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# The plight of Mass Man & the concept of creatura according to Romano Guardini & Josef Pieper

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THE PLIGHT OF MASS MAN & THE CONCEPT OF *CREATUR*
ACCORDING TO
ROMANO GUARDINI & JOSEF PIEPER


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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of Masters of Philosophy


School of Philosophy & Theology

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Andriya M N Martinovic

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Candidate's Name                              Candidate's Signature

Date: 09/11/2018

*Dedicated to my father,*

*Andriya Milan Martinovic,*

*in whose loving memory*

*this thesis is written;*

*who found himself in Leisure;*

*whose body was laid to rest with Contemplation*

*upon his brave heart;*

*and to whose author, Josef Pieper,*

*I am eternally grateful.*

# Table of Contents

Abstract


       This thesis argues that the plight of Mass Man finds relief when creaturely awareness is practised. For Guardini, a close reading of key passages substantiates the basis for the thesis. The Pieper response considers a broad selection of texts to affirm what is explicit in Guardini regarding Mass Man, establishes continuity with it, and explicates what Guardini infers regarding *creatura*. Chapter 1 finds that Guardini affirms the goodness of matter or masses, and man's mediative role in perfecting it (*Ur-Werk*), by drawing upon Augustine's theory of *hyle* as creation; but shows the possibility of massification when man, as created spirit, contravenes his mediative role given to him by the Creator, who is uncreated spirit. Through a discussion pertaining Augustine's Manichean past, Chapter 2 finds that the problem of *masse* can never go so far as to claim that *masse* is intrinsically evil. Rather, the problem consists in an evil (*malum*), an ontological privation in man's relational dimension to other beings. Chapter 3 finds that Mass Man is conceived conceptually due to the proliferation of the Kantian autonomous attitude. Chapter 4 finds that Mass Man suffers subjugation to autonomous artefacts, or technology, which eclipses the created order, and which is a condition of existence in inverse proportion to a practise of creaturely awareness. Lastly, Chapter 5 finds continuity with Guardini, that Pieper acknowledges the existential problem of *masse* apropos to the terms of reference Guardini posits, and responds through the recommendation to re-espouse *intellectus*, through the philosophical act, and so re-espouse the givenness that is *creatura*.

Thesis Introduction


This thesis argues that through the writings of Romano Guardini and Josef Pieper the plight of Mass Man is relieved through a conception of *creatura*. However life might challenge him, Mass Man is the man-creature, made by God in His image, expressed in Scripture and written by both authors as the clay or *mass* formed by the divine potter, whose analogous being and contingency to the Creator endows him with relational capacity; *but* whose nature and purpose, through concrete circumstances appropriate to his world, condition him into an exclusively anthropocentric set of relations, which destroy man's realisation of this common ontology and corrupts him through his subordinate, heteronomous relationship to the autonomous individual. Although, ontologically, man will always be as mass to the Creator, through technology the individual secures a perverse dominion over nature and others; whereupon he makes man into his masses. Mass Man must re-espouse createdness if he is to meet the challenge of the day. A reading of *creatura* within Guardini and Pieper show how this challenge can be won.


The treatment of this challenge is pursued through three broad topics: Guardini's thought on Augustine; the relation of this thought to Kant's transcendental idealism; in its first part, the problem posed by Guardini's explicit theory of mass and implicit idea of *creatura*; and in its second part, how relief is found to the problem through Pieper in his explicit theory of *creatura* and implicit idea of mass. While much more could be done on these topics individually, their joint discussion serves to outline their existence and connection within Guardini and Pieper. The principal theoretical assumption made is that *creatura* belongs to western, Christian intellectual history. Except where translation assistance has been provided so that the full meaning of key

German terms is elucidated, the primary texts considered will be limited to English translations. Although secondary literature in English is limited, the researcher has nevertheless consulted these texts also with the view that they will point to tertiary sources which pertain to the thesis.

The structure that follows serves as a "cry and response" from Guardini to Pieper.[1] The first four chapters focus upon Guardini wherein each chapter is dedicated to the task of analysing appropriate passages and terms which setup the framework of Guardini's "cry".[2] This "cry" expresses Guardini's largely existential argument and can be ultimately classified as disclosure of the problem. The fifth and final chapter is dedicated to responding to the foregoing disclosure through analysis of appropriate Pieper texts, which, in a complementary fashion, reveals that Pieper's response is largely essentialist in character, apropos to the occidental tradition.

The "cry and response" methodology is legitimated in view of the strengths, agreement and continuity between each primary source. Guardini is needed, for without his disclosure as to the problem and solution, sufficient terms of reference would be lacking around which Pieper's response can be arguably oriented, and without which justifiable doubt as to the tenability of the "cry and response" would become insurmountable. Hence the whole thesis relies on the coherence

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[1] See footnote #521.

[2] Guardini was known for his melancholy. Also, it was a theme his works frequently considered. Those with this temperament are known at times for their profound earnestness, an equal depth of thought and feeling, and a need to manifest their beliefs for the betterment of others. This is arguably the psychological component to Guardini's personality that makes it fitting to characterise his words as a *cry*. See - Robert A. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 4, 165-68; Hans Urs von Balthasar, Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2010). eBook. 40-41. Cf. Romano Guardini, *Learning the Virtues: That Lead You to God* (1998), 180; *The Conversion of Augustine* (Westminster, Md.,: Newman Press, 1960), 91, 131, 74.

of its two parts: in the case of Guardini, that the thesis question points to a common object apprehended by both sources; and in the case of Pieper, that his texts and the conceptual furniture found within can be validly made into an intellectual response.

The chief basis for this methodology consists in both sources in their own way holding Immanuel Kant to be the theorist responsible for the problem of *masse*, and the eclipse of *creatura* wrought thereby, seen in the social proliferation of the dialect between autonomous and heteronomous being. Hence in the case of Guardini he broadcasts the fact and extent of this problem which *masse* engenders; and in the case of Pieper the problem hitherto discussed is brought to bear upon the conception of *creatura* within traditional western metaphysics. In this way each author's intellectual strengths are utilised and, although markedly different in their approach, are shown to possess agreement and continuity. Thus, through Guardini and Pieper, the relief that *creatura* brings to the problem of *masse* serves to verify that a response from the latter can be justifiably posed to the cry of the former.

The **first Chapter** considers *Letters From Lake Como*, wherein Guardini's theory of *masse* and creaturely awareness as it pertains to non-human entities is discussed. It is found that that the concept of *Ur-Werk* signifies how Guardini draws upon, but also continues from,

Augustine's theory of *hyle* and *imago dei*, pointing to the concept of "mastery" seen in the relationship created and uncreated spirit has to matter.[3]

The **second Chapter** considers *The Conversion of Augustine* wherein Guardini's theory of *masse* and creaturely awareness is discussed as it pertains to the ontology of man's relational dimension.[4] Contrast is made between Guardini and certain theorists regarding Augustine's Manichean past, his conversion to Christianity, and the import these events had on his theory of *massa, hyle* and similar terms. It is found that, underpinning these concepts, there is either a Christian or Manichean, a single or dual, concept of *creatura* and how man relates to being; either truly as "*allonom*"[5], or falsely under the Kantian term, "*heteronom*"[6]. The Christian, in seeing man under a singular and good creative efficacy, portrays evil as non-being. The problem of *masse*, therefore, like the problem of evil, can never posit that the masses are intrinsically evil. Whereas the Manichean sees man under a dual efficacy, portraying man as evil in a positive sense, rendering mass evil in itself. Guardini ultimately argues that a concept of *heteronomy* is as far as the problem of *masse* can go, as a relational deprivation to being.

The **third Chapter** considers *The World and The Person* wherein the conceptual existence of Mass Man is conceived in its relation to the proliferation of the autonomous worldview

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[3] Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race, (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W.B. Eerdmans, 1994). Ebook. 18-19, 35, 81.
[4] *The Conversion of Augustine*, 115-16.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.

(*Weltanschauung*). It is found that this proliferation is dialectical in nature and occurs due to an ignorance as to the concept of *creatura*.

The **fourth and final Chapter** on Guardini considers *The End of The Modern World*, wherein the positive existence of Mass Man as a deprivation of creaturely awareness is climatically laid bare.[7] It is found that, contrary to creaturely awareness, Mass Man suffers from technological awareness. The latter serves to furnish the world and dominion of the autonomous individual. For Mass Man to find relief, inspired by his true relation to the Creator, Guardini urges Mass Man towards a certain practise of poverty, of letting go of his relationship to the autonomous individual by way of technology, and to take up a relationship with his Creator by way of *creatura*.[8] Through these four chapters, it is demonstrated that the problem of Mass Man always exists in inverse proportion to the practise of creaturely awareness.

The logical relation of these four chapters proceed by way of their continuous and coherent examination of the concepts of *masse* and *creatura*; without which it would be untenable to press for a singular thesis statement. Without treatment in Chapter 1 of Guardini's elemental view on matter and spirit, the in-depth treatment of its relation to Augustine in Chapter 2 would look more

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[7] The source used is actually a compilation of two texts, formatted as one in the edition the researcher uses. The first source is *The End of The Modern World*, and the second is *Power & Responsibility*. When cited, it has not been articulated whether the citation is from either source, since the page number given takes you to the appropriate page, passage or term.

[8] Although Pope Francis uses poverty throughout *Laudato Si* mostly in its material sense, this exception reveals a deeper dimension to poverty after the fashion of Guardini. In paragraph 11 Pope Francis states that, "[t]he poverty and austerity of Saint Francis were no mere veneer of asceticism, but something much more radical: a refusal to turn reality into an object simply to be used and controlled." Francis, *Encyclical on Climate Change & Inequality: On Care for Our Common Home*, Encyclical on Climate Change & Inequality (Brooklyn: Melville House, 2015).

like a stretch of the imagination than a real link. Next, without this in-depth treatment that shows that massification at the level of the individual is possible – and not merely as a collective or sociological phenomena as is prevalent to extent mass theory – the argument in Chapter 3 that man can treat other men as mass would likewise be too rash. Lastly, through the aims of the preceding chapters *masse* and *creatura* becomes ensconced into a uniform concept whereupon the project of Chapter 4 becomes possible to show that the plight of Mass Man is seen overtly as a symptom of a loss of creaturely awareness.

The **fifth and last Chapter** considers a response through a broad selection of Pieper texts wherein the following is evidenced: firstly, that Pieper was personally and intellectually influenced by Guardini as to the formation of concepts proper to Mass Man and *creatura*. Secondly, because the plight of Mass Man is arguably a crisis of realism, an epistemology which rebalances *intellectus* and *ratio* is needed so that man knows how he is open to real being; not merely as one who, at "the sole disposal of *ratio*"[9], finds himself subject and even *subjugated* to mental being. Thirdly that *creatura* is needed so that being is understood as ontological property instead of neutrally, as "*ens ut sic*"[10] or *natura*. Fourthly it is evidenced that Pieper implicitly acknowledges the existential plight of Mass Man in relation to the practise of sophistry. Lastly it is evidenced that philosophy as *theoria* must be urgently promoted in place of that system of conditioning constructed by the sophistical tendency to be at the sole disposal of *ratio* so that man is not reduced to "raw

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[9] Josef Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 1998), 18.
[10] *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays* (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 1999), 48.

material"[11], that is, to the state of Mass Man. All this logically relates to the preceding Chapters because without the analysis they give no such interpretation of Pieper as a Guardinian mass theorist would be justifiable. Thus it is demonstrable that Pieper acknowledges the existential problem of *masse* apropos to the terms of reference that Guardini posits, and responds to it uniquely in essential terms. Thereby, the plight of Mass Man according to Guardini and Pieper is relieved.

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[11] *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 96-97.

CHAPTER 1

*Briefe vom Comer See* (1927)

or

Letters From Lake Como:

explorations in technology and the human race [*LLC*] (1981)


1.  Introduction

This Chapter introduces the elemental, Augustinian significance of mass (German, *masse*) for Guardini and will argue that *masse* so defined is one of his basic theoretical positions for cultural critique. Through a close reading of key texts within the *LLC*, this position shall be analysed and explicated in its true and false forms (as it primarily relates to non-human entities). In this way Guardini sets out to announce, decry, and to lay bare, the problem of mass.


Several types of evidence are found within the *LLC* that support the 'cry' interpretation given to *LLC*. Evidence is found in how his literary technique is largely inductive, kerygmatic and impressionistic rather than deductive, focusing more upon the impact reality has than what reality is said to prescribe. This approach aids the reader to realise his own existence in relation to masses as well as realise that masses impact daily living.[12]

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[12] From the outset, we hold that "inductive" and "deductive" are sufficiently self-evident terms and need no special explanation.

With respect to who brought the masses into existence, Guardini places the onus upon "the North". In *LLC*, this term is used literally and figuratively. The latter sense is evidence that points to theorists such as Kierkegaard and Grundtvig, and the concurrent philosophical, mythical and literary genesis of idealism with "the crowd".[13]

Also, evidence is found in *LLC* that Guardini uses *masse* outside its contemporary usage by echoing the more ancient position of Augustine on: mastery, *hyle*, *massa*, *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei*. These concepts are built upon with respect to the question of man's mastering of the masses through what Guardini calls *Ur-Werk*.

Thus Guardini shows that his theory of *masse* stems from and relates to a strongly Augustinian concept of *creatura*. Further, the problem of *masse* is seen or resolved should man choose or not choose to conform his mastery of the masses to its created truth. Discussion of *LLC*, therefore, seeks to make these points plain so when the problem of *masse* is applied in following chapters *to humans* the underpinning theory has already been submitted, as a backdrop, for consideration.

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[13] Howard N. Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth: The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, American University Studies Series V, Philosophy, (New York: P. Lang, 1996), 1-24. Chapter 4 will focus upon this area in-depth; presently, though, "the North" has sufficient, in-text meaning to deserve attention distinct from an analysis of its conceptual roots.

2. Mass theory: one of Guardini's basic positions

Dupré explains in his introduction to the *LLC* that from 1923 to 1925 Guardini published in *Die Schildgenossen*, when living in Berlin, a set of letters written to his long-time friend, Josef Weiger. In 1927, these letters were published as the *LLC*.[14] In this work, Guardini takes up various themes which would critique the role *masse* should have in an increasingly aggregated world of nature and machine.[15] Creaturely awareness serves as a backdrop to this discussion. It is inferred throughout the text as the correct existential which is troubled by a wrong understanding of what *masse* is.

Krieg states that Guardini felt compelled to articulate his cultural theory due to the Nazi state's "aim of taking "a formless mass into its hands"[16], that is to say, to totally reshape and so destroy Christian Europe. This cultural assault, states Krieg, bifurcates human existence into either having dignity or being merely "one among the 'masses'".[17] But despite the world changing this way, the palpable intimacy within *LLC*, perhaps with a *pathos* similar to his priestly role as confessor, establishes a safe space in which the plight of Mass Man is primarily discussed with respect to

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[14] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 19.

[15] Krieg relates that "…in his many diverse writings he engages in "the consistent, that is to say methodical, encounter between [Christian] faith and the world. And not only the world in general, for [neoscholastic] theology also does this in its distinct questions, but in the *concrete*: in culture and its appearances, history, society and so forth [emphasis added]." Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 44-45. Krieg's discussion of Guardini 1925 work, *Der Gegensatz*, highlights the nature the importance of 'concreteness' to Guardini. Ibid., 14-15. Further, this concept was central to Guardini's anthropology: "I experience myself as a concrete [being]. And this concrete [being] exists in itself…" ibid., 15.
"The powers he resisted are called unbridled technology, totalitarianism, and atheism (as the logical consequence of the first emancipation and the absolutization [sic] of "modernity"). Balthasar, *Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source*. 52.

[16] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*. Due to unsuccessfully troubleshooting an error in the citation software, the researcher acknowledges the typographical error of "*Ii*" wherever this reference is used.

[17] Ibid., 173.

non-human entities. While Royal believes this work suffers from an idyllic, "over-idealization of his Italian birthplace"[18], it is understandable, even necessary, that Guardini viewed his birthplace in this way, because that idealization made it possible for him to give a cultural critique of what is before him and to elucidate the cultural use and abuse of *masse*. According to Krieg's impressive bibliography, *LLC* is perhaps the first instance of Guardini discussing the concept in a published document.[19] Balthasar states that "…from 1920 to 1960" "[he] cannot detect any changes in [Guardini's] basic position" regarding his response to "the bombed-out spiritual and intellectual landscape" around him.[20] One aim of this research is to demonstrate that Guardini's mass theory is one aspect of that basic position.

3. The masses have value: Guardini's kerygmatic and inductive approach

Guardini creates this safe space by introducing to the reader the word, *masse*, much as Socrates used his method of *endoxa* to gravitate towards his main argument. So Guardini introduces the term to the reader in its common and inert usage as it refers to non-human entities in order to contrast it later to that *anthropological* usage that denigrates the goodness of man. This sense to *masse* can be understood as the first, earliest, and more elementary literary source within Guardini's anthropological development of the idea of mass.

After situating the reader in the safe space of Lake Como, Italy, where Guardini wrote the *LLC*, Guardini calls to mind the phenomena that in his view destroys the natural harmony between nature

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[18] Robert Royal, *A Deeper Vision: The Catholic Intellectual Tradition in the Twentieth Century* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015).
[19] Or at least that limited to English translation. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 257-64.
[20] Balthasar, *Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source*. 8.

and civilisation, and that subsequently changes the role that *masse* plays within this harmony. To this end he states that:

> [t]he sad part was that I felt as though a great process of dying had set in around me. How can I put this to you? Look, what has already taken place up in the North I saw beginning here. I saw machines invading the land that had previously been the home of culture. I saw death overtaking a life of infinite beauty, and I felt that this was not just an external loss that we could accept and remain who we were.[21]

"The North" in its literal sense includes Germany where Guardini lived much of his life.[22] Indeed, it is assumed to indicate *due north* of Lake Como. Upon this, the figurative sense to "the North" finds a deeper meaning in the thought of Kierkegaard and Grundtvig; deserving therefore its own special analysis in Chapter 4. But for now, attention shall be given to the term in its present context.

It is noteworthy that Guardini does not single out any particular nation in reference to the North, nor does he speak in this way to be vague or obtuse.[23] Rather, and given his primarily German audience at the time (e.g., *Die Schildgenossen*), he points to the phenomenon first without couching it in political language/discourse, for instance what Victor Klemperer calls "the language of the third Reich"[24] or LTI (*Lingua Tertii Imperii*). Essentially, LTI possessed truth value due to

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[21] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 15.

[22] The researcher is aware that Guardini was born in Italy.

[23] Guardini's analysis of the Hitler's salutation, *Heil*, reveals Guardini's general attention to the symbology of terms. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 124-27.

[24] Victor Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich: Lti Lingua Tertii Imperii: A Philologist's Notebook*, trans. Martin Brady, Bloomsbury Revelations edition. ed. (London; New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 9. This language, Klemperer states, "permeated the flesh and blood of the people through single words, idioms and sentence structures which were imposed on them in a million repetitions and taken on board mechanically and unconsciously." Ibid., 15. Later Klemperer writes that, "language does not simply write and think for me, it also increasingly dictates my feelings and governs my entire spiritual being and more unquestioningly and unconsciously I abandon myself to

the authority of the speaker, not due to whether his words referred to things.[25] So if the speaker, for example Joseph Goebbels, used force to assert his authority, the truth value of the LTI became synonymous with the potential force behind the assertion he made. In this way, conceivably anything might be made to be true, since it was unlikely that anyone could counter the force behind the assertion. This Klemperer calls the LTI's obsession with "invocation"[26], a methodology geared towards turning individuals and personalities, into "unthinking and docile cattle in a herd driven and hounded in a particular direction, to turn them into atoms in a huge rolling block of stone."[27] So when Guardini asserts that a "great process of dying"[28] was happening to civilization and nature, for which the North was the culprit, it is an assertion that runs counter to the LTI by its palpable lack of force and respect for the masses. Balthasar states that Guardini sought to persuade the masses through solidarity and camaraderie, not through force.[29] Rather, Guardini would hold that the created individual possesses its own interior invocation to tell the individual what is and what is not socially or generally normative. Thus, the North is one of many key terms and phrases within *LLC* that reveal Guardini's commitment to speaking plainly, counter-politically and respectfully of the individual.

