscript{746} As St Thomas writes, by inclining us to mitigate the punishment we inflict on another, clemency is closely connected to charity which inclines us to do good to others rather than evil.\textsuperscript{747} Moreover, \textit{epikeia} is a virtue, connected to clemency, by which we understand the limits of the law giver’s intention and mitigate a punishment that was not intended for a particular kind of case. The application of the law according to this kind of valid exception is equity.\textsuperscript{748} Clemency assists the virtue of equity by influencing the angry person to inflict punishment only when it is necessary.\textsuperscript{749}

Reflecting on St Thomas’ teaching on anger, Cole asks about how a priest should act with his parishioners even if his anger is justified? “The difficulty in the priesthood”, he writes, “is that one may reasonably use anger to solve a problem, but often it only creates more problems causing some bad people to become worse and discouraging good people from becoming better.”\textsuperscript{750} Therefore, the priest should strive to be prudent to know when and how to express anger and “cultivate a love of gentleness while not becoming a wimp in the face of evils in his parish community.”\textsuperscript{751} It is also helpful for him to be aware of what makes him vulnerable to excessive anger, for example, tiredness, loneliness or discouragement. He can, besides, as St Thomas advises, avoid thoughts that cause anger even though he may not be able to “prevent disordered movements from arising”.\textsuperscript{752} In this way he can moderate his anger by focusing on thoughts and matters that properly absorb his attention and distract him in a healthy way from what causes him to feel anger.

\textsuperscript{746} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.157, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{747} See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.157, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{748} See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.157, a.2, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{749} To the contrary, injustice is the infliction of an excess of punishment and cruelty is “the hardness of heart” which leads someone to increase the punishment inflicted through injustice. \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.159, a.1, ad 1. A worse vice is to “delight in a man’s punishment for its own sake” so that savage or brutal person lacks “the human feeling that leads one man to love another”. \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.157, a.1, ad 3. The savage and brutal man acts according to the “bestial emotions”. These are corrupted passions that move a man to inflict punishment for “merely the pleasure” he derives “from a man’s torture”. \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.159, a.2, resp.
\textsuperscript{750} \textit{The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood}, 207.
\textsuperscript{751} Ibid, 214.
The seminarian also needs to temper his zeal and not allow it to be driven by a self-righteous anger. Zeal is the intensity of love which sets aside any obstacles to union with the beloved and it moves us to counteract what opposes the beloved’s good. So, the greater the love and the greater the zeal to protect the beloved, the greater the anger is when the beloved is hurt or offended. This can be a challenge for those who love God and seek his glory and feel hurt that God is treated with indifference and arrogance. Zeal and anger thus need to be tempered so that they do not become a hatred for others, by which we desire “another’s evil for evil’s sake”. For we are prone to sin by way of excess, even though we begin with a just cause. Thus, we can sin, St Thomas reminds us, when we seek “vengeance with the aim of doing away with the sinner rather than the sin”. The seminarian needs to ask for the grace to seek God’s honor, but to do this in a way that reveals God’s true justice and mercy.

In summary, the teaching of St Thomas on the affective experience of anger is a call for the seminarian to take responsibility for himself and others. To become responsible in regard to anger he needs to first recognize that it is a legitimate part of an affectively mature person’s character. Anger can enable him to respond to situations that need to be reformed because attitudes or actions have harmed people and personal relationships need to be returned to a healthy state. Yet, he also needs to be wary of anger’s propensity to incline him to exaggerated responses that would badly affect his capacity to make a just decision about what should or should not be done. Virtues, such as clemency, that incline him to moderate his anger and reflect upon the truly good course of action that should be taken are also necessary if he is to become a responsible person. These virtues give internal balance to the seminarian’s affective responses and enable him to bring his anger into proportion with the truth of a situation. The fruit of such maturity is the ability to be responsible for others in situations of injustice and to work in a truly helpful manner for the rectification of attitudes and actions that inflict harm on others.

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753 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.28, a.5, resp.
754 St Thomas notes that “anger has more mercy than hatred has” because it only inflicts a punishment for the desire of counteracting an evil according to the “measure of justice”, whereas hatred is “satisfied with no particular measure of evil”. See Summa Theologica I-II, q.46, a.6, ad 1. Although, he then notes that, from the point of view of its explosiveness, anger can exclude mercy more than hatred. Garrigou-Lagrange admonishes us to “avoid bitter zeal, which sermonizes indiscriminately” and thus does damage to religious communities. The Three Ages of the Interior Life, Volume 2, 104.
755 On Evil, q. 12, a.1, resp.
Conclusion

This chapter has reflected upon St Thomas’ teaching on the irascible passions and how this teaching can deepen the seminarian’s understanding of how to develop affective resilience. Essentially, the irascible passions provide an affective impetus to strive for the arduous good and respond to the evil that is difficult to repel. In this way, the precise object of the irascible passions is to help the seminarian to cope with challenges and deal with obstacles. Each irascible passion has a part to play in the development of the seminarian’s affective resilience. The passion of hope enables the seminarian to strive for the arduous good, which is the more fulfilling because it requires both greater effort and a greater investment of the person to attain it. Despair can also be a helpful passion, in the sense that it inclines the seminarian to leave aside that which is beyond his power to attain and be free to strive for what brings him fulfilment. Fear inclines him to avoid the evil and seek counsel from others. Daring equips him to face challenges, while he relies upon external resources, personal competencies, the help of others, and deliberating well before confronting a major challenge, to help him succeed. Finally, while anger provides him with the energy to restore the balance of justice, the seminarian must also take care to develop moderating virtues such as clemency. Otherwise, he may be prone to an excessive anger and even an immoderate zeal, which will damage the relationships of trust and esteem he should enjoy with his future parishioners. Now, having considered St Thomas’ teaching on the human passions, the next chapter will explore both how virtue forms them and how St Thomas’ teaching on virtue can be applied to the seminarian’s affective formation.
SECTION 2

THE VIRTUES AS FORMATIVE PRINCIPLES

Section 2 looks at virtue as a principle of formation for the seminarian’s affectivity. Chapter 7 considers how the cardinal virtues shape the affective capacities of the seminarian so that he can responsibly love others in a prudent, just, temperate, and courageous way. Chapter 8 considers the implications for affective formation of St Thomas’ teaching on virtue for the proper development of the love of friendship, the desire to delight in beauty, and the capacity to properly rest the soul. Chapter 9 considers how the Theological Virtues, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Beatitudes and the Fruits of the Holy Spirit, shape the affectivity of the seminarian.
CHAPTER 7

THE FORMATIVE ROLE OF THE VIRTUES

In *Pastores Dabo Vobis* Pope St John Paul II writes of attributes such as justice that help the seminarian to better reflect the Good Shepherd’s attitude to others. These are virtues, that is, abiding perfections of the seminarian’s character that facilitate his ability to act for the good. They enable him to relate to others in such a way that his ministry will be as “humanly credible and acceptable as possible”, and that he may be responsible for a community of people.\(^{756}\) St John Paul II also writes of other virtues that are necessary for the seminarian’s affective maturity, “a significant and decisive factor” in his formation. Chastity requires “a strong training in freedom”, mastery of self, and the capacity to avoid selfishness and individualism, so that the seminarian can love others by making a sincere gift of himself.\(^{757}\) Given that the priest’s “affections and instinctive impulses” are left “intact”, the priest, furthermore, needs “prudence” by which he can avoid whatever is not in accord with his vocation.\(^{758}\) Moreover, the Pope writes of an education of the seminarian’s conscience so that he can exercise a “responsible freedom”.\(^{759}\) In other words, without certain virtues the seminarian cannot fulfill his vocation.

From St Thomas’ teaching on virtue we can glean a set of principles to guide the development of the seminarian into the affective maturity that Pope St John Paul II envisages. This maturity is essentially formed by the cardinal virtues, which serve to enable the seminarian to relate responsibly to those he is called to serve as a priest. To demonstrate this the following points will be examined: 1) The Nature of Virtue; 2) Prudence and Affectivity; 3) The Mean of Virtue; 4) Passion and Moral Virtue; 5) Virtue and the Growth of Freedom; 6) Implications for Affective Formation. While the aim of this chapter is to consider St Thomas’ teaching on virtue in relation to affective formation, the next chapter will consider his teaching in regard to three important areas of affectivity: friendship, beauty and *eutrapelia*.


\(^{757}\) Ibid. See also n.44.

\(^{758}\) Ibid, n.44.

\(^{759}\) Ibid.
1. The Nature of Virtue

The aim of this section is to examine the wider context of the development of the intellectual and volitional capacities in which affective formation is conducted. For St Thomas, the passions are virtues in the more general sense of providing the capacity to act in a certain way. “Virtue denotes a principle of action”, he writes, “wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues”.\(^{760}\) Anger, for instance, equips us with the energy to correct a perceived injustice. To attain affective maturity, however, the passions need to be formed in accord with wise judgement and right willing. This is the purpose of the virtues in a more particular sense. “Human virtue”, as St Thomas defines it, “is a habit perfecting man in view of his doing good deeds”.\(^{761}\) Virtue forms the faculties of the person so that he can act for the good.\(^{762}\) Thus, the person develops himself by freely directing himself to the good.\(^{763}\)

St Thomas’ understanding of how habits perfect human powers underlies his teaching on how virtues perfect the human person. He refers to power and habit as the intrinsic principles of human acts.\(^{764}\) The powers of the human soul are capacities to act in particular ways, for example, the power of the intellect is directed to understanding.\(^{765}\) Now, a power is fulfilled by acting well in accord with its proper end, but “habits are necessary that the powers [of the soul] be determined to good”.\(^{766}\) Without this kind of perfection the power would be ill directed.\(^{767}\)


\(^{762}\) See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q. 59, a. 4-5.

\(^{763}\) On the development of the acts of the person so that he can come into his “plenitude” see *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.18, a.1, resp.

\(^{764}\) See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.49, prol.

\(^{765}\) See *Summa Theologica* I, q.77, a.3, resp.

\(^{766}\) *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.49, a.4, resp.

\(^{767}\) Fagothey explains: “Habit does not give us the power to *do* something; this we must have from our nature. But habit enables us to do something *more easily and readily*”. See *Right and Reason*, 225.
The English word “habit” is derived from the Latin *habitus*, which, St Thomas explains, “is derived from *habere* (to have)”. In a more general sense, habit is a “quality” which inheres in a being by which it is disposed a certain way to good or ill. “For”, St Thomas explains, “when the mode is suitable to the thing’s nature, it has the aspect of good: and when it is unsuitable, it has the aspect of evil”. For example, health, a state of well-being and a disposition to this state, is a habit. Moreover, habit is a quality implying more than a disposition, for habit “implies a certain lastingness”. St Thomas gives a person’s knowledge of science as an example. If someone has an imperfect grasp of the subject, “we say that he is disposed to that science, rather than that he has the science”. The deeper grasp of the science, which is a more perfect and lasting perfection of the intellectual power, is called the habit of science. The significance of the language of habit is that it indicates the real change in the person through the exercise of his faculties. The person becomes more, has more and can do more by perfecting his faculties.

The habit that forms a power is perfected through “many” acts. However, while “repeated acts cause a habit to grow”, if a particular “act falls short of the intensity of the habit, such an act does not dispose to an increase of that habit, but rather to a lessening thereof”. The habits of the intellect, for instance, can be diminished by incorrect conclusions or deception. Habits of the will, “either of virtue or of vice, may be corrupted by a judgment of reason, whenever its motion is contrary to such virtue or vice, whether through ignorance, passion or deliberate choice”. For

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768 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.49, a.1, resp. I will continue to use the English word habit with the meaning given it by St Thomas in the Latin *habitus*. This reclaims the richer meaning of habit in English rather than capitulating to its diminished meaning as an impulsive reflex action that inhibits a person’s freedom.

769 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.49, a.1, resp.

770 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.49, a.2, resp.

771 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.49, a.2, ad 3.

772 Ibid.

773 St Thomas’ point is expressed well by Bonnie Kent who writes that the various words used in relation to *habitus* signify those characteristics which have become natural and enduring through long practice, thereby making the individual, in one way or another, the person she is: a brilliant mathematician, a brave soldier, or a faithful wife”. Bonnie Kent, “Habits and Virtues”, ed. Stephen J. Pope, Editor, *The Ethics of Aquinas* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), 117.

774 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.51, a.3, resp. St Thomas gives geometry as an example: “science can increase in itself by addition; thus when anyone learns several conclusions of geometry, the same specific habit of science increases in that man. Yet a man’s science increases, as to the subject’s participation thereof, in intensity, in so far as one man is quicker and readier than another in considering the same conclusions.” *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.52, a.2, resp.

775 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.52, a.3, resp. Hence we must not only know but act for our good. As Fagothey, S.J. writes: “knowledge alone will not suffice to make men good”. *Right and Reason*, 228.

776 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.53, a.1, resp.
example, corruption can occur “when a man fails to make use of his virtuous habit in order to moderate his own passions or deeds”.

Thus, the need to continually practice the habit so that he can both maintain and improve himself.

For St Thomas, there is an intrinsic link between love and virtue. Virtue gives order to love so that we can properly will the good of other people. In other words, by properly developing the respective faculties of mind, will and passions, we can develop the capacity to care for others. For example, the development of justice, as we will see below, disposes a person to attend to the objective need of another. To the contrary, bad habits distort these same faculties and so corrupt the communication of love. On account of this damage to the human good, bad habits are called vices. We will consider the impact and healing of the vices in Section 3.

Since, in a general sense, “virtue is a habit by which we work well”, we can attribute virtues to the intellect, such as the development of science, which in the context of St Thomas’ discussion of the intellectual virtues refers to the ability to make valid deductions from necessary truths. Gregory Reichberg comments that these virtues “ensure expertise in our scientific, artistic, and technical endeavours”. They are called intellectual virtues because “they are stable dispositions for apprehending truth”. The intellectual virtues perfect the speculative and practical intellect. These two terms refer to the intellect acting for two different purposes. The speculative intellect,

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777 Summa Theologica I-II, q.53, a.3, resp.
778 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.55, a.1, ad 4.
779 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.55, prol.
780 Summa Theologica I-II, q.56, a.3, resp. This understanding of science is different to the way we tend to use the word science today. By science we refer in a more restricted sense to the effort to gain knowledge, through the use of experiments to test our theories, of how various aspects of physical reality works, such as the study of chemistry, biology, and physics. St Thomas’ understanding of science is not inimical to this effort to gain knowledge but his use of the word science refers more specifically to the habit of the mind to study reality for its own sake and in relation to what are its necessary principles rather than what is contingent and to this extent unsure. For a brief discussion of St Thomas’ understanding of science as a habit of the speculative intellect (the mind set to acquire knowledge for its own sake), the different divisions of science in respect of the various aspects of reality, such as mathematics, and the study of the most necessary principles of reality in metaphysics, see John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 4-10.
St Thomas explains, considers the principles of reality and truth in itself. As Reichberg explains, the “proper good” of the speculative intellect is “the pronouncement of true judgments (assent to true propositions)”. On the other hand, St Thomas explains, the practical intellect considers what is to be done. Its practical virtues, as Reichberg explains, guides “agents in their tasks that have yet to be performed”. The seminarian’s proper formation involves the development of both his speculative and practical thinking, because he needs to be both a good student and serve others through his practical abilities as a pastor. The development of these practical abilities, as we will see below, includes the virtues that form his affective life.

The three virtues of the speculative intellect are “wisdom, science and understanding”. In explaining these virtues St Thomas contrasts knowing a truth in itself and knowing it through another. The habit of knowing “self-evident principles” - truths that are known in themselves - is called understanding. Of truths that are known through the inquiry of reason there are two virtues: wisdom and science. Wisdom “considers the highest causes” and therefore “rightly judges all things and sets them in order”, and science concerns “the different kinds of knowable matter”.

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782 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.57, a.5, ad 3. St Thomas writes that the speculative intellect is the intellect considering the truth of things as they are which “depends on the conformity between the intellect and the thing”. It thus deals with “necessary matters”.

783 *The Intellectual Virtues*, 134.

784 See *Summa Theologica* I, q.79, a.11, resp.

785 *The Intellectual Virtues*, 134.

786 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.50, a.4, resp.

787 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.58, a.4, resp. *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.57, a.2, resp. For example, that one thing cannot be another at the same time and in the same respect. Reichberg describes understanding as “intuitive insight” which refers to the capacity to grasp necessary truths “without the mediation of an inference working through a middle term”. It is “the act by which we immediately apprehend (percipitur statim) undervived (per se notum) necessary truths. Truths of this sort earn the title of principles because they are a source from which other truths may be drawn.” “The Intellectual Virtues”, p.136. St Thomas writes highly of understanding in *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.8, a.1, ad 3: “understanding denotes a certain excellence of a knowledge that penetrates into the heart of things”. In the responsio St Thomas explains: “Understanding implies an intimate knowledge, for intellegere (to understand) is the same as intus legere (to read inwardly).”

788 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.57, a.2, resp. Wisdom considers the first or ultimate causes of being. Reichberg describes it as “the architectonic science” inasmuch as it reflects on the general principles of all the sciences and coordinates them in relation to each other. Science in the context of these three speculative virtues refers to the capacity to draw out “conclusions by reference to necessary and universal truths” and it is also the habitual disposition to have an intellectual memory from which to recall previous conclusions and then extend this knowledge by new deductions. Examples are the science of mathematics or physics (natural philosophy). *The Intellectual Virtues*, 137-138.
There are two virtues of the practical intellect, that is, the intellect inasmuch as it regards what is “contingent” and “can be effected” by our will and action.\textsuperscript{789} Art “regards things to be made” and prudence “regards things to be done”.\textsuperscript{790} Art is “the right reason about certain works to be made”.\textsuperscript{791} It concerns an external work to be completed with material elements. Art does not of itself imply a right ordering of the will. St Thomas refers to the need for moral virtues such as justice “which rectifies” the artist’s “will, to do his work faithfully”.\textsuperscript{792} The implication of this point is that all activities, in some way, need to be directed by a proper concern for moral goodness.

Prudence, however, is “the right reason of things to be done”, guiding the will rightly to act for happiness.\textsuperscript{793} As St Thomas explains: “Prudence is of good counsel about matters regarding man’s entire life, and the end of human life”.\textsuperscript{794} In its role of making good judgments prudence is vital to affective maturity. Prudence is “most necessary for human life because a good life consists in good deeds”.\textsuperscript{795} Prudence ensures that not only what a man does is good but that how he does it is good, that is, “that he do it from right choice and not merely from impulse or passions”.\textsuperscript{796} By the guidance of prudence a man knows the end toward which his action is directed and what is suitable to attaining that end. So, it is prudence that ensures an action or passion is properly directed according to the good grasped by reason.\textsuperscript{797} For example, as Kent writes: “A person needs prudence to judge correctly which dangers would be good to face.”\textsuperscript{798} This leads us to the integral role of prudence in forming the seminarian’s affectivity and personal relationships.

\textsuperscript{789} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.57, a.5, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{790} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{791} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.57, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{792} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.57, a.3, ad 2. Reichberg writes: “The will (\textit{voluntas}) is the faculty responsible for safeguarding the overall good of the person”. He goes on to write: “the will, whose defining referent is goodness as such (\textit{bonum universale}), enfolds each of these particular goods within its inclination to a total, all-encompassing goodness.” \textit{The Intellectual Virtues}, 139.
\textsuperscript{793} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.57, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{794} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.57, a.4, ad 3. St Thomas writes that some “in so far as they are good counsellors in matters of warfare, or seamanship, are said to be prudent officers or pilots, but not simply prudent: only those are simply prudent who give good counsel about all the concerns of life.”
\textsuperscript{795} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.57, a.5, resp.
\textsuperscript{796} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{797} Fagothey writes of the way we distinguish true from false prudence: “Without prudence fortitude becomes boldness, temperance becomes moroseness, justice becomes harshness. Prudence chooses the right means toward worthy ends; the choice of good means toward bad is mere cleverness or shrewdness, but not true prudence”. \textit{Right and Reason}, 232.
\textsuperscript{798} \textit{Habits and Virtues}, 123.
2. Prudence and Affectivity

An important dimension of affective maturity is the relationship between prudence and the moral virtues. It is integral to affective maturity not only to think well but to act well. Without good decisions and actions the affective power remains poorly developed as a part of the seminarian’s character. This is the importance of examining the moral virtues which perfect the will in its capacity to act for the good. The word moral comes from the Latin *mos*, which can refer to a custom or “a natural or quasi-natural inclination to do some particular action”. St Thomas applies this concept to the will, which exercises a kind of inclination by directing human acts. Virtue most of all resides in the will because by it all the “other powers that are in some way rational” are moved. As St Thomas explains, if we talk of a man doing “well actually, this is because he has a good will”, or he exercises that good will through another of his capacities.

There are two reasons for calling a habit a virtue: “because it confers aptness in doing good” and “besides aptness, it confers the right use of it”. A habit of the will is thus called a virtue because it enables a choice in accord with moral good. Even though a man has the habit of science, for

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799 This is implied from St Thomas’ understanding that virtue in general, “denotes a certain perfection of a power”. *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.55, a.1, resp. It is the discovery of the activity that is suitable to the development of a power and the carrying out of this activity that perfects that power. In his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard* he writes of the end of a thing as its “proper activity” and that the thing “arrives at its end through its proper activity”. See In IV SENT. d.49, q.1, qa.1, On Love and Charity: Readings from the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, trans. Peter A. Kwasniewski, Thomas Bolin, O.S.B., and Joseph Bolin (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

800 It can be reiterated at this point that St Thomas’ insight in *Summa Theologica* is to first reflect carefully on the life of the passions so that the virtues can be understood as principles that form our affectivity. This emphasizes St Thomas’ conviction that without the passions there is a diminished life of virtue. As Reinhard Hütter writes: “Thomas’s treatment of both the passions and the virtues in the *Summa Theologiae* demonstrates his exquisite sensitivity to the fact that losing appreciation of the acts of the sense appetite, the passions, as integral for human flourishing would be tantamount to the failure to understand the integral role the passions play in the development of the virtues. For Thomas, there simply cannot be a true formation of moral character without the passions being fully integrated into this formation.” Reinhard Hütter, *Dust Bound for Heaven: Explorations in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas* (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, UK: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2012), 76.

801 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.58, a.1, resp.

802 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.56, a.3, resp. See also *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.50, a.5, resp.

803 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.56, a.3, resp.

804 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.57, a.1, resp.

example, it does not necessarily follow that he will use it for the good of his neighbour. Moral virtue, however, “is a habit of choosing, i.e., making us choose well”. The role of the moral virtues is to ensure that the will is rightly inclined to the good in accordance with prudence. St Thomas gives the analogy of a blind horse:

The natural inclination to a good of virtue is a kind of beginning of virtue, but is not perfect virtue. For the stronger this inclination is, the more perilous may it prove to be, unless it be accompanied by right reason, which rectifies the choice of fitting means towards the due end. Thus if a running horse be blind, the faster it runs the more heavily will it fall, and the more grievously will it be hurt.

As Josef Pieper explains, the various abilities we have as persons only achieve their perfection “when they are founded upon prudence, that is to say upon the perfected ability to make right decisions”. Prudence pertains to the practical ability to apply principles to the concrete case, so that when we argue about “particular cases” we need “not only universal but also particular principles”. Without such prudence, someone can be wrongly swayed by passion so that a universal principle “is destroyed in a particular case”. St Thomas gives the example of someone “who is swayed by concupiscence, when he is overcome thereby, the object of his desire seems good, although it is opposed to the universal judgment of his reason”. The development of prudence enables the seminarian to maintain a consistency between what he knows to be true and what he does. However, the ability to make good judgments also requires the overall development of the volitional and affective capacities of the human person.

The moral virtues ensure that the will and the passions are in right order and do not interfere with the judgment of prudence. They properly dispose a person to good ends and means through

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806 St Thomas writes: “For if a man possess a habit of speculative science, it does not follow that he is inclined to make use of it, but he is made able to consider the truth in those matters of which he has scientific knowledge: - that he make use of the knowledge which he has, is due to the motion of the will. Consequently a virtue which perfects the will, as charity or justice, confers the right use of these speculative habits, if they be done out of charity …” Summa Theologica I-II, q.57, a.1, resp.
807 Summa Theologica I-II, q.58, a.4, resp.
808 Summa Theologica I-II, q.58, a.4, ad 3.
810 Summa Theologica I-II, q.58, a.5, resp.
811 Ibid.
812 Ibid.
perfecting man “by certain habits, whereby it becomes connatural, as it were, to man to judge aright to the end”\textsuperscript{813} St Thomas establishes this point on the way that “the virtuous person judges aright of the end of virtue”, because he judges according to his character which influences the way he views the end.\textsuperscript{814} Pieper draws the implication that we must have a basic and diligent stance for the truth, a receptivity to “the objective reality of being”.\textsuperscript{815} This attendance to truth in our judgments about what to do for others informs all the other virtues. As Pieper writes: “Truth, then, is the prerequisite of justice”.\textsuperscript{816} And so it is for the formation of our affections and passions.

The four basic virtues that develop the moral life in its application to affectivity are the Cardinal Virtues of Prudence, Justice, Temperance and Fortitude. These apply the measure of reason to the main powers of the human soul.\textsuperscript{817} The cardinal virtues are the “principal” virtues from which the other moral virtues flow.\textsuperscript{818} For instance, from temperance flows the virtue of chastity which we will consider below in the implications for affective formation. In this role the moral virtues are, as Reichberg explains “attitudinal dispositions: thus in addition to ensuring the right sort of behavior with respect to the concrete situation confronting the agent, they also prompt an appropriate emotional response. Prudence, similarly takes into account how the agent’s appetite is affected while performing a particular action. ‘For in order to good deeds,’ Thomas notes, ‘it matters not only what someone does but also how he does it’ (Ia IIae, q.57, a.5)”.\textsuperscript{819} The distinction St Thomas makes here, between what is done and how it is done, is important because it concerns the expression of someone’s affective response in relation to others. It is not enough for him to say that what he does is good because he also needs to be careful of how that action expresses his

\textsuperscript{813} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{814} Ibid. In this context St Thomas quotes Aristotle: “such as a man is, such does the end seem to him” Summa Theologica I-II, q.58, a.5, resp. The more complete statement from Aristotle is: “How the end appears to each individual depends on the nature of his character, whatever this may be.” Aristotle’s statement is made in the context of an objection that moral discernment is a natural gift rather than something acquired by choice. Aristotle’s reply is that we make choices and thus we are “in a sense partly responsible for our dispositions, and it is because we have a certain moral quality that we assume the end to be of a certain kind”. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, v, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (Allen & Unwin, 1953); revised by Hugh Trendennick (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Classics, 1976/1983).
\textsuperscript{815} The Four Cardinal Virtues, 9.
\textsuperscript{816} Ibid, 8.
\textsuperscript{817} The word cardinal comes from the Latin cardo meaning “hinge”. As MacKenzie explains: “The Cardinal Virtues are supposed to be those on which the others hinge or depend.” A Manual of Ethics, 333.
\textsuperscript{818} Summa Theologica I-II, q.61, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{819} The Intellectual Virtues, 140. The reference in brackets is to Summa Theologica.
emotional life and affects the person to which the action is directed. Think, for example, of the priest who gives the greeting to the congregation at the beginning of Mass but who says these words in a hurried or perfunctory way. What he does is good - to give the words of greeting to the congregation. The way he performs the action, however, is imperfect, given that the congregation needs to be greeted in a prayerful and considerate manner to draw their hearts into the time of liturgical prayer.

Prudence, as we have seen, perfects the power and acts of reason about moral matters. Justice perfects the power and acts of the will for the purpose of reason putting order into our actions in relation to our neighbor. Temperance perfects the concupiscible power and its acts so that our tendency to pleasure is formed according to our true good, and our tendency to inordinate pleasure is curbed. Fortitude perfects the irascible power and its acts so that we follow reason even in the face of the “fear of toil and danger”. Without these virtues the seminarian’s character and his relationships become too fragile to be deeply fulfilling, because he will neither judge correctly of the good works that properly promote relationships nor will he persist in them. This refers to both his friendships and his commitment to the relationships involved in his pastoral ministry.

The importance of prudence for affective development can be explored through the close connection between our knowledge and our will. In regard to human action St Thomas writes: “the act of the will is nothing else than an inclination proceeding from the interior principle of knowledge …”, so that each “act of the will is preceded by an act of the intellect …” “As a result,” Michael Sherwin comments, “the moral goodness of the will, and thus also of the agent him or herself, depends upon knowledge”. Also, while knowledge specifies the object of love, the will moves the mind to discern an object to love and decide for it. There is, then, a mutual influence exercised by mind and will. St Thomas writes: “Love ranks above knowledge in moving, but knowledge precedes love in attaining”, for we cannot love something without knowing it.

The significance of this point is that a sound knowledge of human affectivity and the principles that properly develop it, must always be the basis for the seminarian’s affective formation. Love

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820 Summa Theologica I-II, q.61, a.2, resp.  
821 Summa Theologica I-II, q.6, a.4, resp.; q.4, a.4, ad 2.  
823 Summa Theologica I-II, q.3, a.4, ad 4.
can only ever be to the good if it is guided by a true practical grasp of how that love is to be expressed and communicated. It is also the case that a sound education in affectivity opens the mind of the seminarian to new possibilities that he has not considered before. Unless he is presented with a knowledge of how to properly develop he will be hampered in his ability to affectively grow. Knowledge and right judgment are the basis for true affective development.

On this point, St Thomas compares prudence to sight. Prudence seeks knowledge of the future by comparing knowledge of the past and the present with “things afar off, in so far as they tend to be a help or hindrance to that which has to be done at the present time”. In this way prudence “includes application to action, which application is an act of the will”. Without this application of prudence to action the other faculties of the person cannot be perfected. Fortitude, for example, forms a man’s character so that he “should not stray from the right judgment of reason through fear or daring”. Exercising prudence is, then, an essential part of being affectively and ethically mature. As Pieper explains:

The virtue of prudence … being the perfected ability to make decisions in accordance with reality – is the quintessence of ethical maturity (of which, of course, teachability is a great component). And the pre-eminence of prudence over justice, fortitude, and temperance means simply that without maturity truly moral life and action is not possible.

Our affectivity must therefore be educated by a true prudence. “And education to prudence means”, Pieper explains, “to objective estimation of the concrete situation of concrete activity, and to the ability to transform this cognition of reality into concrete decision.” In this way prudence “is not only the quintessence of ethical maturity, but in so being is also the quintessence of moral freedom”. An intelligent grasp of both the reality within the person and the world external to him is the only authentic basis for developing affective maturity and being free to act well in relationships. Without accurately understanding his affective faculties the seminarian cannot form

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824 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.47, a.1, ad 2.
825 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.47, a.1, ad 3.
826 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.47, a.8, resp.
828 Ibid.
829 Ibid.
them, nor can he develop them without being properly attentive to the people and the realities he encounters.

3. **The Mean of Virtue**

The virtuous mean concerns the practical judgment of what is appropriate given the circumstances and needs of the person concerned. St Thomas comments that “the principal act of virtue is choice”.\(^{830}\) This choice is according to reason and the judgement of the wise man. This “does not refer to one who is wise simply, knowing the ultimate causes of the whole universe, but rather to one who is prudent, that is, wise in human affairs”.\(^{831}\) In other words, it applies to a person who is capable of making good practical judgments about the good in the particular concrete case.

The mean of virtue is not the arithmetical mean, the mid-point between two quantities, but is the proper mode of an action for the true good of those concerned. For example, liberality is the mean between prodigality, by which we spend too much, and illiberality, by which we do not spend enough. Moreover, not only should we consider the objective content of things but their relative significance for the particular person. St Thomas writes:

> … the mean is relative in regard to us inasmuch as it neither exceeds nor falls short of a proportion suitable to us. Hence this mean is not the same for all. If we apply the relative mean to a shoe, it will not be more than the length of the foot or less. It will not be the same for all because not all have the same size foot.\(^{832}\)

Likewise, in regard to the amount of food to be given to an athlete, St Thomas writes: “The wise man avoids excess and defect, and wants to find the mean not objectively but relative to us.”\(^{833}\) Another example is found in the way workers strive for the mean of their work, which is found in neither more nor less than the perfection of the work requires. Moreover, in *Disputed Questions on Virtues*, St Thomas considers that the good of a thing is in accord with its “standard or measure”.

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831 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Two, Lectures VI, n.323.
832 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Two, Lectures VI, n.311.
833 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Two, Lectures VI, n.314.
It is for this reason that “we say that what is good is neither more nor less than it should be”.\textsuperscript{834} Indeed, in any area of skill the good is found in what conforms “to the measure that the skill in question demands”.\textsuperscript{835} Now, in a similar way, since “reason is the measure and standard of all human emotions and activities”, the proper limits set by reason mark out what is good in affective acts.\textsuperscript{836} St Thomas writes:

The mid-point of a virtue … consists in having things and emotions properly proportional to and measured in accordance with the person. The appropriate measurement is different for different people. What is too much for one person is too little for someone else. That is why what is virtuous is not exactly the same for everyone.\textsuperscript{837}

St Thomas’ explanation of the mean is very important for the development of the seminarian’s capacity to make practical judgments and to guide others. This is not detrimental to a proper respect for moral absolutes. Some “actions and passions by their very name imply vice: passions such as ill-will, shamelessness, envy and actions such as adultery, theft, murder. All of these and their like are evil in themselves and not only in their excess or defect”.\textsuperscript{838} But the mean of virtue does guide the seminarian to prudently attend to those matters that admit of proper adaptation to the person concerned. For example, a person who has suffered the loss of a beloved relative is not expected to work with the same strength as someone who is without such grief. What might be laziness in one person is something very different in a grieving person. Again, one mother can emotionally cope with the responsibility of many more children and another cannot. The personal qualities, dispositions, and circumstances of others, are to be taken into account by the priest who is virtuous, affectively mature and pastorally responsible.

\textsuperscript{835} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{836} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{837} Disputed Questions on the Virtues, On the Virtues in General, a.13, ad 17.
\textsuperscript{838} Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book Two, Lectures VII, n.329.
4. Passion and Moral Virtue

Passion needs to be developed as an integral dimension of moral virtue. In St Thomas’ understanding, virtue does not deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities because these powers are proper to the human person. Rather, these powers are integrated within the overall good of the human person by the correct understanding of their purpose. The role of virtue is to make these subordinate powers carry out the command of reason through the exercise of their proper acts. Thus virtue orders the passions to their proper perfection. Paul Gondreau concludes from this line of thought: “To attain the state of moral perfection we need to become good in our emotions and desires as well as in the choices of our will”. Here lies the basic difference between St Thomas’ view of the formation of passion and that of theologians such as St Bonaventure and Blessed Duns Scotus, who hold that virtue only tames the passions. For St Thomas, to the contrary, the passions are formed so that virtue resides in them. Virtuously formed passions become a positive expression of the reason and the will of the person.

Gondreau refers to the difference between continence and chastity as an example of how the moral life is incomplete without the virtuous formation of the passions. St Thomas describes chastity as a virtue that moderates a person’s actions in sexual matters, “in accordance with the judgement of his reason and the choice of his will”. Continence can refer to the abstention from all venereal pleasure or it can refer to the resistance of evil desires which are vehement. In this second sense continence is a virtue to the extent that “the reason stands firm in opposition” to disordered passion. But it is not a virtue in a complete sense because the capacity to experience passion is not in harmony with reason but is unruly and in need of restraint. Gondreau sees the problem in “the continent individual” performing “the virtuous deed through raw will power alone, not with the...
help of his passions”. Thus, there is something lacking in terms of this person’s development as an affectively mature and virtuous person.

The significance of this is that a truly mature person has developed his emotional responses so that they reflect his proper understanding of the good and they assist his virtuous action. They become part of the good actions he performs. This requires a deliberate development of his emotional responses so that they grow in harmony with what he wills. The opposite of this is to neglect the specific development of his affective responses, so that he attempts to act virtuously through will power alone. This can be exhausting because the energy of the passions is pulling against the choice of the will as it is guided by the judgement of the mind. It is also immature from the point of view that the specific capacities within the person remain imperfect and do not reflect the person’s grasp of the true good. There is, in other words, a disintegration between the person’s reason and the person’s unformed affective responses. To this extent one dimension of his maturation as a human person is left unfulfilled.

For “complete moral perfection”, however, there needs to be an internal ordering of the passions in regard to created bodily goods. The temperate person performs the good with the help of his passions so that “even his desires are morally praiseworthy”. Chastity, as an expression of temperance in relation to sexual desires, is an example of an act of the sensitive appetite that is harmonized with the virtuous good. The continent man, however, acts according to virtue but is still lacking a certain unity of life. The counter-movement of the still yet to be fully integrated emotions foils the orientation of his psychology to virtue and holiness. Gondreau writes: “His desires speak a different voice from his reason.”

This is an example of how St Thomas’ teaching on the virtues and passions is one of integration. St Thomas comments: “we say reason holds the place of a father giving guidance and of friends

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844 The Passions and the Moral Life, 436.
845 Ibid.
847 Gondreau comments that Aristotle here uses the word “homophonía” which means “of one voice” with reason. The Passions and the Moral Life, 487. St Thomas comments on this in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Book One, Lecture XX, n.239. Here Thomas is commenting on Nichomachean Ethics 1.13.1102b25-28.
848 The Passions and the Moral Life, 438.
849 I am using the word integrate in the sense of “combine into a whole” or “complete (an imperfect thing) by the addition of parts”. See Bruce Moore, The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th ed. (South Melbourne,
offering advice.” The role of the moral virtues is thereby one of intelligently gathering our passions into harmony with our good actions and virtuous relationships. For St Thomas, virtues can be in the sensitive appetite inasmuch as its acts are under “the command of reason”. The concupiscible and irascible passions, as acts of the sensitive appetite, are not as such the subject of virtue but since “they have a natural aptitude to obey reason”, they can be “considered as participating in reason”. St Thomas has, then, in Gondreau’s words, a “participated psychology”, where the acts of the sensitive appetite are brought to their true perfection by sharing in and expressing reason and will.

It is true that for a virtue such as justice, which concerns the direction of the will in regard to our neighbor, the direct matter of the virtue is not a passion. However, there is still an intimate connection between justice and passion. St Thomas writes: “joy results from the act of justice … And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appetite; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher … Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause passion.” As Robert Miner comments, such passions indicate “the flourishing of that virtue”. In other words, the person’s willing of the good of justice and his affective responses are in a unity and express his maturity of character. Furthermore, given the way a good habit shapes the character of the person, we can state that the habitual disposition formed by a just will affectively inclines the person to desire what is just for the other person. In this way, Lombardo writes of justice, not as “an abstract ideal against which we measure ourselves. Rather, justice “denotes an affective disposition toward

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Australia: Oxford University Press, 2004), 727. Likewise, Pieper refers to temperance in its role of harmonizing our desires. Temperance disposes “various parts into one unified and ordered whole”. The Four Cardinal Virtues, 146.  
850 Commentary on Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Book One, Lecture XX, n.240. Here St Thomas is commenting on Nichomachean Ethics 1102b28-33.  
851 Summa Theologica I-II, q.50, a.3, resp, ad 3.  
852 Summa Theologica I-II, q.56, a.4, resp. As Robert Miner explains, the concupiscible and irascible powers can be perfected “according to their capacity to participate in reason. Because they can participate in reason, they are fit to serve as subjects of moral virtues.” As acts of these two powers, the passions can be regulated or developed by the relevant moral virtues, for example, temperance, which moderates the desire for pleasure in accord with the moral good. See Robert Miner, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions: A Study of Summa Theologiae 1a2ae 22-48 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 288-289.  
853 The Passions and the Moral Life, 440.  
854 Summa Theologica I-II, q.59, a.5, resp.  
855 Thomas Aquinas on the Passions, 291.  

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others, and a constant inclination to give them what they are owed.”

Justice gives an objective guide for the expression of affectivity in relation to others.

That is, justice regulates external action so that it is “commensurate with someone else” and thus forms and integrates passion. It regulates matters such as “buying and selling” and the actions we perform for others, such as refraining from undue acts of violence. Thus, justice concerns acts that regulate our relations with others. From this point of view, all the moral virtues that concern the regulation of the passions in some way concern the notion of giving to another what is due to him. There is, then, a relationship between the virtues that regulate our actions in relation to others and our internal experience of the passions. This is so because in actions directed to another justice is damaged by an inordinate passion that exceeds its “due measure” and is expressed in a disordered fashion. In destroying “the due measure of the external act” justice is destroyed.

Justice is vital for the affective life because it gives an objective rule for the expression of the passions in our personal relationships. As Pieper writes: “Justice says: That is another person, who is other than I, and who nevertheless has his own peculiar due. A just man is just, therefore, because he sanctions another person in his very separateness and helps him to receive his due.” In justice we reflect an essential quality of goodness in its respect for the other, namely, diffusiveness, because goodness by its very nature is meant to be shared. As St Thomas writes: “because the better a thing is, the more does it diffuse its goodness to remote beings”.

This justice is expressed in our various relationships. In regard to God we have the justice of religion; in regard to our parents and our country we have piety; in regard to our benefactors we have gratitude. There is a justice for those entrusted to our care, such as parents exercise for their children and parish priests

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857 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.60, a.2, resp.
858 Ibid.
859 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.60, a.5, resp.
860 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.60, a.3, resp.
861 Ibid.
862 Ibid.
863 *The Four Cardinal Virtues*, 55.
865 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.60, a.3, resp.
for their parishioners. Justice then guides the development of the seminarian’s affectivity so that he can properly express himself in relation to those who rely upon him. It also restrains his worst impulses so that he can avoid violating the rights of others. Thus justice ensures that his relationships are rightly ordered in their affective reality.

Temperance and fortitude are the two cardinal virtues that directly concern the integration of the passions. Temperance regulates the six acts of the concupiscible power: love, desire, joy, hatred, aversion and sorrow. The word temperance comes from the Latin *temperare*, which means to set bounds or keep within limits. Temperance refers to the observation of proper limits, moderation, and self-control. As a virtue, it forms the capacity for acts that concern pleasures both within the person, either according to “bodily sense, or to the inner apprehension of the mind”, and in relation to others, for example, in matters of sexuality. Temperance also moderates the pleasures by which a person seeks to assuage the negative impacts of evil that cause hatred, aversion and sorrow. For example, that a person in sorrow not drink alcohol to a level of harmful excess.

