Between forum and tower: The sources of political judgement in the leadership of Pope John Paul II

Cormac McCaughan

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Between Forum and Tower:  
The Sources of Political Judgment in the  
Leadership of Pope John Paul II  

Cormac McCaughan  

A thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of  
Master of Philosophy  

School of Philosophy and Theology  
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Thesis Abstract

According to Mary Ann Glendon, scholars and statespersons have often grappled with a tension of pursuing their political ideals within practical realities. In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon examines how the political judgments of prominent public figures illuminates how conceptions of political ends inform, or do not inform, those decisions. This thesis draws from contemporary debates on Aristotle’s *phronesis* to explore how political actors deliberate between acting with integrity and compromising their political ideals. It develops a theoretical framework to examine the sources of political judgment in the leadership of Pope John Paul II towards Communist authority in Poland. The research proposes that John Paul II’s moral diplomacy draws from his political aim to expand the peoples’ participation in Poland’s political culture and economic structure. His decisions served as a “catalyst” for the Solidarity movement, which ultimately helped secure his political aims. However, external pressures on the Communist Government make it difficult to determine the extent to which John Paul II is “practically wise” in this context.

Introduction

“What can be more glorious,” [Cicero] asked, “than the conjunction of practical experience in great affairs of state, with the knowledge of these arts acquired through study and learning?”

This thesis examines how Pope John Paul II’s political thought informs his decisions to influence the Polish Communist government between 1978 and 1989. It argues that the Pontiff’s philosophical formation under totalitarian regimes helped shape his view that participation in political, economic and social activities constitute basic human rights. As the first Polish Pope in the history of the Catholic Church, John Paul II combined the conventional diplomatic and moral authority of the papacy with knowledge and reflection gained through his own experiences of totalitarian regimes, to influence events leading to the collapse of the Polish Communist government in 1989. The project argues that his political philosophy and

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the Polish context of that period directly informed his political strategy to encourage the Polish government to increase its citizens’ political, social and economic freedoms, while advocating nonviolent political organisation. Thus, it studies how John Paul II, as a philosopher, makes political decisions as a statesperson.

The thesis examines and then adopts Mary Ann Glendon’s main question in her work, *The Forum and The Tower*² about whether it is possible to be politically effective without compromising too much on principles. In order to do so, it develops Glendon’s method into a theoretical framework, so as to understand the ways that Pope John Paul II brought together his work in the *tower* (his thought about the aims of politics) with his activity in the *forum* (his political strategy towards Poland in that period). Glendon observes that the kinds of persons who ponder her question, among them students in the disciplines of philosophy and law,³ are concerned that politics often requires compromise on personal principles in order to gain, or retain, some degree of political influence. Glendon recognises that pursuing political goals as a political actor is difficult and imprecise. It requires skills to deliberate when, how, and to what extent one should advance a particular goal without damaging one’s effectiveness in the long-term. Glendon offers Weber’s view that if a political actor focusses “too narrowly” on the “ultimate good, the goals may be damaged and discredited for generations, because responsibility for consequences is lacking.”⁴ At the same time, if a political actor focusses too narrowly on immediate success at the expense of political principles, the person’s political aims become undermined.

The thesis proposes to make two contributions to knowledge. Firstly, it provides an original analysis of Glendon’s methodology in *The Forum and The Tower* and develops a

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³ Ibid., ix.
framework applicable to new contexts. Second, it applies the developed framework to a figure appropriate to Glendon’s question, namely John Paul II, to understand his method of political judgment. It consists of four chapters. Chapter One and Chapter Two adapt and develop Glendon’s method to focus on the relationship between political theory and political judgment. Thus established, Chapter Three and Chapter Four apply the method to John Paul II so as to examine the extent to which John Paul II retains his political thought in his methods and strategies to influence Polish politics. It highlights the process of deliberation where John Paul II considers the short-term advantages of compromising on his political views, versus the merits of, as Weigel puts it, “thinking long-term” by not sacrificing “core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”

The framework also considers the extent to which John Paul II’s decisions contributed to the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989.

To construct the methodology, the research project makes the dimensions of Glendon’s framework more explicit, which in turn makes possible an application to future case studies beyond the present subject. Pursuing this point, Chapter One outlines Glendon’s project in *The Forum and The Tower*. It proposes that Aristotelian virtue ethics help understand concepts central to *The Forum and The Tower*. Glendon employs classical concepts in Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics* to frame her analysis. Contemporary debates on Aristotle’s concept of *eudaimonia* (happiness) and *phronesis* (or practical wisdom), aid a conceptual understanding of what

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7 Definitions and arguments on *phronesis* will be drawn from: Eugene Garver, ‘After “Virtu”: Rhetoric, Prudence and Moral Pluralism in Machiavelli’, *History of Political Thought* 17, no. 2 (1996); Eugene Garver, *Confronting Aristotle's Ethics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014);
constitutes a life of philosophy (the tower), and what constitutes a life of politics (the forum). Glendon highlights the importance of the classical passions thymos (spiritedness) and eros (love) as non-rational forces that explain the desire to hold theory and practice with integrity.

These debates reveal a lack of consensus over whether Aristotle believed the best kind of life was one of theoria (contemplation) as the best and most self-fulfilling activity, or a combination of the moral virtues, best fulfilled in the life of the statesman. The lack of consensus among scholars provides contextual grounding for Glendon’s claim that scholars can deliberate “endlessly” about the “advantages and disadvantages” of a particular course of action, but it is statespersons who must “make decisions, and take responsibility for them.” Therefore, Glendon’s framework studies how political thought (in the tower) informs, or is compromised, in political action (in the forum).

Copleston’s explanation of Aristotelian virtue as a “double position” of mean and excellence, shows that sound political judgment requires a synthesis of political ends with a sound understanding and judgment of what means are most likely to contribute towards their success. The virtuous statesperson aims towards the right “ends” through deliberating about what “means” will succeed. Political judgments that fail to adapt the means to the practical


Glendon does not reference which scholars have deliberated this topic, and as such necessitates that the thesis examine contemporary discussions within Aristotelian virtue ethics to test the soundness of this claim.


realities of the political context are excessive, and constitute a vice in relation to practical wisdom. At the other extreme, decisions that focus only on the present conditions and ignore the pursuit of political ends, is another form of excess, and is also a vice in relation to practical wisdom. In Glendon’s view, Edmund Burke and Cicero are examples of the wise statesperson. They combine a “mastery of philosophy” with experience in “managing great affairs.”¹¹ This explanation demonstrates that Glendon’s view of sound political judgment, what can be aligned with _phronesis_ – or practical wisdom – is Aristotelian. Thus, it is presently argued that scholarly perspectives on Aristotelian virtue ethics, particularly practical wisdom, enable an original analysis of Glendon’s understanding of political judgment in _The Forum and The Tower_.

Chapter Two develops Glendon’s analysis into a theoretical framework that is applicable to new contexts. Drawing from the explanation of virtue in Chapter One, it shows that the statesperson able to retain moral integrity and be successful in those aims is “practically wise”. The practically wise person must deliberate what means best serve the political aims. Following Copleston, sometimes the right action involves an “excess” rather than a “defect”, while in other cases the reverse may be preferable.¹² Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends.

Additional to Glendon’s terminology, concepts from Maritain’s essay “The End of Machiavellianism” help identify excessive forms of political judgment, which, Maritain argues, constitute vices.¹³ Practical wisdom is understood as both a mean point between what Maritain calls “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other.¹⁴ These terms are employed in the present thesis to highlight how political actors in _The Forum_

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¹⁴ Ibid., 62–64
and The Tower engage in a moral process of deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. Such decisions involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”

Building on Glendon and Maritain, Hartmann’s graph of virtue is adapted to establish a new graph of phronesis, or practical wisdom. The graph helps explain how the practically wise person aims at the mean between excessive forms of what contemporary scholars of phronesis call “political judgment”. It is the visual result of the conceptual integration of The Forum and The Tower and “The End of Machiavellianism”. Accordingly, the graph is employed heuristically as a visual aid throughout the discussion, providing the reader with a reference point that captures the distinctive elements of political judgment being examined.

The current analysis is limited to how perspectives of political ends inform, or do not inform, political decision-making. Other insights are not considered, such as how one’s political legacy can change over time. Political thought, in the form of published works, can also shape future political events. For example, Glendon credits Locke’s political philosophy with fundamentally shaping the modern American legal and political system, and so in that sense they can be considered as works from the tower that have practical impact in the forum. Aspects of Glendon’s framework in addition to the above are thus excluded from the current research project.

Applying an adapted Glendon framework as described above fills a gap existing in research about the thought and political legacy of Pope John Paul II. Specifically, the framework synthesises studies of John Paul II’s ethical and political thought with analyses of his political decisions and contributions to the collapse of communism in Poland. Chapter

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15 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 38
Three primarily engages Gregg, Buttiglione and Barrett, who offer comprehensive studies of Karol Wojtyla’s John Paul II’s ethical and political thought. These studies argue that John Paul II has an intense interest in the fundamental dignity of the human person. His philosophical thought is built around his analysis of the person as an irreducible subject. These thinkers argue that his philosophical thought guides his views of political ends. In particular, John Paul II advocates that all persons have a fundamental right to have their dignity recognised through participation in the dynamic social, economic and political aspects of their community. These rights include the right to work and have a sense of ownership of work, to participate in the determination of the political and economic system in which they live, to exercise freedom of worship and association of groups without government oversight, and to act in accordance with their conscience. Buttiglione also suggests that John Paul II’s experience of totalitarian governments in Poland shaped the intensity of his interest in individual rights as the manifestation of fundamental human dignity.

Within the understanding of John Paul II’s political convictions, Chapter Four analyses his political decisions to influence the circumstances of his home country of Poland. The chapter follows Troy, Marshall and Hall’s characterisation of papal political influence as

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22 Ibid., 50, 60–62.
“hybrid”, where the Pope is both the Holy See’s “chief diplomat and moral authority”. This agency enables John Paul II to make more direct public pronouncements than would have been possible as a priest under Communist oversight. Weigel, Luxmoore and Babiuch, and Gaddis argue John Paul II’s engagement with Poland contributed to the Communist government’s decision to allow free elections in June, 1989. This event marks the start of its transition from a communist political and economic system, to a liberal democratic political system, and an open market economy. John Paul II can be credited as the “catalyst” that inspired the Solidarity movement, which formed one year after his papal pilgrimage to Poland in 1979. He presented the freedom to worship, to form independent unions, to participate in the economic and political system through democratic elections, among other freedoms, as basic human rights. The Solidarity movement drew from his public message to secure these rights in the form of the first independent trade union under the communist government in Poland. Solidarity and the Polish Catholic Church provided the organisational support that sustained and developed growing national opposition to the communist political and economic system. By 1989, the Polish government recognised Solidarity had become “a decisive factor on the political scene” and that it required Solidarity’s support for any legal act to be effective.

Synthesizing analyses of John Paul II’s political thought and political action demonstrates how his political decisions draw from his political philosophy. This suggests that John Paul II makes political judgments in a way that is consistent with his view of political ends. Further, it shows how Karol Wojtyla’s formation under totalitarian systems shaped his cautious and moderated approach to critiquing the communist system. This view follows Weigel’s insight in his essay, “Lessons in Statecraft”, which argues that John Paul II prioritised his long-term aim of political autonomy for the Polish people over short-term success. The current research project draws from secondary literature to show how this strategy took form in the Pope’s public demand that the state uphold basic human rights. John Paul II encouraged nonviolent political resistance, and shifted Vatican foreign policy – called the *ostpolitik* (Eastern politics) – from accommodating government policies he disagreed with, to arguing for new policies that upheld basic human rights. Glendon’s framework emphasises that the decisions of scholars and statespersons show how ideas about the ends of politics (the *tower*) can shape individual efforts at political influence (in the *forum*). Applied to John Paul II, it therefore demonstrates he is a political actor who gives preference to long-term aims and political integrity over compromise for immediate political advantages.

Glendon’s audience – the aspirant statesperson – is also interested in political success whilst retaining moral integrity. The thesis therefore also considers the extent to which John Paul II’s decisions contributed to the collapse of the communist government. At the time of his election to the papacy in 1978, over 90% of Poland’s population adhered to the Roman Catholic faith, and the Catholic Church wielded considerable political authority in Poland.

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time, low wage growth and rising food prices, coupled with increasing government debt to finance expenditure, stagnated the Polish economy. The Soviet Union’s abandonment of its direct military intervention policy, under Gorbachev, also increased the Polish people’s confidence to organise mass political opposition. These factors contributed to what Glendon describes as the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and luck”, which facilitated the effectiveness of John Paul II’s political strategy.

The scope of analysis is also limited to the Polish context under communism. It excludes arguments that link the collapse of communism in Poland with the collapse of the entire Soviet Union. Some commentators take a linear approach to the events between 1989-1991, extrapolating a kind of domino effect where Poland caused the collapse of the entire Soviet Union. The literature is not settled on this issue, as scholars argue this is an overly simplistic analysis. Therefore, the present thesis limits the area of analysis to the Polish context during John Paul II’s papacy – between 1978-1989 – and does not engage the contested literature on the links between the revolution of 1989 in Poland and the rest of the Soviet Union.

38 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xii.
Chapter One

Introduction

Mary Ann Glendon’s *The Forum and The Tower* examines the lives and decisions of prominent scholars and statespersons who “grappled with tensions between political ideals and practical realities.”\(^{41}\) This chapter aims to show that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics help understand Mary Ann Glendon’s thought about the relationship between political theory and political practice, outlined in *The Forum and The Tower*. The aim of the chapter is to contextualise Glendon’s project within contemporary discussions of Aristotle’s *Ethics* and *Politics*.\(^{42}\)

This chapter considers Aristotle’s account of virtue, in particular as to how virtue applies to Aristotle’s claim in the *Politics* that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue” are “philosophy” and “politics”.\(^{43}\) The thesis draws mainly from Copleston’s *A History of Philosophy* to explain how virtue is both a mean point between extremes of action and an excellence towards the good for the individual.\(^{44}\) The chapter aims to show *The Forum and The Tower* draws from Aristotelian concepts to define the life of philosophy and the life of politics, and the intersection between them. The chapter will show that within Aristotelian virtue ethics, philosophy and politics intersect in the moral process of deliberation about how to achieve ends, or goals. Ends will also be defined within Aristotle’s virtue ethics as goods, things toward which persons aim for the sake of the goal,

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\(^{41}\) Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, xii.


and not any other object or aim. Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue, it is possible to discern that, across the examples in The Forum and The Tower, the scholars and politicians deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and “mean” forms of political judgment. An excessive commitment to conceptions of ends is one extreme of political judgment; on the other extreme is an abandonment of moral virtue for the sake of immediate advantages. The present thesis will show how Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise man” to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom (EN1106b 36-1107a2).

Section One: An Overview of The Forum and The Tower

In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon presents a vocational dilemma that several of her students come to her with: is politics such a dirty business, that if I entered I would lose my moral compass? Glendon lists the kinds of questions men and women interested in public service grapple with in the face of this tension,

How should one comport himself or herself as a member of a regime that may be far from being even second best? How much should one compromise for the sake of getting and keeping a position from which one might be able to influence the course of events? How much should one compromise for the sake of achieving a higher political goal? Are private morality and public morality distinct, and if so, what principles should govern political action?  

46 Aristotle’s account of virtue comes from the Greek arête, which is often also translated as excellence. For Aristotle, virtue is defined as lying in a mean position between prodigality and meanness (NE II.6 1107a1-2). Sorabji explains that the mean position is determined by the person who has “practical wisdom”, as this person knows, through experience and through the orthos logos (the right rule NE II.2 1103b31-34), what action is required in particular instances. Sorabji, “Aristotle on the role of Intellect in Virtue “, 206.
Glendon’s project is to answer these kinds of questions, primarily for those interested in holding “theory and practice together with integrity”.

Glendon proposes that scholars and statespersons have deliberated the same kinds of choices throughout history, making them perennially meaningful and worthy of further analysis. In her words,

“For as long as there have been governments and people to study them, statespersons and scholars have pondered the relative merits of life in the public forum and life in the ivory tower – the different skills required, the temperaments suited for one or the other way of life, and the relationship of the study of politics to its practice.”

Glendon frames the deliberations of scholars and statespersons in *The Forum and The Tower* within the study of governments. Scholars and statespersons, Glendon writes, consider the relationship between the study of politics and the practice of politics. Glendon terms the life dedicated to the study of politics as “life in the ivory tower” and the life dedicated to the practice of politics as “life in the public forum”. The “merits” of each kind of life, the skills and temperaments needed to be successful in each are implicitly not the same. Glendon cites the experiences of the “modern day scholar-statesman”, Henry Kissinger, to illustrate why integrating the life of the mind with the world of action is challenging.

As a professor, I was responsible primarily for coming up with the best answer I could divine. As a policymaker, I was also responsible for the worst that could happen. As a professor, the risk was that the important would drive out the urgent. As a policymaker, the risk was that the urgent would drive out the important.

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48 Ibid., ix
49 Ibid.
Kissinger continues that the political actor “lives in the world of the contingent”, dealing with “partial answers” that “hopefully are on the road to truth.”

Glendon suggests that observing the “wise statesman” is a means to learn how to work within situations such as those Kissinger describes. Glendon describes the ideal statesperson as one who “combines experience” in making sound judgments on “great affairs” with the “mastery of philosophy”. In her view, Cicero personified this ideal, and offers his belief that philosophers should “not stand aloof from the fate of their cities”, but learn how to, as the wise statesman does, “operate within the limits of the possible”.

Thus, *The Forum and The Tower* is a study of how scholars of political theory attempt to influence the politics of their State.

How does Glendon propose to understand the distinction between and intersection of theory and practice to guide the intended audience of *The Forum and the Tower*? Glendon writes a collection of “biographical essays” to explore the lives and decisions of twelve prominent political actors and scholars who face a similar tension to pursue their aspirations to “make a difference”. Within these lives, Glendon’s method focuses on how the aspiration to “make a difference” manifests itself in the decision-making process. In particular, Glendon identifies instances where the life of the mind – the “tower” – and the life of political action – the “forum” – intersect. Her method aims at identifying these moments of political judgment in varying political circumstances to determine how conclusions from the study of politics inform political decisions. Each person deliberates whether the circumstances in the present
moment are favourable to the pursuit of conceived political aims, or are so unfavourable, that, as Glendon quotes Plato, the only reasonable course of action is to “keep silent and offer up prayers for one’s own welfare and for that of one’s country”.  

**Thymos and Eros**

On what basis does Glendon believe that the political theorist desires to influence the course of political events? Glendon suggests that political theorists can possess a desire to “make a difference”. For example, Glendon states that Cicero thought the life of public service was “the course that has always been followed by the best men”, and that “brave and high-minded” persons have no stronger reason for entering politics than a “determination not to give in to the wicked, and not allow the state to be torn apart by such people.” Sometimes, Glendon states, scholars can possess a desire to influence governments with greater emphasis on their own political thought as advisers to rulers. Plato is such an example, in Glendon’s view. Plato, though a distinguished scholar by age forty, believed that he had to be involved in the decisions of governments lest he “might someday appear to be a mere man of words, one who would never of his own will lay his hand to any act”. Glendon suggests that the experiences of prominent scholars and statespersons show that desires for a certain kind of life do influence the process of deliberation.

Abizadeh explains there are rational and non-rational forces, or “passions”, that drive the wise statesperson, which are fundamental to making choices (*prohairesis*). Glendon’s framework uses rational and non-rational concepts to suggest that the content of a scholar’s

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57 Ibid., 7.
58 Ibid., 6.
59 Plato, ‘Seventh Letter’, in Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, 4. On the other hand, John Locke, observes Glendon, was “quite content” to live his life as a scholar at Oxford. However, by his mid-thirties, chance encounters with prominent politicians had brought him to a kind of influence as an adviser to governments to which “Plato had aspired in vain”.
political aims are shaped by both “reason and passion”; she explicitly uses thymos and eros, which she simply defines as a “spiritedness” and the “love of fame” that are the “ruling passion of the noblest minds.” Such passions, Glendon argues, drove some of the figures she profiles “to pursue a life in the public forum”; while others placed the quest for knowledge at the centre of their energies.

Glendon offers little to explain what role thymos and eros play in her method. However, scholarly considerations of these concepts shows that integrating political thought with political action is desirable; and this does seem to be the sense in which Glendon offers these concepts. That is, Glendon employs eros and thymos as manifestations of the desire for a holistic approach to ethics and the realisation of conclusions of ethics in the political life.

To understand how this is the case, Cooper explains both thymos and eros are major psychic forces within the soul. They are also complex and ambiguous, and he treats them separately in his essay, “Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of the Republic”. Cooper situates these concepts within Plato’s account of the soul, which consists of three parts – the rational, the spirited, and the desiring. Each part of the soul can be considered a “faction”, which creates a contest between factions for dominance. This contest is analogous to life in the polity. Like the city, the soul is subject to faction, each part clashing, causing harm and ill harmony when it is not resolved. The proper way to understand the soul is not of different parts pulling in different directions, but rather a contest for the same end:

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62 Ibid., 3
63 Ibid.
65 The concept of “soul” (psyche) is developed by Plato’s psychology in Book IV of the *Republic*. Socrates breaks the soul into three parts: the rational, the spirited, and the desiring parts. This structure enables a treatment of the soul as having respective parts that perform clearly assigned functions. See Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 341–342.
Thus, a different part of the soul can be dominant in directing the will towards a certain kind of action.

Cooper’s distinction between two kinds of eros is helpful to understand Glendon’s use of it in *The Forum and the Tower*. Cooper suggests there is a “higher, nobler” form and lower, “base” form of eros - the eros of the philosopher and the eros of the tyrant. These two types are the most opposite, in terms of the ruling parts. The philosopher is ruled by a well-developed intellectual part, and the tyrant of the lowest kind of desires. They are each united, however, by a shared desire: eros. The tyrant’s eros is a love of base desires and raw appetites. This eros directs the tyrant towards pursuing the passions that reside within the desiring part of the soul. Conversely, the philosopher’s eros is a love of wisdom. The philosopher is driven towards wisdom, loving whole classes of things and “desiring wisdom.” Santas describes the feeling of eros as the “sense of… radical incompleteness and… longing for wholeness.” Howland adds that “Eros is definitive of the human condition: it is not a specific, discrete desire of a part of the soul or body, like thirst, but a mysterious longing of body and soul as a whole for whatever it is that will provide us with a comprehensive satisfaction.”

That the satisfaction aimed for be “comprehensive” is an important aspect of eros. Howland defines the aim of eros as “a kind of wholeness or unity.” The person with eros thus “senses” that the object of their desire will provide “comprehensive satisfaction.” Such a love is most proper to the life of the philosopher. Cooper explains that, “The culmination of eros is in the love of the Good… which manifests itself in the practice of philosophy.”

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66 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 345  
67 Ibid., 348  
68 Ibid.  
71 Howland, *The Republic*, 38–9  
72 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 367
With the fullest form of *eros*, the philosopher desires what is total and comprehensive, which can only be through the practice of philosophy. The present thesis suggests that Glendon employs the noble, or holistic understanding of *eros*. Glendon suggests this force is that which drives the person towards pursuing the life of the philosopher, which has as its aim the pursuit of the “highest ideals”. The present thesis will explain in the following section how *eros* is paired with Aristotle’s statements in *NE X6-8* that *theoria* – the activity of contemplation found in the life of the philosopher – is the “best and most complete” act. This pairing is significant for Glendon’s project because the theorist aims to work out what the best kind of life is, and thereby work out the human good for their State. Glendon’s use of *thymos* shows that the scholar will desire these conclusions about the human good to have political effect.

Strauss identifies *thymos* as *the* political passion. Zuckert explains that this spiritedness can be aroused by a range of slights or insults. It has many manifestations, the most common of which is anger. What causes *thymos*? Cooper states that *thymos* is aroused when *eros* is thwarted. That is, when the soul is prevented from attaining what it desires, a raging anger arises that drives the person to rectify the wrong. This raging is *thymos*. Thus, “*thymos* is born of and for the sake of *eros*”, and *thymos* can be understood as born of a kind of war, and aims at victory (success).

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73 Glendon, *The Forum and The Tower*, 72–3, 160. Glendon explains that, in the life of Alexis De Tocqueville, his passion for the highest ideals is evident in his work *Democracy in America*, where he draws stark contrast between what he perceived as the American passion for commerce and the more noble, European aim of enlightened thinking.  
78 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 366.  
79 Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 367.
Relevant to Glendon’s project is Cooper’s claim that *thymos* manifests itself in the political life when the noble form of *eros* is denied. *Thymos* becomes a desire to act in the affairs of the State when the lover of wisdom, i.e. the philosopher, sees their conceptions of the good “thwarted” in the management of the State.\textsuperscript{80} Cooper argues that all persons know “something” of what victory and honour are in ordinary achievements, but suggests that the strongest manifestation of *thymos* is connected to when the best kind of *eros*, which must entail the Good, or philosophy, is lacking in the State.\textsuperscript{81} It is the passion which aims to achieve every political good, including order, justice, honour, victory, and like things. *Thymos* can become the “natural ally of reason” in its effort to direct desire towards the right ends.\textsuperscript{82} Thus, the soul that possesses both the *thymotic* and *erotic* passions will not be content to “stand aloof from the fate of their cities” (the State), and aim at the highest political ideals.\textsuperscript{83}

Glendon recognises that either *thymos* or *eros* can dominate as a motivating force in the soul, which affects the political decisions of the scholar.\textsuperscript{84} In Glendon’s view, De Tocqueville’s experience illustrates how *thymos* directs decision-making. Tocqueville was an esteemed scholar, producing *Democracy in America* in 1835, which became an instant bestseller.\textsuperscript{85} Despite his eminence as a theorist, Tocqueville confided that he desired political success above all things. She quotes him, saying: “Do not believe that I have a blind enthusiasm, or indeed

\textsuperscript{80} Thomas Pangle, *The Rebirth of Classical Political Realism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss*, 165–66. Anger itself has many manifestations, however Strauss explains that its most noble expression stems from the “most noble indignation about injustice, turpitude and meanness…”

\textsuperscript{81} Cooper, ‘Beyond the Tripartite Soul’, 368

\textsuperscript{82} Pangle, *The Rebirth of Classical Political Realism: An Introduction to the Thought of Leo Strauss*, 165–66

\textsuperscript{83} Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, xi

\textsuperscript{84} Seth Bernadete advises *thymos*, like *eros*, has a base manifestation. Like *eros*, *thymos* can be corrupted by bad rearing. *Thymos* can direct desire to achieve the greatest good, if the person has been educated well. If not, it can “run rampant” in subservience to lawless desire. See Seth Bernadete, *Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989), 55.

\textsuperscript{85} Glendon, *The Form and the Tower*, 152
any kind of enthusiasm for the intellectual life. I have always placed the life of action above everything else.”

Glendon cites a passage from Tocqueville’s biographer, Andre Jardin, who states that Tocqueville “could not conceive of fulfilling his personal destiny in any other way than by active participation in political life.” At the same time, observes Glendon, though he was convinced that “politics was his destiny”, he was, in Glendon’s view, “poorly suited by talent and temperament for a political vocation.” De Tocqueville possessed a “fiercely independent streak” that caused him to isolate himself politically from major political factions, which ultimately left him largely politically marginalised throughout his twelve years in the French Chamber of Deputies. In light of these experiences, Glendon offers Weber’s perspective, that: “The qualities that make an excellent scholar and academic are not the qualities that make him a leader to give directions in practical life, or, more specifically, in politics.”

On the other hand, Glendon also argues that skilful political judgment absent of eros causes a mode of decision-making that disregards the aims of philosophy. Machiavelli exemplifies, in Glendon’s framework, the political actor who prioritises immediate advantages over the pursuit of “higher ideals”. Machiavelli devised a method of political action that focused on outcomes, particularly securing power and influence, rather than consistently acting upon, and aiming towards, “higher ideals”. His method, writes Glendon, all but abandoned a concept of political judgment oriented towards retaining moral integrity. This evidences a lack of eros, in that integrated, holistic sense that Glendon seems to have in mind, in Machiavelli. As such, the example of Machiavelli’s decision-making suggests an approach opposite to Plato and De Tocqueville: a rejection of the insights of scholarship, in favour of political expediency.

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86 Ibid.
87 Ibid., 153
88 Ibid., 160.
89 Ibid., 5
90 Ibid., 77
91 Ibid., 79
Glendon observes that it is only rarely that the right combination of thymos and eros enable the ideal statesperson to emerge. However, she believes Cicero and Edmund Burke are two such examples where the skills of the politician and the wisdom of the philosopher are found in the same person.  

It is only rarely that thymos and eros of the mind are as felicitously combined as they were in Cicero and Burke. Some [in The Forum and The Tower] opted early for philosophy or statesmanship and seldom looked back. Others… were tugged in many directions.  

Cicero’s belief expresses that thymos and eros are manifested in the ideal statesman, who combines excellence in practical decision-making with a deep understanding of philosophy.

What can be more glorious, than the conjunction of practical experience in the great affairs of state, with the knowledge of these arts acquired through study and learning?... the person who has had the will and the capacity to acquire both – that is, ancestral institutions and philosophical learning – is the one who I think has done everything deserving of praise.

Cicero and Burke’s legacies, notes Glendon, are among the few in history where each are noted for contributions to political theory as well as for distinguished public service. Indeed, she draws a sports analogy between them and an athlete who has represented at the highest level in “both major leagues”. Therefore, it is Glendon’s view that, across the examples in The Forum and The Tower, scholars aim at working out the human good through philosophy, and can be drawn into the political life. The ideal statesperson, the kind of person Glendon’s

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92 Ibid., xi.
93 Ibid., 7
94 Ibid., 222
student desires to emulate, will be one who, like Cicero, combines political experience with a mastery of philosophy.

Part of the skill of operating within the “limits of the possible,” is the political environment of the State. Unfavourable political conditions provide tension between the scholar’s “political ideals” and “practical realities”. Indeed, Glendon believes that the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck” are repeatedly “elusive”. For this reason, this optimal confluence requires more than just a proper balance of thymos and eros, but also the skills of deliberation, and knowledge of the right ends of politics. Scholars must learn how to deliberate when the time is right to “speak [the] truth (of one’s convictions) to power” and when it is better to “speak the truth with measure” as part of a “prudent accommodation” to gain or retain, a position of influence.96

To understand how Glendon uses the relationship between political thought and political action, the present thesis asks, how does Aristotle’s concept of virtue manifest itself in the deliberations of the examples in The Forum and The Tower? The following section aims to show how Aristotle’s virtue ethics can help understand the concepts Glendon employs in The Forum and The Tower. Contemporary debates on Aristotle’s view of the best kind of life helps contextualise Glendon’s thought about the pursuit of philosophy and politics.