In the above passage Guardini has placed the reader alongside himself, as one in equal standing with himself, as he describes in the North a "dreadful confusion of forms"[30] causing the

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it…Words can be like tiny doses of arsenic: they are swallowed unnoticed, appear to have no effect, and then after a little time the toxic reaction set in after all." Ibid.

[25] Here it is assumed that *phenomenon* and *things* are sufficiently coterminous with Guardini's preference for concrete speech.

[26] Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich : Lti Lingua Tertii Imperii : A Philologist's Notebook*, 23.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*.

[29] Balthasar, *Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source*. 11.

[30] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 40.

decay of life around him. How Guardini journeys with his reader is an example of what Krieg calls Guardini's kerygmatic approach.[31] Guardini relates this confusion through themes such as: the decline of civilization; the rise of the machine; and the sadness he feels from having these realizations. He does not make recourse to doctrinaire statements, rather he expresses his own values above trying to change those of his reader. This thesis argues that the substratum to these values is the created form in which Guardini participates.

The kergymatic approach separates Guardini's mass theory from the propagandistic approach towards the masses within the LTI, for example within Hitler's *Mein Kampf* (1925) which was published around the same time as *LLC*. Hitler asserts that theoretical literature should be for "*soi-disant* [i.e., self-appointed] intellectuals" and "newspaper propaganda" for the masses.[32] But for Guardini, all are welcome to ponder upon, not yield or acquiesce to, the perspective he gives. In conjunction with Klemperer's account, Guardini's clearly does not see his reader as "*Üntermenschentum*"[33] (subhumanity), nor as a "formless mass of anonymous, global proletarians"[34], as Joseph Goebbels would declare. The masses can act philosophically like Guardini, and due to this have a greater potential than their leaders would admit or allow. The masses are not automata; they are humans just like Guardini, Hitler and Goebbels. The basis for this is man's created form. His kerygmatic approach is symptomatic of *creatura* speaking, as it were, throughout the daily existence of the individual. By being kerygmatic, while Guardini speaks

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[31] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 36,138-39, 44, 52, 59
[32] Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, (Mumbai: Jacio Publishing House, 2012). eBook. 40.
[33] Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich : Lti Lingua Tertii Imperii : A Philologist's Notebook*, 135.
[34] Ibid., 248.

to the masses he does not degrade them as the LTI would. The masses are not functionaries. They possess equal value within the human species.

Like his kerygmatic rather than propagandistic approach, Guardini has recourse within the *LLC* to inductive rather than deductive arguments. This is consistent with Krieg's assertion that Guardini's theory was very much "grounded in experience"[35], which occasioned "…the pursuit of new questions"[36] such as a theory of mass to creatively diagnose through a Christian existentialism "the signs of the times"[37]. This approach in part can be broadly contrasted to the systems of Neo-Scholasticism which, according to Krieg, Guardini consistently avoided.[38]

4.  Upholding the masses

In this context, however, the terms inductive and deductive can refer to more. Guardini's inductivism can be contrasted in a political context to the dichotomy Klemperer makes regarding German romanticism – between expressionism and impressionism – and how the Reich's "*weltanschauung*"[39] "either inherits…or shares"[40] the qualities of the former. It is noted, however, that right now a slight deviation has been made from Guardini's discussion of *masse*. But this

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[35] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 17.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid., 183.
[38] Krieg relates thus: "Guardini…observed that the church and its theology benefit when the church encourages not only the deductive theology of Neo-Scholasticism but also the inductive theology of Augustine, Anselm, and Bonaventure." Ibid., 19. Besides, the researcher can find no evidence of a neo-scholastic mass theory, although it is of course welcome and needed
[39] "The emergence of the 'idle chitchat about *Weltanschauung*' (in the sense of something 'illogical') can be explain as part of the incipient opposition to decadence, impressionism, scepticism and the undermining of the idea of a continuous and therefore responsible self." Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich : Lti Lingua Tertii Imperii : A Philologist's Notebook*, 146-47.
[40] Ibid., 70.

deviation is relevant, presently, as a way to explain how his methodology supports his anthropological mass theory. Expressionist propaganda, Klemperer states, emphasises "the importance of the will and a fervently thrusting forward momentum"[41] in an effort to prescribe "fixed rules for [itself] and [for] the world around"[42], but without respect for the impressions or worldview of its audience. Possessing a created form would mean that man's impressions or worldview were already in a way determined; a way, though universally configured (i.e., all men are created), was in no way politically totalitarian. Due to this, deductivism of this sort needed to be and was avoided by Guardini so as to validate the masses' impressions of the world in a society which sought total political control of them; and, for their benefit, to exemplify this attitude within the content of *LLC*.

As stated, Guardini's inductivism goes against this tendency by validating intuition and experience, thus validating the capacity for the masses to articulate their own worldview, but also in particular affording the masses the opportunity to see and understand the plight they are in. Creaturely awareness affords a diversity of views much how Aristotle in his *Ethics* asserts that ethics is more a matter of choice between this or that good than that between good or evil. Writing in this way within *LLC,* Guardini is showing to the reader that impressions or experiences are commensurate with forming an accurate worldview. Thus, from Guardini's perspective it would verge upon absurdity that the Reich would assert its worldview while preventing the same from its populous. Indeed, its absurdity stems from the grave injustice wrought when any power-base seeks to prohibit in the collective what it itself depends upon for existence. Arguably, then, Guardini

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[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid.

proffers his theory of mass inductively as a tacit act of rebellion, and by doing so exemplifies how one's intuition and experience is equipped to adequately understand the nature of the world, and problem of *masse*. In fact, it is due to the contrary of inductivism or experience – blunt force, power-mongering propaganda – that the masses themselves possess a problem: that being, the devaluation of their nature; as well as the devaluation of their thoughts about the problem they are in; and how the world around them is comprised and made up of certain masses that can be either used or abused. Guardini's inductivism, on a political level, is therefore an approach equipped to counter the massifying effects inherent to LTI, the Reich's propaganda and the approach it takes.

*5.* The death of nature; the death of *masse*

In *LLC*, the death to which Guardini refers is that occurring to nature. In *The World and The Person* (1939) Guardini gives this definition of nature as it was understood in Modern times:

> The concept of nature is the concept of an object which signifies that which presents itself to our thought and action. But it is also a concept of values, and signifies a valid norm for this thought and action: that which is proper and healthy, wise and perfect - the 'natural.' Opposed to this is the unnatural, the artificial, abnormal, unhealthy, spoiled.[43]

Thus for Guardini, a decay of nature is not merely an ecological reference to, say, deforestation, or climate change, but of that normative aspect proper to natural objects in which humans can live "healthy, wise and perfect"[44]. It is therefore due to compliance with nature, properly  understood,

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[43] Romano Guardini, *The World and the Person* (Chicago: H. Regnery Co., 1965), 5.
[44] Ibid.

that man can achieve his potential.[45] A proper understanding for Guardini cannot be without a consideration of its created dimension.

In the above *LLC* passage, the mood is ripe with Guardini's melancholy.[46] Guardini situates the object-use of *masse* when he states: "[a]ll these things were caught up and encircled by the well-constructed mountain *masses*. Culture, very lofty and yet self-evident, very naturally – I have no other word [emphasis added]."[47] Allowing his kerygmatic mood to permeate his inductive argument helps the reader to value the subject responsible for each elucidation (i.e. Guardini), and as one who is not writing in the mode of LTI, nor thinking in abstraction, but reflecting upon the *concrete* reality of *concrete* decay. Further, reflection upon the concrete world generally and mass-decay specifically is symptomatic of seeing the world in *massive* terms. It is incumbent, therefore, to set about defining what Guardini means by *masse*.

Given the theme of decay Guardini is discussing, it appears as no coincidence in the above *LLC* passage that he chooses *masse* to denote man's place within nature rather than man's undue dominion over it. In subduing nature in this way, the masses are set against the normativity of nature. The following passage from the *Sixth Letter* aids an understanding of what he is doing: "in accordance with the formula discovered, energies and masses [*masse*] are put to use in   the

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[45] Whereas only sentences latter he begins to make plain his fundamental disagreement, something to be flagged now but pursued in a more appropriate context. The upshot of his disagreement is to do with the goodness of nature being misconceived as absolutely, not contingently, good: "[this] concept of nature expresses something final. One cannot go beyond it. As soon as something is derived from it, it is definitely understood. As soon as something can be shown to have a natural cause, it is justified. As soon as something is recognized as being according to nature the problem disappears. This does not mean that nature in the last analysis and as a whole can be understood. On the contrary: it is perceived as something so profound and rich that the consideration of it is infinite." Ibid., 6.

[46] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 4, 165-68.

[47] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 16.

proportions desired."[48] Here Guardini is drawing the link between that "great process of dying",

as he puts it, and Heidegger's concept of the "standing reserve"[49] or the "enframing"[50] of

mechanistic science which sets the masses against nature. It is a crucial point here that Guardini

shows solidarity with the masses as against their corrupt masters, stating that, "[t]he new desire

for mastery does not in any sense follow natural courses or observe natural proportions [i.e. the

masses]."[51] Balthasar calls that which results from such mastery "second-degree nature".[52] With

this he refers back to Guardini's statement, "now man lives in an abstract environment, and the

abstract, the conceptual, does not constitute 'spirit', does it? No! Spirit means life."[53] Thus "the

great process of dying", of which "the North" is the culprit, is caused by a mastery which sets the

masses against their "natural courses" and "proportions"[54], and ultimately against the spirit of man

himself. At the heart, therefore, of Guardini's theory of *masse* is how, in a unique way, man relates

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[48] The full text concerned reads as follows: "The other form of knowledge and its mastery is very different. It began to emerge already during the Renaissance but has really come into its own very recently. This knowledge does not inspect; it analyzes. It does not construct a picture of the world, but a formula. Its desire is to achieve power so as to bring force to bear on things, a law that can be formulated rationally. Here we have the basis and character of its dominion: compulsion, arbitrary compulsion devoid of all respect.
  The first way of ruling began with investigation, then noted connections, unleashed forces, realized possibilities, emphasized what it desired, and, stressing this, repressed other things. It was a knowing, validating, stimulating, directing, and underlining of natural forces and relations. All that it gave form to was still in some way nature. Mind and spirit were certainly involved; human purposes, views of reality, and essential relations were put to use. But all of this was always in organic connection with nature. It was rule by service, creation out of natural possibilities, which did not fail to transgress set limits or observe final directions. But now, *in accordance with the formula discovered, energies and masses are put to use in the proportions desired.* They are detached from their organic links and arbitrarily pressed into service. The new desire for mastery does not in any sense follow natural courses or observe natural proportions. Indeed, it treats these with complete indifference. The new mastery posits its aims arbitrarily on rational grounds [emphasis added]…" ibid., 34-35.
[49] Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology, and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt, 2013 ed. (New York: Garland Pub., 1977), 17.
[50] Ibid., 19.
[51] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 34.
[52] Balthasar, *Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source*. 9.
[53] Ibid., 8.
[54] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 34.

to matter; that is, in a manner unlike all other entities. *Masse* and man are thus inextricably and uniquely related.

Guardini's friend, Martin Heidegger, later put it these terms, as cited above.[55] "Enframing", "standing reserve" and so forth are key terms within "The Question Concerning Technology".[56] According to Tuttle, this work forms Heidegger's bulwark in relating technological mastery with Mass Man or, using Heidegger's term, *Das Man*.[57] However, the date stamp for *LLC* seems to pre-empt Heidegger and the popular twentieth-century discourse concerning the masses, for according to Lovitt the *LLC* precedes Heidegger's first public lecture on the matter in 1949 at the *Club at Bremen Lectures* (1949-1955).[58] Further, the *LLC* predates Adorno and Marcuse's discourse on the Masses within their joint work, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, published (in the German) sometime in the 1940s, as well as the writings of Shils and Bell from the nineteen-sixties onwards.

This is not to say that Guardini conceived the concept of the Masses on his own.[59] Besides his friendship with Heidegger, on the strength of which it is fair to assume they shared their ideas,

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[55] Guardini and Heidegger became friends around 10 years before he wrote *LCC*. Ibid., 6.

[56] We can suggest here that as Guardini's perspective regarding "the North" has Heideggerian undertones, then likewise his allusion to a subjective usage of 'mass' might be as well. For this to be so Guardini's usage would need to agree with Heidegger's equivalent term, *das man,* which is that extreme form of *mitsein,* or that tendency in man to care so much for the other that it deprives his ability to care for himself. This possibility is confirmed in Guardini's 1947 work, *The End of the Modern World,* where he defines Mass Man: "[as]…that human type – who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous…".[56] This statement by Guardini shows that his basic idea of Mass Man as *extreme heteronomy* essentially mirrors Heidegger's basic idea of *das man* as the extreme of *mitsein*. However, this aspect to *masse* will be discussed in a later chapter. Cf. Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 12.

[57] Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth : The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, 65-82.

[58] Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, ix.

[59] It is reasonable to assume that Weiger was already apprised as to Guardini's interpretation of *masse*, for it is unlikely that Guardini would engage in correspondence with his friend about matters Weiger was ignorant.

his knowledge of Hegel[60], Kierkegaard[61] and Nietzsche[62], whose works, according to Tuttle, constitute the beginnings of Mass theory in modern times, would have made Guardini sufficiently aware of the term's conceptual and historical meanings. [63] As cited earlier, Hitler's repetitive use of the term, in *Mein Kampf* and in public, along with Goebbels and other public ministers, might also be considered a major influence. Scott notes that Arendt, known for her theory of totalitarianism, wrote about Kierkegaard due to Guardini's influence as her lecturer, which indicates that Guardini was aware of Kierkegaard's work with this concept.[64] Thus the *LLC* was most probably written with all these sources as grist is to the mill of Guardini's mind.

While the general sense to *masse* has been in consistent use since the Greeks (e.g., *hoi polio*), although seemingly not for the Latins, it is telling that Guardini pre-empts the prevailing discourse of the Masses in the twentieth-century in his writings in the *LLC*. [65] This is indeed telling, arguably because of Guardini's knowledge about its ancient, Christian usage, specifically in Augustine, which will be discussed later. Presently it should be pointed out that from drawing upon this usage, it sets Guardini apart from many mass theorists.[66] Thus due to Guardini's specific

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[60] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 15.

[61] Ibid., 31.

[62] Ibid., 48.

[63] Preface. Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth: The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, xi-xv.

[64] Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott, "Hannah Arendt Twenty Years Later: A German Jewess in the Age of Totalitarianism," *New German Critique* 86, no. Spring-Summer, 2002 (2002): 26. Cf. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 201.

[65] According to *PHI* Latin texts, a database of 362 classical Latin sources up to around 200AD, from its 128 'hits' for the stem "*massa*" (inclusive of derivations), all sources used the term to describe something inanimate. These 'hits' in their context were translated with thanks to Dylan Littler.

[66] Gasset's 1926 work, *Revolt of the Masses* (*La rebelión de las masas*) is another normative work in which the term is explored, but seemingly without recourse to ancient or Christian thought. It would appear that Giner is ignorant of Guardini's letters (written from 1923-25) which resulted in the publishing of the *LLC* (1927. Giner states that, "[t]he task of presenting a fully articulated explanation of the man in the mass in the new perspective fell to Jose Ortega." Although nowhere in the *LLC* does Guardini (i.e., the translator) use the term, Mass Man, Guardini certainly goes far in articulating how the term mass relates to man, before too hastily defining the nature and existence of Mass Man as

knowledge, he had the ability and perspective to firstly, and gently, pose the connection of *masse*

with a Christian understanding of nature as *creatura* before showing its contemporary,

problematic, academic and anthropological usage. In contrast to Gasset's broad-sweeping criticism

of the average person in favour of an elite-ruled renaissance, that Guardini exhibits solidarity with

the masses means that he wishes them to be ennobled according to their nature, but without being

dependent upon him after the fashion of Goebbels, as though Guardini were such an elite.[67]

*Creatura* serves as a tacit justification for why the masses can thrive without elitist patrimony.

Further, Guardini sees the decay of nature and civilisation as a problem caused by such elites, not

the masses that form it. This means that he does not deny that masses of men indeed exist.

Elsewhere in several places *LLC* makes this clear.[68] But what it also means is that he does not wish

to devalue those to whom the term can apply.[69] Distinguishing in *LLC* between human and  non-

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Ortega does. See - Salvador Giner, *Mass Society* (London: Martin Robertson, 1976), 75-76. Elsewhere in Swingewood's work, *The Myth of Mass Culture*, the same ignorance appears to be evident. Alan Swingewood, *The Myth of Mass Culture* (London: Macmillan, 1977).

[67] "The mass is the average man." José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1993), 6.
For instance, the same charge can be made against Hitler who in *Mein Kampf* saw that the masses could only be "rescued" by the "very few" who controlled the masses opinions and actions. Hitler, *Mein Kampf*. 53, 73.

[68] For example in his *Seventh Letter*: "But the masses have changed all this." Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 39. And later: "[art is brought] into the trashy sphere, that is, within the reach of the masses." Ibid., 41. Lastly from the *Nine Letter*: "[w]e must be willing…to accept the fact of everything in mass, to accept the fact that even among the masses each person has rights and life and goods…" ibid., 51.

[69] To be clear, Guardini is not saying that the masses do not have a problem. The following passage makes this clear, but what is also clear is that he does not devalue *masse* inasmuch as they are victims of circumstance. "A dreadful confusion of forms has emerged. These forms no longer have roots in life and its essential content. We build theaters in the form of temples, banks in the form of cathedrals, apartment complexes in the form of palaces. Working days and Sundays merge into one another. Work is done in high-heeled shoes and silk stockings. We no longer dress specially for festivals. Employers who try to act as such often make themselves ridiculous because all they have is money. Those of necessarily modest means ape the practices that demand wealth and big houses, but no inner style drives them to do so. Now lofty words are used to say everyday things. Newspaper articles are written in academic and oratorical forms that would demand philosophical investigation if the articles had any content. Solemn addresses bear the stamp of the marketplace. And so it goes on without end. Everywhere we find hybridization. All rankings are lost. We all think we are justified in whatever we do. We are no longer tied to the essence of content or the historical or social dignity of form. Nothing commands respect, and nothing is inviolable. We lay hands on everything. All philosophical problems, all art, all historical events, all personalities, even down to the last hidden thing in recollection, letter, or confession -all are up for grabs. How sickening it is! How vulgar life has become in every sphere, even in religion, for despite the profound equality of the children of God and the fact that all things are theirs, they are unable

human masses places the problem at distance from the reader; which is to say, the reader is apprised

of a broader plight happening around them that through their own reflection they are welcomed to

consider. Hence the problem is not the masses – human or not – but those who devalue *masse* as

an entity.

6. The mastery of the masses

A conceptual transition occurs within *LLC* when Guardini goes from introducing *masse* to

his reader to showing his reader how it applies to them. Showing the reader its applicability to

them is a sensitive task, for it involves disclosing to them, albeit done subtly by Guardini, how

they might take on the characteristics of Mass Man. Therefore, as an intermediary step between

non-human and human masses so defined, even as a way to guide the reader gently and not too

hastily, he moves from praising an object such as the mountain masses to praising those masses

used in human production. So here Guardini takes no issue with man mastering a mass, as the

outcome can be good and useful. Further, it moves towards the question of how *masse* and man

uniquely relate. He states that however good such products can be, which in their totality can be

called culture, such are still "alien" or "artificial", to nature.[70] This is the "second-nature" to which

Balthasar refers. To elaborate, Guardini gives this key example to aid the reader:

> Take a vessel sailing on Lake Como. Though it is of considerable weight, the masses
> of wood and linen, along with the force of the wind, combine so perfectly that it   has

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to prevent the surrender of all arcana and the irruption of clamor [sic] and bustle into the quietness that alone is
essentially creative. How we long for an arcane discipline that will protect what is sacred from the marketplace,
including the marketplace within." Ibid., 40.
[70] Ibid., 17.

become light. When it sails before the wind, my heart laughs to see how something of this sort has become so light and bright of itself by reason of its perfect form. I do not know what historians make of it, but it seems credible to me when I am told that boats of this kind sailed already in the age of the Romans. We have here an ancient legacy of form. Do you not see what a remarkable fact of culture is present when human beings become masters of wind and wave by fashioning wood and fitting it together and spanning linen sails? In my very blood I have a sense of creation here, of a primal work of human creativity. It is full of mind and spirit, this perfectly fashioned movement in which we master the force of nature.[71]

In this statement there is a nuance worth pausing upon, as it serves to further delineate Guardini's usage from the likes of the LTI, Gasset or Hitler. Gasset would hold that the massification of man is a reality on equal par with Guardini's mountain, wood and linen masses; in other words, as is done with wood, so is done with man. No acknowledgment of their essentialness, nor their essential difference, is given importance under Gasset's definition. It is as if Gasset never considered that the plight of Mass Man was a more complex problem than the overall or general misuse of natural objects. For this reason, this lack of distinction is problematic for it comes conceptually close to the fallacy of reification; but it is a problem for which Guardini accounted by distinguishing between human and non-human masses, how the former can utilise the latter, and how a discussion of their dynamism is fundamental to a fuller, mass theory.