Temperance can be seen as a general virtue which implies a “moderation, which reason appoints to human operations and passions”. It also refers to withdrawing “from things which seduce the appetite from obeying reason”. Thus, temperance disposes us to have due proportion in our affective experience and its expression through our words and deeds. Pieper writes of this virtue: “The primary and essential meaning of *temperare*, therefore, is this: to dispose various parts into one unified and ordered whole.”

That is, the desires and experiences of pleasure are brought into a unity with the true good of the person and the persons he loves. We will refer to chastity as an example of how temperance develops affectivity and the relationships it involves in the implications for affective formation. A major point to be noted here, however, is that St Thomas’ teaching on the virtue of temperance “affirms the goodness” of the various desires that it perfects, such as food, drink, sex, or anger. The point of the specific virtues of abstinence, sobriety, chastity and clemency is not to squash desire, but to “permeate it with reason, so that it instinctively inclines

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867 Summa Theologica I-II, q.60, a.5, resp.
868 Summa Theologica II-II, q.141, a.2, resp.
869 Ibid.
870 The Four Cardinal Virtues, 146.
toward what will bring the human person to the greatest flourishing”. There is a twofold benefit of temperance for the seminarian. Temperance both develops his desires in harmony with his true good and it develops his ability to properly express his desires in his personal relationships. A simple example is that moderation in drinking enables him to think clearly about what he will say to others.

The irascible passions are ordered toward different objects, as St Thomas explains, “for daring and fear are about some great danger; hope and despair are about some difficult good; while anger seeks to overcome something contrary which has wrought harm”. The three virtues that form these irascible passions are fortitude, which regulates “fear and daring”; magnanimity, which regulates “hope and despair”; and meekness, which regulates “anger”. Fortitude especially concerns “the pains of the mind and dangers”, most of all those “which lead to death, and it is against them that the brave man stands firm”. Thus, as Pieper writes, fortitude allows us to have the courage “to accept injury” and to act according to a sense of self sacrifice. Also, fortitude is not a matter of feeling no fear in the face of evil, “but”, Pieper explains, it consists “in not allowing oneself to be forced into evil by fear, or to be kept by fear from the realization of good”. The formative influence of fortitude will be discussed below in relation to virtue and the growth of freedom.

5. Virtue and the Growth of Freedom

The virtues that we have discussed above form the various faculties of the seminarian so that he can act for his true good and that of others. In this way virtue serves to develop the self-mastery that Pope St John Paul II recommends as an essential quality for affective maturity. He writes in Pastores Dabo Vobis that “freedom requires the person to be truly master of oneself”. Still,

871 The Logic of Desire, 186.
872 Summa Theologica I-II, q.60, a.4, resp.
873 Ibid. We have already discussed magnanimity in relation to the passion of hope (Chapter 6) and will discuss both it and meekness in more detail when we consider the Capital Vices of vainglory and anger (Chapter 10).
874 Summa Theologica II-II, q.123, a.11, resp.
875 The Four Cardinal Virtues, 135.
876 Ibid, 126.
877 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.44.
some would argue that virtues restrict freedom because they are habits and as such they are
determinations of powers and acts. By implication, then, are virtues restrictions of our
affectivity?

In relation to this issue, Benedict Ashley writes that virtues are not “routine habits which are rigid
and instinctual, but flexible skills by which we can meet ever-varying circumstances”. Ashley
describes virtue as a “skill in good moral decision and behavior”. Good character is, then, “the
possession of all the necessary moral skills or virtues”. Still, in what specific way does virtue
enable us to act freely? In The Sources of Christian Ethics, Servais Pinckaers gives two analogies
about how we exercise our freedom precisely through the exercise of good habits: learning to play
the piano and learning a language. In each case we begin with the desire to acquire a new skill.
This requires guidance and good practice until the person can perform the skill with facility. It is
precisely the acquired skill that enables a person to perform the task with freedom, increase his
own good and communicate it to others. In regard to the performance of music Pinckaers
comments:

… the person who really possesses the art of playing the piano has acquired a new freedom.
He can play whatever he chooses, and also compose new pieces. His musical freedom could
be described as the gradually acquired ability to execute works of his choice with perfection.
It is based on natural dispositions and a talent developed and stabilized by means of regular,
progressive exercises, or properly speaking, a habitus.

The same process is followed in learning a new language. Through the study of this new language’s
vocabulary and grammar, and by practicing it in its native country, we learn to converse with other
people in their mother tongue.

878 St Thomas writes that the powers of the soul are “determined to good” by habits. Summa Theologica I-II, q.49,
a.4, resp.
879 Ibid.
880 Ibid.
881 Ibid.
Pinckaers calls this “freedom for excellence”, because by following the necessary principles we are set free to perform a skill. He then applies this concept to morality, taking the example of courage. The desire of a young person to be brave is formed through various trials of varying difficulty, so that he gradually acquires the ability to be courageous in the face of greater trials. “Courage”, Pinckaers writes, “… is a characteristic of the morally mature person… courage enables us to undertake worthwhile projects of high value to ourselves and others, regardless of all interior and exterior resistance, obstacles, and opposition.” This is an excellence to freely act for the good. This kind of freedom is not against our natural inclinations but develops them, so that we may act well for our good and that of others. Pinckaer’s point here is very significant for affective formation, because it enables the seminarian to see that his freedom to act for his own good and that of others is positively promoted by the virtues.

The growth of our virtue and freedom requires a long process of development, which Pinckaers articulates in “three basic stages of human life”: discipline, progress and the perfection of freedom. These stages of growth in moral freedom and maturity reflect St Thomas’ threefold articulation of growth in charity. In Summa Theologica II-II, q.24, a.9, St Thomas compares the growth of charity with that of the body. These stages are distinguished “according to those particular actions or pursuits to which man is brought by this same growth”. The three stages are those of childhood before the age of reason, when he exercises the capacity of reason and speech, and “when he begins to acquire the power of generation, and so on until he arrives at perfection”.

By analogy, we can talk of the degrees of charity which incorporate all the virtues in the love of God and one’s neighbor. First, there are the beginners who are occupied “chiefly with avoiding sin and resisting” inordinate desires which move them away from charity. In this stage “charity

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883 Ibid, 356.
884 Ibid.
885 Alasdair MacIntyre writes along similar lines when referring to the way virtue shapes emotional responses: “Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways. To act virtuously is not … to act against inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues.” After Virtue, 3rd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2007), 149.
886 The Sources of Christian Ethics, 359.
887 Summa Theologica II-II, q.24, a.9, resp.
888 Ibid.
889 Ibid.
has to be fed or fostered lest it be destroyed”.

The second stage is that of those who are proficient in virtue, and “whose chief aim is to strengthen their charity by adding to it”.

Thus while those in the first stage are chiefly concerned with avoiding sin, those in the second stage are chiefly concerned with “progressing in virtue”.

Those in the third stage “aim chiefly at union with and enjoyment of God”.

This is the stage of the person who has grown fully mature with Christ’s own fullness (Ephesians 4.13).

Pinckaers’ articulation of the three stages more explicitly links the growth of virtue to the growth of freedom. He defines the first stage as that of discipline in which there is a communication of knowledge from a teacher to his pupil for the sake of forming his mind and will. This is not the matter of an imposition of the master’s will. It is rather a “relationship” in which the teacher imparts “the principles and rules of some art or science, and particularly that art of living that is morality or wisdom”.

This kind of discipline “appeals to natural dispositions, to a spontaneous sense of truth and goodness, and to the conscience of the child or disciple”.

The seminarian undertakes this kind of education when he commences his formation for the priesthood.

The second stage is that of the development of virtue in which the person takes a deeper personal hold of moral truths and seeks to practice them. It is the stage of progress. With this greater maturity the person seeks to practice virtues such as justice and honesty, “even though such actions require sacrifice or may be unnoticed by others”.

Whereas in the first stage sensible pleasure and the idea of reward and punishment acted as “supporting motives” to do good, now there is a “love of virtue for its own sake” and “love of others for themselves”.

There is a growing joy because the person grows in his awareness of the fulfilling quality of his good actions. This stage requires the seminarian to persevere so that he can develop his life of virtue, learn to enjoy the improvement of his own good character, and see the fruits of his virtuous efforts for the good of others.

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890 Ibid.
891 Ibid.
892 Summa Theologica II-II, q.24, a.9, ad 3.
893 Summa Theologica II-II, q.24, a.9, resp.
894 The Sources of Christian Ethics, 360.
895 Ibid.
896 Ibid, 363.
897 Ibid.
The third stage is that of maturity and the perfection of freedom. Pinckaers characterizes this stage “by two features: mastery of excellent actions and creative fruitfulness”. The person in this stage can view “his life in its entirety” and act according to “a higher goal which will profit himself and others”. His maturity stamps his personality on his actions when he has appropriated moral truths and lives according to them. To achieve the fullest integration of his human capacities he cultivates a broad range of virtues relevant to many different activities and at the service of some greater purpose with other people. John MacKenzie makes a comment that amplifies the point made by Pinckaers and that is instructive for the seminarian:

… unless a man has, in some form, a broad human interest which lifts him out of himself, his life remains a fragment, and the virtues have no soil to grow in. The first requisite, then, for the development of the virtues, is to unite ourselves with others in the pursuit of some end or ideal, i.e. something that has real value, intrinsic or instrumental.

MacKenzie gives the pursuit of science, politics, poetry or religion as examples of such healthy and unifying life-projects. The priesthood too gives a great unity of purpose for the cultivation of virtue in the service of Christ and his people. Thus, the seminarian’s talents and energies can be galvanized for the great task of sharing in Christ’s priestly ministry. In this is found the freedom for the seminarian to develop himself over a life time in a truly worthy project. It is a project that will contribute to the good of others through all the works of the priesthood, such as preaching, celebrating the Sacraments, and helping those in need of right counsel and consolation. Yet, the fundamental point is that a life of moral progress, as Pinckaers has described it, is the setting in which the seminarian can develop his affectivity and be free to contribute to the lives of others.

6. Implications for Affective Formation

From St Thomas’ teaching seminary formation can gain a clearer understanding of the role of the intellectual and moral virtues in affective formation. There is, firstly, a real connection between the speculative and practical intellects. In the study of wisdom and the truths that are reflected

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899 Ibid.
upon through the virtues of understanding and science, the seminarian acquires a habit of clear thinking about the intricate relationships of created things. The study of wisdom opens his mind to the connection of all things to God as the First Cause. Thus the seminarian is disposed to seek the truth of his affectivity, in light both of his love for God and how to develop his affectivity for the good of others.

A connected issue is the seminarian’s care to study the matters that are specific to his vocation. In the plethora of information in the modern media he can feel too easily distracted from applying his mind to what is really needed. This requires him to sometimes surrender the acquiring of disparate elements of information so that he can properly concentrate his energies on what is truly important. This pertains to a formation of his desire for knowledge. St Thomas’ teaching on the avoidance of curiositas (a vain curiosity) is pertinent here. This is not a criticism of a proper curiosity to discover truly enriching and helpful knowledge. It is rather a call to attend to why he desires knowledge. For example, is it to be used for sinful purposes such as pride? It is also a call to be careful of the effects of pursuing knowledge, for example, is the time spent on this particular area of knowledge distracting him from acquiring knowledge of matters that are necessary for his priestly ministry.

St Thomas’ teaching on this matter is an affirmation of the proper formation of the seminarian’s desire for thought and reflection. The aim is to help him acquire the virtuous disposition of learning well so that he can deepen his knowledge for his own good and for the sake of those he will guide, as a priest, to the fullness of Christian life.901 This relevant virtue is studiositas, which is the capacity to properly concentrate and focus our search for knowledge. It is the ability to properly and keenly apply our mind to a certain area of intellectual endeavor, such as the understanding of how to develop affectivity.902

Yet, the practical series of acts that are appropriate to the development of his various faculties needs to be developed too, so that he can come to his proper affective perfection. By considering St Thomas’ teaching on the development of his powers through good habits, the seminarian is lead to reflect upon how his decisions and passions shape his character. Both thinking well about what

901 See Summa Theologica II-II q.167, a.1, resp.
902 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.166, a.1, resp. From the point of view of acquiring knowledge, the keen application of the mind to acquire knowledge is studiositas. From the point of view that the desire for knowledge is properly directed, it is the moral virtue of “seriousness”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.166, a.2, ad 2.
to do and deciding to put this good thinking into practice is vital to the proper development of his affectivity and relationships. Hence, there is need to develop the virtue of prudence as the foundation of expressing his affectivity in a mature fashion.

The need for good judgment also requires the will to be properly formed in relation to others. Justice develops affective maturity by orienting the seminarian’s will to the true need of the other person. Without willing what is due to another there can be no willing of that person’s good, there can be no authentic love. Justice is as such an essential pastoral attitude to be developed in the seminarian. If the priest does not respect the just needs of the person or community he is called to serve his pastoral ministry will lack credibility. It will not respect the basic conditions of a right relationship.

Temperance is also an integral virtue for the seminarian’s affective development. It ensures the proper integration of the seminarian’s capacity for pleasure and joy to be suffused with the proper measure of reason. This enables him to direct the capacities of love, desire, joy, hatred, aversion and sorrow in proportion to the person, relationship and situation before him. On the other hand, the purpose of the virtue of fortitude is to integrate the passions of hope, daring, fear, and anger, in accord with the good when a person is challenged by evil. Fortitude is an essential virtue because there are serious challenges for the priest, as for anyone, in the way of life that is entailed in his vocation and life of service. Examples include having to preach the gospel when it is not well received and standing by those who have suffered the worst kinds of suffering. Without the formative influence of fortitude, the capacity of the seminarian to fulfill his vocation is severely hampered. For, lacking fortitude he is unable to perform good actions and persevere in them under difficult circumstances.

St Thomas’ teaching on these four cardinal virtues indicates the four vital areas of affective growth for the seminarian. Prudence points to the need for a practical grasp of the right way to behave, so that the seminarian can direct his own life to the good and guide others to do the same. Justice ensures that his will is oriented to the true good of those entrusted to him and hence it respects the integral affective dimension of relating well to other people. Temperance ensures the development of his concupiscible passions for his own inner emotional balance and how he expresses himself before others. Fortitude ensures that he is virtuous when evil would force him to be otherwise.
The seminarian also needs to understand the mean of virtue so that he can become a trustworthy moral guide. The moral counsellor is right to admonish people to avoid violating moral absolutes. Yet he also should know the principles which admit of adaptation. Regarding the application of ecclesiastical laws of fasting, for instance, St Thomas points out that they need to be applied appropriately.\footnote{See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.147, a.4, ad 1. St Thomas points out that the Commandments of God as they are held in the precepts of the natural law are necessary for salvation in themselves unlike the commandments of the Church which are promulgated by the Church to help the Christian to be holy. The assumption is that the subject matter of some Church commandments can be of a defeasible nature.} If, for example, one must do “much work, either for one’s bodily livelihood, or for some need of the spiritual life and it be impossible at the same time to keep the fasts of the Church, one is not bound to fast”.\footnote{\textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.147, a.4, ad 3.} Thus, one ought to advise a particular person according to his true physical and emotional capacity.\footnote{See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.147, a.6, ad 1.} If he becomes a priest, the seminarian will need to know how to advise his parishioners about such matters, touching as they do on what is reasonable and affective.

One finds that St Thomas’ idea of \textit{habitus} involves a developmental perspective which can mark out for the seminarian a way to attain affective growth. Craig Steven Titus comments that St Thomas’ idea of \textit{habitus} is “a key for understanding the development of human powers”.\footnote{Craig Steven Titus, “Moral Development and Making All Things New in Christ”, \textit{The Thomist} 72 (2008): 239.} It teaches the seminarian to focus his efforts on the specific development of his powers of thought and action, and to review his progress in this development. The developmental perspective is also manifest, continues Titus, in St Thomas’ idea of “connaturality” which amounts to “the need to develop a second nature to act competently”.\footnote{Ibid.} The seminarian can aim, then, to acquire the qualities that make him an affectively mature person, by constantly practicing them in the various pastoral situations afforded him. For example, he can learn to set aside a hasty judgment and carefully consider the significance of his emotional states and inclinations. In this way he becomes, (that is, it gradually becomes a connatural quality in him), a more reflective and discerning person who is more inclined to make responsible decisions.

The three part process of growth in virtue and charity, which we gleaned from St Thomas and Pinckaers, can guide the seminarian to gradually appropriate the truth of how to be affectively
mature. The first stage is that of discipline in which, Titus writes, “growth in virtue involves a disciplined distancing of oneself from what is destructive, empty, or undeveloped”\(^{908}\). This stage is grounded in the teachings of the Commandments. To understand this it has to be borne in mind that, for St Thomas, law is “a rule or measure of acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting”\(^{909}\). It is geared towards the common good so that it directs a person’s actions toward proper relationships.\(^{910}\) Thus law acts as a training of the seminarian’s natural aptitude for virtue.\(^{911}\)

At this first stage he can use law as a rule to guide the promotion of good affections and thoughts and thus promote self-mastery.\(^{912}\)

The second stage develops patterns of living that make for consistent growth in the capacity to relate to such groups of persons as family and society. Qualities such as pardon, confidence in God, generosity, prayer, and the like, “further structure the internal life of one who is making progress in Christian virtue”.\(^{913}\) This growth is promoted by identifying “areas in which one must engage in concrete action with real neighbors and personal challenges”.\(^{914}\) From this stage the seminarian learns to be specific about developing the patterns of thinking and acting that promote a virtuous life. In the third stage the seminarian has attained a maturity that gives him joy in the works of virtue. This enables him to direct his desires and actions freely toward what is excellent. This is the fruit of the grace filled efforts in the first two stages.

While the seminarian strives to progress through these stages the question for the seminary formation staff is: does the seminarian manifest this maturation of virtue so that it is apparent he can be trusted to act responsibly for others as a priest?

The final point concerns an example to demonstrate how St Thomas’ teaching on virtue guides the positive development of affectivity in relation to others. It concerns chastity which is vital to the seminarian’s relationships, given his commitment to celibacy. St Thomas writes of the

\(^{908}\) Ibid.
\(^{909}\) Summa Theologica I-II, q.90, a.1, resp.
\(^{910}\) See Summa Theologica I-II, q.90, a.2, resp.
\(^{911}\) See Summa Theologica I-II, q.95, a.1, resp., where St Thomas writes of how the young need guidance to move towards maturity through such authority figures as parents.
\(^{912}\) Law is construed by St Thomas, as Titus observes, “not as an end in itself, but as a means to promote the growth of internal dispositions and to provide the arena for practices (studia) that model charity”. Moral Development and Making All Things New in Christ, 252.
\(^{913}\) Ibid, 253. The role of the Beatitudes and Theological Virtues will be discussed in Chapter 9.
\(^{914}\) Ibid.
development of sexuality through the virtue of temperance. “For it belongs to chastity”, he explains, “that a man make moderate use of bodily members in accordance with the judgment of his reason and the choice of his will.”

Pieper explains that chastity “realizes the order of reason in the province of sexuality”. That is, the person grasps the true personal significance of the acts of affection that are connected with human sexuality and orders his relationships accordingly.

St Thomas points out that the word chastity implies a sense of restraint, which is necessary given our propensity for the pleasures of touch. These concern pleasures connected to the basic necessities of life such as food and warmth. This is especially so regarding the pleasures associated with sexual union, which “are more impetuous, and are more oppressive on the reason than the pleasures of the palate”. However, Pieper notes that St Thomas’ concept of reason in this matter respects the complete “sensuality and spirituality” of the human person. St Thomas regards sexuality as a proper sphere of human expression. In response to a question about the moral goodness of pleasure in marital intercourse, for example, he affirms its abundant pleasure as a true good for the couple.

Yet, St Thomas also disapproves of actions that violate the proper order of sexual relationships. For example, fornication shows disrespect for the person who may be conceived outside of marriage. Thus St Thomas writes of the need for “the mother’s care” and the guidance and protection of the father which is properly expressed in the abiding commitment of marriage. In other words, St Thomas grounds the expression of the affective experiences associated with sexuality in the good of persons, in this case, the welfare of the child. Indeed, given the perfective nature of the virtues, the chastity, fidelity and responsible care extended by the father and mother to the child, ennobles them as self-giving and affectively mature persons. An implication to be

915 Summa Theologica II-II, q.151, a.1, ad 1.
916 The Four Cardinal Virtues, 155.
917 As Pieper writes: “Ratio here signifies – in its widest sense – man’s power to grasp reality.” Ibid, 156.
918 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.151, a.2, ad 2.
919 Summa Theologica II-II, q.151, a.3, ad 2.
920 The Four Cardinal Virtues, 157.
921 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.34, a.1, ad 1. St Thomas also writes that the abundant pleasure connected to sexual acts “directed according to reason” is not against the mean of virtue. See Summa Theologica II-II, q.153, a.2, ad 2.
922 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.2, resp.
923 St Thomas’ main concern here is with the irresponsibility of fornication as a lack of respect for the needs of children. Elsewhere he writes about the indissolubility of marriage on account of “the greatest friendship between husband and wife”, their one flesh union “which produces a certain gentle association” and their “partnership in the
drawn here is that within the social sphere of human flourishing and affective formation, the capacity for renunciation for the good of others enables us to respect their dignity.

St Thomas’ thought could be unfolded for the seminarian by making more explicit how sexuality intimately forms the personality. In an age when the gift of being male or female has been obscured by the ideology of gender fluidity, the seminarian needs to reflect on the gift of sexuality as an integral dimension of the human person. In the Vatican document *The Truth and Meaning of Human Sexuality*, sexuality is discussed as a matter that touches intimately on human identity and relationality. The document states: “Every form of love will always bear this masculine and feminine character.”

For sexuality informs every level of a human person’s being “on the physical, psychological and spiritual levels influencing every expression of a man or woman”. Sexuality is thus the well-spring of a person’s capacity to give and receive affection. As we read in the document: “Sexuality is a fundamental component of personality, one of its modes of being, of manifestation, of communicating with others, of feeling, of expressing and of living human love”. Sexuality is a beautiful gift to each person and it is to be given as a beautiful gift to another in true affection.

St Thomas’ teaching is in fact addressed to this interpersonal nature of sexuality, and how men and women can relate to each other out of mutual care. Virtues such as chastity express reverence for other persons. For example, as we saw above St Thomas is conscious of the need for parents to conceive children within marriage so that they can care for them in the best possible way. The virtue of modesty is also relevant to this interpersonal nature of sexuality. In regard to the outward movements of the body, St Thomas writes that there is a “fittingness to the person” and then a “fittingness to externals, whether persons, business or place”. This fittingness pertains to what “is becoming in movement and behavior”, and as such it is referred to as “taste” and “to what is becoming to the business in hand, and to one’s surroundings”. In other words, the affectively

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926 Ibid, n.10.
927 Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.1, resp.
928 Ibid.
mature person is aware that what he says and does, how he expresses himself and how he dresses, are important to the proper communication of himself to others.

Furthermore, what we do in the body makes known what is in our affections and attitudes. St Thomas writes: “outward movements are signs of the inward disposition” which “regards chiefly the passions of the soul”.929 Thus others form a judgment about us from the way we act, and it is why “moderation of outward movements is directed somewhat to other persons” to properly communicate our thoughts and feelings and build relationships.930 This pertains “to the virtue of truthfulness, whereby a man, by word and deed, shows himself to be such as he is inwardly”.931 This is a deep form of affective integration, signifying a person’s maturity. We could also say that appropriate gestures not only express the maturity of the person but develop it. In the very act of the person expressing himself with affective integrity he deepens the unity of his inner affective life and his gestures. Now, one application of this integrity is that to be authentic expressions of affection, outward gestures must be in accord with the truth of the vocations of those involved. Otherwise, there is an inherent inconsistency between the commitment of mind and heart of one person to another, and how he integrates his other relationships with this more fundamental commitment of himself. Gestures of affection for a married woman, for example, need to be in accord with the truth that she is married to another and not to me.932 The same holds mutatis mutandis for the seminarian and priest according to his vocation to celibacy.

A related issue is that the seminarian needs to understand the fulfilling nature of virginity and how it is a true expression of himself as a chaste person. To a culture saturated with the supposed necessity of sex it can seem unreasonable to be celibate. St Thomas, however, argues that the person giving up the marital union is acting contrary neither to reason nor his own fulfilment. Right reason requires us to direct things to an end in “a measure proportionate to that end”933. Now, our good consists in more than external things, such as riches and “bodily goods”, but also “in the

929 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.1, ad 1, ad 3.
930 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.1, resp.
931 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.1, ad 3.
932 Modesty regards the mystery and the intimacy of the person and how that mystery should be veiled until the appropriate moment. As *Catechism of the Catholic Church* teaches: “Modesty protects the mystery of persons and their love”. See *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, n.2522, Second Edition, English translation from Editio Typica (Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications/Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2000/2004).
933 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.152, a.2, resp.
goods of the soul among which the goods of the contemplative life take precedence of the goods of the active life”. 934 It is reasonable to forego the good of marriage for the love of God.

The fundamental reason for celibacy is a loving attentiveness to God himself and his concern for others. This moves the seminarian to set aside what is good in marriage for the sake of this greater good. “Now holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation”, St Thomas explains. 935 Here St Thomas quotes 1 Corinthians 7.34, that one who gives up marriage is concerned with thinking of the things of the Lord rather than what would rightly concern one’s spouse. Accordingly, some give “themselves to the contemplation of Divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race”. 936 Such persons stand as contemplators of God’s beauty and witness to its fulfilling power. This fundamental relationship is the principle by which the seminarian integrates his expressions of affection with other persons and carefully sets aside whatever is incompatible with it.

Without a sound understanding of himself as a sexual being the seminarian cannot relate well to others through “the charism of celibacy”, as Pope St John Paul II teaches. 937 The seminarian needs to be “capable of esteem and respect in interpersonal relationships between men and women”. 938 This is a call to a very positive way of life in connection with others and the service of their good. Thus St John Paul II calls for the development of a “sexual education” that enables the seminarian to understand love as involving the whole person, physically, psychically, and spiritually. For this purpose, the proper self-governance of chastity impresses upon the seminarian a sense of responsibility for the affective welfare of those he serves and befriends. It enables him to understand that conducting his relationships in a chaste and modest fashion is a true expression of affection for others.

Yet there is another important point to consider in relation to the seminarian’s reasons for undertaking the life of priestly celibacy. Celibacy is not a call to set aside the beauty of sexuality but to express it according to the gift of himself to God and God’s people. It should not involve an undue fear of the intimacy of marital love but a free surrendering of its possibility, so that he can

934 Ibid.
935 Ibid.
936 Summa Theologica II-II, q.152, a.2, ad 1.
937 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.44.
938 Ibid.
follow the call of God. The seminarian therefore needs to review his reasons for desiring to live a celibate life. When St Thomas argues that the counsel of virginity does not violate reason and the mean of virtue he explains: “Virgins abstain from all erotic love for an adequate purpose and in the way that they should. Their purpose is God . . .” Yet, St Thomas continues to explain, if virgins abstain

for a bad reason, for example, because they hated erotic love in itself, or the idea of having children or a spouse, then this would be an example of the vice of unfeelingness. But to abstain from all erotic love for a proper end is virtuous. Indeed, men who do this in order to devote themselves to warfare for the benefit of their country are praised for their civic virtue.939

However, it could be asked: how can the seminarian avoid unfeelingness and still be capable of affectionately loving others when he is called to surrender the love of marriage and family life? Or, to put the question another way: is there a place for the expression of true and affectionate friendships in the life of the seminarian while he surrenders the relationships of family life? An essential dimension of this issue is brought to light in the way Christ loved others. This is the key to reflecting upon the sublimation of the seminarian’s feelings by which he gives to others his love, life and work, which could have been placed at the service of his wife and family. It strengthens him to surrender the love of family life and yet enjoy the friendships that are appropriate to his vocation. The salient point here is that if his life is to truly reflect the life of Christ the Priest and the Good Shepherd then it has to include the capacity for affection and tenderness with friends.

To grasp this point, it is essential for the seminarian to contemplate the truth of Sacred Scripture that Christ loved men and women with the love of friendship. Three examples suffice to establish this truth and each one is presented to us in the gospel of St John. First, it is clearly noted of Christ that he loved Martha, Mary, and Lazarus, and that they welcomed him into their home with great affection, Mary tenderly anointing Christ’s feet and wiping them with her hair (John 11.5; 12.1-3). St Thomas describes this offering of affection in terms of Christ “being ministered to by his friends” and “the kindness shown to Christ” by them.940

Second, the beloved disciple lay close to the heart of Christ at the Last Supper, which along with the first example clearly demonstrates Christ’s capacity for receiving physical affection and enjoying the closeness of someone he loves (John 13.23-25). St Thomas writes that “lying close to” Christ shows the beloved “disciple’s intimacy with him”.941 Third, the love of Jesus for Peter is revealed in his tender threefold repetition of the question: “do you love me”? This reveals, not only Peter’s need to affirm his love for Christ, but Christ’s ardent desire that Peter love him (John 21.15-19). St Thomas writes that in this part of his gospel the evangelist shows Christ “dealing with his two especially loved disciples”.942 Thus, St Thomas emphasizes the special love Christ had not only for the beloved disciple but also for Peter.

The fundamental point is that these three friendships reveal Christ as a truly loving and mature person, who knows how to communicate and receive love through affectionate words and gestures. Now, it is true that the seminarian ought to be humble and not presume he has the virtue of Christ, and therefore self-knowledge and due care are essential virtues to be developed in him. This is a matter of knowing how to act with courtesy, self-restraint, and respect for others, which are always basic conditions for a true friendship and the sharing of mutual affection. Nevertheless, the truth remains that the supreme model of priesthood and celibacy reached out to friends. To avoid a serious consideration of this truth is to allow undue fear of what can go wrong to improperly interfere with the seminarian’s right to true and lasting friendships.

Thus, Christ’s capacity for friendship acts as a guiding principle for the way the seminarian conducts healthy friendships in accord with his vocation. The seminarian can become a true, kind, and a tender friend to families, married people, men and women, both the young and the old. Admittedly, there is much more to be said about this, but we first need to clearly state that the importance of affectionate friendships flows from the example of Christ himself. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of how these friendships can be developed are clear from what has been discussed in this chapter. Virtues such as chastity, modesty of gesture, and affective integrity with

942 Ibid, n.2614.
respect to one’s vocation and the vocation of others, remain abiding and essential principles to
guide any true expression of affection.943

Conclusion

The main point of this chapter has been to reflect on the importance of virtue as a fundamental
principle of affective formation. From St Thomas’ teaching we have seen that the cardinal virtues
can shape the affective capacities of the seminarian, so that he can become a prudent, just,
temperate and courageous person in his relations with others. As such he can love them properly
and take responsibility for their welfare. Attentive to the needs of each person through a well
formed judgment and right will, he will neither counsel the violation of moral absolutes nor require
of someone what is inappropriate to him, in matters that admit of a proper adaptation in keeping
with the mean of virtue. The seminarian will aim for the gradual maturation of his affectivity and
life of virtue by following the guidance of proper law. Then, he will aim to make his own the
principles that proper law embodies and which enable him to live a life of goodness in union with
others. Finally, through the development of chastity he will relate to others in a manner that is
consonant with his vocation to celibacy and the proper order of affection for others. In this way,
he will become an affectively mature person who will be free to communicate what is good through
a life both of sound judgment and perseverance in good actions. This leads us to the threefold

943 For a treatment of friendships between consecrated celibate men and women, see Basil Cole and Paul Connor,
between religious of the opposite sex, however, is not so easily discerned. God does not normally will consecrated
men and women to become close friends. This is because the desire for marriage can easily result … Nevertheless,
given the histories of some of the saints, such friendships can be helpful” (104). It needs to be further commented,
however, that particular factors need to be taken into account if virtuous friendships are to develop, such as the age,
stage of formation, and the affective maturity of the people concerned. Furthermore, there are other requirements,
such as, that the people concerned are properly accountable to others, such as a wise spiritual director. Connected to
this issue is the awareness, on the part of the celibate person, that he has renounced for the sake of the Kingdom, the
intimate companionship that is specific to romantic, sexual and marital love. The level of intimacy, it is is to be in
accord with the celibate’s vocation, must be one of chaste friendship. For a discussion of this issue see Andrew
Apostoli, CFR, When God Asks For An Undivided Heart: Choosing Celibacy in Love and Freedom (Boston: Pauline
Books and Media, 1995), 53-58, 153-171. Apostoli, for example, writes about how the celibate person needs to
properly express his affection for his friends and avoid harmful affective attachments such as possessiveness.
consideration of the next chapter, which concerns St Thomas’ teaching on the formation of the love of friendship, the desire for beauty, and the need for appropriate rest.
CHAPTER 8

THREE EXAMPLES OF HOW VIRTUE FORMS AFFECTIVITY

The previous chapter considered the virtues as principles that form the seminarian’s affectivity. This chapter will examine St Thomas’ teaching in relation to three dimensions of affective formation, which are chosen as examples to show how virtue forms love in personal relationships. Other examples could be chosen but these dimensions are chosen because they concern relationships which are vital to the seminarian’s affective maturation. They require the capacity to relate well to others and to maintain an affective balance in the seminarian’s love for his friends, for beauty in others, and, for playful words and deeds (eutrapelia). These three dimensions of the seminarian’s affective life need to be well formed because they touch upon fundamental personal needs. Without friends he cannot develop a life that is shared in personal conversation and in mutual support through the joys and sorrows of life. Without a sense of reverence for beauty in other people he cannot be drawn to others through the radiance of their goodness in a way that respects that beauty and goodness. Without the ability to receive and give pleasure to others through witty conversation and an appropriate sense of fun he cannot afford others the rest and recreation that is essential to the restoration of the human heart. In each of these matters, the importance of St Thomas’ teaching for affective formation is that he respects the goodness of these affective needs and he also reflects on the virtues that properly form them. So, to apply St Thomas’ teaching on these matters to the affective formation of the seminarian we will develop the following lines of reflection: 1) Friendship and the Good of Virtue; 2) Beauty and Affective Formation; 3) Eutrapelia and Leisure.

1. Friendship and the Good of Virtue

From St Thomas’ teaching on friendships the seminarian can gain a better understanding of what friendship entails and how it can be formed for the true good of those involved. The following points will be discussed to show how this is so: a) Virtuous Friendships; b) Love of Self and Friendship; c) Implications for Affective Formation.
a. Virtuous Friendships

For St Thomas, human fulfillment involves the development of friendships, which only attain their true perfection when the friends possess certain virtuous personal qualities. He comments that of “all things required for human living … friendship is especially necessary, to such an extent that no one in his right mind would choose to live in the possession of great external goods without friends.” 944 St Thomas writes about three basic kinds of friendship. The first is the friendship of utility, in which the friends love each other but only to engage in a kind of business arrangement to gain some profit. Friendship for the sake of utility falls away “when utility ceases”. 945 In the second kind of friendship the friends love each other for the sake of finding pleasure in each other’s company. When the pleasure is offered but not reciprocated, however, friendships of pleasure fall away. St Thomas gives the possible failure of sexual love between two lovers as an example. When “the beauty of the beloved” and her “attractiveness” decreases, and the favors given her cease, the “pleasurable friendship sometimes breaks up”. 946 Yet, pleasant company is necessary for virtue’s sake, because “no man can continuously endure something unpleasant; he could not even stand good itself if it were displeasing.” 947 Nevertheless, there is a more perfect form of friendship.

In the third and most perfect form of friendship the friends are virtuous and love each other as another self, seeing the good of the friend as their own good. This is “perfect friendship built on the good of virtue”. 948 This kind of friendship endures but takes a long time to develop, requiring persons who are capable of inspiring and exercising deep intimacy, trust and patience. Therefore it is rare.

944 St. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C.J. Litzinger, O.P., (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1993), Book Eight, Lecture I, n.1539. For an examination of St Thomas’ understanding of friendship and its fundamental importance for human life, see Daniel Schwartz, *Aquinas on Friendship* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007/2012). Schwartz considers St Thomas’ reflections on the kinds of acts that promote or hinder the development of friendships. For example, he examines concord, which is a union of the friends’ wills (22-41); pride and the unwillingness to agree with others (69-93); and the need for a free and sincere act of repentance to reinstate the honor of a friend who has been offended by an unjust act, so that the friends can be reconciled (142-161).

945 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture IV, n.1590.

946 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture IV, n.1587.

947 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture VI, n.1615.

948 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture VI, n.1609.
St Thomas comments that “the principal act of friendship is to live with one’s friends”. 949 Hence friends join together in activities such as conversation, games, sport and philosophy, that give “them most satisfaction in their lives”. 950 These activities help men become better “by exercising their friendship and improving each other”, because “the traits that they admire in each other get transferred to themselves”. 951 Conversely, absence from friends can cause forgetfulness of the friendship. Thus, “it has become proverbial that many friendships are destroyed through a man’s neglect to call upon his friend, to converse and associate with him”. 952 In this way, the neglect of a friendship leads to a cooling of affection between friends.

Some can lack the qualities necessary to develop friendships. St Thomas maintains that some people who are “morose”, “elderly” and “peevish”, “follow their own way. For that reason they cannot agree with others: they have little taste for conversation with others both because they are intent on themselves and because they are suspicious of others.” 953 These people can be “quarrelsome and critical of what others do”. Yet while they “can be benevolent inasmuch as they affectively wish good to others and even effectively assist them in their needs”, they do not become friends. 954 For they do not take pleasure in the company of others or enjoy conversation with them.

To be fair, though, it might be observed that young people can also be lacking in friendliness through defects like self-absorption and arrogance. Many older people, on the other hand, learn mildness and acceptance of others through their own sufferings. 955

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949 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture V, n.1600.
950 Ibid.
951 Ibid.
953 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture VI, n.1607.
954 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Eight, Lecture VI, n.1608.
955 An additional point can be taken from Donald Burt who comments that friends need to be frank with each other, open about their true plans, thoughts and desires, even what they think of their friend’s words and deeds. Although, there is no substitute for tact and timing. See Donald X. Burt, O.S.A., *Friendship and Society: An Introduction to Augustine’s Practical Philosophy* (Grand Rapids, Michigan/Cambridge, U.K.: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1999), 64.
b. Love of Self and Friendship

St Thomas’ reflections on friendship include a consideration of the relationship between proper love of self and the ability to know how to love others. The basic idea is that in recognizing our own good we have a platform for perceiving the good of others and how to promote it. For we tend to extend to our friends the same attitudes we have for ourselves, such as preserving our human life, especially its rationality, and enjoying our own company. Moreover, the person who properly loves himself knows that he is fulfilled in generously loving others. Such a person understands that he is enriched by doing what is noble and thus manifests true self-love. St Thomas writes:

>a person loves himself more, to the extent that he assigns to himself greater goods. But he, who makes it his business to excel in virtuous works, assumes for himself the goods that are noblest and best, i.e., the honorable kind. Therefore, such a one especially loves himself.\(^{956}\)

This kind of self-love is conducive to true community life. Striving for the true human good such a person “is eager to perform exceptionally good actions”. If everyone strove in this way the needs of all would be satisfied. For “one would come to the assistance of another and the goods that are best, viz., virtues, would become the property of each”.\(^{957}\) Such people “know themselves truly, and therefore truly love themselves”. They understand the true worth of their rational nature, “the inward man” that St Paul writes about in 2 Corinthians 4.16.\(^{958}\) In this way, proper self-love and friendship have certain interchangeable characteristics. St Thomas explains:

>For in the first place, every friend wishes his friend to be and to live; secondly, he desires good things for him; thirdly, he does good things to him; fourthly, he takes pleasure in his company; fifthly, he is of one mind with him, rejoicing and sorrowing in almost the same things. In this way the good love themselves, as to the inward man, because they wish the preservation thereof in its integrity, they desire good things for him, namely spiritual goods, indeed they do their best to obtain them, and they take pleasure in entering into their own hearts, because they find there good thoughts in the present, the memory of past good, and the hope of future good,

\(^{956}\) Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book Nine, Lecture IX, n.1867.

\(^{957}\) Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book Nine, Lecture IX, n.1875.

all of which are sources of pleasure. Likewise they experience no clashing of wills, since their whole soul tends to one thing.\(^{959}\)

In properly loving himself the virtuous person forms within himself a pattern of the good that needs to be loved and promoted in his friend. As Anthony T. Flood writes: “self-love forms the template for how a person relates (or fails to relate) to others in friendship”.\(^{960}\) Improper self-love misconstrues the true personal wealth of the person’s own self. Wrongful self-love, “which is a principle of sin … reaches to the contempt of God”, St Thomas writes. For the sinful person so desires “external goods as to despise spiritual good”.\(^{961}\) To the contrary, we ought to love ourselves out of the theological virtue of charity and according to the wisdom of God. For God gives us the gift of our life and, out of love for us, wills that we come to our true fulfilment. In light of this, St Thomas distinguishes two kinds of friendship. First, under the general meaning of friendship a man cannot be a friend to himself. However, he is more than a friend because love is a matter of union and

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\text{a man is one with himself which is more than being united to another. Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friendship. For if we have friendship with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves.}\]

\(^{962}\)

Secondly, charity refers to friendship with God and that we love all that is connected with God, which includes ourselves as loved by God.\(^{963}\) Here we find the ultimate source of our proper self-esteem. It is also the nexus of our self-love and our love for our friends – God loves them and in this light we see how they are truly worthy of love.

Without proper self-love the mutual love of friendship lacks substance. As Flood explains: “If a person does not love himself, it would be odd that he considers himself a good thing to give or

\(^{961}\) Summa Theologica II-II, q.25, a.7, ad 1.
\(^{962}\) Summa Theologica II-II, q.25, a.4, resp.
\(^{963}\) See Summa Theologica II-II, q.25, a.4, resp.
communicate to someone else.”964 Furthermore, if he does not have the capacity to enjoy greater goods in himself he will not be able to enjoy them with a friend. This is the problem with the wicked person and why he cannot enjoy true friendship. As Flood explains: “a wicked man does not know how to relate to others in love because he cannot even relate to himself properly”.965 It is only the affectively mature person, possessing a true self-love, who can give himself to another in love.