Section Two: Understanding Glendon’s Project through Aristotle

The present thesis employs Aristotelian virtue ethics to understand The Forum and The Tower because Glendon states her method follows Aristotle’s Ethics.97 Aristotelian influence can be found in multiple instances in The Forum and The Tower, particularly when considering

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96 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xiii.
97 Author’s correspondence with Mary Ann Glendon, February 10, 2017.
his view that effective statesmanship requires virtue.\textsuperscript{98} Glendon employs Aristotle’s observation that a tension exists between political decision-making and a desired political aim because leaders have to act, and often with only partial information. Decisions must be made sometimes without the benefit of a symmetry between one’s principles and actions likely to succeed, when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”\textsuperscript{99} Such circumstances, Aristotle observes, drive virtuous men and women away from politics and government because of the fear of corrupting their moral character.\textsuperscript{100} However, these persons remain intensely interested in perennial political arguments – arguments about “human nature, reason and passion, tradition and innovation, liberty and law.”\textsuperscript{101} Glendon suggests Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics} as a conceptual lens through which to understand the desire to hold theory and practice together with integrity. Glendon quotes from Aristotle’s \textit{Politics} as the opening to \textit{The Forum and The Tower},

There is a dispute among those who agree that the most choiceworthy life is that accompanied by virtue as to whether the political and active way of life is choiceworthy, or rather that which is divorced from all external things – that involving some sort of study, for example – which some assert is the only philosophic way of life. For it is evident that these two ways of life are the ones intentionally chosen by those human beings who are most ambitious with a view to virtue, both in former times and at the present; the two I mean are the political and the philosophic.\textsuperscript{102}

The two ways of life chosen by “human beings who are most ambitious with a view to virtue” are the path of either study (called the philosophic way of life) or the political, active

\textsuperscript{99} Glendon, \textit{The Forum and the Tower}, 38.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid., 79.
\textsuperscript{101} Ibid., xiii.
\textsuperscript{102} Ibid., vi.
way of life. As the previous section has shown, Glendon’s framework highlights interior passions of *eros* and *thymos*. Glendon uses a holistic view of *eros* as a passion that directs the person towards the life of the philosopher, and *thymos* as the passion that directs the philosopher towards political action.\(^{103}\) Thus, the passions Glendon uses in *The Forum and The Tower* are consistent with Aristotle’s perspective that the best kind of life is either philosophy, or the political life. Therefore, Aristotle is employed as a starting point to understand how different scholars and statespersons deliberate the merits of each kind of life – philosophy and politics – to their goal of making a difference. The present thesis turns to Aristotle’s view of “virtue” as a concept that can merge the aims of philosophy and politics in the process of deliberation in Glendon’s framework.

**Understanding Aristotle’s Virtue: Mean and Excellence**

Aristotle defines virtue as a “disposition to choose, consisting essentially in a mean relatively to us determined by a rule, i.e. the rule by which a practically wise person would determine it” (*EN*1106b 36-1107a2). The person who has “practical wisdom” knows, through experience and through the *orthos logos* (the right rule *NE* II.2 1103b31-34), what action is required in particular instances.\(^{104}\) In the *Nichomachean Ethics*, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of virtue – intellectual virtue, and character (or moral) virtue (*ethike arête*).\(^{105}\) Intellectual virtues are of the “rational part of the soul”, while character virtues are of the non-rational part of the soul (though this does not mean “irrational”, as this part is still responsive to reason).\(^{106}\)

Intellectual virtues aim at truth as its object, for its own sake, while character virtue aims at

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\(^{103}\) Ibid., 3, 7, 79.


\(^{106}\) Ursula Coope, ‘Why Does Aristotle Think that Ethical Virtue is Required for Practical Wisdom?’, *Phronesis* 57, no. 2 (2012): 142-163.
truth, not for its own sake, but for practical purposes.\textsuperscript{107} The practical nature of the moral virtues are most relevant to Glendon’s project. Glendon wants to know how to influence the public sphere in light of reflections on the human good. Copleston explains that Aristotle’s \textit{Ethics} and \textit{Politics} are each concerned with the human good. In the \textit{Ethics}, Aristotle considers what human activities are constitutive of a “good life”, and indeed whether there is such a thing as \textit{the} good kind of life. In the \textit{Politics}, Aristotle asserts that the task of political science is to work out the human good, and that the individual and the State have the same good.\textsuperscript{108} Copleston states,

Ethics, then, are regarded by Aristotle as a branch of political or social science: we might say that he treats first of individual ethical science and secondly of political ethical science, in the \textit{Politics}.\textsuperscript{109}

Copleston continues that one learns about how to be virtuous through observing the moral judgments of the person “who was generally looked upon as good and virtuous”. Moss explains that Aristotle defines virtue as “prohairetic”, which is itself a state of “issuing decisions.” Virtue is that which makes decisions right.\textsuperscript{110} Thus, virtue is learned through observing the decisions of the one generally looked upon as virtuous.\textsuperscript{111} This kind of moral learning is evident in Glendon’s project. The aim of \textit{The Forum and The Tower} is to observe the decisions, particularly the moral judgments, of those considered able to make judgments well. Understanding how to identify what the right judgments are of the virtuous person is thus fundamental to Glendon’s approach.

Copleston argues that Aristotle’s account of virtue has a “double position”. In the “ontological dimension” virtue is a mean; in the “axiological dimension” virtue is an

\textsuperscript{107} Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 328–9.
\textsuperscript{108} Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 332.
\textsuperscript{109} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 211-12. Moss points out that children learn to be virtuous from their parents as their first examples of moral virtue.
excellence. In the ontological dimension, good actions have an order or proportion, according to Copleston. This proportion is a mean between two extremes, where each extreme is a vice. One extreme is a vice through excess, the other is a vice through deficiency. The mean is the virtue.\footnote{Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 336.} The excess and defect can be in regards to a feeling or an action. For example, with the feeling of anger, it is proportionate to experience a great amount of anger at the sight of the innocent being tortured, while the defect would be apathy towards seeing the torture. In the same vein, it would be an excess to show the same great amount of anger when witnessing torture, as at dropping one’s ice-cream. The mean is thus a proportionate response. Urmson explains,

\begin{quote}
\ldots if a man has excellence of character he likes acting in a proper way, feeling emotions which he can manifest with pleasure, since there is no internal struggle\ldots To have one's emotions and actions in a mean, says Aristotle, is to feel and manifest each emotion when, on what matters, toward such people, for what reasons and in such a manner as is proper.\footnote{James O. Urmson, ‘Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean’, 159.}
\end{quote}

With action, the mean point is determined by the goal. For instance, with the action of giving money, the excess is “prodigality”, which is a vice, and the defect is “illiberality” or “stinginess”, another vice. The mean point is liberality, or generosity – which does not give away too much, to the wrong cause, at the wrong time, nor too little to the right cause. The virtue of generosity is choosing the mean point between excess and deficiency, giving a proportionate amount of money to the right cause.\footnote{Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 336.} Sorabji offers a comparable view of the virtue of generosity to Copleston, noting that \textit{phronesis} enables a person “in the light of his conception of the good life in general,” to discern what act constitutes generosity in a particular
instance. That is, “A picture of the good life will save him from giving away too much, or too little, or to the wrong causes, in particular instances.”

Copleston uses a map, or graph, developed by Hartmann, that can be used to illustrate the relationship between ends and means, or excellence and the mean, in Aristotelian virtue. This relationship will be used to explain how the life of philosophy and the life of political action intersect in Glendon’s framework. This graph is shown in figure 1 below. The “ontological dimension” is represented along the horizontal ‘x’ axis, which forms the base of the semicircular graph. This shows that the extremes of actions are called “excess” and “deficiency”. These are placed at the extreme right and extreme left of the horizontal axis, respectively. The middle point is at the centre of the horizontal axis. Hartmann states that the graph reflects Aristotle’s view that virtue could not be assigned to either the category of “mean” or the category of “excellence”, but to their “synthesis.”

Figure 1: Hartmann’s Graph of Virtue

As Hartmann’s graph illustrates, the centre of the horizontal axis is labelled “badness”, and not “virtue”. Why is it bad that one chooses the middle point between excess and defect –

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115 Sorabji, ‘Aristotle on the Role of Intellect in Virtue’, 206
117 Hartmann, Ethics, 424.
is this not virtue? Copleston explains that virtue is not just a mean, it is also an excellence. For Aristotle, excellence is actions aimed towards the good.\textsuperscript{118} For an act to be virtuous, it is not simply a matter of choosing a “middle road” between two vices. The act itself must aim at something desirable in itself – the good, which makes the action “right”.\textsuperscript{119} That the act aims towards the good elevates the act from a simple “opposition to both vices” as a middle point between them, to a synthesis of making the right choice for the right ends.\textsuperscript{120} At the same time, the mean point is a practical guide that helps set limits on the right proportionate action or feeling in a specific context. As Copleston explains,

\begin{quote}
It is not as though virtue were a composition of vices from a valuational point of view, since, from this point of view, it stands in opposition to both vices; but it is nevertheless a mean from the ontological viewpoint, since it combines in itself both the good points, which, run to excess, constitute vices.\textsuperscript{121}
\end{quote}

Copleston argues the Aristotelian “doctrine of the mean” is not simply “an exaltation of mediocrity” in the moral life.\textsuperscript{122} Urmson concurs, stating the doctrine of the mean is not a fixed rule of moderation in all circumstances.\textsuperscript{123} Simple calculated compromise between vices is a bad outcome, as the graph illustrates. Moral goodness, or virtue, becomes excellent when the right ends are sought.\textsuperscript{124} On the graph, this is reflected in the vertical, or ‘y’ axis. The extent to which one’s actions aims towards the right ends determines the height one reaches on the vertical axis, towards goodness.

The map shows that virtue is a “double position”, as Copleston puts it. In one sense, virtue is a mean point between vices, but it is also an excellence because it aims towards the

\textsuperscript{118} Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 332.
\textsuperscript{120} Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 336.
\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 337.
\textsuperscript{122} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{123} Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, 164–5
\textsuperscript{124} Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 345. Copleston states that a person can only be considered good if the action proceeds from moral choice and is done because (the aim) is good.
good. Goodness can only be attained when one applies both the mean and excellence rules of Aristotelian virtue. “Goodness” is both the highest point of the vertical axis and the middle point of the horizontal axis. This illustrates that virtue is a “synthesis”, in Hartmann’s words, of the right ends and proportionate means.125

The semicircular boundary around each axis completes the graph. The boundary places a limit on the extent that extreme actions or feelings can move towards the right ends. The closer one acts to an extreme on the horizontal axis, the lesser height that action can gain along the vertical axis. Thus, within the virtuous life the person seeks out not only what ends to pursue, but also deliberates what means are right in the circumstances to pursue those ends.

Urmson cautions it is a common misconception to consider practical wisdom as limited to deliberation only in scope. This is not the case, he argues. There are two further skills required for practical wisdom – which he calls “understanding” and “judgment”. Understanding is the “capacity to sum up a situation.”126 This skill is exhibited in observation – the person sees what unfolds before him or her, and assesses it accurately. This activity of understanding is, on its own, more a “touchline” skill – it is not phronimos to simply sum up a situation in theory. Practical wisdom is exhibited on the “field of play”; judging what is best to do brings understanding from the “sidelines” into the “action”.127 In sum, practical wisdom is a virtue that deals with action. It is a deliberative process that constitutes knowledge of the ends that are good for the person, a sound understanding of the means available in the present moment towards that end, and the choice to pursue the right means, towards that end.

The thymos and eros of the mind, as Glendon employs them, can be linked to Aristotle’s description of “choice” as “reasonable desire” or “the deliberate desire of things in our power”. This description shows, in Copleston’s view, Aristotle does not identify preferential choice

125 EN, 1106b 36-1107a2, in Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 336.
127 Ibid., 165-66.
with reason by itself, or desire by itself. Rather, Aristotle proposes that actions are a manifestation, and in a certain sense embodiment, of some emotion (NE 1105b 21). Between one’s own formation and understanding of their own desires, the person must work out what kind of life to pursue. This task requires *phronesis*, which is a moral virtue that is constituted by a “disposition towards action, by the aid of a rule, with regard to things good or bad for man” (EN VI.5 1140a 30). As Copleston explains, practical wisdom is a “moral process” concerned with a “practical syllogism”, of deliberation on means to achieve ends. For example, A is the end; B is the means to A here and now; therefore, B should be done here and now.

Sorabji observes that, to Aristotle, practical wisdom is the chief virtue of the statesman. Practical wisdom can be applied in a range of settings, from the individual good, to the good of the family or household, and the good of the State. But it is pertinent to the present thesis that Sorabji observes that practical wisdom is the virtue responsible for working out the individual good (called ethics) and the good of the State (called political science). The task of politics is to work out the human good – both for the individual and for the community (the common good). Therefore, the task of working out the human good falls to the politician – or statesperson. (NE 6.13 1144b17-1145a6; 10.8 1178a16-19; Eudemian Ethics 3.7 1234a29). Therefore, in Glendon’s consideration of the “merits” of the life of the philosopher and the life of the statesperson, *phronesis* is an essential practical virtue to help the person deliberate, and choose, the best kind of life.

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129 Urmson, ‘Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean’, 164–5. Urmson states these include emotions like anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, longing, emulation, pity and, in general, conditions that involve likes and dislikes.
130 Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, 339, 344. In its expanded form, Aristotle’s moral process is as follows: i) the agent desires an end; ii) the agent deliberates, seeing that B is the means to A (the end to be obtained); C, the means to B, and so on, until iii) the agent perceives some particular means towards the end that can be done here and now; iv) the agent chooses the mean perceived as practicable in the *hic et nunc* (here and now) and; v) the agent performs that action.
Eudaimonia as “Happiness”? Contemplation and Moral Virtue

Is there a definitive answer as to which of the two options Aristotle puts forth – philosophy and politics – is the highest kind of life? Indeed, how does Aristotle determine that these two kinds of life are the most choiceworthy, and not the life of a doctor, a lawyer, or a builder? The answers to these questions on Aristotle and his account of the highest life remain contested. It is precisely this contested space that Glendon’s arguments address, making her work particularly appropriate to analysing the case study of John Paul II as both philosopher and statesman.

To determine the best kind of life, Curzer states one must ask what activity, or activities, constitute the best way to live? Rorty writes Aristotle has often been “charged with indecision” and with holding incompatible views about the “relative merits of a comprehensive practical life and one devoted primarily to contemplation”. On one interpretation of the Nichomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics, the highest life is realised in the activity of the most divine part of man, in accord with its “proper excellence”. This is the activity of theoretical contemplation (theoria). On the other dominant account (called “secondary” at NE1178a9), contemplation is one activity within a wide range of activities that constitute the

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133 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 119.
best kind of life. Contemplation is one good within a life of intellectual and moral virtue.\textsuperscript{139} Is Aristotle contradicting himself by stating in one instance the happy life consists in one activity, and then saying it involves a combination of activities? This seeming contradiction has the added difficulty of Aristotle requiring other conditions for \textit{eudaimonia}, including good fortune, wealth, good looks, slaves and other features scholars find puzzling.\textsuperscript{140}

Scholars have bracketed these competing accounts into the \textit{inclusivist} interpretation (moral virtue as the best life) and \textit{intellectualist} interpretation (contemplation as the best activity).\textsuperscript{141} This section will give a brief account of Aristotle’s highest life, and portray some of the more recent scholarly debates around what his account actually constitutes. Specifically, it will address the rational basis for the highest life as philosophy and politics. The aim of this section is to illustrate how the virtue of \textit{phronesis} enables a “synthesis” of the two kinds of life in the ideal statesperson.

Aristotle asks what is generally viewed as the end, or ultimate aim, of life. He is interested in working out if there is some sole end for the sake of which every action is done.\textsuperscript{142} Aristotle says if there is indeed such an end, then it would be worthwhile to work out what it is, for it must be the highest good of all (\textit{NE} I.2 1094a 23). Aristotle tells his audience in the \textit{Nicomachean Ethics} that the best or highest end aimed at is \textit{eudaimonia}.

Verbally there is very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness (\textit{eudaimonia}), and identify living well and faring well with being happy (\textit{NE} I.4 1095a 14-19).

\textsuperscript{139} Thomas Nagel, ‘Aristotle on Eudaimonia’, 7.
\textsuperscript{140} Urmson, \textit{Aristotle’s Ethics}, 118.
\textsuperscript{142} Frederick Copleston, \textit{A History of Philosophy}, 332–3.
However, as Urmson states, *eudaimonia* is a highly complex concept that defies modern norms of definitions.\textsuperscript{143} The word *eudaimonia* does not translate easily to English or other languages in its complete form. “Happiness” is a common translation; however, with its modern connotations of feelings or as a disposition of contentment, most scholars agree this is a limited translation of *eudaimonia*.\textsuperscript{144}

Is *eudaimonia* a single end that all actions ultimately aim at, or is *eudaimonia* a combination all the goods desired for their own sake? In *NE* I.7, Aristotle describes what intellectualists, such as Richardson Lear\textsuperscript{145}, and Bush\textsuperscript{146} argue are the criteria for what constitutes the highest life. These are that *eudaimonia* is: self-sufficient (*autarkes*), complete without qualification (*teleion haplos*), particular to human beings, involves excellent activity, and is the best and most complete end.\textsuperscript{147} And in a later passage at *NE* X 6-8 Aristotle declares the life of contemplation to be the sole, highest, most *eudaimon* life. Tessitore\textsuperscript{148}, Curzer\textsuperscript{149} and Ackrill are among the scholars who argue Aristotle’s account of the best life is ambiguous. In particular, Ackrill argues that it is unclear how a person can live a *eudaimon* life without moral virtue.\textsuperscript{150} The present thesis suggests that within this debate, it is possible to identify philosophy as that which entails the criteria for the highest activity.

\textsuperscript{143} Urmson, *Aristotle’s Ethics*, 135.  
Levels of Ends for Happiness

On balance, the present thesis suggests the more convincing stance toward Aristotle concerning this issue is expressed by Richardson Lear and others who hold comparable intellectualist arguments that Aristotle believes contemplation (theoria) is the best and most complete activity. However, although contemplation is the highest activity, inclusivists including Ackrill and Garver point out convincingly that the answer to “what is the best activity?” does not extend to practical questions of how to best live. The activity of deliberation requires phronesis, or practical virtue, to deliberate about how to pursue virtue in the present moment. The virtue of practical deliberation is proper to the moral life, not the contemplative. The present thesis suggests that this debate reveals that Glendon’s ideal statesperson is drawn from Aristotle’s “practically wise man”, who combines both the excellences proper to philosophy and the moral virtues.

In Book I.7 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle proposes happiness, or *eudaimonia*, is an end sought in itself, self-sufficient and most complete.\(^{151}\) Richardson Lear proposes that the highest good must conform to the most complete human activity, which, she argues, is contemplation. To understand how this might be, Richardson Lear suggests there are degrees of completeness within goods in the *Ethics*.\(^{152}\) Completeness means the degree to which a thing – that is, a good (a thing desirable) – is sought for its own sake.\(^{153}\) Thus the most complete good will be associated with *eudaimonia*. Lear discusses Aristotle’s explanation of completeness, which is:

> If there is only one complete end, this will be what we are seeking, and if there are more than one, the most complete of these will be what we are seeking. Now we call that which is in itself worthy of pursuit more complete than that which is worthy of pursuit


\(^{152}\) Gabriel Richardson Lear, *Happy Lives and the Highest Good*, 31.

for the sake of something else, and that which is never desirable for the sake of something else more complete than the things that are both desirable in themselves and for the sake of that other thing, and we call complete without qualification that which is always desirable in itself and never for the sake of something else (NE I.7 1097b28-34).\textsuperscript{154}

Richardson Lear argues Aristotle is working out a way to narrow down a single, highest good from the multitude of practicable goods human beings are able to pursue. This is what the finality criterion does, in her view. If there are many complete, or final, ends, that which is most complete will be what is sought as the highest end.\textsuperscript{155} Goods must therefore be distinguished between higher and lower, by their level of completeness. Richardson Lear distinguishes three levels of ends – lower, middle and highest level ends. The first is goods that are chosen for the sake of other goods – for example, buying runners to get fit for one’s health. These are instrumental goods. Their purpose is subordinate to the further end they serve. One cannot properly explain an account of them without reference to the end. The runners do not explain themselves – they serve a purpose, to run, which might in turn be chosen for the enjoyment of running, or for the further end of health. Regardless of where the chain ends, its instrumental nature subordinates it to goods that do not need to explain themselves in this way.\textsuperscript{156}

Middle-level ends are those chosen for their own sake. These are goods that we choose and deem desirable even if nothing further comes from them; they are desirable in themselves. In achieving them, we have completed our aim fully. For example, medicine aims at health, and health is desirable for its own sake; the end of health is not more perfectly achieved by the

\textsuperscript{154} Gabriel Richardson Lear, \textit{Happy Lives and the Highest Good}, 31–2.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 29
\textsuperscript{156} Urmson, \textit{Aristotle’s Ethics}, 10–11.
addition of another good. Such ends are more final than instrumental goods. Intelligence, honour and pleasure, are also among those that Aristotle considers sought for their own sake.

However, these ends are not happiness itself, as one does not declare he or she is eudaimon because he or she has health, or wealth, or intelligence. Richardson Lear argues that Aristotle places all the virtues in this middle-level end category. The virtues are chosen for the sake of themselves, but they are also chosen for the sake of eudaimonia, supposing that through them we will live happily. However, eudaimonia is not chosen for the sake of these things (NE I.7 1097a34-b6). The moral virtues then, and their highest expression in the political life, do not constitute happiness, but rather are middle level ends, which means they cannot be the highest end in the hierarchy.

At NE X 6-8 Aristotle declares the activity of contemplation to be the sole, highest, and most complete end. The eudaimon life is that which consists of the end which is the “best and most complete” and is therefore the “super end” on which all other ends converge. Walker defines contemplation as an activity that consists in “the exercise of the theoretical intellect according to its proper virtue of theoretical wisdom, and in actively comprehending the ultimate explanations of things.” Rorty describes contemplation as the “self-contained activity par excellence”. Contemplation is the most “end-like” activity because it is the most enduring kind of activity, most self-sufficient, and is performed for its own sake. Contemplation is “fully and perfectly achieved in the very act” (NE 1177b1-5). Walker’s

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157 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 332.
159 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 31–33.
161 Gabriel Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good, 33.
164 Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’, 559.
165 Rorty, ‘The place of contemplation in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics’, 378. Though Rorty notes that the activity of contemplation requires certain conditions to be performed, such as political
view concurs with that of Rorty, as he suggests for Aristotle, “the contemplative life is happiest” because it is “organised around the properly highest end within a human life.”167 This account renders contemplation the most complete activity, and the highest good. The task of ethics is to work out the individual good, which Glendon’s students want to work out in their discernment about how to best live. The intellectualist account suggests that the best activity a person can engage in is contemplation. The present thesis has shown that phronesis is needed to make deliberations in the present based on knowledge of ends. Thus, phronesis must help Glendon’s student answer: how is the contemplative life to be lived practically? This is the focus of the following section.

Section Three: Life in the “Forum” & Life in the “Tower”

Political Influence through Life in the “Tower”

Glendon suggests that the person who concludes the contemplative life is best can still influence the State, and that it is important to remain interested in its affairs. In The Forum and The Tower, Glendon observes that some of the figures she analyses “opted early for philosophy or statesmanship and seldom looked back.”168 As the present thesis has argued, Glendon’s holistic approach to the eros of the mind renders it a force that drives the person towards a kind of unity or wholeness, found in the life of the mind. In addition to eros, Glendon’s use of thymos as a spirited force drives the scholar towards involvement in the political life. As a practical consideration, what is the best life for one who concludes that the life of the mind is more choiceworthy than the political life? Bostock and Miller are among intellectualist

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167 Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’, 558.
scholars who suggest that Aristotle has in mind a certain kind of “lifestyle” or “occupation” most proper to the contemplative ideal. This kind of life is the life of the philosopher.169

The contemplative life is often characterised as one devoted to studying or teaching, in whatever mode best leads to wisdom (sophia). Walker notes life in the Aristotelian Lyceum (where Aristotle taught) cannot be equated with the modern academic’s career. This frees Aristotle from the claim that the life of the modern professor is happiest. Nonetheless, Walker claims Aristotle idealises the academic, even “quasi-monastic” lifestyle.170 Urmson echoes this view, suggesting Aristotle shows “too much enthusiasm for his own profession” in his claim for the highest life as purely contemplative.171 That said, Copleston acknowledges that Aristotle’s “common-sense” approach recognises contemplation is not possible for any person without certain pre-existing conditions, such as political stability, a reasonable degree of comfort, friendship, and like things.172 Accepting these conditions as necessarily first established, the best kind of life is one that organises itself around theoria; this life aims at wisdom.173 In Glendon’s view, the philosophic and the political intersect in the life of the philosopher through his or her conception of the ends of politics.174 The person who possesses thymos and eros considers the individual good (ethics), and the good of the State (political science). The philosopher in The Forum and The Tower has to use phronesis to work out how

170 Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’, 562.
171 Urmson, Aristotle’s Ethics, 119.
172 Aristide Tessitore offers a different view, suggesting Aristotle is simply trying to convince his audience of the importance of philosophy to the project of political governance. In his essay, “Making the City Safe for Philosophy”, Tessitore suggests Aristotle’s audience are the inheritors of the ruling class – wealthy young students who have political ambition to succeed. Aristotle’s goal is to steer the thought of the ruling class towards accepting philosophy as an important tool for making good political judgments. See Aristide Tessitore, ‘Making the City Safe for Philosophy’, 1251–2, 1261–2.
173 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 335.
best to influence the course of political events. Glendon writes that, “scholars have often exerted considerable influence on politics as advisers to rulers, or, indirectly through their writings.” Furthermore, a scholar’s philosophical legacy can “nourish” and contribute to future political events.

However, Glendon considers that this mode of political engagement is far from the ideal of the statesperson. Indeed, Glendon urges caution against efforts to have political influence as a theorist without practical political experience. She states that, sometimes theories taken out of a scholar’s context and reapplied in future contexts can have effects they never imagined, or intended.

The ideas taken out of their original contexts can morph into surprising forms…the ideas that migrate from political theory into political practice are often mere fragments, yanked out of the context that gave them nuance and balance.

Glendon’s advice is clear that satisfying thymos by remaining in the “tower” and trying to indirectly influence the organisation and governance of one’s city or nation is an unpredictable path. Glendon suggests that scholars emulate Cicero’s advice to philosophers:

Philosophers, Cicero said, should not stand aloof from the fate of their cities. But he cautioned them that if they want to put their talents at the service of the polity, they

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176 Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, xii, 3–4. Glendon writes that Plato felt the desire to influence the course of political events “so strongly” that he “imagined he could enlighten [Syracuse’s] intellectually curious, but tyrannical rulers.”

177 Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, 117–19. How ideas migrate into practical politics is not treated explicitly in this thesis. Glendon offers no precise method to measure what impact an idea has in a political setting, though she does give some examples. For example, Rousseau’s works *The Discourses on Livy* and *Emile* had a profound influence on the political upheavals in revolutionary France. Some of Rousseau’s most eloquent passages became slogans for the revolution of 1789 and the reign of terror that followed. The resulting bloodshed and upheaval was a consequence, Glendon argues, that Rousseau never intended. For a work of how ideas migrate into political events, see Daniel Philpott, *Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

must learn what the wise statesman knows: how to operate within the limits of the possible.\textsuperscript{179}

Not to stand “aloof” from the city requires a more direct involvement in operating within the “limits of the possible”. A philosopher ought to remain interested in the affairs of the state even only to ensure that conditions remain amiable to philosophy. Glendon has expressed this mode of thinking in other works.\textsuperscript{180} She also believes philosophical concepts can have a lasting impact on the shape of moral and legal norms in a political community.\textsuperscript{181}

The present thesis suggests that Lear’s and comparable intellectualist arguments shows that a unity of principles, desired through eros, is consistent with aiming for contemplation as the highest end in the life of the philosopher. This is Glendon’s “life in the ivory tower”. However, Glendon’s view remains consistent with the likes of Urmson, who argues wisdom through \textit{theoria} does not guarantee virtue in moral action. Indeed, a life of contemplation requires dedication for a long time, as would be the demands of reaching excellence in any profession.\textsuperscript{182} It is on this point that \textit{inclusivists} make a practical observation: can excellent contemplation provide clear choices to practical questions?\textsuperscript{183}

\textbf{The Inclusivist Solution to \textit{theoria} in the “Forum”}

\textit{Inclusivists} suggest there is an intellectual problem with formulating Aristotle’s highest life as the life of the philosopher. Ackrill observes: how can one good be chosen for its own sake, and have intrinsic value, and yet be subordinate to another, higher, good? It would seem

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{179} Ibid., xi.
\item \textsuperscript{181} See Glendon, ‘Looking for Persons in the Law’, \textit{First Things}.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Urmson, \textit{Aristotle’s Ethics}, 119.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Eugene Garver, \textit{Confronting Aristotle’s Ethics} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2014), 190.
\end{itemize}
that a good that has intrinsic value in itself, but is also subordinate to a higher good, has no
intrinsic value at all, but only instrumental value. If a good is chosen for the sake of some other
good only, does it not render it an instrumental good?\textsuperscript{184} Thus, are not the moral virtues,
pleasure, or honour chosen only instrumentally – that is, for the sake of happiness?\textsuperscript{185}

Ackrill proposes the \textit{inclusivist} solution to the middle to higher-level ends problem.
Ackrill suggests that if \textit{eudaimonia} is an inclusive end, that is, the composition of all intrinsic
goods (not instrumental goods), then these middle-level ends are all choiceworthy for the sake
of \textit{eudaimonia}. Each good is a constituent of the whole that is \textit{eudaimonia}. Ackrill here argues
that this does not render such goods as moral virtue, honour and pleasure to be of mere
instrumental value – that they are for the sake of happiness. Rather, these goods are
instrumental only insofar as they are \textit{are} intrinsically valuable. Happiness is a constitutive good,
inclusive of all noble and good ends.