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[71] Ibid., 19. The German reads: "Auf dem Corner See fahren welche, schwer, für große Lasten ausreichend. Aber die Massen von Holz und Leinwand und Wirideskraft so vollkommen durch- formt, daß sie leicht geworden sind. Wenn solch ein Boot vor dem Winde seine Bahnen zog, hat mir das Herz gelacht, wie einem wohl' geschieht, wenn etwas durch vollendete Form von innen her leicht und hell geworden ist. Ich weiß nicht, was die Historiker dazu meinen, aber mir schien es wohl glaubhaft, als mir jemand sagte, so seien die Boote schon zur Römerzeit gewesen. Uraltes Formerbe ist hier. Spürst Du, welch wundervolle Kulturtatsache darin liegt, wenn der Mensch mit gebogenem und gefugtem Holz lind gespannter Leinwand Herr wird Über Wasser und Wind? Bis ins Innere habe ich die Schöpfung gefühlt; das Ur-Werk des Menschenschafifens. Ganz gesättigt von Geist, diese vollkommen durchbildete Bewegung, in welcher der Mensch die Naturgewalt bewältigt!"

To explain Guardini's view on *masse* as non-human entities: though he does admit that a sailing vessel is an "ancient legacy of form"[72], thus implying human agency, he does not go so far as to claim that its material or "masses of wood and linen"[73] are the agent of that legacy. Rather, the "ancient legacy" is that "remarkable fact of culture"[74] where "human beings become *masters of wind and wave* [emphasis added]"[75] through use of requisite masses. Thus, human agents work upon non-human masses for the good of culture. This means that a mass is something equally vital for the attainment of personal mastery, the creation of forms such as a sailing vessel, and the possession of concrete knowledge. Hence Guardini's view does not devalue *masse*, for *masse* can be a useful good for society. *Masse* in its non-anthropological sense is thus a good when understood and used this way. This example shows how Guardini's theory is distinct from Gasset's and others'. Since whatever mass under consideration is not its own agent, the plight of Mass Man is therefore not strictly caused by Mass Man himself. As it is the text itself illustrating this, it counts as strong evidence of Guardini's object-use of *masse*. Further, it shows how *masse* is the material component to mastery; that is, how matter is used by people, and thus how the non-human and anthropological usages would relate in Guardini's mind; that is, when people are viewed as non-human masses and, subsequently, used by other people.[76]

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[72] Ibid.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid.
[75] Ibid.
[76] The researcher is aware of his curious use of object and subject, given its Kantian overtone, and given Guardini's criticism of so many of Kant's doctrines. Therefore, by these two terms I simply mean as has already been stated: object as referring to non-human entities, and subject as referring to human-entities.

7. A textual parallel between Guardini and Augustine as to their theory of the void

Guardini's repeated and consistent use of mass and master are signposts to the possibility that a parallel exists between his writings and those of Augustine. An exploration of Augustine's work, *On The Nature of The Good* (c. 404 AD), corroborates this, wherein Augustine defends the goodness of "the void" (Gen 1:2) due to its being created by a Christian, beneficent, supreme God, as opposed to a Manichean, malign, dualistic demiurge of matter.[77] In comparing and contrasting Guardini with Augustine it is evident how the doctrines of *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei* inform each author's concept of nature; and how these concepts are consistently inferred by Guardini throughout *LLC*.

Two key and related differences are evident between Guardini and Augustine: first, that in *LLC* Guardini omits all supernatural reference in general, and apologetical reference to Manicheism in particular; secondly and more importantly, that Guardini still infers, as did Augustine against Mani's demiurge of matter, who is responsible for the existence of evil masses. The corroborating text comes from *Chapter 18*, titled, "Hyle, Which Was Called by The Ancients the Formless Material of Things, is Not an Evil"[78]. The similarity is evident in three ways:  first,

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[77] Saint Augustine, St Augustine: Colected Works, (Delphi Classics, 2016). 4785-856.
[78] "For neither is that material, which the ancients called *Hyle*, to be called an evil. I do not say that which Manichæus with most senseless vanity, not knowing what he says, denominates *Hyle*, namely, the former of corporeal beings; whence it is rightly said to him, that he introduces another god. For nobody can form and create corporeal beings but God alone; for neither are they created unless there subsist with them measure, form, and order, which I think that now even they themselves confess to be good things, and things that cannot be except from God. But by Hyle I mean a certain material absolutely formless and without quality, whence those qualities that we perceive are formed, as the ancients said. For hence also wood [*silva*] is called in Greek ὕλη, because it is adapted to workmen [*quod operantibus apta sit*], not that itself may make anything, but that it is the material of which something may be made. Nor is that *Hyle*, therefore, to be called an evil which cannot be perceived through any appearance, but can scarcely be thought of through any sort of privation of appearance. For this has also a capacity of forms; for if it cannot receive the form imposed by the workman [*artifice*], neither assuredly may it be called material. Hence if form is some good, whence those who excel in it are called beautiful [*formosi*], as from appearance they are called handsome [*speciosi*], even the

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the similar terms used; second, the similar meaning of key terms; third, the similar argument made

with these terms. Each similarity gives credence to the others. However, to be fair, the third way

will only be examined after illustrating the key difference between Augustine and Guardini.

The similar terms can be detailed as follows:

| Augustine | | Guardini | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Original | Translated | Original | Translated |
| *Silva* | Wood | *Holtz* | Wood |
| *Hyle* | The void | *Masse* | Mass |
| *Quod operantibus apta sit* | Workmen | *Herr* | Master |
| *Artifice* | Workman | *gebogenem* | Lit. "bent", Trans. "fashioning" |
| *Creare* | Create | *Schöpfung* | Creation |
| *Creantur* | Created | *Menschenschaffens* | Human creativity |
| *Speciosi* | Beautiful | | |
| *Formosi* | Handsome | *vollendete Form* | Perfect form |

In a preliminary fashion, it is significant that so many similar concepts are used between Guardini

and Augustine which reflect the view that nature *is creation*. Their similarity indicates the aspect

of *creaturely awareness* to the Augustinian sense of *masse* within the *LLC*. By this it is meant that

Guardini views *masse* as Augustine, inspired by scripture, viewed *hyle*; in other words, the masses

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capacity of form is undoubtedly something good. As because wisdom is a good, no one doubts that to be capable of wisdom is a good. And because every good is from God, no one ought to doubt that even matter, if there is any, has its existence from God alone." St. Augustine, "On the Nature of the Good," Christian Literature Publishing Co., http://www.newadvent.org/fathers/1407.htm. Latin translation comes from: Sant'Agostino, "De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos Liber Unus," http://www.augustinus.it/latino/natura_bene/index.htm. The researcher is unable to find a hard copy text of the original Latin. This is why an online source has been used.

for Guardini and Augustine alike, are created things crafted by humans into other, more perfect creations. Both compare this act to the Genesis account of creation (Gen 1:4, 10, 12, etc).[79] Moreover, in Chapter 5 the same scriptural connection is made by Pieper to substantiate his theory of *creatura*. Thus in an elementary way, present within *LLC* are some of the basic concepts and Christian sources that justifies a response to Guardini by Pieper.

Second is the parallel meaning to Guardini's key term, *masse*, and Augustine's term, *hyle*; in other words, that Guardini uses *masse* as a German translation of *hyle* indicates more than mere similarity. [80] It could indicate Guardini's intent to use his *masse* discourse to reflect Augustine's conception of and discourse on *hyle*. The Guardini text builds upon the creaturely, metaphysical criteria Augustine ascribes to *hyle*. That is, Guardini uses the same criteria as Augustine. For example, when Guardini states: "[t]hough it [i.e., *masse*] is *of considerable weight* [emphasis added]"[81]. This sense agrees with Augustine who, in *Chapter 3*, categorises all of creation according to a threefold criterion: "measure [*modus*], form *[species]*, and order [*ordo*]"[82] Torchia elaborates that these criteria provided a "metaphysical status of goodness"[83] for

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[79] It is noteworthy for other researchers into mass theory, that in Genesis God does not call the void good, but only that which was made from the void. Verses 1-2 do not contain any affirmation of the goodness of the void: "In the beginning God created heaven, and earth. And the ear was void and empty, and darkness was upon the face of the deep; and the spirit of God moved over the water."

[80] According to the translation assistance of Sr Mary Luka. Further, in an unrelated work by Goddu, we see during the middle-ages the Latin language equate *massa* with *hyle*. See - André Goddu, *Copernicus and the Aristotelian Tradition : Education, Reading, and Philosophy in Copernicus's Path to Heliocentrism*, History of Science and Medicine Library, (Leiden The Netherlands; Boston: Brill, 2010), 105. fn. 38.

[81] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 19.

[82] "For we Catholic Christians worship God, from whom are all good things whether great or small; from whom is all measure great or small; from whom is all form great or small; from whom is all order great or small. For all things in proportion as they are better measured, formed, and ordered, are assuredly good in a higher degree; but in proportion as they are measured, formed and ordered in an inferior degree, are they the less good. These three things, therefore, measure, form and order…are as it generic goods in things made by God, whether in spirit or in body." Augustine, *St Augustine: Colected Works*. 4792.

[83] N. Joseph Torchia, *Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, American University Studies Series Vii, Theology and Religion (New York: P. Lang, 1999), 170.

creation. Also, Torchia defines *measure* as it "pertains to limit, end, or unity of things"[84]; he defines

*form* as a thing's "general appearance or distinctive features"[85]; and *order* according to a thing's

"position in the hierarchy of creation, along with their natural end."[86] The Guardini text uses these

criteria. First, *measure* is accounted for in saying the masses have "considerable weight"[87]; second,

*form* is accounted for in saying the masses are "so light and bright of itself by reason of its perfect

form"[88]; and third, *order* is accounted for by Guardini when he states the purpose for which the

masses have been used – to build up "culture"[89] through increasing mastery of the masses, and to

create a "legacy of form"[90] as a result.[91]

The demonstration above details what can be called *Guardini's Augustinian usage of*

*masse*. This is noted for, in the following chapter, Guardini discusses Augustine's theory of *masse*

as it pertains to humans. However, there are two key differences between Guardini and

Augustine's texts that need to be discussed before determining the scope of this usage, and the

nature of *masse* when for Guardini it falls outside of this scope.

Though Guardini rescinds from sacred theological terms within his *masse* discourse he still

reflects Augustine's views as to *hyle*. Guardini does this through use of precise language that, to a

Christian intellectual would still be termed theological, but of the natural kind. The inference

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[84] Ibid.
[85] Ibid.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 19.
[88] Ibid.
[89] Ibid.
[90] Ibid.
[91] "Do you not see what a remarkable fact of culture is present when human beings become masters of wind and wave by fashioning wood and fitting it together and spanning linen sails?" Ibid.

within *LLC* of *creatura* is one key term. For example, while Guardini does not attribute *masse* directly to the Christian or Manichean god, he does, in his "very blood", see it as "creation" (*Schöpfung*) like Augustine does *hyle* (*creantur*), albeit as a "primal work of human creativity" (German, "*Ur-Werk des Menchenschaffens*").[92] Of central importance is the German, *Ur*, which means "out of, original", and from which "primal" is translated. This could be misread to mean that man's primal capacity to create is intrinsically caused. By intrinsically it is meant that whatever capacities man has are his *autonomously*, that is to say, these capacities have not been given to him extrinsically, from without by the Creator.[93] However, to read *Ur-Werk* in this way, that is, as something whose form is without relation to the Creator, a form which is not extrinsically caused, would align Guardini with those deists whom elsewhere he firmly opposes. For example, in *The World and Person* he states:

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[92] Ibid., 19.

[93] Krieg states Guardini critique stemmed from an aim to explain the nature of personal freedom in "response to Enlightenment view of self-autonomy." Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 171.

Extrinsic means that the agent is distinct from whatever it is acting upon. In this specific sense, speaking of God as an extrinsic first cause is way of expressing that the Creator is the causal principle behind all of creation. While the Creator-agent is extrinsic *as a cause*, His agency is intrinsic to man *as an effect*. Thus, whenever this research speaks of God in the former case, it implies what we have said in the latter case. In this way, the term is distinguishable from positing God as an *external* cause, for instance the likes of Wuellner who conflates the meaning of the two, for as we understand it while the Creator's agency exists *as cause* upon creation, the same agency is not present *as effect* within creation. This creates a problem in the case of what is over and above nature; God's agency becomes purely gratuitous. But is not creation also a gratuitous act? Is it right to speak of nature as non-contingent being when only God is necessary this way? Further, positing the Creator as an external cause divorces the principle of ontological analogy between Creator and creation from the material, efficient, formal and final causes said to comprise all of created reality; leading towards a deistic conception of God, a concept of which this research has repeatedly demonstrated its criticism. Guardini's concept of *creaturely dependence* seems to be his way of expressing what we mean here by God-as-extrinsic-cause, God as the analogate of creation, and so forth. See - Bernard J. Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1956), 45.

See especially – fn. 34 Josef Pieper, Living the Truth, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1989). eBook. 91. "The concept of 'measure' has to be approached from the concept of 'essential form'. The 'measure' of an existing thing is its 'extrinsic' form; it is—as in Meister Eckhart—the 'preceding type', and thus, in a very direct sense, the 'archetype' of reality. The essential form inherent in a thing is, for Scholasticism, its 'intrinsic formal cause'; the 'measure' of a thing is its 'extrinsic formal cause', which—together with the intrinsic formal cause, yet preceding it—causes the thing to be what it is."

There arises the idea of the mysterious, all-creative, holy nature which is itself God; so it is in Giordano Bruno, Spinoza, Goethe, Holderlin, Schelling. Nature itself is conceived as the primary religious fact…This is particularly in positivism, which runs through the modern age.[94]

Here Guardini separates himself from theorists who would hold that *Ur-Werk* need not have an extrinsic first cause. For these theorists *Ur-Werk* involves a conflation of nature and grace, chiefly characterised by nature possessing its own creative efficacy.[95] For Guardini however, unity between nature and grace does not mean sameness. While *Ur-Werk* is "rooted"[96] in nature it is not autonomous from supernature. This avoids a deistic conception of God, as in the case of Bruno, Spinoza and those others to whom Guardini refers, and thus an autonomous, *uncreaturely* conception of man. Hence, *Ur-Werk* presupposes a relationship to the creator inasmuch as creative efficacy must be extrinsically caused. In other words, *Ur-Werk* cannot cause its own effect, it cannot be self-created, in the same way that a reflection is not an image of itself. Instead, the primal creative capacity of man reflects, as *imago dei*, the creative power of God.

However radical or rooted *Ur-Werk* is in man, for Guardini there is no causal equivocation between this radicalness and by whom this principle was created; in other words, no matter   how

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[94] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 7.

[95] His reference to Dionysius only sentences later in the *LLC* passage in question seems to be a veiled reference to his views regarding the conflation of nature and grace within the passage given from *The World and The Person*. The passage concerned is: "[*Ur-Werk*] is full of mind and spirit, this perfectly fashioned movement in which we master the force of nature. Certainly, we pay for it already with a certain remoteness. We are no longer plunged into the sphere of wind and water as birds and fishes are. The *Dionysiac* surrender has been reshaped [emphasis added]." Here Guardini is alluding to the difference between unity and sameness as to the nature and cause of *Ur-Werk*. He posits "the mind" as the differentiating principle of *Ur-Werk*. This in effect distances ourselves from what we create; likewise, from the natural world. Man is thus created distinctly from the rest of nature, and thus creates distinctly for the same reason. Due to this, *Ur-Werk* is that work of man which poses a unity, without inferring sameness, between nature and grace.

[96] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 7.

radical *Ur-Werk* is, it undoubtedly points to an extrinsic first cause which by Christian faith is called God. This view demonstrates Guardini's theory of creaturely awareness in that God, being not nature, still calls nature into existence *ex nihilo*. Thus Guardini, in affirming in this case the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, proposes the same view inherent to Augustine's view on *hyle*: that by God alone and not some other demi-god, whether that deity be the god of matter, matter itself or creative efficacy conflated into and expressed by the autonomous individual, *hyle* or *masse* is created.

In this sense Guardini posits *Ur-Werk* as that radical creaturely act that points to the Christian God in whom Guardini believes. Such is arguably a continuance of God's creative work through man. In this manner Guardini rescinds from sacred theological terms within his *masse* discourse while still conceptually reflecting Augustine's views as to *hyle*. In so doing, Guardini goes beyond Augustine in how *Ur-Werk* mediates, and thus somehow continues that which God created *ex nihilo*.

As to Guardini and Augustine's view on corrupted masses: this similarity rests upon their joint belief as to how creation can be mastered such that it leads to corruption. Corruption is here when the measure, form and/or order of a thing is frustrated, while mastery is the agency held over measure, form and order. Two basic forms of frustration can be distinguished: the first pertains to corruptibility inherent to nature; the second pertains to that corruptibility inherent to agency. Torchia reminds us that the first kind relates to Augustine's core doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*

wherein while all things "made by God"[97] are essentially good, but because they are not "born of God"[98] (e.g., Jesus Christ and the Holy Spirit) they are still corruptible. This type of corruption creates the possibility for corrupted masses. As to the second kind of corruption – that caused by agency – for Augustine it is mainly a question of the nature of evil and trying to pinpoint evil somehow existing within a created form. For Guardini, the focus is more practical or existential, trying to give evidence of evil *per se* by giving examples of corrupted forms. In Augustine and Guardini holding that a certain kind of agency or mastery is that which corrupts the masses it is arguable that the difference in Guardini is in him extrapolating from Augustine's understanding of the Manichean heresy that component which places creative efficacy within the hands of men, within the purview of human possibility. *Hyle* is no longer the demi-god of corrupt masses. Instead, it follows that man becomes this demi-god whenever he understands God deistically and so uses *Ur-Werk* autonomously.

Man becomes the exemplar of matter. Corrupt masses inevitably arise when human agency bares no reflection to its Creator, meaning that man will fashion things in the only image he believes to remain – himself. This is symptomatic of an insufficient consideration as to how things have already been made by the Creator. This specifically and most importantly includes ignorance as to the cause of man's own creative efficacy. In this way, his power becomes idealised as without an extrinsic first cause inasmuch as no consideration is given for this precise cause. Hence man chooses to act as the sole, autonomous exemplar by which physical things have resemblance. Through this perspective, matter ceases to possess form; that by virtue of *creatio ex nihilo* and

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[97] Torchia, *Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, 150.
[98] Ibid.

*imago dei* it in fact possesses form becomes meaningless, since the mastery wrought thereby is disconnected from these principles. The plight of Mass Man arises, therefore, when man does not see himself, along with the faculties he possesses, as possessing a reflective agency; rather, the radical alteration of *Ur-Werk* to admit no extrinsic first cause leaves man as the only creative principle remaining in the world. The problem, therefore, is no less than the *absolutisation* of man's creative efficacy. Through ignorance so defined, in man setting himself up as an absolute principle, the consequences of his newfound yet corrupted creative efficacy precipitates what Guardini calls "the confusion of forms"[99] - mechanisation, the decay of civilisation, the corruption of the masses, and the manifestation of evil.