St Thomas’ teaching that a man loves himself more than another, on account of being more deeply united with himself, is not egoistic but recognizes the need to properly integrate love of self with love for others. It is a statement about the obvious closeness we have to ourselves and does not advocate a selfishness that excludes the proper good of our neighbor. In relation to this, Christopher Toner points to St Thomas’ teaching that the creature, especially the rational creature, attains its ultimate perfection by imitating God, although every creature attains this end according to its created nature and proper measure.966 Now, the human person achieves this ultimate perfection through “knowing and loving God”.967 Thus, this perfection is attained through a personal relationship of love with God. As Toner argues: “This essentially relational nature of human perfection or beatitude is also central to defending Aquinas against the broader charge of self-centredness.”968 For, the true good of the person is essentially linked to both the common good and the whole range of virtues that enable him to conduct relationships such as friendship. “And therefore”, St Thomas explains, “such virtues as those which direct man’s affections to God or to his neighbor are subjected to the will, as charity, justice, and such like.”969 Indeed, the healing role of grace serves to orientate the human heart to love God “above all things”.970 So, it is in this context “of the common good of the whole universe, which is God” that we are moved to love our

965 Ibid, 455.
966 See *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book Three: Providence Part I, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975/2001), Chapter 19, n.5: “all things tend through their movements and actions toward the divine likeness, as toward their ultimate end”.
967 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.1, a.8, resp.
969 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.56, a.6, resp.
970 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.109, a.3, resp.
own good.971 We love ourselves because, ultimately, God finds us lovable and we see that our good is promoted through a proper love for others who are also loved by God. Thus, the love of self and the love of others is brought together in a unity through the love that God has for us.

Charity adds to this the love of a “spiritual fellowship with God” and “a certain quickness and joy” in this love for God as “the object of beatitude”.972 As well as this orientation to God we have a natural inclination to live in society. Justice perfects this inclination.973 Toner points out the perfection of the moral agent includes serving the “welfare” of another and “being good includes” serving another’s “well-being”.974 This accords with St Thomas’ insistence that we model ourselves on God who loves us and calls us to love our neighbor as ourselves.975 Again, St Thomas’ vision of self-love is not to be equated with egoism or selfishness, but to be interpreted according to his rich understanding of the person’s true fulfillment through virtuous relationships.

c. Implications for Affective Formation

Friendships are essential to the seminarian’s life and they are to be positively encouraged as an integral part of his affective growth. At the same time, he needs to reflect on the quality of his friendships and develop them in accord with a proper love for others. Is he only interested in friendships of utility and pleasure? Or is he prepared to patiently develop the kind of friendship that requires the solid basis of such virtues as intimacy, trust, loyalty and patience? Is there a careful development of what is best in the friendship, so that the friends share true and noble goods that enrich them as persons?

At the same time, the need for a truthful self-love is also an integral dimension of the seminarian’s affective development. Drawing from St Thomas’ teaching on self-love the seminarian needs to respect the proper unity of loving his neighbor and the proper love of himself. Until he has become

971 Ibid.
972 Ibid.
973 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.94, a.2, resp: “man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society; and in this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination”.
974 Was Aquinas an Egoist? 608.
975 Summa Theologica I-II, q.25, a.4, resp.
mature enough to understand how to develop the inner riches of his mind, will and passions he cannot share these personal riches with another person. This maturity includes the virtues that enable him to love others in ways that promote their true welfare.

One application of this truth concerns the proper limits that need to be respected in friendships. At this point, Anthony Kelly’s comments about the difference between Divine love and human love are pertinent. The Divine Love possesses an “almighty” character and “God can communicate in a way that is beyond the many kinds of giving found in creation”. However, human love can only be authentic when it respects its essential characteristic as created and finite. Kelly writes:

Yet even in our most generous and outgoing acts, we have to acknowledge limits. There is a point beyond which our kind of loving becomes tragic. It can end in being either self-destructive for ourselves or oppressive of the other – or, more likely, both. Not to accept inherent limits on time, energy, and personal capacity is to have only a tired, exhausted shell of one’s self to offer to others. More tragically still, if any of us pretends to a quasi-almighty loving of the other and tries to enter into their very being and become their total life, then a destructive, oppressive possessiveness is the dismal result. If we attempt love beyond our human limits, we are diminished in who we are and oppress those we pretend to love.

Maintaining the right balance between answering the needs of others and caring for our own genuine needs is presented in a prayer of St Thomas: “Grant that whatever good things I have, I may share generously with those who have not and that whatever good things I do not have, I may request humbly from those who do.” This indicates, again, the affective dimension of human maturity needed to respond both to the needs of oneself and the needs of others.

One question that arises from the question of self-love and friendship is: should a friendship ever be brought to an end? When one friend progresses past another in some way it can be difficult to maintain the friendship because, as St Thomas writes, friends need to be “pleased, delighted, and

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distressed” by the same things. Nevertheless, a compelling reason for ending the friendship would be another’s obstinate evil. The friendship should be broken off, St Thomas explains, “only with those who are incurable owing to their excessive wickedness (i.e., cannot be returned readily to the path of virtue)”.

This teaching is instructive for the seminarian who needs to take into account the way his friendships affect his capacity to live his priestly vocation. There is a proper principle of self-love here by which the seminarian judges that, for the foreseeable future this friendship needs to be moderated or ended until the friend changes his attitude. An example of the problem we are discussing is that the friend may be aggressively negative about the seminarian’s vocation and openly disparage it. This can cause a lack of proper confidence in the seminarian and rob him of the peace he needs to pursue the way of life he thinks God calls him to live. However, it needs to be noted in this kind of example that the seminarian’s particular temperament, character and age needs to be taken into account. What one person can cope with another may find too much at a particular stage of life. This needs to be taken into account when the seminarian is advised by formators on the best course of action to take in such matters.

2. Beauty and Affective Formation

The aim of this section is to draw upon St Thomas’ teaching to discuss the formation of the seminarian’s affective experience of beauty. This discussion will include a treatment of how beauty is an important dimension of personal communication which will be applied to the seminarian’s liturgical formation. The following will be considered: a) Beauty as a Dimension of Personal Communication; b) Spiritual Beauty; c) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. Beauty as a Dimension of Personal Communication

In St Thomas’ understanding, the affective capacity for experiencing beauty is a distinctively human trait. As rational beings we take “pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own

\[^{979}\text{Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book Nine, Lecture III, n.1794.}\]

\[^{980}\text{Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book Nine, Lecture III, n.1792.}\]
sake”. Hence we stand with “face erect, in order that by the senses, and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things” we “may freely survey the sensible objects around” us. Thus knowledge, whether through seeing or hearing, undergirds the experience of love in regard to beauty. The beautiful fulfils a person’s “desire, by being seen or known.” This works on the level of the senses as well as on the level of the spirit. As St Thomas writes: “bodily sight is the beginning of sensitive love: and in like manner the contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love”. In both cases, it is the capacity to know that is the first faculty involved in a person being moved to love the beauty of some object.

St Thomas also reflects on beauty as an attribute of God the Son. In a discussion of how we apply certain attributes to the Divine Persons, St Thomas associates beauty with the Son. He analogically applies three basic principles in created beauty to the Son’s Uncreated Beauty:

For beauty includes three conditions, integrity or perfection, since those things which are impaired are by the very fact ugly; due proportion or harmony; and lastly, brightness, or clarity, whence things are called beautiful which have a bright color.

Beauty is attributed to the Son because he perfectly shares “the nature of the Father”. This is perfect integrity. Moreover, the Son is “the express Image of the Father” and is, therefore, in proportion to him, for “an image is said to be beautiful, if it perfectly represents even an ugly thing”. Thus, there is perfect harmony between the Father and the Son. Finally, “clarity” is attributed to the Son because he is “the Word, which is the light and splendor of the intellect”.

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981 Summa Theologica I, q.91, a.3, ad 3. For a sustained treatment of St Thomas writings on beauty see Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas, trans. Hugh Bredin (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1988). The present argument does not concern St Thomas’ view of the metaphysics of beauty so much as his view of beauty as a communication of the person in his gestures and in his interpersonal relationships.

982 Ibid.

983 Summa Theologica I-II, q.27, a.1, ad 3. I agree with St Thomas’ emphasis on the role of sight and hearing in the experience of beauty but I have been guilty of describing certain experiences of taste as “beautiful”.

984 Summa Theologica I-II, q.27, a.2, resp. There will be an explanation of spiritual beauty below in the section on the virtues that form the experience of beauty in persons.

985 Summa Theologica I, q.39, a.8, resp.

986 Ibid.

987 Ibid.

988 Ibid. St Thomas’ understanding of the beauty of the Son is consonant with the Letter to the Hebrews which speaks of the Son as “the reflection of God’s glory” and that he “bears the impress of God’s own being” (1.3). New Jerusalem Bible: Study Edition comments of this passage: “These two metaphors are borrowed from the sophia and logos theologies of Alexandria, Ws 7:25-26; they express both the identity of nature between Father and Son, and
This pertains to brightness or clarity, a quality, we could say, by which the Son’s perfection is manifest to the mind ready to receive his truth and love.

In writing of the Incarnate Son’s clarity, St Thomas refers to the Transfiguration. When he was transfigured on the mountain “his face shone like the sun” in the presence of Peter, James and John (Matthew 17.1-2). St Thomas identifies this transfiguration of Christ’s body with “the glory of his clarity”.989 That is, there is a radiance of the truth and glory of who Christ is as the Son of the Father. Christ’s clarity was shown to the apostles to encourage them because the “road” to the Kingdom of Heaven is “hard and rough”, while the going is “heavy”.990 Since the disciples needed to see that the end is “delightful”, the Lord revealed a glory that is properly his as the Incarnate Son, but which he will share with “those who follow the footsteps of his Passion”.991 This is in accord with St Paul’s teaching, St Thomas observes, that Christ will transform our earthly bodies into the likeness of his glorious body (Philippians 3.21).

Further to this, St Thomas’ comment that clarity “is a quality of the very person in himself”, which “pertains to the aspect of his person”, underscores the communicational quality of beauty.992 In this context, beauty is a communication of the identity of the person through his countenance and bearing. The clarity of the Transfiguration, then, was an outpouring of the glory of Christ’s Godhead and soul, manifesting him as the Beloved Son of the Father. It is also “a representation of his body’s future clarity”, St Thomas writes, for the permanent glorification of his body would take place in the Resurrection.993 In showing his disciples a representation of his future clarity Christ desired “to arouse men to a desire of it”.994 For the clarity of our resurrected bodies will reveal our “glorious freedom” as God’s children (Romans 8.18-21). Clarity here not only pertains to Christ’s identity as the glorified Son, but also to our identity as those called to share Christ’s Resurrection.

the distinction of person. The Son is the brightness, the light shining from its source, which is the bright glory, see Ex 24.16f, of the Father (‘Light from Light’). He is also the replica, see Col 1:15d, of the Father’s substance, like an exact impression made by a seal on a clay or wax, cf. Jn 14:9.” Henry Wansbrough, The New Jerusalem Bible: Study Edition (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985/1994), 1975.

989 Summa Theologica III, q.45, a.1, resp.
990 Ibid.
991 Ibid.
992 Summa Theologica III, q.45, a.1, ad 3.
993 Summa Theologica III, q.45, a.2, ad 3.
994 Summa Theologica III, q.45, a.3, resp.
Clarity is one of the qualities St Thomas ascribes to the resurrected body. Clarity, a certain “lightsomeness”, is an overflow into the body from the soul’s enjoyment of the divine vision. It is a communication, through the body, of the goodness and the wholeness of the beatified person. For, as St Thomas notes, our Lord spoke of the just shining like the sun in the Father’s kingdom (Matthew 13.43). To understand St Thomas’ point, it is helpful to consider that even in this present life we see goodness, kindness and joy reflected in the countenance of healthy and virtuous people.

It is not only Christ who manifests the quality of clarity. The words of the Father are imbued with their own clarity. At the Baptism the Father testified to his Son: “This is my Son, the Beloved; my favor rests on him” (Matthew 3.17). At the Transfiguration the Father repeats these words, adding an exhortation: “Listen to him” (Matthew 17.5). Since our adoption as children of God “is through a certain conformity of image to the natural Son of God”, St Thomas explains, it was fitting for the Father to speak at both Christ’s Baptism and Transfiguration. In Baptism “we acquire grace” which is a share in the Son’s relationship with his Father. This is completed by “the clarity of the glory to come”, as foreshadowed in the Transfiguration. Thus the Father expresses tenderness for his Son, confirming his identity and his redemptive mission in the light of his future glorification.

In light of these theological considerations of the Trinity, the affective dimension of beauty can be considered in its significance for the seminarian’s future priestly ministry. The vocation of the priest involves the capacity to communicate the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. Already we have a number of principles about the communication of the beauty of God to others. It involves the complete gift of oneself in love to others. This love is communicated in a way that reveals the love of one person through his words and deeds to another. This will be considered below in relation to the Sacred Liturgy. Also, someone’s identity is revealed through his countenance and hence how he looks at others and appears to them. Hence, he communicates something of himself to them. These points will become clear below, when we consider St Thomas’ teaching on spiritual beauty and honesty.

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996 *Summa Theologica* III, q.45, a.4, resp.
997 Ibid.
998 Ibid.
b. Spiritual Beauty

St Thomas applies the three conditions for beauty - integrity or perfection; harmony or proportion; and, clarity (lightsomeness) - to the moral life. “Integrity” refers to the wholeness of a being. However, by the “perfection” of a being we intend two further points. The first results from the form of a thing being whole because it has “its parts complete”. The second concerns the “end” of an activity, such as the harpist properly playing the harp, or what is attained by an activity, such as the house that the builder makes. Since the form of a thing is what enables it to act a certain integrity needs to be maintained between its form and its actions. For example, speech is the “proper operation” of human reason and communication with others. Given its purpose to express the person and help to build personal relationships, we need to respect the structure of language and maintain its truthfulness. Otherwise, we neither speak coherently nor build trust with others. Thus, “both in life and in speech” we must show ourselves as we are and what we know without duplicity, by which we show “one thing outwardly while having another” in our heart.

Due “proportion” or “harmony” refers to a proper relation between the goods a person desires and how he responds to them. Now, while beauty can be ascribed to every virtue, it is ascribed to temperance “by way of excellence, for two reasons”. First, in a more general sense, temperance “consists in a certain moderate and fitting proportion, and this is what we understand by beauty”. Second, temperance restrains us from what is not in accord with reason, which thereby defiles us and causes a lack of the fittingness that we associate with beauty. “In consequence beauty is a foremost attribute of temperance”. Temperance forms the human desire for pleasure, so that this desire and the actions that flow from it reveal our true dignity as human persons.

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999 Summa Theologica I, q.73, a.1, resp.
1000 Summa Theologica I, q.91, a.3, ad 3.
1001 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.109, a.3, ad 1: “Now it would be impossible for men to live together, unless they believed one another, as declaring the truth to one another.”
1002 Summa Theologica II-II, q.109, a.2, ad 4.
1003 Summa Theologica II-II, q.141, a.2, ad 3.
1004 Ibid.
1005 Ibid.
1006 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.142, a.8, ad 1. For Thomas, the connection we have with other animals is a good one and we are meant to incorporate a proper affection for animals with a proper affection for human persons. In fact, for Thomas, a proper “affection of passion” in regard to animals disposes us to a proper affection for our fellow human beings. In his treatment of the reasons for the ceremonial precepts of the Old Covenant about respect for animals and the humane killing of them Thomas comments: “Now it is evident that if a man practice a pitiful
St Thomas continues this line of thought when he writes of honor as the witness which is due to a “person’s excellence”. Glory is the effect of this honor, since by witnessing to the person’s excellence his goodness is made clear to many people. At this point, St Thomas identifies glory and clarity, drawing upon Romans 16.27 in which St Paul exhorts his readers to “give glory” to God through Christ. Glory, in this context, connects the concepts of the clarity of knowledge about a person’s goodness and the due praise rendered on account of this goodness. In this way, “glory denotes clarity”, St Thomas writes, for clarity refers to a certain pleasing brightness or revelation of a being’s form. More specifically, in regard to the development of character, St Thomas writes about a certain clarity which is brought about by the proper integration of our desires.

Temperance involves a certain clarity, which is the pleasing form of good character. For the temperate person properly orders his pleasures according to the good of reason, which is the most distinctive element of the human person. It is this proper ordering of the human person’s desires that allows the beauty of a well-formed character to be manifest in the person’s way of life. St Thomas also identifies honesty, being honorable or morally good, with beauty. He writes that “beauty or comeliness results from the concurrence of clarity and due proportion”. This is seen in “spiritual beauty”, which consists in “conduct or actions being well proportioned in respect of the spiritual clarity of reason”. That is, a person’s words, deeds, and personal relationships, are conducted according to the truth about how to live a good human life.

affection for animals, he is all the more disposed to take pity on his fellow-men.” Summa Theologica I-II, q.102, a.6, ad 8. I cannot pursue this line of thought in detail here but Thomas’ insight raises the issue of how the seminarian and priest can be helped by a proper affection for animals kept as pets such dogs, cats and horses. Among other benefits, this may offer the priest a consoling presence in times of loneliness and isolation and be a cause of delight and healthy distraction when others visit him.

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1007 Summa Theologica II-II, q.103, a.1, resp.
1008 Summa Theologica II-II, q.103, a.1, ad 3. The word doxa is used in Romans 16.27, which can signify glory, splendor, brightness, brilliance, the revealed presence of God, God himself, or heaven. For instance, see 1 Timothy 3.16, where there is reference to Christ being taken up into glory. See M. Barclay, Jr., A Concise Greek-English Dictionary of the New Testament, Newman (Stuttgart, West Germany: Biblia-Druck, United Bible Societies, 1971), 48. Thus St Thomas’ connection of glory with the clarity or brightness of God being known and then rightly praised holds true to the Scriptural account.
1009 Summa Theologica II-II, q.142, a.4, resp.
1010 Ibid.
1011 Summa Theologica II-II, q.145, a.2, resp.
1012 Ibid.
c. Implications for Affective Formation

The quality of beauty that St Thomas refers to as clarity has the power to attract the human heart. Clarity, from the Latin word for light - *claritas* - is a radiance or a shining. By *claritas* the ancient writers meant clearness or brightness to the sight, clearness to the mind, and fame or renown, that is, the goodness of virtue that was made clear to others and recognized by them.\(^{1013}\) The importance of the word clarity is that it communicates the multi-layered structure of the experience we have of beauty. The beauty of form appeals to our whole sensitive, intellectual and affective being. As John Saward explains, something, for instance, a beautiful work of art, “illuminates our senses, our imagination, our intellect”.\(^{1014}\) Beauty is in this way an experience of a being’s intelligible form. As Saward writes:

> The form of a thing is its intelligibility, making it be what it is and so enabling us to see it for what it is. Radiance, the splendour of form, manifests the thing to us. It is its capacity to be known by an intellect.\(^{1015}\)

This capacity to receive the communication of a being’s splendor, as Pierre-Marie Emonet writes, “establishes a relationship to a person’s profound affectivity”.\(^{1016}\) That is, it gives us an experience of fulfilment, delight and joy. It satisfies a desire to see and hear according to the truth and goodness of things, people and relationships inasmuch as they are perfect, harmonious and bright. If this is true of beautiful things, it is even truer of our meeting with persons. The beauty of someone’s good character has a power to shine upon our minds and hearts, moving us to admiration, gratitude and emulation. This is why the generous dedication of parents, the devotion of truly good friends, the heroic bravery of soldiers, the steadfast fidelity and forgiveness of the martyrs is so compelling.

It follows that the seminarian ought to be educated in this power of spiritual beauty. For example, the seminarian ought to have many opportunities to work with people who engage in works of mercy. The radiance of their lives can inspire the seminarian to live like them. It likewise instills

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\(^{1015}\) Ibid, 45.
in him a conviction that if he communicates his personal goodness to others it will move their hearts to do likewise for others. Another example concerns the reading of the lives of the saints and biographies about admirable priests. From reading and discussing the good qualities of these holy people the seminarian is drawn to emulate their attitudes and actions. Moreover, he can speak of the good qualities of these holy people and so move the hearts of others to live a saintly life.

St Thomas’ understanding of beauty as a communication of the person is also helpful for the seminarian’s liturgical formation. It is fitting, then, that the Sacred Congregation for the Clergy in its document - *The Gift of the Priestly Vocation* - mentions two activities among the many ministerial skills that ought to be developed in the seminarian. First, the seminarian ought to acquire “an appreciation of sacred art” which could aid him in his catechetical work. This appreciation would also give him “a greater awareness of history and the ‘treasures’ to be preserved, which are the patrimony of the particular Churches in which they will work”. The Congregation for the Clergy also mentions “the knowledge of sacred music” and states that “a proper appreciation of art and beauty is in itself a value, which furthermore has a clear pastoral application”. St Thomas’ theology of beauty as a communication of the person is very relevant at this point. Beautiful art enables the faithful to be drawn into the mystery of Christ, Our Lady and the saints. The beauty of stained glass windows, for example, opens the mind and heart to contemplate the scenes of Sacred Scripture and the lives of the saints.

Still, more than the presentation of beautiful art, St Thomas’ reflections on beauty open up lines of reflection on the beauty of actions that enable others to enter into the mystery of Christ. The seminarian needs to acquire an understanding of beauty that enables him to see the significance of how he communicates his thoughts and affections to build relationships. The way he conducts himself by a prayerful and virtuous life in his personal relations enables him to communicate something of the beauty of God and his love for the people of God. The words and gestures the priest makes ought to manifest that spiritual honesty and chaste respect by which his love for God and his people is made clear to them.

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The seminarian, for example, needs to prepare well for when he will be called as a priest to communicate the beauty of Christ through the way he speaks and performs the actions of the Sacred Liturgy. For instance, the words of consecration at the Eucharistic Sacrifice should be spoken in a clear and reverent voice for the people to hear and contemplate this offering of our Savior’s love for them. By ordination the priest has the privilege to speak in persona Christi the words by which Christ anticipated the gift of himself on the Cross: “This is my Body which will be given up for you.” These sacramental words are beautiful and deeply moving. They evoke the mystery of God’s gift of himself through the Cross and Resurrection of his Son. The beauty of these words and the sacrifice they embody call forth the deepest love from the people who hear them spoken. Thus, the voice of the priest sacramentally embodies the beautiful voice of the Incarnate Son of God, both in his self-offering to the Father and in the gift of himself to the congregation.

Another dimension of the importance of beauty in the Sacred Liturgy concerns the seminarian’s understanding of how to preach. This point is brought to light by Frederick Bauerschmidt who writes of the aesthetics of the preached Word in connection with St Thomas’ teaching on beauty. For St Thomas, good preaching instructs the intellect and appeals to the heart so as to draw the congregation to love God. Bauerschmidt draws upon St Thomas’ understanding of beauty as an experience of delight in a person when something is seen to possess the qualities of integrity, proportion and brightness. In Bauerschmidt’s view, these qualities become apparent in the orderly presentation of the mysteries of Christ, which can be presented so that “the sheer attractive power” of Christ, with whom St Thomas particularly associates beauty, can become manifest. We saw above, for instance, how St Thomas relates the theme of beauty to Christ in the Transfiguration.

Furthermore, Bauerschmidt observes that St Thomas associates beauty with order and that this sense of order and its beauty is present in his homiletical approach.\(^\text{1018}\) St Thomas, for example, is very careful to unfold the benefits associated with the various mysteries of salvation. When, for instance, he speaks about the line of the Our Father - “Thy kingdom come” – St Thomas is careful to note three benefits that appeal to the desire of the hearer. First, the coming of the Father’s kingdom is desirable because in it there will be only those who are good and there will be no one who does evil. Second, the kingdom is desirable because there will be complete freedom from any

\(^{1018}\) See Summa Theologica I, q.96, a.3, ad 3; q.108, a.5, ad 5.
form of bondage and all will share in God’s kingship, so that the saints will want what God wills and God will affirm what the saints want. Third, there is “supreme delight in God”, so that whatever we seek on earth will be found in a “more perfect and more excellent” way in God.\textsuperscript{1019}

Bauerschmidt notes that St Thomas’ Latin, in his explanations of the faith, is “unadorned, uncomplicated, never seeking to draw attention to its surface by dazzling the reader, but trusting in the beauty revealed in the manifestation of the fittingness of its subject matter”.\textsuperscript{1020} And while the preacher cannot prove the mysteries of faith, he can present them in a way that allows “the beauty of their fittingness” to appear “in its full persuasive force” to lead others to a living faith.\textsuperscript{1021} Thus, the simplicity of the preacher’s language serves to allow the inherent beauty of the Gospel, as truly good news for the congregation, to become apparent. Behind this approach is found a recognition of the person of Christ, who is the main focus of the preaching and who ultimately enables the faithful to receive the light of faith. This point can be illustrated by referring to a distinction that St Thomas makes between Christ and St John the Baptist. The distinction concerns the evangelist’s description of John in his important role as the one who bears witness to the light (John 1.6-8):

But Christ testifies in one way and John in another. Christ bears witness as the light who comprehends all things, indeed, as the existing light itself. John bears witness only as participating in that light. And so Christ gives testimony in a perfect manner and perfectly manifests the truth, while John and other holy men give testimony in so far as they have a share in divine truth.\textsuperscript{1022}

The difference between the two is highlighted by St John’s attitude that he rejoices to hear the bridegroom’s voice, in other words that Christ has now come and that it is time for John to give way to him (John 3.27-30). St John is very conscious of the order that he must respect: it is a privilege to prepare the way for the Lord and it is fitting that he not get in the way of the Lord, so


\textsuperscript{1021} Ibid. The reference Bauerschmidt gives from St Thomas’ writings does not talk about the beauty of the arguments but it does talk about the use of persuasive arguments. See Summa Theologica II-II, q.1, a.5, ad 2.

that he may exercise his saving ministry for others. It is both the love of friendship and humility that inspire St John’s attitude. This attitude also needs to be in the heart of the preacher, who must in a simple, orderly, and heartfelt fashion serve to prepare the way in the mind and hearts of the congregation, but recognize that it is Christ who saves the hearer. It is the beautiful selflessness of the preacher that enables him to prepare the hearts of the faithful to receive Christ.

This attitude is beautiful according to the criteria of moral virtue in its appeal to the heart that we discussed above. There is an integrity, proportion and clarity about the attitude of St John and the preacher that allows the hearts of the congregation to perceive how beautiful Christ is. This is so in two ways: first, that from this attitude of selflessness he seeks to present Christ in his truth so that he can be believed. Second, because his own love for Christ and the people becomes apparent to the perceptive and they are moved to consider that Christ must indeed be worthy of a profound love, because he is loved wholeheartedly by his ordained minister. In fact, is this not part of the beauty of the witness of celibacy? God is so good and beautiful that the ordained minister gives his life to preaching the gospel, and he is prepared to surrender the beautiful love of marriage and family life to preach Christ?

3. Eutrapelia and Leisure

For the sake of a balanced development of his affective life the seminarian needs to learn how to properly relax his mind and affections. This pertains to the virtue of eutrapelia. Leisure, moreover, forms the seminarian’s need to enjoy the good for its own sake. This finds its ultimate justification both in God who is to be loved for his own sake and the human person’s intrinsic worth. One implication of this concerns the meaning of celibacy and its expression through such activities as contemplation which are not ultimately justified by their contribution to an affective apostolate. Celibacy and contemplation are of intrinsic worth. They are to be enjoyed as a gift from God and a gift of the seminarian’s self to God and his people.

To unfold these points in terms of their importance for affective formation the following will be discussed: a) The Virtue of Eutrapelia; b) The Intrinsic Worth of Leisure; c) Implications for Affective Formation.
a. The Virtue of Eutrapelia

In the prayer *For Ordering a Life Wisely*, St Thomas prays for the grace to be “cheerful without frivolity, mature without gloom, and quick-witted without flippancy”. St Thomas sees cheerfulness and the exercise of good wit as a part of the virtuous person’s character and how he interacts with others. It is instructive for the seminarian, furthermore, that St Thomas’ treatment of the virtues in *Summa Theologica* includes a reflection on the goodness of *eutrapelia*, the virtue of knowing how to enjoy and communicate a proper relaxation of the soul. *Eutrapelia* forms the human passion for play through games and witty conversation.

The word *eutrapelia* is derived from the two Greek words *eu* (good) and *trapein* (to turn), meaning a happy turn of mind. St Thomas explains that a man is “pleasant through a happy turn of mind, whereby he gives his words and deeds a cheerful turn: and inasmuch as this virtue restrains a man from immoderate fun, it is comprised under modesty.” Modesty is an expression of temperance which forms our words and gestures according to what is fitting to the person and circumstances such as place, the business at hand, and the other persons involved. Since “outward movements are indications of the inward disposition, and this regards chiefly the passions of the soul” such moderation forms the person’s affectivity.

St Thomas’ teaching on *eutrapelia* needs to be seen in the context of the finiteness of the human capacity for work. The passion for work needs to be moderated so that we do not over-tax our psychological strength. As an example, St Thomas refers to an occasion in the life of a holy man, Blessed John the Evangelist, who had a witty reply for some people who were “scandalized on finding him playing together with his disciples”. Blessed John the Evangelist “told one of them to shoot an arrow. And when the latter had done this several times, he asked him whether he could do it indefinitely, and the man answered that if he continued doing it, the bow would break. Whence the blessed John drew the inference that in like manner man’s mind would break if its

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1023 From St Thomas’ Prayer “For Ordering a Life Wisely” in *Devoutly I Adore Thee*, 9.
1024 In *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.60, a.5, resp., Thomas names “eutrapelia” as one of the moral virtues that form the passions. Other examples he gives are “fortitude, temperance, liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, philotimia [love of honour], gentleness”.
1025 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.2, resp.
1026 See *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.1, resp, ad 3.
tension were never relaxed.” What this scene, reported by St Thomas, indicates, is the need for affective balance. That is, a truly virtuous life respects the need in oneself and in others to rest the mind in recreational activities.

Both our body and our soul need rest. When we go beyond our “measure in a certain work”, St Thomas explains, we are “oppressed” and become “weary”. This affects the body also because our soul employs the energies of our body when we are engaged in intellectual work. Such work is performed in either theoretical study or applying our reason to practical matters, which can demand great bodily labor. For example, the surgeon must apply his mind to the laborious work of standing and performing a long and intricate medical operation. Moreover, St Thomas notes that the “work of contemplation” can be particularly demanding because it concerns the raising of our mind “higher above sensible things”. This is demanding for us because we often find it easier to deal with physical matters rather than reflect on spiritual realities.

Weariness of the soul is remedied by resting the soul through the application of pleasure. This pleasure is found in “words and deeds wherein nothing further is sought than the soul’s delight”. These kinds of words “are called playful and humorous”. Hugo Rahner’s definition of eutrapelia as a “nimbleness of mind which enables a man to play”, captures St Thomas’ meaning. St Thomas sees such playful words as an important part of the virtuous person’s life. “Hence it is necessary”, he writes, “at times to make use of them, in order to give rest, as it were, to the soul.” This serves to rest us from the serious pursuits of life that demand our attention.

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1027 Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.2, resp.
1028 Ibid.
1029 Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.2, resp.
1030 Ibid.
1032 Summa Theologica II-II, q.168, a.2, resp. Other Doctors of the Church have reflected upon the need for recreation. St Francis de Sales, for example, reflects on this virtue for a number of chapters in his classic work Introduction to the Devout Life. In regard to conversation St Francis explains that a man should not be “too reserved” so that it “looks like he has a lack of confidence in the others or some sort of disdain”. On the other hand, “to be always babbling or joking without giving others time or chance to speak when they wish is a mark of shallowness”. See Francis De Sales, Introduction to the Devout Life, translated and edited by John K. Ryan (New York: Image Books/Doubleday, 2003), 194. It would be interesting to compare the teaching of St Thomas and St Francis de Sales on affective development and its applicability to affective formation but this is not directly pertinent nor is there room for such an extended treatment here.

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However, St Thomas gives some points of caution about distinguishing the virtue of *eutrapelia* from its counterfeit. The proper expression of *eutrapelia* requires us to make sure that the pleasure “not be sought in indecent or injurious words or deeds”. Also, we need to make sure that we do not lose the balance of our mind altogether and engage in unbecoming or immodest behavior. And, we should be careful to conform ourselves “to persons, time, and place, and take due account of other circumstances”. For example, we need to be careful of what we say when others are grieving because we can say something that is insensitive to their need for consolation. Given their present state of sorrow they may perceive certain jokes as inappropriate and offensive.

While St Thomas recognizes the sinfulness of immoderate expressions of fun, he is very clear about the lack of virtue displayed by someone who interferes with the proper enjoyment of others. Such a man falls short of virtue, St Thomas teaches, “by offering no pleasure to” them. Actually, he describes someone “without mirth” and “lacking in playful speech” as “burdensome to others” and “deaf” to their “moderate mirth”. As a consequence, such a person is “vicious” “boorish” and “rude.” Giving appropriate pleasure to others is, however, an act of kindness that distracts them from the difficulties of life and so enables them to recover their affective balance.

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1033 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.2, resp. One example of attending to circumstances in relation to the way games can affect us is gambling. St Francis de Sales is very critical of gambling on account of the effect it can have on the gambler’s affectivity. He points to the intense worry that gamblers have instead of taking pleasure and rest in games. He writes: “Can there be any sadder, gloomier, or more depressing concentration than that of gamblers? You must neither speak, laugh, nor cough while they are playing for fear of offending them.” See *Introduction to the Devout Life*, 196.

1034 An imaginative description of the importance of the virtue of *eutrapelia* and how it can help or hinder the growth of virtue is found in *The Screwtape Letters* by C.S. Lewis. In Letter XI, Screwtape educates his nephew demon - Wormwood - in a very crucial distinction between good and bad laughing, according to the diabolical tempter’s point of view. Screwtape divides “the causes of human laughter into Joy, Fun, the Joke Proper, and Flippancy”. Joy, Fun and Good Jokes can bring people together through the enjoyment of the good. Bad jokes and flippancy, however, can be abused to make a lack of virtue seem funny and acceptable. See C.S.Lewis, *The Screwtape Letters* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1942/1950), 57-60.

1035 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.168, a.4, resp. Timothy McDermott gives us St Thomas’ basic position on the virtue of due and healthy recreation: “Just as we relieve bodily tiredness by bodily rest, so we relieve tiredness of soul by pleasure, which is rest to the soul. We take a break from serious intent and take refuge in words and deeds which are playful and humorous, giving us the pleasure we seek.” See *Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation*, ed. Timothy McDermott (London: Methuen, 1991), 440.
b. The Intrinsic Worth of Leisure

St Thomas’ teaching on leisure can help to deepen the seminarian’s understanding of virtue. A misconception can be that working intensely is necessarily a more virtuous activity than leisure. The point is not to neglect the duty of work, which is a service to others and a way of perfecting human talents, but to reflect upon how leisure also promotes the dignity of the human person. The first point to reflect on is the relationship between the good and the difficult. There are two examples from St Thomas’ teaching that shed light on this matter. First, in considering whether fortitude excels all other virtues St Thomas writes: “Virtue essentially regards the good rather than the difficult”.1036 Since the good of reason is constitutive of the human good, prudence is prior in excellence to fortitude. In other words, the reason this act of fortitude is a virtuous act is that it first expresses the goodness of a right judgment of reason about what is to be done.

Second, in considering whether it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor or God, St Thomas replies to an objection about whether it is easier to love God because there is nothing unlovable in him. In our neighbor, however, there are some things that are unlovable. Therefore, the objection runs, it is more meritorious to love one’s neighbor because it is more difficult. St Thomas’ reply centers upon the reason that an action could be meritorious. He writes:

The good has, more than the difficult, to do with the reason of merit and virtue. Therefore it does not follow that whatever is more difficult is more meritorious, but only what is more difficult, and at the same time better.1037

In other words, virtue is about what truly contributes to the good of the person performing the virtuous deed. In this context, a way opens for us to give due place to the role of leisure as a virtuous activity even though it does not bear the mark of arduousness. In arguing for the goodness of leisure Josef Pieper refers to the role of virtue, not as a mere restraint upon the inclinations of our human nature, but rather as a way of living that perfects our good inclinations. Pieper comments of St Thomas’ understanding of the formative role of virtue: “virtue perfects us so that we can follow our natural inclination in the right way”.1038 Hence more effort and more work does

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1036 Summa Theologica II-II, q.123, a.12, ad 2.
1037 Summa Theologica II-II, q.27, a.8, ad 3.
1038 Josef Pieper, Leisure: The Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 1998), 17. Pieper is referring to St Thomas’ teaching in Summa Theologica II-II, q.108, a.2, resp. St Thomas writes:
not necessarily imply that someone is acting in a more virtuous manner. Rather, the question becomes: is this activity truly perfective of a good inclination, whether it be work or leisure?

Moreover, St Thomas argues that the highest actualizations of love have a certain effortlessness about them, because they arise from love. In relation to the question whether it is better to love an enemy more than a friend, St Thomas explains that it is not the difficulty involved that makes the love of one’s enemies meritorious. This is so even though the greatness of this kind of love is shown by its power to overcome the difficulty involved. “It follows, though,” St Thomas continues, “that if the charity were so full as to overcome the difficulty entirely, that would be even more meritorious”.1039 That is, the effortlessness is an indication of the perfection of the charity.

St Thomas also discusses the role of discipline, which is not undertaken for its own sake but is an instrument of attaining the good. If we look, for example, at the formative role of temperance in regard to pleasures, as a virtue it takes its rule from the attainment of the happiness of the person. As St Thomas writes: “the end [goal] and rule [norm] of temperance itself is happiness”.1040 This sets aside an attitude that what is pleasurable is either to be completely distrusted or is a compromise with moral weakness. The reason for discipline is that we can properly enjoy the good, not that we be disallowed from taking pleasure in it.

Another manifestation of a lack of appreciation for leisure is the attitude that study can only be justified if it is useful to society, for example, for earning money or to be admired. That is, we can never enjoy, for its own sake, some part of knowledge. This is really an argument about the relationship between the liberal and the servile arts. The liberal arts concern those areas of study that do not need to be justified by way of works that are useful. The servile arts are expressed in what we would call working for payment. St Thomas, however, argues that there must be some who are dedicated to the life of contemplation of the truth in study and prayer, for the perfection not only of the individual, but for the sake of “the perfection of the human community”.1041 This

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“aptitude to virtue is in us by nature, but the complement of virtue is in us through habituation or some other cause. Hence it is evident that virtues perfect us so that we follow in due manner our natural inclinations, which belong to the natural right. Wherefore to every definite natural inclination there corresponds a special virtue.”


1040 Summa Theologica II-II, a.141, a.6, ad 1.

highlights something necessary for every single human being. We are not mere functionaries. We have worth in ourselves and we need to engage in activities that respect that innate worth and dignity. The fact that monasteries and convents are often places of refuge and quiet prayerfulness for lay people is a reminder of this role of the contemplative life.

There must be more to our relationships than the merely functional. There has to be time for the arts, for literature, for enjoying each other’s company for its own sake, and time, most of all, for the contemplation of God. In relation to this point, we can return to the ecclesial document *The Gift of the Priestly Vocation*, which states in reference to the seminarian’s formation: “It should be remembered that a proper appreciation of art and beauty is in itself a value”\(^{1042}\). Thus the love of art and beauty is seen as something worthy in itself of the seminarian’s attention. Linked to St Thomas’ reflections on beauty in persons, which needs to be reverenced through appropriate words and gestures, the love of beauty can dispose the seminarian to reverence others. Such love for other people links to the love of God, who is the ultimate source of all beauty and human dignity.

For, God is not a mere functionary for us to use and then forget. To the contrary, we do not need to justify our enjoyment of God in meditation and contemplation in reference to other activities. The enjoyment of God is good and fulfilling in itself. There are those who would see such leisurely activities as prayer and contemplation as acts of idleness. In fact, it is those who work without knowing what they are meant to be doing that enter, Pieper comments, into “self-destructive work-fanaticism”.\(^{1043}\) They work obsessively at something when they ought to be doing something else far more fulfilling. They are not expressing “the industrious spirit of the daily effort to make a living”. Instead, true leisure is “the cheerful affirmation by man of his own existence, of the world as a whole, and of God – of Love, that is, from which arises that special freshness of action, which would never be confused by anyone with any experience with the narrow activity of the ‘workaholic’.”\(^{1044}\) Seeing God as intrinsically lovable enables us to see the true importance of leisure as a condition of the soul and the true importance of activities such as work.

Pieper writes of three qualities of leisure as a condition of the soul, that is, as a mentality and a way of living. First, leisure is the ability to be calm, let things go and be quiet. It requires a freedom

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\(^{1042}\) *The Gift of the Priestly Vocation*, n.181.

\(^{1043}\) Leisure: The Basis of Culture, 27.

\(^{1044}\) Ibid, 29.
from being preoccupied with many things and is, Pieper writes, the “disposition of receptive understanding, of contemplative beholding”. It is the attitude of someone who opens himself so that he can receive understanding. Second, “leisure is the condition of considering things in a celebrating spirit”, which flows from a person’s awareness that his life is a gift from God to be enjoyed and lived. This attitude of celebrating the goodness of life in a festival returns us to the source of our being in God. It refreshes our vision of creation as truly good, because it is given to us as a gift from God, and it manifests the nature of creation as a revelation of God’s goodness.

Third, leisure is not experienced to help us to work better. Leisure is enjoyed for its own sake because it encourages us to rejoice in the inherent goodness of our humanity. That is why God is at the center of true leisure – He is Eternal Rest and is loved for his own sake, not just for what he does. Now, we are created in his image. So, we are imitating God when we rejoice both in the Divine good and when we rejoice in the inherent goodness of the human life God has given us. St Thomas explains:

As God, Who made things, did not rest in the things He made, but rested from them, in Himself ... just so should we learn to rest not in our things or in His things, as if they were the goal, but rather in God Himself, in Whom our happiness consists. This is the reason why man should work for six days in His own works, in order to rest on the seventh day, and be free for the worship of God. But for Christians, such rest is appointed not only temporarily, but for eternity.

The heart of leisure is expressed in festival or celebration. Festival has the keynote of joy, as Pieper writes: “In festival, or celebration, all three conceptual elements come together as one: the relaxation, the effortlessness, the ascendancy of ‘being at leisure’ ... over mere ‘function’”.

Festival derives its meaning from worship, because festival restores in us a harmony with the world and God, who is the source of the being and meaning of the world.

1046 Ibid, 33.
1048 Leisure: The Basis of Culture, 50.
c. Implications for Affective Formation

St Thomas recognizes the importance of *eutrapelia*, a virtue which has a rightful part in Christian life. It is in keeping with a sound theology of virtue to engage in conversations and activities that help us to be refreshed in mind and in heart. On this point St Thomas is on firm Scriptural ground. In Proverbs 17.22 we read: “A cheerful heart is good medicine”. It is in keeping with a sound theological anthropology, therefore, to help the seminarian to practice *eutrapelia*. It is a virtue that forms his desire to relax his mind and affections through playful words and deeds. It is a virtue, too, that forms relationships. The virtuous person knows when to have witty conversations with others to lighten their hearts. The seminarian does have to acquire an appropriate seriousness for his future work as a priest. However, the priest would be seen as overly serious if he did not laugh with others in moments of healthy relaxation.1049 Such healthy laughter can also help others realize that the priest is human and approachable. It thus serves to bind them to the priest in affection and allows them to feel more inclined to come to him when they need his counsel.