One can answer such a question as, “why do you seek pleasure?” by saying that you
see it and seek it as an element in the most desirable sort of life… the answer to the
question about pleasure does not imply that pleasure is not intrinsically worthwhile but
only a means to an end. It implies rather that pleasure \textit{is} intrinsically worthwhile, being
an element of \textit{eudaimonia}. \textit{Eudaimonia} is the most desirable sort of life, the life that
contains all intrinsically worthwhile activities.\textsuperscript{186}

Ackrill’s view of \textit{eudaimonia} is inclusive. Happiness is a composite good, achieved by the
performance of all intrinsic goods, including contemplation, but also the life of political
involvement. Roberts summarises, “excellence or virtue is expressed in functioning well as the

\textsuperscript{185} Gabriel Richardson Lear, \textit{Happy Lives and the Highest Good}, 41. Richardson Lear replies this is a
problematic view. Consider someone that dances for enjoyment – are they dancing because the dance
brings them pleasure, or because the dance aims at happiness? It could be coincidental that the dance
brings both pleasure and at the same time aims at happiness. However, she suggests it is more likely
that happiness must be more complete than the dance is.
kind of creature one is; humans are, by nature, rational and political beings.” For a human person, excellence would be to be a good rational and a good political being.\(^{187}\) Moral virtue is properly expressed in the political life.\(^{188}\) Thus, Walker suggests that Aristotle presents the political life as the main alternative to the contemplative life. The political life itself is most properly exemplified by the statesperson (\(EE\) I.5 1216a23-27).\(^{189}\) Aristotle’s virtue countenances a proportionate response to a given situation. In the political life, the person with excellent character continues to choose “toward the goal” (the end)\(^{190}\), but is able to adapt to shifting political climates using deliberative judgment to choose according to the \textit{orthos logos} (right rule).\(^{191}\)

There is no resolution among scholars on Aristotle’s account of the highest life. Richardson Lear contends that the \textit{inclusivist} account of the moral life as \textit{eudaimon} cannot be reconciled with Aristotle’s statement in \textit{NE} X 6-8, in which he states that contemplation is true \textit{eudaimonia}.\(^{192}\) Further criticism made by Richardson Lear and others, including Stephen Bush and Aristide Tessitore, is that the Greek word for most complete, or final refers to the highest member of a set, but not the set itself. Thus, in their view, \textit{eudaimonia} cannot be an end that is the sum total of all other worthwhile ends.\(^{193}\) This would align more closely to \textit{NE} X 6-8, where contemplation is the highest good of all.\(^{194}\)


\(^{188}\) Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’, 567.

\(^{189}\) Walker, ‘How Narrow is Aristotle’s Contemplative Ideal?’ 561, 567. Walker states that the political life is commonly construed to mean the life of the statesman. However, he argues that Aristotle allows for the life of moral virtue to be expressed by citizens and not just statesmen, particularly at (\textit{EN} X.8 1179a-3), where Aristotle states virtue can be exercised “even from moderate resources”.

\(^{190}\) Jessica Moss, “”Virtue Makes the Goal Right”, 214–15.


\(^{192}\) Gabriel Richardson Lear, \textit{Happy Lives and the Highest Good}, 42.

\(^{193}\) Aristide Tessitore, ‘Aristotle’s Ambiguous Account of the Best Life’, 201.

\(^{194}\) Gabriel Richardson Lear, \textit{Happy Lives and the Highest Good}, 42–3.
The present thesis does not offer a final judgment on this debate. Rather, its purpose in employing this discussion has been to illustrate that The Forum and The Tower draws from Aristotle’s ambiguity on whether the best life is that of the philosopher or the statesperson. This lack of consensus is the starting point from which Glendon examines the deliberations of scholars and statespersons about the merits of “a life dedicated to philosophy, of politics, or of both.” 195 The virtue of phronesis helps explain how the person with thymos and eros needs to deliberate about what “means” are available in the present moment to pursue their views on the good life, both for their individual good, and for the good of the State.

Political Influence through Life in the “Forum”

Glendon proposes that whatever one concludes about Aristotle’s view that the philosophic and the political are the two most choiceworthy paths of life to follow, what is certain is that scholars can debate about great ideas or the “advantages and disadvantages of a course of action, but statespersons must make decisions and take responsibility for them.” 196 Hence, all of the scholars and statesmen profiled in the book “shared the belief that statespersons should keep in touch with the world of ideas and that political theorists should attend to what is going on in the life of the polity.” 197

The challenge for the scholar is to become involved in the affairs of the state, as advisers to rulers or, indirectly through their writings. The danger, Glendon suggests, is through an excess of eros and the corresponding action of a zealous commitment to pursuing one’s conception of the political good. A failure to operate within the power structures of one’s own

196 Ibid., x.
197 Ibid., 221. This indicates Glendon is emphasizing the two paths of life qua careers for the modern student. Though career choice is not the primary aim of the ethics, its practical nature forms the foundation for Glendon’s approach. The studies of the lives and decisions of scholars and statesmen are not two distinct discussions on separate, noble vocations, but show that scholars can try to extend the influence of theory into political practice.
State can render one politically ineffective. De Tocqueville’s “fiercely independent streak” caused him to isolate himself politically from major political factions, which ultimately left him largely politically marginalised throughout his twelve years in the French Chamber of Deputies. Glendon writes,

[De Tocqueville] confronted the problem facing any politician who refuses to accept party discipline or follow the party line: how could he maintain his independence without rendering himself isolated and ineffective? Sadly, Tocqueville was never able to solve that problem, and thus never achieved the political influence he so desperately desired.¹⁹⁸

Within Glendon’s framework, Copleston’s explanation of Aristotle’s virtue as both a “mean” and an “excellence”, indicates that Tocqueville’s deliberations erred on the excessive side of integrity of his own views of “ends”. Tocqueville was unable, in Glendon’s view, to work out the necessary “means” in the time he served in the Chamber of Deputies to be politically effective.

On the other hand, the challenge for the political actor is to keep their view of the good for man – the very reason for their political involvement – in sight while deliberating how to remain influential. Machiavelli exemplifies the person who chooses the life of statesmanship over scholarship as their “central preoccupation.” Glendon relays that Machiavelli sought diplomatic missions as a Florentine public servant during the early 16th century. His method of deliberation emphasised the means to secure power, over the retention of any private morality, or notions of the “good life”.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁹ Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, 66–7. More detail on Machiavelli’s method of political judgment will be explored in the following chapter, as Machiavelli illustrates one part of the present thesis’ aim to construct a “Glendon method” from this analysis.
Glendon’s view on Machiavelli offers a process of deliberation at the opposite extreme of virtue to that of Tocqueville. This shows that, among Glendon’s examples, it is possible to identify different degrees of practical wisdom between the extremes of excessive commitment to ideals on one extreme, and an excess of expediency over integrity of ends, on the other. Machiavelli lacked the _eros_ that could have spurred him towards more noble ends. In the application of Aristotle’s virtue to Glendon’s framework, the present thesis can ask: is this _phronesis_? Copleston explains that “prudence”, or “practical wisdom” is not the same as “cleverness”. On his reading of Aristotle, Copleston views cleverness as the faculty of deliberation that enables the person to find the right means to any particular end, even if that end be “ignoble”. Cleverness is not _phronesis_ because it does not aim at moral virtue, nor the good of the State; rather, it focuses on whatever means can be used to attain whatever end is desired, however morally perilous. On this reading, Machiavelli’s lack of the right ends in the process of deliberation is more akin to “cleverness” than _phronesis_. Glendon’s view that the ideal statesperson is one who combines the mastery of philosophy (knowledge of the good for the individual and the state) with the experience of political judgment (sound deliberation and judgment of means) is therefore the _phronimos_, or “practically wise man”, in Aristotle’s _Ethics_ (EN1106b 36-1107a2).

Thus, Machiavelli indicates a process of deliberation towards the opposite extreme, or vice, to the example of De Tocqueville in the virtue of _phronesis_. Machiavelli and Tocqueville are examples for the discerning student of less than ideal deliberations and choices about political judgment. Tocqueville acts with a focus on ends that causes a defect of sound judgment on means in the _hic et nunc_; on the other end of the scale, Machiavelli exemplifies choices towards the opposite extreme of _phronesis_, displaying an excessive focus on means to the detriment of the ends of politics and his own moral good. The ideal, most closely reached

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200 Frederick Copleston, _A History of Philosophy_, 345.
by Cicero among Glendon’s examples, is the figure worth studying as the synthesis between the aims of philosophy and the aims of the political life. Within Glendon’s framework, therefore, it is possible to identify the degrees to which scholars and statespersons synthesise “ends” and “means” in their decision-making. Too great an emphasis on ends over means leans towards an excess of one kind, and too great an emphasis on means over ends leans towards an excess of the other.

**Conclusion**

Glendon’s *The Forum and The Tower* examines the lives and decisions of prominent scholars and statespersons who “grappled with tensions between political ideals and practical realities.” This chapter has aimed to show that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics help understand Glendon’s thought about the relationship between political theory and political practice, outlined in *The Forum and The Tower*.

This chapter has demonstrated that Glendon uses Aristotle’s claim in the *Politics* that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue” are “philosophy” and “politics” as a starting point to answer her students concerns of how to be politically effective and retain moral integrity. Copleston’s explanation of Aristotelian virtue, as both a mean point between extremes of action and an excellence towards the good for the individual, links the philosophic and the political in the ideal statesperson’s life. Philosophy and politics intersect in the moral process of deliberation about how to achieve ends, or goals. Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue, it is possible to discern that, across the examples in *The Forum and The Tower*, the scholars and politicians deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and “mean” forms of political judgment. An excessive

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commitment to conceptions of ends is one extreme of political judgment; on the other extreme is an abandonment of moral virtue for the sake of immediate advantages. The present thesis has shown how Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise man” to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom (EN1106b 36-1107a2).

As a practical inquiry, the question of which is the highest life between philosophy and politics indicates that philosophy is essential for the good life because it enables a grasp of what is the best thing for human beings. However, it is not proper to philosophy to answer practical questions of how to best live without reference to a different kind of wisdom – which the present thesis has suggested is practical wisdom, or *phronesis*.204

The following chapter aims to examine how *phronesis* is employed throughout *The Forum and The Tower*. This discussion will construct a “Glendon method” through which to analyse the deliberations of the subjects in *The Forum and The Tower*. It will aim to establish a graph of “practical wisdom” that draws from the discussion in this first chapter with terminology from *The Forum and The Tower* and Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism”. This graph is an adaptation of Hartmann’s graph of virtue, through an amalgamation of Copleston, Glendon and Maritain’s work to illustrate how practical wisdom can be understood through Glendon’s framework. Thus, the graph will be called the “Glendon graph.” The chapter aims to show that the graph can be re-applied to a new context, which shall be Karol Wojtyla.

Chapter Two

Introduction

The current research project has aimed to show how Aristotle’s virtue ethics informs Glendon’s framework. Chapter One explored how Glendon portrays the intersection of philosophy and politics. It outlined how concepts from Aristotle’s virtue ethics offers some conceptual grounding on which to understand the challenge scholars and statespersons face in *The Forum and the Tower*. The present thesis has identified that philosophy and politics intersect in the virtue of *phronesis*, especially in the life of the statesperson. Glendon’s project in *The Forum and The Tower* explores how scholars and statespersons deliberate how to affect their political contexts towards their conceptions of political ends.

Chapter One identified Plato and De Tocqueville as examples of political actors who, according to Glendon, exercised an excessive commitment to their own conceptions of political ends without sound judgment of the political circumstances. It also suggested Machiavelli as an example of deliberation that eschews moral virtue as essential for sound political judgment. The thesis has tried to show how Glendon’s ideal statesperson can be understood within Aristotelian *phronesis*, as one who combines a “mastery of philosophy” with experience in managing “great affairs”.

Within the explanations presented of Aristotelian virtue, this thesis suggests that Glendon’s analyses of De Tocqueville and Machiavelli can be understood as examples of political judgment towards the extremes of practical wisdom. Cicero can be understood as the closest of Glendon’s subjects to the *phronimos*. Chapter Two aims to apply these concepts further in close readings of examples in *The Forum and The Tower*. This examination aims to establish a clear framework that can analyse political judgment in new contexts.

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Chapter Two continues the discussion of political influence in the “forum” from Chapter One. From the discussion on how Glendon’s method provides insights into how *phronesis* manifests in the lives and decisions of the subjects in *The Forum and The Tower*, the present thesis argues that an identifiable “Glendon method” can be established. This method analyses the intersection of ends and means, philosophy and politics, thought and action, in the decisions of the person in question. It aims to answer how it is possible to retain moral integrity and be a successful political actor. The framework adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue to Glendon’s project to establish a graph of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom. The graph helps explain how the virtue of practical wisdom aims at political ends through a process of political judgment that aims at the mean between excessive forms of what contemporary scholars of *phronesis* call “political judgment”.

This chapter considers contemporary debates on Aristotelian *phronesis* to help explain how political actors in *The Forum and The Tower* engage in a moral process of deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. Terminology from Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” will be employed to identify excessive forms of political judgment, which, Maritain argues, constitute vices. Following from this, the thesis aims to establish a framework in which practical wisdom is understood as both a mean point between what Maritain calls “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism”

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The method pays special attention to key moments of decision-making where beliefs about the ends of politics might inform the subject’s judgment in an established political setting. These are decisions that involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.” It argues this framework can be applied to a new case study, namely on Pope John Paul II. The framework aids an understanding of Pope John Paul II, specifically in how political principles inform his decision-making, in the established context of Communist Poland.

Section One: The Glendon Method

Context and Political Judgment

The present thesis proposes that context is a fundamental element in *The Forum and The Tower*, and is essential to construct a “Glendon method”. Glendon’s method illuminates instances of political deliberation, where a judgment involves integrity of a political aim, or a degree of compromise on those aims for some immediate advantage. Debates on the virtue of *phronesis* help to construct a framework that presents “sound political judgment” as a mean between two extremes, or vices, which constitute “bad” political judgment.

Glendon adopts a “biographical” format in the essays in *The Forum and The Tower*. This contextualisation of political judgments provides a ground map to appreciate how context can shape conceptions of political ends. For example, Glendon states that Cicero’s preference for the “primacy of politics” over philosophy as the “more illustrious” kind of life “perfectly reflected the ethos of Republican Rome”. Context also helps explain the kind of political conditions that generated opportunities, or hindrances, to the pursuit of political aims. For

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211 The definition of political judgment is taken from David Tabachnick, ‘“Phronesis”, Democracy and Technology’, 998.
example, Glendon observes that Plato’s birth into a “wealthy and influential aristocratic family” made it natural for Plato to believe himself entitled to a life of prominence in Athenian politics. Conversely, Glendon observes that Edmund Burke faced significant obstacles as an Irishman attempting to win election to the British House of Commons. Glendon describes Burke’s context – 18th Century England – as particularly hostile towards Ireland, and especially suspicious of Irish Catholics. The Penal Laws, for example, declared that no Catholic could hold public office, among several other conditions. Burke’s Irish heritage hindered, in Glendon’s view, his efforts the enter British Parliament.

Glendon’s method aims to understand the conceptions of political ends as a reference point for the value of moral integrity in the political life. Maritain explains that whatever is considered the chief end of the state will determine what the statesperson considers the chief means or “power” of the state. For example, if the aim of politics is the “common good”, then the chief power of the state are its “organs” or institutions of justice. Peace is the measure of the state’s “health” – its ability to move towards the common good. Maritain defines peace as a constructive “struggling through time towards man’s emancipation from any form of enslavement”. If the chief end of the state is power, which Maritain states Machiavelli believed, then “military strength” is the state’s primary power, and its capacity to wage “war” is the indicator of its health. The distinction between ends and powers or means has consequences for the statesperson’s conduct. Glendon’s project emphasises that her audience is concerned with retaining moral integrity in the pursuit of political success. Maritain suggests that what the person considers the chief end of politics will also shape their prioritisation of moral integrity in political practice. Should the chief end be the common good, then the statesperson

214 Ibid., 137. Glendon states that as part of this hindrance, Burke was repeatedly investigated by British officials on the nature and extent of his Irish patriotism, and whether he secretly adhered to the Catholic faith. Such public scrutiny led to him to be continually ridiculed in British newspapers.
recognises that being a person “good in every respect” is essential for retaining “clear-sightedness” of the temporal good of human persons in the community. If it is power, it is necessary, in Machiavelli’s words, to learn to not be good. Thus, in Maritain’s view, moral excellence is closely bound to the aims of politics.

Glendon’s view is comparable to Maritain’s, as she observes that often the more “decent” and noble the political aims of the person are, the more they “agonise” over decisions that require compromise of moral principles.\(^{217}\) Glendon recognises, as Maritain does, that conceptions of political ends shape the prioritisation of moral virtue in the political life. Thus, when the political aims are noble, i.e. the common good, the desire for moral integrity is greater than if the aims are less noble, such as those that Machiavelli espoused, of power and stability. The implication for the *phronimos* is that the right conceptions of the aims of politics demand a method of political judgment that avoids “falsehood” and any “slip of the will” entirely.\(^{218}\)

For the purposes of the current research project, a clear explanation of the subject’s conception of the aims of politics is needed to understand where their political judgments involve a retention of moral integrity or a degree of compromise on those aims. However, Glendon provides no definitive account of the right ends of politics. *The Forum and The Tower* limits its analysis to where the aims of politics intersect with, or do not intersect with, political judgments. The book does not compare the political aims with Aristotle’s notion of the common good, or any other particular conception, of right ends. The method instead aims to highlight instances of deliberation between acting towards an aim with integrity, or compromising on an aim for some immediate advantage.\(^{219}\) The thesis adopts terminology from


\(^{218}\) Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 42, 45.

\(^{219}\) Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*. 
Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism” to enable an understanding of how political ends inform, or are tactically ignored, in instances of political decision-making.

Section Two: Maritain and the Glendon Graph

The End of Machiavellianism

The current research project uses Maritain’s “The End of Machiavellianism”\(^\text{220}\) to identify extreme forms of political judgment that constitute vices of *phronesis*.\(^\text{221}\) Maritain’s analysis has the virtue of drawing clear but complex distinctions, which can contextualize Glendon’s method so as to enable the construction of a framework. He examines the political philosophy of Machiavelli to explore the interaction between ends and means in his political judgments. Maritain’s essay identifies the challenges of pursuing the common good through means that Aristotelian virtue describes as excessive or defective. Maritain labels the excessive kind of political judgment “hypermoralism”.\(^\text{222}\) This method of action insists on a purity of means that fails to produce any tangible political impact. It is an excessive form of practical wisdom, because it fails to understand what the right means are in the *hic et nunc* and judge accordingly.\(^\text{223}\) Hypermoralism causes political judgment to remain “something impracticable and merely ideal”, where the practitioner refuses “pharasaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life”.\(^\text{224}\)

At the opposite extreme is Maritain’s term “Machiavellianism”. This term refers to a method of political practice that eschews any notion of moral virtue as essential to securing the chief end of politics. In practice, the person focusses on gaining “immediate success” (power),


\(^{221}\) Ibid., 45–46.

\(^{222}\) Ibid., 61.


often at the expense of personal convictions (morality). Glendon explains that the aspiring statesperson can try to rationalise pursuing immediate political success. The person considers the advantage of trading silence, on a particular belief about right ends, for a position of power. The advantage is that from this newfound influence, they might be better placed to pursue those ends previously abandoned. The risk in this method, Glendon observes, is that one develops a pattern of trading long-term goals for immediate advantages, and thereby fails to achieve the very aims one set out to achieve in the first place.

Chapter One argued that *phronesis* is the virtue proper to the statesperson, and combines an accurate understanding of the present moment and the right judgment on the means to pursue the right ends. Sorabji, among others, argues that the wise statesperson needs philosophy to work out what are the right ends. *Phronesis* is a deliberative capacity that does not supply the ends itself. Rather, philosophy is tasked with supplying the human goods, while *phronesis* must deliberate how to achieve those ends. Thus, philosophy and *phronesis* complement one another in Aristotle’s wise statesperson.

However, some proponents of Aristotelian *phronesis* argue that it is prudent judgment for the statesperson to be “flexible” and avoid “fixed universals” of political theory. Ruderman, in his essay “Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment”, argues

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228 Jessica Moss, “‘Virtue Makes the Goal Right’”, 216.
230 Richard S. Ruderman, ‘Aristotle and the Recovery of Political Judgment’, 409–420. Ruderman also raises the concern that the “revivalists” of *phronesis* ascribe the virtue to every citizen in a democracy, whereas Ruderman believes Aristotle identifies *phronesis* with the statesman only. Tabachnick argues that this argument can be resolved by distinguishing between a “common” *phronesis*, exercised by the citizens in matters relating to their own lives, and “uncommon” *phronesis*, which is the specific deliberation of the statesperson towards the human good. See David E. Tabachnick, “‘Phronesis’, Democracy and Technology”, 1002–3.
contemporary scholarship among political scientists seeks to appropriate Aristotle’s concept of *phronesis* into a model of political decision-making that limits the role of philosophy in political judgment. Barber and Lyotard are among scholars who argue that Aristotle’s *phronesis* can be used to produce a mode of political judgment that avoids “logical extremes” on the one hand and a politics of pure “accident and force” on the other. These arguments aim to “assign wholly different tasks” to philosophy and political practice. Ruderman argues this design is conceived as an “antidote to reason” – to remove any requirement for the statesperson to “invent” morality, or rely on principles to base his or her reasons for acting. This argument suggests a loose correlation between moral virtue and political decision-making directed at achieving political aims.

Maritain proposes that there are degrees to which the statesperson can err on either side of the mean, which can constitute what contemporary scholars call “sound political judgment”. Maritain argues that the morally virtuous statesperson must use his intelligence to devise “cunning” ways to achieve the ends in difficult circumstances, without descending into “falsehood or imposture”. The distinction between – to use Aristotle’s terms – “cleverness” and “falsehood,” in the means one deploys, is both difficult and imprecise. This moral dilemma is the focus of Glendon’s analysis. She highlights the process of deliberation

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234 Ibid., 416–417.
on means to pursue a particular aim that recognise the need for compromise, but offers no precise point at which “prudent accommodation becomes pandering”.

Maritain’s perspective is congruent to Copleston’s view of virtue; Copleston states that for virtuous acts, the right choice will sometimes require an “excess” rather than a “defect”, while in other cases the reverse may be preferable. Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends. This section aims to explain how “Hypermoralism” and “Machiavellianism” are extreme forms of political judgment, and explore how the political judgments of subjects in *The Forum and The Tower* demonstrate operating between these extremes. It aims to show how Glendon’s framework illustrates political judgments that lean towards excess, or defect, on either side of the mean. It will suggest that the terms “integrity” and “compromise” can be used to indicate a moderate form of political judgment that errs on the mean side of either of the “hypermoralist” and “Machiavellian” extremes.

Copleston draws from a graph developed by Hartmann to explain “ends” and “means” in relation to virtue. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 below show how Hartmann’s graph of virtue can be adapted to the current research project’s discussion of *phronesis*. The adapted graph attempts to highlight how philosophy and politics, or ends and means, intersect in the virtue of practical wisdom. The graph shows how the wise statesperson acts towards the mean, as a middle point between extreme forms of political judgment. The graph aims to illustrate that Glendon’s analysis of scholars and statespersons shows different methods of political judgment, where some examples operate at the extremes of political judgment, while the ideal statesperson acts towards the mean.

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Figure 2.1: Hartmann’s original

Chapter One explained Copleston’s argument that the Aristotelian “doctrine of the mean” is not simply “an exaltation of mediocrity” in the moral life. Likewise, Urmson states the doctrine of the mean is not a fixed rule of moderation in all circumstances. Simple calculated compromise between vices is a bad outcome, as the graph illustrates. Moral goodness, or virtue, becomes excellent when the right ends are sought. The graph shows that the extremes of actions are called “excess” and “deficiency”. These are placed at the extreme right and extreme left of the horizontal axis, respectively. The middle point is at the centre of the horizontal axis. Hartmann states that the graph reflects Aristotle’s view that virtue could not be assigned to either the category of “mean” or the category of “excellence”, but to their “synthesis.” This is reflected in the vertical, or ‘y’ axis. The extent to which one’s actions aim toward the right ends determines the height one reaches on the vertical axis. The graph below adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue, generally, to the virtue of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom.

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243 Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* 345. Copleston states that a person can only be considered good if the action processds from moral choice and is done because (the aim) is good.
244 Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethics*, 424.
The thesis proposes that the Hartmann’s labels of “excess” and “defect” can be adapted to Maritain’s terms “Machiavellianism” and “Hypermoralism” as vices related to the virtue of practical wisdom. Hartmann’s other terms, “goodness” and “badness,” can also be adapted to reflect the aim or “end” – “practical wisdom”. “Cleverness” replaces “badness” as the middle point between the vices, absent the right aims necessary for practical wisdom. Chapter One outlined that “practical wisdom” is not the same as “cleverness”. On his reading of Aristotle, Copleston views cleverness as the faculty of deliberation that enables the person to find the right means to any particular end, even if that end be “ignoble”. Cleverness is not phronesis because it does not aim at moral virtue, nor the good of the State; rather, it focuses on whatever means can be used to attain whatever end is desired, however morally perilous.\(^{245}\) On the graph, cleverness is a “mean” form of political judgment between “hypermoralism” – the absoluteness of ethical claims – on the one hand, and “machiavellianism” – the denial of ethics and moral virtue in the political life.\(^{246}\)

The present thesis argues that the graph, when applied to The Forum and The Tower, helps illustrate how Glendon’s examples of political actors make judgments between the

\(^{245}\) Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 345.

extremes of practical wisdom. The following section aims to show how the graph provides a visual representation of practical wisdom as the virtue proper to understanding how philosophy and politics, theory and practice, and thymos and eros intersect in *The Forum and The Tower*. It will argue for a method whereby one can read the political decisions through Glendon and an amalgam of Hartmann’s graph of virtue, with Maritain’s terminology. When the method is tested against Plato, his decisions are towards the “hypermoralist” extreme of practical wisdom. That is, Plato’s decisions exhibited ethical absolutism and lacked immediate success. Machiavelli can be placed within the “Machiavellian” half of the graph. It should, though, be clarified that Maritain believes Machiavelli is a more moderate political actor than the term “Machiavellian” denotes. As will be seen, Glendon considers Cicero and Edmund Burke the closest among her examples of the “ideal statesperson”.

**Hypermoralism**

Maritain labels an absolute commitment to ethics and ideals in politics as “hypermoralism”, which is an Aristotelian vice. Urmson concurs that an excess of commitment to ideals is one extreme of practical wisdom. To Maritain, hypermoralism is an approach to politics that is highly idealistic and largely impracticable. It involves the refusal to engage in any form of political activity that is stained with the “mud of human life”.

The purity of means consists in not using means morally bad in themselves, it does not consist in refusing pharisaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life, and it does not consist in waiting for a morally aseptic world before consenting to work in the world, nor does it consist in waiting, before saving one’s neighbour, who is drowning, to become a saint, so as to escape any risk of false pride in such a generous act.

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249 Ibid., 61–2.
Maritain contends that “ethics” can become a “distraction” in political judgment, when the person in question applies ethical principles as absolute. Such insistence severs the ethical life from the political life, which, Maritain argues, ignores the “empirical practical wisdom” of the nation’s moral and intellectual “instincts”. The “common inherited experience”, which contains accepted values and beliefs in a kind of national consciousness, is generally more potent than any “artificial construction of reason”.  

Beiner is among the scholars of *phronesis* who share Maritain’s criticism of a method of political judgment that is too reliant on theory. Beiner states that there is a “natural and unbridgeable gap between theory and practice.” Theory, Beiner argues, is rigid, inflexible, abstract, and the product of “morally disengaged minds” concerned with “fixed universals” absent of any adaptability to political circumstance. Ruderman suggests that this kind of “rationalist” mindset informs a desire for a “rigorous consistency or intellectual elegance in one’s mind”. This produces decisions that are “unable to elude the seductiveness of logical extremes.”

The present thesis proposes that Glendon’s analysis of Plato’s attempts at political influence exemplifies an excessive commitment to ideals. Glendon highlights Plato’s two attempts at serving as an adviser to Kings of Syracuse. His attempts to advise King Dionysius I and later his son, Dionysius II, were his most defining efforts at influencing politics. Glendon describes Dionysius I as a man who, among other vices, possessed “zero tolerance for criticism”. Plato’s view on giving advice to rulers was that one should “never pander to power”. The firm application of this principle caused Plato to imply in his discourse on the

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just man to the King that Dionysius was not an example of a “good man”. In Glendon’s view, this was “not the most politic thing” to say. The king reacted badly and ordered Plato’s death or sale into slavery.²⁵⁶ Plato’s rigid inflexibility on any kind of compromise on the principles, or ends, of his own mind is evident in his Seventh Letter:

When government is being carried on the right course, it is the part of a wise man to advise such people. But when rulers flatly refuse to move in the right path and order their counsellors to advise them only about how aims can most readily be accomplished, I should consider unmanly one who accepts the duty of giving such forms of advice, and one who refuses it to be a true man.²⁵⁷

This kind of decision-making resonates with Maritain’s explanation of hypermoralism as a “pharasaic refusal” to engage in the “mud of human life”. Plato can be understood as a political actor who believes that immediate success cannot justify sacrificing moral integrity. Indeed, Plato’s counsel is clear that it is an “unmanly” thing to advise a ruler on practical means of pursuing an aim, should the “wise man” consider that aim not right. That he lacked success through these means suggests this is not practical wisdom. Glendon observes the fault may lie “not in the stars, but in [Plato himself]”, and the qualities that make an excellent scholar are not the same as those that make a great statesman.²⁵⁸

The thesis proposes Plato’s decisions can be mapped onto the adapted “Glendon graph”, which aims to show Glendon’s judgment on the extent to which Plato acts towards the mean, or the extremes, of practical wisdom. Plato’s advice for when all noble efforts are spent, is to “be silent and offer up prayers for oneself and for one’s country”.²⁵⁹ Plato could not bear to see his ideas in their ideal form tampered with and amended, for the purpose of taking at least some

²⁵⁶ Glendon, The Forum and The Tower, 11. Glendon states Plato had to be rescued by a friend, who repurchased him and brought him back to Athens.
²⁵⁸ Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 166.
²⁵⁹ Ibid., 14, 79.
effect. This inability to compromise rendered him politically ineffective.\(^{260}\) Glendon’s view of the limits of theory in practical judgments is expressed in other works and is similar to Maritain’s. In *Rights Talk*, Glendon observes that a part of contemporary American political discourse relies on abstract language, especially on human rights. This immobilises judgments about what is practical and sensible, producing a form of “rationalist hyperliberalism”. This subverts, in Glendon’s view, the skill of judgment to the abstracted sense of rights to a logical extreme, particularly in the decisions by judges, bureaucrats and other democratically unaccountable officials.\(^{261}\) The thesis suggests that judgments, like Plato’s, that rely on principles, or ends, to inform political decisions without understanding what means might best, move towards the aim are not practically wise. These decisions constitute a vice within the virtue of *phronesis*. On the graph, this project proposes that Plato can be placed towards the “hypermoralist” extreme. Figure 2.3 below shows this mapping.