Evil is the truest word in Augustine that expresses Guardini's concept of decay or death. This is because decay and death signify that evil manifests to the point that it looks like something. Though *in fine* Augustine's conception of evil has been debated, it certainly always excluded evil as an extrinsic first cause, as something with creative efficacy. As Augustine preceded Guardini, and Guardini demonstrably followed Augustine, it is probable that Guardini followed to a significant extent Augustine's view as to evil in like manner that their views on the goodness of creation are demonstrably similar. As the *LLC* text has confirmed this, it seems that Guardini, like Augustine, is also providing a defence of the goodness of creation as against the possibility that *masse* is created by and from evil.

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[99] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 40.

Here are some examples of Guardini and Augustine's affirmation of *masse* and *hyle*: first, both are clear in affirming the goodness of *masse* or *hyle*: Guardini calls the masses *vollendete Form* (perfect form); Augustine calls *hyle*, for instance, *speciosi* and *formosi*. Second, both see either *masse* or *hyle* as a good in creation from which even greater goods are able to come: Guardini relates how the masses are fashioned into that "ancient legacy of form"[100], "that remarkable fact of culture"[101]; and Augustine relates within *De Natura* how *hyle,* as having the "capacity of forms"[102], "is undoubtedly something good"[103], even "handsome"[104] or "beautiful"[105], due to its being created by a supremely Good God. Thus Guardini's Augustinian theory of *masse*, as within *LLC*, is demonstrable in how the text reflects Augustine's text on and thought upon *hyle*. Moreover, Guardini goes further by explicitly attributing to man this creative capacity as *Ur-Werk* to beneficently master the masses or *hyle* into more perfect objects as a way to mediate God's creative power. But it is apparent that *LLC* laments the failure (not its fulfillment) of this creative power in our time. Nevertheless, through the textual evidence given, it is demonstrable that Guardini's view on *masse* echoes to an extent Augustine's *hyle* doctrine.

8.  Guardini's theory of *masse* as a development of Augustine's theory of the void

The following shall discuss how Guardini echoes but goes beyond Augustine. While *Ur-Werk* mediates God's creative power and that which *Ur-Werk* fashions, it is not an autonomous capacity. This means for Guardini that *Ur-Werk* and *masse* can only be thought of as causally

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[100] Ibid., 19.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Augustine, "On the Nature of the Good".
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid.
[105] Ibid.

distinct, but not at all separate, from what can be called God's *Ur-Werk*; for if *Ur-Werk* were somehow causally separate then man's *Ur-Werk* would once again become intrinsically self-causing. Thus in the *LLC* text it is God who is the unstated but ever-present worker of what Guardini happily points towards as the culminating good of *Ur-Werk* – the perfection of form through use of the masses.

However, if *masse* is not set upon by *Ur-Werk* then *masse* remains itself in identity as a lower good; it is not subjected to God's creative power which *Ur-Werk* mediates; and is thus frustrated from attaining its form. Here it is not the goodness of the creative capacity that is in question, as this would unfairly call into doubt Guardini's thoroughly Christian worldview; rather, it is man's decision to act or not act according to his capacity that causes the frustration of forms, that which can be called *massification*. Massification so defined is the misuse of *Ur-Werk*; it is the illicit creation of objects through misuse of the mass or masses set upon; and a transgression of God's design present as form before man's intellect. Massification, therefore, is much an ecological problem as it is a specific type of human evil.[106]

This shall serve as final evidence of Augustine's thought within Guardini's *masse* discourse within the *LLC*, although the latter has clearly expressed his mind through his own terms; specifically, although for Augustine *hyle* is without doubt created by the one, beneficent God, there is still the concept of *massa* (in the Latin) itself – as distinct within Augustine's conceptual

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[106] Cf. "The gift of existence is filled with the value of true createdness, but carries with it the terrible possibility of perverting [*verkehren*] this true createdness into the self-satisfaction of autonomy." Translation assistance advises that *verkehren* has the connotations of illicitness. Guardini, *The World and the Person. Welt Und Person; Versuche Zur Christlichen Lehre Vom Menschen*, 1962 ed. (Würzburg: Werkbund-Verlag, 1950), 35.

framework from *hyle*, although seemingly not within Guardini's – that is used by him to show the relationship between man's creaturely potential and his free participation in good or evil. In this way, the problem of *massa* in Augustine becomes distinct from the problem of *hyle*; so too in Guardini, it will be explained in detail in the following Chapter how he works with this difference in Augustine's terminology. This discussion will show how the *LLC* necessarily points beyond the non-human order towards the inner, spiritual and personal world. This is done by showing how masses cannot be understood without an understanding as to the nature of human agency in its quest to form relationships to other beings.[107]

This specifically Guardinian understanding of *masse* is evident within his broader argument within the *LLC*. The masses are only a problem insofar as their misuse is a problem. Further, it serves as contextual evidence as to the argued interpretation of the *Ur-Werk* passage. In his *Second Letter*, true, human *Ur-Werk* only occurs when "the sphere of natural reality has to some extent been released by that of the consciousness, of the ideal, only when it has been challenged and rarefied by this."[108] Here Guardini is holding to the same standard as that within the *Ur-Werk* passage – affirmation of man's conscious capacity to continue *pro-creating* by

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[107] The researcher considered documenting another, quite mysterious dimension to how *Ur-Werk* can be tied to Augustine. This was due to the research of Torchia, van Oort and others. The link was with respect to the Manichean doctrine of Primal Man. Although it is the opinion of the researcher that Guardini *might have* been aware of this figure due to the eerie coincidences between *Ur-Werk* and this doctrine, given that Augustine never seems to refer to Primal Man, it is even less likely that Guardini had beyond elementary knowledge of it, much less refer to it, let alone *consciously* include it within his conceptual framework as to *masse*. As well, the concept of primality is used extensively within Augustine in reference to other concepts (e.g., original sin) not directly related to *Ur-Werk*, much less research into *masse*. Be that as it may, the hypothesis that Primal Man influenced Guardini in some way is worth considering as its own thesis. Discussion of Primal Man can be found in the following recent sources: *Augustine and Manichaean Christianity: Selected Papers from the First South African Conference on Augustine of Hippo, University of Pretoria, 24-26 April 2012*, Nag Hammadi and Manichaean Studies (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2013), 60, 79-80, 82, 85. Torchia, *Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, 68, 70-71, 73-75, 78, .

[108] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 18.

mediating God's creative power through awareness of and cooperation with forms as they present themselves.

*9. Masse* and spirit in unity through *Ur-Werk*

Guardini divides creation into nature and consciousness. Guardini alludes to this crucial distinction in the previous citation and unites them under a common, extrinsic principle, which the following citation shows. Just prior to the *Ur-Werk* passage, Guardini states that:

> culture seems from the outset to have about it something alien to nature, something unreal and artificial. This element becomes stronger until it runs up against a limit, the supreme measure of a spirit-filled culture. This culture is remote from nature, as is essential in such a relation, and yet it is so close to it, tied to it so elastically, that is remains natural, and natural juices may flow within it [emphasis added].[109]

Thus, Guardini admits the difference between *creation as non-human* and *creation as human*, while showing their relation, agreement, and pre-eminence of the latter over the former. To be sure, after the *Ur-Werk* passage he states:

> [t]hose who control the ship are still very closely related to the wind and waves. They are breast to breast with their force…We have here real culture – elevation above nature, yet decisive nearness to it…we are shot through with mind and spirit. We master nature by the power of mind and spirit, but we ourselves remain natural.[110]

This distinction between human and non-human masses affords *Ur-Werk* a mediative position between created matter and uncreated spirit, something which could be called *created spirit*.

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[109] Ibid., 18-19.
[110] Ibid., 19.

Through this inductive line of reasoning, Guardini demonstrates that creation is both natural and non-natural, therefore further distinguishing the nature of *Ur-Werk* into its material and spiritual components.

Later in the *Third Letter* shortly after the *Ur-Werk* passage, he relates the deleterious consequences of when *Ur-Werk* acts unnaturally, that being the creation of "abstract"[111] and "artificial"[112] objects of "modern thinking"[113] and "modern technology"[114], utterly unlike the "sailing vessel"[115] which *Ur-Werk* creates. This reinforces his view that *Ur-Werk* is not so beyond nature as to be at odds with it. Elsewhere in *Pascal For Our Time* Guardini considers the spiritual component in *Ur-Werk*, while working upon and towards matter, as ultimately something configured towards God, for to be spiritual means to "exist in relation to…God".[116] It follows, therefore, that a failure of *Ur-Werk* is also an existential failure in living truly to the extrinsic principle by which everything exists.

In Guardini's *Sixth Letter*, he again delineates between natural and unnatural creations: the former comes from "natural possibilities"[117], the latter from "energies and masses…detached from their organic links"[118]. What this means is that matter has a certain normative aspect inherent to itself, dictating how it can be integrally used as a whole. Man's spiritual agency can choose or not

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[111] Ibid., 24.
[112] Ibid.
[113] Ibid.
[114] Ibid.
[115] Ibid., 19.
[116] *Pascal for Our Time* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1966), 71.
[117] *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 35.
[118] Ibid.

choose to acknowledge this aspect in place of its own idea or norm, its own conception of possibilities. The origin of each norm resides in the Divine Idea. But man is able to act upon the Idea as present in things. Hence reason affords man the opportunity to assimilate or not assimilate an image of reality. Metaphysics has traditionally defined man along these lines: as a being, who by virtue of his rational capacity, becomes himself according to the measure of the being he knows.[119] But Guardini points out that a problem arises when knowledge is sought to isolate the part from the whole. Although such parts still possess their own form, their own participation in the Divine Idea, to act upon this knowledge serves to actualise not the whole as it integrally or already exists, but to actualise the human agent's idea of that form through select, divisive apprehension of it material parts. Thus, a challenge arises between idea and form as to which should be normative. But neither the form in question nor the created spirit inspecting it are in themselves the problem as Manicheism would claim, but rather an agent acting upon an idea which ignores a thing's integral existence. In this way, abstractive, quiddative knowledge can become senile to the existential whole. No matter the extent of the form's division, it is symptomatic of massification to ignore the broader form at the expense of the finer one. Should the latter scenario become normative, and should something already divided be challenged by yet another division so conceived, then that which is already divided loses its normativity to yet another, even finer form; revealing that normativity consists more in the idea or knower than in what is known. This is a way to explain that while a conflict can exist between the normativity of form or idea this does not amount to perfect enmity; instead, man is simply prioritising his idea, or mental being, over form, or real being. From an ecological standpoint, the havoc man might reap with each real being

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[119] Daniel J. Sullivan, *An Introduction to Philosophy*, 1992 reprint ed. (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1957), 65.

he ignores, with whatever matter he utilises but whose normativity he ignores, it is within man's potential to be a problem ecologically this way. But he is not inherently a scourge to this planet. It is simply a matter of achieving true mastery or stewardship of real being. This is achievable only when nature is viewed as creation, for out of this way of seeing proceeds that real being possesses normativity inasmuch as it reflects the Divine Idea. Should man choose to align his idea with the Divine Idea present in the thing, so defined as real being, then, naturally enough, the conflict between man and the environment will by degrees lessen. Understanding nature as creation and not as mass provides a conceptual gateway towards true knowledge generally and correct stewardship specifically.

In his *Seventh Letter* he further describes this misapprehension between objective and subjective normativity and thus delineates between true and false mastery of the masses:

> On the one hand, a developed humanity has slowly achieved clearly evolved forms and has developed powers of seeing, owning, living, thinking, ruling, and creating. On the other hand, we have appropriately formed work, mature and full creation…Life pulses through it down to the last member…all of it, material, work, content, is authentic.

> But the masses have changed all this. By a truly puzzling process that economic and social commonplaces do not really explain, "human substance" has suddenly exploded in monstrous numerical growth…It seems to me that the process which creates the machine, bursting apart, as I have said, the organic order, destroying the natural

context, and unleashing isolated powers, *has also triggered the expansive power of human growth* [i.e., the advent of the masses. Emphasis added].[120]

Again, the problem of the masses – here in this passage it seems Guardini deliberately conflates the non-human and anthropological senses – is not with itself, but with its masters who have grossly misunderstood the right relation between matter and spirit. *Ur-Werk* is that anthropological principle which holds this relation in correct balance. But the principle possesses a tipping point between *creaturely awareness* and *creaturely ignorance*. The former acknowledges the mediative role created spirit plays between created matter and uncreated spirit; the latter denies this mediative role, which for instance in Chapter 3 is discussed in terms of man thinking himself absolute in his action upon matter and thus forgetting the inherent contingency man and matter has upon God. Further, this balance rests upon the awareness that while spirit is the faculty by which the masses are perfected, the spirit, in being a created thing as well, is only a truly itself when it correctly masters, not deforms or massifies, according to its God-given primal, spiritual capacity.

10. Guardini's final caution to his reader: do not become false masters

Lastly, in the final pages of the *LLC,* Guardini cautions the reader twofold as regards to what ensues when nature is forsaken by spirit for desire of mal-forming the masses through an arbitrarily conceived, subjective norm: first, the "possibility of creating"[121] is lost. For Guardini, it is as if false-mastery and the massified objects subsequently rendered are not creation at all when the former forsakes its mediative capacity and thus its primal work. Second, by delegating *Ur-*

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[120] Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 38-39.
[121] Ibid., 62.

*Werk* to the machine, "[w]e thus make an object of something that used to be subjective, part of life's initiative."[122] So here Guardini makes plain the necessary, albeit dangerous role that the idea plays in the perfection of form; or in other words, the role true knowledge plays in ensuring man is a good steward of creation. Although Guardini never appears to state it so bluntly, if the preceding argument is granted, what has been illicitly created cannot create either. For Guardini, how could it be when *Ur-Werk* fails, and that what is produced does not resemble nature? Such an object, as separated from *Ur-Werk* and produced by a machine, would be a massified object. Guardini cautions in this way because, as he states at the beginning, he perceives the culprit of all this, "the North", to be an agent of destruction.

In view of this, Guardini's core doctrine of *Ur-Werk* as it relates to *masse* appears to be a philosophical programme to promote *Ur-Werk* and so protect creation from massification. That God's primary role is not the literary focus, such insights are still rich in creaturely awareness and therefore should not be treated with a theological suspicion. Still, to be sure, Guardini can be quoted from his final *Ninth Letter* where he recapitulates the relationship between God and man's distinct but not separate creative capacities: "[h]istory is going forward in the depths, and we must be ready to play our part, trusting in what God is doing and in the forces that he has made to stir within us."[123] Indeed, staying true to our primal work will, for Guardini, enable *masse* to be fashioned as God meant it to be.

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[122] Ibid.

[123] Ibid., 56.

## 11. Conclusion

Set before the reader of *Letters From Lake Como* is a breadth of evidence that supports the comprehension of two key concepts, mass and mastery, and their real-world success or failure. It is Guardini's basic position to show these in their true and false forms, declaring to his reader the need to take his words in earnest. Built upon the thought of Augustine, the concept of creaturely awareness finds its seminal expression within *LLC* as that true anthropological state expressed in the action of *Ur-Werk*, in which man as a unity of spirit and nature mediates the expression or frustration of the Divine Idea. The success or failure of *Ur-Werk* is what determines how the masses are used or abused. If used, the form of the entity is acknowledged and perfected. But if abused, the form is ignored, and instead man implants his own idea upon the object. Thus, creaturely awareness is encouraged by Guardini to prevent the abuse of *masse*. In this context, whereby the problem of *masse* as a non-human entity is considered, the relevance as to its application towards humans is already apparent. The following chapters, therefore, seek to continue this point from which Guardini in *LLC* prescinds.

CHAPTER 2

*Die Bekehrung des Aurelius Augustinus* (1935)

or

The Conversion of Augustine [*COA*] (1960)


1. Introduction

This Chapter argues that Guardini's conception of *masse*, as it applies to the relational dimension of human being, compares at a yet deeper significance to Augustine's theory of *hyle, massa* and like terms, and their subsequent affirmation of the Christian doctrines of *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei*.[124] According to Krieg, *The Conversion of Augustine* belongs to a medley of works written around the time of 1935 wherein Guardini would reflect upon the nature of the person, Christian existence and his quest for being amidst his struggles within and the problems without.[125] Guardini's gaze fixes upon the inmost core of man, out of which he presents to his reader the anthropological fundamentality of *masse* and *creatura*. *COA*, then, can be seen as an appeal to internalise the life and thought of Augustine as it pertains to the overall problem of *masse*. In order to explicate their similarity, the fact of Augustine's conversion to Christianity is discussed in the context of his quandary with his once Manichean faith. This discussion is supported by

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[124] Regarding relationality, Krieg states that, for Guardini, "personal existence originated…in the Bible and has developed within the Judeo-Christian tradition, especially in the writing of Augustine of Hippo. It embraces two notions of person. One is that a person is a "perceiving and acting subject"…At the same time, there is a second, complementary notion of person: a person is a being-in-relation to other persons. Personal existence consist in part in relation as an "I" to another who is a "you," and conversely in being a "you to another who is an "I". In other words, a person is one who participates in relationships of mutual self-disclosure." Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 35.
[125] Ibid., 9, 29, 116.

contrasting Guardini's interpretation to the allegation of Augustine's "Crypto-Manicheism". This chapter affirms Guardini's interpretation through a close-read of key passages from *COA*.

The dualist element proper to theories of the unconscious and Manicheism serve as a gateway into answering how *creatura* for Guardini, like Augustine, can only be subject to one creative efficacy; and how, subsequently, man is deemed *massified* when under the influence of evil; so much so that it would seem that this evil *is real*, exists positively, and so possesses efficacy like the Creator. Instead, through contrast to the Kantian concept of heteronomy, man must be "allonom", which is to say, man must be open to, fashioned and governed by other-being, or what is real around him by virtue of the Creator.[126] Alternatively, man falls into a state of heteronomy when relationality leads him towards non-being, unreality or evil. The allonomy of Augustine is exemplified for the reader so a compunction is felt for *creatura*, for without which, Guardini argues that man will find himself malformed by evil, and so become Mass Man.

2.  *Hyle* vs *masse*: the concept of *masse* within *COA*

*COA* is a work of extrapolation. Through his account of the person of Augustine, this work canbe understood as Guardini's acknowledgement of God's presence in man's free choice to live truly as God's image. In the formulation of his theory on *masse* within *COA,* Guardini makes oblique but consistent reference to Augustine's view on *massa, hyle* and similar terms. Accordingly,

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[126] Krieg states that one of the projects of *COA* was to manifest Guardini's "dissatisfaction" with Neo-Kantianism. Ibid., 28.

Guardini's conception of *masse* as within *COA* is demonstrable firstly by comparing and contrasting Augustine's theory of *hyle* within *De Natura Boni* (c. 404 AD) with the *COA's* primary source, *The Confessions* (c. 397 – 400 AD). Doing this shows that Guardini's theory of *masse* within *COA*, although discussing *The Confessions*, has a better resemblance to Augustine's position within *De Natura Boni*.[127] Secondly, Guardini's conception of *masse* in *COA* is demonstrable by analysing three similar terms, "mass"[128], "lump"[129], and "bulk"[130]. This analysis will show Guardini's unyielding affirmation of *masse* despite the quandary Guardini acknowledges that Augustine had with the term and its meaning.[131] Further, these two demonstrations will serve to separate Guardini from the position that Augustine was a "crypto-Manichean"[132].