Benedict Ashley’s reflection on “etiquette” - an important part of socializing – is closely aligned with St Thomas’ discussion of the moderation of our words and deeds. We want to steer, Ashley writes, “a middle course between an exaggerated civility that betrays vanity and affectation on the one hand, and a boorishness that is offensive and embarrassing on the other”.1050 Ashley distinguishes between the etiquette of serious ceremonies in public, such as the Sacred Liturgy, and etiquette in recreational events, such as social conversation or sports. He mentions decorum as the virtue by which someone knows how to appropriately communicate his feelings and receive the feelings of others, in accord with circumstance, occasion and people. “Lack of decorum”, Ashley explains, “destroys the beauty and dignity of serious affairs, and the enjoyment of recreation.”1051 That is, a lack of decorum interferes with the particular good of both serious and enjoyable social interactions.

1049 Donald De Marco, *The Heart of Virtue: Lessons from Life and Literature Illustrating the Beauty and Value of Moral Character* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996), 160. De Marco calls the virtue of appropriate laughter “mirthfulness”. He refers to a book by Norman Cousins entitled *Head First: The Biology of Hope*, which argues that laughter can help prevent disease: “Laughter can release endorphins, which act as the body’s own naturally produced pain-reducing agents. It can also contribute to improved functioning of the immune system.”


1051 Ibid.
Another point to be considered is that a balanced asceticism properly orders the pleasures that are needed for the relaxation of the seminarian’s mind and affections. The enjoyment of pleasures ought to be adapted to a person’s particular vocation. If a man has to do less physical work he needs fewer physical pleasures. “Wherefore” St Thomas writes, “it is commendable for those who undertake the duty of giving themselves to contemplation, and of imparting to others a spiritual good, by a kind of spiritual procreation, as it were, to abstain from many pleasures.”

St Thomas also draws our attention to the need for the spiritual pleasures of contemplation. Otherwise, an exaggerated desire for other pleasures will be felt. For no one can live without some pleasures.

As Basil Cole comments:

> Quite often human nature is fatigued by mental work, or loneliness, criticisms from superiors or supervisors, or even humiliating failure of some kind. The result of these experiences leads nature to yearn for pleasure to ameliorate the problem of this emptiness of spirit.

These problems can be ameliorated by good pleasures that alleviate the human spirit. One of these pleasures is that of enjoyable conversation with friends, which can reinvigorate the seminarian’s heart and connect him to others so that he receives and communicates joy.

Furthermore, St Thomas’ affirmation of the goodness of leisure acts as a helpful guide for affective formation. Such activities as contemplation, study, and a love for what is culturally uplifting, refresh the heart of the seminarian. They enable him to return to the God who has given him a vocation to the priesthood. They return him to the way he is loved not as a functionary but for his own sake as a human being. Without such a background it will be very difficult for the seminarian to learn to love certain activities for their own sake. He will be predisposed to overlook what is of intrinsic value in himself and others as children of God. This gift of himself transcends the various works he may do as a priest and take on their proper value as an expression of the gift of his love.

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1052 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.142, a.1, ad 2.
1053 See *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.118, a.2, resp.
1054 *Living the Truth in Love*, 199. For a fine description of the benefits of rest, sleep, recreation, exercise, walking and sabbaticals for our health, creativity and work, see Alex Soojung-Kim Pang, *Rest: Why You Get More Done When You Work Less* (UK: Penguin Life, 2017). One point Pang makes is that taking deliberate rest “deepens your emotional reserves and resilience” and “serves as a hedge against narrowness and intellectual atrophy” (243, 245).
1055 St Francis recommends “innocent forms of recreation” such as getting out “into the open air”, being “entertained by happy, friendly conversation”, playing musical instruments and going “hunting”. He also mentions games that reward “skill and bodily or mental activity, such as tennis, chess, and backgammon”. See *Introduction to the Devout Life*, 195.
to God and his people. The other negative side-effect will be an inability to help others be refreshed in the activities proper to their need for leisure. Lacking a true sense of leisure’s vital importance for the human soul, he will not encourage others to respect their need for leisurely activities.

A further point about leisure concerns the seminarian’s need to be aware of the symptoms of boredom, which undermines the restfulness and celebratory spirit of leisure. By leisure we are taken out of ourselves, by focusing our activity on what is of refreshing interest to us. It is an antidote to boredom in which we feel that our life is joyless and our activity futile. The seminarian needs to be attentive to his own feeling of boredom or soul-weariness. Donald Cozens writes:

> Chronic boredom is a symptom signaling that something is amiss on the level of the soul. It announces a crisis of the soul that deserves attention and care. If one sits with his or her boredom, befriends it, so to speak, listens to it, it reveals a dearth of both intimacy and transcendence.  

The recovery of the leisure of contemplation is essential when the priest is in this state. “When caught up in the wonder and mystery of transcendent ecstasy”, Cozens writes, “the soul delights in intimate communion with God’s creation and at the same instant embraces all of humanity.” Such moments transform the priest, he holds them “in his memory, drawing strength and comfort from them”. The priest rediscovers himself, so to speak, as someone loved by God, and he is renewed by the rediscovery of his innate dignity before the God who created him and called him to be a priest.

It is in the context of St Thomas’ teaching on leisure that the importance of the life of contemplation for celibacy becomes clear. St Thomas defines virginity in terms of setting aside the possibility of sexual pleasure for the sake of a greater good, namely, “the goods of the

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1057 Ibid, pp.35-36.

1058 Ibid.

1059 George Aschenbrenner writes that each Christian vocation “has its own distinctive spirituality and focus” and this is the same for the Diocesan priest. Thus we need to encourage the manner of life conducive to priestly celibacy. The celibate priest needs to achieve a balance “among the following three essential relationships: a distinctive companionship with God, a life and faith shared appropriately in the presbyteral community, and a ministry shared with many other people” George Aschenbrenner, S.J., *Quickening the Fire in our Midst: The Challenge of Diocesan Priestly Spirituality* (Chicago: Jesuit Way/Loyola Press, 2002), 108, 111.
contemplative life”.  He sees virginity as a freedom to give oneself “to the contemplation of truth”. More precisely, he writes that “holy virginity refrains from all venereal pleasure in order more freely to have leisure for Divine contemplation”. Virginity is a “leisure for Divine things”. Given St Thomas’ understanding of contemplation as an activity of the person who lovingly attends to God, we see that he defines virginity primarily in terms of the gift of oneself to God, and the contemplation of God’s love and all that is connected with God. The state of virginity enables one to have the physical and affective leisure to engage in this contemplation as a gift of oneself to God. Likewise, the gift of the seminarian can be seen both in terms of the gift of himself to be with God and the gift of his time to be attentive to God’s love and service.

**Conclusion**

This chapter has presented three examples of how virtue forms affective maturity. The presentation of these virtues has drawn upon St Thomas’ teaching that virtue forms the love of friendship, the desire to delight in beauty, and the capacity to properly rest the soul. Such virtues as appropriate self-love and caring for one’s friend as another self, form the seminarian’s ability to maintain mature and fulfilling relationships. Beauty is a communication of the goodness and identity of the person. Contemplating beauty in virtuous people and, most of all, in Christ, the seminarian is enabled to see both a life of virtue and his role as a preacher, as ways of communicating Christ’s beauty to others. Rest is an inherent need of the human person. Thus, the seminarian needs to learn how to rest his mind, alone and with others, in playful conversations and engage in other activities that can be enjoyed for their own sake. Moreover, the attitude of leisure enables the seminarian to experience human life as a gift to be enjoyed on account of his inherent God-given dignity. One implication for his future life as a priest is that he should avoid an excessive work mentality. This would proceed from a futile attempt to find personal worth only in the external works he performs. Rather, he should learn to properly celebrate the inherent goodness and joy of life and teach others to do the same. The implication for his life of celibacy is that he should not see himself as an

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1060 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.152, a.2, resp.
1061 Ibid.
1062 Ibid.
1063 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.152, a.3, resp.
ordained functionary, but as someone to be loved for his own sake and who freely gives himself to the contemplation of the Divine.
CHAPTER 9

THE PRINCIPLES OF GRACE AND AFFECTIVE FORMATION

Virtue forms the seminarian’s affectivity, so that he can experience it as a perfection of himself and so that he can share the richness of his affectivity with others to their true good. However, there is another important dimension of this issue to be considered. St Thomas’ teaching on the formative role of the virtues is part of his overall reflection on the Christian’s life. The development of this life, in imitation of Christ, encompasses the development of the Christian’s affectivity as it is unified in the love of God, vivified by his grace, and ordered by his wisdom. Accordingly, St Thomas’ general treatment of virtue in the Prima Secundae Pars of Summa Theologica culminates in a consideration of the Theological Virtues, the Gifts of the Holy Spirit, the Beatitudes and the Fruits of the Holy Spirit. St Thomas thus reflects on how a person’s virtue - a perfection of the person and a perfection of the way he acts - is brought to its completeness in the life of grace.

The aim of this chapter is to explain how St Thomas’ teaching on these principles of grace can assist the seminarian’s affective formation. The following topics will be considered: 1) The Theological Virtues and Affective Formation; 2) The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Affective Maturity; 3) The Beatitudes Form Desire; 4) The Fruits of the Holy Spirit: a Pattern of Maturity.

1. The Theological Virtues and Affective Formation

Seminary formation can derive from St Thomas’ teaching on the relationship between grace and virtue a better understanding of how the theological virtues shape affectivity. These virtues are principles that develop the particular faculties involved in affective experience while directing them to one’s friendship with God. This teaching will assist the seminarian to acquire a wisdom about the unity of his affective life with the life of grace. St Thomas’ teaching on the mean of virtue in relation to infused virtue is very helpful here. This will be discussed below in relation to the seminarian’s capacity to properly apply the theological virtues to his life.

Chapter 7 studied St Thomas’ understanding of virtue as a proper development of the human person’s affectivity. However, it is important to note that St Thomas also gives a definition of
virtue which recognizes its development within the context of the Christian’s relationship with God. “Virtue”, as St Thomas quotes St Augustine, “is a good quality of the mind by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God works in us, without us”.\textsuperscript{1064} This is a recognition of the full development of the human person’s powers which takes place through the gift and assistance of God’s grace, without overriding their proper structure. As Nicholas Lombardo comments: “Just as grace does not alter or destroy nature but brings it to completion, so too grace perfects human affectivity while respecting its natural structure.”\textsuperscript{1065} St Thomas’ use of this wider definition of virtue indicates his concern to bring together the Aristotelian and the Augustinian understandings of virtue. A brief discussion of this issue serves to focus our reflection on the intimate link between the principles of grace and the affective formation of the seminarian.

St Thomas makes a distinction between acquired virtue, that which we develop in ourselves through our natural capacities, and infused virtue, that which is given to us by the gift of God’s grace. The distinction between acquired and infused virtue in St Thomas’ works flows from his recognition that there is a genuine distinction between the human nature God has given to us in his love as our Creator and the life of grace he wills for us in view of our call to eternal beatitude. In relation to the nature of acquired virtue, St Thomas’ careful study of Aristotle’s reflections on the life of virtue reveals his respect for the thought of those who did not have the advantage of knowing Christ. This leads St Thomas to strike a balance between acknowledging what is helpful in the writings of Aristotle on virtue and examining it with a view to incorporating it into a coherent view of Christian life. St Thomas recognizes that there was authentic virtue in the life of pagans before

\textsuperscript{1064} St Thomas quotes this definition from St Augustine in the first objection of \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.55. Complete English Edition in Five Volumes, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1981). St Thomas describes it in his \textit{sed contra} as a definition gathered from St Augustine’s works, “and principally in \textit{De Libero Arbitrio} ii. 19”. In the main response of the article St Thomas explains that this is a more complete definition of virtue because it takes into account all that constitutes virtue, for example, that it must be a habit by which we live righteously, that is, it is a habit that is for the true good and cannot be put to an evil use. The final point of the definition completes the meaning of virtue as it is understood as infused virtue, that is, that God is the cause of infused virtue in us by the gift of grace, but not without our consent, as he notes in the reply to the third objection. In comparison, see Aristotle’s definition: “virtue is a purposive disposition, lying in a mean that is relative to us and determined by a rational principle, and that by which a prudent man would use to determine it”. In Aristotle’s understanding, virtue refers to a certain excellence of the person which makes both the person good and enables him to perform the act in a way that is good. Aristotle. \textit{Nicomachean Ethics}, Book Two, vi., trans. J.A.K. Thomson (Allen & Unwin, 1953). Revised by Hugh Trendennick. Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Classics, 1976/1983.


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the time of Christ. For example, he writes in *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.65, a.2, resp., that acquired moral virtues can be present in those without charity, “even as they were in many of the Gentiles”. These acquired virtues are in proportion to “the natural power” of the human person. These are true virtues in their own order but they fall short of what virtue is in its fullest sense as good habits that proceed by grace in view of our eternal beatitude. It is not the place to further discuss this issue here, except to state that the recognition of pagan virtue raises the question of whether there can be a point of harmony between the Aristotelian and Augustinian view of virtue. In other words, does the view of virtue without reference to Christ bear any point of harmony with the view of virtue as it is understood by a Christian who sees God as the ultimate source of virtue?

The source of the answer can be found in the truth that God is the source of all good, especially the good of human nature and our capacity to reason and develop our faculties for the good. This capacity, though wounded, remains in us so that we can acquire virtues that are appropriate to our human nature. Grace purifies and elevates these capacities in view of our call to eternal life, not negating but rather perfecting the gift of our humanity. God, as the source of the order of Creation and the order of grace is the ultimate source of the goodness of virtue in those who do not know God and its perfection in the life of Christians. There is much more to be discussed about this, but the main point for our present purpose is that St Thomas sees that St Augustine’s definition of virtue completes, rather than negates, the understanding of virtue in Aristotle. St Augustine’s definition makes clear that God infuses certain virtues with the life of grace that enable the Christian to find fulfilment in eternal beatitude. Yet, this definition respects the essential Aristotelian insight that virtue remains a proper exercise of the person’s faculties for the true good.1066

1066 For a very thorough and insightful discussion of this issue see David Decosimo, *Ethics as a Work of Charity: Thomas Aquinas and Pagan Virtue* (Stanford University Press: Stanford, California, 2014). Decosimo clearly presents St Thomas’ open minded study of Aristotle and St Thomas’ affirmation of virtue, as stable and unified good habits of character, among pagans (106-136). For a discussion of the harmony St Thomas sees in the Aristotelian and Augustinian understanding of virtue and the difference of virtues specific to the life of grace see 103-105. Very important for St Thomas’ understanding of acquired virtue is his commentary on Aristotle’s discussion of how moral virtues are acquired through human acts. See *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Two, Lectures I-VIII, trans. C.J. Litzinger, O.P. (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1993). For example, St Thomas comments that those “who act well in their dealings with others become just”, that is, the repetition of just actions develops in the person a genuine and lasting disposition to act justly (Book Two, Lecture I, n.253).
St Thomas’ insight on this point indicates the profound unity he sees between the action of grace and the humanity of the person who is sanctified. Both sides of this relationship need to be respected. What is truly human needs to be understood if we are to develop a coherent understanding of affective maturity. Yet this can only be fully explained in light of what God reveals to us about the significance of our lives and how we are to live. This acts as a helpful background to the teaching of St John Paul II in regard to the relationship between the seminarian’s human and spiritual formation. This is a point implicit in the discussion of themes such as the priest’s call to reflect the perfection of Christ’s humanity, chastity’s importance for priestly celibacy, and the way the seminarian’s conscience is formed by listening to Sacred Scripture.  

However, the Pope directly addresses this issue when he writes: “Human formation, when it is carried out in the context of an anthropology which is open to the full truth regarding the human person, leads to and finds its completion in spiritual formation.” Created and redeemed by God, the human person is open to the Divine and our affections need to be directed in accord with this truth. Still, another truth also needs to be recognized: union with God has an influence on how the particular affective faculties and relationships of the person are developed. They are formed by the unifying principle of friendship with God. How St Thomas’ reflections on the relationship between these two truths can help affective formation can be made clear by a consideration of the following: a) The Theological Virtues Perfect Affectivity; b) The Relationship of the Infused and the Acquired Virtues; c) The Mean of Virtue and Infused Virtue; d) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. The Theological Virtues Perfect Affectivity

St Thomas reasons that just as we are directed to human happiness by certain virtues and their appropriate acts, we also need virtues that help us to attain our supernatural beatitude. The logic

1067 See Pope John Paul II, I Will Give You Shepherds: Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.43-44 (Boston, MA: St. Paul Books & Media, 1992). See also Congregation for the Clergy, The Gift of the Priestly Vocation: Ratio Fundamentalis Institutionis Sacerdotalis (Vatican City: L’Osservatore Romano, 8 December, 2016), n.69, which mentions that the following of Christ as the Shepherd of the People of God requires the seminarian to exercise the cardinal and theological virtues. This document also states that the human development of the seminarian is “assisted and brought about by divine grace, which gives direction to the growth of the spiritual life” (n.64).

1068 Pastores Dabo Vobis, n.45.
here is that our friendship with God and the attainment of eternal union with him requires an appropriate pattern of life and activity. St Thomas therefore writes about principles of action that pertain to “a happiness surpassing man’s nature, and which man can obtain by the power of God alone, by a kind of participation of the Godhead, about which it is written (2 Peter 1.4) that by Christ we are made partakers of the Divine nature.”\textsuperscript{1069} Beyond our “natural principles”, therefore, additional principles of action are needed and St Thomas refers to these principles as infused virtues.\textsuperscript{1070} By the word “infused” he means that while we exercise them, they are primarily a capacity we have because God gave them to us and it is only by the help of his grace that we exercise them. The first three set of virtues flow directly from the Christian’s relationship with God. The object of these theological virtues of Faith, Hope and Charity “is God, inasmuch as they direct us aright to God”. These virtues “are infused in us by God alone” and we only know about them because they are part of “Divine Revelation” which is “contained” in Sacred Scripture.\textsuperscript{1071}

These theological virtues have a formative role in relation to affectivity. In opening the mind and heart to God in friendship the affective dimensions of the Christian’s life are drawn into a unity with this friendship.\textsuperscript{1072} The basis for this formation of the Christian’s affectivity is found in how the mind and the will is formed by faith, hope and charity. The logic is that Divine Revelation provides the necessary knowledge for the will to be moved to love and desire union with God. So, in reflecting on the nature of faith St Thomas describes its inherent connection to affectivity: “Faith, which is a gift of grace, inclines man to believe, by giving him a certain affection for the good”.\textsuperscript{1073} As Lombardo comments: “for Aquinas, faith implies an affective appreciation for divine good, and not just sheer knowledge of supernatural realities”.\textsuperscript{1074} This is an indication, which will be confirmed as our discussion proceeds, that St Thomas sees affectivity as an important principle in the development of the Christian’s life.

\textsuperscript{1069} Summa Theologica I-II, q.62, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{1070} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1071} Ibid. The names of these virtues come from 1 Corinthians 13.13 where St Paul teaches that there is “faith, hope and charity”.
\textsuperscript{1072} See Summa Theologica I-II, q.62, a.2, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{1073} Summa Theologica II-II, q.5, a.2, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{1074} The Logic of Desire, 151.
This reflects the structure of human affectivity in which the mind needs to appreciate the truth so that the will can tend to the good “as defined by reason”.\textsuperscript{1075} In regard to eternal beatitude, however, the human mind is guided by the “Divine light” in regard to the mysteries of Faith, which consist in the articles of faith and belief in God.\textsuperscript{1076} The light of faith purifies the heart according to the principle that what is known as a good in the intellect moves our affection.\textsuperscript{1077} Thus the will is moved to seek union with God as something attainable with God’s help and “this pertains to hope”. The will is also transformed by a loving union with God “and this belongs to charity”.\textsuperscript{1078} As Lombardo comments: faith “overflows into other realms of affectivity. The appetites respond to objects known by faith in similar ways to objects known by natural means. Since the affections respond to knowledge, and faith imparts knowledge, faith influences the affections. And since the knowledge of faith gives access to the true nature of things and their true value, faith orders the affections according to the true value of things, and thus purifies the heart.”\textsuperscript{1079} For example, St Thomas writes of how our appreciation of God “as an unfathomable and supreme good” causes us to hold him in reverence and so dread “to be separated from” him.\textsuperscript{1080} This is a filial fear which makes us adhere to God through charity and thus fear to offend him and lose his love for us.

St Thomas presents the theological virtues of hope and charity as perfections of the sanctified human appetite for the good.\textsuperscript{1081} That is, hope and charity are theological virtues that perfect human affectivity in terms of its desire for union with God and the experience of union with God in love. There are two basic principles involved here, St Thomas comments, movement to the end and “conformity with the end by means of love”.\textsuperscript{1082} The theological virtues elevate these two principles and direct them in accord with the person’s participation in the life of grace. As St Thomas writes: “Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely,
hope and charity".1083 Hope moves us to trust in God’s promises for our eternal good and charity moves us to love God as our greatest good.1084

Charity, inasmuch as it unites us to God, gives full meaning to all the virtues. Ultimately, it is for the sake of union with God that all our virtues exist. St Thomas comments that faith and hope receive “their full complement from charity as virtues”, and that “thus charity is the mother and the root of all the virtues, inasmuch as it is the form of them all”.1085 That is, every virtue is infused with meaning and purpose by charity as an expression of love for God. Thus, every virtue that forms our passions and actions comes to its fullness when it is properly ordered by charity, by which we love God as our greatest friend.1086 In this way, charity is not only a series of specific acts but, as Lombardo describes it, “a habitual affective disposition that provides a stable shape to a person’s character and affectivity”.1087 Charity is the ultimate motivating principle that gives life and purpose to the other virtues of the Christian, inasmuch as these virtues perfect both him and his personal relationships.

One of the associated experiences of this formative action of charity, inasmuch as it is a love for God, is that it disposes the Christian’s heart to love others. That God loves this person and wills what is good to him kindles a desire in our hearts to likewise love him. Thus there is a new light

1083 Summa Theologica I-II, q.62, a.3, ad 3. Italics added by me.
1084 Lombardo writes of hope: “Theological hope is a kind of love of God, namely, love of God not in himself but for the happiness God gives.” Lombardo also refers to the twofold object of hope: “God as he is desirable for personal fulfillment and happiness, and the earthly goods and divine assistance necessary to attain God”. Such hope generates the passion of hope “insofar as any natural good that is helpful for salvation can simultaneously be the object of both virtue and passion, with a consequent mutual strengthening of each.” The affective response of experiencing hope is caused by the knowledge we have through faith “that God infinitely desires our salvation and actively assists us to obtain it”. The Logic of Desire, 155-156.
1085 Summa Theologica I-II, q.62, a.4, resp.
1086 St Thomas refers to the Treatise on the Passions when explaining the relationship of hope and love. He explains that we love a good, desire it and then hope for it. Also, we love someone because we hope to obtain some good from him. In regard to the theological virtues, however, the object of love, desire and hope is God. See Summa Theologica I-II, q.62, a.4, ad 3. Here St Thomas refers to Summa Theologica I-II, q.40, a.7 in regard to the relevant treatment of the passions. St Thomas describes charity as friendship in Summa Theologica II-II, q.23, a.1, resp. Drawing upon 1 Corinthians 1.9 where St Paul writes that we are called to fellowship with God’s Son, St Thomas writes: “The love that is based upon this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.” God is loved as our greatest friend because he is the ultimate cause of our happiness. See Summa Theologica II-II, q.26, a.2, resp. The love we have for God should be greater than the love we have for ourselves because the Divine Good is greater “than our share of good in enjoying Him”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.26, a.3, resp.
1087 The Logic of Desire, 160.
shed by this love of God on the significance of those who are close to us through family and friendship or entrusted to our care in some way. This truth will become more apparent when we discuss St Thomas’ teaching on the gift of piety below and the importance of the moral virtues for applying the gifts as principles of everyday life. For the moment it is important to note that the love of God overflows into the love of neighbor. These personal relationships are gifts from God to be developed with the care and affection that God would expect in regard to the very people that he himself loves.

This point is summed up in St Thomas’ teaching about the friendship of charity with God: “Indeed, so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them”. St Thomas extends this principle to the relationship between our love for God and the love we have for our neighbor. He writes that God should be loved “before all … as the cause of happiness” and our neighbor is also to be “loved as receiving together with us a share of happiness from” God. The point for affective formation is that love for God is not an individualistic relationship but is intimately bound up with the seminarian’s love for his family, friends, and those he will serve in pastoral charity. Bonnie Kent captures this sense of St Thomas’ insight into the connection between a rightly ordered love for God and our fellow human beings: “Thomas does not regard God as some jealous lover who insists that people care for no one but Him and for no happiness other than the happiness they could have in his presence. God himself gave human beings bodies and emotions; God himself made human beings social (political) animals, inclined by their very nature to seek happiness in the company of others of their kind.” In other words, it is wholly consistent with our love for God to love those people he has entrusted to us.

b. The Infused and the Acquired Virtues

Virtues form human capacities according to the modes of action that apply “in respect of the various matters, which constitute the sphere of virtue’s action, and according to various

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1088 Summa Theologica II-II, q.23, a.1, ad 2.
1089 Summa Theologica II-II, q.26, a.2, resp.
circumstances”.\textsuperscript{1091} St Thomas refers to these virtues as “acquired virtues” because they are “humanly acquired”.\textsuperscript{1092} However, he asks, as there are moral virtues that develop our capabilities according to the light of reason, can there be moral virtues infused in us that are proportioned to the theological virtues and the “gift of grace”?\textsuperscript{1093} In other words, are there moral virtues that form the Christian’s faculties and actions in harmony with the life of friendship with God?

In answering this question St Thomas appeals to the principle that “effects must needs be proportionate to their causes and principles”.\textsuperscript{1094} By grace we have a supernatural end so we must have the personal capacity to act according to this end in the various spheres of human action, in order that what we do leads us to attain this end. Thus St Thomas writes:

> Wherefore we need to receive from God other habits corresponding, in due proportion, to the theological virtues, which habits are to the theological virtues, what the moral and intellectual virtues are to the natural principles of virtue.\textsuperscript{1095}

St Thomas’ logic is that the virtues which can “be caused in us by our actions … are not proportionate to the theological virtues”.\textsuperscript{1096} Thus God must give us virtues that are proportionate to the life of faith, hope and charity, and that perfect the other dimensions of our lives in accord with these theological virtues. That is, God must help us to form our faculties according to his love and the purpose of attaining everlasting union with him. The point relevant to our discussion of affective formation is that these infused moral virtues, like the acquired moral virtues, concern the development of passions and actions. As such these infused moral virtues shape the affectivity of the seminarian by orienting them to act in accord with the life of faith, hope and charity. This is achieved through the way his various faculties are formed by the object of the infused virtues. As Lombardo explains: there is an overflowing of the infusion of sanctifying grace which “permeates the powers of the soul and the affections of the will and the passions, thus establishing the infused

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\textsuperscript{1091} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.63, a.1, resp. \\
\textsuperscript{1092} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.63, a.2, ad 2. \\
\textsuperscript{1093} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1094} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.63, a.2, ad 2. \\
\textsuperscript{1095} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{1096} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.63, a.3, ad 1.
\end{flushright}
virtues”. Here is the basis for the life of grace acting as a formative principle of the Christian’s affectivity.

The object of a virtue “is a good” towards which the activity of the virtue is directed. Now, there is a specific difference in object between acquired and infused virtues. The difference is not found in the person possessing different faculties of mind, will and passion through grace, but it is found in how a particular virtue is measured and formed, either by human reason or the life of grace. To understand this we need to distinguish the formal object of a virtue and its material element. The formal object is the goal of the act. This is the meaning given to an act through our intellectual grasp of its goodness. The material element, however, which is understood in terms of the activity of the senses, is what is basically involved in the act. This material element can be the same both in the act of the acquired and the infused virtue. However, the formal object could change according to the purpose with which the action is undertaken and the way it is measured by either reason alone or by the light of faith.

An example is found in the difference between acquired temperance which guides the experiences connected with the “concupiscence of touch” and infused temperance, which concerns the Christian’s effort to imitate Christ and live a life of holiness. So, in the consumption of food, the mean fixed by human reason is that food should not harm the health of the body and not hinder the use of reason. On the other hand, “according to the Divine rule, it behooves man to chastise his body, and bring it into subjection (1 Cor. Ix. 27), by abstinence in food, drink and the like.”

St Thomas refers to another specific difference which concerns “what the virtue is directed to”. He explains that in relation to “human affairs” and social relationships there are virtues directed to the “forms of government”. The infused virtues, however, relate to a life with others in the life of grace, “in respect of their being fellow-citizens with the saints, and of the household of God (Eph. ii. 19)”. The point is not that the issues of health and civil government are unimportant to the Christian. The point is that the wider context of friendship with God in Christ requires a wider set

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1097 The Logic of Desire, 126.
1098 Summa Theologica I-II, q.63, a.4, resp.
1099 Summa Theologica I-II, q.63, a.4, resp.
1100 Ibid.
1101 Ibid.
1102 Ibid.
1103 Ibid.
of motivations and actions. The Christian needs to recognize how these various elements of his life are brought into a unity according to the life of charity and grace. This leads us to the moderating role of the mean of virtue.

c. The Mean of Virtue and Infused Virtue

We have already discussed the mean of virtue in Chapter 7. However, at this point of the thesis there are some important principles to be added from St Thomas’ teaching, which will help to form the seminarian’s affective balance. These principles will help him to make a proper connection between the theological virtues and the moral virtues that concern the various acts and personal relationships of his life. This will become clear when we consider St Thomas’ important distinction between the infinite nature of God’s grace and the way we respond to it as finite creatures.

St Thomas writes: “The mean of virtue depends on conformity with virtue’s rule or measure, in so far as one may exceed or fall short of that rule”.1104 The mean of virtue is the rule of reason that measures what the action should be, especially in reference to the circumstances of the action. For example, whether this action is truly daring rather than either foolhardy or cowardly. The action should be neither deficient nor in excess of what is appropriate in the particular case. Relevant here is St Thomas’ articulation of the maximum and the minimum of virtue. The maximum of the mean of virtue refers to the action that is in accord with right reason, “where it is right, when it is right, and for an end that is right”.1105 The excess of the mean of virtue occurs when the agent tends to the same kind of action as the maximum, but “when it is not right, or where it is not right, or for an undue end”.1106 There will be deficiency in an action if someone fails to tend toward what one ought to do, “where one ought, and when one ought”.1107 Thus, the mean of virtue guides the seminarian to carefully apply the measure of reason to a particular case.

Moreover, the mean of virtue applies the measure of reason to the kind of activity relevant to a virtue. In regard to the intellectual virtues the mean is twofold. First, in regard to “contemplative virtue”, which concerns the operation of the speculative intellect, the mean or rational measure is

1104 Summa Theologica I-II, q.64, a.4, resp.
1105 Summa Theologica I-II, q.64, a.1, ad 2.
1106 Ibid.
1107 Ibid.
the truth of things, inasmuch as “there is truth in what we think or say, according as the thing is so or not”.1108 Second, in regard to “practical virtue”, which concerns the practical intellect, which considers “the true in conformity with a right appetite”, that is, a right desire.1109 The mean of virtue in this case is the truth inasmuch as it is the source of proper guidance for the will.

How does all this apply to the theological virtues? Considered in themselves, the theological virtues have “God Himself” as their “measure and rule”, and “our faith is ruled according to Divine truth; charity, according to His goodness; hope, according to the immensity of His omnipotence and loving kindness”.1110 Consequently, the measure of the theological virtues surpasses “all human power” because we can never love, or hope and believe in God “as much as we should”.1111 God is absolutely truthful and to be unhesitatingly believed. He is absolutely trustworthy, therefore we place all our hope in him. He is absolutely lovable and therefore to be loved with all our heart. Yet, we are finite creatures and cannot love God in exact proportion to his infinite nature.

However, there is another measure of the theological virtues in relation to the human person. St Thomas explains that we cannot be brought to God “as much as we ought” in accord with his infinite goodness, “yet we should approach to Him by believing, hoping and loving, according to the measure of our condition. Consequently it is possible to find a mean and extremes in theological virtue, accidentally and in reference to us.”1112 The theological virtues have an appropriate measure relevant to the manner in which the human person acts, the circumstances in which he finds himself, and the connection of the theological virtues with the other virtues. This is a crucial point for affective formation which we will return to below.

A connected question concerns the importance of the moral virtues for the life of the Christian. Acquired human virtues can exist without charity because they are acquired by natural human power and acts, “even”, St Thomas observes, “as they were in many of the Gentiles”.1113 The moral virtues infused by God with the theological virtues, however, cannot exist without charity. This is so because charity is the fundamental principle of Christian life which organizes all other virtues

1108 Summa Theologica I-II, q.64, a.3, resp.
1109 Ibid.
1110 Summa Theologica I-II, q.64, a.4, resp. See also ad 1.
1111 Summa Theologica I-II, q.64, a.4, resp.
1112 Ibid.
1113 Summa Theologica I-II, q.65, a.2, resp.
in accord with the friendship of God. Yet, there is another side to this consideration: can charity exist without moral virtue? For St Thomas, the infused moral virtues equip the soul to perform all the works appropriate to attaining the supernatural fulfilment of union with God. That is why St Paul writes of those who love their neighbors as fulfilling the law. For the Law given to us through Christ articulates the moral virtues needed to attain union with God and our neighbor (Romans 13.8). To act in a way that is opposed to these infused moral virtues would be to act in a manner contrary to charity. As St Thomas explains: “in order that man work well in things referred to the end, he needs not only a virtue disposing him well to the end, but also those virtues which dispose him well to whatever is referred to the end”.\textsuperscript{1114} The virtues and acts that concern the various activities of the Christian’s life are integral to his attaining eternal beatitude.

That is, moral virtues express our love for God by enabling us to reverence the various particular goods and actions of human life and human relationships. This is so because God is the ultimate source of those goods and relationships which he loves and wills as dimensions of the human persons he loves. Since charity is the principle of all the good works that refer us to our last end it requires all the moral virtues, because “it is through them that man performs each different kind of good work”.\textsuperscript{1115} That is, good actions deserve to be done well according to their own proper mode of perfection. They express attitudes that shape the various areas of life in accord with the proper perfection of human capacities and personal relationships. Yet, they do this with a view to attaining union with God. If both these dimensions of infused virtue – love for God and the perfection of actions through the virtues - are not respected something of the nature of both is diminished. The reason for this is that while we need to love God we can only do this through the faculties he gives to us as human persons who are sanctified by his grace. Kent expresses this point well when she writes: “Purely human goods are still genuine goods, for Christians no less than other people.”\textsuperscript{1116} In fact, given that human goods find their source in God who loves us, these goods take on a greater importance. The seminarian needs to see that these human goods are to be received with gratitude and to be reverenced through a life that embodies the moral virtues.

\textsuperscript{1114} Summa Theologica I-II, q.65, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{1115} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1116} “Habits and Virtues”, 125.
d. Implications for Affective Formation

In regard to infused virtue Michael Sherwin writes: “Grace transforms the source and character of moral excellence”.\footnote{1117} Drawing upon the discussion above Sherwin’s statement can be explained through two points. First, grace transforms the source of moral excellence by orienting the Christian’s life to friendship with God who assists the Christian to live according to this friendship. Second, grace transforms the character of moral excellence by shaping the attitudes, actions and relationships of the Christian through the principles that flow from and nourish this friendship. These principles, in St Thomas’ terminology, are the infused virtues that are present through the supernatural gift of God.

The other side of this mystery of infused virtue is that the infused virtues are also “intimately the excellences of the agent himself”.\footnote{1118} God truly does give and infuse them into the life of the Christian so that they become his perfections and his capacities to act. This gives the seminarian a principle by which he can interpret the unity between the development of his affective capacities and the life of grace to which he is called. Here the importance of St Thomas’ teaching on the virtuous development of passions and actions within the life of grace becomes clear. Grace does not impose itself as a foreign principle which orders the affectivity of the seminarian without respect for the inherent dynamics of his affections and passions. To the contrary, God as the seminarian’s loving Creator and Redeemer reverences the authentic desires of the seminarian’s heart. For God is the ultimate source of the seminarian’s affectivity and the moral teaching that guides its development. Yet, it is precisely through the principles of infused virtue that his affective life comes to its true maturity and truly perfects the seminarian.

St Thomas’ teaching on the need for the infused moral virtues enables the seminarian to see the importance of his particular attitudes and actions for the development of his affectivity. The theological virtues, as the primary principles of the seminarian’s relationship with God, need to be expressed through the particular attitudes and actions that perfect his faculties and relationships. Prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude are vital to the Christian’s life because they perfect the humanity of the seminarian as he is loved by God. These virtues are rightfully developed

\footnote{1118} Ibid, 29.
through the personal relationships they entail because they are practical expressions of the good faculties God has entrusted to him. Thus, the development of his human formation finds its ultimate reason in the love God has for him and for the people he will one day serve as a priest.

Another implication is that the seminarian’s affective formation should not be developed as though it stood in isolation from the proper theological foundation of his affective formation. The seminarian’s human formation should not only draw upon secular sources of information, such as the contemporary psychological and sociological sciences. Rather, affective formation needs to be developed in harmony with the life of grace and the virtues appropriate to it. Accordingly, the theological sources of reflection - Sacred Scripture, the moral wisdom of the Church, the experience of the saints, the writings of the Doctors of the Church - are the ultimate measure of what promotes affective maturity. This does not diminish the proper role of other levels of knowledge and experience to help in affective formation, but it sets their formative influence within proper theological parameters. If some suggestion of a particular science contradicts the light of revelation it needs to be carefully examined to see what truth it may or may not hold. For example, if a seminarian was given psychological counselling in which he was encouraged to perform sexually immoral acts by himself, or with others, this would be clearly contrary to the truth of his affective development. This would only be doing him affective harm.

St Thomas’ discussion of the mean of virtue in regard to the life of grace is a vital part of knowledge about affective development. It concerns the Christian’s capacity to order his actions according to the right relationship between the theological virtues and the moral virtues. This right relationship acts as a guide to wise Christian action. From the point of view of who we are loving there is a need for an unlimited response to God. However, as St Thomas observes, that truth should not obscure the other side of the relationship – created persons necessarily have to adapt their actions to their limited resources and various proper needs. Without the recognition and application of this truth the seminarian cannot engage in a truthful and fruitful relationship with God and his neighbor. For example, the seminarian should not confuse loving God with having to be at liturgical prayer all day because his service of the needy, work, and recreation, in due measure, are also necessary and virtuous activities for him. And he should learn to apply this principle in regard to the people of God who will be in need of his sound counsel: each one has his own vocation, sensitivity, needs, and strength.
While faith, hope and charity are the foundation of his life as a future priest, the other dimensions of the seminarian’s life need to be respected and developed too, according to their particular dynamics. One application of this truth is that he should not think the theological virtues substitute for the development of his affectivity. It is not enough for him to believe in God, hope in him and make acts of love for him in prayer and worship. Rather, the affective life and the personal relationships that flow from it have their proper place in the seminarian’s heart. While these relationships need to be brought into harmony with his greatest friendship with God, they still have their own goodness and specific contribution to make in his character development. Without their proper development the seminarian cannot give full expression to the life of grace that God imparts to him. For, his graced humanity needs to be developed through the various faculties, actions and relationships accorded to him as a created person by the gift and wisdom of God.

What would a substitution of the theological virtues for the proper development of affectivity look like? In other words, what does it look like when the seminarian thinks that it is enough for him to believe, hope and love and that he doesn’t need to specifically develop his affectivity? Essentially, we would have a man who makes acts of faith, hope and love in prayer and worship, but who lacks the capacity to appropriately express human emotion in his personal relationships. The effect of this would be that an important dimension of how he communicates care to others would be underdeveloped because he lacks proper feeling for their needs. We can find an example in the priest who is prayerful but who possesses little capacity to meet others in a warm and welcoming fashion. Indeed, he may think that his prayerfulness is sufficient for his priestly ministry but his lack of affective development hinders his ability to draw others into union with Christ. For instance, he may not know how to communicate a sense of heartfelt compassion to those who are suffering through his words and gestures. In this way, he has not integrated his affectivity with his love for God so that he can communicate this love in a way that is credible to the human heart.

2. The Gifts of the Holy Spirit and Affective Maturity

Another dimension of the formative role of the principles that proceed from the life of grace concerns the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. These seven gifts form the seminarian’s affectivity by sensitizing his heart to the promptings of the Holy Spirit who works to perfect his mind, will and
affections. St Thomas views the gifts as intimately involved in the development of the Christian’s affectivity. For example, the gift of piety forms the “appetitive power” in our personal relations, the gift of fortitude moderates our fear in response to dangers, and the gift of fear purifies our “inordinate lust for pleasures”. The contemplation of these gifts enables the seminarian to be aware of how the Holy Spirit assists him to mature his affectivity as a follower of Christ. To show how St Thomas’ teaching on the gifts can be helpful for affective formation the following will be discussed: a) The Formative Role of the Gifts; b) The Gifts that Form the Mind; c) The Gifts that Form Affectivity; d) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. The Formative Role of the Gifts

The gifts of the Holy Spirit have an integral place in St Thomas’ vision of the Christian’s moral development. The gifts are a habitus and as such abide in the personality of the Christian as dispositions to properly develop his mind and affectivity. St Thomas links the gifts of the Holy Spirit to Christ who possesses them in their perfection. As such, the gifts embody certain fundamental attitudes and modes of action that are appropriate to the one who loves God. In this regard, St Thomas quotes Isaiah 11.2, which speaks of the spirit of the Lord communicating certain qualities to God’s servant: “the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and the fear of the Lord”. These are called gifts, St Thomas explains, “because they are infused in us by God, but also because by them man is disposed to become amenable to the Divine inspiration”. St Thomas also quotes Isaiah 1.5 which refers to the attitude of the disciple who listens to God and does not resist his will. Such people are “moved by

1119 Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, resp.
1120 Lombardo comments that the gifts “somehow stamp our personality”. In this way he points to the permanence of the gifts as dispositions to co-operate with the Holy Spirit. The Logic of Desire, 139.
1121 St Thomas writes that the gifts are infused by God to make a person sensitive “to the Divine inspiration” and they “conform us to Christ, chiefly with regard to His Passion, for it was then that these gifts shone with the greatest splendor”. Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.1, resp. In a point that highlights the close connection between the language of the passions and the language associated with the Gifts, Lombardo writes that the word St Thomas employs for “the Divine inspiration” in reference to the Gifts of the Holy Spirit is “instinctus”. This implies “that the Holy Spirit plays a continuous subtle role in guiding and strengthening us” rather than sporadically intervening in the life of the Christian. The Logic of Desire, 141. Lombardo takes this point from Servais Pinckaers, O.P., “L’Instinct et L’Esprit au coeur de ‘ethique chrétienne’,” in Novitas et veritas vitae: Aux sources du renouveau de la morale chrétienne, ed. C.J.Pinto de Oliveira (Fribourg: Editions universitaires, 1991), 213-23.
1122 Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.1, resp.
Divine instinct” and thus they have “no need to take counsel according to human reason, but only to follow their inner promptings, since they are moved by a principle higher than human reason”. Thus, the gifts are motivating principles that help the seminarian to live like Christ.