**Figure 2.3: Plato on the “Glendon Graph”**

![Graph showing Plato's position on the Glendon Graph]

Plato’s political judgments, in Glendon’s view, failed to reconcile his insistence to “carry out my ideas about laws and constitutions”; with his idea that the statesperson is “like the navigator of a ship”, who learns to “change tack” as the conditions shift between favourable

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\(^{261}\) Glendon, *Rights Talk*, 81.
and unfavourable. Plato’s decisions show that he could not exercise tact in the form of flattery or pandering to rulers; nor moderate his views on the just man to win immediate success in the form of favour with Dionysius. This is reflected on the graph. Plato is placed low on the vertical axis, to reflect his lack of success and sound judgment in his attempt to advise Dionysius; he is closer to the extreme of “hypermoralist” than the centre, or mean. This reflects his insistence on retaining his political convictions, or a “purity of means”, in Maritain’s words. Thus, an idealistic form of political judgment constitutes a vice in relation to the virtue of practical wisdom. This is relevant because it highlights the limits of theory, and of principles, in practical wisdom. It indicates that theory is the “touchline skill”, as Urmson describes, whereas practical wisdom requires additional skills such as good sense, understanding and experience (NE 1141b17; 1142a14).

Maritain offers his Catholic perspective that moral integrity is an essential component in the life of the statesperson, who must also consider the eternal destiny of humanity – eternal union with God. Maritain’s essay considers this goal as the only “perfect justice”, and therefore concedes that it is part of the nature of temporal politics that perfect justice cannot be attained. The “political virtues” aim at the “earthly common good” and such virtues are only “indirectly related to the ultimate end of man”. Thus, part of the practical science of politics requires the statesperson to make judgments that do not conform perfectly to ethical principles. At what point, then, does compromise on principles, as an essential part of practical wisdom, become morally destructive, as Glendon’s students ask? Debates on the nature and extent of

265 Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? Perspectives from the Review of Politics, 57–60. This perspective will be relevant to the current research project as it assists in understanding Pope John Paul II’s own catholic perspective on the distinction between the ultimate end of human persons and the temporal role of politics.
266 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, xiii.
flexibility, compromise and the use of “cunning” can be placed within the half of the graph between “cleverness” and “Machiavellianism”.

**Machiavellianism**

Maritain recognizes the same problem that Glendon highlights in *The Forum and The Tower* - that acting with moral integrity does not align with immediate political success:

> It is true that politics being something intrinsically moral, the first political condition is that it be just. And it is true that at the same time that justice and virtue do not, as a rule, lead us to success in this world.\(^{267}\)

Political ethics must maintain a “truly realist quality”, which Maritain argues that, when usurped, is the basis of what he calls “Machiavellianism”. This requires learning how to pursue political ends within circumstances that are imperfect with regard to the application of ethical principles. For example, Maritain acknowledges the statesperson must generally learn “the political toleration of certain evils”, such as new statutes of law that permit the “retention of long ago ill-gotten gains”. This is because new human ties and “vital relationships” infuse these relationships with legal legitimacy that are “in reality ethically grounded”.\(^{268}\) The pursuit of the right political ends, encompassed within the “common good”, enables the statesperson to resolve the “antimony” between political justice and political expediency.\(^{269}\) Usurping these circumstances for the “benefit of immorality”, on the other hand, is the essence of Machiavellianism.

In *The Forum and The Tower*, Glendon suggests Machiavelli’s political thought as an opposing extreme to Plato.\(^{270}\) In *The Prince*, Machiavelli counsels new leaders on methods and

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\(^{268}\) Ibid., 61.

\(^{269}\) Ibid., 52.

\(^{270}\) Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, 74, 79. Glendon compares Machiavelli with Plato’s own advice of never pandering to power, suggesting a direct contrast between the two scholars.
practices to secure power in sixteenth-century Florence. Machiavelli advises, “it is necessary to a prince, if he wants to maintain himself, to learn to be able to not be good, and to use this and not use it according to necessity.”

Machiavelli’s idea of political virtue is one of courage and political skill; and rather than the *Sophia* Aristotle proposes, wisdom is simply canniness. Moral virtue is a useful tool, but is not an end worth pursuing if it does not assist in the goal of securing power. And there are even times where it is better not to be virtuous.

Glendon observes that Machiavelli, though steeped in the thought of Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Augustine, held that the ideals they aimed at to be untenable. These thinkers were aware of humanity at its worst, and observed that human efforts would always fall short of ideals. But each insisted on retaining ideals as worthwhile political goals. To Machiavelli, accepting such aims would be disastrous for a statesman. To aim for such ideals, rather than taking men as they are, Machiavelli wrote, would render a statesman politically ineffective:

[There is so great a distance] from how one lives to how one should live that he who lets go of what is done for what should be done learns his ruin rather than his preservation: for a man who wants to make a profession of good in all regards must come to ruin among so many who are not good.

Politics, says Glendon of Machiavelli, should be based on empirical observation, taking men as they are and not as they ought to be. Maritain argues that Machiavelli is not proposing a ground-breaking science of politics that is highly practical, taking men as they are and not as they ought to be. He quotes Lerner as “rightly observing” that “power politics existed before

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271 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, 61, in Glendon, *Forum and Tower*, 73. Glendon acknowledges that in *The Prince*, Machiavelli states it is far easier for the leader to achieve his aims when he has inherited his rule from a long lineage. The leader who inherits rule, rather than takes it by force, has a much easier task of keeping power, so long as they operate within the traditions and customs established by previous generations of leaders.

272 Ibid. 74–5.


Machiavelli was ever heard of, [and will] exist long after his name is only a faint memory.”

Machiavelli’s “radical pessimism regarding human nature” elevates bad politics to a normative level.\footnote{Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, 38.}\footnote{Ibid., 39. Maritain observes that public custom and tradition encouraged feelings of guilt and public pressure to be placed on the statesman who commits bad acts. What Machiavelli’s political philosophy does is remove the guilt altogether, and establish bad action as normative for political behaviour.} Maritain says,

For not only do we owe to Machiavelli our having become aware and conscious of the immorality displayed, in fact, by the mass of political men, but by the same stroke he taught us that this very immorality is the very law of politics.\footnote{Ibid.}

However, Maritain distinguishes what he calls “absolute Machiavellianism” from Machiavelli himself. Indeed, Maritain writes that Machiavelli would “pale at the sight of modern Machiavellianism.”\footnote{Ibid., 42.} Machiavellianism is the rejection of any notion of the moral life whatever, and seeks to employ “wickedness” at every opportunity for “immediate success”. In contrast, Machiavelli has in mind the goal of political stability, and advises the prince against vice and greed, should these threaten the aim of political stability. Machiavelli is thus revolutionary in elevating a means of political judgment that abandons moral virtue as desirable for the person, or as a component in the health of the state. However, he does not abandon ends themselves, as political stability is still important for the state to function well. At the extreme of Machiavellianism, the aim is the constant pursuit of power, what Maritain calls “immediate success”, which is destructive for the person’s ethical character and the state.\footnote{Ibid., 52.} Thus, Machiavelli is not himself an “absolute Machiavellian” as Maritain describes, though he still rejects the importance of moral integrity in securing the right ends of the state.

Glendon’s quote from Villari, a biographer of Machiavelli, concurs with such a distinction. Villari acknowledges that Machiavelli pursued an end, a “dream”, of a politically
unified Italy as the “holiest of objects”. Unlike Machiavellianism, which denies any political ends, Machiavelli had in mind the aim of a unified Italy. Machiavelli’s distinct political method is exemplified in his belief that this aim would have been “impossible to achieve… without recurring to the immoral means practiced by the statesmen of the time.”

The present thesis proposes Machiavelli can be placed closer to the Machiavellian extreme of the graph than the mean, shown on figure 2.3. Glendon acknowledges that Machiavelli’s method of political practice won him important diplomatic missions that were, in his view, important to the aim of political stability. He enjoyed political favour with some rulers of Florence. However, Glendon observes towards the end of his life his influence in politics diminished.

Machiavelli created, in Maritain’s view, “a profound split, an incurable division between politics and morality”. In the Aristotelian image of the practically wise man, Machiavelli, though interested in some ends of politics, lacked the *eros* that Glendon says

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283 Ibid.
284 Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, 74. This was in part due to his falling out of favour with the new Pope Alexander VI, some
should have encouraged him to higher ideals. Hence, on the vertical axis, Machiavelli is placed higher than Plato, but is still closer to “cleverness” than “Practical wisdom”. In support of this view, Glendon offers Villari’s comment that it is uncertain whether “the excessive immorality of the means employed may not, even while momentarily grasping the desired end, sap the very foundation of society, and render in the long run all good and strong government an impossibility.” On Maritain’s view, this antimony between idealism (wrongly confused with ethics) and realism (wrongly confused with politics), limits the possibility of achieving genuine political aims toward the common good, and renders the actor who pursues this method of judgment, clever at best.

Therefore, two nearly diametrically opposed accounts of the “very law of politics” are manifest in the examples of Plato and Machiavelli. At one extreme is a “hypermoralist” commitment to ideals, and at the other a total abandonment of those ideals, both to the detriment of politics and its aim – the common good. Glendon suggests that, in light of the experience of Plato and Machiavelli, the need for “public servants who can negotiate such moral minefields with wisdom and integrity is more urgent than ever.” Therefore, as Maritain says, a “deadly division [is] created between ethics and politics both by Machiavellians and hypermoralists”. The present thesis suggests such a division is exemplified in Glendon by Plato and Machiavelli, as the hypermoralist and Machiavellian respectively. The mean point between these extremes shall thus be the ideal goal for the statesman concerned with retaining integrity to aim towards. However, as Maritain argues, and the example of Burke testifies, the mean point itself is difficult to pinpoint.

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285 Ibid., 213.
288 Ibid., 61.
289 Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 79–80;
Burke’s method of political judgment is a useful illustration of Maritain’s point that the statesperson must use the skills of intellect, called “cunning”, to discern how to advance the common good, and when to opt instead for what Glendon calls “prudent accommodation”, without “falsehood or imposture”. Glendon’s view of Burke suggests that a method of political judgment that uses compromise and “cunning” without descending into “cleverness” is possible, though it is difficult to identify the line between a prudent compromise and a full betrayal of principle. Burke argues that “falsehood and delusion are allowed in no case whatever. But, as in the exercise of all the virtues, there is an economy of truth. It is a sort of temperance, by which a man speaks truth with measure, that he may speak it the longer.”

Burke’s method of political judgment insisted on identifying what means are available in the present moment to pursue a particular good, even if it only be a partial fulfilment of that good. “It is a settled rule with me to make the most of my actual situation, and not to refuse to do a proper thing because there is something else more proper, which I am not able to do.”

Edmund Burke’s parliamentary career reveals several instances where his values clashed with that of his government. Particularly, this manifested in Burke’s drafting of a report on the Penal Laws imposed by the British on Ireland at the time. Though repulsed by them, in the report, Burke maintained his government’s view that the laws were both “just and necessary”. This example was characteristic of Burke’s continual efforts to navigate the “tightrope” he had to walk between party policy and personal conviction. In some instances,

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he could advocate for what he believed in, but in many cases he needed to remain silent. This indicates Burke’s willingness to compromise his beliefs at certain times, to retain his position as Member for Bristol. Indeed, throughout his career, Burke compromised on personal preferences to align his views with his party. Is this practical wisdom, or too much compromise? Glendon quotes Burke’s friend, Dr Samuel Johnson, who explains: “I do not say that he [Burke] is not honest; but we have no reason to believe from his political conduct that he is honest.” This view highlights the imprecision between “falsehood and delusion” and the “economy of truth”.

Maritain recognises that although it is necessary for the statesman to be just in order to “procure and further the political common good”, it is not sufficient always to be just. Sometimes, Maritain observes, it is not necessary to be just, and indeed may be occasionally more advantageous to be unjust to gain “immediate political success.” The debate on phronesis between scholars such as Gadamer and Gallagher on the one hand, and Lyotard and Timinaux on the other, highlights that the extent political theory and notions of political justice ought to direct sound political judgment is unclear.

Lyotard argues that phronesis is “pure judgment”, and involves no reference to theory to inform decisions. As with Copleston’s description of practical deliberation judging what means can be pursued in the hic et nunc, Lyotard states that any decision must be considered “case by case”, because “each situation is singular” and no external criteria can guide the

296 For example, Burke was passionate about free trade with America, which he called for in the House of Commons. Glendon argues this move had negative consequences for Burke, a Member of a port city, where his electorate turned on him, and eventually voted him out of office.
297 Burke is criticized for his silence on several causes many believed him to have firm convictions on, especially the continued repression of his compatriots in Ireland under the Penal Laws. See Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 137.
judgment beyond what appears to be the right means to immediate success “here and now”. 301 Lyotard denies wholly that any theory of justice can inform practical contexts, stating, “that is, after all, what Aristotle calls prudence. It consists in dispensing justice without models. It is not possible to produce a learned discourse upon what justice is.” 302 Instead, Lyotard contends that sound judgment requires “sensitivity to differences” and the “ability to tolerate the incommensurable”. 303 Within this framework, phronesis is only concerned with particulars, and not with universal, or objective, concepts. 304

Steinberger views practical wisdom a calculative element in the act of deliberation, where the State sets the boundaries of ethics. Political judgment is “essentially neutral”, particularly with regard to “specific political arrangements, procedures, or policies… [and even] on the purposes of political society.” 305 Steinberger sees the statesman’s work as malleable to any political reality. Political judgment accepts political realities, and does not seek to transform them into an established ideal. It simply acknowledges the system and the corresponding values of the community, and as such does not critique the framework in any way. 306 The task of the statesman here is simply to clarify the best practice within what is established as permissible. Barber concurs that phronesis deals with practical circumstances that necessitate and even justify a “lesser degree of precision” than rigid theory. 307

Conversely, Gallagher and Tabachnick are among the scholars who argue that political judgment devoid of political theory to provide ends is closer to Aristotle’s view of “cleverness”. Tabachnick observes that Aristotle states the phronimos is concerned with “universals” as well

301 Jean-Francois Lyotard and Jean Loup Thebaut, Just Gaming, 27, 51.
302 Ibid., 26, 43.
303 Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition, xxv.
305 Steinberger, The Concept of Political Judgment, 300–301.
306 Ibid., 297.
as the “particulars” (NE 1141b15-16).³⁰⁸ To deny the aims of the common good is, in Tabachnick’s view, detrimental to the health of the State, because it is the precise aim of the State to secure the good of its members. Gallagher notes that for Lyotard, phronesis is simply the “ability to play the game with inventiveness, to play ‘master strokes’ – justice is nothing other than this”.³⁰⁹ Gallagher argues that while sensitivity to “working at the limits of what the rules permit” is necessary, to then allow the State’s “generally accepted norms” to dictate the common good denies the legitimate use of reason in politics.³¹⁰ Indeed, the risk of “public reason” providing the sole reference point for the “health of the State” leaves rational inquiry into the human goods unable to correct perversions of public reason.³¹¹ The phronimos, would not be able to share in this sensitivity because they would be focused solely on the individual, unable to even fathom, let alone provide for, the larger or greater ends of his shared community, the “human goods” [of which] Aristotle writes.³¹²

Therefore, the “inventiveness” of the statesperson cannot function with respect to achieving the common good without reason (philosophy) to inform the right ends.³¹³ In contrast to Lyotard, Maritain states that an approach to politics that denies the aim of political justice is essentially “destructive” for a “nation as well as a civilisation”, because it gnaws away at the interior ethical character of the person. The ethical character supports political justice, which is the chief moral virtue and the very “soul” of human societies. It is through aiming at political justice, and struggling against defects of it, that society is preserved.³¹⁴

³¹³ Ibid.
In Glendon’s view, however, it is nonetheless necessary to “operate within the limits of the possible”. The present thesis suggests that this discussion helps understand, though not precisely, that cleverness and compromise differ through the presence of political ends. Maritain’s view on the use of cunning without degrading into lying as “exactly the affair of intelligence” renders some unjust acts permissible, and in some cases, necessary.  

Thus, where can Burke be placed on the graph of practical wisdom?

Copleston points out that Aristotle believes one should not aim for the same precision with ethics, as one would expect from mathematics. In the sciences, it is appropriate to search for, and find, precise answers to mathematical questions. In ethics, however, only general and approximate accuracy can be expected. As mathematical precision cannot be expected, Copleston states that identifying what actions constitute excess, mean, and defect do not conform to “hard and fast, mathematical rules”. In some cases, the appropriate action would involve an excess of one kind of action, rather than a defect, and the reverse in others. For example, in the virtue of courage, the situation might demand a more audacious act, rather than a reserved one. This act leans towards excess from the ontological viewpoint, but as the situation required a more audacious act, it was also a better choice. Therefore, it is possible that actions that lean towards the hypermoralist or Machiavellian sides of the scale can still produce the right outcome. Furthermore, these more excessive actions may even be the right means in a particular context. However, the accuracy of the decision, as Glendon points out, is often known only through hindsight. As such, the wisdom of these decisions is best observed “long after the person has passed from this life”.

316 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 332–3.
317 Ibid., 337.
Therefore, a “grey area” replaces Hartmann’s vertical line through the centre of the graph. It covers the full height of the vertical axis, between the areas of “cleverness” at the base, and “practical wisdom” at the top. The grey area represents the difficulty in assessing whether an action constitutes cleverness or cunning in the legitimate use of intelligence. In Burke’s case, this thesis proposes that Glendon’s analysis renders it possible to place Burke within the grey area of the map, reflected in figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4: Burke on the “Glendon Graph”

Section Three: Reasons for Success or Failure And Limitations

On Success and Failure

Glendon’s use of biography to establish context is important for phronesis, as it provides insights into the political conditions that the political actor must reflect on to determine if the conditions either hinder or provide opportunities to advance towards an aim with integrity, or through compromise. Unfavourable conditions, like those Burke experienced, help justify Glendon’s judgment that he ought to be considered among the few examples of statesmen worth emulating. Few opportunities presented themselves to Burke to advance his aims, and thus, Glendon states, it is difficult to determine how he could have achieved more as a statesman.319 At the same time, hindsight provides the opportunity to understand that the

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impact of one’s decisions can take effect long after one’s death. For instance, Glendon states Burke’s accomplishments, though modest in his lifetime, set the forces in motion that eventually vindicated some of his other aims, such as ending an oppressive system of British rule in the East India Trading Company. Glendon concludes that “just because one does not see the fruits of one’s efforts in one’s own lifetime, does not mean those efforts were in vain.”  

In this way, Burke can be placed closer to the “practical wisdom” end of the vertical axis, rather than towards the “cleverness” end at the base. Burke’s calculated compromise embodies, in Glendon’s view, the reality that political virtue alone is not enough to generate successful outcomes. Indeed, she writes that the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck will always be elusive”. Compromise on political aims to service immediate needs is part of the imperfect and imprecise nature of politics. At the same time, favourable political conditions can facilitate success in one’s political aims. Thus, part of Glendon’s method is to offer context on whether the political conditions were favourable or unfavourable for the specific political ends of the person in question. This enables her to offer some judgment on the relationship between the political actor’s decisions and the political conditions in the “reasons for success or failure”.

Limitations of the “Glendon Graph”

Glendon highlights the impact the scholar’s philosophical legacy can have on future political contexts. Locke’s contributions to the founding principles of American Democracy; Cicero’s synthesis of Greaco-Roman legal thought later nourished Western law and politics; Cicero’s works also inspired future prominent figures such as St Augustine; and Plato’s philosophical discourses are studied widely today. The extent of the “difference” scholars

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321 Ibid., x.
322 Ibid., xii, 4, 39–40.
and statespersons have made is an aspect of Glendon’s insight that graph cannot take into account. It is limited to how the political judgments of the subjects in *The Forum and The Tower* erred on either the side of integrity or the side of compromise on each side of the mean in the virtue of *phronesis*. It tries to highlight how the person aims at an end, and has to deliberate whether they will deploy an action that is compromising on their views in order to reach that end, on the side of “cunning”; or if they will opt for a choice on the side of integrity. The success, or failure, of the means chosen over the course of their political involvement helps to answer Glendon’s concerned student about how different kinds of political judgment contribute to success or failure.

**Conclusion**

The “Glendon graph” helps understand how conceptions of political ends can inform political decisions. The method used to employ it analyses the intersection of ends and means, philosophy and politics, thought and action, in the decisions of the person in question. Through the application of the graph it is possible to retain moral integrity and be a successful political actor. The framework adapts Hartmann’s graph of virtue to Glendon’s project to establish a graph of *phronesis*, or practical wisdom. The graph helps explain how the virtue of practical wisdom aims at political ends through a process of political judgment that aims at the mean between excessive forms.

This chapter has considered briefly how contemporary debates on Aristotelian *phronesis* help explain how political actors in *The Forum and The Tower* engage in a moral process of deliberating the extent to which theory, or conceptions of political ends, can inform decisions “here and now”. Terminology from Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” identified “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other, as labels...
denoting excessive forms of political judgment. The present thesis proposes that Glendon’s method is to identify moments of decision-making where beliefs about the ends of politics might inform the subject’s judgment in an established political setting. These are decisions that involve deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.” Additional considerations of success and failure are situated within observations on the political conditions the subject operates within. A key insight of *The Forum and The Tower* is that often the circumstances in which the person tries to be of political influence, can have a greater impact on the success, or failure, of their efforts, than their own choices.

The thesis will now test the construction of the “Glendon graph” and the aspects of Glendon’s method that it visualises, in an original application of the method in a new context. It will suggest that Karol Wojtyla, known as Pope John Paul II, is a candidate worthwhile to situate within this framework. It proposes to offer two studies on John Paul II, in Chapter Three, and Chapter Four, respectively. Chapter Three aims to describe the central features of John Paul II’s conception of political ends, as the reference point against which to understand how his political judgments are informed by his political thought. It situates his political thought within his political context, in order to establish, as Glendon’s method indicates, how context informs or shapes his political thought. Chapter Four applies the Glendon graph to a study of John Paul II’s political engagement with an established context of Communist Poland. It analyses how his conceptions of political ends inform his political judgments. Finally, it will comment on the extent to which the political conditions enabled John Paul II to act with a greater degree of integrity, than compromise, in this context.

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Chapter Three

Introduction

Chapter Three contains the first of two studies aimed at understanding Karol Wojtyla within the framework. It aims to describe his political context, so as to explain how his education and formation inform his passionate beliefs, particularly in the dignity of the human person as the basis of fundamental human rights. In this context, the present thesis aims to establish Wojtyla’s views about the ends, or aims, of politics. The study identifies Wojtyla’s development of participation as the primary philosophical concept that informs his political thought. Within the framework, Wojtyla’s experiences of totalitarianism and his development as a philosopher produce a political philosophy that elevates the good of the individual person as the goal toward which politics should be oriented. In particular, it aims to show how Wojtyla’s political thought is critical of political and economic structures – socialism and capitalism – that he argues produce outcomes that corrode the properly oriented concept of human dignity, most particularly through the denial of his understanding of basic human rights.

The chapter addresses the first study in three sections. Following Glendon’s biographical approach, Section One highlights Wojtyla’s intellectual formation in a biographical essay. It pays particular attention to how the political and cultural dynamics of Poland under Nazism and Communism inform his interest in the philosophy of the human person. The thesis argues that Wojtyla’s intellectual development as a philosopher, poet, playwright and Ethics professor at the University of Lublin help situate him within the “tower”. Glendon observes that “some [in The Forum and The Tower] opted early for philosophy or statesmanship and seldom looked back. Others… were tugged in many directions.”

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327 Glendon, Forum and Tower, 7.
contemplative religious order of the Carmelites to becoming a priest and train as a philosopher
demonstrates his choice for a life in the “tower”, rather than the “forum”. According to
Glendon, circumstances sometimes draw scholars from the “tower” into public life. This
insight proves applicable to Wojtyla’s case, given that he was elected to the papacy on October
16, 1978. Section One presents the context for considering how Wojtyla’s political thought is
influenced by his experiences living under Nazism and Communism. Furthermore, his
intellectual training as a philosopher shape his political thought.

Section Two goes on to establish that the human person is the central preoccupation of
Wojtyla’s philosophical development. Following the work of Wilk, Buttiglione, and others, it
shows how Wojtyla draws from the philosophical schools both of phenomenology and of
Aristotelian-Thomism, to develop the anthropology that provides the intellectual basis for his
political thought. Wojtyla ultimately aims to provide a philosophical anthropology whereby
the person’s irreducibility, as subject, is central. With this, Wojtyla counters any understanding
of the person through abstract definitions or ideological axioms, which he thinks ultimately
leads to a denial of personhood at the heart of human experience. This argument is the basis
for Wojtyla’s view that human rights need to be derived from the “hic et nunc” – the here and
now of personal experience. It suggests that Wojtyla has his own Polish context in mind.
Section Two employs Barrett’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” rights in
Wojtyla’s political thought, to highlight Wojtyla’s distinction between individual responsibility
and the role of economic and political structures to secure human rights.

Section Three argues that human rights are fostered at the level of the political community, or the State, through Wojtyla’s concept of participation. It engages Clark,

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329 Ibid., 6.
330 Edward Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy: The Ethical and Political Thought of Karol
Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2010), 60–64.
Williams, Gregg, and Barrett, among others, to highlight that “the state exists in order to protect…rights”,\(^{331}\) which requires statespersons to foster conditions where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community.\(^{332}\) Wojtyła’s conceptual antithesis, \textit{alienation}, explains his opposition to any form of political system or human behaviour that fails to treat human persons as ends in themselves. In his political thought, he is particularly critical of notions of socialist as well as capitalist economic structures that claim to be good in themselves. The implications of these ideas within the current research project are that Wojtyła holds passionate and intellectually formed convictions about the ends of politics that are fundamentally incompatible with the tenets of the political systems under which he was educated. The analyses of Williams and Murphy show how Wojtyła employed caution and subtlety in advancing his political ideas, in his philosophical works and in his limited pre-papal public life, during which he was an archbishop and cardinal, while also a professor of Ethics.\(^{333}\) Arguably, a comparison can be made between Wojtyła’s experience and that which Glendon locates in Burke, who adopted a comparable caution in his public life. This will be discussed in what follows.

Chapter Three makes its argument by way of descriptive analysis. It aims to relay Wojtyła’s political thought clearly, rather than to critique it. This clear explanation will enable

subsequent analysis, in Chapter Four, of where his thinking can directly be either seen, or not seen, in his political decision-making.

Before embarking on these three sections, this chapter explains why Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II is a fitting candidate to study within the established framework. To resolve potential confusion over interchanging John Paul II and Karol Wojtyla, the present thesis follows the approach adopted by Guietti and Murphy, in their translation of Rocco Buttiglione’s *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*. Guietti and Murphy distinguish “Karol Wojtyla’s thought and John Paul II’s teachings.” When referencing philosophical works, Guietti and Murphy “limit [them]selves to Professor Wojtyla.” John Paul II is used exclusively for the Pope’s public teachings, such as social encyclicals and public addresses. John Paul II’s and Wojtyla’s works will be distinguished in the footnotes.334

**Why Pope John Paul II?**

Glendon’s method addresses the scholar who is passionately driven toward the highest life, and tries to work out how to be involved in the practice of politics, whilst retaining integrity of principles developed in their political thought. Therefore, any study of new figures in new contexts must pay particular attention to the political ideas held by the person about how to best live, especially as they apply these beliefs, or perspectives, to their political context. Their efforts to be involved in the most “pressing political events” of their times constitute the arena in which their decisions need to examined.335 Glendon argues these figures share both the intellectual and passionate qualities, and that these traits are desirable for the ideal statesperson. To establish new contexts to study within her framework, Glendon calls for attention to those

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able to successfully “bridge the gap between scholarship and statesmanship.” Glendon suggests that Karol Wojtyla – Pope John Paul II – is one such candidate worthy of study in her framework. “One thinks, for example, of extraordinary intellectuals like Vaclav Havel and Karol Wojtyla who were at the forefront of the movements that brought a nonviolent end to totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe…”

Glendon suggests that the “vocational journeys of such persons will one day be fascinating and instructive to explore.” As Glendon herself has suggested Pope John Paul II – Karol Wojtyla – as a candidate whose “vocational journey” is worth studying within her framework, the present thesis proposes to take up her suggestion and examine Karol Wojtyla as she has studied others. Glendon has helpfully suggested that Wojtyla’s involvement in the collapse of totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe as an appropriate political arena to examine the intersection of Wojtyla’s scholarship and political action. Therefore, the present thesis aims to apply the methodology derived from Glendon, to Karol Wojtyla as a political theorist, with special attention to his engagement as a political actor with totalitarian governments in Eastern Europe.

Section One: The Biographical Context of John Paul II

The Role of Context in Karol Jozef Wojtyla: A Brief Biography

Karol Jozef Wojtyla (b. 18 May 1920 d. 1 April 2005) was the first non-Italian Pope elected to the papacy in over 455 years. His election to the papacy took the Catholic world by surprise – Wojtyla was just 58 years old – a relatively young age for a pontiff in the twentieth

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336 Ibid., 224.
337 Ibid. Among others she suggests Rocco Buttiglione, Francis Fukuyama and Vaclav Havel as candidates worth studying in her framework.
Further, unlike several of his predecessors he was untrained in the Italian-style Vatican diplomatic corps; nor was he from a noble family. Instead, Wojtyla was the first Pope from Poland in the Church’s history, and his professional and personal background was more unconventional for a pontiff than any Pope before him. Wojtyla was a priest, a philosopher and an Ethics professor, who came from a small town named Wadowice, in Poland. Rowland observes that by 1978, Wojtyla’s curriculum vitae read “something like: poet, priest, philosopher, playwright, Pope.” The present thesis suggests that applying the Glendon framework shows how Wojtyla’s “unconventional” context shapes his political thought, especially on how human dignity shapes the rights of individuals in economic, social and political life in the Polish State.

Suffering marked much of Wojtyla’s upbringing in Poland. He was largely raised by his father – a middle-ranking officer in the Polish Army – having lost both his mother and his elder brother while he was still young. He attended the local schools and was raised as a devout Catholic by his father, as was the experience of many Polish children. When he was just twenty years old, his father also passed away. On top of the loss of his family, Wojtyla also experienced the death of several close friends, especially Jews, during the Nazi Occupation of Poland in the Second World War. Cooper notes anti-Semitism was prevalent in Poland during Wojtyla’s youth, but that Wojtyla often extended “heroic support” to Jews, especially throughout the Nazi occupation of Poland, emblematic of his growing passion for the dignity of all persons.

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340 George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 1–500. Weigel comments that, when Wojtyla’s name was announced from the Vatican to the crowds in the square as the new Pope, the crowds cheered but also asked, “who? Is he one of us (an Italian)?”

341 George H. Williams, ‘John Paul II on Church, State and Society’, *Journal of Church and State* 24, no. 3 (1982): 473.