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[127] Note to the reader: I deliberately use *masse* and *massa* for different reasons. This is true across all other chapters in the research paper. The German, *masse*, is an umbrella term and it refers to the way Guardini uses the concept in general. On the other hand, *massa* in the Latin refers specifically to its usage in Latin texts.
As well, thanks to BeDuhn we know that Augustine would adopt the Aristotelian conception of *hyle* over the Manichean one in his work written close to *Da Natura* and *The Confessions – Contra Faustum Manicheum*. "Both Alexander of Lycopolis and Augustine carry out intra-Platonic debates on the back of the Manichaeans, siding with those who, following Aristotle, consider *hyle* a passive substrate of material differentiated only by the infusion of eternal forms. "Not knowing what *hyle* or the subject-matter of things is, you make it the race of darkness, in which you place not only innumerable bodily forms of five different kinds, but also a formative mind. Such, indeed, is your ignorance or insanity, that you call this mind *hyle*, and make it give forms instead of taking them." Jason BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 1, Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E*, Divinations (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 319.
[128] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 10.
[129] Ibid., 91.
[130] Ibid., 117, 78, 84.
[131] The best outline of this issue the researcher can find comes from: Jason BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 2 Making a "Catholic" Self, 388-401 C.E*, 1st ed., Divinations: Rereading Late Ancient Religion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 478. Nisbet states that while Augustine converted to Christianity from Manicheism, and so did away with a dualist worldview, the state of conflict between good and evil remained forever impressed upon Augustine's mind. Robert A. Nisbet, *The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought* (New York: Crowell, 1973), 195-96.
[132] "Throughout most of church history, Augustine's reputation was little troubled by these allegations of crypto-Manicheaism. However, over the past century or so, the charge has once again taken on life." Paul Rhodes Eddy, "Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?: Augustine and the Crypto-Manichaeism Question," *Scottish Journal of Theology* 62, no. 3 (2009): 316. It seems more likely that, in keeping with BeDuhn's position, *The Confessions* was not the consternations of a Christian trying to be as non-Manichean as possible, but rather *The Confessions* was written as a "protreptic" to Manichean readers. The forward thrusting nature of the work finds its meaning not in Augustine trying

Guardini's conception of *masse* within *COA*, although the primary source under consideration is *The Confessions*, better resembles the conception of *massa* within *De Natura Boni*. This is significant due to Guardini already drawing from *De Natura* to develop his theory of *masse* in *LLC*. This in turn is significant given the goal of *De Natura* regarding *hyle* to essentially Christianise or redeem the otherwise Aristotelian concept (e.g., hylomorphism. *Hyle*, matter; *morphe*, form) from its Manichean sense. Guardini's reading of *The Confessions* uses this redeemed form of *hyle* so as to *affirm the masses* in relation to its anthropological sense as proffered by social theorists. Although curiously the term itself is never used in *COA* or, for that matter, *The Confessions*, it is arguable that Guardini, in knowing Augustine had Christianised *hyle* in *De Natura* interprets *The Confessions* through this lens (and elsewhere, as noted, *Contra Faustam Manicheum*). Thus, Guardini transposes onto *The Confessions* Augustine's redeemed view of *hyle*.

That Augustine omitted using *hyle* in *The Confessions* is significant given that *The Confessions* was at once the newly ordained Bishop of Hippo's (c. 395 AD) most extensive apology against his prior Manichean faith (from c. 373 AD); *The Confessions* was a protreptic written for a Manichean audience; and was equally an outpouring of his new Christian faith (from c. 386 AD); would it not make sense for him to write against the Manichean conception of *hyle* as well, given that *hyle* for a Manichean was essentially a deity whom Augustine had previously adored? Not exactly, for according to O'Donnell, who states in his commentary to *The*

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to stifle his Manichean shadow but in Augustine trying to convert a Manichean audience. For example, BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 2 Making a "Catholic" Self, 388-401 C.E*, 76.

*Confessions* that, "[s]ome explanation for [Augustine's] cautious handling (and avoidance of the term ηυλε common among the philosophers here) lies in the Manichean doctrines about the primordial matter"[133]. Torchia relates as much, revealing a compelling reason why Augustine found the term so reprehensible: "[e]vil or *hyle* constituted an opposing principle to the Father of light that acted as a kind of competing god."[134] Further, Torchia states that, *hyle* or evil was thus imbued with "creative efficacy"[135]. Augustine, looking back on his Manichean worldview as a Christian, would see it as reprehensible that the world, as composed of *hyle*, was not created *ex nihilo* by a beneficent God, but was in a way a temporal jail within the devil's belly.[136] Fuhrer argues that within *The Confessions,* "[t]he motifs of Manichaean myth…cannot be extended in their meanings", because the myth does "not extend beyond the sphere of sensual perception nor do [the myths] refer to anything beyond [the senses]."[137] Nor did the myths have even exegetical utility.[138] Fuhrer concludes that Augustine saw Manichaeism as nothing but a snare (Lt., *decipula*) to the development and expression of his Christian mind.[139] Beduhn agrees and adds that

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[133] This research will provide "some explanation", but it is beyond our scope presently to try to completely uncover why exactly Augustine makes this omission. "Commentary on 12.3.3". James O'Donnell, "Confessions," Clarendon Press; Oxford University Press, http://www.stoa.org/hippo/.

[134] Torchia, *Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, 225. Therese Fuhrer, "Augustine's Moulding of the Manichaean Idea of God in the Confessions," *Vigiliae christianae* 67, no. 5 (2013): 533.

[135] Torchia, *Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine : The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, 226.

[136] Torchia rightly remarks on the degree of knowledge Augustine had of the Manichean faith, since, firstly, he was a "hearer" and not an "auditor"; and second, he did not have access to primary sources. Nonetheless, Torchia concludes, agreeing with Maher, that Augustine's knowledge of Manicheism should be based upon what he wrote, not what he should have known. See - ibid., 79. Regarding my comment as to "the devil's belly", Torchia relates a core Manichean cosmogenic doctrine that "Primal Man became entangled with the Evil…Once entrapped in the entrails of the evil Archons, Primal Man prevented any further proliferation of the principles of Darkness - ibid., 78.

More broadly, Krieg points out that, for Guardini, the conversion of Augustine, and indeed any man to Christ, can only make sense in the context of a creaturely reality. A "purely natural" nature gives no possibility to conversion. Further, Krieg states that to achieve this aim was in part of project of Guardini's to bring modernity into dialogue the Christian, *creaturely* worldview. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 29, 44.

[137] Fuhrer, "Augustine's Moulding of the Manichaean Idea of God in the Confessions," 544.

[138] Ibid., 543-44.

[139] Ibid., 544.

within *The Confessions* any mention Augustine would make of Manicheism served simply to refute it and convert its followers.[140] Using *hyle* in any way besides this would only serve to supplant, not support, Augustine's commitment to a Christian account of reality.[141]

That being said, Augustine in *The Confessions* uses abstract synonyms for his pre-Christian conception of *hyle*. In Book three *moles* is used: "[n]or did I know God to be a Spirit who hath not any parts extended in length and breadth, nor whose Being was to be a bulk [*moles*]"[142]. Also in Book seven *conglobaretur* is used: "not seeing myself clearly – that whatever was not extended in space, either diffused or massed together [*conglobaretur*] or swollen out or having some such qualities or at least capable of having them, I thought must be nothing whatsoever."[143] It is conceivable that these examples could count as evidence against the foregoing argument, that Augustine avoided using *hyle* due to its reprehensible connotations. However, O'Donnell's view stands if these synonyms still refer to *hyle*, but in a controlled manner. For instance, stating that *my mother passed away from a terminal illness* is a controlled way of referring to the death of   a

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[140] BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 2 Making a "Catholic" Self, 388-401 C.E*, 1-3.

[141] Besides, only a few years later (404 AD) in *De Naturo Bono* he refuted and set out to utterly dismantle any credibility to the Manichean *hyle* doctrine.

[142] Augustine and F. J. Sheed, Confessions, (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co., 2006). eBook. 44. For the Latin: William Watts, *St. Augustine's Confessions: With an English Translation by William Watts*, 2 vols., vol. 1 (London; New York: William Heinemann; Macmillan, 1912), Ebook, 121.
In like manner, *massa* is used in Book 5: "And it seemed better to believe that You had never created evil, than to that anything of the nature that I thought evil was should be from You: in my ignorance I thought of evil not simply as some kind of substance, but actually as bodily substance, because I had not learned to think of mind save as a more subtle body, extended in space [as bodies are]. I thought of our Saviour Himself, Your only-begotten Son, as brought forth for our salvation from the mass [*massa*] of Your most luminous substance: and I could believe nothing of him unless I could picture it in my own vain imagination. I argued that such a nature could not possibly be born of the virgin Mary, unless it were mingled with her flesh. And I could not see how that which I had thus figured to myself could be mingled and not defiled. Thus I feared to believe the Word made flesh lest I be forced to believe the Word defiled by flesh." Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 88. For the Latin: Watts, *St. Augustine's Confessions: With an English Translation by William Watts*, 1, 248.

[143] Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 117-18. For the Latin: Watts, *St. Augustine's Confessions: With an English Translation by William Watts*, 1, 334; ibid.

loved one; in other words, this phrase is a way of silencing certain unmentionable heterodox realities by conveying specific facts still of an orthodox character.[144] In this way *hyle* is conceptually deconstructed into its Christian and non-Christian parts, whereby within *The Confessions* the former is affirmed and the latter denied. Therefore, on the strength of O'Donnell's commentary, as Augustine's wholesale omission of *hyle* cannot be fairly ignored, given how passionately he refutes Manicheism and how tremulously he approaches Christianity, his choice of other terms within *The Confessions* is likely evidence of a further choice to silence the full, galling, unchristian reality that *hyle* signified.

Understandably, then, Augustine prescinded from using *hyle* in *The Confessions* by using other, abstract terms. Augustine would eventually use and affirm *hyle* as a concept in *De Natura Boni* and elsewhere, but he would need to firstly silence and deny *hyle* as a deity in *The Confessions*. Further, using *hyle* prior to a comprehensive and programmatic Christianisation of its meaning and associations would infer some beholdeness upon Christianity to rely on Manichean dogma; likewise, using *hyle* prior to achieving this could be an iteration of this beholdeness within Augustine's heart. Thus, omission of *hyle* from *The Confessions* was not accidental, but arguably neither did Augustine intend the aforementioned synonyms to mean precisely what *hyle* meant; rather, *moles* and *conglobaretur* had their own distinct meanings from *hyle*, and thus distinct purposes as well.

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[144] We acknowledge BeDuhn's presentation of Augustine's Christianity as primarily an historical phenomenon. For example, in - Jason D. BeDuhn, "'Not to Depart from Christ': Augustine between 'Manichaean' and 'Catholic' Christianity," *HTS Teologiese Studies* 69, no. 1 (2013): 7. As we shall see, Guardini's interpretation of Augustine prioritises the ontological reality of God over delimitations which the historical perspective can give to Augustine's conception of Christianity.

Importantly, as to these synonyms of *hyle* being conceptually distinct from *hyle* itself, Guardini demonstrates such knowledge within *COA*. Also, Guardini interprets Augustine's view on *hyle* as though it were from *De Natura* and similar sources, that is, when Augustine saw Mass Man chiefly as God's felicitous creation suffering the effects of sin. The same holds for Guardini's treatment of *massa* in the non-*hyle* sense, although *massa* and like terms which Guardini acknowledges in *COA* from *The Confessions* are nuanced; and which, therefore, will receive attention in this chapter. This means that in *COA*, as in *LLC*, Guardini remains affirmative of the masses due to his interpretation of Augustine. Thus, a discussion of *moles* and similar terms as within *The Confessions* will explicate how Guardini interprets this text through the thesis about *hyle* that *De Natura* puts forth: that the masses are not evil as *hyle*, but good as *creatura*.

Although half the question pursued concerns Mass Man, its discussion within *COA* is unique in contrast to Ortega Y Gasset's work, *Revolt of the Masses*. In this source, Guardini makes no overt attempt to systemically present his and Augustine's mass theory. Instead, the nature, existence and problem of Mass Man is advanced within the broader theme of instantiating Augustine as an exemplar of creaturely awareness. Through the analysis made, it is important that this is remembered so that the problem which Mass Man embodies is not without a resolution. Guardini's dialogue between Mass Man and *creatura* is demonstrable through his usages of "mass"[145], "lump"[146], and "bulk"[147]. These terms serve as earmarks to Guardini's own, distinct mass theory that draws from Augustine. This is stated to highlight, firstly, that discussion of

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[145] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 10.
[146] Ibid., 91.
[147] Ibid., 117, 79, 84.

Augustine will be held so that Guardini is better understood; and secondly, that his interpretation of Augustine is the primary focus.

*3.* Guardini's interpretation of Augustine regarding his conception of *hyle* and *massa*

Before analysing these texts in Guardini, a summary of Augustine's view as to *hyle* and *massa* needs to be given. This is specifically important for situating *COA* within scholarship on Augustine, particularly to defend the position that Augustine did not remain influenced by Manicheism after his conversion. This is meant to facilitate an evaluation of Guardini's defence on the matter in light of surrounding interpretations of Augustine.

a) The unconscious, creaturely awareness, and Guardini's method of interpreting Augustine

One recent attempt to situate Augustine in relation to Manicheism comes from Paul Eddy, who in "Can a Leopard Change its Spots?" (2009), recapitulates various opinions to ultimately argue that Augustine in certain "unconscious"[148] ways still thought in concepts appropriate to the Manichean faith, even when he had converted to Christianity.[149] However, in contrast to Eddy's

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[148] Eddy, "Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?: Augustine and the Crypto-Manichaeism Question," 323.

[149] "According to Sir Leslie Stephen, 'Manicheaism may be disavowed in words' but 'it cannot be exiled from the actual belief of mankind'. This very sentiment personalised to Augustine, was repeated by his opponents from soon after his conversion until his dying day. No one can seriously question whether Augustine eventually rejected the religion of Mani and converted to Christianity in its fourth-century, North African Catholic form. There is no disputing that Augustine went on to become the most ardent and influential critic of the Manichean religion that the Christian tradition has ever produced. His anti-Manichean writings, largely penned during the 390s, are numerous and well-known. Included among them is his *Confessions*, a text that, thanks to the work of Van Oort and others, we can now recognise, beyond its autobiographical and doxological aspects, as most likely an intentional anti-Manichean polemical treatise. What is in question, however, is the extent to which Augustine was able to *purge himself of certain unconscious remnants of his former Manichean worldview* [emphasis added]." Ibid.

thesis Guardini saw an undue emphasis within Augustine scholarship regarding his "interior process"[150] of conversion.[151] Eddy's thesis that Augustine was an unconscious Manichean is an example of this. But before proceeding into a dialogue between the positions held by Eddy and Guardini, what Eddy means by "unconscious" must be considered first.

Quispel states that, "Mani was always in Augustine's mind, consciously as his enemy, unconsciously as his twin."[152] Here "twin" draws upon the theories of the shadow-self by Freud, Jung and others.[153] Accordingly, it becomes credible that Augustine's shadow remained Manichean. Eddy states that, on the one hand Augustine was a leopard who had changed his spots, that is, he consciously and "fundamentally rejected the dualistic worldview of the Manicheans and embraced the orthodox Catholic conception of God"[154]; whereas, in pointing to the unconscious he concludes his essay stating that, "as the case of Augustine demonstrates, the

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[150] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, xi.

[151] Such cautioning by Guardini would also pertain to more the recent and authoritative scholarship of BeDuhn whose emphasis upon the immanent or material, efficient causes of Augustine's conversion seems to lack consideration towards transcendental or supernatural, efficient causality. In other words, Guardini would argue that God is *the* cause due to which conversion *per se* happens. BeDuhn's research understandably is silent on the topic of supernatural causality; that is to say, as to the relationship regarding the *who* behind *why* Augustine became Christian, and God's relationship to *how* Augustine's conversion historically played out. See - BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 1, Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E*, 193-97.

[152] Eddy, "Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?: Augustine and the Crypto-Manichaeism Question," 346, fn 111.

[153] "[W]hen one tries desperately to be good and wonderful and perfect, then all the more the shadow develops a definite will to be black and evil and destructive. People cannot see that; they are always striving to be marvellous, and then they discover that terrible destructive things happen which they cannot understand, and they either deny that such facts have anything to do with them, or if they admit them, they take them for natural afflictions, or they try to minimize them and to shift the responsibility elsewhere. The fact is that if one tries beyond one's capacity to be perfect, the shadow descends into hell and becomes the devil. For it is just as sinful from the standpoint of nature and of truth to be above oneself as to be below oneself. It is surely not the divine will in man that he should be something which he is not, for when one looks into nature, one sees that it is most definitely the divine will that everything should be what it is." "The Structure of the Psyche," in *The Quotable Jung* (Princeton University Press, 2015). Otto Rank, *The Double; a Psychoanalytic Study* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971); David Sandner, "The Uncanny," in *Fantastic Literature: A Critical Reader* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2004).

[154] Eddy, "Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?: Augustine and the Crypto-Manichaeism Question," 345.

erstwhile spots can also – and forever – change the leopard."[155] This question that Eddy's article raises, *which is changing which? the leopard or spot?* shows that the tendency to determine Augustine's conversion through evidence of his interior process is alive and well today in Augustine scholarship. From Guardini's perspective, this method tends to reduce the "religious-spiritual"[156] to the "psychical-ethical"[157]. Guardini states that this view of Augustine makes him out to be merely "a man who fights his way through the intellectual and religious summit which [he] finally reaches, but at the price of overcoming and stifling his instincts."[158] In this way, conversion to Christianity becomes proportionately difficultly to the shadow it tries to overcome. But, Guardini continues, "[t]he transformation succeeds only partially"[159], since if conversion is only symptomatic of a psychological process towards a higher existential state, and the shadow – as part of this process – can never be overcome, then to this Augustine will always be consciously Christian, but always identify unconsciously as Manichean as well.

Entertaining the crypto-Manichean thesis misrepresents the true ordering of the created individual. In *The World and Person*, Guardini describes this capacity to be ordered with respect to the Creator as "divine inwardness"[160] or the "perforated" [161] centre of man's being wherein God's being emanates. But the crypto-Manichean thesis creates a dualistic loop within Augustine – half Christian, half Manichean – which is problematically indicative of the Manichean problem

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[155] Ibid., 346.
[156] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 20.
[157] "[Augustine's] confession of his own agitated mental and emotional state at this time invites psychological analysis of the conditions of his conversion and engagement with the extensive modern research on this subject." Ibid., 197.
[158] Ibid., xii.
[159] Ibid.
[160] Ibid., 20.
[161] *The World and the Person*, 73.

of duality with which Augustine grappled. In giving undue focus to Augustine's interior processes, Eddy's thesis lacks Guardini's consideration that Augustine's conversion, in being an event between man and God, is both a religious and anthropological event. What is meant by "interior" in this context comes to exclude God's agency on this interior. Creaturely awareness affords the concepts of Creator and creature to resolve this dualistic problem. When viewed as merely a psychological process, the human creature, whom within *COA* Augustine exemplifies, is stripped of his ontological openness towards his Creator; requiring the creature to find a unifying principle within himself, even though he is supposedly dualistically configured; thus not affording to the creature the capacity, as creature, nor with respect to the object sought, as Creator, by which the creature is ordered.[162] For conversion to be both a religious and anthropological event, creaturely awareness is needed to resolve the crypto-Manichean question. A true ordering of man requires a relational unity between he who seeks perfection and the Creator who offers it.[163] Creaturely awareness is this unity existentially experienced.

On the strength of Guardini's argument, granting Eddy's thesis occasions a dualistic loop between Augustine's Christian-self and his Manichean-self. Katsafanas informs us that psychological theories developed throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth century which sought

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[162] Guardini instantiates Augustine as an exemplar of such openness when he calls him "allonom" later in the primary source. *The Conversion of Augustine*, 116.

[163] Cf. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 104. In a discussion of Guardini's critique of Rilke's poetry, Krieg states that, for Guardini, the point of relationality is not merely to bridge the gap between self and other, but through *allonomy* (i.e., the Scriptural term, *allon*, used in the second of the two great commandments of Christ) between person and person, which we know receives its form, as person, due to its createdness in the image of the person of God.

to understand the relationship between conscious and unconscious activity.[164] He divides such activity into a state which, firstly, *underlies* conscious activity.[165] Secondly and more importantly Katsafanas posits a state of unconscious that *competes* with consciousness, whose proponents were Freud, Jung and others.[166] Eddy's crypto-Manichean thesis is arguably based upon the latter conception, that the unconscious *competes* with conscious activity whereby Augustine's shadow, double or twin would compete with his conscious assent to all that which Christianity holds to be true. In this dynamism, the more Augustine assents to Christianity the more his shadow will vie for dominance. Augustine's unconscious activity will always be more or less contrary to his conscious activity. Thus, according to Guardini, Augustine's conversion will only ever be partial, being not a symptom of that relational, ontological unity between creature and Creator, but an instance of a dualistic "compulsion and contradiction"[167].