The gifts are sometimes called virtues in the broad sense that virtue “perfects man in relation to well-doing”, but “in so far as they are Divine virtues, perfecting man as moved by God” they are “over and above” the virtues. The gifts proceed “from the Divine prompting”. Their object is to supply the shortcomings of virtue in the mind and the will which subsist even in the person whose character is formed by reason and the theological virtues. Since it is difficult for the Christian “to avoid folly and other like things”, God “safeguards us from all folly, ignorance, dullness of mind and hardness of heart … Consequently the gifts of the Holy Ghost, which make us amenable to His promptings, are said to be given as remedies to these defects. Thus, one function of the gifts is to bring about a softening of the seminarian’s heart that he may be open to God and love his neighbor.

The “most important” part of the experience of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, Nicolas Lombardo writes, “is that they mark out an important category of graced human affectivity”. They are more intimate expressions of the Holy Spirit’s work in the Christian’s heart to bring his life and relationships to their Christ-like perfection. For example, St Thomas explains that the Gifts enable us to perform our duty to our neighbor by the same acts of justice but “much more heartily” and “with an ardent desire, even as a hungry and thirsty man eats and drinks with eager appetite”.

1123 Ibid. Lombardo comments that “the Latin word instinctus” is used by St Thomas to reflect “a sense that the Holy Spirit plays a continuous, subtle role in guiding and strengthening us, and that the significance of this word choice has been minimized by Aquinas’s commentators for fear of correlating the gifts too closely with animal instinct”. Here Lombardo is discussing a line of thought from Servais Pinckaers in “L’Instinct et L’Esprit au coeur de l’ethique chrétienne,” 213-23, 220. Another view of this matter is found in Germain Grisez who thinks that St Thomas commingles the divine and human action in the gifts as actuations of human faculties. See Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 1: Christian Moral Principles (Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 632-633. However, I think the point that St Thomas wishes to make is that the Holy Spirit is truly helping us to be responsive to his guidance and helps to unfold the life of grace in its fullness. Such guidance and help is a divine act of the Holy Spirit but which at the same time respects the reality of the person’s faculties for God moves from within in a way that is far higher and more subtle than human action.

1124 Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.1, ad 1.
1125 Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.1, ad 4.
1126 Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.2, ad 3.
1127 The Logic of Desire, 142.
1128 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.3, resp.
This pertains to the graced development of the Christian’s affectivity, in this particular case, his desire to act for the just good of his neighbor.

b. The Gifts that Form the Mind

The Gifts of the Holy Spirit first influence the formation of affectivity by perfecting the speculative and practical powers of the intellect. To help the apprehension of truth the speculative reason is perfected by the Gift of Understanding, by which the Christian more intimately penetrates the mysteries of Divine Revelation. The speculative reason is also perfected by the Gift of Wisdom, by which the Christian’s life is ordered in accord with the sweetness of God’s love and the desire to attain it in its fullness. The practical reason is perfected by the Gift of Knowledge, by which the Christian perceives the true meaning, purpose, and value of created things in light of God’s creative and wise love for them. The practical reason is also perfected by the Gift of Counsel, by which the Christian judges well of what to do in particular circumstances.

The consideration of the gifts that form the seminarian’s mind incline him to seek the Holy Spirit’s guidance in the development of his affections and relationships. This leads him to respect the sources that the Holy Spirit has provided for his guidance. For example, the teaching of Sacred Scripture, the wisdom gained by the long experience of the Church, and the counsel of wise spiritual directors. The attitude formed by these gifts is one of eagerly desiring to judge according to the mind of Christ and seek what is to the true good of others.1129

The Gift of Knowledge, for example, deepens our vision of earthly goods and purifies our desire to seek glory through them. Knowledge pertains to a “right judgment about creatures”, which is of great importance for the affectivity of the Christian because “it is through creatures that man’s aversion from God is occasioned”.1130 Wisdom 14.11, for example, teaches that creatures can be a

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1129 A similar line of thought is found in the Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church when it outlines an approach to the proper formation of moral conscience. The development of a truthful conscience “is formed by” the Word of God, and the teaching of the Church, “supported by the gifts of the Holy Spirit and helped by the advice of wise people”. Prayer and an examination of conscience are also recommended in q.374. Compendium of the Catechism of the Catholic Church (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2005/Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications, 2006), 120.

1130 Summa Theologica II-II, q.9, a.4, resp.
trap for the unwise who “deem the perfect good to consist” in them.\textsuperscript{1131} Consequently, we can suffer the loss of “spiritual joy” which is not caused by created goods, “except in so far as they are referred to the Divine good, which is the proper cause of spiritual joy”.\textsuperscript{1132} This is not a requirement to disdain creatures. While the essence of beatitude consists in the contemplation of God, it “does consist somewhat in the right use of creatures, and in well ordered love of them.”\textsuperscript{1133} Hence, as Farrell and Hughes write, the child of God “learns to love created goods for what they are worth” in light of how they proceed from and are related to God.\textsuperscript{1134} Thus, the Gift of Knowledge forms the seminarian’s affectivity to have a properly ordered love for created goods, inasmuch as they proceed from God’s love and lead the seminarian to God.

c. The Gifts that Form Affectivity

The Gifts also directly perfect the acts of the will and the passions. In this regard, St Thomas links the formative role of the gifts to the formative role of the moral virtues. The Gifts perfect the Christian, making him “ready to follow the promptings of the Holy Ghost, even as the moral virtues perfect the appetitive powers so that they obey reason”.\textsuperscript{1135} One implication of this teaching is that in forming the Christian’s attitude to created goods, the Gifts encourage him to make a more eager effort to perfect his passions and actions through the moral virtues. In this regard, the Gifts emphasize how important it is to exercise a right attitude to others. For example, the Gift of Piety forms relations with others according to their status as beloved children of God. The Gift of Fortitude strengthens us against “the fear of dangers” so that we do not offend God’s love. The Gift of Fear strengthens us “against inordinate lust for pleasures”, by inclining us to act out of reverence for God.\textsuperscript{1136} In each case, the Gift strengthens the affective life of the Christian by pointing to the importance of the action in light of its implications for his relationship to God.

\textsuperscript{1131} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1132} Summa Theologica II-II, q.9, a.4, ad 1.; Summa Theologica II-II, q.9, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{1133} Summa Theologica II-II, q.9, a.4, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{1135} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{1136} Ibid.
In relation to the formative role of the gifts, St Thomas writes: “these gifts extend to all those things to which the virtues, both intellectual and moral, extend”\textsuperscript{1137} They “perfect man for all the acts of the soul’s powers”.\textsuperscript{1138} Since these virtues either influence (e.g. by justice we give to another what is due to him), or directly pertain to the guidance of the passions (e.g. chastity regards expressions of affection between the sexes), the Gifts also form the passions. For example, St Thomas mentions that just as temperance restrains us from evil pleasures for the sake of our good, “so does it belong to the gift of fear, to withdraw man from evil pleasures through fear of God”.\textsuperscript{1139} Also, St Thomas writes of the connection between Wisdom and our affectivity: “Wisdom directs both the intellect and the affections of man”.\textsuperscript{1140} Wisdom leads a man to deeply reverence God out of love because he considers “the Divine excellence, which wisdom considers”.\textsuperscript{1141} The Gift of Fear, in its turn, withdraws us from evil “through reverence for God” inasmuch as we do not want to offend God’s love for us.\textsuperscript{1142}

Let us take the Gift of Piety as an example of how the gifts form affectivity. In his consideration of the Gift of Piety, St Thomas considers piety as a virtue and applies it to how the Holy Spirit makes the Christian tender in his affections for God and his neighbor. As a virtue, piety perfects our affections “in matters touching a man’s relations to another”.\textsuperscript{1143} It specifically refers to “the reverence which we give to our father and to our country. And since God is the Father of all, the worship of God is also called piety … Therefore the gift whereby a man, through reverence for God, works good to all, is fittingly called piety”.\textsuperscript{1144} Thus, filial devotion is given to God as the ultimate loving source of our being and then to others, inasmuch as they reflect his goodness.\textsuperscript{1145}

Now, in working to perfect our love for God the Holy Spirit moves us to experience “a filial affection towards God”, making us cry out to God as our Father (Romans 8.15).\textsuperscript{1146} This affection then leads us to extend “worship and duty not only to God, but also to all men on account of their

\textsuperscript{1137} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{1138} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.7, resp.
\textsuperscript{1139} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{1140} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, ad 5.
\textsuperscript{1141} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1142} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, ad 4.
\textsuperscript{1143} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, resp.
\textsuperscript{1144} Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.4, ad 2.
\textsuperscript{1145} See Summa Theologica II-II, q.101, a.2, resp.
\textsuperscript{1146} See Summa Theologica II-II, q.121, a.1, resp.
relationship to God”. An implication St Thomas draws is that the Gift of Piety is connected with the beatitude concerning the meek, inasmuch as the Gift of Piety disposes us, as children of God, to extend his mercy to his children. Thus, we are moved out of a tender affection for our Heavenly Father both to seek his honor and to procure the true welfare of our neighbor.

**d. Implications for Affective Formation**

St Thomas’ teaching on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit highlights the intimate involvement of God in affective formation. To recognize this enables the seminarian to avoid making too sharp a distinction between the human and spiritual aspects of his formation. Rather, it is important that he see these two dimensions of formation - the human and the spiritual - as intimately related in himself as a person who is created and redeemed by God. The effect of neglecting this dimension of the seminarian’s affective formation is to deprive him of a knowledge of the sources of grace that help him to develop his affectivity. This can amount to a practical Pelagianism, in which the seminarian’s affective formation is conducted on his own resources without reference to the guidance and strength of the Holy Spirit. This would limit the seminarian’s hope that he can attain an affective maturity that is Christ-like. For, without the help of the same Holy Spirit who formed the affectivity of Christ, how can the seminarian become affectively mature in the personal relationships that are integral to his future priestly life?

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1147 See *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.121, a.1, ad 3.
1148 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.121, a.2, resp. As Walter Farrell and Dominic Hughes write in *Swift Victory*: “The Gift of Piety looks to God as to a Father, and puts the filial touch in all of our actions, all of our thoughts, all of our dealings with others” (137).
1149 For a treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in relation to the beatitudes and in the context of developing a Christ centred moral theology see *The Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 1*, 632-653. Here Grisez proposes that the gifts not be regarded as divine acts which move human powers but rather as virtues inasmuch as they dispose us to act and gifts inasmuch “as their relationship to faith enlivened by charity makes them specifically Christian” acts (633). The alternative to this he proposes is that the gifts be identified with charity considered as the gift of the Holy Spirit which transforms moral principles into the Christian principles articulated in the beatitudes. Grisez’s account touches upon the formation of affectivity by way of the implications to be drawn for the Christian’s actions. This is so in terms of whether or not the affective experience is integrated with a morally good act. For example, the Holy Spirit by the gift of fortitude assists the Christian to avoid following an emotional “aversion” to suffering when it would lead him to act against his God-given vocation (642-643).
The seminarian needs to contemplate the gifts of the Holy Spirit to increase his awareness of how the Spirit assists the development of his affectivity. Each of the Gifts refers to a principle of grace by which the Holy Spirit helps to develop the seminarian’s mind and affectivity in accord with the heart of Christ. Together these principles provide a set of attitudes that forms how the seminarian expresses his affectivity. A mature Christian acts according to a true Understanding and orders his life according to God’s Wisdom in relation to others. Through a true Knowledge of created realities he loves them in right relationship with God who is the source of their being. Affective maturity involves taking care to seek the Holy Spirit’s guidance by the Gift of Counsel to make decisions that truly serve the good of others. The Gift of Fear impresses a deep sense of reverence on the heart of the seminarian for God and his teaching about how to relate to others. By the Gift of Piety the seminarian loves God as a tender Father and loves other people because they are God’s children.

The Gifts sensitize the seminarian to the action of the Holy Spirit. In this way they contribute to the development of the seminarian’s affective formation by opening him to the guidance and encouragement of the Holy Spirit. Yet, the gifts do not override the proper development of the moral virtues. Rather, the virtues dispose the seminarian to the love of God, “since man, through being well subordinate to his own reason, is disposed to be rightly subordinate to God”. That is, being open to reason’s grasp of the good the seminarian is disposed to listen to the God who is the creator of the human capacity to reason. As Craig Steven Titus explains in relation to prudence:

Aquinas’ notion of the grace (the graced instinct) of the Holy Spirit does not constitute parallel realms or competitive worlds that divide nature from graced-nature or law from spiritual instinct. Rather the grace of the sevenfold gift of the Holy Spirit disposes one to the impulses that bring a further measure to reason.

In accord with St Thomas’ principle that grace perfects nature, we could say that the gifts of the Holy Spirit perfect and do not negate the proper action of the faculties formed by the moral virtues. Furthermore, St Thomas teaches that all the virtues find a connection in the virtue of prudence. For St Thomas, as we saw in Chapter 7, there is a mutual influence between prudence and love, yet prudence always has the role of guiding the way love is expressed. In this way, Titus explains,

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1150 Summa Theologica I-II, q.68, a.8, ad 2.
St Thomas avoids “a formalist reduction of moral goodness to the goodness of the will”.\textsuperscript{1152} St Thomas further applies this insight to the relationships between prudence and charity. Prudence is necessary for the proper operation of our faculties under the rule of charity and as they are guided by the Gifts. For there is a specific perfection of the person through the judgment of the right course of action and the proper guidance of the moral virtues. This should not be neglected by a false appeal to the higher guidance of the Holy Spirit. In doing violence to the proper judgment of reason, violence is done to the person who has responsibility for his own actions. For example, the Gift of Counsel does not excuse the seminarian from carefully studying moral principles so that he can properly guide others.

It is true that for St Thomas, “the infused moral virtues are connected, not only through prudence, but also on account of charity”.\textsuperscript{1153} However, while charity is the virtue that directs all our virtues in accord with our love for God, prudence is still an integral virtue. This is so according to the principle that the lower power must be perfected if the higher power is to be properly exercised. As St Thomas explains: “for if the principal agent were well disposed, perfect action would not follow, if the instrument also were not well disposed”.\textsuperscript{1154} The implication is that if we are to work well towards our ultimate end we need more than the virtue of charity, which disposes us to that end. We need “also those virtues which dispose” us properly to “whatever is referred to the end”.\textsuperscript{1155} For this reason, the seminarian needs to develop the virtues that perfect his various faculties, acts and relationships. This development enables the life of charity and the action of the Gifts to be unfolded and applied in the various dimensions of his life. In other words, the formation of the seminarian’s affectivity through the Gifts also needs the development of prudence and discretion. Otherwise, the Gifts will not truly enhance the affectivity of the seminarian. For example, it is insufficient to appeal to the Gift of Piety to justify how we express a tender love for others because they are fellow children of God. Personal relationships also require a sound judgment about how they are to be conducted, according to both the proper human good of the people involved and principles such as respect for the other’s freedom, fairness and courtesy.

\textsuperscript{1152} Ibid, 256.
\textsuperscript{1153} Summa Theologica I-II, q.65, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{1154} Summa Theologica I-II, q.65, a.3, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{1155} Ibid.
There is a final implication that needs to be made more explicit to appreciate the importance of the Gifts as principles of affective formation. The Gifts are unified and motivated by charity, that is, the love of God and the love of our neighbor as ourselves. Whether we consider the Gifts that perfect the mind or affectivity of a Christian, we are looking at Gifts that draw us into the same attitude to others that God has for them. The Gifts are not principles by which we look simply to the perfection of our own character and desires but enable us to share in the attitude that God has toward other people and ourselves. This is most obvious in a Gift like Piety which inclines us to love God with reverence and our neighbor as a part of God’s family by grace. It is no less real, however, in the Gifts that perfect the mind and judgment of the Christian. For example, the Gift of Knowledge is not a mere elevation of the mind to acquire more detailed knowledge of created realities but the ability to know created realities as they given to us by God and help us to come know God. In other words, it is the grace filled capacity to know created realities, especially other created persons, within the context of a relationship of love and friendship with God.

The importance of the relational nature of the Gifts is that it moves the seminarian away from an exaggerated attitude to acquire knowledge about things that neglects a proper attention to people. It places the quest for knowledge at the service of both promoting proper personal relationships and the good of others. Drawing the seminarian into a stance of seeing others according to the love of God for them and entering into relationships with them, the Gifts lead the seminarian out of a tendency to be self-absorbed and into a true regard for the other person.1156

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1156 See Andrew Pinsent, *The Second-Person Perspective in Aquinas’ Ethics: Virtue and Gifts* (New York: Routledge, 2012), for a treatment of how St Thomas’ analysis of infused virtue, the Gifts, Beatitudes and Fruits can be explained in terms of the Second Person Perspective. This is the ability to share the attitude of one person, for example, a parent for one’s brothers and sisters. Pinsent argues that St Thomas’ understanding of virtue can be explained in terms of the grace filled ability the Christian has to share the attitude or “stance” of God to others (81). This is an essentially relational understanding of virtue by which one person can relate to others not as impersonal objects but as persons according to the love of God for them. See Chapter 2 for Pinsent’s treatment of the Gifts as Second Person Dispositions (31–63). He considers the Gift of Fear, for instance, as an appropriation of “God’s stance toward the loss of one’s own good if one is separated from God” (52). That is, we fear to lose the union of love with God most of all because God desires our friendship.
3. The Beatitudes Form Desire

As a future shepherd of the faithful the seminarian will have to give a clear example of the way of Christian life. This example ought to shine forth in the formation of his desires to reflect the life of Christ. The seminarian ought to manifest the rightly ordered affections that flow from a heart that yearns for the promise of eternal life. By desiring to experience the fulfilment of this promise the seminarian’s perspective is purified, so that he rightly desires the fulfilment of earthly goods and loves his neighbor with true affection. To explore how St Thomas’ teaching on these matters is important to affective formation the following topics will be discussed: a) Formation of Affectivity by the Beatitudes; b) The Beatitudes and the Motivations of the Heart; c) Implications for Affective Formation.

a. Formation of Affectivity by the Beatitudes

The Beatitudes refine the Christian’s understanding of the attitudes that fulfill the life of Faith, Hope and Charity so that he may attain beatitude. The Beatitudes do this by appealing to the desires of the Christian for certain dimensions of happiness, for example, mercy, that he can only properly receive when he communicates them to others. We read of the Beatitudes in Matthew 5.3-12 and a shorter form is found in Luke 6.20-23. To the mind of St Thomas, these Beatitudes are acts that give us a foretaste of the happiness of eternal life. Future happiness can be experienced in us both by the predisposition or readiness for future happiness developed by a virtuous life and by an anticipatory experience of this eternal happiness in the heart of the holy man. In this way, Servais Pinckaers observes, St Thomas recognizes the beatitudes as “Christ’s answer to the question of happiness” and through his treatise in Summa Theologica I-II, q. 69, aa.1-4, affirms that this teaching has “the place of honor in Christian moral teaching”. Thus, the Beatitudes

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1157 Lombardo comments in regard to this line of thought from St Thomas (Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.2) that the beatitudes are “‘preparations or dispositions’ for eternal happiness, and also ‘rewards,’ in the sense of being an inchoate taste of what will be brought to completion in the next life, obtained as the direct result of the activity of the virtues and gifts”. The Logic of Desire, 144.

1158 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.2, resp.

hold a pivotal place in St Thomas’ understanding of the Christian’s affective and moral development.

The Beatitudes order the Christian’s affections in accord with the promises of God about eternal life. In addressing the question of whether the rewards assigned by the Beatitudes are in this life or the next, St Thomas recognizes our common psychological experience: we desire the good of which we are aware. St Thomas sees that the promises attached to the Beatitudes “are a kind of preparation for, or disposition to happiness”, and they also refer to certain dimensions of the perfection of happiness in Heaven. Moreover, even though there may be a lack of material rewards in the present life the faithful “never lack spiritual rewards”. In other words, we are enriched through living the values that the Beatitudes impart to us, over and above the material rewards we can set our hearts on. St Thomas writes of these various goods that the Christian believer can attain and which give a new perspective on our goals and actions.

In the Beatitudes, the Kingdom of Heaven denotes “the beginning of perfect wisdom, in so far as the spirit begins to reign in men”, St Thomas writes in reference to Matthew 5.3. The possession of the land (Matthew 5.4) refers to “the well ordered affections of the soul that rests, by its desire, on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance, signified by the land”. The faithful are comforted by the Holy Spirit (Matthew 5.5). They have their fill (Matthew 5.6) of what the Lord Jesus referred to as the will of the Father (John 4.34). They obtain God’s mercy (Matthew 5.7) when they repent and when they forgive others. They are cleansed by understanding and so they can, “so to speak”, see God (Matthew 5.8). When they “are the peacemakers of their own movements” they are very like God (Matthew 5.9), “and are called the children of God”. “Nevertheless these things will be more perfectly fulfilled in Heaven”. When our desires are aligned with the attitudes expressed in the Beatitudes, our hearts are open to the blessings of a right relationship with God and our neighbor.

1160 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.2, resp.
1161 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.2, ad 2.
1162 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.2, ad 3.
1163 Ibid.
1164 Ibid.
1165 Ibid.
1166 Ibid.
These blessings and dispositions of the Beatitudes influence the Christian’s affective development. This accords with the principle given by St Thomas that the higher actions of grace “perfect man in all matters wherein the virtues perfect him”.\textsuperscript{1167} We would therefore expect that as the moral virtues perfect the actions and passions, so too, according to the higher principle of grace and hope in eternal life, the Beatitudes would perfect them. We see this line of thought at work in St Thomas’ discussion of how the Beatitudes develop our attitudes and decisions. The Beatitudes are in part exhortations to set aside incorrect ideas of what brings us happiness. The very hoping for the fulfillment of all our desires in eternal beatitude gives us a happiness that purifies and moderates our desires for present goods. This inchoate happiness enables us to refocus our hearts and be drawn away from a distorted perspective of the importance of present goods, and thus we can avoid exaggerating their importance.

Each of the Beatitudes purifies the Christian’s affective responses. The poor in spirit are called blessed (Matthew 5.5) because they know how to set aside an improper attachment to riches and honors. They avoid placing their hope in sensual pleasure as the source of their happiness. The meek are called blessed (Matthew 5.4) because they can order their irascible passions in accord with the good. Those who are meek moderate the passion of anger so that they do not violate the principles of justice. Those who mourn are called blessed (Matthew 5.5) because they know how to ensure the proper order of their concupiscible passions. They do not an improper desire for wrongful pleasure. Indeed, with their hearts intent on the joy of Heaven they are enabled even to make “a deliberate choice of sorrow”.\textsuperscript{1168} This can be interpreted in the light of St Thomas’ earlier discussion of the passion of sorrow. Here he comments that the sorrows of this life can lead us to the “comfort of the future life”.\textsuperscript{1169} For when we mourn for our sins or mourn for the delay of eternal glory we merit “the consolation of eternity”.\textsuperscript{1170} Likewise, we merit that glory when we do not avoid “hardships in order to obtain it”.\textsuperscript{1171} That is, on account of our desire to share God’s glory we accept the sufferings that accompany a life of fidelity to God in this world.

\textsuperscript{1167} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.69, a.1, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{1168} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.69, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{1169} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.35, a.3, ad 1.
\textsuperscript{1170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1171} Ibid.
Furthermore, those who hunger and thirst for justice are blessed (Matthew 5.6) because they are moved to eagerly do what is right by their neighbor. The merciful are blessed (Matthew 5.7) because they give generously not only to their friends, according to the right rule of reason, but beyond this they give to those in need, the poor and the maimed (Luke 14.12-13). The clean of heart are blessed (Matthew 5.8) because they have been purified by the virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Their hearts are not affected by disordered passions. The peacemakers are blessed (Matthew 5.9) because they are perfected in their relations with their neighbors, according to the virtue of justice, so that the harmony of peace is experienced.\textsuperscript{1172} The eighth Beatitude corresponds to the other seven and confirms them, declaring their ultimate reward: heavenly glory.\textsuperscript{1173}

Each beatitude has an affective dimension inasmuch as it shapes the desires of the Christian in relation to others. By acting like Christ, according to God’s justice, mercy, purity, peace, and in the hope of experiencing the fullness of these blessings in Heaven, the Christian forms his affections and passions. The Christ-like attitude and the actions that flow from them shape the Christian’s affective experiences so that they can be part of a true experience of unity with his neighbor. Indeed, each beatitude articulates a dimension of such a true unity inasmuch as it is both a condition for the flourishing of personal relationships and an indication that the relationship is healthy. In other words, a true relationship for the Christian requires the Christ-like attitudes of justice, mercy, purity, peace and hope in heavenly blessing, and these are indications that the relationships truly flow from the heart of a person who is attuned to God’s wisdom and love.

\textbf{b. The Beatitudes and the Motivations of the Heart}

Why are the Beatitudes so helpful for affective development? The Beatitudes appeal to our motivations, by imparting a knowledge of future promises that influences our attitudes and decisions in regard to present realities. For instance, St Thomas mentions “the chief motive for mourning is knowledge, whereby man knows his failings and those of worldly things”.\textsuperscript{1174} This knowledge and motivation is the cause of the desire for the comfort that the Beatitude promises. In this case, the Beatitude encourages the Christian to courageously consider his failings and look

\textsuperscript{1172} See Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{1173} See Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.3, ad 5.
\textsuperscript{1174} Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.3, ad 3.
openly at how earthly realities can fall short of his expectations. Thus, the Beatitude encourages him, through the promise of God’s comfort, to leave aside wrongful behavior and refuse to seek comfort in earthly things to the detriment of his striving for heaven.

The first basic problem of motivation St Thomas mentions concerns “sensual happiness”, by which we seek the object of our natural desire where we should not seek it, rather than seeking it in accord with our love for God. Instead, we can place too much store “in temporal and perishable things”. Thus, the rewards of the first three Beatitudes answer the desire for external things such as “riches and honors”, in which we seek “a certain excellence and abundance”. The promise of the Beatitudes is essentially geared to answering the truth of these desires in God, in whom they have their full meaning in the glory of the Kingdom. Flowing from the felt need for riches and glory is the affective problem of feeling insecure about how much we need to live. This feeling of insecurity inclines many to be cruel and pitiless in their fighting to possess earthly goods. “Hence Our Lord promised the meek a secure and peaceful possession of the land of the living, whereby the solid reality of eternal goods is denoted.” It is this sense of security, built upon God’s promise, which enables the Christian to avoid clinging to earthly riches and doing evil to acquire them.

Another problem is that we often seek “consolation for the toils of the present life, in the lusts and pleasures of the world.” The sorrows of life, for example, can obscure our view of the truly moral way to fulfill our desires. Thus, the promise of the Beatitude addresses the need to leave aside what is an abuse of the goods of pleasure. There is, then, a need for a kind of mourning for what might be perceived at a certain time as a helpful remedy, but which nevertheless harms the moral good of the Christian. The Christian must allow himself to grieve and let go of what will hold him back from attaining his true good in God. This leaving aside of what is evil is encouraged by the promise of consolations that will be experienced according to God’s love and providence.

St Thomas applies the same basic structure of thought to the other Beatitudes. For some there is a motive to move away “from acts of justice, and instead of rendering what is due” take what does

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1175 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.69, a.4, resp.
1176 Ibid.
1177 Ibid.
1178 Ibid.
not belong to them so “that they may abound in temporal goods”.

Here a hunger for possessions has overridden the need for relating justly with one’s neighbor. This affective disorder is addressed in the Beatitude concerning those who hunger for justice and are promised that they will have their fill. It is not the desire for being filled that is denied but its disordered manifestation through injustice that is purified, by relating it to a respect for the rightful needs of others.

Some are motivated to neglect the works of mercy because they do not want to “be busy with other people’s misery”. Here the fear that ensues in a passion of aversion impedes a person’s capacity for the compassion of pity, which is so necessary for serving those in need. Thus the Lord promises mercy to those who are merciful, thereby appealing to the motivation of the human heart to recognize our common need for mercy. Through the experience of this need for mercy the Christian will be inclined to recognize the need to become merciful to others.

Two Beatitudes help the Christian to properly use wealth for the good of others. First, the Beatitude concerning the poor in spirit teaches that they will possess the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 5.3). Therefore the poor in spirit are predisposed to overcome an undue attachment to riches. They know the relative value of wealth. They look to the excellence and abundance of good things found in God. The true wealth they have is the love of God and the love of their neighbor, which moderates their desire for external riches. So that “the well ordered affections of the soul”, St Thomas comments, rest “on the solid foundation of the eternal inheritance”.

The other Beatitude counteracting covetousness is that the merciful are blessed (Matthew 5.7). This Beatitude perfects our liberality, out of reverence for God, to consider the needs of others. Some stay away from works of mercy, St Thomas observes, because they do not want to “be busied with other people’s misery. Hence Our Lord promised the merciful that they should obtain mercy, and be delivered from all misery”. St Thomas here touches upon the way God motivates us by the promise of mercy which will be abundantly fulfilled for the merciful. Thus we are motivated to set aside a false attachment to riches and answer the needs of others.

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1179 Ibid.
1180 Ibid.
1181 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.4, resp.
1182 Summa Theologica I-II, a.69, a.2, ad 3.
1183 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.3, resp.
1184 Summa Theologica I-II, q.69, a.4, resp.
1185 Summa Theologica I-II, q.70, a.4, ad 3.
The motivation of the noblest desires of the human heart are recognized in the Beatitudes concerning the clean of heart and the peacemakers. The Beatitude concerning the clean of heart, disposes us to seek an accurate understanding of other persons and how to serve their true good. This especially concerns our relationship with God. As St Thomas writes: “the eye being cleansed by the gift of understanding, we can, so to speak, see God.” That is, a correct understanding, as it is guided by the help of the Holy Spirit, enables us to perceive God and the truth of his ways. This correct perspective on the presence of God also predisposes us to correctly understand and work for the good of our neighbor. The same appeal to a good motivation is made in the Beatitude concerning peace, which concerns those who work to be in a right and harmonious relation with others. To work for this kind of peace closely aligns us with God. St Thomas writes:

to make peace either in oneself or among others, shows a man to be a follower of God, Who is the God of unity and peace. Hence, as a reward, he is promised the glory of the Divine sonship, consisting in perfect union with God through consummate wisdom.

In this Beatitude, the desire we have for unity and peace is encouraged by the promise that one will be known as a child of God, who desires such unity and peace for his children. The desire here is live in accord with the deepest motivation of God’s heart, to have his children living together as a true family in this world and in the next.

Underlying all the Beatitudes is a sense that God is aware of the human person’s deepest desire to be like God and act according to God’s mind and heart. Thus God makes a promise that both articulates that need and impresses it deeply upon the Christian’s heart. The Christian is drawn through the well-founded hope that God will realize his promises. Moreover, in commenting on the order of the rewards articulated by the Beatitudes, St Thomas again points to the power of the promise to reorder and incite our desires according to the promised blessings of God. St Thomas explains that there is a movement from possessing the land of the heavenly kingdom to possessing it without sorrow. We are comforted in the possession of this kingdom according to a fullness that “implies abundance of comfort”. Further still, mercy surpasses this fullness because in heaven

1186 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.69, a.2, ad 3. Grisez describes the purity of heart envisaged by this beatitude as a “single-minded devotion to God, essentially including a sense of sin and a process of continuing conversion”. *The Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 1*, 647.
1187 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.69, a.4, resp.
1188 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.69, a.4, ad 3.
we receive more than we merited or can even desire. Beyond this there is the vision of God himself, the source of all our blessings.\textsuperscript{1189}

The rewards of the Beatitudes that St Thomas reflects upon refer to specific categories under the general reward of Heaven. These rewards are promised to inflame the heart of the Christian to set aside placing his security in a happiness that falls short of his dignity as a child of God. Since the glory of Heaven assures us every blessing, the Christian is encouraged to sacrifice earthly goods, if it is necessary, to attain the eternal Kingdom. For example, those tempted to give way to unrighteous anger are exhorted to be meek. For the meek will be given the lasting security of the heavenly homeland.\textsuperscript{1190}

c. Implications for Affective Formation

The formation of the Christian’s life through the education and enlivening of his desires is an important theme of Sacred Scripture. 1 John 3.1-3 refers to the lavishing of God’s love on the Christian and makes him aware of the moment he will be able to see God as he is. The implication is that the person who hopes for this moment “purifies himself”. That is, the desired future blessing shapes how the Christian lives in the present. Likewise, St Thomas’ teaching on the Beatitudes refers to a fundamental dimension of affective formation: the development of the seminarian’s desires in light of the promised blessing of eternal happiness. The contemplation of the blessings that flow from a life lived according to the Beatitudes, motivates the seminarian to live in a way that makes him blessed.

The implication for affective formation is to adopt the language of the promise that Christ used to evoke the love, desire, and hope of the human heart for the fulfilment of God’s blessings. Thereby, the Beatitudes will shed light on the meaning of the attitudes and actions that express the love, desire, and hope of the seminarian in relation to others. However, this education of the seminarian’s desires needs to follow the logic of Christ in his teaching about the Beatitudes. Each of the Beatitudes refers to a particular blessing that the seminarian can long for. This longing, however, needs to be exercised in the knowledge of its importance for himself, inasmuch as in offering it to

\textsuperscript{1189} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1190} See \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.69, a.4, resp.
another he will experience it for himself. An example given above refers to the need for mercy. The longing to receive the mercy of God incites the seminarian’s desire to show mercy to others, according to his own need to receive mercy. By making him aware of his own need for the blessing, an education in a rightful desire takes place, so that he can grow in a pattern of action that produces a blessed form of life. In this case, a merciful attitude to others that reflects the mercy of Christ.

For the purpose of developing an analysis of affective formation, we can glean from St Thomas’ teaching a richly developed understanding of how to appeal to the human heart to respond to the Gospel. It is a way that can open the seminarian’s heart to a richer view of how his heart can be moved to fulfill his vocation and live a life of service for others. It is a way of understanding affectivity in light of a promised blessedness that draws the human heart in its desire for completion and joy. This is a teaching that can draw the seminarian to live for God and his people. It is a teaching that he can impart to the people of God that they may share this blessed hope of the fulfilment of their desires in God. The implication for affective formation, then, is to place a great emphasis upon both the increase of the seminarian’s desire to receive the promises of God and to live in such a way that he will be made ready to receive them.

4. The Fruits of the Holy Spirit: a Pattern of Maturity

St Thomas’ teaching on the Fruits of the Holy Spirit articulates the kinds of personal qualities a fully mature person possesses and exercises in relation to others.\footnote{Lombardo writes: “In question 70 of the Prima Secundae, at the culmination of his account of human flourishing’s essential structure, Aquinas turns finally to the fruits of the Holy Spirit”. He also comments that before St Thomas “the fruits had been only vaguely defined in the theological imagination” and that he “offers a creative reinterpretation of the fruits as the final product of the Holy Spirit’s activity in the human person.” The Logic of Desire, 145-146.} They are the kinds of acts that manifest a mature joy in the properly formed affections and virtues of Christian life. To possess the fruits is a goal for the seminarian who, with the help of the Holy Spirit, aims to practice the Theological Virtues, Gifts, and Beatitudes so that he may become affectively mature. To reflect on how these fruits are present in his life, or are not present, enables the seminarian to evaluate his affective progress. Inasmuch as the Fruits are not present, he can develop both his responsiveness to grace and his capacity to develop the Virtues, Gifts, and Beatitudes from which the Fruits are
matured. This will dispose his mind and heart to bear fruit in charity, joy, peace, patience, long-
suffering, goodness, benignity, meekness, faith, modesty, continency and chastity. These qualities are hallmarks of how a mature Christian conducts his personal relationships and forms his affectivity so that these relationships may flourish.

From Christ’s teaching that the tree is known by its fruits (Matthew 12.33), St Thomas draws the implication that a person “is known by his works”. In the material world fruit “is the product of a plant when it comes to perfection, and has a certain sweetness”. In reference to the spiritual life fruit is both what a man produces in his actions and what he gathers from them in terms of the results in himself and his relationships. The word fruit, in its implication of being something pleasant, also refers to our everlasting fulfilment. As St Thomas writes: “man’s fruit is his last end which is intended for his enjoyment”. Human actions also give joy inasmuch as they are suitable to us and give pleasure to us according to their proper goodness. Accordingly, they are called fruits. If our actions proceed from and are suitable to reason, then they are the fruits of reason. If our actions proceed from the power of the Holy Spirit, as he works in us, they are the Fruits of the Holy Spirit.

St Thomas writes about the Fruits of the Holy Spirit in a general sense as “any virtuous deeds in which one delights”. The man who co-operates with the inspiration of the Holy Spirit finds in such holy actions “something ultimate and delightful”. Just as the fruit is the highest point of development we expect from a fruit tree, so the Fruits of the Holy Spirit are acts that are expected as the outcome of a life formed by the grace of God. Thus, while we delight in God for his own

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1192 In explaining the set of paradigmatic twelve fruits as they are found in Catholic theology, St Thomas refers to the Book of Apocalypse which speaks of “the tree of life bearing twelve fruits” (22.3). The list of twelve fruits St Thomas reflects upon adds three to those given by St Paul in Galatians 5.22. Lombardo explains that St Paul writes about the fruits of love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faith, gentleness, and self-control. However, Latin copyists added three fruits in a common manuscript tradition, in order to clarify certain fruits with close synonyms. So in Aquinas’s list of the fruits, there is longanimity and patience (longanimitas and patientia) instead of just longanimity (longanimitas); modesty and gentleness (modestia and mansuetudo) instead of just modesty (modestia); and continence and chastity (continentia and castitas) instead of just continence.” The Logic of Desire, 145, f.n.114.

1193 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.70, a.1, sed contra.

1194 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.70, a.1, resp.

1195 Ibid.

1196 Ibid.

1197 Ibid.

1198 Ibid.
sake as our supreme good, we also delight “in virtuous deeds … for the sake of their inherent
goodness which is delightful to the virtuous”. In this way, someone manifests his maturity as a
virtuous person by the joy he experiences in virtuous actions. For example, the loving father
experiences a certain joy when he acts for the welfare of his children.

St Thomas describes these Fruits as an overflow of the abundant action of grace in us. The
difference between them is inferred “from the various ways in which the Holy Spirit proceeds in
us” and sets in order three dimensions of the Christian’s life. First, the order within us. Second,
the order in relation to things near us. Third, the order in relation to things below us. As Lombardo
notes, St Thomas’ point here is that, “what he sees as most essential to the fruits is that they order,
and thereby perfect, the mind and the interior affections of the human person. For Aquinas, the
fruits are not phenomena haphazardly associated with the activity of the Holy Spirit; they correlate
to the determinate ways in which the Holy Spirit perfects the various faculties of the human
person”. So, the Fruits are perfections both of our inner life and our ability to relate well to the
world and other people.

In relation to the order within us: we are disposed well when we are properly disposed to good and
evil things. The fruits that pertain to this proper disposition are charity, joy, peace, patience and
long-suffering. Charity is mentioned first because “the first disposition of the human mind” is love,
the first of the passions and the cause of all the others. Charity is appropriately the first of the
Fruits mentioned because the Holy Spirit is Love (Romans 5.5). Joy is the next fruit because
the union of love produces joy and since the Holy Spirit as Love truly abides within us this union
with him produces joy (1 John 4.16). Peace is the third Fruit because when our hearts are “perfectly
set at peace in one object”, we account “all others as nothing”. And when we are in a secure
and lasting union with the beloved, we are at peace and undisturbed in our love and joy. Patience
is the next Fruit because the Holy Spirit helps us to be undisturbed when evil threatens our peace.
Long-suffering is the next Fruit, by which we remain undisturbed when good things are delayed.

1199 Summa Theologica I-II, q.70, a.1, ad 2.
1200 Summa Theologica I-II, q.70, a.3, resp.
1201 The Logic of Desire, 147.
1202 Ibid.
1203 Ibid.
1204 Ibid.
In regard to the order of the Christian in relation to things near him, the Holy Spirit helps him to be well disposed to his neighbor. The Fruits that flow from this proper attitude are goodness, benignity, meekness and faith. Goodness is the Fruit pertaining to someone having a good will to his neighbor. Benignity (generosity) relates to how he acts well and kindly with regard to his neighbor. Meekness concerns how he peacefully suffers evil from his neighbor and restrains his anger. Faith (fidelity) is the fruit by which he refrains from doing harm to his neighbor, by “fraud or deceit”, and by which he is faithful to God.\textsuperscript{1205}

Then there are the Fruits that pertain to the order of the Christian in relation to things below him. “Man is well disposed in respect of that which is below him”, St Thomas writes, when he has a proper regard for his sensitive appetite, the source of his life of passion.\textsuperscript{1206} The fruits that flow from a proper ordering of the passions are modesty, continence, and chastity. Modesty is the Fruit by which the Christian observes a proper “mode” or manner in all his words and deeds.\textsuperscript{1207} Continence preserves him from internal desires of what could be lawfully desired in sexual matters but which is foregone on account of his vocation, for example, if he has a vocation to celibacy rather than marriage. By chastity the Christian is withdrawn from “unlawful desires” in sexual matters (such as adultery).\textsuperscript{1208}

What are the implications for the seminarian’s affective formation of St Thomas’ consideration of the Fruits of the Holy Spirit? The Fruits are a certain completion of St Thomas’ treatment of the general principles of the Christian’s affective development. Concentrating on the theme of the enjoyment of the good acts that proceed according to the Holy Spirit’s influence, St Thomas draws a line of progression. This line of progression proceeds from the basic principle of love and its orientation to enjoy the good, all the way up to the enjoyment of the actions that proceed from the life of grace in its maturity. These actions include the ability to experience joy in the affective dispositions that are essential to relating properly to one’s neighbor.\textsuperscript{1209}

\textsuperscript{1205} Summa Theologica I-II, q.70, a.3, resp.
\textsuperscript{1206} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1207} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1208} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1209} Lombardo comments: “The fruits describe all sorts of affections and affective qualities: the joy and peace that flow from charity; patience and long-suffering in the face of difficulties; more fervent service of others through “the
Just as we enjoy the actions that proceed from our reason when they attain their proper perfection, so too do we enjoy the actions that proceed from the Holy Spirit’s communication of his love. This flows into our enjoyment of all the other perfections of our mind and affections that he works in us. In reflecting on the Fruits of the Holy Spirit, St Thomas gives us an outline of mature growth and an expectation of its outcome in the life of the Christian who co-operates with God. These Fruits flow from both the mind that is informed by Faith and the Heart that is enlivened by Charity. Thus, the seminarian ought to reflect in his attitudes, affections, and actions the perfections of a mature inner life, as they are articulated in the Fruits of the Holy Spirit.