Wojtyla later commented following his father’s death that, by the age of twenty, “I had already lost every person I had ever loved”. The personal loss was reflected across Poland, which had lost one fifth of its national population between 1939-1945.

In this context of war, suffering, and death, Wojtyla contemplated the merits of the vocation of the Diocesan Priesthood, or a more radical form of spirituality and contemplation with the religious order known as the Carmelites. Weigel observes that by 1945, Wojtyla had been “wrestling for some time” with the question of whether to enter the Discalced Carmelite monastery to pursue a “contemplative life in complete withdrawal from the world.” The attraction of the contemplative life suggests, in the Glendon framework, the strong presence of the noble, holistic form of *eros* in Wojtyla’s deliberation. Further, Maritain’s observation that the ultimate human good in the Christian context is the eternal union with God, suggests this kind of contemplative vocation is reflective of a pursuit of the highest, most complete, kind of life. Wojtyla took the advice of his superior and Prince Archbishop, Cardinal Stefan Sapieha, who counselled him to complete his studies and formation of the Diocesan Priesthood. Wojtyla was ordained a priest on November 1, 1946 by Cardinal Stefan Sapieha, aged 26.

Wojtyla retained his interest in the Carmelites, even after his ordination to the priesthood. Immediately after his ordination, Wojtyla was posted to the Dominican Faculty of Theology in Rome, known as the Angelicum, to complete his doctorate in Theology. His choice to complete his Doctorate in Theology on Saint John of the Cross – a Carmelite mystic –

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346 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 78. The Carmelite spirituality involves a monastic lifestyle of near-continual prayer and contemplation. The Carmelites are often considered “mystics”, due to the amount of prayer and contemplation the spirituality requires.
347 Jacques Maritain, ‘The End of Machiavellianism’, in *A Liberalism Safe for Catholicism? Perspectives from the Review of Politics*, 57–60. Maritain does not draw a definitive correlation between Aristotle’s concept of *theoria* as the highest life and the “monastic” life of the in the Catholic context, though he does emphasise the importance decision-making that keeps in mind the ultimate end of eternal life.
348 Cardinal Sapieha was Wojtyla’s childhood hero and a major influence on Wojtyla’s decision to enter the priesthood, according to Buttiglione. See Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, 30–32.
highlights the retention of his interest in the merits of the order. During his studies at the Angelicum, Wojtyla was exposed to the philosophy of St Thomas Aquinas, through the tutelage of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. Buttiglione states Garrigou-Lagrange was a major influence on Wojtyła’s early philosophical formation, particularly through introducing Wojtyla to the thought of Saints Thomas Aquinas and John of the Cross. This influence is reflected in his doctorate, where Wojtyla attempted to confront the relation between dogmatic faith and mystical (experiential) faith, expressed in the writings of Aquinas and John of the Cross, respectively. Most importantly, the engagement with John of the Cross solidified Wojtyla’s conviction in the importance of an anthropology that started from the experience of the person.

The eros of the mind that Glendon believes is essential for grasping the right human goods manifests in Wojtyla’s interest in philosophy generally and ethics in particular. In 1954, Wojtyla accepted a professorship at the Catholic University of Lublin, where he was appointed chair of Ethics two years later. Wojtyla also published Love and Responsibility in 1960, which was his first major philosophical work that explored sexual ethics.

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350 Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, 44–53. Buttiglione explains that Garrigou-Lagrange was a renowned defender of a “rather rigid and plodding Thomistic orthodoxy”. However, Garrigou-Lagrange also displayed an “outstanding modernity” in encouraging Wojtyła’s doctorate on applying the spiritual experiences of St John of the Cross to a new priestly spiritual formation in a post-war Europe.

351 George Huntston Williams, *The Mind of John Paul II: Origins of His Thought and Action* (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 106. Wojtyła’s doctorate concluded that faith in a dogmatic sense and faith in an experiential sense can be viewed as two aspects of a unitary process that enable a theological transcendence.

352 *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, 53. Ingarden was an early disciple of Husserl and later Scheler, whom Buttiglione describes as the father of Polish phenomenology.

353 The University of Lublin was the only non-State university in the Communist Bloc. Gregg explains this was significant because it was the sole facility that allowed open discussion and cultivation of the works of St Thomas Aquinas in its philosophical school. See Gregg, *Challenging the Modern World: Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II and the Development of Catholic Social Teaching* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 1999), 72–3.

argues that from the beginning of Wojtyla’s clerical career, Wojtyla had been “trained within the authoritarian context of the occupying Nazi authorities and of the ideologically Marxist People’s Republic.”\textsuperscript{355} In this context, in 1959, Wojtyla published his second dissertation on \textit{An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the System of Max Scheler},\textsuperscript{356} under the direction of Roman Ingarden at the Jagellonian University in Krakow.\textsuperscript{357} Ingarden’s influence exposed Wojtyla to phenomenology and the modern philosophy of Kant, which were the two schools of thought Wojtyla engaged with to attempt a construction of a Christian Ethics on the basis of Max Scheler’s phenomenological system.\textsuperscript{358}

As Weigel puts it, Wojtyla inquired how Kant and Scheler could answer the moral question of doing things that one “ought”, rather than simply what one “prefers”.\textsuperscript{359} Wojtyla’s answer was ultimately that “the ethical system constructed by Max Scheler is “not at all suitable as a means of formulating a scientific Christian ethics.”\textsuperscript{360} Scheler’s phenomenology, in Wojtyla’s view, lacked a rigorous metaphysics that could be linked back to an objective anthropology for a coherent ethical framework, though Wojtyla did acknowledge Scheler’s importance in bringing “back into philosophy everyday things, concrete wholes, the basic experiences of life as they come to us.”\textsuperscript{361}

Wojtyla continued to explore the usefulness of phenomenology in understanding ethics in his principal philosophical work, \textit{The Acting Person}, published in 1969. Buttiglione states

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\textsuperscript{355} George Huntston Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State, and Society’, \textit{Journal of Church and State} 24, no. 3 (1982): 472.
\textsuperscript{356} Karol Wojtyla, \textit{An Evaluation of the Possibility of Constructing a Christian Ethics on the Basis of the System of Max Scheler} (Lublin: Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1959).
\textsuperscript{357} Buttiglione, \textit{Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II}, 44. For Ingarden, phenomenology is not a philosophical system per se, but is a method of philosophical inquiry that can engage with a broad range of philosophical systems. See also A T Tymieniecka, ‘Beyond Ingarden’s Idealism/Realism Controversy with Husserl’, \textit{Analecta Husserliana}, vol. 4 (Dordrecht, 1976), 250.
\textsuperscript{359} Weigel, \textit{Witness to Hope}, 128.
\textsuperscript{360} Barrett, \textit{Persons and Liberal Democracy}, 23.
\textsuperscript{361} Weigel, \textit{Witness to Hope}, 127.
\end{flushright}
The Acting Person contains Wojtyla’s fullest formulation of his philosophy.\textsuperscript{362} Between 1970 and 1978, Wojtyla delivered several lectures and published papers giving more precise clarifications of his thoughts in The Acting Person, particularly his most original thinking that blended phenomenology with Thomism. In 1979, The Acting Person was published in America in English, which introduced Wojtyla’s work to worldwide audiences.\textsuperscript{363} From this outline, it is arguable that Wojtyla’s intellectual formation places him within the “tower”, as a scholar rather than a statesperson.

However, Glendon also observes that circumstances can introduce political opportunities to advance one’s own conception of the human goods. Charles Malik exemplifies this point, as Glendon portrays him in The Forum and The Tower. Malik was a philosopher, who, like Wojtyla, was also steeped in the works of Thomas Aquinas. Further, Malik was intent on spending his career as a teacher and professor. Glendon writes that Malik, through chance, found himself at the centre of the team responsible for drafting and shepherding the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (UNDHR) through successive bodies, competing interest groups, and approval processes. Through a series of what Malik described as “the oddest coincidence[s] of my life at the United Nations”, his election to head several United Nations committees, gave him an unusual degree of influence in moving the UNDHR through the approval process, and into international law.\textsuperscript{364}

In a comparable way, in 1963, Wojtyla was appointed Archbishop of Krakow. Already surprising was Wojtyla’s ordination as Bishop in 1958, at just 38 years of age. Weigel observes that the circumstances surrounding Wojtyla’s appointment were particularly unusual. The established Polish Communist Party wielded the authority to veto any appointment the Pope

\textsuperscript{362} Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II, 40–43 The book was not met without criticism, as scholars at a conference at the Catholic University of Lublin, questioned whether it was necessary to apply a personalist lens to Aquinas’ thought.

\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., 41–42. See also Weigel, Witness to Hope, 324.

proposed for a new Bishop in Poland. For eighteen months, from June 1962 to December 1963, the Vatican and the Polish government had been deadlocked over the appointment of the new Archbishop of Krakow. The Communist Party’s “chief ideologist” had vetoed seven names, insisting, “I’m waiting for Wojtyła, and I’ll continue to veto names until I get him.”\(^{365}\) Wojtyła’s name was finally submitted, and the Communist Party agreed to his appointment. Weigel comments that the Communist Party regretted this appointment soon after.\(^{366}\) Over the next fifteen years, Archbishop Wojtyła became “something of a public personality in [Krakow]”, known for being an outspoken “defender of the human person against persecution and humiliation.”\(^{367}\) On October 16, 1978, Weigel states the implausible again occurred, with the College of Cardinals responsible for electing the new Pope breaking with centuries of tradition and electing the first Polish Pope, Karol Wojtyła, who took the name Pope John Paul II.\(^{368}\)

Polish culture had considerable formative influence on Wojtyła’s interests and formation in those areas more associated with the “forum”. Buttiglione states that Wojtyła’s participation in “many of the classics of Polish literature” helps draw a “sketch of the atmosphere in which the cultural and spiritual vocation of Wojtyła came to maturity.”\(^{369}\) The themes of resistance in Polish plays helps explain how the theatre was an important tool of resistance against the Nazi Occupation. Wojtyła, like many other Poles, believed that resistance


\(^{366}\) Ibid., 186.

\(^{367}\) Ibid., 120–1. Weigel also notes that Wojtyła never publicly used the word “communism” or criticised the Communist government directly. The nature of his rhetoric and its impact on Polish politics will be examined in Chapter Four.

\(^{368}\) Ibid., 252–3. Weigel describes that, though not certain, it is likely the sudden death of Pope John Paul I, after only 33 days as Pope, created the conditions for the Cardinals prompted the occasion for doing the “unthinkable” in electing Wojtyła. He cites Cardinal Ratzinger (who later became Pope Benedict XVI), as stating that “the shock of the September [1978] Papacy, so abruptly and unexpectedly ended, created the human conditions for the possibility of doing something new.” Ratzinger, like several other Cardinals, believed God was saying something to them through the suddenness of Pope John Paul I’s death.

through preserving culture was fundamental to ensure a nation’s survival of an oppressor. Polish history was a resource Wojtyla frequently drew from for inspiration for the content of both his poems and plays.\textsuperscript{370} He published a number of plays and poems, right up until his election to the papacy, including \textit{David, The Jeweller’s Shop} (turned into a Hollywood movie)\textsuperscript{371} and \textit{The Radiation of Fatherhood}.\textsuperscript{372}

Buttiglione states that a “unity of the finite and the infinite” is a “recurring theme in Wojtyla’s own poetry and philosophy.”\textsuperscript{373} Buttiglione suggests Wojtyla draws his interest in this unity from his Polish identity, and that Poland is a reference point for his conclusions about individual rights and the role of government in upholding those rights.\textsuperscript{374} Wojtyla’s cultural and philosophical formation are each linked by his passionate and intellectual formation in the relationship between the person’s ultimate aim (the infinite) and ethical action (the finite). As Poland transitioned from a nation under Nazi control to a nation under Soviet Communist control, Wojtyla’s philosophy emphasised the need for linking sound philosophy with concrete moments of “action”.\textsuperscript{375} Wojtyla’s aim to unify the finite and the infinite parallels the likes of Cicero and Burke’s aim to integrate the “tower” and the “forum”, or ends and means. For Wojtyla, the reality of choice has a double effect of both the immediate effect of the action, and the inner formation that act has on individual character. Thus, it is important for actions to aim at the right ends to develop a sound character, which, Wojtyla believes, is desirable for the individual.\textsuperscript{376}

\textsuperscript{371} Rowland, ‘John Paul II and Human Dignity’, in \textit{John Paul II: Legacy and Witness}, 54.
\textsuperscript{372} Buttiglione, \textit{Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II}, 27.
\textsuperscript{373} Ibid. Buttiglione states these themes are “the genius of Catholicism”. The likes of Norwid and Schelling helped shape the same aim – placing the obligations and duties of the present moment at the service of Christ, who is eternal – in Wojtyla.
\textsuperscript{374} Buttiglione, \textit{Karol Wojtyla}, 42–3
In his approach to the “forum”, Weigel believes that Wojtyla was not especially vocal about Polish politics, nor did he publish any works directly engaging the Polish Communist government while he was a priest and ethics professor. Indeed, Weigel argues, “by all accounts, Father Karol Wojtyła continued to be utterly uninterested in what passed for ‘politics’ in Poland in the 1950s.” This indicates Wojtyla did not contain the same degree of *thymos* – what Glendon calls the “noble sort of ambition” that drives political action – as he did *eros*. Nevertheless, his work in the “tower” was concerned with the significance of work in the “forum,” and could also be considered a response to that domain. For example, he is concerned that ideologies, among other “evil of our times”, deny each person’s fundamental uniqueness. In a letter in 1968 to Jesuit friend and theologian Henri De Lubac, Wojtyla confided,

“I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to the metaphysical significance of the mystery of the PERSON. It seems to me that the debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverisation, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical than of the moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of “recapitulation” of the mystery of the person.”

For Wojtyla, the human person-in-relationship as distinct from the “human being” as member-of-species, or ideologies that reduce human persons to solely material beings, is a defining feature of his major philosophical works, with profound implications for his political thought. Williams states that John Paul II brings “his experiential, philosophical, and

theological antecedents”, and the “political situations with which [he] is faced” to the first “Slavic” papacy. How these experiential, philosophical and theological ideas shape John Paul II’s conception of human rights is the focus of the next section. It aims to understand Wojtyla’s idea of the “human person” and the implications his philosophical thought has on individual rights. The section following will then address how human rights are fostered in Wojtyla’s concept of community, and the obligations fundamental rights place on economic and political structures, thereby constituting the central aspects of his political thought.

Section Two: Human Persons and Human Rights

The Human Person at the Centre of Wojtyla’s Political Thought

Wojtyla’s philosophical project aims at providing a philosophical anthropology of the person as an irreducible subject. He approaches this through bridging the philosophy of objective man (ontology) and subjective man (phenomenology). His aim is to present a philosophy that solves the problem of how to understand man as a subject, in an objective sense. Wojtyla identified a need for applying the tools of phenomenology to enrich the Thomistic account of the human person. For Wojtyla, the metaphysics of St Thomas Aquinas left little room to explore the realm of personal experience as a means of recognising objective values. Hence, Wojtyla’s most original thought attempts to incorporate the personalist lens of phenomenology with the ontology of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition.

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381 Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State, and Society’, 472.
382 Wilk, ‘Human Person and Freedom According to Karol Wojtyla’, 269. Wilk explains Wojtyla’s anthropology relies on the classical Boethian definition of the person – individual substantia ratio naturalis (individual substance of a rational nature). Wojtyla writes, “In the first and fundamental approach the man-person has to be somewhat identified with its basic ontological structure. The person is a concrete man, the individual substantia of the classical Boethian definition.” Wilk explains that all of Wojtyla’s exploration of the inner dynamisms of the person is grounded in this definition.
Wilk identifies Wojtyla’s concern that sole reliance on phenomenology lacks a sound ontology, and can lead to subjectivism.\textsuperscript{385} On the other hand, for Wojtyla, phenomenology provides a way of enriching the concept of the human person through exploring the “whole subjective, conscious aspect,” which he claimed had been, to some extent, “levelled by metaphysical naturalism.”\textsuperscript{386} Wojtyla’s concern about an intellectual divide between a “metaphysical naturalism,” on the one hand, and “subjectivism” on the other, highlights his focus on human goods from the “tower”. The dominant aspects of Wojtyla’s philosophical thought concern the intellectual understanding of human personhood, which he believes can be resolved through objectivising subjective human action. Understanding human personhood through both experience and an objective ontology is essential for Wojtyla’s grasp of human rights, which shapes his ideas of the ends of politics. Wojtyla writes,

I am convinced that the line of demarcation between the subjectivistic (idealistic) and objectivistic (realistic) views in anthropology and ethics must break down and is in fact breaking down on the basis of the experience of the human being. This experience automatically frees us from pure consciousness as the subject conceived and assumed \textit{a priori}, and leads us to full concrete existence of the human being, to the reality of the conscious subject. With all phenomenological analyses in the realm of that assumed subject (pure consciousness) now at our disposal, we can no longer go on treating the human being exclusively as an objective being, but we must also somehow treat the human being as a subject in the dimension in which the specifically human subjectivity of the human being is determined by consciousness. And that dimension would seem to be none other than \textit{personal} subjectivity.\textsuperscript{387}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[387] Wojtyla, \textit{Person and Community}, 210
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For Wojtyla, the philosophical insight *operari sequit esse*, which is to say, *action follows being*, necessitates a rich understanding of human action, within a sound account of being (ontology). Wojtyla explains that “something has to exist to be able to act”, and “something acts according to its being”. The human person is, for Wojtyla, capable of action that constitutes the person’s identity, within the limits of human nature (as Aquinas theorised). Human action at once reveals the person as an independent, free-thinking subject whose acts are unique and irreducible; and at the same time the person is a member of an objectively ordered species that can experience the same kinds of “inner happenings” as all other human persons. As Wojtyla puts it,

For us action reveals the person, and we look at the person through his action. For it lies in the nature of the correlation inherent in experience, in the very nature of man’s acting, that action constitutes the specific moment whereby the person is revealed. Action gives us the best insight into the inherent essence of the person and allows us to understand the person most fully.

All human beings can be distinguished by this potency to both act and be aware of the inner transformation through the act. Wojtyla argues that the blend of phenomenology with classical ontology helps gain the insight that human beings have a richer identity than simply a shared membership in the same species. At the same time, this shared nature enables subjective human action to transcend itself as a manifestation of an objective nature. Persons pursue actions that fulfil their good, and this human good is the same for every person.

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388 Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, 83–84
389 Ibid., 71. The self constitutes itself through action, through the *operari* proper to the human being as a person…the human self is able to constitute itself in this manner only because it already is and has been constituted in an essential and fundamental way as a *suppositum*. The *suppositium humanum* must somehow manifest itself as a human self: metaphysical subjectivity must manifest itself as personal subjectivity.
390 Ibid., 66.
Personal subjectivity recognises persons as “someone”, rather than “something”. The status of “someone” is unique to each person, and therefore imbues him or her with an inviolable dignity. Buttiglione notes that the core of the human rights movement stemmed from the same conviction shared by Wojtyla – belief in the “inviolable dignity of each individual human person”. For Wojtyla, this dignity is the source of human rights.

Within the framework, Wojtyla’s approach to political ends through philosophy, rather than government policy primarily, renders him an “intellectual”. To treat a person as a mere being leads to a limited grasp of the person, with practical complications. Abstract definitions of beings do not grasp the full essence of being a person. Moving away from this vision can also reduce human beings to objects. For Wojtyla, as for Kant, treating persons as means to ends is a great moral wrong. He states:

Whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but also allow for the fact that he or she too has or at least should have distinct personal ends. This principle, thus formulated, lies at the basis of all the human freedoms.

Wojtyla’s central occupation is thus the human person, which is the basis of his conception of the proper practice of politics. Gregg argues that Wojtyla’s consideration of

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393 Rocco Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla and St. Thomas Aquinas’, paper presented at P.A.S.T.A Converence (Houston, Texas, 17–19 October, 2013); Buttiglione observes that Wojtyla’s final view is that while phenomenology enriches the traditional approach of Aristotle and Thomism, it is “unable to overcome the opposition between nature and person”. Buttiglione summarises, Karol Wojtyla rereads the modern discovery of subjectivity on the basis of the metaphysics of being in order to arrive at the concrete human being who is ‘the way of the Church’. Along this route the philosophy and theology of St. Thomas offer to John Paul II a compass and a landmark that smooth the path and make fruitful the dialogue with time.
396 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 28.
“politically contentious matters” includes the role of unions, market limits, socialism and capitalism as economic systems, in a way that is faithful to the authoritative tradition of Church teaching and his moral anthropology. Gregg cites Glendon’s interpretation that John Paul II’s perspective on the human person, “applicable to economics, politics, law and all other disciplines relating to man – is rooted in a view of the human person which aspires to be correct.” This view is “profoundly anthropological” in its orientation, highlighting the person as free-thinking and choosing subject, alone and in community with others. Wojtyla reads the entire political landscape through the lens of his moral anthropology. As Schall observes, Wojtyla’s insistence on working out the proper human ends is consonant with Aristotle’s notion of the purpose of politics as working out the human goods. Indeed, Schall notes that Wojtyla is particularly concerned with identifying proper political ends in response to the “lowering of sights of which Machiavelli and modern liberalism spoke.” This point is relevant to earlier discussions in Chapter Two, concerning the problems that can be involved in a so-called Machiavellian perspective on the nature of politics. In his view of political ends, Wojtyla is not Machiavellian.

**Human Rights**

From Wojtyla’s phenomenological training, writes Buttiglione, Wojtyla’s solution to idealistic accounts of personhood is to derive analysis from the *hic et nunc* – the here and now of history. Beginning with the experiences and actions of human persons is the starting point

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399 Gregg, *Challenging the Modern World*, 141.
401 Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla’, 6. Buttiglione is clear that Wojtyla’s starting point of the present moment, grounded in reality, then proceeds to take the listener “step by step” towards “the fundamental structures that enliven this history and towards the Son of God who stands in the centre of cosmos and, through his incarnation, also of history.” Thus, Wojtyla’s philosophical and political thought cannot be wholly separated from “the light of the history of salvation”.

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to recognise dignity and is the locus of rights. Abstract (idealistic) accounts of human persons fail to grasp the needs (and the dignity) of persons in real contexts. Wojtyla argues that all considerations of human rights must start from this reality. As Urmson explains, failing to understand what the right means are in the *hic et nunc*, and to judge accordingly, is an excessive form of political judgment, and is a vice.\(^{402}\) Thus, Wojtyla is aware of the intellectual problem of what Maritain calls “hypermoralism”, which causes political judgment to remain “something impracticable and merely ideal”.\(^{403}\) Figure 3.1 below, illustrates how “hypermoralist” forms of political judgment are excessive, in relation to the virtue of practical wisdom.

**Figure 3.1: Hypermoralism as a Vice**

According to Barrett, Wojtyla, as John Paul II, adopts several rights from the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights. The basic rights that must be protected and upheld by governments, and include the right to life, freedom of religion, freedom to found a family, to gain employment for a just wage, to internal and external migration, the right to participate in the free choice of the political system to which one belongs, and the right participate in the community.\(^{404}\) Williams argues that John Paul II promotes these rights because of his formation

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Acknowledging the theological roots of Wojtyla’s thought, the present thesis aims to emphasise Wojtyla’s conception of political ends as a philosopher, rather than as a theologian.


under totalitarian systems. His experience of Polish communism, and the lack of worker rights, political freedoms, freedom of religion and economic stability informed his approach to the papal politics.\textsuperscript{405} Weigel adds that John Paul II’s 1979 address to the United Nations “unambiguously” committed the Catholic Church to the “cause of human freedom and the defence of basic human rights as the primary goal of its engagement with world politics”.\textsuperscript{406} This, then, is where John Paul II’s work clearly intersects between tower and forum. John Paul II proposed “the Church wishes to serve people also in the temporal dimension of their life and existence”,\textsuperscript{407} giving it an interest in the political common good of each nation-state, and the means used to secure it. Hence, basic human rights are where John Paul II’s work as a philosopher (in the tower) opts to engage world politics (the forum).

Barrett categorises John Paul II’s list of rights into “positive” and “negative” rights. The positive rights are basic preconditions needed to guarantee participation in the political life of the community and “should be received from others.”\textsuperscript{408} These rights include access to employment, a just wage, and search for the truth without fear of censorship. Barrett describes them as “positive” because they require the support of economic and political structures, as well as the support from the community to secure them.\textsuperscript{409} Negative rights are those limitations on behaviours that must be observed not just by government, but by individuals and groups to ensure the social welfare of those lacking access to basic goods.\textsuperscript{410} This distinction emphasises the role and responsibility Wojtyla places on both individual persons and structures of community, including economics, government and community culture, to secure human rights. The individual is tasked with pursuing the good, and upholding the good of others, within a

\textsuperscript{405} Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State, and Society’, 472.
\textsuperscript{406} Weigel, Witness to Hope, 349.
\textsuperscript{407} Pope John Paul II, Return to Poland: The Collected Speeches of John Paul II (London: Collins, 1979), 22.
\textsuperscript{408} Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 61.
\textsuperscript{409} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{410} Ibid., 60.
just political and economic structure or system that enables the full participation of the person in the life of the community.\textsuperscript{411}

Barrett suggests Wojtyla has a “qualified acceptance” of the liberal democratic order as the system naturally consistent with “man’s social nature.”\textsuperscript{412} However, this acceptance of liberal, democratic rule is “tempered with conditions and critique.”\textsuperscript{413} Wojtyla believes that the system itself can never be the political end sought. Rather, “the human person transcends the political community and constitutes therefore the end to which all political action should be oriented.”\textsuperscript{414} This includes an active participation from persons in the political process to avoid “narrow ruling groups”:

Peoples must be able to choose freely the social organisation to which they aspire for their own country, and … this organisation should be in conformity with justice, in respect of freedom, religious faith, and human rights in general. It is a commonly shared conviction that no people should be treated by other peoples as subordinate or as an instrument.\textsuperscript{415}

Barrett states that it is precisely because of Wojtyla’s concept of free human action, when aimed at human goods, as an expression of dignity, that he favours a political system where political choices are enhanced as good in itself.\textsuperscript{416}

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\item \textsuperscript{411} Wojtyla emphasises that human dignity is located in real experiences, and not guaranteed through abstract concepts. “Humanity is not the abstract idea of the human being, but… [is] the personal self, in each instance unique and unrepeatable. Humanity is not an abstraction or a generality, but has in each human being the particular “specific gravity” of a personal being… to participate in the humanity of another human being means to be vitally related to the other as a particular human being, and not just related to what makes the other (\textit{in abstracto}) a human being. This is ultimately the basis for the whole distinctive character of the evangelical concept of neighbour.”
\item \textsuperscript{412} Barrett, \textit{Persons and Liberal Democracy}, 49.
\item \textsuperscript{413} Ibid., 63.
\item \textsuperscript{414} Buttiglione, ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla”, 5.
\item \textsuperscript{416} Barrett, \textit{Persons and Liberal Democracy}, 64.
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Barrett compares Wojtyla to Tocqueville regarding the necessity of education about “true ideals” that form the basis for citizens to make informed political choices. Like Tocqueville, states Barrett, Wojtyla “stresses the importance of non-state institutions to suitably educate and form persons.” These “structures” help supply the public knowledge of political ends. Tabachnick concurs that “an educational backdrop” is necessary for citizens to make “sound judgments.” Without institutions to deliver these conditions, however, Wojtyla believes it is acceptable that rights be secured by rulers who are appointed through acceptable non-democratic means. Thus, for Wojtyla, the “basic organising principle [of the State] should be the primacy of the good of humanity and of the human person over every other consideration.” The person is more fundamental for Wojtyla than the system in which the person operates. Any political or economic structure is subordinate to the prior rights of the human person.

This brief account of Wojtyla’s perspective on rights aims to highlight that persons and structures, individuals and the community, are responsible for securing human rights. This idea has implications in the social, economic and political structures of any society. In the context of explanations of John Paul II’s concept of participation as the chief end of politics, the present thesis proposes that John Paul II believes human rights need to be fostered within communities as well as within structures of both governance and economics. His idea from the “tower” thus informs and intersects with his activity in the “forum”.

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417 Ibid.
418 Tabachnick is among those scholars who rely on the argument that citizens can exercise Aristotle’s phronesis. Ruderman rejects this notion, arguing that only the statesperson can exercise phronesis. Tabachnick suggests there is a “common phronesis” that citizens exercise to determine how to pursue the human goods, and the “uncommon phronesis”, which belongs to the statesperson who must work out how to attain the human goods for the whole State. See Tabachnick, “‘Phronesis’, Democracy and Technology”, 1000.
419 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 64–5.
Section Three: Participation, Alienation and Political Structures

Participation: The Chief End of Politics

The current research project argues that Wojtyla’s formation and education under totalitarian regimes informs his political thought about the role of economic and political systems in securing human rights. Wojtyla’s central argument for the end of politics – that is, the common good – is bound up with his concept of participation. Wojtyla contends that “the state exists in order to protect…rights”, which requires statespersons to foster conditions where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. Participation for Wojtyla begins with understanding the person as an individual I as distinct from other I’s. This I is taken from the school of phenomenology, particularly the work of Max Scheler. Participation, in this sense, expresses the way “we as persons exist and act together with others, while not ceasing to be ourselves in action, in our own acts.” Clark identifies participation and its antithesis, alienation, as Wojtyla’s central concern for humanity. Clark also argues that it is for this reason participation is the criteria by which to evaluate forms economic, social and political structures. She cites Wojtyla,

423 In particular, Wojtyla drew from Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and a Non-Formal Ethics of Value: A New Attempt Toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, trans. Manfred S. Fings and Roger L Funk (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1973); Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), explains the phenomenological school more generally. The subjective existence in a community are those I-Thou relationships within the community, where persons reveal themselves to one another. They reveal themselves through conscious action, which reveals their self-determining and self-governing nature, which, for Wojtyla, is the distinctively human capacity. They also reveal themselves in their striving for fulfilment, through “acts of conscience” that reveals a “transcendence proper to the human person”. An interpersonal community, properly speaking, is one in which the members take care of themselves, but also of others. This responsibility reflects conscience and the transcendence of the person, as each recognises that both the I and the Thou are constitutive of the “path the self-fulfilment”, and forms an “authentically personal” dimension of community.
424 K Wojtyla, Person and Community, 199.
426 Ibid., For Wojtyla, “there exists as mutuality in participation: on the one hand, by participation, a self releases the personalistic value of its act, and on the other hand, all participation types of activity
The structures of the social existence of human beings in the conditions of modern civilization... absolutely must be evaluated in the light of this basic criterion: Do they create the conditions—for this is their only real function—for the development of participation?427

Conceptually, Wojtyla argues that when persons engage in a “community of acting” as a group, this dimension is termed by the pronoun “we”.428 The individual simultaneously displays a readiness to think in terms of, and act towards, the good of the we as the fulfilment of each individual I.429 The “we” does not diminish the interpersonal relationships already present in the community; rather, it shifts the direction each member takes towards self-fulfilment – which now happens in relation to a commonly held end. Wojtyla explains, A we is many human beings, many subjects, who in some way exist and act together. Acting ‘together’ (i.e., ‘in common’) does not mean engaging in a number of activities that somehow go along side by side. Rather it means that these activities, along with the existence of those many I’s are related to a single value, which therefore deserves to be called the common good.430

The distinguishing character of community in Wojtyla’s philosophy is the explicit identification of individual fulfilment through participation in community with the common good.431 The fulfilment one receives through genuine interpersonal relationships is in no way should be structured in such a way that the self, which is included in that form of action, is given the opportunity to realize (concretize) its own self.”