Obviously, the psychical is still a real component in man. For Guardini, it receives its due place when it is lies on the *outer side* to man's inmost reality, his religious capacity. Under this illustration is it reasonable to speak of the psychical as *subordinate* to the religious. This illustration is consistent with another principle of *imago dei* that created being receives its measure due to uncreated being. Further, following this methodology avoids excluding God as the most fundamental anthropological factor, and avoids the assumption that Augustine's unconscious remained irreconcilably rebellious when he chose to conform himself to this factor. Nonetheless,

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[164] Paul Katsafanas, *The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious*, First ed. (New York;Oxford, United Kingdom;: Oxford University Press, 2016), 17.
[165] Theorists such as Leibniz and Nietschze belong to this group. Ibid.
[166] "The Unconscious," (Oxford University Press, 2016), 17.
[167] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, xiii.

this does not mean that Augustine did not struggle with Manichean tenets of faith; much less have his 'evil' unconscious covered, as snow, with supernatural grace so as to make his conversion incommensurate with personal choice. What it means, then, is that Augustine's struggle with and conversion from Manicheism were not separate from Augustine himself. His conversion was not merely a change of belief; rather, his conversion was a change rendered by God to His creature, Augustine. Hence, as conversion occurred pre-eminently to the individual, nothing proper to the individual could be delimited from this event; making Augustine's decision towards conversion synonymous to the presence of the Christian God dwelling *within him*, not in merely his *parts* as in the case of the conscious and unconscious. This interpretation allows unity between Creator and creature within Augustine's struggle without allowing dualism, enmity and non-conformity. It offers a middle ground by partly granting Eddy's argument regarding Augustine's unconscious Manichaeism. Above all it conforms the *how* or historical reality of Augustine's conversion with the *why* or meta/superphysical reality causing it.

With a middle way found from within *COA* that defends Augustine's conversion, one which accounts for Augustine's conscious and unconscious processes, and which acknowledges scholarship pertaining to this account, it is possible to turn towards Augustine's struggle with Manichaeism itself as represented through usage of *massa* and like terms. As first this research has prescinded from demonstrating that Guardini opposes determining the nature of Christian conversion, whom Augustine exemplifies, via an antagonism and even dualism of interior processes; instead relying upon creaturely awareness to order and unify the creature in conformity to the Creator; this has been done so that conversion, from Guardini's perspective, is understood as a completable anthropological and religious event, built upon a singular creative efficacy that

*creatura* entails rather than a dual efficacy which a competing theory of consciousness entails. Having thus defended Augustine's conversion, how Guardini interprets the alleged influence Manicheism had over Augustine's theory of *massa* and like terms can now be discussed; its relationship to good, evil and creative efficacy; and how, again, evidence of creaturely awareness serves as evidence to how the problem *massa* posed for Augustine's conversion to Christianity is resolved.

   *b)* Guardini's interpretation of Augustine's quandary with *massa*

   The main concepts in question within *The Confessions* are *moles* and *conglobaretur*, which, curiously, are similar in meaning to the concepts used within *COA* by Guardini to ratify Augustine's conversion and make Augustine and his view on *massa* markedly non-Manichean. Of importance is the work of Bonaiuti,[168] whom Eddy cites.[169] The former in 1917, countering the thesis of Adolf Von Harnack that, "[Augustine's] ideas about sin and grace were inspired by his baptizer, Ambrose himself"[170], in *The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin* concluded that "[i]t is…not untrue to affirm [Augustine's] Manichean fellowship left in [his] mind a pessimistic background"[171]. This pessimism was due, firstly, to Augustine from 394 AD adopting, over his teacher Ambrose, the stance of Ambrosiaster (whom Augustine knew to be Hilarius of Poitier (c. 310-367)) in the interpretation of several New Testament passages wherein

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[168] Ernesto Bonaiuti and Giogio La Piana, "The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin," *Harvard Theological Review* 10, no. 2 (1917); Ernesto Bonaiuti, "Manichaeism and Augustine's Idea of 'Massa Perditionis'," ibid.20 (1927).
[169] Eddy, "Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?: Augustine and the Crypto-Manichaeism Question," 332.
[170] Bonaiuti and Piana, "The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin," 160.
[171] Ibid., 175.

*massa* was used in translation of *phyrama*: that man is as clay being fashioned by a potter with respect to God's creative action.[172] Next, in 1927 in *Manicheaism and Augustine's Idea of 'Massa Perditionis'*[173] Bonauiti argues the thesis, "not noticed by others"[174], that Augustine's *massa/phyrama* usage became imbued, firstly by way of reading St. Ephrem (ca. 306-373), by the Manichean anthropological synonym, *bolos*,[175] and secondly by way of Augustine's friend,

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[172] "In the Vulgate we find "massa" about a dozen times, only four of which appear in the New Testament (Rom 9:21; 11:16; 1Cor. 5:6; Gal 5:9), where the correspondent Greek work is φύραμα [*phyrama*]. The meaning is in every caste "paste", or an amorphous compound of inorganic of vegetable substances. That gives no clue for our purpose. In two of the four Pauline passages the word is used in the well-known proverb, "Modicum fermentum totam massam corrumpit [a little leaven corrupts the whole mass]." Now it was only a commentator on the Pauline Epistles living in Rome under Pope Damasus (366-384), who made a paraphrase of the passage Rom. 5 – "in quo omnes peccaverunt" – exactly with the figurative word "massa," and it was Ambrosiaster. He wrote: "*In quo*, id est in Adam, *omnes peccaverunt.* Ideo dixit 'in quo,' cum de muliere loquatur, quia non ad speciem reulit sed ad genus. Manifestum itaque est in Adam omnes peccasse, *quasi in massa;* ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, quos genuit, omnes nati sun sub peccato. Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex ipso sumus omnes [*in whom*, that is in Adam, *all have sinned.* That is why he says 'in whom', when he speaks about the woman, because he refers not to the specific, but to the general. And thus it is clear that all have sinned in Adam, *as if in a mass* [or *en masse* in French]; for, since he himself was corrupted through sin, those whom he begat, are all born under sin. From him, therefore, we are all sinners, because we are all from him]." It is well known that Augustine was acquainted with this Pauline comment and held it in great consideration as coming from Hilarius of Poitiers. In *Contra duas Epistolas Pelagianorum* address to Pope Boniface about 420, Augustine, holding the opinion that the words "in quo" are to be related to Adam, writes, "Et sic Santus Hilarius intellexit quod scriptum est 'in quo omnes peccaverunt [and that is how St. Hilarius understood what was written 'in whom all have sinned']," and he quotes the passage above to the letter. Is it not very significant that this metaphor "massa," brought in to express the idea of the original participation of mankind in the sin of Adam, is to be found here in a passage known and quoted by Augustine? As we stated above, the two fundamental elements of Augustine's thought about original sin and spiritual rebirth are the real and full responsibility of all human individuals in the sin of Adam, and the gratuitous character of grace. Now we think it right to assume that Augustine took from Ambrosiaster, with which he became acquainted in 395, the metaphor of "massa peccati," and from it, through a natural reference to the words of Rom. 9:21, "massa luti," from which the potter makes pots according to his will, Augustine drew the notion of the absolute and inscrutable freedom of God in electing his own people, the saints." Ibid., 167-69.

[173] It is noteworthy that in Bonauiti's 1917 essay he refers to *Saint* Augustine in his discussion of Original Sin. Whereas in this essay, as the question pertains to Augustine's Manicheaism, a topic related to but not strictly belonging to an article of Faith, he is referred to as simply "Augustine". This is perhaps an attempt by Bonauiti to make clear that Augustine, however human and fallible, has nonetheless been declared a Saint in Heaven due to his heroic life as a Christian.

[174] Bonaiuti, "Manichaeism and Augustine's Idea of 'Massa Perditionis'," 120.

[175] Bonauiti acknowledges that Mani did not use Greek; *bolos,* however, was the term ascribed to him by opponents to contrast it with *phyrama* in Scripture. "In [St. Ephrem'] "Ad Hypatium adversus haereses" the Syriac writer outlines, in order to refute it, Mani's anthropological dualism…: "How do they say that some of those souls who sin much and do much wickedness and blaspheme much and are guilty of great unbelief, those that are found like dregs in the midst of that which *they call Bolos* [emphasis added], - as they say that when the Fire dissolves all, into the midst of it is gathered everything which is mixed and mingled in created things from the Lights, and those souls which have done much wickedness are assigned to the realm of the darkness when it is tormented?" That the word 'Bolos' in Ephrem's text was a technical term taken literally from the Syriac Manichaean sources is confirmed also by the fact that we find it again in a similar clause of the Syriac version of the treatise against the Manichaeans of Titus of Bostra.

Evodius, who associated *bolos* with another Greek word for "world", *globus.*[176] Thus according

to Bonauiti, besides Ambrose, the influences of Sts. Hilarius. Ephrem and Evodius, directly

impacted Augustine's understanding of the world and his anthropology concerning sin and

predestination, which was already tainted by his once Manichean preoccupation with the elect.

Although in later, arguably more authoritative scholarship, BeDuhn disagrees with the

'leopard/spot' thesis;[177] nevertheless, due to these pessimistic influences upon Augustine, it is fair

to admit that a striking and eerie similarity existed between Christianity's teaching regarding evil

and the universal effects of Original Sin, and the Manichean teaching regarding *hyle* and the

universal evilness of matter.[178]

Through Guardini's method of interpreting Augustine's conversion through the lens of

creaturely awareness, scholarship pertaining to *how* his Manichean quandary arose can count as

evidence of Augustine progressively distilling the thesis that evil existed in an ontologically

Christian way.[179] For the Christian follower of the Nicene council and creed, evil could not have

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This coincidence receives further light from certain passages of the Acta Archelai. As is well known, Hegemonius, or whoever was the author of the Acta, is the first Christian writer who deals with Mani's writings." Bonauiti continues: "the most important point for my special purpose is the fact, *not noticed by others* [emphasis added], that in the Latin version of the Acta the Greek term *Globus* is translated by 'massa,' which came to assume in Latin theological language after Ambrosiaster and Augustine a technical meaning parallel to the meaning of Bolos in Manichean theology." Ibid., 118-20.

[176] Bonauiti cites: "[o]n this account they cannot be received in the kingdoms of peace, and they shall be submerged in that horrible lump (*globus*)…" ibid., 121.

[177] BeDuhn, *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 2 Making a "Catholic" Self, 388-401 C.E*, 1.

[178] Although, as stated in an earlier footnote, in more recent scholarship BeDuhn points out that even if this connection were made, it referred to man in an eschatological not primordial sense; that is to say, what man will become, not what he already is. Ibid., 478. Further, BeDuhn states the concept of evil as treated within *The Confessions* should be read through the lens of an older Augustine reflecting upon his younger self. Due to this, the Augustine's conception of evil gains increased intensity in term of his matured awareness of it when peering back on himself. The Manichaean influence on his quandary over evil was thus, according to BeDuhn, a permanent fixture of Augustine's mind. *Augustine's Manichaean Dilemma. 1, Conversion and Apostasy, 373-388 C.E*, 32.

[179] We acknowledge through the research of Teske, before proceeding further, the role Platonism and the neo-Platonic thought played in Augustine's effort to define a substance in non-corporeal terms. Teske argues that Augustine is

creative efficacy like *hyle* since there is only one God, hence only one creative power, thus only one cause by which creation receives any capacity; whereas Manicheism admits efficacy to evil as the second, albeit inferior dual principle of the divine, hence allowing for two creative powers, thus two principles by which creatures receive capacity. Further for the Christian, God creates *ex nihilo*; whereas Manicheism, having divinity exist as matter means that creator and creation are indistinct. With the influence of the above sources, Augustine's interpretation of *massa* in Rom 9:21 perhaps caused him to lack terminological precision in distinguishing the difference between Christian and Manichean creative efficacy. Given it was in part Augustine's mission to speak the truth against Manicheism, finding difficulty in distinguishing this or that Manichean element is a far cry from being an unconscious Manichean. It is more likely evidence of Augustine's openness to the Creator through his conversion process. Thus, aside from the crypto-Manichean quandary, which in this research Eddy represents, Augustine's actual quandary is clear: that post-lapsarian man somehow became, in terms of his radical or formal capacity, ontologically at odds to pre-lapsarian man insofar as evil, by way of Original Sin, came to possess seemingly creative efficacy; even though it was known, for instance, through the Nicene Creed, that creation was a sole and sovereign capacity of the Christian God; who, in making all things in His image, made all things good; and who in making man, and charging him to go forth and multiply, afforded man a mediative or pro-creative role in what His image would look like (Chapter 1). Nonetheless, in an existential or phenomenological sense evil bore some sort of 'existence', even though    existence

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probably the first thinker of his time to systematically defend non-corporeal substances. But it is beyond the scope of this research to consider these influences which Teske brilliantly summarises in the following article: Roland J. Teske, "A Key Concept in Augustine's Thought," *revista portuguesa de filosofia* 64, no. 1 (2008).

was incontrovertibly a created reality. Along these lines did Augustine grapple, to substantiate that creative efficacy belonged only to the Creator, and to understand how evil existed despite this.

Leading into an in-depth textual analysis, this line of thought as to the ontological difference between pre- and post-lapsarian man relates to *massa* as it is used within *The Confessions*. Most obviously, Augustine refers in Book 12[180] and 13[181] to the key *phyrama/massa* passage, Rom 9:21: "[o]r hath not the potter power over the clay [*phyrama/massa*], or the *same lump,* to make one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour [emphasis added]?" Hence Augustine would have wondered: does God cause evil? Does He mal-form or massify people? Or is it, rather, that he permits the existence of the true reason for "dishonour" – evil? *COA* demonstrates that Augustine earnestly and consciously grappled, through pre-existing concepts which in part were Manichean, with the possibility of God fashioning him "unto dishonour", from and into a mass.

Also, Augustine's omission of *hyle* and, instead, his subsequent use of *moles,* etc, is further evidence of this grappling. However, his deliberate omission of *hyle* seems to be a bold and not so unconscious denouncement of Manicheism; whereas, his non-use of *hyle* seems to indicate him struggling to distinguish between Christian and Manichean conceptions. Granted it was not until around 426 AD that Augustine exclaimed, in Bonaiuti words, a most "appalling definition of

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[180] This translation of *The Confessions* is used because it is the work cited by the translators of COA. Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 280.
[181] Ibid., 299.

mankind"[182], "*massa peccati, massa luti, massa damnationis, massa damnata*"[183]; nevertheless, at around the time of writing and publishing, *The Confessions* discussed *massa* as a Christian convert using language appropriate to Manichean and extra-Ambrosian sources.

4. *Masse*, Guardini and Augustine: an in-depth textual analysis

Guardini was aware of the Manichean consideration within Augustine's writings. According to Eddy, this topic was taken up by the German, Albert Bruckner, in 1897.[184] BeDuhn dates its inception into German scholarship back to 1831.[185] Due to this, it is likely that Guardini as a German scholar was aware of the topic, as raised again by Eddy and others in 2009, even if Guardini discovered it in his own way. Either case is likely given Guardini's academic career revealing an adeptness in and personal affinity with Augustine's thought.[186] The extent of this awareness will be determined by analysing the usage of the three terms used in *COA*, "mass," "lump," and "bulk."[187] This analysis is geared towards explicating Guardini's conception of the human creature.

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[182] Bonaiuti and Piana, "The Genesis of St. Augustine's Idea of Original Sin," 165.
[183] Ibid.
[184] Eddy, "Can a Leopard Change Its Spots?: Augustine and the Crypto-Manichaeism Question," 330.
[185] Johannes van Oort, "Augustine's Manichaean Dillemma in Context," *vigiliae Christianae* 65, no. 5 (2011): 543.
[186] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 28.
[187] A note on translation: 'mass' and 'bulk' come from Frank Sheed's translation, *Augustine: Confessions.* See - Cf. Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions.* This is the English edition which the translator of *The Conversion of Augustine* chose for Guardini's quotations of Augustine

a) *Catervatim* or "masses": a massy but good mind

From Book 10, Chapter 8 of the *The Confessions*, Guardini in Chapter 2 of *COA* quotes a passage from Augustine wherein the latter is trying to understand the nature of his soul by use of one of its faculties, memory. In this passage, the term by which masses is translated is "*catervatim*"[188]. Guardini translates this as "*Haufenwise*[189]". The passage reads:

> [w]hen I turn to memory, I ask it to bring forth what I want: and some things are produced immediately, some take longer as if they had to be brought out from some more secret place of storage; some pour out in a heap, and while we are actually wanting and looking for something quite different, they hurl themselves upon us in masses [catervatim] as though to say: "May it not be we that you want?" I brush them from the face of my memory with the hand of my heart, until at last the thing I want is brought to light as from some hidden place. Some things are produced just as they are required, easily and in right order; and things that come first give place to those that follow, and giving place are stored up again to be produced when I want them. This is what happens, when I say anything by heart [emphasis added].[190]

Guardini points out that one issue here with which Augustine is grappling – subsequent to his grappling with the corporeity of Manichean *hyle/*evil – is the incorporeity of his soul. Given the coupling in Manicheism of goodness with spirit and evil with matter, if Augustine can demonstrate that his soul benefits from utilising matter by way of memory this would contraindicate the Manichean doctrine of *hyle*, since it is due to matter than Augustine can better understand his spirit. Due to his memory's incorporeity, and although Augustine at this stage does not yet fully believe

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[188] William Watts, *St. Augustine's Confessions: With an English Translation by William Watts*, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London; New York: William Heinemann; Macmillan, 1912), Ebook, 94.

[189] Romano Guardini, *Die Bekehrung Des Aurelius Augustinus* (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 1989), 25.

[190] *The Conversion of Augustine*, 10. Cf. Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 195.

that his memory is real, Guardini challenges the pertinacity of Augustine's disbelief by asking, "[i]s not remembering precisely the retaining of corporeal things in an incorporeal manner?"[191] Further, Guardini elaborates upon Augustine's difficulty with matter seen in terms of how evil seems to communicate itself corporeally without possessing actual existence, as in the case of good things, so that the nature of evil is not confused with corporeity in itself. Guardini states:

> [n]othing is paltry, oppressive, or crude…but rather, according to dimension, and the unfolding of different degrees of depth, height, breadth, and inwardness, the scene is variegated and full of tensions and potentialities: in brief, a stage for rich and significant happenings.[192]

Hence, while Guardini quotes Augustine calling it a "palace"[193], his own analysis omits this term, referring to it initially as a "place"[194]; then, even more neutrally as an "architectural concept"[195], probably in the medieval tradition of the Memory Palace. But for the reader it would be easier to associate their existential dramas as something happening within a typical habitation, rather than within a palace. So Guardini arguably refashions Augustine's imagery to suit the contemporary reader.[196] In Guardini emphasizing place over palace, it indicates the createdness of the imagination within Augustine, whereby there is "[n]othing paltry, oppressive, or crude" about having masses in one's mind; that is, in imagining corporeal or *created* objects, since the average

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[191] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 11.
[192] Ibid.
[193] "And so I come to the field and vast *palaces* of memory, where are stored the innumerable images of material things to it by the senses [emphasis added]." Ibid., 10.
[194] Ibid.
[195] Ibid., 11.
[196] This reinforces the concept of *imago dei* and *creatio ex nihilo* by characterising the imagination as a faculty geared towards the real world. Cf. "Augustine's so-called (and, in scholarly research, all too much cherished?) "invention of the inner self" seems to have less to do with any inherent psychological peculiarity or genius on Augustine's part, but much more 'with his conditioning by the heightened concern with self and interiority found in Manichaeism." van Oort, "Augustine's Manichaean Dillemma in Context," 554.

home for the average reader might not be palatial and far-fetched; but instead be rather massy and ripe with creaturely happenings.