It is true that there is a certain virtue in struggling to attain a higher level of virtue. However, the pattern of the Fruits of the Holy Spirit indicates a mature stage of affective growth that the seminarian needs to desire, pray for and work towards. It is the stage of affective maturity in the man who, like Christ, manifests the Fruits of the Holy Spirit both in himself and in his personal relationships. Thus, one way of helping the seminarian to reflect on the progress he has made in affective maturity is to ask him whether he perceives the Fruits of the Holy Spirit in himself, in his actions, and in his personal relationships. Does he see that he conducts himself as a man who is charitable, joyful, peaceful, patient and long-suffering? Is he good, generous, meek, and faithful to others? Is he modest, continent, and chaste in his affections for others? Does he understand that by these Fruits he is contributing to the good of others through an affectively mature love?

**Conclusion**

The central point to be gleaned from this chapter is that the perfective action of grace is the deepest principle of affective formation. The seminarian needs to open his heart to the various principles of grace by contemplating and exercising them as we have discussed above. By Faith he accepts what God has revealed about how he is to live as a child of God. By Hope he is encouraged to live so that he can receive God’s promise of Heaven. By Charity he develops a life of intimate and loyal friendship with God and allows this friendship to overflow into his love of others. Affective formation is thus set within the overall development of the Christian’s life. This formation is

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good fire of love’; restraint of anger; and the moderation of ‘interior desire’ by continence and chastity [in reference to *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.70, a.3].” *The Logic of Desire*, 146.
deepened by a sensitivity to the guidance of the Holy Spirit through such Gifts as Knowledge and Piety, which shape the seminarian’s understanding, affectivity, and how he relates to others. Moreover, the seminarian’s desires are shaped by the Beatitudes, which embody attitudes that are necessary to attain the promises of God. For example, the desire to receive mercy forms the readiness to be merciful. Finally, the Fruits of the Holy Spirit give a pattern of maturity, by which the seminarian experiences joy when he relates well to others through such qualities as generosity and chastity. Now, having examined St Thomas’ reflections on the formative role of grace, the work of the last two chapters is to analyze St Thomas’s teaching on infused virtue in relation to the problem of inordinate affectivity. The aim will be to help the seminarian apply the principles of infused virtue so that he can properly form his affective responses when they incline him to sin.
SECTION 3

THE RESPONSE TO DISORDERED AFFECTIONS

Section 3 analyses St Thomas’ teaching on disordered affectivity and how infused virtue can help the seminarian to respond to it with maturity. Chapter 10 considers the capital vices, from pride to gluttony, helping the seminarian to both discern the source of his sins and a way to develop his authentic desires through the exercise of infused virtue. Finally, Chapter 11, considers St Thomas’ teaching on lust, inasmuch as it harms the seminarian’s ability to responsibly love others, and how the infused virtue of chastity enables him to properly form his sexual desires.
CHAPTER 10

THE CAPITAL VICES AND AFFECTIVE FORMATION

The last three chapters have been an analysis of how St Thomas’ teaching on grace and the virtues can be applied to the affective formation of men preparing for the ordained ministry. The purpose of this chapter is to consider St Thomas’ teaching on how affective responses can be inordinate and how the seminarian can respond to them in a virtuous manner. To develop this point we will examine St Thomas’ teaching on the capital vices as principles that distort someone’s affectivity and which incline him to sinful patterns of behavior. The aim is to understand the sources of these inordinate tendencies and how to reorient them to the good through the virtues. To complete this consideration, the next chapter will conduct a case study on how the virtue of chastity can foster the healing of inordinate sexual desire.

The study of St Thomas’ teaching on the vices will help the seminarian to assimilate the teaching of Pope St John Paul II on affective maturity. In *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, John Paul II calls the seminarian to set aside any disordered forms of affectivity, because they diminish how he relates to others and thereby inhibit his ability to communicate the goodness of Christ. For example, the seminarian should avoid being arrogant or quarrelsome, because he is called to be a man of communion who promotes the welfare of the Christian community. And, out of fraternal charity priests ought to set “aside all forms of jealousy, envy and rivalry”. Thus, the seminarian should seek to purify his inordinate affective tendencies, in order to relate virtuously to others and help them come close to Christ.

To achieve this reorientation of his affectivity, the seminarian needs a coherent and detailed explanation of the sources of affective distortions and their impact on his personal relationships. For example, he needs to understand envy, what motivates it, and how it damages his personal relationships. Without this kind of knowledge the seminarian lacks the instruments of self-reflection that will help him to distinguish his good and evil motivations. This also becomes the basis for him to look to the relevant virtues that can foster his affective growth. With this in mind,

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1211 Ibid, n.28.
the following discussion concerns three important dimensions of St Thomas’ teaching on vice and how it can be helpful to the seminarian’s affective formation. First, there will be a reflection on St Thomas’ teaching on the general relationship between affectivity and sin (1). Second, there will be a consideration of how inordinate self-love and pride are the chief sources of sin (2-3). Third, the discussion will move to a consideration of St Thomas’ teaching on the capital sins of vainglory, envy, acedia (sloth), avarice and gluttony, and the virtues that help to re-order them (4-8). A consideration of anger will be excluded from this present chapter because it has been examined in Chapter 6.

1. Affectivity and Sin

The first step in coming to understand the negative impact of the capital vices is to consider the general relationship between affectivity and sin. The goal is to reflect upon how our faculties can generate inordinate desires and how these faculties can be reformed. St Thomas describes the state in which our faculties are left without their proper ordering to virtue as “a wounding of nature”.1212 This wounding is manifested in a certain distortion of each faculty’s acts. There is a wound of ignorance inasmuch as we do not clearly understand the truth. There is the wound of malice by which we choose in an evil way. The wound of weakness is found in the irascible passions which move us to either inordinately pursue the arduous good or avoid the arduous evil. The wound of concupiscence consists in the lack of due moderation in the pursuit of pleasure through our concupiscible passions.1213

The purpose of recognizing these wounds is to seek their purification, that is, the reorientation of our distorted acts and habits so that we can properly pursue the good. The purpose of repentance and grace, then, is not to diminish the proper acts of these faculties but to restore them, according to the principle that “grace perfects nature”.1214 Grace, in other words, enables someone to properly develop his faculties in order to live a truly virtuous life.

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1213 See Summa Theologica I-II, q.85, a.3, resp.
Sin, on the other hand, impairs both the formative influence of grace and the proper development of our faculties. Since we find our fulfilment in God, any action that harms our friendship with God also harms the proper exercise of our faculties. This in turn inhibits the development of our personal relationships with others because we lack the ability to act well towards them. An analogy is found in human friendship, which is damaged through deceitfulness, by which a person is predisposed to repeat this bad pattern of behavior in future relationships.

For the purpose of affective formation it is important for the seminarian to reflect on the impact of disordered passions, which can distort his affective experience and incline him to wrongful behavior. The passions can move someone’s will indirectly by distracting it, either partially or altogether. This occurs because he has a limited capacity to counteract the tendency of a strong passion. For example, tiredness can limit his ability to resist a strong burst of anger and it can be difficult for him to turn his attention away from an object that is the cause of a strong affective response. Thus, the passions can inhibit his reasoning process by inclining him to give too much attention to the particular case and not enough attention to a general moral principle.

For example, St Thomas describes the thinking process of the incontinent person who reasons that fornication is not right while a strong passion suggests that pleasure be pursued. Steven Jensen argues that in this case the weak person fails to consider the fuller picture by filtering out other relevant considerations about the act. The person is so desirous of pleasure, “that she wants to choose now, and she does not want to bother thinking about other aspects of the action”. This is an abandoning of reason, “at the particular level”, because the person fails to sufficiently “investigate the nature of this particular action”. Instead, she would do better to reflect upon the true meaning of sexual love as an expression of a faithful love in marriage and that she violates

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1215 *On Evil*, q.2, a.11, resp.
1216 The other side of this is that the misuse of our faculties is sinful because we are harming the good faculties given to us by the God who loves us.
1217 St Thomas explains that “the soul’s powers are rooted in the one essence of the soul” so that the passions, mind and will exert a mutual influence. Moreover, “all energy is weakened through being divided”, thus if “closely fixed on one thing” the person can only give “less attention … to another”. *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.77, a.1, resp.
1218 For example, someone moved by anger at a grave injustice can find it difficult to think about something else and so his anger becomes more intense. See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.77, a.1, resp.
1219 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.77, a.2, ad 4.
1221 Ibid, 372.
this meaning through her lustful act. Thus, she should develop her capacity for careful reflection and avoid impulsive actions so that she can prepare well for a lasting marital union.

In studying such elements of St Thomas’ teaching on sin, it might be asked whether we are proceeding too negatively for the purpose of the seminarian’s affective formation. On this point, George Corbett argues that “comparatively little attention” has been given “to Aquinas’ treatment of sin” for two reasons. There is the tendency to see St Thomas as a champion of virtue ethics and there is the cultural trend to emphasize the good, virtue, and heaven, while avoiding negative themes such as sin and hell. But, Corbett argues, St Thomas’ careful treatment of the psychology of sin can be of enormous help to us. St Thomas shows “how reflection on the reality of a particular sin – which is the natural starting point for a penitent – is potentially transformative: it can, and should, lead a person to the path of virtue of which sin is a disorder”. That is, St Thomas’ teaching on the vices has a positive purpose – to set aside what is evil so that we can be free to strive for the true good.

Furthermore, it is far better, as Basil Cole explains, to systematically study the vices rather than allow them to become “an unconscious motivating power”. Ignorance can do “damage when emotions are repressed or denied, for all the capital vices revolve around unreasonable and ill-formed emotions”. Consequently, the effort to purify the inner forces that distort the seminarian’s way of relating to others is a necessary part of his self-knowledge. He “must learn the difference between his authentic self and the false images, projected by the seeds of the capital vices”. He must learn how to discern between those desires and actions that truly develop his identity, as someone preparing for the priesthood, and those which corrupt this identity.

Furthermore, as De Young points out, giving names to vices is an instrument of proper self-awareness. “It gives us a clearer idea of what we’re facing, helps us disentangle surface symptoms

1222 See The Error of the Passions, 373, 376.
1224 Ibid.
1226 Ibid, xv.
1227 Ibid, 233.
from root causes, and points to therapies that are likely to be most effective.”\textsuperscript{1228} For, the capital vices “depict for us the traits of character” which need to be purified if we are to live a more Christ-like life.\textsuperscript{1229} Observing our feelings, actions and habits, or “deeply rooted patterns in our character”, we can see what needs to change if we are to become better people.\textsuperscript{1230} Furthermore, guided by a set of objective principles, we can more accurately reflect upon our affective experiences and what they prompt us to do. Thus, we are able “to think through reasons for acting one way rather than another”, writes DeYoung, and so “resist the pull of passion.”\textsuperscript{1231} This is a positive approach that enables the seminarian to think through and reorient his inordinate desires.

So, the importance of this introductory description of inordinate affectivity is that it is the starting point for a wise discernment of good from evil tendencies. For St Thomas, sin is not in our faculties as they are “instituted by God”, but only as they depart from God’s ordination.\textsuperscript{1232} That is, they are good in themselves as human faculties, but they can generate disordered desires. The point of the following discussion of the capital vices, therefore, is carefully to describe the main inordinate affective tendencies so that the seminarian may wisely discern them. Now, the first step in this analysis is to consider the source from which the capital sins flow: inordinate self-love.

\section*{2. Inordinate Self-Love}

St Thomas observes that love of self is commanded by God (Leviticus 19.18) and it “is right and natural” when we desire “a fitting good” for ourselves.\textsuperscript{1233} However, this love of self can be distorted by focusing wrongly on oneself to the exclusion of the proper good of others and it is this “inordinate love of self [that] is the cause of every sin”.\textsuperscript{1234} Inordinate self-love inclines us to strive

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1229} Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, \textit{Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and their Remedies} (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Pres DeYoungs/Baker Publishing Group, 2009), 18.
\item \textsuperscript{1230} Ibid, 34.
\item \textsuperscript{1231} Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Colleen Mcuskey, Christina Van Dyke, \textit{Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context}, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 103.
\item \textsuperscript{1232} On Evil, q.3, a.1, ad 5.
\item \textsuperscript{1233} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.77, a.4, ad 1. We have looked at the proper development of self-love in Chapter 8.
\item \textsuperscript{1234} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.77, a.4, resp.
\end{itemize}
for goods in a way “that arises either from inordinate desire for some good, or from inordinate avoidance of some evil”. For example, seeking to satisfy our desire to be loved more than others we unduly criticize someone so that others will love him less.

This inordinate self-love is then expressed in three basic ways that concern certain fundamental dimensions of human life. These are called the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life (1 John 2.15-17). Concordiscence of the flesh is the disordered desire of goods directly involving the body, for example, sexual acts. Spiritual concupiscence is a disordered desire for delights that are connected with sight and imagination. This is also called concupiscence of the eyes, which refers to two sinful tendencies: undue curiosity and covetousness. Curiosity, in this negative sense, is an undue interest in things that distract us from what we ought to be doing. Covetousness is an immoderate desire to have material goods that are beyond our true needs. The pride of life refers to “the inordinate appetite of excellence”, which blinds us to our true state of neediness before God and inclines us to be arrogant with our neighbor.

These three sinful tendencies are further specified by the capital vices. A capital vice is “one from which other vices arise most frequently”. So, the capital vices have the “character” of being origins “in respect of several sins”. Hence they are compared to “the leaders of an army”, because they have a role in directing the specific instances of personal sins. The capital vices incline us to sin because they have “ends chiefly desirable as such, so that other sins are

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1235 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.77, a.4, ad 3.
1236 The psychology behind St Thomas’ explanation of how self-love is the source of all sin is that every affective experience presupposes “love of some kind” and implies a movement to a good or withdrawal from an evil for the sake of preserving the good that is loved. *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.4, resp. See also I-II, q.25, a.2, resp. For instance, hope strengthens our “desire for a good that is loved”. *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.27, a.4, ad 3. Thus, if the love of oneself is disordered it will influence one’s view of how to attain what one loves in more particular instances. DeYoung comments that love is “the most basic or fundamental passion, in the sense that it is the explanatory root of all other movements of the sense appetite. Our aversions, fear, and responses of anger stem more basically from what we love”. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, “Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth: Three Interpretive Issues”, *The Thomist*, 75 (2011): 47.
1237 See *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.77, a.5, resp.
1238 Ibid.
1239 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.34, a.5, resp. The word capital is derived from the Latin word – *caput* - for head. This is a metaphorical word for a principle of thought, a principle of action, or someone who governs.
1240 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.84, a.3, ad 1.
1241 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.84, a.3, resp.
subordinated to such ends”. \(^{1242}\) That is, they are very attractive because they regard goods that are vitally important to attaining happiness. \(^{1243}\) Nevertheless, the capital vices, as we shall see below, involve an inordinate desire that inclines us to sinful actions to attain these goods and thus violate them.

St Thomas divides these goods into those of the soul, of the body and of external things. \(^{1244}\) Pride and vainglory aim to achieve the goods of the soul, which are excellence and honor. Gluttony and lust aim for the goods of the body. Avarice aims to possess external things that provide security. Furthermore, sloth, anger, and envy, aim to avoid certain goods because they are an obstacle to a good that is desired “inordinately”. \(^{1245}\) Sloth is an aversion to God because we view our friendship with him as burdensome. Anger resists justice as an obstacle to inordinate vengeance. Envy is an aversion to the good of another because it diminishes our own excellence.

The advantage of St Thomas’ approach to the capital sins for affective formation is that he sees them in terms of a positive psychology of the human faculties, which enables the seminarian to make a vital distinction between good and evil desires. That is, St Thomas sees that the human faculties are in themselves good, but that they need to be formed according to reason and that they can generate evil desires which need to be corrected. As George Corbett observes, St Thomas measures the evil of the capital vices by right reason, inasmuch as the person experiencing them does not relate his desires to their “proper end or ends”. \(^{1246}\) This enables the seminarian to see the vices as disorders “in the proper functioning of man’s natural faculties and are related to good objects which may be desired or avoided”. \(^{1247}\) The aim of affective formation, therefore, is to help the seminarian correctly form these desires. For example, since money promises a certain self-sufficiency, someone can experience an immoderate desire to attain it and other vices can flow

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\(^{1242}\) *On Evil*, q.8, a.1, resp.

\(^{1243}\) As De Young explains: “This very desirable end – as the object or good that defines the capital vice in question – plays its role as final cause on account of its affinity with happiness (beatitude), the ultimate end of human action. The teleological role of the capital vices in directing action gives them enormous motivating power and influence in initiating other sins, which are committed for its sake or to achieve their ends.” *Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth*, 45.

\(^{1244}\) *On Evil*, q.8, a.1, resp.

\(^{1245}\) *On Evil*, q.8, a.1, ad 1.

\(^{1246}\) *Peraldus and Aquinas*, 397.

\(^{1247}\) Ibid, 399-400. Corbett comments that the key issue in helping someone to understand his attraction to the capital sins is that “every sin is based on a natural appetite for some good” (398).
from this. St Thomas recommends, then, the proper use of money by the virtue of liberality, which includes the ability to see that it is fulfilling for someone to share his goods for the sake of another.

3. Pride

In De Veritate, St Thomas Aquinas offers a sobering thought that can help the seminarian to recognize how God can allow him to experience weaknesses, so that he will become more humble. St Thomas refers to the “wisdom” of God who leaves “the infirmity of sensuality” after baptism, so that we will “avoid the vice of self-exaltation”. That is, while sensuality and the passions can be integrated into a virtuous life, they are also capable of being disordered and, as such, can incline us to sin. Yet, God allows us to struggle with this disorder, acting according to the intention of “a wise physician”, who “discharges a patient without having cured his illness if it could not be cured without the danger of a more serious illness”. Similarly, God judges that pride is a far worse malady than disordered concupiscence, because pride is a turning away from God, a false self-sufficiency, and an “actual contempt of God”. It is far better, then, to struggle and to be humble than to remain untested and proud. Now, the specific goal of this section is to examine the nature of sinful pride and how it damages the seminarian’s ability to become a priest who is concerned for the welfare of God’s people. Then, it is to consider how such virtues as humility further the seminarian’s affective growth as a priest.

St Thomas considers pride to be the source of all other types of sin due to “its general influence towards all vices”. As Ecclesiasticus 10.15 teaches, pride is the beginning of all sin and it is the first manifestation of sinful self-love inasmuch as it is “an inordinate desire to excel”. Pride is

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1248 St Thomas gives robbery and insensibility to mercy as examples. See On Evil, q.13, a.3; resp.
1250 Ibid.
1251 Summa Theologica I-II, q.84, a.2, resp.
1252 St Thomas describes pride as the “queen and mother of all the vices”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.162, a.8, resp.
1253 Summa Theologica I-II, q.84, a.2, resp. The word excellence comes from the Latin excellere which is derived from ex, out of, and celsus which means lofty. See Bruce Moore, The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th ed. (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2004), 481-482. Thus excellere is translated as to stand out,
a more general characteristic of all sin as an “actual contempt of God, to the effect of not being subject to His commandment”.\textsuperscript{1254} Pride, moreover, manifests itself in certain characteristic ways. We can think that our good comes from ourselves alone and not recognize that our good ultimately comes from God. We can also boast, that is, we can talk as if we have some virtue or have accomplished some good work, when in fact we know that neither is the case. This is an act of deceit, which as an expression of “the inward arrogance of the heart” is also an act of pride.\textsuperscript{1255}

Pride is a corruption of an innately good tendency. In St Thomas’ view, “human beings by every natural appetite seek likeness to God, inasmuch as every good naturally desired is a likeness to God’s goodness.”\textsuperscript{1256} Thus, as there is a proper love of self in accord with God’s love for us, there is also a proper love for our own excellence. Since God has made us in his image (Genesis 1.26-27), it is right for us to strive, with his help, to be like him. In fact, for St Thomas, pride can refer to the glory and superabundant good that God promises to those who are faithful to him.\textsuperscript{1257} It can also refer to works of outstanding quality, such as the evangelical counsels.\textsuperscript{1258}

In the sinful sense of pride, however, someone does not respect right reason and he strives for what is rightly beyond him.\textsuperscript{1259} The nature of sinful pride is indicated by the Latin word – \textit{superbia} - which refers to the attitude of someone who aims higher than his true good. As St Thomas writes: “he who wishes to overstep beyond what he really is, is proud”.\textsuperscript{1260} This is exemplified by Satan’s fall from grace. In responding to the question whether Satan sinned in trying to be like God, St Thomas makes the following distinction: “To be like God as befits each thing is praiseworthy. But one who desires likeness to God contrary to the ordination established by him desires wickedly to be like God.”\textsuperscript{1261} St Thomas also describes pride as a hidden vice which can arise even in the best of deeds: “some are even proud of their humility”.\textsuperscript{1262} Pride is so grievous because it is not a turning

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\item \textsuperscript{1254} \textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.84, a.2, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{1255} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, 162, a.4, ad 2.
\item \textsuperscript{1256} \textit{On Evil}, q. 8, a.2, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{1257} See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.162, a.1, ad 1.
\item \textsuperscript{1258} \textit{On Evil}, q. 8, a.2, ad 17.
\item \textsuperscript{1259} See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.162, a.1, resp.
\item \textsuperscript{1260} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{1261} \textit{On Evil}, q. 16, a.3, ad 15.
\item \textsuperscript{1262} See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.162, a.6, ad 1; II-II, q.162, a.5, ad 3.
\end{itemize}
away from God for a particular good, but an aversion to God because we do not want “to be subject to God and His rule”.1263 That is, a person desires to act as though he were the ultimate source of his own being and fails to respect the wisdom and will of God for him. Thus, he is not open to a relationship with God which is grounded in the truth that God is his wise and loving Creator.

The essential nature of pride is clarified in St Thomas’ consideration of the Original Sin of Adam and Eve. They were in the state of innocence, which meant that they did not experience the tension we feel between the sensitive and spiritual appetites. Therefore, the first sin had to be that Adam coveted “some spiritual good above his measure: and this pertains to pride”.1264 Since the first man coveted a spiritual good above his measure, “it follows that he coveted God’s likeness inordinately”, by wanting to have the same knowledge of good and evil as God.1265 This means “that by his own natural power he might decide what was good and what was evil for him to do”.1266 He sought to act so “that by his own natural power” he might “obtain happiness”.1267 That is, the first man thought that he should be the ultimate arbiter of what was good and evil for himself, rather than accepting God’s help to attain his true happiness.

This is an attitude of seeing the principles of his being as restrictions, rather than as principles that need to be respected so that he may come to the fullness of his being. Moreover, this inability to share God’s life, wisdom, and love, is quickly transferred to his neighbor, who is then seen as a competitor for self-excellence, rather than as a person who needs to be honored and loved. For example, the proud man is disposed to “the observing of other people’s failings” and to “presume inordinately on his superiority over others”.1268 In seeking to usurp the central place of God in his heart, the proud man is inclined to take God’s place over his neighbor.1269

What is the significance of St Thomas’ teaching on pride for the seminarian’s affective formation? Pride is an affective stance that rejects the goodness of the proper principles of his created being.

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1263 Summa Theologica II-II, q.162, a.6, resp.
1264 For, St Thomas explains, “it was not possible for the first inordinateness in the human appetite to result from his coveting a sensible good, to which the concupiscence of the flesh tends against the order of reason”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.163, a.1, resp.
1265 Summa Theologica II-II, q.163, a.2, resp.
1266 Ibid.
1267 Ibid.
1268 Summa Theologica II-II, q.162, a.3, ad 2, 4.
1269 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.162, a.1, ad 2.
This lack of respect for the truth, on account of an exaggerated focus on his own excellence, will blind him to a proper relationship with God, who is the loving source of those created principles. Pride is also an attitude that immediately overflows into a lack of respect for the excellence of his neighbor. It therefore poisons the very source of the seminarian’s love, both for God and for his neighbor, blinding him to the essential priestly responsibility to place God’s interests above his own (1 Timothy 6.11). Moreover, failing to keep God’s interests as his first priority and looking primarily to his own interests, he ceases to look after the interests of his neighbor who is entrusted to him by God (Philippians 2.3-4, 21). This is a disastrous attitude because the priest’s life is essentially a call to accept the love of God and help others to do the same.

An essential dimension of purifying the seminarian’s pride is to help him attain a more accurate understanding of how God rules us. The rule of God should be understood according to his creative love, which “infuses and creates goodness” in all things, including the good of our human nature. God cares for our dignity, because we share in “some likeness to God”, created, as we are, in his image. Thus God does not arbitrarily restrict our happiness but guides us to our true perfection. “All created things”, St Thomas writes, “stand in relation to God as products of art to the artist. But the artist brings his works into being by the ordering of his wisdom and intellect.” God is understood here as a wise and generous giver and we are called to imitate God by wisely communicating goodness to others. In this way, the seminarian should not see his excellence in terms of self-aggrandizement. Rather, he ought to understand his true excellence according to God’s generosity, which is an excellence of exercising his gifts to help others.

There are certain virtues that nurture the seminarian’s ability to serve God and help others achieve their true good. Humility, contrary to pride, “observes the rule of right reason whereby a man has true self-esteem”. Thus humility withdraws the human heart “from the inordinate desire of great things” that are beyond him. That is, humility disposes us to refrain from thinking that we are

1270 Summa Theologica I, q.20, a.2, resp.
1271 Summa Theologica I, q.93, a.1, resp; a.7, ad 4.
1273 For St Thomas, “the creature becomes like Him [God] by being good” and as “God is the cause of goodness in others … so the creature becomes like God by moving others to be good”. Summa Theologica I, q.103, a.4, resp.
1274 Summa Theologica II-II, q.162, a.3, ad 2.
1275 Summa Theologica II-II, q.162, a.1, ad 3. St Thomas distinguishes humility from pusillanimity which is “a deficiency in pursuing great things” that are possible to us. Pusillanimity is “the mind’s attachment to things beneath
greater than we are before God and others. One expression of humility is the virtue of docility, by
which we are inclined to learn from others and resist the inordinate inclination to believe what we
desire to be true, even against evidence to the contrary.1276 No one can consider all points of
knowledge sufficiently, and hence we are in need of being taught by others, especially those who
have more experience than we do “in practical matters”.1277 By listening carefully to others we
open our minds to grow in knowledge and good judgment.1278

Without such docility the ability of people to help others is severely hindered, because, “delighting
in their own excellence, [they] disdain the excellence of truth”.1279 This particularly applies to
those who have to exercise authority for the welfare of others. St Thomas notes that those who are
“learned should be docile in some respects, since no man is altogether self-sufficient in matters of
prudence”.1280 The lesson for the seminarian is that he needs to attain a habitual disposition to seek
counsel so that he may make good decisions. He needs to listen to those who have expertise in
other areas of life, because pastors are required to take counsel when making certain decisions, for
example, in relation to the administration of property and finance.1281

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1276 One of the effects of pride, St Thomas observes, is that “a man is ready to believe what he desires very much”.
*Summa Theologica* II-II, q.162, a.1, ad 3. As DeYoung explains, pusillanimous people underestimate their “capacities”,
shrinking “back from attempting great acts in order to avoid the possibility of thereby exposing their shortcomings
or failures”. *Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice*, 145.

1277 “Man has a natural aptitude for docility”, St Thomas explains, “even as for other things connected with
prudence. Yet his own efforts count for much towards the attainment of perfect docility: and he must carefully,
frequently and reverently apply his mind to the teachings of the learned, neither neglecting them through laziness,
nor despising them through pride.” *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.49, a.3, ad 2.

1278 “Affective knowledge of the truth by which we sincerely seek to know what is to the good of others. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.162, a.3, ad 1. St Thomas writes of the “affective” knowledge of the truth by which
we sincerely seek to know what is to the good of others. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.162, a.3, ad 1. Cole refers to this
as a “knowledge of the truth as really experienced through love”. *The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood*, 92.

1280 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.49, a.3, ad 3.

1281 Canon 1277 stipulates that the bishop must consult the Diocesan Finance committee and the college of
consultors for major financial decisions. Canon 537 stipulates that there must be “a finance committee to help the
parish priest in the administration of the goods of the parish”. *Code of Canon Law Annotated*, 2nd ed. (Montreal:
4. Vainglory

The aim of this section is to consider St Thomas’ teaching on vainglory, with a view to purifying the seminarian’s desire for acclaim, so that he may work for God’s glory and the good of God’s people. St Thomas views vainglory as the capital vice that closely follows after pride. As pride desires excellence in a disordered way, so vainglory is a disordered desire for others to know of our excellence.⁴²² In Latin, *inanis gloria* or *vana gloria* means empty glory.⁴²³ This emptiness follows from the “transitory nature of things”, how they lack “solidity or stability”, and how they can fail to attain their end and the fulfilment of human desire.⁴²⁴ Thus we should not place too much store in them. Timothy McDermott sums up St Thomas’ point about vanity by describing it as “importance, reputation and prestige sought in a disordered way by vanity”.⁴²⁵ It is a self-conceit by which a man thinks too much of himself, over-valuing both his worth and how much he ought to be recognized.⁴²⁶

True glory, however, can refer to a person’s goodness as “known and approved by many”, and it is right that people be honored for their virtue, especially when it is of an outstanding quality.⁴²⁷ God himself reveals his glory for our sake so that we may know his goodness, which leads St Thomas to conclude that we may “rightly” seek glory inasmuch as it is for the good of others.⁴²⁸ For example, in Matthew 5.16, Christ encourages us to do good so that seeing our good works others may glorify our Heavenly Father. Thus, the question for the seminarian is whether his desire for glory is related to a good end.⁴²⁹ While it is true that as a priest he should be self-effacing and

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⁴²² *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.133, a.5, resp. “Pride covets excellence inordinately”, writes St Thomas, “vainglory covets the outward show of excellence”. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.162, a.8. ad 2.

⁴²³ *Inanis* means empty or void. *Vana gloria* comes closer to our English word vainglory, where *vana* also means empty or void. See *Cassell’s Latin Dictionary*, 294, 630.

⁴²⁴ *On Evil*, q.9, a.1, resp. St Thomas quotes Ecclesiastes 1.2 which speaks of the ultimate vanity of things.


⁴²⁶ Ibid, 425.

⁴²⁷ *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.132, a.1, resp. The approval could be by many, by a few, or even by oneself.

⁴²⁸ *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.132, a.1, ad 1. For example, unless we know of God’s mercy how can we turn to God and repent with the hope that he will pardon us and help us to live a better life?

⁴²⁹ St Thomas writes: “Every perfect thing by nature communicates itself to other things as much as it can, and this belongs to everything because everything imitates the first perfect thing, namely God, who communicates his goodness to everything. And one’s goodness is communicated to others regarding both others’ existence and others’ knowledge. And so it seems to belong to a natural appetite that one wish one’s goodness to become known. Therefore, if one relates this desire to a proper end, it will belong to virtue, and if one does not, it will belong to vanity.” *On Evil*, q.9, a.1, ad 3.
look to the honor of others, he should also tell them of the good he has done to help them understand how they can live a virtuous life. For example, when the seminarian has successfully helped someone in need, he can talk about this to encourage others and to help them see how they can become helpful people.

St Thomas gives two valid reasons for seeking glory. The first is that it be to the salvation of others who, when they see our goodness, will be encouraged to imitate our good example. This is in keeping with Romans 15.2, where St Paul exhorts us to please our neighbor to build the community. The second reason is that a man, when he sees that he is praised by others for his good works, will be encouraged to persevere “more resolutely” in them. St Paul, for instance, in Romans 12.17, “often calls to the mind of the Christian faithful their good works that they may more resolutely persist in them”. In this way, it is right to encourage people in their goodness.

The desire for glory is disordered, however, when we glory in “something false or something temporal or do not refer our glory to its proper end”. Thus the desire for glory is vain when we seek what is unworthy, or seek praise from someone whose judgement is not virtuous, or when the glory is not properly ordered to a good end, such as God’s glory or the spiritual good of others. “Glory goes bad”, as DeYoung writes, “when we desire it for the wrong things and for the wrong ends.” In this way, vainglory corrupts the human heart, inclining us to seek what is not truly worthy of praise. Vainglory can also make someone “presumptuous and too self-confident”. This occurs because he overvalues his own worth or he listens to people who overstate his good qualities. Thus, he can be over confident of his virtue and neglect avoiding what leads him to sin.

Vainglory also causes the seminarian to lose sight of his true good at the expense of having approval from others. Robert Massey describes vainglory as a “compulsive search for glory”. He defines vainglory as: “The tendency to be driven toward the appearance of excellence when

1290 On Evil, q.9, a.1, resp.
1291 Ibid.
1292 On Evil, q.9, a.2, resp., in which St Thomas gives the example of a person glorying in his own bad singing.
1293 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.132, a.1, resp.
1294 Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice, 26.
1295 Summa Theologica II-II, q.132, a.3, ad 3. St Thomas writes that vainglory “easily leads human beings to perish inasmuch as it causes them to trust in themselves”. On Evil, q.9, a.2, ad 4.
the individual does not actually develop the real self through productive achievements”. If he desires a recognition that, as John-Mark Miravalle writes, is “divorced, as it so often is, from genuine merit”, he is accepting a principle of “triviality and superficiality”. Preoccupied with the praise of others, the seminarian will not value the true development of himself. He may, also, rely heavily on the praise of others rather than seeking God’s approval, which alone will matter when he dies.

The disordered desire of vainglory can overflow into the life of the seminarian in other ways that will badly affect his future priestly life. Through boasting, the seminarian can try to magnify his excellence before others. He can refuse “to accept a sounder opinion”, out of a desire to show that he is not intellectually inferior to others. He can argue past the point of courtesy because he does not want “to be outdone by others in argument”. He can be a hypocrite and only pretend to live a holy life. Moreover, Cole suggests that the vainglorious priest can refuse to participate in a common project because it is not done his way and he feels that this diminishes his honor. And, the priest can neglect to preach the more difficult teachings of the Gospel for the sake of his parishioners’ approval. In each case, he is motivated by a wrongful desire for his own glory, which inhibits his ability to fulfill his priestly ministry by honoring the needs of others. For example, in relation to the neglect of preaching the truth, he fails to provide God’s people with a proper explanation of the Christian life.

1297 Ibid.
1299 On Evil, q.9, a.2, ad 9. This makes sense given the tendency of the vainglorious person to excessively desire, as DeYoung writes, “recognition and approval from others”. See Glittering Vices, 60. In such a state he easily loses the sense of who he really is and how best to act.
1300 See On Evil, q.9, a.3, resp.
1301 Ibid. St Thomas observes elsewhere that in making “a show of his own excellence” he could become “too persistent in his own opinion”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.q.138, a.2, ad 1.
1302 Ibid.
1303 The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 124-126.
1304 Ibid, 119.
Vainglory can also interfere with the seminarian’s affective formation by inducing him to fear an appropriate self-disclosure of his affective and moral struggles. Without this kind of “self-disclosure”, DeYoung writes, true moral and spiritual formation cannot take place.\textsuperscript{1305} The seminarian needs to talk to an appropriate person, such as his spiritual director, about his struggles so that he can receive appropriate advice. This is necessary for his own self-improvement but it is also necessary so that a proper judgment can be made about his suitability for the priesthood.

How is vainglory purified in the seminarian’s heart? The first step is to see the true value of earthly glory in light of the glory of Heaven. St Thomas writes of how our desires only find their “perfect fulfilment” in Heaven through our union with God who alone completely satisfies us.\textsuperscript{1306} Our desire for earthly glory cannot ultimately satisfy us because earthly glory concerns what is creaturely and finite. Rather, we should hope for the gift of heavenly honors, which is one of the superabundant delights of eternal life.\textsuperscript{1307} This hope encourages the seminarian to set aside a disordered desire for earthly honors and instead to desire praise and honor from God for having lived a truly holy life.

Vainglory is also purified by two important virtues: magnanimity and humility. Through magnanimity we strive for what is truly noble.\textsuperscript{1308} Magnanimity concerns honor, which is the greatest of external goods because it is the recognition of a person’s virtue.\textsuperscript{1309} The magnanimous man strives for what is truly worthy of “great honor”, but he does not overvalue acclaim from others.\textsuperscript{1310} Thus he is free to perform truly great deeds whether is praised for them or not.

\textsuperscript{1305} Vainglory: The Forgotten Vice, 52.
\textsuperscript{1307} See The Three Greatest Prayers, Apostle’s Creed, XIII, 95.
\textsuperscript{1308} St Thomas further explains that “a man is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to do some great act”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.129, a.1, resp. Magnus in Latin means great or large, and animus refers to the soul as “the spiritual or rational principle of life in man” and “more specifically, the soul, the seat of feeling, the heart”. Cassell’s Latin Dictionary, 46.
\textsuperscript{1309} See Summa Theologica II-II, q.129, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{1310} Summa Theologica II-II, q.129, a.2, resp.; Summa Theologica II-II, q.129, a.1, ad 3. Benedict Ashley suggests the title nobility for magnanimity. He comments that sometimes it is called ambition in the good sense of being the “development of that integrating element of courage which gives one confidence that important goals can be achieved in spite of serious obstacles in the way”. Benedict M. Ashley, Living the Truth in Love: A Biblical
Through magnanimity the seminarian can see that he is worthy of great things when he considers the gifts God has given him. “Yet humility makes us honor others and esteem them better than ourselves, in so far as we see some of God’s gifts in them.”1311 Focusing on the goodness of God, the seminarian can maintain a balance between striving for his true greatness and honoring God’s gifts in others. As Cole comments, the solution to vanity is “humility or an attitude that realizes there are limits to one’s gifts, accomplishments and ideas”.1312 Thus humility steers us away from a lack of truthfulness about ourselves and restrains our drive to promote ourselves beyond the truth.

Another dimension of this issue for the seminarian concerns his need for appropriate praise. Cole explains that giving honor to someone reminds him that he “has certain virtues and gifts, and it is given as encouragement to continue growing in deeds of virtue.”1313 There are people, however, who deeply feel the absence of a true loving affirmation and, perhaps, desperately desiring it, seek it in a disordered way.1314 Seminarians who may have suffered a lack of appropriate affirmation before they came to the seminary can likewise be inclined to inordinately seek honors and approval. They need to be appropriately praised by seminary formators to develop their self-esteem and to encourage them on the path of virtue. At the same time, they should be educated in the teachings that have been developed above to help them work for a true glory that is based upon virtue.

5. Envy

The purpose of this section is to examine St Thomas’ teaching on envy and to help the seminarian understand its negative effects on his capacity to love others. Envy is a sorrow which is

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Introduction to Moral Theology, OP (Staten Island, New York: St Pauls, 1996), 258). As Cole notes, for many this will mean doing small things with great love. See The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 88.
1311 Summa Theologica II-II, q.129, a.3, ad 4.
1312 The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 126. Otherwise, as John-Mark Miravalle observes, we can pretend “to an excellence not possessed”. Resisting the Less Important, 168.
1313 The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 114.
1314 Cole comments of people who did not receive appropriate praise as children that they can attempt to make up for their lack of affirmation by desiring “honor for its own sake, or for other improper reasons”. The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 114. For a treatment of how the lack of affirmation causes an excessive desire for approval, see Conrad W. Baars, M.D. and Terruwe, Anna A., M.D., Healing the Unaffirmed: Recognizing Emotional Deprivation Disorder, ed. Suzanne M. Barrs, MA and Bonnie N. Shayne, MA (Staten Island, New York: St Pauls, 2002), 26-27.
experienced when another person’s good is regarded as an evil to oneself, “in so far as it conduces to the lessening of one’s own good name or excellence”. We experience envy because we love “to be honored and esteemed”. Thus, the sadness of envy is caused by a belief that we deserve more honor than another. This is a manifestation of vainglory, and those who are excessively ambitious for glory are all the more disappointed when another is honored. So, we are driven to envy by a desire to rival or surpass the reputation of another. The significance of this for affective formation is that envy contradicts charity, which seeks the good of others. Since the priest is called to live according to charity, he needs to set aside envy, developing a spirit of generosity.

There are various manifestations of envy that reveal its true nature as a contradiction of charity. Envy is contrary to pity because “while envy grieves over” a neighbor’s good, “the pitiful man grieves over his neighbor’s evil”. Thus envy disposes us to avoid alleviating another’s sorrow. The envious person speaks badly about others. For example, by tale-bearing someone secretly strives to lower another’s reputation. If the attempt is successful the envious person rejoices at the misfortune of the one he envies and if it fails he grieves. Furthermore, gossip, as Cole writes, “goes beyond harming a person’s reputation to the desire to split up friendships”. This is an offence against the love of friendship, St Thomas explains, and so is an even worse sin than detraction because “a friend is better than honor, and to be loved is better than to be honored”. Hatred also arises out of envy because we hate what we regard as an evil to us, in this case, the good of our neighbor. St Thomas regards this as the “last step in the path of sin”, because it is a

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1315 Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.1, resp. As Fulton Sheen expresses the matter: “Envy is sadness at another’s good and joy at another’s evil”. See Fulton Sheen, The Seven Capital Sins (USA: St Pauls, 2001), 13.
1316 Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.1, resp.
1317 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.1, ad 2.
1318 Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.1, ad 2; Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.1, ad 3.
1319 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.1, resp.
1320 Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.3, ad 3. In Galatians 5.26, St Paul exhorts Christians to avoid envy because it undermines charity. For, St Thomas explains, “charity rejoices in our neighbor’s good, while envy grieves over it”. Envy is thus “contrary to charity” which is the source of our “spiritual life”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.3, resp.
1321 Summa Theologica II-II, q.36, a.4, ad 3.
1322 The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 159.
1323 Summa Theologica II-II, q.74, a.2, resp.
fundamental contradiction of the love human beings are meant to have for each other.\textsuperscript{1324} The evil of envy is manifest in that it is by Satan’s envy death came into the world (Wisdom 2.24).