427 Wojtyla, Person and Community, 206.
428 Williams, ‘John Paul II’s Concepts of Church, State and Society’, 472.
429 Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community, 251–2.
431 Jeffreys, ‘John Paul II and Participation in World Politics’, 75. Jeffreys explains the most localised form of community is expressed in the I-Thou relationship. The I-Thou relationship reflects the “interhuman, interpersonal dimension of the community”. When recognising the person as another I, there is a “reflexivity of this relationship”, where I acknowledge a “relation that proceeds from me, but also returns to me.” Jeffreys observes that this experience uncovers more than a fact of two members of the same species; it uncovers a normative element, that is “reducible to treating and
diminished, but is rather enhanced and enriched by participating in the shared common end of the community.\textsuperscript{432} Therefore, the task of politics is to devise the means for every member of the community to experience participation.

Gregg explains that Wojtyla believes the person must have a sense of “acting for himself” as the community works towards achieving its “objective goal”. As a worker, for example, the employee must have a sense of ownership over his labours that dignifies his ability to produce a good or service through his actions.\textsuperscript{433} Participation is a “constitutive factor of community”.\textsuperscript{434} In \textit{The Acting Person}, Wojtyla’s concept of community also distinguishes the goal of community from the fulfilment of the individual members. Each community has particular aims that are achieved through actions that aim at, and achieve, the ends.\textsuperscript{435} Wojtyla colours his example of the worker with the example of workers digging a trench. The labourers come together in a “community of acting” towards a shared goal: digging the trench.\textsuperscript{436} But at the same time, Wojtyla argues that it is vital that the labourer (or any person) “belonging to a community of acting… is in a position in his communal acting to perform real actions and fulfil himself.”\textsuperscript{437} This ability to be fulfilled through the relationships in the community of acting is what Wojtyla calls “participation”.\textsuperscript{438}

In his political thought, Wojtyla argues that any system that fails to understand the personalistic and relational foundation of participation is “dangerous for the truth of the image in question” and “impossible”.\textsuperscript{439} While Wojtyla locates the problem within personal

\textsuperscript{432} Karol Wojtyla, \textit{Person and Community}, 239. Wojtyla notes that social groups can become a source of alienation in proportion to the disappearance of community, that is, in proportion to the

\textsuperscript{433} Gregg, \textit{Challenging the Modern World}, 137.

\textsuperscript{434} Wojtyla, \textit{The Acting Person}, 332.

\textsuperscript{435} Gregg, \textit{Challenging the Modern World}, 137. Gregg suggests that here, Wojtyla might be drawing these distinctions from the German \textit{Gemeinschaft} (community) and \textit{Gesellschaft} (society).

\textsuperscript{436} Ibid., 336.

\textsuperscript{437} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{438} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{439} Karol Wojtyla, \textit{Person and Community}, 239. Wojtyla notes that social groups can become a source of alienation in proportion to the disappearance of community, that is, in proportion to the
responsibility, he recognises that economic and political structures can contribute to what he calls “alienation”, which is the antithesis of participation and leads to the perversion of the common good.

Alienation: The Defect of Economic and Political Systems

For Wojtyla, “alienation basically means the negative of participation, for it renders participation difficult or even impossible.” Practices that subordinate the dynamic, fulfilling nature of relationships in the communities of being and the communities of acting, to collective interests (called totalism) or individual interests (called individualism) create alienation. For Wojtyla, individualism occurs where the person accepts needing other persons as a kind of means to an end to continue to advance toward their own goals. The individual has no interest in the fundamental good of other beings, and engages with them only to the extent they can benefit their goals. Such a practice denies Wojtyla’s claim that human persons can only be fulfilled in mutually self-giving relationships. At the opposite extreme is totalism. This defect prevails when collective interests subvert individual rights. Mejos comments that in totalistic societies, there is a tendency that persons may be coerced to contribute to the achievement of the common good. He writes,

It is not surprising that a state or even a small community running on the lines of totalism will end up committing violations of fundamental rights of human beings as persons. Persons are not allowed to pursue their own individual growth under the assumption that it will not bring any contribution to the social group.

_440_ Wojtyla, ‘Participation or Alienation?’ in _Person and Community_, 206
_441_ Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_, 274.
_443_ Wojtyla, _The Acting Person_, 274.
Schall observes that Wojtyla has market and State systems in mind when describing the defect of totalism:

People lose sight of the fact that life in society has neither the market nor the State as its final purpose, since life itself has a unique value, which the State and the market must serve. Man remains above all a being who seeks the truth and strives to live in that truth, deepening his understanding of it through a dialogue, which involves past and future generations.445

Both totalism and individualism, despite their differences, has the same root cause. Each method promotes a conception of the human good that ignores the essential need of participation in the social dimension of the community, give the goal of the common good: participation as essential for self-fulfilment. The means of participation can be diverse, but can only be pursued through the limits of treating others as other “I’s”.446

Analysing Political and Economic Structures: Socialism and Capitalism

Gregg observes that when he was writing his social encyclicals during the Cold War, John Paul II unpacked the “structures of sin” in the power structures of the “East” and “West” blocs. Baum writes that Sollicitudo Rei Socialis refers to

The existence of two opposing blocs, known commonly as the East and the West. The reason for this description is not purely political, but is also, as the expression goes, geo-political. Each of the two blocs tends to assimilate or gather around it other countries or groups of countries, to different degrees of adherence or participation.447

Gregg argues that the “blocs” John Paul II refers to are the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Each bloc “identifies itself with a system of organising society and exercising power which presents itself as an alternative to the other.” Gregg notes John Paul II identifies the root of the opposition is ideological in nature. The West promotes a “liberal capitalism” while in the East there exists a “system of Marxist collectivism.” This opposition grew into a “military opposition and gave rise to two blocs of armed forces, each suspicious and fearful of the other’s domination.”

Schall observes that in Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, Pope John Paul II affirms the view that true human development “cannot consist in the simple accumulation of wealth”, but rather “must be measured and oriented according to the reality and vocation of man seen in his totality”. Linking this to the later encyclical Centesimus Annus, John Paul II writes that “the political economy is a means to the end of full personal development of the individual, institutional and social levels.” The purpose of these encyclicals is not to provide a strict Catholic economic model. Rather, John Paul II offers a moral compass to guide any economic model, present or future, and to serve as the basis for critique of any model. He does not set out a list of prescriptions for economic activity and structure, but articulates a detailed understanding of the human person, which is to provide the “normative basis for the critique of a political economy.” This system is guided by moral precepts that “the State and all of society have the duty of defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the

448 Gregg, Challenging the Modern World, 188
449 Ibid.
450 Gregory Baum et al., The Logic of Solidarity.
452 Sethi, Reflections on Centesimus Annus, 903.
essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each individual.\textsuperscript{454}

Gregg writes that John Paul II’s declaration in introducing \textit{Centesimus Annus} sums up the central thesis of his political thought,

A great commitment on the political, economic, social and cultural level is necessary to build a society that is more just and worthy of the person. But this is not enough! A decisive commitment must be made in the very heart of man, in the intimacy of his conscience, where he makes his personal decisions. Only on this level can the human person affect a true, deep and positive change in himself, and that is the undeniable premise of contributing to change and the improvement of all society.\textsuperscript{455}

John Paul II sees the market, political order, and social structures through the lens of man as the image of God, with a spiritual nature that orients him towards reflection and wonder. He has a personal identity that cannot be expressed in economic terms alone. He has a personal character; his needs satisfied through more than the state order. His intermediary groups, such as family, social, religious and other community groups, are fundamental to full human development.

Wojtyla writes that, within the “Eastern Bloc”, the good of the group is the most important, while “the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of the mechanism.”\textsuperscript{456} A central tenet of \textit{Centesimus Annus} suggests, according to Schall, that socialism’s error is predicated on “this moral-anthropological truth about man”:

The fundamental error of socialism is anthropological in nature. Socialism considers the individual person simply as an element, a molecule within the social organism, so that the good of the individual is completely subordinated to the functioning of the

\textsuperscript{454} \textit{Centesimus Annus}, 57 in Schall, "The Teaching of "Centesimus Annus"." 31  
\textsuperscript{455} John Paul II, “Confronting the Challenges”, 3 in Gregg, \textit{Challenging the Modern World}, 233.  
socio-economic mechanism. Socialism likewise maintains that the good of the individual can be realised without reference to his free choice, to the unique and exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face of good or evil. Man is thus reduced to a series of social relationships, and the concept of the person as the autonomous subject of moral decision disappears, the very subject whose decisions build the social order.457

At the same time, John Paul II rejects the self-regulating free market in favour of a system where certain inherent values cannot be violated. John Paul advocates necessary State and societal intervention in the Market, as “there are collective and qualitative needs which cannot be satisfied by market mechanisms… these mechanisms carry the risk of an ‘idolatry’ of the market, an idolatry which ignores the existence of goods which by their nature are not and cannot be mere commodities.458 Effectively then, Wojtyla’s perspective of the defects of economic and political systems in securing the common good draws from his analysis of the prevailing geopolitical structure of the Cold War, which, in turn, is shaped by his personal experience of totalitarianism. That is, Wojtyla’s idea that the common good is secured through enhancing individual participation in the economic, political and cultural aspects of national life is shaped by his education under totalitarian regimes. Buttiglione proposes it is possible to speak of Wojtyla’s “political praxis”.459 As Glendon emphasises in The Forum and The Tower, the political context can shape the person’s conceptions of what political ends are and how they are best pursued. In Wojtyla’s case, Buttiglione argues that Wojtyla’s Catholic formation as a Priest informs his understanding of how to pursue political ends. He writes,

459 Rocco Buttiglione ‘The Political Praxis of Karol Wojtyla’, 5.
It is a matter of course that John Paul II did not make politics in the common sense of this word if by the word politics you understand a struggle to conquer and defend power. The man who tells the truth does not enter into the political game. The witness given to truth produces however political effects which can sometimes be even revolutionary.\textsuperscript{460}

Guietti and Murphy also add that Wojtyla’s education under Polish communism and Nazism directly informs these views. They describe Buttiglione’s account of Wojtyla’s philosophy as “a fiery defence of freedom in an age of political tyrannies. Wojtyla’s awareness of freedom and of the real possibility of losing it derives from his direct experience [of being educated under Nazism and Communism].”\textsuperscript{461} For example, according to Jeffreys, Wojtyla writes of participation as a “property of the person”.\textsuperscript{462} It is expressed through the human capacity to “endow existence and action with a personalistic dimension” when a person acts together with other persons.\textsuperscript{463} This affirmation of work as personal property directly contrasts the socialist notion of state ownership and redistribution of labour. In social matters, Wojtyla tends to “take the side of unions”, in support of the freedom and dignity of “blue collar workers”.\textsuperscript{464} His experience as a labourer in the Slovay Chemical Plant and a limestone quarry as a student helped Wojtyla appreciate the dignity of labour. The manual labour produces “solidarity” among the workers, who require a right to unionise as a legal recognition of that bond, in the service of his belief in a just wage.\textsuperscript{465}

Weigel is of the view that throughout the 1980’s, John Paul II never explicitly identified the nations being treated as subordinate to others, but was unmistakably interpreted as referring

\textsuperscript{460} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{461} Guietti and Murphy, ‘Transaltors’ Afterword’, 313.
\textsuperscript{462} Jeffreys, ‘John Paul II and Participation in World Politics’, 75.
\textsuperscript{463} Jeffreys, “John Paul II and Participation in International Politics”, in The Political Papacy, 74.
\textsuperscript{464} Guietti and Murphy, 313-14.
\textsuperscript{465} Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 65.
to Poland’s denial of these freedoms under the Polish government.\textsuperscript{466} Guietti and Murphy go so far as to argue that Wojtyla’s philosophical works are a veiled critique of the communist totalitarian system in which he was educated. They state that “even the carefully obtuse Communist censorship would never have suspected that [Wojtyla’s political thought in \textit{The Acting Person}] was a really dangerous piece of writing.”\textsuperscript{467}

Guietti and Murphy posit whether Wojtyla’s insistence on human freedom and individual rights is “so radical that, in retrospect, one might ask if Wojtyla overreacted to his experience of political slavery.”\textsuperscript{468} Another assessment can also be considered, however, which is that this notion of Wojtyla’s subtle critique of the communist political system helps explain his seemingly “obsessive” defence of human freedom. Some comparison is possible between Wojtyla’s subtlety and Burke’s notion that “one learns to speak the truth with measure, that he may speak it the longer”\textsuperscript{469} Wojtyla takes the pursuit of “true ideals” as a worthwhile pursuit of politics. However, under a politically tyrannical regime, little room was offered to Wojtyla as a philosopher to publish openly about his view on the limits of the communist system. Indeed, Williams writes that “one can find hardly any explicit references to Marxism and Communism in Wojtyla’s writings.”\textsuperscript{470} Instead of critiquing Marxism, Communism, or materialism, Wojtyla’s lectures as an Ethics professor focussed on the more abstract “utilitarianism”. Instead of “totalitarianism”, Wojtyla used the more ambiguous “totalism”.\textsuperscript{471}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textsuperscript{466} Weigel, \textit{The End and The Beginning}, 114–15.
\item \textsuperscript{467} Guietti and Murphy, 311.
\item \textsuperscript{468} Ibid., 313.
\item \textsuperscript{469} Glendon, \textit{The Forum and the Tower}, 137.
\item \textsuperscript{470} George H Williams, “Karol Wojtyla and Marxism”, in Pedro Ramet (ed.) \textit{Catholicism in Communist Societies, Catholicism and Politics in Communist Societies}, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990) 365
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Guietti and Murphy cite Strauss’ view that oppressive regimes can create a mode of writing that critiques the dominant power structure with subtlety:

For the influence of persecution on literature is precisely that it compels all writers who hold heterodox views to develop a peculiar technique of writing, the technique which we have in mind when speaking of writing between the lines.472

Unlike Plato, who, as Glendon recounts, failed to say the “politic thing” when engaging with powerful rulers, Wojtyla’s pre-papal writings suggests that Wojtyla exercises caution in expressing political ideas that could incite an aggressive response from the prevailing political power. This approach can be compared to Glendon’s analysis of Burke, who continually exercised caution in his writings and statements on the plight of the Irish people, who experienced oppression under English laws and social norms.473 Thus, Wojtyla’s work as a scholar within the “tower” exhibits some of the cautionary wisdom that Glendon suggests is important for those who aim at political influence, or find themselves through circumstance in positions of influence.

On the other hand, as Pope, John Paul II’s encyclicals contain clearer enunciations of his views on political systems, which suggests he holds a new platform of agency through which to advance his political ideas. John Paul II’s efforts to advance his political aims in his home country of Poland is the subject of analysis in Chapter Four. Thus, how Pope John Paul II approaches political practice through the papacy is of particular interest to the current research project. In particular, it will examine how his approach influenced Poland under the Communist system.

Conclusion

Chapter Three has aimed to describe Karol Wojtyla’s political context to understand how his education and formation inform his passionate beliefs, particularly in the dignity of the human person as the basis of fundamental human rights. In this context, the study identified Wojtyla’s development of participation as the primary philosophical concept that informs his political thought. It has shown that Wojtyla’s experiences of totalitarianism and his development as a philosopher produce a political philosophy that elevates the good of the individual person as the goal to which politics should be oriented. In particular, it has given evidence to suggest that Wojtyla’s political thought is critical of political and economic structures – especially socialism and capitalism – that produce outcomes that corrode his conception of human dignity, most particularly in the denial of what he considers basic human rights.

It has suggested that the method shows Wojtyla’s consideration of whether or not he should join the Carmelites, and his decision to become a priest and train as a philosopher demonstrate his choice for a life in the “tower”, more so than the “forum”. Within his vocation as a philosopher and ethics professor, the thesis has attempted to relay Wojtyla’s understanding of the human person as the central preoccupation of his philosophical development. Through Wilk, Buttiglione and others, the chapter has shown how Wojtyla draws from both the philosophical schools of phenomenology and Aristotelian-Thomism to construct his anthropology, which provides the intellectual basis for his political thought. It has argued that Wojtyla’s conception of human rights draws from this anthropology, and has implications for his view on individual responsibility and the role of economic and political structures in securing human rights.

Clark, Williams, Gregg, and Barrett, among others, were employed to highlight that “the state exists in order to protect…rights”, 476 which requires statespersons to foster conditions where each person can fully participate in the dynamic life of the community. Within Wojtyla’s concepts of participation and alienation, the thesis suggests that Wojtyla’s own experiences of totalitarian regimes under Nazism and Communism directly inform his critique of the limits of political and economic structures in securing human rights. His education amidst these political experiences produced a method of political thought that, in the view of Williams, among others, exercised caution to not openly criticise the Polish communist system. In his limited pre-papal public life as a philosopher and ethics professor, Wojtyla can be understood as an intellectual with deep convictions about the dignity of the human person. This dignity grants the person inviolable rights that, in Wojtyla’s view, must be fostered through ordinary social life, and fostered through the support of economic and political systems naturally consistent with these aims.

With his election to the papacy, Chapter Four argues that Pope John Paul II experiences an increased political agency that enables him to pursue his political aims with a more robust and direct rhetoric than he employed as a philosopher in Poland. Chapter Four presents a case study on John Paul II’s engagement with Polish communism to identify how, and to what extent, the means he pursues to secure human rights for the Polish people are consistent with the political thought established in Chapter Three. The current research project aims to understand whether John Paul II operates with integrity, or whether he compromises on his political aims, within the present thesis’ explanation of phronesis. It will attempt to place him on the “Glendon graph”, which will help illustrate the extent to which John Paul II can be considered a phronimos, or can be placed more towards the extremes of “hypermoralism” or “Machiavellianism” in his method of political judgment.

Chapter Four

Introduction

Chapter Three argued that political aims are, for John Paul II, actualised through securing individual rights, recognising workers’ dignity, participation in the process of selecting government, economic freedoms, and the freedom for religious and cultural expression. These can be understood as John Paul II’s view of political ends. Chapter Four contends that Pope John Paul II pursued these political aims in the Polish communist context through means consistent with his political ends. Effectively, this means that he did not compromise his values from the tower when pursuing his ends in the forum. Chapter Four discusses this in three sections. The first identifies, through scholarly perspectives, instances where John Paul II’s engagement with Poland relies on his principle of participation. It argues that the “hybrid” agency of Pope John Paul II gave him unique agency in communist Poland. His role as head of the Catholic Church and of the Holy See gave him both international legal and political status and a moral obligation to defend the convictions of the Church. This section employs the arguments of Troy, Hall and other international relations theorists, on the nature of papal political influence. The inclusion of these scholarly perspectives does not alter the method of this thesis. Instead, the addition of Troy’s terminology describing the Pope’s political agency as “hybrid” helps understand the nature of John Paul II’s political influence.

477 See Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 38.
Glendon’s observation that agency can be facilitated through circumstance applies to John Paul II’s context. This highlights the transition in agency that Wojtyla makes from his pre-papal identity as a priest, poet, philosopher and professor of ethics, to his status as “chief diplomat” and “moral authority” on behalf of all adherents to the Catholic faith. Arguably, within this mode of agency, the addition of John Paul II’s Polish identity and experience of living under communism contributed to an unprecedented level of papal influence in Poland, where the national population was over 90% Catholic.

Section Two considers John Paul II’s political judgment in Poland as both a diplomatic actor and a “moral authority”. It explores how John Paul II deploys the tools available to him to determine the extent to which his decisions reflect an integrity of his convictions, or involve a tactful compromise on principles for the sake of immediate advantages. The thesis argues that his shift in papal foreign policy towards Eastern Europe – known as the *ostpolitik* – and his papal rhetoric during his public addresses, indicate that there is no conflict between the means that John Paul II used to influence Polish politics, and the political ends that he wanted to achieve. Though his decisions were consistent with his political aims, it can also be seen that that John Paul II exercised caution and used moderated language designed to inspire the Polish people without causing negative reactions from the Polish government.

The Glendon graph helps to interpret these examples, ultimately showing how John Paul II’s integrity leans him towards the “hypermoralist” side of the mean. However, his moderated language and strategic approach renders him closer to the middle point of the map, rather than the extreme.

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Section Three follows the insight of Glendon’s framework that political circumstances can facilitate, or hinder, the individual’s political success. She writes that the “optimal confluence” for political success involves “gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck.” Therefore, part of Glendon’s method requires consideration of how the political conditions were favourable or unfavourable for John Paul II’s political aims. This enables her to offer some judgment on the relationship between his decisions and the political conditions in the “reasons for success or failure”. Thus, although John Paul II’s actions aim for the right ends, it is arguable that the political circumstances were highly favourable for John Paul II to pursue his aims with integrity, and be successful. These circumstances must also be considered to assess the extent of John Paul II’s success in enhancing political participation through the communist collapse in Poland.

In light of this view, the section considers the extent to which John Paul II can be considered “practically wise”, in this context. Luxmoore and Babiuch’s, *The Vatican and The Red Flag*, and Gaddis’ *The Cold War: A New History* are among the works that offer analyses that argue John Paul II’s political engagement with Poland had a considerable impact on the events that led to the free elections and subsequent collapse of communism in 1989. John Paul II, then, can be considered central to the foundation of the Solidarity movement in Poland, which in turn was a major factor in the collapse of communism in Poland in 1989. The third section also considers perspectives in McDermott and Stibbe’s *The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe*, which emphasises that a combination of political, economic, and international factors contributed to the final demise of the Polish government, among other

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483 Ibid., x.
governments, within the Soviet Union. When placed within the Glendon framework, these factors constitute what Glendon calls the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. The framework offers some insights, or “lessons” on how John Paul II approaches decision-making, within the context of political, social and economic pressure on the Polish government. These factors were essential preconditions for John Paul II to successfully pursue his political aims in the Polish communist context.

The present thesis does not consider arguments of whether this led to the collapse of the entire Soviet Union. Some commentators take a linear approach to the events between 1989-1991, extrapolating a kind of domino effect whereby Poland caused the collapse of the entire Soviet Union. The literature is not settled on this issue, as scholars argue this is overly simplistic analysis. Therefore, the present thesis limits the area of analysis to the Polish context only, not engaging with the contested literature on the links between the revolution of 1989 in Poland and the rest of the USSR.

The thesis concludes that Glendon’s insight into the role of favourable conditions influencing political success can be applied to Pope John Paul II’s role in the collapse of the communist system in Poland. The Pope’s agency as diplomat and legitimate moral authority added additional pressure to the network of forces already pressuring the Polish communist system. In particular, his papal pilgrimages to Poland served as a catalyst and a unifying force necessary for the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union. However, it is perhaps more significant that John Paul II was elected to the papacy at the particular moment in history where a network of pressures had already undermined the communist system dramatically.

Section One: The Political Agency of the Papacy

The Pope as a “Hybrid” Political Actor

The framework aims to understand the nature of political influence Pope John Paul II possessed in the Holy See’s engagement with the Polish communist government between the Pope’s election in October, 1978 and the partial free elections in Poland on June 4, 1989. As Glendon contends, in some cases chance and circumstance can elevate a person to new positions of political influence, sometimes even undesirably.\(^{488}\) Chapter Three briefly explained that John Paul II’s elevation to the Polish episcopate (the order of Bishops) and then later his election to the papacy on 16 October, 1978, reflects the kind of circumstances Glendon considers “chance”, which differs from actively seeking a position of influence.\(^{489}\) This section aims to explain how Wojtyła’s election to the papacy enhances his political influence, from his pre-papal political agency as a philosopher and priest, and Archbishop of Krakow. In particular, it highlights how the papacy is the kind of political platform that enables John Paul II to make public pronouncements with more integrity than the subtlety he employed as a priest under communist oversight.

Troy, Marshall, Hall, and other international relations scholars, argue that religious organisations, and the Catholic Church especially, are engaged actors in political and social policy. Marshall explains that religious institutions extend their political and religious positions beyond their constituencies, and seek to be engaged in public policy discussions, regardless of the percentage of the population that institution claims as adherents.\(^{490}\) Diplomacy is the primary mode through which religious organisations engage with governments and


\(^{489}\) Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 252.

stakeholders in public policy discussions. Unlike other organised religions, however, Holy See diplomacy is “highly institutionalised, rests on formal diplomatic representations around the globe equal to embassies and acknowledged by international law.”

Troy explains that the Holy See exercises diplomacy in a unique fashion, distinct from its secular counterparts. Holy See diplomats, writes Troy, do not represent their principal’s (the Pope’s) immediate possessions, such as territory. Rather, they have a “hybrid” character, at once exercising an ecclesiastical role as a priest of the Catholic Church, and the representative of the Pope, and at the same time engaging in ordinary diplomatic practice as the international legal status of the Holy See enables them. Conway states that the Holy See’s two-fold priorities of individual salvation and temporal well-being keep it relevant to the public square. “Through [The Holy See’s] supernatural mission of salvation and the mundane reality of world politics, [the papacy] remains a singular and surprisingly vital factor in the international scene.” Troy proposes that the “hybrid character” of papal diplomacy is generated from political and religious “entanglements”. Papal diplomacy, therefore, is a unique combination of universal religious principles with conventional diplomatic practice.

Gillis argues that papal influence extends into public policy and the decisions of other States. Popes have the capacity to be of consequence, and must recognize the Papacy has political implications. Gillis states, in *The Political Papacy: John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Their Influence*:

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492 Troy, “’The Pope’s Own Hand Outstretched’, 522.
493 Ibid.
495 Troy, “’The Pope’s Own Hand Outstretched’, 522.
Once elected, all pontiffs recognize that they have the responsibility to make pronouncements with political implications since silence might mean a lost opportunity. At the same time, they must do so thoughtfully and carefully, often balancing the church’s diplomatic needs and the gospel’s demand to be prophetic. What a pope says is important because, as the leader of more than one billion Catholics, he commands the most significant international religious voice in the world. What he says is reported in the press all over the world. And what he says goes beyond pious platitudes. By his pronouncements, he attempts to influence public policy, other religions, governments, believers, and nonbelievers alike.497

The Holy See, then, adds moral value to international dialogue through its interest in religious communities, Catholic and non-Catholic alike, that reside within nation-states.498 The rights of religious groups, their freedom to worship, to gather as a community of believers and act according to the convictions of their faith are just some of the interests on which the Holy See engages governments. Further, the Holy See is a unique actor because it is more than an advocate for itself and its own interests. It also has a special interest in fundamental rights of all persons.499 Squaring its interests in the domain of universal values enables the Holy See to transcend the partisan nature of politics and interest-driven nature of diplomacy.500 Significantly, this elevates its “moral authority” as the chief defender of universal human rights.

499 Historically, this was not always the case. Prior to the loss of the Papal States in 1870, the Holy See pursued a policy agenda more similar to any other contemporary state. Popes no longer ruled vast territories or lands as sovereigns, “the popes of the mid-twentieth century had nonetheless carved out a new territory with considerable sway – the consciences of men and women, where the power of argument and persuasion was key.” Thus, it is relevant for the new pontiff to take note of his multiple roles in the world as pastor and sovereign, and learn to capitalize on the kind of influence he has as a moral witness to the good of the human person. See Gillis, The Political Papacy, viii, ix.
500 Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power Resource’, 593.
The Pope himself is considered the “chief diplomat and moral authority”. The “moral authority” of the Pope is also termed “soft power” by international relations scholars. Moral authority is considered a resource of power for individuals, organisations and States. Hall argues that “moral authority” can be used as a “power resource” when it becomes institutionalised as a “convention”. Hall writes that moral authority is institutionalised when it becomes “socially embedded in a system of actors whose social identities and interests impel them to recognize it as a power resource.” He continues that moral authority can be used as a tradable asset, like money or “the credible threat of military force,” to the extent each party values its worth. Moral authority has value among political actors as a medium of arbitrating disputes between spiritual and temporal authorities. It is a form of “currency” that can be traded when the political actors involved calculate that “hard power” options, such as military force, carry undesirable risk.

Through his election to the papacy of the Roman Catholic Church, Pope John Paul II exercises the “hybrid agency” of the Vatican City state as “chief diplomat” and “moral authority”. The Papal authority means he functions “as a political figure as well as spiritual leader”. Troy states that although the Holy See itself has a broad diplomatic apparatus, public and academic focus remains focussed on the Pope, which serves to publicise the Pope’s agency,

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501 Hall, ‘Moral Authority as a Power Resource’, International Organisation 51, no. 4 (1997): 591–622. Soviet Leader Mikhail Gorbachev is reported to have introduced John Paul II to his wife as ‘the highest moral authority on earth.’ See Weigel, Witness to Hope, 602.
504 Hall, 594.
505 Ibid., 596–7.
506 The Vatican City State was founded following the signing of the Lateran Pacts between the Holy See and Italy on February 11th 1929. These were ratified on June 7th 1929. Its nature as a sovereign State distinct from the Holy See is universally recognized under international law. For more information see: http://www.vaticanstate.va/content/vaticanstate/en.html
and enhance it. As former US Ambassador to the Vatican Francis Rooney puts it, “from nuts and bolts bureaucratic decisions to great theological disputes… the pope is the person in whom final authority is vested. There is no separation of powers in the Vatican. Every chain of command leads ultimately to him.”

Rooney continues that the Holy See participates in international relations as the governing body of the Vatican City State. As such,

The Holy See, which enjoys international juridical status, is… presented as a sovereign and independent moral authority, and as such takes part in international relations. Within nations its action as a moral authority, aims at furthering an ethic of relations between the different protagonists of the international community.”