Masse here signifies mental being whose form corresponds to real being, and due to which exhibits the same affirmation of masse as within LLC. This example serves to jointly affirm masse and the rational subject due to both originating from the Logos or "Urwort"[197]. Guardini pursues this stance through analysis of the palace passage and Augustine's subsequent grappling with, firstly, the goodness and incorporeity of imagined things within the imagination; second, his epistemological quandary regarding the intuition of essences; and third, the numinous role he plays in creating an idea that conforms to a thing's essence. Guardini holds that it was insufficient for Augustine to hold that imagined things were good solely because they were thought; instead, Augustine had to look beyond himself to find that it was God or the living Logos enabling, indwelling and harmonising within man matter, form and idea.[198] Thus masse, as within or outside the subject, equally for Guardini, is endowed with Logos or Urwort.[199] Granted, states Guardini, that this endowment does not and should not give way to "theological absolutism"[200], Guardini states that speculation of this kind gives Augustinianism a certain "impetuous longing for the absolute and its inherent excitement"[201] Thus the subject, whose imaginings can include the

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[197] This German term is used in the English translation. Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 14.
[198] "As soon as the mind seriously attempt to grasp a thing, contact with the *Logos* is made. The prototype [idea] pushes its way to consciousness, until, in the moment of insight, it flares up as an illumination of a thing's essence (*Ding-Wesen*), or truth. "Eternal ideas" that "radiate in the mind"; the mind's reaching up and "touching" the eternal forms: such is the language used in the Augustinian heritage of the Middle Ages and to this day." Ibid.
[199] This ultimately becomes Augustine's position; however, hindsight enabled Guardini to grasp and explain these matters with relative brevity and conciseness.
[200] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 14.
[201] A longing to which Guardini himself consistently resorts. Ibid.

destructive if not ungainly activity of the masses (Lt., *catervatim*), is not spurned in *COA*. Neither does the subject ever falsely act as *Urwort* or the ontological guarantor for qualifying such masses; rather, *all* is subject to *Urwort*. The affirmation Guardini gives to the subject is thus the same given to *masse* in *LLC* as both entities have their being as creations of *Urwort*.

b) *Seinsklötzen*: man, spoken into being by the *logos* is not a mute lump of being

The next text in question comes from Chapter 10 wherein Guardini makes the revealing statement, that existence is "no series of mute lumps of being [*Seinsklötzen*[202]], no blind mechanical unrolling, but a meaningful succession of words."[203] This passage illustrates the tipping point from *masse* within the subject (as above), to *masse* as the subject (as follows). The sense in which Guardini uses *Seinsklötzen* is consistent with his aim to affirm the masses. Guardini embarks upon this by stating, "[i]t is not that Augustine belittled man"[204]. Instead, he states that Augustine's anthropology was "one [which] deeply experienced man's need, limitations, mistakes, wickedness, yet who never [ceased] to consider him something great, significant, powerful."[205] The quandary or "wrestling"[206] Guardini is showing within Augustine, between man's "sense and nonsense, joy and sorrow, good and evil"[207] is brought to relief under the lightof "the greatness of the human spirit"[208] because "[t]he Son of God, the Holy *Logos* Himself become man, has stood in history and sanctified earthly reality"[209]. The existence of mass is  one

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[202] According to Sr Luka, this word translates to mean *a set of building blocks.*
[203] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 91.
[204] Ibid., 85.
[205] Ibid.
[206] Ibid., 87.
[207] Ibid.
[208] Ibid., 85.
[209] Ibid., 86.

such reality. Thus, due to *Urwort*, and that which is man's "sanctified earthly reality", which in *LLC* Guardini calls *Ur-Werk*, everything not formed according to *Urwort* and *Ur-Werk* still can be "brought to relief", that is, re-fashioned according to the uncreated being of God through the cooperation of the created being, man. Such is by definition *creaturely awareness*. Therefore man is not *Seinsklötzen*, for his reality is a creation of and cooperation with God's speech. Hence there is radical and ongoing opportunity for Mass Man to be re-fashioned; but also an opportunity to be further and radically deformed. *Ur-Werk* cannot be nullified any more than *Urwort* can be silenced. For Guardini, Augustine's view of man is not pessimistic, because even in his darkest moments, "insofar as [the darkness] really *is*"[210], man is still God's creature whose nature, moreover, was adopted by Christ. Due to this reality, conceiving man as mere mass is not merely pessimistic but an admission of despair, of which Guardini believes Augustine is definitively innocent. This is why Guardini firmly denies *Seinsklötzen*. To affirm it would tip man's nature from being deformable *per accidens* to deformed *per se*. Thus, man is never *massa per se* since human nature, as God's speech, perdures. However, man can become *massa per accidens* since free will is likewise appropriate to human nature.

Demarcating an anthropology of despair from Augustine, Guardini exhibits a straightforwardness to contrast his view with the problem of contingency, which in modern times has led man to despair. Inasmuch as man sees himself as nature and not creation, something Guardini argues elsewhere, for instance in *The Person and The World*, man likewise has come to

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[210] Ibid., 85.

see himself as necessary and not contingent.[211] This view is repeated in *The End of the Modern World*, where Guardini sees contingency as a fact due to the doctrines of *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei*.[212] This is the anthropological context of *Seinsklötzen*. Man is a glorious example of *creatio ex nihilo*. But his glory in no way makes him necessary.[213] Augustine illustrates this of man through a metaphor of speech. Guardini relates that, "in [speech's] very passing, in the fading away of one word and the sounding of the next, speech has its being. Its passing is the condition [or contingency] of its existence, its meaning, its beauty, and its melancholy"[214]. The same can be said of man. Granted that melancholy can arise in reflection upon human contingency, and which subsequently can further tend towards despair, for Guardini and Augustine it should occasion amazement in view of the Creator due to whom man is contingent.

It is now appropriate to quote the whole *Seinsklötzen* passage. Guardinis state that man exists as:

> …no [keine] series of mute lumps of being [Seinsklötzen], no blind mechanical
> unrolling [blinden Abläufe], but a meaningful succession of 'words'. Things and

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[211] *The World and the Person*, 18.

[212] "The doctrine of creation most decisively reveals the power of God, the Infinite Sovereign. The world was created out of nothing by the freedom of the Almighty Whose commanding Word gives to all things being and nature; of itself that world lacks any trace of internal necessity or external possibility." *The End of the Modern World*, trans. Elinor C Briefs, Rev. ed. (Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 1998), 76.

[213] Again, in *The End of the Modern World*, Guardini offers a measured explanation of this type of perfidious 'necessitarianism'. "This concept is now revealing itself more and more clearly to be false. Man, not nature, determines things. And not from necessity, which would render him a kind of nature once removed, but in freedom. Awareness of this is beginning to penetrate the most varied fields. One typical example is extreme existentialism, which swings back the pendulum from the former all-determination of nature to a radical freedom that is as unrealistic as the concept against which it is reacting. This version of reality consumes all of truth's substance, leaving man in pure arbitrariness; in other words, everything becomes meaningless." Ibid., 192.

[214] *The Conversion of Augustine*, 91.

events are words entering into time, but they spring ultimately from the Word that transcends all time, the Word eternally spoken, spoken God from the speaking God.[215].

Here Guardini is showing how our existence is caused by God. It is not accurate to suggest that reference to speech is only metaphorical, given Guardini's view on *Urwort* (*logos,* Christ). Hence it is truly God's speech that causes our existence. This is why Guardini negates *Seinsklötzen*. However, this does not mean that God has created evil people or bad speech. It means that, "insofar as [bad speech] really *is*"[216], that is to say, insofar as man is contingent upon his Creator, that man is incontrovertibly good. Hence man can be admixed with bad speech (just as Shakespeare, if poorly delivered, is still Shakespeare) without this speech having come from or possessing its own creative efficacy.

That man is God's speech means he echoes the voice of God. Since our existence is not necessary, that is, God chose to create us from nothing, in like manner man can choose to echo or *pro-create* according to his created form. Hence, freely, man speaks his being. But due to this, bad speech can happen; in no way, however, does it silence God (*Urwort*) or change man's nature.

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[215] Ibid. Cf. *Die Bekehrung Des Aurelius Augustinus*, 98. "Das Vergehen ist die Bedingung ihres Seins, ihres Sinnes, ihrer Schönheit und ihrer Trauer. Und noch muß darauf aufmerksam gemacht werden, daß hier das Dasein eine Rede genannt wird: keine Reihe von stummen Seinsklötzen und blinden Abläufen, sondern eine sinnerfüllte Folgegestalt von »Worten«. Dinge und Geschehnisse sind Worte, die in der Zeit dahingehen, zuletzt aber dem Worte entstammen, das über aller Zeit ist, ewig gesprochen, als der vom sprechenden Gott gesprochene Gott...". The usage of 'mechanical' in the English translation, upon examination of the German, does not relate to Guardini's broader views on 'the machine', 'technology' and 'Mass Man.' The phrase, "no blind mechanical unrolling," comes from "blinden Abläufen". The root of *Abläufen* is '*Läufe,*' which basically means 'run,' and the preposition 'ab' can mean 'un, not, non'. Together "blinden Abläufen" can mean 'blind stopping.' However, Sr. Luka's translation agrees with the English translator (1960) of *Die Bekehrung Des Aurelius Augustinus*, stating Abläufen can be validly translated within the context of the sentence to mean 'process,' 'procedure' or 'mechanism'. It can be compared to the passage on p. 45, "Seing Welt ist kein menschenfremdes mechanisches System*"*, which in the translation on p. 33 reads as, "Augustine's world is no inhuman mechanical system…". Now we can see why the *Seinsklötzen* passage was translated as it was, as it is consistent with Guardini's broader view as shown in the *mechanisches* passage.

[216] *The Conversion of Augustine*, 85.

Hence our bad speech, "insofar as it really *is*", cannot speak as God speaks, any more than someone can create a "goatstag"[217]. In other words, no evil a man commits can un-cause his creaturely goodness nor create as a deity, as in the case of a goatstag. To admit otherwise, for instance, that God withdraw His being due to evil committed, or that such evil succeeds in changing our nature, would result in affirming man as *Seinsklötzen*; since, in the first case, *Urwort* is no longer spoken to man, or in the second, man is able to speak independently of *Urwort*. Either case would in theory deprive man of all hope or connection to his Creator. Annihilation is the only possible outcome. This type of man, as divorced from *Urwort*, is unable to enact his *Urwerk*, and thus would become mal-formed or massified. Mass Man, for Guardini, is thus a state in which man freely lives as though God were a non-entity. Thus, Mass Man is not so rebellious against his creaturely nature as much as he is totally unaware of it. Although Guardini negates *Seinsklötzen* in reality, his

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[217] If philosophy can rigorously and systematically defend the existence of the goatstag, then the same can be done for seeing no difference between good and evil. The ancient's discussion of the goatstag (ὁ τραγέ-λαφος) highlights the representation of impossible objects by way of rigorous, systematic metaphysical argumentation. Guardini's discussion of bad speech likewise highlights the conceivability of an impossible existence. For the ancients, this metaphysic, according to Doyle, is an adumbration of modern idealism, specifically Kant's transcendental idealism. John P. Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing: Late Scholastic Theory of Supertranscendental Being* (Leuven, BEL: Leuven University Press, 2012), 1. As well for Guardini, Kant is to blame for providing a rational account of existence that does not emphasise man's creaturely status or existential contingency. This can be called deism. Ancient idealism (in a sense) broadened the scope of intelligibility beyond τὸ ὄν (being), as Aristotle would have it, or *quod est* (what is), as the Latins would have it, to include a more nebulous, ephemeral category - τὶ or *quid* (something). Deism preached the broadening of man's radical capacity to exist without ontological dependence upon his creator, but without saying God did not exist. In ancient idealism objects of spurious intelligibility gained equal, ontological status. This resulted in the 'proto-Copernican revolution'. Thus in modern deism, the spurious habit of life whereby God is forgotten gains equal, ontological status to 'those crazy Christians'. Deism resulted not in revolution, not in a renewed anthropology, but in corruption, mal-formation or *massification* of man – living as though God was irrelevant. For ancient idealism, if something could be spoken, that is, was τὸ λεκτόν (the expressible word), then it (τὶ) became ontologically coterminous with τὸ ὄν. For the deists, they simply needed to change the definition of creation, by limiting creation or contingency to, say, the 'past tense', for their view not to be seen as 'veiled, practical atheism'. Granted the Stoics asserted their metaphysics for complex reasons beyond my purview, that νοήματα (thoughts in the soul) became the measure of realism allowed them to bestow being upon things that cannot exist (e.g., the goatstag). "Chapter 1". Ibid., 1-17. Elsewhere, Doyle quotes Plato who calls these half-pyschic, half-real objects "something in between" (μεταξύ τι). Ibid., 1-2. Likewise for Guardini, the acceptance of deism has allowed man to limit his contingency, and upon this limitation build a pattern of life, much like Plato's μεταξύ τι, whereby man's existence is half-psychic and half-real: half-real inasmuch as, yes, in fact he is more contingent upon God than deism allows; half-psychic inasmuch as, yes also, man is free to believe error.

affirmation of free will allows *Seinsklötzen* or Mass Man to exist as a fictive *res*, much as how some of the ancients defined the goatstag.

Understanding *Seinsklötzen* in this way, Guardini's negation (*keine*) of "blind mechanical unrolling" can now be interpreted. If God's speech is ongoing, so too is the cause of man's existence. Machine existence, however, points straight to man as the creator. Hence to say that man does not exist mechanistically is another way of saying that man does not receive his existence from himself, but from God.

Next, the negation of *Seinsklötzen* means that as man receives his existence from God, he is not a necessary being like God. If man bore likeness to a machine, it would mean that his existence was self-explanatory, answerable only by inspection of its material parts. In this way, man as machine allows his existence to be viewed in purely immanent terms, thus dispensing him of any beholdeness beyond himself. The question of his existence, then, finds no explanation, nor requires the positing of any causal, ontological link, between man and any other being. But this is what Guardini is negating! Hence, our existence is not necessary, self-explanatory or machine-like, but is contingent upon God, who did not need to but freely choose to create man, and indeed made man reliant on a relationship with other beings (*allonom*). Relationality or *allonomy* so expressed goes against a deistic conception of man from which two conclusions arise. Firstly, that as man is God's choice, so too is the possibility of his existence. The dependency man has upon God is a*lways and ongoing* inasmuch as man exists due to God acting with respect to what is possible, not necessary. Secondly, it can be concluded that, as our contingency is a reality common

amongst men, man can understand himself better by fostering relationships with those whom contingency is shared in common.

However, deism attempts a loophole in the *always and ongoing* conception of creation, whereby *always* is granted but *ongoingly* is denied. This position is confirmable, for instance, in an essay by Tudor,[218] the writings of Crouse concerning the Enlightenment,[219] the writings of Gregory concerning the metaphysical origins of modernity,[220] and more generally *The Legacy of Deism* by Peter Bryne.[221] Western intellectual history is thus replete with this form of denial and its leading to deterministic or mechanistic anthropologies. Thus, a deist would argue: *yes, God is always the formal cause of man's existence; but given man exists now, we do not continue to exist with respect to this cause. Yes, our existence has always come from God; but it is not granted ongoingly*; *man now lives independently from this cause. Thus, you should take independence as the first principle of man's historical reality.* No longer did the cosmos *depend* upon God as its formal and final cause; rather, through understanding material and efficient causes (matter, attraction, repulsion, etc), a creaturely, that is, an ontologically contingent, awareness of existence

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[218] "…the one-sided insistence upon His transcendence, to the exclusion of His immanence, leads to Deism." Ciocan Tudor Cosmin, "The Philosophic Background as Starting-Point for Early Christian Doctrine of God's Immanence," *Dialogo* 2, no. 2 (2016): 133.

[219] "The Enlightenment, especially in its most radical (French) forms, seemed inherently opposed to the very possibility of creation – or, at best, subscribed to the rather attenuated form of that doctrine that appears in deism. Robert D. Crouse et al., *Divine Creation in Ancient, Medieval, and Early Modern Thought: Essays Presented to the Rev'd Dr. Robert D. Crouse* (Boston, NETHERLANDS: BRILL, 2014), 425.

"But what if the anti-Roman exclusion of divine immanence that presupposed metaphysical univocity were to be combined with Occam's razor and a conception of the nature world as an explanatorily adequate system of self-contained, efficient causes? *Then there would be neither a place for the active, ever-present, biblical God of Christianity, nor a reason to refer to him except perhaps as an extraordinarily remote, first efficient cause.* [emphasis added]" Brad S. Gregory, *The Unintended Reformation: How a Religious Revolution Secularized Society* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2012), 43.

[221] Peter Byrne, *Natural Religion and the Nature of Religion: The Legacy of Deism* (Florence, UNKNOWN: Taylor and Francis, 2013).

faded from Western thought. How could this awareness stay in vogue if its two, key determining factors – God, and his free decision to make us in his image *ex nihilo* – were non-demonstrable? According to Guardini's consistent position across his works this validated the worldview, inherent especially to post-medieval thinking, of creaturely independence (the pre-Christian classical period on the whole did not possess a concept of *creatura*. Due to this, the creaturely problem manifests, after being developed, it become corrupt); that is to say, as the first principle by which man, as a bundle of demonstrable causes, could sufficiently understand himself without recourse to non-demonstrable formal and final causality. Mechanistic anthropology is a symptom of deism and a consequence of denying that God is *always and ongoingly* the formal and final cause of man. This is not to say, of course, that natural causes do not exist; simply that such causes are God's creation also, are thus held in existence like man. An edition, therefore, can be posited as to the *Seinsklötzen* passage to conform it to Guardini's broader thinking on deism: "man [and all creation] is no "…blind mechanical unrolling [but a creation whose formal and final cause points to] the Word [who] transcends all [material and efficient causes]."[222]

c)  *Molem* or "bulk": mass becomes man because of God

In Chapter eleven, titled "Creation and Providence", Guardini discusses Augustine's theory regarding man's creaturely existence. This is the context in which the latter uses "bulk"[223] and whom the former cites, so a summary shall be given.

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[222] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 91.
[223] Ibid., 117.

Guardini's analysis involves a twofold attitude which humans can have toward reality; first, the "autonomous attitude"[224], denoted by a "standing on one's own feet as master of one's own existence, confident of sound personal relations to things and values"[225]. Here, Guardini holds to a basic, more common-sense definition of autonomy, rather than to its meaning within Kantian scholarship.[226] Second, instead of describing its opposite with the usual term, heteronomous, so as "to avoid [the] negative undertone"[227] apropos to Kantian scholarship, Guardini posits the term "allonom"[228] instead, in whose Greek root it is found: (1) ἄλλος (*allos*), meaning, "other"[229]; and (2) νομος (*nomos*), meaning *law*. These root words have their basis in Christ's two great commandments (Jn 13:34).[230] Given this basis for *allos*, where within Scripture it defines who man is in relation to the Christian social order, it is likely that Guardini referred to *allonom* to express this reality. Accordingly, Guardini defines the term as that "tendency to be conscious of 'the other'"[231].

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[224] Ibid., 115.

[225] Ibid.

[226] Granted that elsewhere in *COA* he critiques Kantian autonomy. For example: "[t]he will to autonomy in every sphere of value, the desire of each to be "critically" pure, becomes a striving for a "pure ethics" that is its own end, utterly distinct from any actual effects on concrete existence. Hence it retreats first from the ecclesiastical and the religious, then from the public well-being and welfare, and finally from education in all its forms. It abandons the category of perfection completely and limits itself to pure intention; indeed, ultimately it is forced to become an ethical system of mere duty and pure form. For in breaking down the relation between attitude and being, validity and reality, it loses also the fullness and richness of the world: the "what" of things and processes fades before the ethical imperative. When this "must" can no longer be found within the order of things and world values, all that remains is abstract duty; concrete existence deteriorates to a kind of raw material to be determined by that duty." Ibid., 52. This line of argumentation, however, belongs to subsequent chapters.

[227] Ibid., 115.

[228] Ibid.

[229] 'ἄλλος'. Henry George Liddell, Robert Scott, and Henry Drisler, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 7th ed. (New York: Harper & brothers, 1889). For example in Jn 13:34, it reads: "[a] new commandment [entolēn] I give unto you: That you love one [allēlous] another [allēlous], as I have loved you". Although *nomos* is not used but *Entolēn* is, firstly it is common sense to say that a commandment is a type of law, secondly, *nomos* in the NT referred to the law of the Jewish Covenant (e.g., Mat 5:17-18, 11:13).

[230] It falls outside of the scope of this research to discuss *agape* and its relation to *allon*.