A major influence that generates envy can be pusillanimity, by which someone can neglect to strive for worthwhile goals in accord with his true ability.\textsuperscript{1325} He wastes his abilities out of pettiness of mind and due to the fear of failure he holds back from “the great things” of which he is worthy.\textsuperscript{1326} This man is inclined to envy because out of his “smallness of spirit” he thinks “that he cannot prosper among others who are prospering”.\textsuperscript{1327} In other words, his ungenerous view of what he can achieve determines his view that among those who do well he cannot do well.\textsuperscript{1328} In terms of the seminarian’s affective formation this attitude is very detrimental because it obstructs his ability to achieve his own potential. Moreover, in terms of his future priestly ministry, it limits his ability to help others attain their potential and exercise their gifts for others, lest he not have the limelight.

Another challenge for affective formation concerns the difference between jealousy and envy. These two words can be used interchangeably in English but they are not the same affective experience. In \textit{De Veritate} St Thomas describes jealousy in association with love. “Jealousy adds to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one’s beloved.”\textsuperscript{1329} This kind of jealousy can lead us to protect a friendship. Sheryl Overmeyer writes that jealousy involves the experience of “an imagined or actual threat to something one holds dear” and envy, in contrast, is an experience of “feeling deprived in comparison to another”.\textsuperscript{1330} Disordered jealousy, perhaps due to a feeling of insecurity or a spirit of domination, becomes excessively

\textsuperscript{1324} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.34, a.6, resp.
\textsuperscript{1325} St Thomas gives the example of the man who buried his talent (Matthew 25.14). See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.133, a.1, resp.
\textsuperscript{1326} St Thomas writes: “For just as the magnanimous man tends to great things out of greatness of soul, so the pusillanimous man shrinks from greatness out of littleness of soul.” \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.133, a.2, resp. This is nothing less, Cole observes, than “stagnation in the growth of virtue”. \textit{The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood}, 153.
\textsuperscript{1328} St Thomas also writes that the faint-hearted can be envious “because all things are great to them, and whatever good may befall another, they reckon that they themselves have been bested in something great” \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.36, a.1, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{1329} \textit{De Veritate}, q.26, a.4, ad 8.
\textsuperscript{1330} Sheryl Overmeyer, “Is Aquinas’ Envy Pagan?”, \textit{Journal Of Moral Theology}, Vol.6, No.2 (2017): 156. As St Thomas observes that “the envious grieves over the good of those who are deserving of it”. \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.36, a.3, ad 3.
protective and does not leave the other person free to have other friendships. This is sometimes called possessiveness, which can have the added sense of treating another like an object of ownership, which is beneath that person’s dignity. The person with disordered jealousy can also be envious because another is given the affection he seeks for himself alone and he feels slighted by this.\textsuperscript{1331} For a man called to priestly celibacy, such possessiveness and envy undermines his ability to love others generously with respect for their proper freedom.

A better attitude to encourage in the seminarian is emulation, which is inspired by a sadness that we do not have the good another enjoys, and this motivates us to attain the same kind of good. This is praiseworthy when it concerns being zealous to attain goods in harmony with a life of virtue.\textsuperscript{1332} Emulation is, thus, a zeal by which we “strive for progress with those who are better than we are”.\textsuperscript{1333} There is, then, a noble ambition by which someone aspires to acquire certain good qualities or a position to properly exercise his gifts.\textsuperscript{1334} By emulation the seminarian can strive to practice the virtues of faithful people, especially holy priests who serve their people with generosity of heart.

The great challenge for affective formation is that envy, as Overmyer points out, “is fundamentally a social vice” - it sees others as a threat to one’s good because they are good and enjoy a good.\textsuperscript{1335} Thus envy focuses the seminarian inordinately on the good of others to the detriment of focusing on what he can do to better himself. As Overmyer writes: “By shifting our critical gaze from the problem that lies in ourselves to an external threat, we further enact our own inadequacy.”\textsuperscript{1336} What is the answer to this problem? DeYoung explains that we need to see our unconditional worth

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\textsuperscript{1331} The seminarian may have to deal with this issue when he befriends married people. He should exercise due caution if he is the object of a married person’s jealousy and if necessary withdraw from the situation. For a discussion of this issue see Germain Grisez, \textit{The Way of the Lord Jesus: Volume 3: Difficult Moral Questions} (Quincy, Illinois: Franciscan Press, 1997), Q.32: “May a man continue a friendship with a woman against her husband’s wishes?” 149-154.

\textsuperscript{1332} St Thomas notes St Paul’s teaching that we ought to be zealous for the spiritual gifts (1 Corinthians 14.1). See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.36, a.2, resp.

\textsuperscript{1333} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.36, a.2, ad 1.

\textsuperscript{1334} As Peter Kreeft writes: “Aspiration looks up and says, ‘I aspire to be up there too’ ... Envy, on the other hand, looks up and says, ‘I want you to be below me.’” Peter Kreeft, \textit{Back to Virtue: Traditional Moral Wisdom For Modern Moral Confusion} (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 122.

\textsuperscript{1335} \textit{Is Aquinas’ Envy Pagan?} 157.

\textsuperscript{1336} Ibid, 161.
before God, who frees us to rejoice in our own proper good and in the good of others. This point is framed by St Thomas in terms of the friendship of charity, by which we love ourselves ultimately because God loves us. Whereas envy would make us see ourselves as defective, Overmyer writes, “charity sees a self that is esteemed by and is worthy of God’s love”. This is a self we want the seminarian to see, one that is worthy of proper self-improvement and is capable of contributing positively to the lives of others. Furthermore, when he seems to miss out on certain gifts the seminarian needs to place his faith in God who will give him the gifts he truly needs.

An important virtue for the seminarian to acquire, for his future priestly life, is that of duly praising others. “It takes effort”, Cole writes, “for young and old to learn how to rejoice at another’s good fortune, such as earning money, receiving worldly honors or possessing supernatural gifts.” Praising the good of others, however, opens their hearts in gratitude to the priest for his encouraging remarks, and this deepens the bonds of mutual affection and charity. This is a foretaste of the heavenly communion. St Thomas describes this as a mutual delight, in which “each one will possess all good things together with the blessed”, loving each other as another self, and in which “they will rejoice in the happiness of others’ goods as their own.” In acting with such generosity the priest enables the people he serves to experience something of this mystery and he encourages them to do the same for others.

6. Acedia (Sloth)

The aim of this section is to analyze St Thomas’ teaching on acedia (sloth) and how it influences the seminarian to resist the renewal of his affectivity. For St Thomas, acedia is a spiritual lethargy which flows from a distaste for union with God and the way of life it entails. Acedia is a sorrow

1337 See Glittering Vices, 54.
1338 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.25, a.4, resp.
1339 Is Aquinas’ Envy Pagan? 162.
1340 Cole writes: “One principal guiding light for growing in faith is that God’s refusal to give a favor, good fortune or desired blessing is often a gift in disguise because only he knows what is best for anyone in light of his plans for each person.” The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 147.
1341 Ibid.
1343 St Thomas distinguishes physical laziness - the shirking of “a distasteful task and burdensome work” – from acedia which is a sorrow “on account of the Divine good”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.35, a.4, ad 3. The distaste
which weighs us down on account of our seeing the Divine good as burdensome.\textsuperscript{1344} It is an “immoderate sorrow” which makes us sluggish in performing the actions to achieve this good.\textsuperscript{1345} Thus opposed to union with God \textit{acedia} obstructs the love of charity, which is friendship with God.\textsuperscript{1346} St Thomas therefore “emphasizes”, as DeYoung, McCluskey and Van Dyke write, “the gravity of sloth by placing it in direct opposition to the theological virtue of charity”.\textsuperscript{1347} This enervating sadness inevitably influences the seminarian’s love for the activities involved in his affective formation, because they ultimately find their meaning in relation to God.

A dimension of St Thomas’ teaching on \textit{acedia}, that is significant for affective formation, concerns his understanding of how acedia is experienced as a resistance to personal renewal. Commenting on Galatians 5.17, St Thomas writes about \textit{acedia} as a distaste for the spiritual good which flows from the tension between the flesh and the spirit in the human person. He compares \textit{acedia} to having “infected taste buds”, which cause people to have a “distaste for healthy food and grieve over it whenever they need to consume such food. Therefore, such sadness and abhorrence or boredom regarding a spiritual and divine good is spiritual apathy.”\textsuperscript{1348} By making us avoid the

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\item[1344] See \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.35, a.1, resp. St Thomas writes of boredom as a “sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything” \textit{De Veritate} q.26, a.4, ad 6. “Those who are bored”, Nicholas Lombardo writes, “find their situation uninteresting and unpleasant, and they might describe themselves as feeling weary or restless.” He suggests that “boredom might be described as the emotion that ensues when the will finds nothing it desires and nothing worth seeking”. Nicholas E. Lombardo, O.P., \textit{The Logic of Desire: Aquinas on Emotion}, (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 261.
\item[1345] See \textit{On Evil}, q.11, a.2, resp. This is in keeping with the etymology of the word \textit{acedia}, which, DeYoung informs us, comes from the Greek word for “a lack of care”. As DeYoung explains, \textit{acedia} refers in general to “a lack of appetite, unresponsiveness, aversion, and, at its limit, even distaste”. In theology, \textit{acedia} is “an appetitive aversion to a spiritual and interior good because that good is perceived by the agent as evil in some way”. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, “Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on the Vice of Acedia”, \textit{The Thomist}, 68 (2004): 182. The Greek word is άκηδεια.
\item[1346] See \textit{On Evil}, q.11, a.2, ad 2 and \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.24, a.2, resp. The \textit{Catechism of the Catholic Church} describes \textit{acedia} as “a form of depression due to lax ascetical practice, decreasing vigilance, carelessness of heart”. See \textit{Catechism of the Catholic Church} (CCC), 2nd ed. English translation from Edito Typica (Strathfield, NSW: St Pauls Publications/Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2004), n.2733. \textit{Acedia} is an effect of \textit{presumption}, the attitude of thinking that I can be close to God without applying the means he has provided and when I realise that I must make an effort to cooperate with his grace I am thus lead “to discouragement” (CCC, n.2755).
\item[1347] Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Coleen Mcluskey, Christina Van Dyke, \textit{Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context} (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009), 175.
\item[1348] \textit{On Evil} q.11, a.2, resp. This is in keeping with the etymology of the word \textit{acedia}, which, DeYoung informs us, comes from the Greek word for “a lack of care”. As DeYoung explains, \textit{acedia} refers in general to “a lack of appetite, unresponsiveness, aversion, and, at its limit, even distaste”. In theology, \textit{acedia} is “an appetitive aversion to a spiritual and interior good because that good is perceived by the agent as evil in some way”.
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Divine good *acedia* hinders the work of grace by which “the Holy Spirit stirs up and turns the affections to right willing”\(^\text{1349}\). There is, then, an opposition between the guidance of the Holy Spirit and the man who lives “according to himself. Hence flesh here is taken as referring to the whole man. Accordingly, whatever springs from disordered self-love is called a work of the flesh.”\(^\text{1350}\) In this way, *acedia* makes us resist the work of the Holy Spirit who enables us to love God and to improve in character.

Furthermore, commenting on Ephesians 4.17-19, St Thomas writes of the old way of living that is marked by sinful desires such as covetousness, whereby a man sins “ardently, with a constant and insatiable appetite for more”.\(^\text{1351}\) The new man, on the other hand, puts aside bitterness, anger, and tends to kindness and mercy.\(^\text{1352}\) And in Ephesians 4.20-24 we are called to put off the old man’s former way of life and put on the new man created by God in justice and holiness of truth. St Thomas comments that the old man is corrupted, inasmuch as “the mind and the affections” are corrupted by sinful choices.\(^\text{1353}\) These are the works of the flesh, such as fornication and enmity, which St Paul writes about in Galatians 5.19-21. They “are alien to the nature of those things which God has planted in our nature”.\(^\text{1354}\) That is, these sinful actions distort the proper development of the human person and his ability to relate to others.

The term - “works of the flesh” - needs to be nuanced in case it be wrongly understood as a condemnation of the body. As DeYoung comments, for St Thomas the opposition between the flesh and the spirit “is not a battle between bodily desires and spiritual ones, but a battle between the sinful, fallen self and the new self redeemed by Christ and transformed by his Spirit”.\(^\text{1355}\) Someone can resist becoming the new person that the Spirit of Christ desires, because she is held

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\(^\text{1349} \) Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, trans. F.R.Larcher, O.P. (Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, Inc., 1966), Chapter 5, Lecture 4. St Thomas’ reflections on this struggle does not involve a condemnation of the human body. He agrees with Ephesians 5.17 that no one hates his own flesh but nourishes it.

\(^\text{1350} \) Ibid, Chapter 5, Lecture 5.


\(^\text{1352} \) See Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians, Chapter 4, Lecture 10.

\(^\text{1353} \) Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians, Chapter 4, Lecture 7.

\(^\text{1354} \) Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Galatians, Chapter 5, Lecture 6.

\(^\text{1355} \) DeYoung continues that the difference is “between a life and character dominated by sinful desires, habits, and actions on the one hand, and the way that that life and sinful nature becomes transformed by grace into a person’s new life in Christ, with its new desires, habits, and actions on the other”. DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, “Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth: Three Interpretive Issues”, *The Thomist*, 75 (2011): 56.
back by “all her habits and desires that are rooted in rebellion toward God and prideful attempts at autonomy.”¹³⁵⁶ For DeYoung, this is “more fundamentally” to be understood “as resistance to the transformation of the self implicated in friendship with God”.¹³⁵⁷ The effect of this, as St Thomas explains, is that a man can loathe spiritual goods as though they were contrary to himself. Spiritual lethargy ensues, on account of the man seeing these goods and the acts to attain them as “the burdens of commitment”.¹³⁵⁸ This requires a “renovation” of himself, that is, he needs to renew his identity as someone who thinks and acts according to a friendship with Christ.¹³⁵⁹

_Acedia_, however, is the sinful attitude that does not accept “the demands to become holy, to be created anew” that this friendship entails.¹³⁶⁰ The seminarian may be helped to grasp this point by reflecting on DeYoung’s idea of the “accommodation of identity” that is required of married persons.¹³⁶¹ There is a cost in terms of individual freedom, a restricting of priorities, a demand for sacrifice, the altering of patterns of thought, a vision of life, that needs to be intimately shared by the married partners. This is so because they have entrusted themselves to a common way of life which requires certain attitudes if it is to flourish. Resistance to these attitudes will cause a lethargy for the actions that embody and nourish the marital union.

This can be applied, _mutatis mutandis_, to the man preparing for the priesthood who has to live in a manner befitting his vocation. He must be accountable to the Church, diligent in his duties for the people of God, giving himself to a life of prayer and priestly celibacy. He can, however, resist the activities that develop his vocation, because he fails to sufficiently value the way of life that accords with his vocation and identity. To apply the words of DeYoung: “His lack of commitment speaks of an unwillingness to surrender himself to God.”¹³⁶² This attitude stymies his ability to

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¹³⁵⁶ Ibid.
¹³⁵⁷ _Resistance to the Demands of Love_, 192. DeYoung writes elsewhere, with McCluskey and Van Dyke, that sloth “turns away from the heart of our divine identity – our communion with God in friendship – and all that that entails”. See _Aquinas’s Ethics_, 177.
¹³⁵⁸ _Resistance to the Demands of Love_, 196.
¹³⁵⁹ _Commentary on Saint Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians_, Chapter 5, Lecture 9.
¹³⁶⁰ _Resistance to the Demands of Love_, 198.
¹³⁶¹ Ibid.
¹³⁶² _Glittering Vices_, 95.
renew his affectivity “after the pattern of Christ”, because he is not even willing to make the appropriate steps to achieve this renewal.\textsuperscript{1363}

A symptom of this state is to go after “diversionary activities”.\textsuperscript{1364} Preoccupied with these activities a person’s attention is absorbed and he avoids facing the “demands made by divine love” for the regeneration of his nature.\textsuperscript{1365} This problem is moderated by learning to remain stable in the way of life he has committed himself to, learning to enjoy the good by persevering in the activities that enable him to attain it.\textsuperscript{1366} This requires “a long process of rehabilitation and transformation”.\textsuperscript{1367} It is an arduous process which involves the denial of disordered inclinations on a daily basis. Yet, it enables the development of a character that can persevere in a virtuous life long enough to experience the joy that is its fruit.

St Thomas’ teaching on how to respond to temptations to neglect the good can also help to moderate acedia. He recommends that we ought to consider the good so that we can be moved to desire it, “because the more we think about spiritual goods, the more pleasing they become to us, and forthwith sloth dies away”.\textsuperscript{1368} That is, the more we understand the good, how it can be attained, and how it fulfills us, the more it can attract us. The seminarian’s desire to prepare well for the priesthood, for instance, can be enkindled when he considers that as a priest he will help others through the priestly ministry. One consideration in this regard is that many penitents will be deeply consoled by the communication of God’s forgiveness in the Sacrament of Penance.

7. Avarice

The priest is called to a life of simplicity, which will both witness to the supreme importance of God’s love above all material gain and give a good example of the use of material goods for the

\textsuperscript{1363} Resistance to the Demands of Love, 203-204. DeYoung, McCluskey and Van Dyke write of sloth as a “direct threat to one’s spiritual identity as a sharer in the divine nature”. Aquinas’s Ethics, 180.

\textsuperscript{1364} Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth, 57. DeYoung comments that acedia is manifested as “a curious mixture of depression or inertia on the one hand, and a flight or escapism on the other”. While there is a feeling that a duty can be burdensome it can cause a great burst of energy to avoid it. Resistance to the Demands of Love, 190.

\textsuperscript{1365} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{1366} See Aquinas on the Vice of Sloth, 64.

\textsuperscript{1367} Ibid, 56.

\textsuperscript{1368} Summa Theologica II-II, a.35, a.1, ad 4. Likewise, we need to give time to consider the goodness of created things and appreciate the moderate delight they offer us.
service of one’s neighbor. A disorder in the seminarian’s affections in regard to riches would undermine his vocation to the priesthood, because he would be too focused on acquiring riches. To the contrary, he must learn to be responsible for the goods of the community and be completely honest in the administration of its goods. Still, as a priest he will have to care for the finances of the parish. Therefore, he needs a formation of his affectivity in regard to riches, that he may use money for the glory of God and the good of others. Therefore, the aim of this section is to glean from St Thomas’ teaching a deeper understanding of avarice and how it can be purified by virtues like liberality and magnificence.

For St Thomas, avarice, or covetousness, is an “immoderate” desire for possessions and riches. It is an inordinate desire for amassing earthly goods. This desire is the root of all sins, in the sense that our inordinate desire for these goods leads us to turn away from seeking an everlasting good in God. As St Paul teaches, the desire for money is “the root of all evil” (1 Timothy 6.10). This teaching is also true in that money enables us to acquire “the means of committing any sin whatever”. Thus, avarice involves a lack of insight into the ultimate importance of God’s love and how riches are subordinate to that love.

Furthermore, as a disordered affection for money, avarice causes a lack of balance in our desires. By being unduly attached to acquiring possessions we impede our generosity for others by being unduly inclined to keep it for ourselves. This opposes the virtue of liberality by which our affections for “the possession and use of money” are tempered and we are free to use the money to help others. Avarice can even become an expression of idolatry, because we can give to a

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1369 See *Pastores Dabo Vobis*, n.30, where Pope St John Paul II calls for “a loving and responsible use of goods and at the same time an ability to renounce them with great interior freedom – that is, with reference to God and his plan.”

1370 Ibid.

1371 *Summa Theologica* I-II, q.84, a.1, resp.

1372 Ibid. St Thomas’ thought on avarice is summarized in this passage of McDermott’s translation: “Material goods are useful for certain ends, and we should seek them in a balanced way, to the degree that they are necessary to our particular status in life; but to want to acquire and retain goods in excess of this measure is wrong and avaricious: avarice is an unbalanced love of possessing. All such material goods useful for human living we sum up in the one word money. Avarice as an unbalanced acquisition and retention of wealth steals what belongs to others and contravenes justice, and as an unbalanced interior passion for wealth it is opposed to generosity”. See *Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation*, 420.

1373 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.117, a.6, resp. DeYoung notes that the word liberality “comes from the same Latin root as our word liberty … this virtue is about freedom … from attachment to money and whatever money can buy”.

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creature an honor owed only to God by making a temporal good our ultimate end. Yet, while the Letter to the Hebrews exhorts Christians to be content with what they have (13.5), this does not entail that the desire for possessions is sinful in itself, because such goods help us to live. Instead, there needs to be a proper “measure” in the use of such goods. Otherwise, we can be lead to the “acquisition and keeping of riches” even to the violation of justice, for instance, through such acts as theft.

Avarice leads a man to regret what he has given and to give only a little (2 Corinthians 9.5). This engenders an attitude of miserliness, in which the mark of a narrow mind is to be subject to money. Furthermore, noting the link between avarice and coldness of heart, St Thomas writes: “if the love of riches” can become “so great as to be preferred to charity” it counters our love for God and neighbor. “Lust for riches”, he concludes, “brings darkness on the soul, when it puts out the light of charity, by preferring the love of riches to the love of God”. The worst manifestations of avarice can be to deceive others, for example by perjury, committing treachery, “as in the case of Judas, who betrayed Christ through covetousness”, and “preying on one’s friends, as gamblers do”. It is clear that avarice has the power to gravely harm relationships which require attitudes of love, justice, mercy and fidelity. These are all virtues that the seminarian needs to practice if he is to be a priest who can build relationships of trust.

Attachment to riches is implied in the word avarice, DeYoung also notes, as revealed in its Latin root avere, to crave. See Glittering Vices, 101.

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1374 See On Evil, q. 13, a.2, ad 1.
1375 Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.1, resp.
1376 Summa Theologica II-II, a.118, a.2, resp.
1377 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.5, ad 1.
1378 Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.4, resp.
1379 Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.4, ad 3.
1380 Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.8, resp.
1381 Avarice causes a restriction of the human heart’s capacity for joyful communion with others which bears with it the punishment of an ungenerous and miserable outlook on life and friendship. Great literature can present this truth in a penetrating and persuasive way to the seminarian. A classic example of this is found in Ebenezer Scrooge from Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol. It is only when he is struck by the heritage of miserliness and moroseness he has bequeathed to others that he begins to discover his need to be tender hearted. When he begins to act in a more munificent and openhearted way he knows deep joy and happiness, in the simplest of human meetings, so that his humanity deepens and his capacity for peaceful union with others surprisingly expands. See Charles Dickens, A Christmas Carol (London: Bloomsbury Classics, 1995), 177.
These manifestations of avarice, so counter to relationships grounded in a care for others, suggest a question very relevant to affective formation: how can avarice come to have such a powerful hold on our affections? For St Thomas, things are more desirable when they provide more of what makes us happy; and one condition of happiness is that we seek security of life.1382 “Now riches”, he writes, “give great promise of self-sufficiency” because money enables us to get many things which make us feel secure that we can have what we need.1383 The problem with this attitude is that we can excessively rely upon riches to provide this security so that we leave ourselves open to two sinful attitudes: refusing to help the needy and an anxiety for maintaining these riches.1384 Cole explains that the avaricious man thus “looks to things before people” and thereby “clogs” his ability to exercise the virtue of liberality.1385 This attitude impairs the freedom from undue concern for security and money the seminarian needs to generously serve people who need his help.

This condemnation of avarice, however, should not be confused in the seminarian’s mind with neglecting to care for material goods. As St Thomas explains, we share in God’s providence by taking responsibility for our needs and showing the foresight to prepare for the future.1386 In Scripture, for example, Joseph stored grain for the coming famine in Egypt (Genesis 41.47-49). So, we should attend to these matters without seeking goods “in excess” of our true needs, making sure to avoid two vices: neglect and prodigality.1387 The negligent man is imprudent and fails to promptly act for the good.1388 The prodigal man, on the other hand, gives to others excessively, out of an undue love to “curry favour” with them.1389 Thus, he unduly gives away “his means of support” and he wastes what he should spend on those who rely upon him.1390 Prodigality, St

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1382 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.7, resp.
1383 Ibid. See also Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.7, ad 2.
1384 St Thomas writes here of an “excessive love” for money that overrides our love for other people in their need. Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.8, resp. St Thomas also refers to this as an “insensibility to mercy” by which the avaricious man’s heart is not softened enough to feel mercy for others. He also calls this “inhumanity”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.118, a.8, ad 3.
1385 The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 167.
1386 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.55, a.6, resp. St Thomas writes that “due foresight” is a part of prudence. Summa Theologica II-II, q.55, a.7, ad 2. He also notes that our Lord had a common purse for himself and his Apostles (John 12.6).
1387 Ibid.
1388 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.54, a.2, ad 1.
1389 Summa Theologica II-II, q.119, a.1, ad 1. Cole observes that, in contrast to prodigality, by liberality a man uses money for the welfare of others, exercising a stewardship for his family, friends and those who are in urgent need. See The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 172-173.
1390 Summa Theologica II-II, q.119, a.3, ad 1.
Thomas observes, is a vice that the clergy should avoid because they are “the dispensers of the Church’s goods”, which “belong to the poor”. Thus, the seminarian should be formed to be a pastor who will care for parish finances and responsibly use money to help those in need.

Nevertheless, meanness is another vice that undermines the seminarian’s affective formation, because it opposes the virtue of magnificence, a word which comes from the Latin and means, to make great things (magna facere). Through magnificence someone spends “much in order that some great work may be accomplished”. By meanness, to the contrary, an inordinate fear leads him to “spend less” than his “work is worth” and thus fail “to observe due proportion between” his expenditure and his work. In his *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, St Thomas mentions examples of magnificence such as the “vast outlay” that is in keeping with the building of a house. He specifies too that the expense of great amounts of money has to be for an honorable good, according to prudence, and given cheerfully, promptly and readily. The main objects of the virtue of magnificence are the divine worship, the welfare of the public, providing for great events to honor community leaders, and other events that happen infrequently such as weddings. In this way, someone should not lavish gifts on himself but make great expenditure for the common good. Furthermore, he should ensure that each part of the project is finished in accordance with the overall purpose of the project, and that both materials and craftsmanship are excellent in quality.

A point to be taken for the seminarian’s formation is that priests are sometimes called to undertake a great work for the common good. It should be noted that St Thomas discusses magnificence as

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1391 Ibid. *As Catechism of the Catholic Church*, n.2446, teaches: “When we attend to the needs of those in want, we give them what is theirs, not ours. More than performing works of mercy, we are paying a debt of justice”.


1393 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.135, a.2, resp. The opposing vice to meanness is wastefulness by which a man spends “more than is proportionate to his work”. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.135, a.2, resp.


1395 *Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics*, Book Four, nn.712, 714-715, 725-727, 729. St Thomas also notes that there should be a sufficient quantity to complete the project.
a virtue in the *Summa Theologica*. Most of all, St Thomas sets the virtue of magnificence in the context of the greatest work, which is “in reference to the Divine honor”. St Thomas thus sets magnificence as a virtue that is a proper expression of the Christian life. The implication we can draw is that for the sake of God’s honor and the good of his people, the priest should attend to such needs as the providing of buildings for public worship and education. He must do this with a rightful care for the excellence of material and craftsmanship. He should do this, however, with a sense of responsibility because he is dealing with the money of the Church and her people. Therefore, he must follow a proper process of consultation with various ecclesiastical structures, for example, the parish community or the Diocesan Office headed by the Bishop.

### 8. Gluttony

The aim of this section is to acquire for the seminarian’s affective formation a balanced teaching on the problem of gluttony and its purification through such virtues as abstinence. This will help the seminarian to analyze the experience of gluttony and guide others to enjoy created goods in a virtuous way. To achieve this aim it is necessary to be clear that St Thomas does not criticize the enjoyment of eating and drinking in itself. Rather, he defines gluttony, not as “any desire of eating or drinking, but [as] an inordinate desire” for these goods. However, gluttony is an inordinate passion by which we desire the pleasure of eating and drinking to the detriment of other valid dimensions of our affective life. For example, spending too much on rich foods limits someone’s ability to give to others who are in need. It is this disordered desire which needs to be moderated so that it can be brought into harmony with our true good. One point that will be highlighted below is how this lack of moderation interferes with the seminarian’s ability to relate well to others.

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1396 “It belongs to magnificence to do something great”, he writes, to spend a large amount to, for instance, honour someone. *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.134, a.2, resp. See *Summa Theologica* II-II, a.134, a.3, resp; a.1, ad 3.
1397 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.134, a.2, ad 3.
1398 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.148, a.1, resp. Cole notes that the English word *gluttony* is a translation of the Latin word *gula*, “a desire for excessive eating and drinking of alcoholic beverages”. See *The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood*, 177.
1399 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.148, a.2, resp. St Thomas writes: “The rule of reason in this matter is that a human being consume the food appropriate to sustain their substance and good condition and to enjoy the company of those with whom they live ... Therefore when human beings desire and consume food according to this rule of reason they
Some manifestations of gluttony St Thomas observes are the excessive desire of “overdelicately prepared” food, eating hastily, or eating excessively. Peter Kreeft gives a contemporary list of such disorders. Eating hastily means that we are “gulping”; eating sumptuously refers to “demanding rich foods”; eating greedily is the attitude of “I want what I want when I want it”; and, eating daintily refers to the attitude, “it must be perfectly prepared”. In terms of the effects upon the gluttonous person, St Thomas writes of a dullness of sense in the understanding, a loquaciousness or “an excess of words”, and scurrility or a lack of restraint in outward behavior. In other words, the disordered love for eating spills over into other kinds of disordered behavior.

How can the inordinate desire of gluttony be reformed? Abstinence is the virtue of going without food for a good reason. For example, fasting is a form of abstinence by which we moderate our desires for food and drink, disposing ourselves to exercise proper self-governance in relation to other desires. That is, the formation of our desires in relation to one form of bodily good, nourishment, forms in us a capacity for moderation that we can apply to another good that involves our body, for instance, the proper expression of our sexual desires. However, St Thomas cautions that fasting must be done moderately, so that we are not deprived of the good health we need to perform our duties. Ecclesiastical laws of fasting, therefore, need to be properly applied. They ought to be adapted to the capacity and circumstances of the particular person because we cannot fix the same amount of food for all, for “one person needs more, and another less food”.

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1400 On Evil q.14, a.3, resp. “Eating sumptuous foods is not a sin”, St Thomas clarifies. “But inordinate desire for sumptuous food can be a sin”. See On Evil q.14, a.3, ad 5.
1401 Back to Virtue: Traditional Moral Wisdom For Modern Moral Confusion, 177.
1402 Summa Theologica II-II, q.148, a.6, resp. Gluttony is manifested, then, in “the random riotous joy which is described as unseemly” and which arises from those who immoderately indulge in “meat and drink”. Summa Theologica II-II, q.148, a.6, resp; ad 1.
1403 Summa Theologica II-II, q.147, a.1, ad 2.
1404 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.147, a.4, ad 1 where St Thomas explains that the commandments of God are precepts of the natural law which concern matters of themselves necessary for salvation. The commandments of the Church, on the other hand, concern salvation but “not of themselves” and only through the requirement of the Church.
1405 Summa Theologica II-II, q.147, a.6, ad 1. As examples St Thomas mentions children, the sick, the aged, those who go on a long pilgrimage, and those “doing much work” for their livelihood. Summa Theologica II-II, q.147, a.4, ad 2, 3; II-II q.147, a.7, ad 3.
Formed in a sense of due measure for himself in such matters, the seminarian will be disposed to guide others according to their proper need, circumstances and ability.

Another issue for affective formation concerns the consumption of alcoholic drinks which can hinder the seminarian’s ability to make good decisions. Alcoholic consumption is moderated by the virtue of sobriety. St Thomas comments: “sobriety takes its name from measure, for a man is said to be sober because he observes the bria, i.e. the measure”. The measured use of alcoholic drinks is “most profitable”, but excess in this matter “is most harmful, since it hinders the use of reason even more than excessive eating”, and it can lead to excessive anger and quarrels. St Thomas goes so far as to suggest that some may need to abstain from wine altogether because they may be so unduly affected by it that they cannot lead a virtuous life. Furthermore, some have a greater need for sobriety because they have to care for others and they need to be in a state of mind to do this. Ministers of the Church, for example, “should fulfill their spiritual duties with devout mind” and be able to teach others in a coherent fashion. Thus, the seminarian ought to be formed in sobriety so that he can properly fulfill his duties for others as a priest.

We could summarize this section by stating that moderation has a social dimension. It gives the seminarian affective balance in regard to delightful goods, disposing him to appreciate their worth in relation to greater goods, such as sharing with other people (Matthew 25.35). It leaves his mind free to function clearly so that he can fulfill his duties to the people in his pastoral care. The benefits of this are manifest in the lack of it. For example, the drunkard can make indiscreet and offensive statements. For a priest this would be very damaging because his parishioners need to see him as

1406 Summa Theologica II-II, q.149, a.1, resp.
1407 Ibid. The complete Latin word is sobrietas meaning “moderation in drinking”. See Cassell's Latin Dictionary, 559. As McDermott translates St Thomas: “Intoxicating liquor has a special facility for hindering our reasoning processes by muddling our brain, and so it calls for a special virtue, sobriety, to stop this happening.” Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation, 429.
1408 Summa Theologica II-II, q.149, a.1, resp. However, as Cole writes: “… it is evident from experience that ‘spirits’ tend to foster relaxation, gladden the heart, induce conversation and aid in health when taken moderately.” The Hidden Enemies of the Priesthood, 186.
1409 See Summa Theologica II-II, q.149, a.3, resp., ad 3.
1410 Summa Theologica II-II, q.149, a.4, resp.
a person who will converse with them in a respectful manner.\textsuperscript{1411} The priest of discretion is more likely to be seen as someone to be trusted and approached for help and counsel.

**Conclusion**

What does St Thomas’ teaching on inordinate desires contribute to the seminarian’s affective formation? It, first of all, provides the seminarian with a process of reflection to discern both why he sins and how sin harms him by distorting his desires for important human goods. For example, pride distorts his desire for self-excellence and in the process makes him regard his neighbor with arrogance. In this way, pride interferes with his ability to learn and conduct his relationships with charity and humility.

But more than this, affective formation can draw upon St Thomas’ positive presentation of how the virtues develop authentic desires that are distorted by the capital sins. St Thomas begins with the premise that the human faculties involved in sin are inherently good even though they can generate inordinate desires. The implication of this for the seminarian’s affective formation is enormous for his moral outlook and how he guides others later as a priest. One aim of responding to sin is certainly to disentangle the good from the evil in his desires, but in St Thomas’ vision of the affective and moral life that is not enough. There also needs to be a careful discernment of the need that underlies the inclination to sin and the virtue that re-orders it to the good.

Thus we can suggest that a basic structure emerges from our study of St Thomas’ teaching for developing the seminarian’s affective maturity, in response to inordinate desires that can impair his ability to relate well to others as a priest. The seminarian can be encouraged to set aside a preoccupation with his own excellence and glory (pride and vainglory) and, according to the heart of God, seek to honor his neighbor. In place of seeing his neighbor’s good as a cause of sadness (envy) he can exercise a loving appreciation for the good and joy of other people. Rather than seeing his vocation as a burden (acedia) he can rediscover his identity as someone called to share Christ’s pastoral charity and undertake his formation for this ministry with generosity. Instead of restricting his heart by hoarding riches for himself (avarice) he can be formed to administer the

\textsuperscript{1411} “Eating is linked to social bonds,” writes DeYoung, “expressions of love for one another, provision and comfort and security and celebration.” See *Glittering Vices*, 154.
goods of the Church for the true good of others. Setting aside a disordered passion for consuming created goods (gluttony), he can acquire the ability to share them with others.

However, there is one last capital sin to consider: lust or inordinate sexual desire. This will be considered, in the next and final chapter, in terms of its negative impact on human affectivity and personal relationships. Following the structure of this chapter, there will also be a consideration of how virtues such as chastity form sexual desire in the context of the seminarian’s affective formation.
Human sexuality is a beautiful gift from God which the seminarian rightly receives in a spirit of thanksgiving. Accordingly, in Pastores Dabo Vobis, Pope St John Paul II articulates a very positive view of sexuality, which includes the goodness of “a love that involves the entire person”, the ability to give oneself to another, and receive the gift of that person’s love.\textsuperscript{1412} It is in this context that the Pope asks for a formation in chastity, which prepares the seminarian to live a commitment of celibacy for Christ and the Church, and responsibly love others with affective maturity. The Pope also mentions other virtues that will help the seminarian to be chaste: prudence; self-mastery; respect for men and women in his personal relationships; and, selflessness.\textsuperscript{1413} These virtues enable the seminarian to relate to others in a way that respects their dignity as persons who are worthy of love and esteem.

The seminarian’s formation in chastity is all the more necessary when we consider that the culture from which he comes can encourage unchaste practices. For example, there is internet pornography which, Gail Dines writes, presents men with the portrayal of women in degrading acts of violent porn.\textsuperscript{1414} This encourages an attitude to women which lacks “any sense of love, respect, or connection to another human being”.\textsuperscript{1415} The seriousness of this issue was recognized by Cardinal Schönborn, Archbishop of Vienna, who in a retreat at Ars in October 2009, pointed out that in seminaries devices such as firewalls should be used to exclude pornographic websites. However,
with the availability of websites for many devices such as phones, he noted that seminarians have to exercise great personal responsibility. He recommended support groups, too, where seminarians are accountable to each other and, by their companionship, can ameliorate the effects of loneliness that can lead to “harmful addictions” such as pornography. These are significant statements by the Cardinal which alert seminary formators to the real challenge to help seminarians live a chaste life.

Furthermore, the importance of formation in chastity is accentuated in such ecclesial documents as *Guidelines for the use of Psychology in the Admission and Formation of Candidates for the Priesthood*. This document requires formators to direct away from the priesthood seminarians who are seriously incapable of being humanly mature. It requires formators to exercise a careful judgment in this matter, because of the tendency of some to minimize the weaknesses of seminarians and others to unduly emphasize their difficulties. The document also refers to other possible problems, such as an “excessive affective dependency”, an “insufficient capacity for being faithful to obligations taken on”, and “a sexual identity that is confused or not yet well defined”. If it is evident, moreover, that a seminarian cannot live celibacy with an “affective and relational equilibrium”, he should be asked to leave the seminary. The Church’s underlying concern in all these matters is that the seminarian needs to be able to form chaste relationships, for his own sake and the welfare of those he will serve as a priest.

The aim of this final chapter, then, is to take up the concern of the Church for the seminarian’s affective formation in chastity. This will be done by examining St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity and its formation by a life of virtue. There will be two main considerations. First, St Thomas’ teaching on lust will be considered to see how it enables the seminarian to understand how lustful behavior undermines both his character and his personal relationships. Second, to complete this study, St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue will be considered in view of what it contributes to

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1418 Ibid.
1419 Ibid, n.10.
the seminarian’s understanding of how to respond to lust and grow in chastity. This will bring to a conclusion the argument that St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity can be used as an instrument of affective formation.

1. How Lust Damages Personal Relationships

Previous chapters (3-4, 7-8) have analyzed St Thomas’ teaching on the goodness of human passions such as desire, love, and pleasure, when they are integrated with virtue. It is not surprising, therefore, that St Thomas has a positive view of human sexuality. For him, it is good that people have “beautiful and pleasing bodies”, and that properly ordered sexual acts, even in their “exceeding pleasure”, are virtuous.\textsuperscript{1420} His negative view of lust, however, comes from his conviction that certain acts disrespect the goodness of sexuality. Lust, for St Thomas, is the love of sensual pleasures without moderating them in accord with the true good both of human sexuality and the personal relationships that involve it. Lust thus interferes with the moderating influence of temperance, which enables us to love spiritually beautiful realities, such as the virtue of fidelity, that incorporate pleasure with good moral acts.\textsuperscript{1421} The problem with lust is that it isolates one aspect of sexual acts - physical or emotional pleasure – from the meaning of proper sexual relationships. For instance, adultery seeks the pleasure of sexual union to the exclusion of fidelity to one’s spouse.

For St Thomas, lust undermines a person’s respect for the meaning of sexuality as the capacity for husband and wife both to be united in sexual love and to give life to others. This is “a very great good” which needs to be wisely cared for, in order to protect and nurture human beings in family life.\textsuperscript{1422} While St Thomas has been criticized for concentrating too much on the procreative meaning of sexual intercourse, he does, in fact, recognize the constitutive importance of affection for married love.\textsuperscript{1423} In \textit{Summa Contra Gentiles}, for instance, St Thomas establishes the


\textsuperscript{1421} See \textit{On Evil}, q.15, a.1, resp.

\textsuperscript{1422} \textit{Summa Theologica} II-II, q.153, a.2, resp; a.3, esp.

\textsuperscript{1423} For example, DeYoung writes: “[St Thomas] overemphasizes the procreative purpose of sex almost to the point of forgetting about its potential for intimacy”. DeYoung recognises that St Thomas warns, in \textit{Summa Theologica} II-
indissolubility of marriage on the fact that “there seems to be the greatest friendship between husband and wife, for they are united not only in the act of fleshly union but also in the partnership of the whole of domestic activity”. That is, the spouses share an intimate personal life together both through their sexual union and in the activities of their family life.

The importance of this spousal friendship is brought out in St Thomas’ discussion of the marriage of Mary and Joseph. St Thomas upholds their union as a true marriage, even though they had never consummated their marriage. This is so because “the form of matrimony consists in a certain inseparable union of souls by which husband and wife are pledged by a bond of mutual affection that cannot be sundered.” St Thomas’ point is that while matrimony has the goal of begetting and caring for children, this is sought by spouses who are united in their love for each other and who open this love to the gift of children. The goodness of this affection is seen in greater clarity when we consider that children need their parent’s abiding nurture, guidance, and protection. St Thomas’ point is that this mutual love is the very basis from which springs the married couple’s love for their children. So, the evil of lust is that it interferes with the good of married affection which is linked so intimately to the good and security of family life.