Before his papal election, Wojtyla’s political influence was limited to his office as Archbishop of Krakow, through which he negotiated with the Communist government for specific pastoral initiatives. The present thesis suggests that, as Pope John Paul II, he combines the “hybrid” channels of diplomacy and moral witness, with his distinctive Polish national identity to elevate his political influence in Poland to an unprecedented level. As mentioned, Will observes that, by the mid-1980s, around 90% of the Polish population was Roman Catholic. Agnew’s insight that States recognise the usefulness of maintaining “conventional formal relations” with the Church because of the “sheer number of humans” involved is relevant to Poland in this context. Thus, by the mid-1980s, Will was in a position

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510 Weigel, *Witness to Hope*, 151–2. Weigel describes how, as a Cardinal and Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla successfully lobbied the Polish government on several instances regarding issues including religious freedom, freedom of expression, new church buildings, and Church autonomy over its pastoral initiatives. For example, on Christmas Eve, 1959, Wojtyla celebrated Mass in Nowa Huta – the new worker’s city – in a field where they aimed to build a Catholic Church. The city was based on a Communist model and had no Church. Weigel reports that thousands gathered in this form of “public witness” and “moral authority” in defence of the right granted by religious freedom to a place of worship.
to observe that: “the institutional church in Poland is far stronger today than it was prior to World War II.”

In Poland, cooperation between Church and State is arguably more significant than any other Eastern bloc nation. Byrnes adds that the Catholic Church exercises considerable influence in Polish politics because of the Church’s history of constantly defending Poland from foreign oppressors. He writes there is a “long-standing, intimate relationship between Catholicism and Polish national identity”. Within Poland’s particular historical context, the “uncontested cultural centrality of Polish Catholicism became a major political factor. The Polish Church is a political institution because history has identified it as an authentically Polish alternative to an alien governing power.” The Church is thus recognised as Poland’s “principal moral authority”, which provides it with a “new source of strength.” The elevation of Wojtyla as the “first Polish Pope” thus infuses the traditional “hybrid” authority of the

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512 Will, ‘Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland’, 154. “This homogeneity is reflected in the institutional strength of the Roman Catholic Church. Ninety-three percent of Poland's thirty-five million people are Catholic by baptism, two to three percent are Orthodox or Protestant; and only four to five percent are nonbelievers. Only about 10,000 Jews remain in Poland.” Will continues that in 1937 the Church “had twenty dioceses, 5,170 parishes, and 11,239 priests. As of 1980, it is organized in twenty-seven dioceses with seventy-nine bishops, 7,556 parishes, and 15,444 priests. There are also forty-two monastic institutes with 4,207 religious priests and 1,477 brothers; and 25,313 women religious in 2,449 houses in Poland. More than 1,000 priests and women religious currently have been sent out.”

513 Weigel, The End and The Beginning, 448.

514 Timothy A. Byrnes, ‘The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics’, in The Catholic Church and the Nation-State: Comparative Perspectives, ed. Paul Christopher Manuel, Lawrence C. Reardon and Clyde Wilcox (Washing D.C.,: Georgetown University Press, 2006), 103-4. Byrnes explains that the Church was the constant space where Poles could experience some freedom from state repression throughout its “long history of partitions and foreign occupations. By 1795, the Polish state was erased from all European maps. Although re-established after the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, Poland suffered brutal occupation during World War II and was dominated by the Soviet Union over the long decades of Communist rule. Because of this brutal history, the question of national identity and its relation-ship to state sovereignty is perhaps more contested in Poland than any other European state.”

papacy with the Polish Church’s identity as the “alternate legitimate public authority” to
government rule.\textsuperscript{516}

The following section aims to analyse how John Paul II uses his “hybrid” channels to
advance his political ideas in Poland. It argues that John Paul II conducts a method of political
strategy that is consonant with his own conceptions of political ends. This analysis relies on
the “Glendon graph” to illustrate that John Paul II retains integrity in his political judgment,
and suggests this can be mapped onto the Glendon graph.

\textbf{Section Two: The Political Judgment of John Paul II}

\textbf{Integrity or Compromise?}

Chapter One offered Copleston’s view that for virtuous acts, the right choice will
sometimes require an “excess” rather than a “defect”, while in other cases the reverse may be
preferable.\textsuperscript{517} Hence, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards excess or
defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends. In some instances,
more excessive actions may even be the right means in a particular context. However, the
accuracy of the decision, as Glendon points out, is often known only through hindsight. As
such, the wisdom of these decisions is best observed “long after the person has passed from
this life”, so that the full impact of one’s decisions can be properly appreciated.\textsuperscript{518}

Chapter Two suggested that Burke’s method of political judgment is a useful
illustration of Maritain’s point that the statesperson must use the skills of their intellect, called
“cunning”, to discern how to advance the common good, and when to opt instead for what

\textsuperscript{516} Byrnes, ‘The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics’, 103.
\textsuperscript{517} Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 337.
\textsuperscript{518} Glendon, The Forum and the Tower, 223.
Glendon calls “prudent accommodation”,\textsuperscript{519} without “falsehood or imposture”.\textsuperscript{520} Glendon’s view of Burke suggests that a method of political judgment that uses compromise and “cunning” without descending into “cleverness” is possible, though it can be difficult to identify the line between a prudent compromise and a full betrayal of principle. At the same time, hindsight provides the opportunity to understand that the impact of one’s decisions can take effect long after one’s death. As Glendon has argued, Burke’s accomplishments, though modest in his lifetime, set the forces in motion that eventually vindicated some of his other aims.\textsuperscript{521} Thus, to assess John Paul II’s decisions within the framework, it is necessary to understand whether his political judgments involved actions that lean towards either side of the mean of practical wisdom. It must also consider, through the lens of historical analysis, whether his political aims were ultimately successful.

The present thesis suggests that Glendon’s terms “integrity” and “compromise” can be used to denote actions that lean towards either side of the mean, but are not the excessive “hypermoralist” or “Machiavellian” extremes.\textsuperscript{522}

\textbf{Figure 4.2: Between the Mean and Extremes: Integrity & Compromise}

\textsuperscript{519} Glendon, \textit{The Forum and the Tower}, xiii.
\textsuperscript{520} Maritain, “The End of Machiavellianism”, 42.
\textsuperscript{521} Glendon, \textit{The Forum and the Tower}, 6–7, 149, 225.
\textsuperscript{522} Glendon, \textit{The Forum and the Tower}, 7, 23–4.
Figure 4.2 shows that political judgments that contain commitment to political aims as part of the right means fall between the middle point, and the hypermoralist extreme of the graph. Such judgments can be considered as acting with “integrity”. Political judgments that consider a lesser commitment to political aims as the right means in the here and now, fall between the middle point and the Machiavellian extreme of the graph. Such judgments can be considered a “compromise” on essential aims for the sake of some other “immediate advantage”, or “immediate success”.

Gaddis, Bernstein, and Byrnes, among others, offer detailed analyses on the role John Paul II played in the events that led to the first partial free elections in Poland on June 4, 1989. Appendix A provides a timeline that links the development of John Paul II with the events in Poland that lead to the election on June 4, 1989. This section aims to examine John Paul II’s decisions and public engagements within the Polish communist context. It focusses on how his political thought from the “tower” informs those decisions in the “forum.” It highlights that John Paul II employs his “hybrid” agency of diplomacy and moral authority through means consistent to what he considers the ends of politics in the Polish context. It assesses the extent to which John Paul II’s judgments lean towards the side of “integrity” or the side of “compromise” on the Glendon graph. It will argue that John Paul II makes decisions that consistently retain the integrity of his political aims. However, it supplies evidence in support of Byrnes’ argument that Pope John Paul II played a significant role in the changing political landscape in Poland. Furthermore, it makes the case that Polish society shapes “John

Paul II’s approach to political questions”524 through the “caution” and “moderated” rhetoric he exercised.525 The present thesis suggests he is attentive to the circumstances “here and now”, which places him closer to the mean, rather than the extreme of “hypermoralism”.

“Chief Diplomat”: The Ostpolitik and Diplomacy

The strategies John Paul II deployed as part of his foreign policy towards Eastern Europe demonstrate his method of decision-making prioritises long-term political aims over short-term advantages.526 The Pope, in consultation with the largely Italian Vatican Secretariat of State, devises strategies within its foreign policy to conduct its pastoral initiatives effectively, as well as occasionally to mediate negotiations for preventing, or ending, conflict between States.527 The Ostpolitik – or “Eastern Politics” – was an inclusive term, employed in a variety of Vatican policies since 1960, with the purpose of ameliorating the situation of Catholics in Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Its aim was to provide the Church with sufficient freedom to carry out its pastoral activities in Eastern European Communist nations.528 The new strategy required a shift in approach for better relations with Communist states.529 A realist framework informed the Vatican’s approach to the current system of power. This was in large part shaped by Cardinal Agostino Casaroli, the Vatican’s Secretary of State throughout the Ostpolitik. The Vatican read the landscape of European power created under the Yalta

526 Ibid., 29–30.
527 Rooney, The Global Vatican, 141. See also Weigel, Witness to Hope, 272–3. Weigel explains that the Vatican Secretariat of State has functioned as mediator in negotiating conflict resolutions between nations. For example, through Pope John Paul II’s intervention, the Holy See was brought in as mediator between Argentina and Chile in January, 1979, who each threatened the other with war over a dispute on the Beagle Channel boundary.
529 Ibid., 29. Hehir observes that papal foreign policy under Pope Pius XII directly condemned communism as an ideology that is totally incoherent with the social teaching of the Catholic Church. He states that Pope John XXIII, his successor, recognised that the public condemnation of communism limited the Church’s ability to negotiate with Communist nations.
system, as largely stable and fixed.  

There was a balance between Eastern and Western European powers, and the Soviet side of the balance of power would remain as such for the determinate future.  

As Gaddis writes, the Vatican followed the East/West bloc, as they “agreed to accept, for the foreseeable future, the world as it was.”  

These beliefs informed the Vatican Secretariat’s view that silencing its condemnation of communist government policies that it believed violated human rights could give it “breathing space” for its pastoral initiatives in communist countries.  

In practice, Vatican diplomacy acknowledged the legitimate authority of the Communist government in power. Open condemnation of communism as an illegitimate form of government ceased. The ideological and philosophical differences between the Christian tradition and the Communist state were no longer emphasized. Instead, the Church pursued an avenue of negotiating for specific, pastoral needs in those countries. Such aims included the appointment of bishops that the Church considered trustworthy and the Government deemed acceptable, applicants to the seminary, and other pastoral matters. These goals were considered more achievable than attempting to pressure communist governments to change their policies on religious freedom.  

Through downplaying anti-communist rhetoric, the Church hoped to

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530 Weigel, *The Final Revolution*, 86.  
531 Hehir, ‘Papal Foreign Policy’, 29.  
532 Gaddis, *The Cold War*, 120. Gaddis writes that the “strategy [détente] had looked like a hopeful development. It did not free the world from crises, but the new spirit of cooperation did seem to limit their frequency and severity: Soviet-American relations in the late 1960s and the early 1970s were much less volatile than during the first two decades of the Cold War, when confrontations erupted almost annually. This was a major accomplishment…”  
534 Hehir, 27 ‘Papal Foreign Policy’. The previous attitudes to communism enunciated by Pope Pius XII contained open condemnation of the Communist system of government, which was only modified to a more cautious approach with the introduction of the Osptolitik under Pope John XXIII in 1967.  
535 Ibid., 30.
gain back some control over its pastoral and ecclesial authority in countries across Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{536}

By 1978, the \textit{Ostpolitik} was a settled method of engagement between the Holy See and the Eastern European states. By 1980, there were sixty million Catholics in the Soviet bloc Communist countries.\textsuperscript{537} Catholics were the majority in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and held a significant minority in Yugoslavia. Kengor describes the method of compromise to gain “breathing space” as a Cold War version of détente.\textsuperscript{538} The strategy had achieved modest success, which varied between countries.\textsuperscript{539} Kramer suggests that this approach made The Vatican a neutral moral voice, critical of “both east and west, with the respect of both worlds.”\textsuperscript{540} This neutral approach made it an appealing ally to the Soviet Union nations, and enhanced the Holy See’s status as a legitimate moral authority. Weigel states that in Poland, local communities described the situation as “bad, but stable bad.”\textsuperscript{541}

Within the thesis’ understanding of practical wisdom, this approach suggests that the Holy See considered what Glendon calls “prudent accommodation” of communist government policies necessary to gain immediate advantages. Weigel describes the approach as preferring short-term gains over long-term goals.\textsuperscript{542}

\textsuperscript{536} Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”’, 283. Kramer explains that the shift in Vatican diplomacy to a position of nonalignment also provided an opportunity for the Vatican to disentangle itself from the label of open supporter of Western politics. The legitimacy of the Vatican as a neutral moral authority rested on its ability to observe both the qualities and the faults of both major economic and political systems. This position was most precisely articulated under the papacy of Paul VI (1963-1978). Hehir describes Paul VI’s diplomatic programme as operating in a neutral territory between Eastern and Western ideologies, “By the 1970s, Paul VI was taking positions that were critical of the policies of both superpowers. Without announcing major departures from previous polices, he moved the Catholic Church in a series of small steps to a position of having contacts with both major powers, formal relationships with neither, and a record of critical commentary of both.”

\textsuperscript{537} Ibid., 283, 86.

\textsuperscript{538} Paul Kengor, \textit{A Pope and a President} (Washington, USA: ISI Books, 2017), 182–3.

\textsuperscript{539} For a breakdown of the degrees of success and failure of the policy by country, see Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”’, 301–4.

\textsuperscript{540} Kramer, ‘The Vatican’s “Ostpolitik”’, 286.

\textsuperscript{541} Weigel, \textit{Witness to Hope}, 195–98.

\textsuperscript{542} Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft’, 27.
(predecessors to John Paul II) calculated that accommodating the communist regimes as legitimate representations of their respective people’s interests would deliver better short-term results than pursuing a method of open condemnation of communism as an ideological and political system. Figure 4.3 shows that Vatican foreign policy by 1978 can be placed on the “Glendon graph”. The “compromise” approach of the ostpolitik can be considered one that leans closer to the centre on the “Machiavellian” half of the graph, rather than on the side of “integrity”.

Figure 4.3: Vatican Ostpolitik by 1978

That the ostpolitik achieved “modest success” means it is placed closer to the base than the top of the vertical axis, and visibly within the “compromise” area of the horizontal axis, which indicates the policy delivered only moderate advantages in exchange for a greater degree of compromise. The ostpolitik received criticism on its decision to rescind permissions for clandestine ordinations in the Czech and Ukrainian Churches. The compromise on what was considered by some news sources as a key part of the underground Church’s resistance was labelled an abandonment of the Church’s responsibilities. The New York Times published that the Vatican was “[making] a sacrificial lamb out of the Ukrainian Catholic Church in its search

for improved relations with the Soviet Union.” Critics of the ostpolitik also argued that the lack of Vatican opposition to oppressive measures in Communist countries in return for its diplomatic support actually served to enhance the Communist regimes internal and external legitimacy. However, Ortaymer notes it is unclear what other policies could have been more successful during the 1960s and early 1970s.

In John Paul II’s analysis, this was not a sustainable policy in the long term. Byrnes proposes that John Paul II,

…used the enormous resources of his office to focus world attention on his homeland. He targeted his considerable personal energy on radically reformulating Polish politics and government, as well as using the Polish model to effect systemic change in the social and political life of the European continent.

John Paul II’s strategic goal drew from his first-hand experience of living under the communist system in Poland, which gave him unique insight into its limitations. His perspective was also developed through his own intellectual formation of the concept of the person. As the previous chapter has shown, John Paul II developed an anthropology that emphasises the dignity of the person in everyday circumstances as the starting point to defending each person’s fundamental rights that the Polish government actively restricted. This formation, Weigel argues, gave John Paul II the conviction that the primary issue with the pragmatic aims of the ostpolitik was its failure to properly secure the rights of persons that the State was obligated to protect. For John Paul II, the communist system was predicated on a

546 Ibid., 305.
547 Byrnes, ‘The Polish Church: Catholic Hierarchy and Polish Politics’ 103.
false conception of the person, which crippled its ability to ensure the rights of the Polish people in a fundamental way.\textsuperscript{550} As such, Weigel suggests John Paul II’s policy towards communism in Poland as, “one had to win, one had to lose.”\textsuperscript{551}

Byrnes argues that John Paul II shifted the emphasis of Papal diplomacy towards a firmer commitment to human rights in the public sphere, as part of his goal to “reformulate Polish politics.” Rather than continue the line of political toleration under the \textit{ostpolitik}, John Paul II challenged the Polish government to improve its policies on the grounds of human rights, as the means to “reaching diplomatic agreements.”\textsuperscript{552} Weigel notes John Paul II made continual references to both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1975 Helsinki Act in his diplomatic addresses.\textsuperscript{553} The Helsinki Act’s provisions required the Polish government (among other signatories) to permit the exercise of religious and association freedoms, in the form of permissions to form organisations, among other requirements. The Solidarity Trade Union cited these provisions in defence of its organising activities, to which John Paul II gave public support.\textsuperscript{554}

John Paul II’s decision to adopt a human rights stance towards Poland and Eastern Europe broadly, produced a form of political judgment consonant with his political thought. In 1983, on his second pilgrimage to Poland, John Paul II confronted Polish leader Jaruzelski, declaring Poland to resemble “one giant concentration camp under martial law.”\textsuperscript{555} As a diplomat, John Paul II arguably used human rights language as a less confronting challenge to the Polish government than directly critiquing communism as a political system. Bernstein

\textsuperscript{550} Weigel, \textit{The End and The Beginning}, 167.  
\textsuperscript{551} Weigel, \textit{Witness to Hope}, 232–3.  
\textsuperscript{553} Weigel, \textit{The End and the Beginning}, 114–15.  
\textsuperscript{555} Rooney, \textit{The Global Vatican}, 144. Rooney also describes John Paul II’s face as downcast during the State authorities’ opening remarks at the airport when he arrived for his 1983 visit. He reports the crowds experienced a genuine bond from the Pope, sensing he shared their sadness at the state of Poland.
quotes Polish President Jaruzelski’s recollection of a private meeting between himself and the Pope:

[The Pope always spoke] in terms of human rights or civil rights. And when we discussed rights we naturally mean[t] democracy. If there is democracy, then you have elections; if you have elections, then you have power. But he never put it that way. It showed his great culture and diplomacy, because in substance he used words and phrases you couldn’t argue with. Because if he had said, ‘you have to share power with Solidarity’, we would have argued about it, naturally. But when one simply mentions human rights, it’s such a general term, such a general notion, that you can have a constructive discussion, which eventually brought us [the regime] closer to that goal without losing face.556

Jaruzelski notes that John Paul II’s use of human rights language was an effective means of facilitating constructive dialogue between the Polish government and the Holy See. Chapter Three explained that for John Paul II, rights are basic preconditions needed to guarantee participation in the political life of the community and “should be received from others.”557 These rights include access to employment, a just wage, and search for the truth without fear of censorship. Barrett states that for John Paul II, rights require the support of economic and political structures, as well as the support from the community to secure them.558 As such, John Paul II’s use of rights language in his diplomacy illustrates his commitment to human rights as an essential political good.

John Paul II arguably shifted Vatican foreign policy to a closer alignment with US foreign policy objectives. Bernstein proposes John Paul II and Ronald Reagan actively sought

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557 Barrett, Persons and Liberal Democracy, 61.
558 Ibid.
each other’s mutual support to destabilise the Eastern bloc communist governments, and especially Poland, where the Church was strongest in number. Bernstein argues that Reagan’s closest advisors considered the Catholic Church the “crucible of anti-communist conviction.” As such, Reagan sought “both openly and covertly to forge the closest of ties with the Pope and the Vatican”. Bernstein contends that part of the “holy alliance” between John Paul II and Ronald Reagan involved channelling resources for Solidarity and intelligence-sharing through the Vatican.

Such decisions reflect a decisive shift in the *ostpolitik*’s diplomatic strategy and tactics. As Rooney puts it, Pope John Paul II had a “way of moving past the usual diplomatic parlance to say exactly what he meant.” However, despite his belief that the *ostpolitik* was an unsustainable policy, John Paul II retained the policy and placed Cardinal Casaroli, who strongly supported the policy, in charge of bilateral negotiations with communist states. Weigel argues this decision demonstrates prudential judgment. Rather than abandon the *ostpolitik* entirely, John Paul II permitted the Vatican diplomatic service to continue the norms of accommodationist diplomacy while pursuing his own method of diplomatic engagement. Appleby summarises the shift in John Paul II’s strategy towards Poland in these terms,

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560 Ibid.
561 Bernstein and Politi, *His Holiness*, 290–295. Some scholars dispute Bernstein’s account of both the extent of the alliance between Reagan and Pope John Paul II, as well as the actual impact their collaboration had. Gayte and Garneau, for example, observe that John Paul II remained publicly critical of the United States’ weapons development programs and increasing nuclear capabilities. John Paul II remained thoroughly committed to his own principle of arms control in the aim of a nonviolent revolution, thus suggesting he remained less aligned to US views than Bernstein argues. For more information, see James F. Garneau, ‘Presidents and Popes Face to Face: From Benedict XV to John Paul II’, *U.S. Catholic Historian*, 26, no. 4, (Fall, 2008): 89–106; Marie Gayte, ‘The Vatican and the Reagan Administration: A Cold War Alliance?’, *The Catholic Historical Review* 97, no. 4 (October, 2011): 713–736.
563 Weigel, *The End and the Beginning*, 183.
[Pope John Paul II] demonstrates both continuity and change in papal policy. His teaching on human rights, economic justice, and international order develops ideas from the eras of Pius XII through Paul VI. But his historical experience, his philosophical convictions, and his personal style of pastoral leadership and diplomacy have all set John Paul II's pontificate apart from his predecessors…This pope engages world leaders with a more explicitly geopolitical analysis than his predecessors; he speaks more openly about power and how it should be directed and contained.\textsuperscript{564}

The extent to which this shift in policy contributed to the collapse of the communist government in Poland is the subject of further analysis in the next section. However, the conclusion of this part can fittingly observe that John Paul II employs his political ideas of the rights of persons consistently in his diplomatic engagement with communist Poland. As Troy and others have proposed, the Pope exercised a “hybrid” agency that enables him to speak as a moral authority through diplomatic channels as well as to the global press and his adherents.\textsuperscript{565} John Paul II’s agency is enhanced through his rigorous public defence of human rights. This seemingly contradicts the wisdom learned from Plato’s experience, that consistent public affirmation of political aims, worked out in “the tower” has little traction with totalitarian authorities.

“Moral Authority”: Rhetoric on Pilgrimage

Throughout his papal pilgrimages to Poland in 1979, 1983, and 1987, John Paul II deployed a rhetoric that consistently reinforced the idea that Poland’s national history and identity was inseparable from its religious history and identity. Melady contends that papal rhetoric is a distinctive style of “sacralising the secular.”\textsuperscript{566} In \textit{The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul II}, Margaret Melady, \textit{The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul II: The Pastoral Visit As a New Vocabulary of the Sacred} (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1999), 18.
II: The Pastoral Visit As a New Vocabulary of the Sacred, Melady argues that the “task facing the Church at the time of Pope John Paul II’s elevation to the papacy was to restore a sense of the sacred.” John Paul II believed, according to Melady, that emphasis on the Church’s distinctive lens of viewing reality was an essential tool to shift away from previous Vatican policy of accommodating secular perspectives of the situation in Poland. In practice, John Paul II repeatedly “employed images of Polish history” that evoked a form of religious patriotism. The images of upward “struggle and conflict” serve to entrench the image of “unseen but omnipresent” spiritual forces that would help Poland overcome the communist system.\textsuperscript{567} The Pope’s rhetoric created a “forward moving and assured future” that “is also a ‘victory’ that must be won by those who believe that grace is more ‘powerful’ than sin.” Melady states that the Pope’s rhetoric drew “battle lines” between “life and death, grace and sin,” that could only be overcome by confronting communism through a more direct rhetoric than previous Popes had employed.\textsuperscript{568}

Throughout his 1979 visit, John Paul II reminded the Polish State authorities that “an agreement” of cooperation between the Church and State in Poland “corresponds to historical reasons of the nation, whose sons and daughters, in the vast majority, are the sons and daughters of the Catholic Church.”\textsuperscript{569} In a negotiation with Polish First Secretary Gierek for this agreement between the Church and State, John Paul II deployed rhetoric that called for national unity, through the aims of justice and peace, and through the securing of basic human rights for the Polish people. According to Bernstein, Gierek emphasised international détente as the primary path to peace. John Paul II, however, “laid down a list of conditions” that were “designed” to influence the Communist government to make “unprecedented concessions”

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{568} Melady, The Rhetoric of Pope John Paul II, 153.
\item \textsuperscript{569} John Paul II, Return to Poland, 22.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
coexist peacefully with the Church. In evidence of the success of this more direct approach, Sculz states that by the early 1980’s, “The church and [Polish President] Jaruzelski engaged in a permanent dialogue on every aspect of national life.”

As Chapter Three argues, John Paul II’s political thought is chiefly concerned with the ability of people to secure their basic rights, through participating in the determination of their own political, cultural and economic future. In the Polish context, John Paul II is clear that the situation in his home country required the government to recognise in practical terms the basic rights of the Polish people to authentic participation in Poland’s social and political order. He stated that “the drawing together of peoples…can only be achieved on the principle of respect for the objective rights of the nation, such as: the right to existence, to freedom, to be a social and political subject, and also to the formation of its own culture and civilisation.” To secure these basic conditions, John Paul II states, “our times demand that we should not lock ourselves into the rigid boundaries of systems, but seek all that is necessary for the good of man, who must find everywhere the awareness and certainty of his authentic citizenship.” These claims demonstrate a decisive shift from previous accommodationist Vatican approaches to Eastern Europe to a more confrontational approach. John Paul II’s language emphasises the central tenets of his political thought – that the Polish people have a right to determine their own culture, and the political system in which they participate.

Indeed, scholars of rhetoric Melady and Jamieson suggest that John Paul II was thoroughly deliberate in the location of his speeches, using “dramatic symbols” and linking his own Polish identity to the assessment that a radical reclaiming of faith was relevant and

571 Szulc, ‘Poland’s Path’, 222.
572 See Gregg, *Challenging the Modern World*, 223.
574 John Paul II, *Return to Poland*, 183.
necessary in the immediate historical moment. Melady concludes John Paul II’s rhetoric rendered him a “credible and compelling” advocate for the Polish people. These decisions appear decisive in leading Soviet leader Gorbachev to fly to the Vatican in 1988 to meet the Pope to discuss Poland’s future. Weigel notes that at this meeting, Gorbachev described John Paul II as “the highest moral authority in the world, and a Slav.”

However, it is also conceivable that John Paul II drew from his experiences in using caution and subtlety in his statements as a priest and Bishop in Krakow, Poland. Bernstein observes John Paul II’s rhetoric remained in the abstract realm of rights, rather than citing specific events. These included the basic rights of workers to a “just salary”, “to security”, and to “a day of rest” in an address to one million people in the steelworks town of Katowice. John Paul II connected the area of work to the question of trade unions, stating that all workers had “the right of free association” and to form unions as “a mouthpiece for the struggle for social justice”. The State, John Paul II proposed, “does not give us this right, it only has the obligation to protect and guard it” through “whatever system of relations and powers.” Throughout the 1979 visit, Weigel observes John Paul II did not mention “politics” or “economics” once, in any of his thirty-two sermons to an estimated ten million people. Instead, he repeatedly welcomed any reference the Polish authorities made to peace and a united Poland. Gaddis writes that “Wojtyła had been working quietly for years—as priest, archbishop, and cardinal—to preserve, strengthen, and expand the ties between the individual morality of Poles and the universal morality of the Roman Catholic Church. Now, as pope, he witnessed his success.” This highlights that John Paul II retained the experiences from his

576 Weigel, The End and the Beginning, 177.
577 Bernstein, ‘John Paul II and the Fall of Communism’, 38.
578 John Paul II, Return to Poland, 183.
580 Weigel, The Final Revolution, 137
cautionary approach as priest, ethics professor and Bishop in Krakow and applied them as Pope.\footnote{Kraszewski, ‘Catalyst for Revolution’, 30.}

John Paul II’s political judgment through the *ostpolitik* and his papal visits to Poland suggests he is aware of and practices a form of prudent accommodation. As Murphy states, “while martyrdom remains always a free man’s last witness to truth, there is plenty of room for prudence between conformism and martyrdom.” Murphy continues that “Wojtyla did not seem an enthusiast for death”, and, as “a general principle, the crown of martyrdom should not be desired as long as it can be avoided.”\footnote{Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, 311.} Therefore, John Paul II makes political judgments with integrity, but not at the “hypermoralist” extreme. On the Glendon graph, John Paul II’s strategic approach to “reformulate Polish politics” through the use of “dramatic symbols”, human rights language and closer collaboration with US administration policies, suggests he can be placed on the opposite side of the map to the *ostpolitik* of his predecessors.

**Figure 4.4: John Paul II on the “Glendon Graph”**

*Figure 4.4* indicates that John Paul II’s political judgment involved a greater degree of integrity, than of compromise in pursuit of his political aims. Barbato writes that Popes exercise the Church’s agency “most powerfully” when they engage “on principle” and out of “the clear
conviction of its confessions”, but is also “wisely discrete on its particularities, policy and procedure.”

Gaddis captures how John Paul II’s political thought directly informs his decisions when he describes that John Paul II, along with US President Reagan and UK Prime Minister Thatcher, had “destinations in mind and mind maps for reaching them.” Byrnes echoes this view, declaring that “the pope was committed to the establishment of true, absolute Polish autonomy in both political and cultural terms.” These perspectives indicate that John Paul II’s political thought in the “tower” informs a strategically devised method of rights rhetoric and diplomacy designed to pressure the Polish government in the “forum”.

The present thesis has followed Copleston’s argument that in some cases virtue requires the person to act in a way that leans more towards an excess of the mean proper to that action. In the virtue of practical wisdom, the virtuous statesperson may use actions that lean towards excess or defect as a legitimate use of “intelligence” in the pursuit of the right ends. John Paul II arguably uses means that lean on the “hypermoralist” side of the mean, though he is not a “hypermoralist” by Maritain’s definition. This thesis proposes John Paul II’s method of political judgment as diplomat and moral authority – the “forum” – draws directly from his political thought – the “tower”. Thought and practice intersect consistently in the Pope’s political decision-making. Thus, the framework shows that John Paul II’s method of political judgment involves “integrity” in the context of Polish communism. However, as Buttiglione and Murphy argue, John Paul II is sensitive to the needs of the present moment and deploys his moral and diplomatic agency with a degree of understanding of what means best serve his political aims. Therefore, John Paul II’s actions place him closer to the mean on the horizontal axis, rather than the hypermoralist extreme on the Glendon graph.

584 Gaddis, The Cold War 152.
586 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, 1, 337.
The extent to which John Paul II’s aims were successful and thus whether the means were used in the right way, at the right time, has not yet been shown. The following section aims to understand the extent of John Paul II’s impact on the political events that led to Poland’s partial free elections on June 4, 1989. The framework engages arguments that suggest John Paul II exercised unprecedented influence for a Pope on Polish politics throughout the 1980s. However, the framework also highlights that the political conditions were most favourable for John Paul II’s actions to be considered the right means at the time. Thus, it will argue that the framework shows that political conditions enabled John Paul II’s agency, in a way that validates Glendon’s view that political circumstances are essential components of political outcomes.

Section Three: Success or Failure – Is John Paul II the “Practically Wise Man”?  

This section considers the extent to which John Paul II can be considered “practically wise” in this context. Luxmoore and Babiuch’s, *The Vatican and The Red Flag*, 588 Gaddis’ *The Cold War: A New History* are among the works that argue John Paul II’s political engagement with Poland had a considerable impact on the events that led to the free elections and subsequent collapse of communism in 1989. In particular, John Paul II is credited with being the “catalyst” that caused the Solidarity Trade Union to form in 1980.589 This argument considers the emergence of Solidarity as both a movement and the Trade Union as a key contributor to the pressure that caused the communist government to hold free elections on June 4, 1989.590

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However, the present thesis also considers Glendon’s view that favourable conditions can facilitate political agency, while unfavourable conditions can hinder effectiveness.\textsuperscript{591} Therefore, part of Glendon’s method requires consideration of how the political conditions were favourable or unfavourable for the person’s political aims. This enables her to offer some judgment on the relationship between the political actor’s decisions and the political conditions in the “reasons for success or failure”.\textsuperscript{592} Thus, although John Paul II’s actions aim for the right ends, the political circumstances must also be considered to assess John Paul II’s success in the pursuit of enhancing political participation through the communist collapse in Poland.

**John Paul II and the Solidarity Movement**

During the 1979 papal visit to Poland, John Paul II had “conjured up images of a nation defiantly reasserting its identity against the external forces of power and coercion.” Luxmoore and Babiuch contend the impact of the message began to take on an organised, political form by mid-1980. Solidarity had needed a “spark” to ignite – and John Paul II’s 1979 pilgrimage functioned as that catalyst.\textsuperscript{593} In August 1980, at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdansk, the same site where around forty-five worker protesters were shot in 1970, Lech Walesa led a strike that was replicated across several factories in Poland. Luxmoore notes that these strikes were distinctly nonviolent, more organised and more sustained than those in 1970, and 1976. Gaddis states that Walesa followed John Paul II’s example of “rattling the Polish authorities” when he announced the formation of *Solidarność* (Solidarity), the first ever independent trade union under communism in Poland.\textsuperscript{594} “The word ‘Solidarity’ appeared on the banners of the 17,000 Gdansk strikers. The Pope’s picture was everywhere. His words were being repeated”.\textsuperscript{595}

\textsuperscript{592} Glendon, *The Forum and The Tower*, x.  
\textsuperscript{593} Luxmoore and Babiuch, *The Vatican and The Red Flag*, 225.  
\textsuperscript{595} Luxmoore and Babiuch, *The Vatican and The Red Flag*, 225.
strikers’ organised and peaceful approach forced the communist government into legalising the Solidarity Trade Union. Gaddis observes that “the pen with which [Walesa] co-signed the charter for Solidarność bore the image of John Paul II. And from Rome the pontiff let it be known, quietly but unmistakably, that he approved.”

Walesa describes Poland prior to John Paul II’s election to the papacy as “in a state of apathy”. The perspective of the Polish people was one of fear of Soviet intervention, and a sense that the Communist system could not be undermined, and that social organised resistance with an alternative, and attractive, narrative could not be established. However, when Pope John Paul II was elected to the papacy, and visited Poland less than a year later, Walesa states the Polish people could “not help but notice the size of the crowds in attendance.” It is estimated that nearly ten million Poles saw John Paul II in person on his nine day pilgrimage, and “virtually the entire country” was engaged through radio and television broadcast. This gave, in Walesa’s view, the Polish people a sense that “there are a lot more of us than there are of them” – meaning the State. Walesa concluded that John Paul II’s 1979 visit to Poland had a direct impact on the foundation of Solidarity.

Without the Holy Father [in Poland, 1979], we would not have been able to take note of our numbers, and to organise, and the Communists would have been able to break us apart. So [Solidarity] was caused by coming together for prayer, yes, but it also helped us to count our strength in numbers.

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596 Gaddis, The Cold War, 119.
598 Weigel, Witness to Hope, 224
Walesa argues that John Paul II’s 1979 pilgrimage had a unifying and awakening effect on the Polish people. The crowds that attended each of the places he visited gave visible credibility to the idea that mass social opposition to the regime was possible, through the unifying force of social solidarity. At the same time, Walesa also cautions not overextending the role of John Paul II in the collapse of communism in the Eastern bloc. Walesa believes that John Paul II was limited by his religious mission to help Solidarity’s organised activities throughout the 1980s. However, he concludes that if one “wanted to assess in percentage who contributed [to the collapse of communism], we would have to give 50 percent of credit for bringing communism down to the Pope, [and] 30 percent to Solidarity and Lech Walesa, that means myself.” 602

In December 1981, the Polish government banned the Solidarity Trade Union, and arrested several of its leaders, including Walesa. Appleby states the arrest of intellectuals and religious leaders, in conjunction with Poland’s economic stagnation, caused a series of worker and student protests throughout the 1980s. These conditions enabled John Paul II to encourage continued organised opposition with the support of the Polish Church under a common theme of solidarity. 603 Byrnes links the consistency of John Paul II’s messaging in his 1979 and his 1983 pilgrimages to Poland. When “John Paul II entered Warsaw in triumphant glory in 1979, and when he defiantly and repeatedly uttered the loaded word ‘solidarity’ before Polish audiences suffering under martial law in 1983—these were the crucial, purposefully symbolic acts of a very resourceful subversive.” 604 Kraszewski concurs with this view, stating that “from a situation in Poland of social, moral and economic malaise, in which people felt that nothing good could happen, [John Paul II] came, and the emotional, psychological consequences were

602 Ibid.
604 Byrnes, 106.
inevitable.” Thus, Appleby declares it “indisputable” that John Paul II was “central” to the causing the Solidarity revolution and the communist collapse in Poland.

Thus, John Paul II is considered an influential actor in the collapse of communism, owing to his role in igniting the Solidarity Trade Union, and his support of the movement throughout the 1980s. The Pope’s public messaging gave the Polish people the “raw materials” through which to forge “tools of liberation” that were essentially “moral and cultural in nature”. In Weigel’s view, John Paul II’s engagement with Poland helped the Polish people “find tools of resistance that totalitarianism cannot match”.

However, the framework also highlights that the political conditions were unusually favourable for Pope John Paul II, which arguably enhanced his political impact.

The “Confluence of Gifts, favourable conditions, and plain luck”

The present thesis recognises that the causes leading to the collapse of the communist government, signalled with the elections on 4 June 1989, are complex. Scholars disagree on the ultimate or even dominant causes of the communist system’s collapse across the nations under the Warsaw Pact. Several questions as to why “1989” occurred that remain contested, are captured by McDermott and Stibbe, who ask:

Why did the seemingly impregnable fortresses of communism disintegrate so rapidly in the autumn of that year?; why was this historic transformation achieved so peacefully?... were internal or external developments the main motor of change?; what role did ‘the people’ play in the overthrow of communism, or, conversely, did the machinations of leading individuals account for the extraordinary events?; how far do

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606 Appleby, ‘Pope John Paul II’, 12
607 Weigel, ‘Lessons in Statecraft’, 26
political, ideological or economic factors explain the demise?; was the collapse inherent in the utopianism of communism’s modernising spirit and its unshakable belief in hyper-centralist economic and political structures?\footnote{McDermott and Stibbe, ‘The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, 1–2}

McDermott and Stibbe’s \textit{The 1989 Revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe},\footnote{Ibid.} provides a selection of perspectives on the causes and processes of the collapse of communist governments across Eastern Europe. These viewpoints emphasise a combination of political, economic, and international factors contributed to the final demise of governments within the Soviet Union. When placed within the framework, these factors constitute what Glendon calls the “optimal confluence of gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. These factors were essential preconditions for John Paul II to successfully pursue his political aims in the Polish communist context.

Buckley argues that Gorbachev’s introduction of the \textit{perestroika} (restructuring) and \textit{glasnost} (openness) policies in the Soviet Union were fundamental in causing the eventual collapse of the communist government in Poland - and in the USSR broadly. The centre of these policies was a shift away from the Soviet Union’s overt influence and exertion of pressure on its neighbouring allies.\footnote{Matthew J Ouimet, ‘National Interest and the Question of Soviet Intervention in Poland, 1980-1981: Interpreting the Collapse of the ‘Brezhnev Doctrine,’ \textit{The Slavonic and East European Review} 78, no. 4 (2000): 710–734.} Within this policy shift was the complete abandonment of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”,\footnote{Buckley, ‘The multifaceted Soviet Role’, 59} which prescribed the use of Soviet force to repress any dissidence in Warsaw Pact countries – and had been deployed to great effect in Czechoslovakia in 1968.\footnote{Buckley, ‘The multifaceted Soviet Role’, 58} Buckley observes that the new “Gorbachev Doctrine” was significant in countries like Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria’s transitions to more tolerant, open and pluralist regimes. In particular,
it sent a clear signal to Polish President Jaruzelski that martial law and the banning of the Solidarity Trade Union were no longer considered good policies.\footnote{Buckley, ‘The multifaceted Soviet Role’, 60–1} 

Gorbachev’s most significant reform, according to Dahrendorf, was that the “Soviet army will no longer intervene when its allies go their own way”, and, as an extension, “the Soviet Party will not insist on the monopoly of the communist party”.\footnote{Rahl Dahrendorf. \textit{Reflections on the Revolution in Europe}. (New York: Random House, 1990), 16-17.} The effect of this policy relieved the risk anti-communist forces in Poland faced when mobilising their opposition.\footnote{See Weigel, ‘The Final Revolution’, 19; Jeane Kirkpatrick, \textit{The Withering Away of the Totalitarian States...and Other Surprises}. (Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1990), 3, 81; Martin Malia, "A New Russian Revolution?" \textit{New York Review of Books} (July 18, 1991): 29} In \textit{Reflections on the Revolution in Europe}, Dahrendorf declares that without Gorbachev and his “remarkable approach, the events of 1989 would not have happened in the particular way in which they occurred”.\footnote{Dahrendorf. \textit{Reflections on the Revolution in Europe}, 17.}

In the Polish context, Buckley argues that Gorbachev found Polish President Jaruzelski to be the leader most open to reform, and most adaptable to change.\footnote{Buckley, “The multifaceted Soviet Role”, 62} Malia states that Jaruzelski’s attempts at reform communism were instigated as a result of an openness to Gorbachev’s \textit{perestroika}. Nonetheless, when these failed and demonstrations began again in Poland, the Red Army were not sent in – giving credibility to the policy of supporting internal reform without intervention. This had the effect of enabling the Polish government to negotiate with internal opposition on its own terms.\footnote{William H. McNeill, "Winds of Change", \textit{Foreign Affairs} 69, no. 4 (1990): 152; Michael Howard, "The Springtime of Nations", \textit{Foreign Affairs} 69, no. 1 (1989): 19-20, 23.} The present thesis concurs that this contributed to the non-violent means through which Polish communism transitioned to a pluralist, open market democracy.\footnote{Weigel, “The Final Revolution”, 20-21.} However, Kampleman suggests that the US nuclear weapons advancement also featured in Soviet calculations on the cost of intervention in Poland. By the
mid-1980s, it is plausible that the Soviet Union abandoned the interventionist policy because it was already about to lose the Cold War.621

In addition to Gorbachev’s new foreign policy, the Soviet Union was under pressure to accept internal reform in Eastern Bloc countries due to its overstretched resources in the Cold War. War in Afghanistan, East–West agreement on missiles and dealing with strains with China were higher priorities than internal Eastern bloc issues.622 Further, diplomatic pressure applied through the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 is offered as a major factor. O’Hallaron details how the Helsinki process created a space where human rights and security issues intersected between the US and the Soviet Union.623 The Helsinki Act was signed primarily by the US and the USSR (but not by the Vatican), to codify the status quo of the existing Yalta imperial system (created in 1945 at the end of the Second World War). The Act contained what became known as the “Basket Three” conditions. These contained a set of human rights provisions and compliance review procedures that in effect legalised the formation of organisations to scrutinise the Soviet Union’s practices and record of human rights violations. Multiple conferences were held in Europe between 1977-1989, which were used to provide support to human rights activists in Eastern bloc countries, and amplified pressure on the Soviet Union’s failures to keep to the commitments on human rights.624

Gaddis, among other historians, also emphasises that Polish economic conditions placed the government under considerable pressure, which, in turn, also sustained the motivation for social opposition.625 Will offers a comparable assessment to Gaddis, and

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625 Gaddis, The Cold War, 119.
provides some statistical data to highlight the deteriorating state of the Polish economy during the 1980s. Will states that Poland’s economy had stagnated by the mid-1980s, where the national monthly average pay dropped to 107,000 zlotys, which was equivalent to less than $US20, 57.9% of households did not have any savings, 60% of working age persons were physically impaired in some way, and just 10% of Polish men lived till retirement age.626 US military and economic pressure also contributed to Poland’s stagnant economy. The US Government cut its loans to the Polish government, which Poland had been using to finance its expenditure. The lack of US funds created economic pressure that led to mass strikes across Poland, which further destabilised the Polish regime’s authority.627

Therefore, by the late 1980s, the communist leadership experienced significant economic, social, and political pressure from a network of forces both internal and external. These factors, in the present thesis’ view, constitute ideal conditions for John Paul II to engage Poland through the means, and at the time he deployed them. Junes, Will, and others observe that the timing of John Paul II’s election as the first Polish pope in history, at a time where 90% of the country adheres to the Catholic faith, in the context of these pressures, provides him with an unprecedented influence.628 The network of pressures arguably made it possible for John Paul II to pursue his aims with integrity, and for those means to have a tangible political impact. The present thesis considers John Paul II made sound political decisions, based on his experience as a Pole. It follows Byrnes’ view that “the pope was committed to the establishment of true, absolute Polish autonomy in both political and cultural terms” as his distinctive political

aim. However, that these aims were successful must be considered within the network of forces already pressuring the Polish government.

John Paul II’s Lessons for the Aspirant Statesperson

The present thesis has argued that the favourable political conditions facilitated John Paul II’s political success. Within this context, what lessons do John Paul II’s decisions offer to the aspirant statesperson? Byrnes argues that by the late 1980s, the Polish Government was aware it needed the Church’s support to enter negotiations with Solidarity and other resistance groups, to deliver an acceptable package of economic and political reforms in exchange for ceasing public protests. Byrnes writes that,

The Church under communism was transformed into an indispensable substitute for the civil society that Michnik and other dissidents so desired but that the Soviet system so explicitly disallowed. Therefore, when Polish political autonomy exploded in Poland in the form of the Solidarity trade union, it did so in a distinctively Catholic idiom. From the Black Madonna pin in Lech Walesa’s lapel and the striking miners lining up to receive Holy Communion to the revolutionary rallies held in Father Jerzy Popieluszko’s Warsaw parish, the articulation of free-thinking opposition to the Polish communist government was deeply imbedded in the only viable noncommunist institution to which Poles could turn, the Polish Church.

The Communist government proposed that the Church act as interlocutor on behalf of the Polish people to negotiate the reforms. At this point, the regime was offering some degree of power in the dialogue to the Church in Poland. John Paul II, however, chose to decline the government’s proposition. Weigel states that John Paul II cited Solidarity as the “proper representative of Polish society”, and that any negotiations must be conducted with the Trade

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630 Ibid., 104-5.
Union. In John Paul II’s view, the Church could not substitute itself as mediator, as this involved tacitly accepting the regime’s ban of Solidarity. This decision highlights John Paul II’s preference to retain the integrity of his principled view of the Church’s role rather than take the perceived immediate advantage. Throughout his engagement in Poland as Pope, John Paul II can thus be understood as a political actor who pursues political aims in the “forum” with consistent reference to his political principles. In Weigel’s view, John Paul II’s decisions towards communist Poland provide a “lesson” for “the twenty-first-century statesman” that “moral pressure can be an important lever in world politics, but effective human rights advocacy and democracy-promotion require dexterity – diplomatic dexterity, and dexterity in waging the battle of ideas.” Within the framework, the thesis concurs with Weigel’s view that John Paul II’s decisions in this context exemplify “thinking long-term” as he does not “sacrifice core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”

The decision to reject playing “the role of opposition party” for the communist regime increased pressure on Jaruzelski to recognise and engage with the Polish people’s authentic representative, largely based in Solidarity. As a result, by early 1989 the regime negotiated directly with Solidarity at the Round Table discussions. The result of the discussions was, most significantly, the agreement to hold partial free elections on June 4 1989. Only some of the lower house seats could be contested, but all 100 seats in Poland’s Senate were contestable. Solidarity won 99 of the 100 seats in the Senate, with the 100th won by an independent businessman. Will states that the network of pressures produced a re-distribution of popular support in Poland, which ultimately forced the government to hold Round Table negotiations.

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634 Ibid.
635 Kraszewski, “Catalyst for Revolution”, 44.
636 Paul Kengor, A Pope and A President, 185
Solidarity ultimately “became a decisive factor on the political scene. No legal act will be enforced without Solidarity approval in… the Senate.”

Does John Paul II’s role within the present thesis’ account render him practically wise? Willey, a biographer of the pope, concludes that,

“The rise of the Solidarity movement and indeed Poland’s subsequent transition from Communist dictatorship under Soviet tutelage to the first non-Communist government in Eastern Europe, can be traced directly back to the sense of patriotism, purpose and optimism generated by the Pope’s bold visit to Poland a decade before.”

Within the context of economic, social and political pressure on the communist government, John Paul II’s consistent use of his “hybrid” political influence was essential to the formation and sustaining of the Solidarity movement. Solidarity’s electoral victory in 1989 arguably vindicates the view that John Paul II’s support of the movement and Trade Union was an important contributing factor to the result. Thus, John Paul II can be said to have pursued the right means, at the right time.

However, as Buckley, O’Halloran, and others have shown, the political conditions were unusually favourable for John Paul II. Scholars such as Weigel acknowledge John Paul II could not have had the same kind of effect without certain external factors that eventually forced the regime into negotiations with Solidarity in 1989. On the Glendon graph, the present thesis suggests it is both difficult and imprecise to consider the extent to which John Paul II can be considered “practically wise” in this context. On the one hand, scholars such as Appleby, Kraszewski, and Bernstein, among others, argue that John Paul II exercised exceptional political judgment that was central to the communist collapse. Indeed, Kraszewski’s declares

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637 James E Will, “Church and State in the Struggle for Human Rights in Poland”, 153-176, 154
638 David Willey, God’s Politician: John Paul at the Vatican (London: Faber & Faber, 1992), 1.
that, of all the contributing forces to the collapse of the Communist government in Poland, “no factor… was more important that John Paul II.”\textsuperscript{640} Kraszewski claims that “the pope’s 1979 pilgrimage proved more powerful than any nuclear weapons, politics, or economic restructuring package could ever be.”\textsuperscript{641} On the other hand, Buckley and Malia are among those who emphasise political and economic pressure as most determinant. \textit{Figure 4.5} maps John Paul II between these points.

\textbf{Figure 4.5: Perspectives on John Paul II as “Practically Wise”}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{diagram}
\caption{Figure 4.5 shows that John Paul II falls squarely within the half of the map that leans towards an integrity of means, rather than a method of compromise. As has been argued, decisions that lean towards the excess of the mean can still produce the right outcome, and be the right means – though to a limited extent. There are three red marks, the highest mark on the vertical axis represents Kraszewski and others view that John Paul II’s decisions were strategically devised and correctly executed. The lowest mark on the vertical axis represents Buckley and others view that emphasises the political and economic conditions external to John Paul II.}
\end{figure}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{640} Kraszewski, “Catalyst for Revolution”, 29.  \\
\textsuperscript{641} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
Paul II as more determinant. The centred mark is the middle point between these two perspectives, which, is where the present thesis suggests John Paul II can be placed.

The present thesis hesitates to offer a definitive conclusion on the extent of John Paul II’s strategic decision-making in the collapse of communism in Poland. Analyses that are more thorough, cited in the present thesis, offer more detailed and considered perspectives. An assessment of his impact is a secondary component of the present thesis; its primary concern is understanding the nature of John Paul II’s political decision-making with respect to his political thought. This is the fundamental area of analysis the method has set to understand — as Glendon terms them, the tension between the “forum and the tower.” The present thesis suggests, therefore, that John Paul II can be placed between the higher and lower points already given here.

In a final analysis, then, the Pope’s agency as diplomat and legitimate moral authority added additional pressure to the network of forces already pressuring the Polish communist system. In particular, his papal pilgrimages to Poland served as a catalyst and a unifying force necessary for the creation of the Solidarity Trade Union. However, it is perhaps more significant that John Paul II was elected to the papacy at the particular moment in history where a network of pressures had already undermined the communist system dramatically. Thus, was John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism a feature of political luck and good timing? The factors observed here lend support to the idea that John Paul II fits within Glendon’s assessment that statespersons who aim for the right ends, at the right time, using the right means, can be aided by felicitous political conditions.

Conclusion

John Paul II can be understood as a political actor through the framework developed in this thesis. The developed and adopted method has highlighted that John Paul II used political means in the “forum” in a way that retained the integrity of his political aims from the “tower”.

As a “hybrid” political actor, John Paul II engaged Poland under Communism through “moral-diplomacy”. As part of his new political agency as Pope, he shifted the Vatican’s policies under the ostpolitik towards his own political aims. It is credible that John Paul II’s overt references to human rights and his own philosophic convictions throughout his pilgrimages to Poland, especially in 1979, were strategically conceived to pressure the communist government. His moderated language avoided open confrontation with the regime that, arguably, was designed to “revitalise the human spirit” and inspire a “revolution of conscience”. The impact this had on the formation of Solidarity is tangible. This was backed up by continual public affirmation of the rights of the Polish people to live in solidarity, that there could be “no freedom without solidarity”.

However, the present thesis highlights that the network of political, social and economic pressures arguably facilitated John Paul II’s ability to pursue his aims with integrity, and for those means to have a tangible political impact. These pressures constitute what Glendon calls the “optimal confluence” of “gifts, favourable conditions and plain luck”. John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism in Poland reflects that unique confluence of circumstances, and John Paul II’s efforts. Therefore, that these aims were successful must be considered within the network of forces already pressuring the Polish government. The Glendon graph illustrates that John Paul II acts with integrity as a political actor in this context, and preferences long-term aims over immediate advantages. It is difficult to measure the extent of his effectiveness through this framework. However, it is arguable that John Paul II achieved his political aims, and that favourable political conditions facilitated that success.

644 Weigel, The End and The Beginning, 184
Conclusion

“At sea it is good sailing to run before the gale, even if the ship cannot make harbour; but if she can make harbour by changing tack, only a fool would risk shipwreck by holding the original course rather than change it and still reach his destination.”

This thesis has examined how Pope John Paul II’s political thought informs his decisions to influence the Polish Communist government between 1978 and 1989. It has argued that his philosophical formation in the shadow of totalitarianism helped shape his view that participation in political, economic and social activities are basic human rights. As the first Polish Pope in the history of the Catholic Church, he combined the conventional diplomatic and moral authority of the papacy with his own experiences of totalitarian regimes to influence events leading to the collapse of the Polish Communist government in 1989. The present research has shown that John Paul II’s political philosophy and Polish context directly informed his political strategy to encourage the Polish government to increase its citizens’ political, social and economic freedoms, while advocating nonviolent political organisation. Thus, it has demonstrated that John Paul II, as a philosopher in the tower, made political decisions as a statesperson in the forum that were consistent with his philosophical influences and convictions.

The thesis drew from Mary Ann Glendon’s *The Forum and The Tower* to examine the lives and decisions of prominent scholars and statespersons who grappled with tensions between political ideals and practical realities. For Glendon, the tower conveyed philosophy, specifically political theory, whereas the forum represented political decision-making and action.\(^\text{646}\) It argued that concepts within Aristotelian virtue ethics helped understand Glendon’s


\(^{646}\) Ibid., 44-5.
thought about the relationship between political theory and political practice, outlined in *The Forum and The Tower*. For example, it observed that Glendon used Aristotle’s claim in the *Politics* that the two most “choiceworthy kinds of life for those ambitious with a view to virtue” are “philosophy” and “politics” as a starting point to answer her students concerns of how to be politically effective and retain moral integrity. Viewed within Aristotle’s concept of virtue, it showed that, across the examples in *The Forum and The Tower*, the scholars and politicians deliberate about how to be politically effective within excessive, defective, and mean forms of political judgment. Glendon’s concept of the ideal statesperson is shaped by the “practically wise man”, to which Aristotle refers as the model of practical wisdom.

Aristotelian *phronesis* provided a reference point for how political actors in *The Forum and The Tower* engage in a moral process of political deliberation. The process considers the short-term advantages of compromising on political views, versus the merits of retaining moral integrity by not sacrificing “core principles to what seems immediate advantage.”

Maritain’s essay, “The End of Machiavellianism” identified “Hypermoralism” on the one hand, and “Machiavellianism” on the other, as labels denoting excessive forms of political judgment. Hypermoralism causes political judgment to remain something impracticable and merely ideal, where the practitioner refuses pharisaically any exterior contact with the mud of human life. Machiavellianism, which is at the other extreme, denies the value of moral integrity in political practice. The practically wise statesperson must begin by acting between these two extremes. Indeed, it is both difficult for the statesperson to act precisely at the middle point between these extremes; by its very nature, political action is imprecise. It proposed that, for this reason, ethical action can only provide general and approximate accuracy. As such, in some cases, the appropriate action would involve an excess of one kind of action, rather than a defect, and the reverse in others. For example, in the virtue of courage, the situation might demand a more

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audacious act, rather than a reserved one. The challenge for the statesperson is to identify whether circumstances in the present moment are favourable for acting on the side of strongly held moral principles, or whether an act that involves a tacit compromise on principles, better serves their aims.

The Glendon method has enabled consideration of the extent to which the political decisions of subjects analysed in *The Forum and The Tower* demonstrate the virtue of practical wisdom. Investigation via this method highlights how political actors engaged in a moral process of deliberating between moderate and excessive degrees of political judgment. These are decisions that involved deliberation on a course of action when “apparent right clashes with apparent advantage.”\(^648\) Applied to John Paul II, the method highlighted his political thought is built on his intense interest in the fundamental dignity and rights of the human person. This formed the basis of his political thought, which argued that all persons have a fundamental right to participate in the dynamic social, economic and political aspects of their community.

John Paul II used political means in the *forum* in a way that retained his political aims from the *tower*. As a “hybrid” political actor, John Paul II’s *ostpolitik* revealed a strategic shift in the Vatican’s policies towards Poland. It is credible that John Paul II’s overt references to human rights and his own philosophic convictions throughout his pilgrimages to Poland, especially in 1979, were strategically conceived to pressure the communist government. As has been proposed, his moderated language avoided open confrontation with the regime that, arguably, was designed to “revitalise the human spirit” and inspire a “revolution of conscience”. The thesis has also proposed that the network of political, social and economic pressures at the time made it possible for John Paul II to pursue his aims without compromising his integrity in terms of means, and for those means to have tangible political impact. These pressures constitute what Glendon calls the optimal confluence of “gifts, favourable conditions

\(^648\) Glendon, *The Forum and the Tower*, 38
and plain luck”. Thus, John Paul II’s role in the collapse of communism in Poland is aided by the unique confluence of circumstances that met his efforts.

The thesis has found that the adapted Glendon framework and the corresponding graph of practical wisdom can be reapplied heuristically into to new contexts. It has tested the framework in an original study on Pope John Paul II, focussed to one historical context of his decision-making as Pope. Future studies might well pick up this work, seeking to provide insights into other prominent political actors who grappled with the same tension between their principles and the demands of practical politics. In other words, one could follow this thesis’ example, and take up another candidate that Glendon suggests is worth studying, such as Thomas More.\textsuperscript{649} The framework would in this case enable a study of how More used silence on his beliefs to retain his Chancellorship under King Henry VIII, but ultimately refused to compromise on his views to the point of his own execution. Alternatively, more recent statespersons, such as former US President Barack Obama, show how contemporary perspectives of political judgment emphasise compromise. Obama’s reflections in \textit{The Audacity of Hope}\textsuperscript{650} provide his view that prudent decision-making must err on the side of compromise, to be politically effective in modern democracies. The framework thus enables an understanding of how different political actors prioritise retention of moral integrity when faced with challenging political realities.

\textsuperscript{649} Glendon, \textit{The Forum and the Tower}, 44-45.

\textsuperscript{650} Barack Obama, \textit{The Audacity of Hope: Thoughts on Reclaiming the American Dream} (New York: Three Rivers Press, 2007).
APPENDIX A: Timeline

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MAY 18, 1920</td>
<td>Karol Józef Wojtyła is born in Wadowice and baptized on June 20.</td>
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<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER 1, 1939- JANUARY 1945</td>
<td>World War II begins as Germany invades Poland. The German Occupation abandons Kraków in 1945 and the Soviet Union’s Red Army takes control of Poland.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER 1, 1946</td>
<td>Karol Wojtyła is ordained a priest by Cardinal Sapieha.</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAY, 1955</td>
<td>Establishment of Warsaw Pact joining Poland to the USSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>MARCH 8, 1964 &amp; JUNE 28, 1967</td>
<td>Karol Wojtyla installed as Archbishop of Kraków, and made a Cardinal three years later by Pope Paul VI.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUGUST, 1968</td>
<td>‘Prague Spring’ anti-communist reforms in Czechoslovakia aborted by Soviet-led military invasion</td>
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<tr>
<td>DECEMBER, 1970</td>
<td>Mass strikes begin in the Gdansk shipyard, Poland. 46 Polish workers shot and killed by Polish soldiers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCTOBER 16, 1978</td>
<td>Wojtyla is elected as the first Polish Pope and takes the name John Paul II.</td>
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<td>JUNE 2-10, 1979</td>
<td>Pope John Paul II visits Poland for his Nine Day Pilgrimage. Seen by an estimated 10 million people in person.</td>
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<tr>
<td>JULY 2, 1980</td>
<td>Mass strikes in Poland in protest of economic stagnation, low wage growth, worker conditions and price increases of thirty percent to one hundred percent on beef, pork, and high-grade poultry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST 31, 1980</td>
<td>Strikes cease with formal legalising of ‘Solidarity’, the first “independent self-governing trade union”. Solidarity gains 10 million members within 10 months.</td>
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Bibliography