Yet, how are we to understand what makes lustful actions so attractive when they damage the great good of human sexuality? The answer is found in the nature of the capital sins which are expressions of an inordinate desire in regard to a great good of human life. In the case of lust, the disorder concerns what in itself is a good capacity – the desire for the pleasure of sexual union. Lust, St Thomas explains, has “a very desirable end, so that through desire of that end, a man

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1425 Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence, Part II, Chapter 123, n.6. See nn.3, 5, for St Thomas’ discussion of equity between husband and wife, and the care and personal relationship between parents and their offspring, as reasons for indissolubility.

1426 Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.2, resp.

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II, q.154, a.8, ad 2, that husbands should not “indecently” use their wives because this is contrary to the good of fidelity in marriage. He states that such a man is in some sense an adulterer “even more so than he who is too ardent a lover of another woman”. So, in some limited sense, St Thomas recognizes the importance of affection in marriage. Rebecca Konyndyk DeYoung, Glittering Vices: A New Look at the Seven Deadly Sins and their Remedies (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Brazos Press/Baker Publishing Group, 2009), 161. St Thomas also refers to the “gentle association” that sexual intercourse produces between spouses. Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence, Part II, trans. Vernon J. Bourke (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975, reprint 2009, first published by Hanover House, 1956), Chapter 123, n.6.
proceeds to commit many sins”. For sexual pleasure “is very great” and is “the end of lust”. This pleasure is “very desirable” because it is intense and we easily appreciate its desirability. However, it is important to keep in mind, for the seminarian’s affective formation, that the pleasure St Thomas refers to is not only a physical but also an emotional pleasure. This emotional pleasure involves the enjoyment of a personal union with another. If this point is not appreciated the seminarian can underestimate the true strength of the temptation to lust, dismissing it as only a matter of physical pleasure rather than as a desire to be with someone.

To explain how this is important we need to return to a consideration of love and sorrow. The passion of love involves a feeling of union with another. It is a desire for this experience of unity and of being loved and close to another that drives lust. Another dimension of this affective experience, derived from our consideration of sorrow in Chapter 5, is that we seek to alleviate our sense of loss by seeking pleasure. The sorrow we feel on account of isolation, for example, can drive the felt need for the comfort of being close to another. With this in mind, one can see that lust does not only concern physical pleasure but it also concerns affective needs that make one long for the comfort of sexual union. The seminarian needs to be aware of this affective dynamic in lust, lest it negatively influence his personal relationships. He needs to be aware that he may feel unloved and that a sexual relationship could appeal to him as an answer to this problem. However, he needs to be mindful that there are negative consequences to such lustful behavior, which involve the way he thinks, wills and feels in relation to others. The disorder in his sexual desires engenders sinful attitudes to others that impede his respect for their true good.

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1427 *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.153, a.4, resp.
1428 Ibid.
1429 Ibid. St Thomas refers here to our concupiscence, that is, our affective capacity to strive for pleasure.
1430 We cannot treat of every issue of lust in this section. It can be stated that even in sins such as masturbation, a sexual act that is not shared physically with another, there is still usually some connection to imaginations of having sex with another, such as in the use of pornography. So, the dynamism to union with another, even though obscured, still remains as the emotional drive underlying the lustful act. This point is confirmed by the impact that loneliness has on the person tempted to such sexual sins. St Thomas writes of a range of other sins that violate the affective unity of married life and its connection to the giving of life that is required for the proper meaning of sexual intercourse. He mentions homosexual acts (see *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.154, a.11, resp.); fornication, incest, seduction, and rape (see *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.153, a.5, ad 4.); and, the “abuse of boys” (*Summa Theologica* II-II, q.154, a.1, ad 5).
1431 See *Summa Theologica* II-II, q.153, a.5, resp.
St Thomas refers to a certain blindness of the mind, in the sense that the capacity to perceive the dignity of the other person is diminished by lust. In relation to this point, he quotes Daniel 13.56, where we read that the lustful man who attempted to seduce Susanna is rebuked because beauty deceived him and perverted his heart. This lust induced him to seek Susanna’s condemnation and death when she refused his seductive advances. Then there is a rashness in action, driven by a person’s impulsive desire for the pleasure of sex, so that he does not properly reflect about what he should do. Moreover, through the habit of a lustful life he can diminish his ability to carry out his better judgment and give up a wrongful relationship.\textsuperscript{1432}

There can also be a hatred for God who forbids the immorality of lust, because there can be an undue love for the pleasures of this world in which they are loved more than God. This can lead someone to give up on attaining eternal life, because he is obsessed with sexual pleasure so much that the desire for the spiritual pleasure of union with God in heaven becomes “distasteful”.\textsuperscript{1433} St Thomas also observes that despair can cause sexual lust, in the sense that without “the hope of future happiness” the lustful man sees no reason to give up earthly pleasures.\textsuperscript{1434}

People can also manifest their lust in speech. For example, by wanton words a man directs his speech to lustful pleasures.\textsuperscript{1435} These kinds of sinful words need to be distinguished from true words of affection, in the same way that St Thomas distinguishes chaste and unchaste touches. St Thomas mentions that “certain acts [are] circumstantial to the venereal act, for instance kisses, touches, and so forth”.\textsuperscript{1436} That is, these acts are more intimately connected to arousing lustful desire and so are to be avoided. It should be noted, though, that St Thomas distinguishes appropriate acts of affection from those done with lustful motive. A “kiss, caress, or touch” can be done “without lustful pleasure, either as being the custom of one’s country, or on account of some obligation or reasonable cause”.\textsuperscript{1437} For example, family members and friends greet each other with a kiss or a hug.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{1432} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1433} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{1434} On Evil, q. 15, a.4, ad 3.
\textsuperscript{1435} Summa Theologica II-II, q.153, a.5, ad 4.
\textsuperscript{1436} Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.1, ad 5.
\textsuperscript{1437} Summa Theologica II-II, q.154, a.4, resp.
\end{footnotes}
St Thomas here makes a distinction that is important for the seminarian who has an authentic need for affection. Indeed, he needs to learn how to give and receive words and gestures of affection, distinguishing them from what is inappropriate and lustful. The people he will serve as a priest also have a genuine need for his affection in word and gesture and they will hope that he is someone worthy of trust in this matter. At times they will offer him gestures of genuine affection out of love and appreciation for his presence among them and the work he does for them. In these moments he needs to be very clear about the difference between unchaste acts and gestures of genuine affection. He needs to respect the person before him, the relationship he has with that person as a priest, and the circumstances in which he is with that person. For example, he must be prudent about what he does when he is alone with someone, especially when he is stressed and tired. Yet, he must also know how to show appropriate acts of affection, such as taking someone’s hand to console her when she is genuinely in grief.

It is instructive to note that the Lord Jesus was very careful in these matters, though not afraid to show appropriate affection. For example, when he raises the twelve year old girl from the dead he holds her hand and yet he is careful to have her parents and the three apostles with him at the time (Mark 5.35-42). The Lord shows here a good example of being aware of the context in which an act of affection is communicated. 1438

The consideration of leaving aside lustful attitudes so that the seminarian can seek a truly chaste life is of crucial importance for his affective maturity. As DeYoung points out, respect for human sexuality involves respect for the fundamental values of life and love, hence human existence and human relationships. 1439 As a priest, the seminarian will have to communicate this truth to those preparing for marriage. The pastoral ramifications, however, go beyond this to how he must give good example to those who have taken up a life of consecrated virginity, those who have never found a spouse, and those who have suffered marriage breakdown. It is the priest’s responsibility to give these people a good example of a chaste life in the service of others.

1438 On a personal note I was very impressed with how Pope St John Paul II was capable of showing affection to others. I recall on one occasion, at Corpus Christi Mass in Rome, he tenderly embraced both the parents and their children after they had brought up the offertory gifts.
1439 See Glittering Vices, 162.
2. Infused Virtue and Formation in Chastity

This section will develop six principles from St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue to guide the seminarian in his approach to the development of chastity. To prepare for the articulation of these principles, there will be a discussion of infused virtue from the point of view that it is a principle of healing. This means that infused virtue enables the sinner to re-order his thinking and willing so that his affective responses come into harmony with a renewed life of virtue. To grasp this point, we need to recall that St Thomas’ idea of infused virtue is that it is a principle of grace which enables the seminarian to practice certain virtues in harmony with the Christian life. (The principal virtues considered in Chapter 9 were the theological and cardinal virtues.) It is this truth which assists the seminarian to turn to God for guidance and strength in his affective struggles.\(^\text{1440}\)

a. The Healing Role of Infused Virtue

A key idea for appreciating St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue is that it heals the sinner’s faculties, which have been damaged by sin. To grasp the importance of what he means by this it is first necessary to understand what he intends by the word “faculty”. St Thomas’ Latin term for “faculty” is *potentia*, which can be translated, Paul Crittenden explains, as “capacity” or “ability”.\(^\text{1441}\) Or, as Robert Schmidt defines it, *potentia* is: “A capacity for, or principle of, action; the ability to do or to make.”\(^\text{1442}\) A faculty is, then, a particular capacity of the person to act in a certain way.\(^\text{1443}\) St Thomas observes that some of these powers are innate in the person, like the

\(^{1440}\) We have here a meeting point of the life of faith and the affective renewal of the seminarian which we have reflected upon in Chapter 9. In relation to priestly celibacy, Michael Heintz makes the point that there is an intrinsic link between the principles of grace and development of the seminarian’s human maturity. He writes: “In the formation of men for ordained ministry as priests, their developing self-awareness must never be severed from their relationship to Christ”. See Rev. Msgr. Michael Heintz, PhD, “Configured to Christ: Celibacy and Human Formation”, in John C. Cavadini, *The Charism of Priestly Celibacy: Biblical, Theological and Pastoral Reflections*, (Notre Dame, Indiana: Ave Maria Press, 2012), 67.


capacity to see; “some are acquired by practice”, as when a musician has to repeatedly practice playing the flute; others are acquired by “teaching and learning”, as when a person is taught the work of medicine.\footnote{Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book Nine, Lesson 4, n.1815, trans. John P. Rowan (Notre Dame, Indiana: Dumb Ox Books, 1995). Crittenden gives a basic list of the human faculties: “the capacity for sense perception, having desires, experiencing feeling and emotion, imagining, speaking a language, understanding, judging and exercising purposive choice”. \textit{Reason, Will and Emotion}, 80.} These human faculties are intimately linked. For example, we discussed in Chapter 3 that there is a close association between a person’s mind, imagination, and passions.

This intimate link is the means by which the seminarian’s renewal of mind and heart influences the re-ordering of his other faculties, such as the chaste development of his sexual desires. His mind and heart, renewed by God’s grace, is influenced by the theological virtues, which guide him to think and act according to faith in God, hope in his goodness, and love for him (Chapter 9). St Thomas refers to this intimate working of God’s grace in terms of the Holy Spirit’s action, which “perfects the intellect by the gift of wisdom, and softens the affections by the fire of charity”.\footnote{\textit{Summa Theologica} I-II, q.79, a.4, resp.} In other words, the action of God informs the Christian’s mind and affectivity through the truth of Divine Revelation and the offering of God’s love to him. This is the essence of St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue, which is then unfolded in relation to each faculty or capacity. That is, each faculty for a particular range of acts, for example, to moderate our affections, is guided by and incorporated into the life of the Christian’s love for God. One implication is that the seminarian is renewed by the wise guidance of God who loves him and thereby instills in him the confidence to live a renewed life. This point will be discussed below when we analyze the six principles of affective formation in chastity to be drawn from our study of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity.

This teaching on infused virtue is in harmony with Sacred Scripture where we are taught that virtues are gifts of God. For example, in Wisdom 8.7, we read of temperance, prudence, justice and fortitude as fruits of the labors of God’s Wisdom. Also, in Ephesians 1.8, we read of God, in his grace, showering us with wisdom and insight. Virtue is thus presented as a gift from God who helps us to act virtuously. Receiving what God has made known to us about how to live, and receiving the help of his grace we are strengthened to live a new life.\footnote{Michael S. Sherwin, O.P., “Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice: A Test Case for the Thomistic Theory of Infused Cardinal Virtues”, \textit{The Thomist} 73 (2009): 29.} Yet, as Michael Sherwin
explains, these virtues are also “intimately the excellences of the agent himself”. In other words, infused virtue enables us to act in a way that the virtues become truly our acts and our perfections.

However, for the purpose of our discussion of affective formation, there is another important dimension of St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue, namely, that it can be present even though the residual effects of acquired vices are still felt by the Christian. As St Thomas explains, the beginner in the spiritual life can feel that he is not yet free of the effects of his previous sins. He writes: “infused virtue does not always remove the experience of the emotions straight away”. In this case, the beginner can feel the effects of disordered passions but “they do not take control” and he is able to refrain from evil. This is in keeping with the character of virtue, St Thomas argues, because it is enough for virtue to do the good “without regret” and it is unnecessary for virtue to take pleasure in doing what is burdensome. For example, a man can act bravely even though he feels great fear. An important implication is that the seminarian can feel he is unable to exercise a virtue but God’s gift of grace still supports him to act virtuously.

An example of how infused virtue assists the repentant sinner is found in Matthew Talbot, who lived in Ireland in the 19th century. As Sherwin relates, Talbot was a drunkard who converted and dedicated his life to the love of God, prayer, self-sacrifice, and the service of the poor. However, in this process of conversion he only gradually became free of his inordinate desire for alcohol. Talbot’s experience highlights how the converted Christian can still struggle with the damaging

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1447 Ibid, 29.
1448 St Thomas writes: “virtue which directs man to good as defined by the Divine Law, and not by human reason, cannot be caused by human acts, the principle of which is reason, but is produced in us by the Divine operation alone”. Summa Theologica I-II, q.63, a.2, resp. William C. Mattison III explains that the Christian in the state of grace receives virtues from God to live in accordance with the hope of reaching Heaven. He argues that “acquired cardinal virtues cannot direct a person to the supernatural last end” because they work according to the guidance of reason and not according to the guidance of Divine Revelation. William C. Mattison III, “Can Christians Possess the Acquired Cardinal Virtues?”, Theological Studies 72 (2011): 563.
1449 St Thomas writes: “It happens sometimes that a man who has a habit, finds it difficult to act in accordance with the habit, and consequently feels no pleasure and complacency in the act, on account of some impediment supervening from without: thus a man who has a habit of science, finds it difficult to understand, through being sleepy or unwell. In like manner sometimes the habits of moral virtue experience difficulty in their works, by reason of certain contrary dispositions remaining from previous acts.” Summa Theologica I-II, q.65, a.3, ad 2.
1451 Disputed Questions on the Virtues, q.1, a.10, ad 14.
1452 Disputed Questions on the Virtues, q. 1, a.10, ad 15.
effects of previous vices. Sherwin comments, in light of Talbot’s gradual affective renewal, that the repentant person needs to be informed that infused virtue forms “a new phronesis (a new capacity to reason practically) and a new dynamis (a new power) in his will and passions, even though he still feels drawn to his addiction”.1453 God equips him with “the capacity to judge rightly and do those actions that lead us to union with God in heaven”.1454 In other words, God truly helps him to improve even though he struggles to change for the better.

However, this is difficult for the person beginning a renewed life of virtue. As Sherwin comments, when it comes to the issue of infused virtue, “the beginner finds himself in the unique position of having virtues that he does not psychologically feel like he has”.1455 The words of St Thomas on the attitude of someone beginning a life of virtue are applicable here. The beginner must believe in God “as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him”.1456 Applying this to the purpose of affective formation, the seminarian has to trust that God’s truth guides him and God’s grace supports him. “This trust is necessary”, Sherwin explains, “because on the level of psychological experience” the truth of Gospel morality may not be apparent to him.1457 That is, he may not feel in a time of great inner struggle, that it is true. To help him in this struggle the seminarian will have to trust the guidance of his formators who can bear witness to how God has helped them to patiently rely on his grace. This is essential knowledge for the seminarian’s affective formation, but it is also important for his future priestly ministry because he will have to patiently help others to rely on God’s truth and grace in their affective struggles. Having learnt about these matters through personal experience he will be better equipped to support others.

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1453 “Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice”, p.37. Sherwin explains this in terms of the cardinal virtues: “(1) the ability to judge practically about what we should do and when and how we should do it (infused prudence), as well as (2) an inclination in the will toward a higher justice (infused justice) and (3) a receptivity in the passions to be guided by these higher judgments and inclinations (infused courage and temperance).” Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice, 41. Italics added.
1455 Ibid, p.46.
1456 Summa Theologica II-II, q.2, a.3, resp.
1457 Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice, 47.
b. Six Principles of Affective Formation in Chastity

From our consideration of the infused virtues we see that they are linked to the grace of conversion and the renewal of the penitent’s character. As Sherwin writes, infused virtue “is measured by a wisdom that understands our wounded nature and the priceless character of our supernatural end made possible for us by the elevating and healing action of grace”. Now, St Thomas’ teaching on the renewal of the repentant sinner is both hopeful and realistic. For example, he writes about the loss and recovery of virginity in terms of an analogy with the man who has squandered his great wealth and cannot recover it by his repentance. However, he can recover his life of virtue by repenting of his sin and taking better care of money in the future. “In like manner”, St Thomas writes, “a person who has lost virginity by sin, recovers by repenting, not the matter of virginity but the purpose of virginity”. St Thomas’ point is that grace restores the penitent’s ability to reverently love the good of human sexuality and this is a true renewal of his character.

Now, the aim of this last section is to develop six principles that can guide the seminarian’s approach to affective formation in chastity. In this context, “principle” means a truth of practical thought that has become a personal and strongly held attitude of the seminarian, and which guides his decisions in moments of difficulty. “Principle” in this sense involves the whole person and the formation of his mind, will, and passions, in accord with the virtuous habits that we have discussed from Pope St John Paul II’s and St Thomas’ thought, especially in Chapters 7 and 9. The six principles are: i) infused virtue is a gift of grace; ii) infused virtue concerns affective renewal; iii) infused virtue incorporates all the seminarian’s activities with the life of grace; iv) infused virtue assists the seminarian to cope with the residual effects of sin; v) the seminarian needs to trust God’s wisdom; vi) the excellences of infused virtue truly become the seminarian’s.

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1458 Ibid, p.40. See Summa Theologica I-II, q.63, aa.3-4, for St Thomas’s discussion of infused virtue and temperance as an example which pertains to our desire for pleasure according “to the Divine rule”.
1459 Summa Theologica II-II, q.152, a.3, ad 3.
i. Infused virtue is not acquired by our own unaided natural faculties but is infused by God with the gift of grace

This constitutes the starting point for the seminarian’s growth in the virtue of chastity, otherwise he will attempt to live chastely by his own resources which, since he is wounded by sin, are inadequate to the task. Avoiding pride and vain self-sufficiency, the seminarian will constantly ask for the grace he needs to become the person God desires him to be. Connected with this first principle is another: the seminarian’s life needs to be grounded in a deep love for Christ who is the paradigm for both affective maturity and chastity for the priest.\textsuperscript{1460} Indeed, the importance of chastity flows from the seminarian’s vocation to reflect Christ’s pastoral love for others as a responsible and chaste person when he is ordained as a priest.

ii. Infused virtue is linked to the grace of conversion and the renewal of the character of the repentant person through a renewed understanding of himself

The grace of infused virtue is geared to a renewal of life that flows from the seminarian’s renewed view of himself as one who is loved by God. This affects how the seminarian understands what kind of person he is and what, therefore, he is capable of doing.\textsuperscript{1461} A person who thinks of himself as worthless, unlovable, and unchaste will probably act that way. To the contrary, the person who thinks himself worthy of love and capable of loving chastely, because God thinks him capable of this, will be disposed to live chastely. Here, we need to recall St Thomas’ reflections on sloth as an attachment to our old sinful self which holds us back from attaining the new self that God desires for us (Chapter 10). The point is that infused grace renews the seminarian’s view of himself at its very foundation, to overcome his attachment to his former unchaste self. To take an analogy from our human experience of love: it is the renewed sense of dignity that comes to us through

\textsuperscript{1460} One seminarian commented, after studying the course I gave on St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity at Good Shepherd Seminary in Sydney, that the way forward in affective growth for them was found most of all in their love for Christ. This shows the importance of presenting St Thomas’ reflections on Christ’s affectivity (Chapter 2) so that the seminarian can perceive the link between Christ’s affectivity and the importance of his own affective development.

\textsuperscript{1461} This principle accords with St Paul’s teaching that it is through the modelling of one’s life according to the renewal of one’s mind in God’s truth that one can judge of how to truly act (Romans 12.1-2). In other words, it is through a correct grasp of the truth that one can begin the renewal of one’s moral behavior.
being loved that opens us to a new way of thinking about how we are capable of loving in a worthy manner. Moreover, on account of God’s love for the seminarian he is moved to see that he ought to love God’s children properly in matters concerning sexuality. This is an application of the Gift of Piety which leads him to honor his fellow Christians as fellow children of God (Chapter 9).

iii. Infused virtues concern the same matters as the acquired virtues but according to a rule that flows from the Christian’s participation in the Divine life

Because he is called to love God wholeheartedly and to love his neighbor (Matthew 22.37-38), the seminarian needs to reflect on the implications of this life of faith, hope and charity, for all the various aspects of his life and relationships (Chapter 9). Infused virtue therefore concerns the acts which develop the seminarian’s character in respect of how he deals with created realities, as they come from God and help us come to God. This is an application of the Gift of Knowledge, which enables us to see the true value of things in light of their relation to God (Chapter 9). A right relationship with created realities involves a reverence for the regulation and measurement of things, “while evil results from the fact that it is not being ruled or measured”\(^{1462}\). This sense of proper measurement, or of tempering our desires and gestures, is relevant to how the seminarian orders his sexual desires out of reverence for the proper limits of relationships. The word “limit” here emphasizes the idea of a boundary demarcating one kind of relationship from another and hence the different acts appropriate to the different relationships.\(^{1463}\) Beyond this one disrespects the limits of one’s own proper role in another’s life and the emotional intimacy of the other person.

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\(^{1462}\) *On Evil*, q. 1, a.3, resp.

\(^{1463}\) The English word “limit” comes from the Latin word *limes, limitis*, for boundary or frontier. The basic idea is that there is “a point, line or level beyond which something does not or may not extend or pass”. Bruce Moore, *The Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary*, 4\(^{th}\) ed. (South Melbourne, Australia: Oxford University Press, 2004), 815. In the case we discuss above, the limit indicates the difference between an action that is appropriate or inappropriate to a particular personal relationship.
iv. St Thomas recognizes the relevance of the infused virtues to the person who struggles with the residual effects of acquired vices

In the struggle with the effects of his previous sins, God equips the seminarian with “the capacity to judge rightly and do those actions that lead us to union with God in heaven”. However, there is still the problem that he can feel inordinate desires that flow from his faculties of memory and imagination. Since these faculties are linked to his faculties of mind and will, they can narrow his perspective by presenting lustful objects to his consciousness. In response, the seminarian needs to widen his perspective by focusing his mind and energies on other objects, which serves to diminish his affective responses to any immorally desired objects. For example, he can shift his focus from lustful imaginations by performing other activities such as acts of kindness for others. This forms in him a capacity to properly express love for others in a practical way. It thus counteracts the impulse of lust to imagine other people as sex objects, without any thought for them as real people who need to be loved according to their dignity.

v. The seminarian needs to believe in God “as a disciple believes the master who is teaching him”

St Thomas views the person who begins the life of renewed virtue as someone who needs to trust the wisdom of God, who guides him to experience the benefits of living according to this wisdom. The problem for the seminarian is that this requires patience and trust in the means given to help him progress in chastity. Among other means to this end, three will be highlighted to help the seminarian who feels that he is struggling to really progress: the need for docility; the example of good priests; and, trusting God’s Providence that he will meet people who will love and help him.

Docility, the virtue by which we are open to learn from others, opens the seminarian’s mind to attentively study God’s wisdom, so that he can begin to practice it. A major part of this docility concerns the study of God’s wisdom communicated through Sacred Scripture. This presents a teaching that is both inspired by the Holy Spirit and deeply attentive to the long human struggle for holiness. We could take two examples of how the sources of Divine Revelation assist the

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1464 Infused Virtue and the Effects of Acquired Vice, 37.
1465 Summa Theologica II-II, q.2, a.3, resp.
seminarian to grow in chastity. The first example concerns the very practical advice to be careful of his lustful desires, which can flow into his actions (Matthew 5.18-19). What the seminarian dwells upon as desirable increases his desire for it. To decrease that desire he needs to engage his mind in other activities and thoughts that are truly good. The second example is derived from how the virtue of chastity can be lost through a lack of care for modesty. The most obvious example is that of King David, who lustfully gazed at Bathsheba as she bathed, so that he was overcome by a lust which moved him to seduce her (2 Samuel 11.2-5). Thus, we understand that avoiding the deliberate sight of what corrupts our affections is necessary to live a chaste life.

The second point concerns that of the example of priests who have endured the same or similar struggles as the seminarian. This is a very powerful consideration because we are moved deeply by the example of others who show us that it is possible to be chaste. This teaches the seminarian that his struggles are not so different from others. He also perceives that the grace of infused virtue has been as fruitful in their lives as it can be in his. Priests have loved others and cared for them and they have been loved in return by families, friends and parishioners. For this reason it is also necessary that seminarians contemplate the lives of priests like St Augustine. In his life it is clear that infused grace worked to convert him when he felt at the mercy of his lustful ways.1466 Such true stories inspire and encourage the seminarian to trust the grace and wisdom of God.

The third point concerns a trust in God’s providence, which pertains not just to guiding the universe to its good nor only to the good of the human race in general, but “for the individual” and “for his own sake”.1467 God guides the seminarian to his true fulfilment and in a way that accords with his true need. This is mentioned on account of one of the personal factors that can contribute to lust, namely, the painful feeling that one lacks affection or is lonely. This requires great trust that God will bring people into the seminarian’s life who will love him and help him to grow as a person. Friends, spiritual fathers, brother priests, and families, will communicate to him their love and affection and help him to realize that he is worthy of love and how to show love to others. With

1466 See Augustine, The Confessions of Saint Augustine, trans. E. M. Blaiklock (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1983/1988). St Augustine realised that he was blinded to the truth about his sinfulness (Book Six, n.XVI); that God was guiding him to the truth, even through his experience of sorrow (Book 7, n.VIII); how difficult it was to overcome lust (Book 8, n.V); and, finally, how grace and the Sacred Scriptures helped him to make a decision to start a new life (Book 8, n.XII).

1467 Summa Contra Gentiles Book Three: Providence, Part II, Chapter 113, n.1.
this trust goes the accompanying ability to properly receive and give thanks for this affection when it is given to him.

vi. The infused virtues become “intimately the excellences of the agent himself”

This last principle can help the seminarian to contemplate the generosity of God, who gives the gift of infused virtue so that it truly becomes the seminarian’s own perfection. The word excellence connotes a worthy quality of character that the seminarian can exercise for the good of others. There is a certain delight in this for the seminarian, inasmuch as chastity becomes a personal perfection within him that enables him to enjoy virtuous relationships of affection. It becomes a part of his gift to others, in that he knows how to responsibly love them according to a right relationship and their true good. The pastoral importance of this is that he can relate to others as a priest who loves them according to God’s wisdom and love, and so he can become a minister of God’s goodness to them rather than harming them through the selfishness of lust.

Conclusion

Precisely because the capacity for sexual love is both natural and beautiful, the seminarian, like anyone else, ought to receive his sexuality as a good gift from God. However, the wonderful attractiveness of sexuality can also be subject to inordinate desires, which he can “underestimate”, in terms of their power to incline him to sinful behavior. In reflecting on St Thomas’ teaching on how unchaste attitudes do harm to his character and personal relationships, the seminarian is enabled to see more clearly that he needs to avoid lustful behavior. The ultimate aim here is a positive one. Through the study of the inordinate desire of lust, the seminarian can be convinced of the harm done to himself and others by unchaste actions and, therefore, be motivated to avoid them. More importantly, however, the seminarian ought to honor chastity as a virtue which enables him to engage in relationships with respect for the dignity of human sexuality in others. St Thomas’ teaching on infused virtue is very relevant to this dimension of the seminarian’s affective formation. Chastity is an infused virtue inasmuch as it is an integration, through God’s grace, of

\[1468\] Glittering Vices, 162.
the seminarian’s sexual desire with his identity as a follower of Christ. The truth of this entails that he must turn to God for help to develop the virtue of chastity and exercise it as a participation in God’s care for the dignity of others. Moreover, he ought to rejoice in this ability to live a chaste life both as a true excellence of his own character and a true service for the welfare of those entrusted to his pastoral care.
CONCLUSION

This thesis has set out an analysis of St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity that has formed an argument, particularly for the seminary formator and the seminarian, concerning what affective maturity is and how to attain it. Crucially, this account of affectivity respects that to live with Christ, and to reflect his pastoral charity to others, the seminarian must be capable of relating to all in an affectively mature way. This is because Christ, the Incarnate Son of God, both reveals the mystery of the Trinitarian relations of love and models the true nature of human affectivity for us. To be truly holy, therefore, we need to express our affectivity in such a way that we can conduct fulfilling personal relationships.

St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity, its integral role in Christian life, and how to bring it to maturity provides a way forward for seminary formation. All of the teaching unfolded in this analysis of St Thomas’ reflections can be applied to the seminarian’s affective formation, inasmuch as he can be guided to attain, and assessed as to whether he is progressing in, a life of affective maturity. Affective maturity - the virtuous development of the seminarian’s affectivity in order that he may responsibly love others - is a vital element of priestly life and service. As Pope St John Paul II teaches in Pastores Dabo Vobis, seminarians need to be formed to relate to others in a way that reflects the humanity and the heart of Christ the Good Shepherd. To do this, seminarians need to become capable of loving others in a mature and virtuous manner like Christ. The argument of this thesis is that St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity helps the seminarian to grow in his understanding of how to attain this affective maturity.

More specifically, St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity provides a way forward for seminary formation because it gives a coherent overview of the development of affectivity for all people. It does this: by providing a view of affectivity that is based in a sound theological anthropology (Chapter 2); by presenting a wise and positive view of affectivity in its relationship to the good of the human person (Chapters 3-4); by promoting a balanced view of how to integrate affective responses to evil (Chapter 5); by giving positive reflections on the role of the passions that help the seminarian to cope with arduous challenges (Chapter 6); by articulating the role of virtues in properly forming affectivity so that the seminarian can relate responsibly to others (Chapter 7-9);
by developing a coherent response to inordinate affective desires in light of the gift of infused virtue (Chapters 10-11).

Equally important is that St Thomas’ teaching situates affective development, not only within the individual experience of the seminarian, but also within the wider perspective of personal relationships. St Thomas’ teaching can help the seminarian to be more aware of the impact of his attitudes and actions upon others, and how to exercise virtues that help him to build healthy personal relationships with them. For example, without being just he will fail to build true mutual relationships with others, because he does not focus on promoting their true needs and willing their true good. To this extent, St Thomas’ teaching impresses upon the seminarian the truth that it is in responsibly loving others that true affective maturity is found.

One aspect of the significance of this research is that it presents to the seminary formator a coherent and systematic analysis of St Thomas’ teaching on affective maturity. It is a teaching that can be presented to the seminarian to help him grasp the importance of his affective formation and the principles that promote it. It is worth emphasizing again that the future priest’s own affective maturity has the capacity to affect the lives of many others who will seek his friendship and guidance on their paths toward integrated holiness. St Thomas’ teaching seeks its ultimate guidance from Sacred Scripture and the life of Jesus Christ, and so it is well suited to serve as an instrument of developing the future priest, who is called to reflect the human perfection of the Good Shepherd.

At the same time, St Thomas’ teaching is respectful of the need for a clear and rigorous analysis in the area of a life of virtue, which of its nature includes the development of an affectively mature attitude. In its timeless proclamation of the truth of what it means to be human, St Thomas’ anthropology, with its theological, moral, and psychological dimensions, forms a robust response to Pope St John Paul II’s approach to affectivity. Pope St John Paul II’s own anthropology is influenced by St Thomas’ affirmation of the goodness of affectivity that is developed in harmony with our true good. In comparison with the teaching of the Manuals on affectivity, which in one respect was too negative about the passions, it allows for a more integrated view of emotion. That is, it articulates a positive view of virtue as a way of forming emotion into a responsible expression of love: to build friendships and to engage in relationships of pastoral service that seek to promote the true needs of others.
It has been the finding of this thesis that to be faithful to the vision of Pope St John Paul II, affective formation must have a solid theological basis. We find this in St Thomas’ consideration of God’s affections and Christ’s human affectivity, which lays the groundwork for a reflection on some key affective dispositions the seminarian needs to develop. For instance, the capacity to properly express generous love, joy, mercy, zeal, fear, anger, hatred, compassion, and friendship, are qualities the seminarian needs if he is to reflect both the life of God and of Christ to the world. That is, we are already beginning to see the qualities that an affectively mature person should exhibit.

In terms of understanding himself, the seminarian can be presented with a teaching that encourages in him a proper sense of receptivity. By appreciating that he needs to form his choices by truthful judgements, he can learn to be docile, listening to the wisdom of experienced people, the Church, and Sacred Scripture. Thus, he will be well guided to develop his capacity to feel in response to objects, situations, and other persons, inasmuch as they are perceived to be for his good or against it. Moreover, St Thomas’ teaching on love, desire and pleasure, sets in his mind a very positive attitude to these passions. Yet, it enables him to be more discerning about what gives him true pleasure, in that it needs to properly perfect his understanding, willing, and feeling. It encourages him to grow in his appreciation for the good in himself, in others, and in God, forming his desires so that he may truly enjoy what is truly good. It also calls him to enter into challenging personal and pastoral experiences that will help him discover how to more wisely relate to others and so enjoy his growth in pastoral competence.

Furthermore, in St Thomas’ teaching the seminarian finds a balanced appraisal of the role of negative passions, which can be a sign of affective maturity in response to what harms the good. For instance, anger can provide affective energy for the seminarian to counteract evil. Sorrow can help the seminarian to be compassionate to others by enabling him to understand the damaging and personal effects of evil. Moreover, the irascible passions help the seminarian cope with major challenges. Properly formed hope, despair, fear, daring, and anger, are presented together as affective principles of achieving the arduous good or coping with a graver evil. Yet, the seminarian learns from St Thomas’ teaching to properly form these affective responses through virtuous attitudes, to help him make prudent, rather than rash, decisions. For example, in regard to daring,
the seminarian can be taught to seek counsel from others and carefully deliberate before confronting a major challenge.

The pertinence of St Thomas’ teaching comes more fully to light when we consider the recent Royal Commission into Institutional Responses to Child Abuse in Australia, which was concluded in 2018. The findings of the Royal Commission, highlight that we need to have affectively mature priests who can live their priestly life in challenging times. This is not only a question of forming priests that will understand how to avoid transgressing personal boundaries and so avoid further scandal. It also regards the development of positive relationships of true esteem and genuine respect for others. Even beyond these issues, there is the need for affective resilience. The present negative climate, which is so fraught with anger against the Church and so critical of Catholic clergy, on account of the abuse of children, can undermine the priest’s resolve to live his priestly vocation. Without the capacity to harness his passions of hope and daring, and the ability to moderate his sense of despair and fear, he will not be able to live his vocation when he feels severely tested. He will need, not only a deep sense of the benefit of his future priestly service for the lives of others, but also a great deal of determination and perseverance.

Also significant to the outcomes of the Royal Commission is St Thomas’ teaching on inordinate desires, which can contribute to the seminarian’s affective formation. First of all, St Thomas’ teaching provides the seminarian with a process of reflection to discern both why he sins and how sin harms him by distorting his desires for important human goods. For example, pride distorts his desire for self-excellence and, in the process, makes him regard his neighbor with arrogance. In this way, pride interferes with his ability to learn and conduct his relationships with charity and humility. It then also contributes, sadly, to his capacity to inhibit the peace and proper growth of the people for whom he is called to care.

More significantly still, affective formation can draw upon St Thomas’ positive presentation of how the virtues develop authentic desires that are distorted by the capital sins. St Thomas begins with the premise that the human faculties involved in sin are inherently good even though they can generate inordinate desires. The implication of this is very important for the seminarian’s ability, as a future priest, both to articulate a positive moral outlook for others and to guide them to attain the affective maturity appropriate for their vocation. One aim of responding to sin is certainly to disentangle the good from the evil in our desires. However, in St Thomas’ vision of the affective
and moral life that is not enough. There also needs to be a careful discernment of the desire that underlies the inclination to sin and with this a corresponding discernment of how infused virtue can help to re-order that desire to the good.

This thesis has concentrated on the theological argument that St Thomas’ teaching offers a way forward for seminary formation. Another way to consider the significance of its findings is to indicate other major questions to be investigated in relation to the research undertaken in this work. One worthwhile line of future enquiry would be to review the current affective formation programs of various Catholic seminaries in light of the work of this thesis.

Also, while this present discussion has mainly concentrated on the formation of the seminarian, there is a case for a study of how formators are to be formed. After all, formators are given a vital task to shape the affective maturity of the coming generations of priests in respect of their pastoral service to many thousands of people. How can they be encouraged to acquire a greater wisdom about affectivity, communicate this wisdom to seminarians, and be guided by it in their assessment of the suitability of candidates for ordination to the priesthood? Research into that particular area, based on the findings of this thesis, would be a worthwhile undertaking.

Indeed, St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity could be adapted and used as a basic program of assessment and guidance for the decisions that formators need to make. If the candidate cannot articulate his affective experiences, for example, and manifest that he is capable of shaping them according to the virtues, his suitability for ordination ought to be questioned. For, a lack of affective awareness and wisdom about his personal relationships predisposes the candidate to act according to his unformed affective impulses. Therefore, he is in need of a detailed teaching, like that provided in this thesis, to help him become more acutely aware of his desires and how to properly form them.

After all this, it should be emphasized that the seminarian should be formed in the affective maturity proper to every human being because the future priest should have the same level of affective maturity as anyone else entrusted with the welfare of others. Moreover, the seminarian has a right to an education which enables him to develop his ability to conduct truly fulfilling personal relationships. To do this he needs to understand his affective needs, and how to express them properly for his own good, the good of his friends, and the good of those who are entrusted to his pastoral care. The mature man is the one who is far more capable of positively contributing
to the lives of others. This is the need that formators and seminarians alike can fruitfully reflect upon systematically, in light of the best that the great saints and theologians have to offer. This is not to preclude the knowledge that can be gleaned from other studies. At the same time, it does affirm the need to listen carefully to the witness of Christian experience about the development of our humanity.

This thesis has not discussed the kind of resistance that its conclusions and recommendations may encounter from formators and seminarians. I suggest that principally there could be two reasons for this resistance. The first is on account of the busy nature of the seminary timetable. The sheer volume of studies and pastoral experiences the seminarian must complete could lead seminary formators to avoid providing seminarians with a sustained study of affectivity. This tendency could be exacerbated by a view that the writings of St Thomas are old and outdated on matters of affectivity and personal relationships. The aim of this thesis has been to show that much of St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity are still helpful for a sound understanding of affective maturity and are apt to be developed in the service of the seminarian’s affective formation. This does not prevent the application of knowledge and approaches from other authors in psychology, philosophy and theology, which can help to further the seminarian’s affective formation. In fact, given St Thomas’ example of seeking to derive the truth from wherever it may be found and apply it to Christian life, seminary formators ought to complement St Thomas’ reflections on affectivity with the best that has been discovered, thought and written.

The second reason could concern the formative influences that have shaped the formator’s and the seminarian’s view of affectivity prior to seminary formation. Depending on family and cultural background or personal temperament and habitual inclination, there can be a lack of proper appreciation of the critical importance of the affective life and its development. For example, trite phrases such as - “Do not follow your feelings” - can reveal an impoverished understanding of the affective life without reference to its proper development. Such unreflective statements fail to help the seminarian to accurately articulate his various emotional needs and their motivating power to do both good and evil. As an unarticulated view of affectivity it does not enable the seminarian to distinguish authentic affective development from its distortions. The discussion of St Thomas’ analysis of affectivity in this thesis has been undertaken to provide an articulate view of affectivity that is orientated to a life of virtue. It enables the seminarian to reflect wisely on the proper
development of his affective life and his personal relationships. Yet it also gives him realistic reference points about the avoidance of what is destructive of authentic affective personal and relational experience.

The argument unfolded in this thesis shows that there is much in St Thomas’ teaching that is perennially relevant to the understanding of affective maturity and how it is integral to a truly Christian and priestly life. St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity focuses upon the humanity of Christ as a model of affective maturity, the healthy development of emotionality in the human heart, and its virtuous expression in human relationships. It thus challenges formators and seminarians to reflect deeply on the crucial importance of affective maturity and how they can attain a truly human and Christ-like affective maturity in the service of others.

It is fitting to bring these reflections to a close by relating the findings of this thesis to the pastoral competence of the future priest in light of Amoris Laetitia, Pope Francis’ post-synodal apostolic exhortation on love in the family (2016). This document gives the future priest a teaching on the goodness of sexuality, marriage and family life. It challenges priests to be aware of the way that pastoral needs of parishioners are inseparable from the affective dimensions of human life. The question might be asked: how does St Thomas’ teaching on affectivity assist the seminarian to help those who are either preparing for marriage or are trying to live a married life? Two virtuous characteristics spring to mind from what we have considered in the course of this work. Prudence directs the priest to do more than know how to explain Church teaching. He must also judge when to explain Church teaching, taking into account the present emotional preparedness of the couple before him. Compassion, further to this, inclines him to understand the true suffering of a person who has been abandoned by a spouse and the difficulty he or she must endure on account of so great an injustice. Such compassion enables the priest to support such people in their time of pain.

Moreover, St Thomas’ teaching on the goodness of sexuality, as an emotional capacity for union with one’s spouse and the joy of a truly loving expression of sexual union, offers another dimension of response, not only to Pope St John Paul II’s call for affective maturity, but also Pope Francis’ admonishment toward authentic pastoral care. The seminarian can learn to present the beauty of sexual integrity and how chastity enables people to truly build loving and faithful relationships. With this comes the divine aid of infused grace, which can form in the hearts of those who struggle with sexual temptation a confidence in God’s help to live chastely.
All the virtues spoken of here and in various parts of this thesis are not only to be communicated to those the priest teaches, guides, and supports. They are virtues that help the seminarian to become a priest who will be capable of forming prudent judgments while at the same time relating to others in a truly helpful and warm-hearted manner. They enable the future priest to draw others, through his genuine charity and affection for them, into friendship with Christ by imitating his love as the Good Shepherd, loving them with all the affective richness, and with all the commitment, of a truly mature human heart.
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