[231] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 115. Here we see a similarity to his Heidegger's term, *mitsein* (being with), the extreme of which being, *das man,* which is Heidegger's term for Mass Man, according to Tuttle. See - Tuttle, *The*

For Guardini, *allonom* avoids the negative undertones as expressed in Kant's theory of heteronomy by denying the concept of the apriority of being, the principle tenet upon which heteronomy relies. Guardini relates in *The Person and The World*, that:

> [Kant's] philosophy conceives of the logical, ethical, aesthetic subject as something final supported by the world of the mind. One cannot reach beyond this, since every attempt to do so could be carried out only by means of the categories of this very subjectivity.[232]

By "world of the mind" and "[o]ne cannot reach beyond this", Guardini is referring to Kant's division between knowable phenomena and unknowable noumena. Guardini's interpretation of Kant, that one cannot reach beyond the world of the mind, seems to be pointing towards the issue in Kant's thought of the *noumenal* or incommunicable self or subject. In contrast to Kitcher's discussion of the matter within *Kant's Thinker*, it appears that either the possibility of noumenal affection had not yet developed in Guardini's time, or that incommunicability as applicable to both human and non-human entities was the prevailing theory to which Guardini ascribed.[233] Either way, Guardini would take issue with both interpretations since both proffer Kant's broader theory of autonomy.[234]

Noumenal incommunicability does not afford the possibility of ontological relationality between entities, rendering instead all entities to each other *as alien*. In *The End of   The Modern*

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*Crowd Is Untruth: The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, 51-109.

[232] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 9.

[233] Patricia Kitcher, *Kant's Thinker* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[234] It is a pivotal stance that throughout this thesis it is held that Guardini's interpretation of Kant affords no possibility for noumenal affection between subjects. His principle of autonomy rests upon the impossibility of this affection.

*World* Guardini explains it is a problem that arises when reality is not understood as creation.[235] Ontologically, then, knowledge of being lacks common ground; being is misperceived as separate and incommunicable. In this way, man gives himself the means to view himself as equivocal to created being, or at least as one creation equivocal with all the rest.[236] In a sense this is fair inasmuch as men are said to be rational entities, who by virtue of which are separate from non-rational entities. However, Guardini does not think that separateness in this context has engendered Western thought with creaturely awareness since, in effect, it has engendered in man, inasmuch as his rational capacity distinguishes him, to forget he is still dependent on his creator *like all created beings*. It is as though Kant's ethical maxim – that man is an end in himself – instead occasioned a senility in ontology as to the Christian doctrines of *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei*. For example, Guardini's friend, Martin Heidegger, sought the erasure of *creatura* in his discourse on ontology. Toner relates Heidegger's claim that, "not creation but the very happening of the 'world of sense' wherein historical human being dwell [i.e., facticity]"[237] was the principle (*Seiendheit* or *Ereignis*) of being.[238] Thus facticity, like Kantian apriority, exiled God from ontology by denying the doctrines of *imago dei* and *creatio ex nihilo*, that the being of this world came from the world beyond.

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[235] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 168.

[236] By "equivocal" it is meant "a term or proposition having two or more wholly different meanings, with mere resemblance of words or sounds employed". The "term or proposition" in question is what man posits ontologically with respect to other mean, that being, between himself and all other men, something "wholly different" in meaning, "with mere resemblance of words or sounds employed." Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 41.

[237] Philip Tonner, *Heidegger, Metaphysics and the Univocity of Being*, Continuum Studies in Continental Philosophy (London; New York: Continuum, 2010), 54.

[238] See in general Chapter 2, "Heidegger, Scotus and Univocity" ibid.

Guardini purposes to extend his criticism with Kant to include Heidegger, and to see apriority and facticity both as instances of "epistemology's basic problem"[239] as to the knowledge and character of being. "How", he asks, "is the essence – or aprioristic character – of a thing to be grasped?"[240] He offers an initial insight: "Augustine's answer is already implied in his words "eternal images"[241] and "Your unchangeable light"[242]. He goes on to explain, harkening to Augustine's neo-platonic thought regarding the sign/the signified:

> Understanding is concerned above all with the question of truth, with the question of what is essential and eternal. The senses transmit mere facts, which are as they happen to be, rather than as they should be according to their original image…For Augustine, as for Plato, all this comes, not by way of the senses, but directly from the eternal ideas, of which the objects of experience and process are but images.[243]

This passage shows how Guardini's apology against apriority and facticity is the critical and negative aspect to his positive teaching on *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei*. Both positions arguably ghettoise God to onto-theology. Things, Guardini argues, are not merely "facts"[244] or "objects of experience"[245], but "images."[246] Hence man is the sign, God is the signified. Apriority severs the sign from the signified in the same way that facticity separates God from ontology, in that both speak of being as though it were not created. For Kant, subjective being becomes equivocal to objective being; whereas for Guardini, both exist in relation to each other inasmuch as they  both

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[239] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 12.
[240] Ibid.
[241] Ibid.
[242] Ibid.
[243] Ibid., 12-13.
[244] Ibid., 13.
[245] Ibid.
[246] Ibid.

signify God. For Heidegger, factitious being becomes equivocal to divine being; whereas for Guardini, this-worldly being is created or significant, not factitious, wholly immanent or non-significant.

This is why Guardini redefines heteronomy, not autonomy, because heteronomy still points beyond itself to *allon*, albeit very imperfectly and by way of denial. As heteronomy is against *allon*, heteronomy is still a more pliable concept than autonomy because the latter sees *allon* and *heteros* as non-entities. As in a negative of camera film, heteronomy in its initial, Kantian state, when exposed to the light of creaturely awareness, reveals a picture which signifies something beyond itself, that being God the signifier and His creatures. Guardini uses allonomy to convey this closed reality caught within the locus of heteronomy. Allonomy is thus Guardini's preferred term by which he affirms the creaturely awareness that heteronomy denies, the communicability of God's singular being emanating throughout His creation. Specifically, allonomy removes the equivocation of being within Kant's and Heidegger's ontologies by affirming, respectively, that non-rational being is in reality neighbour or *allon* to rational being, and that the world's factitious or immanent being (i.e., its *aletheia*) is in reality neighbour to divine being.

Allonomy for Guardini, seen in light of this discussion of Kant and Heidegger, indicates the relational half of man with respect to Creator and creation. But man is not only relational; this capacity receives its measure due to his Creator. Allonomy is the "individual's natural awareness of being a member of a whole…part of an all-exclusive happening…that existence and

significance are being continually granted him from the creator alone"[247]. Like autonomy in its

common-sense illustration, it has its own "centre"[248] in man, which is when allonomy functions

according to nature, to a predetermined norm. In this context *to function according to nature* rests

upon the norm given to creation by the Creator. This entails what, in totality, is relational in man

due to being created, and the manner in which man acts due to this fact. In other words, what

Guardini means by creaturely relationality is relationality as a result of formal and final causes,

how man is relational due to that and how his nature signifies God.


By certain acts of relationality Guardini points to the mysterious relationship between our

created potential or nature, and the faculty of volition that actualises it. When Guardini is

discussing allonomy and autonomy the word, *Haltung*, is translated into "attitude". Allonomy is

the *Haltung* or consciousness of the other. Guardini does not delimit this consciousness to the

purely psychological; it is meant to indicate *the totality* or formal capacity of one being to relate

to other beings. *Haltung* can also translate into *manner*, *stance* or *style*.[249] Later Guardini calls this

*Haltung* a "profound awareness"[250], then onward, a "predisposition"[251]. All denote some capacity

towards conscious, relational activity. Hence creaturely relational *Haltung* or allonomy*,* since it is

equally formal and conscious, has to do with existential considerations whose basis is formal

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[247] Ibid., 115-16.
[248] Ibid., 115. This is a concept to be flagged here by explained in subsequent chapters.
[249] We can take Guardini's usage of *Haltung* to have similar political implications as that according to Ernst Junger. Creaturely awareness can be understood as a tenet of natural theology that has social, political import through the responsibility taken by the individual to express into the social strata the truth of their being. See - Ernst Jünger, Laurence Paul Hemming, and Bogdan Costea, *The Worker: Dominion and Form* (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2017), 20.
[250] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 116.
[251] Ibid.

reality. So the allonomous *Haltung* acts upon its relational capacity or "power"[252], putting the reality of others within the realm of volition.

As Guardini had indicated, volition controls the tipping point by which nature reaches out to God and creatures, or fails to. Thus for Guardini, disordered allonomy or heteronomy is in part a result of disordered volition.[253] But what does this disorderedness mean? Since there is nothing uncreated to a creature, there is nothing which does not potentially signify God. But since man is created essentially to be actualised concretely through volition, there is everything about man that *might not* signify God. Hence allonomy still presupposes the completion of acts that accord with man's formal capacity and final end. Failure in this respect means failure to exist as a creature. While Guardini is not so alarmist and blunt, by defining creaturely relational *Haltung* as against that negative expression, heteronomy, close to Guardini's mind is man's perfectibility, and hence the extent he can go in failing to be relational according to his created potential.

This is the context in which Guardini's discourse on allonomy intersects with his usage of the term "bulk [*molem*]".[254] *Molem* is one of many Latin synonyms for *massa*. Its usage pertains to what Guardini distinguishes as Augustine's primary (PO) and secondary (SO) operations of the

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[252] Ibid., 115-16.

[253] Here I wish to demarcate my research from a voluntaristic understanding of the problem of evil. Voluntarism is an extreme view by which personal evil is explained primarily by reference to volition. While scholars generally argue that Augustine and Thomas see evil from opposite ends – Augustine from volition and Thomas from intellect – this does not mean they sit upon the extremity. Since this,

[254] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 117.

soul.[255] PO Guardini defines as "divine being and operation"[256] whereby God "directly acts and endows [man] with meaning"[257] SO is defined as the spontaneous "secondary causes"[258] of PO, "being and human will".[259] Guardini raises this distinction in his discourse on allonomy, since it is by this distinction that Augustine determines what our creaturely relational potential is. For Guardini, Augustine embodies this potential; he does not merely describe it in accurate terms. "[T]he man Augustine is allonom."[260] Thus Guardini cleaves to Augustine to signify what allonomy is. In Augustine's thought then, one finds an instance of true creaturely relationality.

There are two senses within *COA* in which Guardini uses "bulk": the first is neo-Platonist, and the second is Manichean. Both indicate Augustine's attempt to explain how PO is the principle of unity between body and soul. As to the Neo-Platonist sense, Guardini relates that in Augustine's mind, as consistent with the ancient's belief in the impermanency of matter,[261] the locale of PO could not be within anything corporeal. This belief is clearly Platonic and neo-Platonic. In this respect Augustine has difficulty understanding how a spiritual, specifically Christian, God involved matter in man's creaturely existence. *How is man's corporeity involved in signifying God if God is not corporeal?* A further difficulty: as the soul is contingent upon God, so is the body contingent upon the soul. However, Christianity proposed to Augustine that the soul was immortal or indestructible. *How*, might Augustine ask, *could the soul belong to a body when neither shared*

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[255] Ibid., 116.
[256] Ibid.
[257] Ibid.
[258] Ibid.
[259] Ibid.
[260] Ibid.
[261] Fn. 1. Ibid., 185.

*the same way of existing* (viz., permanent/impermanent)*?* Nonetheless Christianity taught, by way

of neo-Platonic concepts, that the two co-existed. Thus PO did not involve abhorrence of the body

so much as it placed it within a hierarchical order of being. This is the Platonic notion of

*participation*, and is the first sense Guardini treats within *COA*. Thus from *The Confessions*, Book

X, Chapter 6, Augustine states:

> [a]nd I tell you, my soul, you are better *[than all corporeal things],* since you vivify
> the whole bulk [moles] of the body: you give the body life, which no body can give to
> a body. But your God is the Life of your life [emphasis added].[262]

In this first sense to *moles*, Guardini cites Augustine who surrenders, through sheer faith, his *moles*

to its Creator. As *moles* here is mostly synonymous to the Genesis conception of *hyle*, it is

understandable that God would vivify *moles* as he did in Genesis. The difference between each

context is that the former involves specifically man, not just *hyle* or prime matter; and further

different is Augustine's "apperception"[263] as to the masses from which he was made. Augustine

knows that despite being made from *moles* he is not merely that. Man exceeds *moles* due to the

Primary Operation of God within man. Given the radical contingency of man's existence, he is no

more necessary than *hyle*; only God can bring him into existence. God's Primary Operation,

despite the body participating at a hierarchically lower level, still relates to the body inasmuch as

PO vivifies it. Since there is only one PO, there is a vital unity between *moles* and the soul, even

when their principle of existence is different. In this way, *moles*, though impermanent, and

therefore different to spirit, is still part of Augustine's singular Christian existence due to PO

harmoniously affecting both.

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[262] Ibid., 117.
[263] Ibid., 178.

As to the Manichean sense to which Augustine once but no longer held, Guardini quotes Augustine, from Book V, Chapter 10:

> I thought that the substance of evil…had its own *hideous bulk* [moles], either gross which [the Manicheans] called earth, or thin and tenuous like the air: for [the Manicheans] imagine it to be some malignant mind creeping over the earth [emphasis added].[264]

Here, *moles* is not used to denote *distance* between creator, soul and body; rather, it is used to denote *enmity*. Further here, *moles* is not subject to a singular, vivifying Primary Operation; rather, in *moles* consisting of "its own hideous bulk" or "substance of evil [*mali substantiam*]"[265], there are potentially dual creative principles at work. Later in Chapter 10, Augustine confesses that his quandary with matter was due to once believing in Manichean dualism. He states the reason he saw *moles* in this way was due to there being two gods, or "two opposing powers [*adverso sibi duas moles*][266], each infinite, yet the evil one lesser and the good one greater; and from this abominable foundation other irreligious notions followed."[267] Thus at the heart of Augustine's quandary with *moles* is not only whether *moles* is evil creation, but that, *moles* was a pseudonym for the evil Creator, *hyle*.

Guardini is aware of Augustine's Manichean quandary as to *moles* when quoting the above passage. Guardini puts it down to two factors: first, Augustine being "incapable of   imagining

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[264] Ibid., 184.
[265] Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 88. For the Latin: Watts, *St. Augustine's Confessions: With an English Translation by William Watts*, 1, 246.
[266] Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 88. For the Latin: Watts, *St. Augustine's Confessions: With an English Translation by William Watts*, 1, 246.
[267] Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 126.

pure spiritual reality. For him reality is synonymous with corporality. Hence, the only possible definition of spirit is this: matter refined to the point of insubstantiality."[268] What Guardini is referring to is a process of distillation Augustine underwent in classifying the difference between material and formal existence. The principle of finitude or impermanence pertained to the former; and the invisible, infinite principle, with respect to which the material thing existed, pertained to the latter. *Moles* was thus a good name for spirit, since it referred to something particular that had no form. And second, Augustine equating essence with "intention".[269] Hence "[e]vil is one kind of being among others; it is an iniquitous essence."[270] This is partly why in Book V, Chapter 10, Augustine describes the Christian God as "a bodily magnitude (*moles corporum*)"[271], since firstly he was spiritual, and second he had a will or intention of his own. Thus Guardini was literate as to Augustine's Manichean meaning to *moles*.

It shows Guardini's even-handedness that he cites the neo-Platonic and Manichean senses to *moles*. However, it is against the Manichean sense that Guardini frames his term, *allonom*. This is seen in the relation between PO or "divine being and operation"[272] and SO or "being and human will"[273], but specifically in the secondary, existential operation, allonomy. Together PO and SO comprise man's total configuration towards reality. Hence, man's *Haltung* is necessarily allonomous in like manner to God's attitude towards others. But the following question arises:

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[268] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 184-85.
[269] Ibid., 185.
[270] Ibid.
[271] Augustine and Sheed, *Confessions*. 126.
[272] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 116.
[273] Ibid.

since, for Guardini, our *Haltung* can devolve into the heteronymous, what Primary Operation causes this disordered Secondary Operation?

Autonomy and allonomy comprise the two laws of "being and human will" or SO. The former is the being of ego or self-will, the latter is the being of *allon* or other-will. Each, for Guardini, has its own centre or radical existence in man. Each is the dialectical opposite (*gegensätze*) to the other, through which man's essence can be understood.[274] In *The World and The Person*, Guardini defines "centre" as "the inner boundary of the whole existence."[275] This boundary, however, "is not absolute and self-based. Rather, it is finite and conditional. It is, so to speak, perforated; that is, it has a passage inward and there, adjoining it, is the power that carries all – God."[276] Thus allonomy is the fixed, central, radical, *yet* perforated boundary between created (SO) and uncreated (PO) being. Given that Augustine embodies allonomy; he is "a man determined by and oriented to the whole"[277], it follows that by *allon* Guardini means *human being, aligned with God's being, that is distinct from but not separate to one's ego*.

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[274] "[Guardini]…saw…personal existence…[as] an organic whole which is characterized by the interplay of opposites…whose essence we can know by means of insight and the dialectical use of conepts." Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 19. For example in Guardini's discussion of birth and death thematically pursued in the Socratic dialogue, *Phaedo*: "The greater arises from the lesser, the lesser from the greater, the stronger from the weaker, the faster from the slower, the worse from the better, the more just from the less just, the separate from the mixed, the warmer from the cooler, etc. The sense of the examples [which Socrates has given in this dialogue] is clear: states are mentioned which have indeed a different character – "opposite" according to the loosely used word – but are referred to an identical standard and an identical underlying reality. Although then, [birth and death] are mutually "opposite" and exclude one another, they yet arise "from one another"." Romano Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 2015 reprint ed. (London, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1948), 110.
[275] *The World and the Person*, 73.
[276] Ibid.
[277] *The Conversion of Augustine*, 116.

At stake in this definition of allonomy are the two elements comprising SO: being and will. The former exists around that fixed centre. The further beyond that point the behaviour is, the more unnatural the man becomes. Hence at extreme to "centre" is non-being. False allonomy is thus an extreme *Haltung*, practically speaking; and a *Haltung* governed by non-being, ontologically speaking. Thus, false allonomy or heteronomy is as a Secondary Operation which seeks non-being, that is, when man conforms himself to a Primary Operation that is not from God.

Non-being for Guardini equates to the understanding of evil as the absence of God, and not as the existence of an equal entity. This absence presupposes having faith in a non-divine Primary Operation; as a Secondary Operation, it presupposes having faith in non-natural things. Hence evil still has existence, but only by acting as though evil is equal to God. In *A Precursor to Vatican II*, Krieg relates key information as to Guardini's understanding of evil: first, that Guardini saw the existence of evil within history.[278] He would say it was a concrete, not merely abstract or intellectual, reality. Second, that Guardini saw good and evil not as opposites but as contraries.[279] Hence evil had no real centre within man, within Guardini's framework. And third, that Guardini disagreed with certain thinkers, such as Jung, who saw "evil as part and parcel of life"[280] or as God's "antipode" or "dark side".[281] This final point confirms Guardini's positions as to what has been argued regarding Augustine's alleged crypto-Manichean tendencies. Lastly, though not

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[278] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 148.
[279] Ibid., 15.
[280] Ibid.
[281] Krieg quotes Guardini: "Jesus recognizes a personal power that fundamentally wills evil: evil per se" He goes on, stating that, "[t]his malevolent force is not God's "dark side" or "antipode" as is proposed by some psychologists (e.g., C.G Jung). On the contrary, the devil is an independent will intent upon spreading "murkiness and confusion" among us. Ibid., 148.

divine, evil is a personal power,[282] not merely a "malevolent force".[283] Hence, the power contrary to God, evil so-called, is simply creatures acting contrary to their Creator, the content of which having immediate expression as *form*, and ultimate measure from the Creator. The creaturely form, therefore, is that "underlying reality"[284], that principle of unity, against which contrariety, evil or non-being finds its immediate measure.

In view of these positions, heteronomy is firstly not an abstract but a worldly happening; secondly, it has no place or ontological centre within man; but thirdly, since it exists negatively it has the same force that any personal act would have; and lastly the seeking of this power by creatures is a contrary to their created form. By way of Krieg a concise outline as to Guardini's conception of evil is evident, from which some assertions can be made as to its connection to heteronomy.

Guardini's conception of heteronomy as a contrary to allonomy is consistent with his broader view of evil. To have heteronomous concern is the basic feature of Mass Man. The contrariety between heteronomy and allonomy is confirmable within *COA* in two ways: first, the preference to use *allonom* over heteronomy and its likely reference to Christ's two great commandments; and second, that allonomy as an existential attitude secondary (SO) to God's being (PO), can only be open to non-ego reality if the object in question is in some way *real*.[285] If man understands non-ego reality in *any other way than as it was created*, then his attitude cannot

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[282] Ibid.
[283] Ibid., 148.
[284] Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 110.
[285] There seems also an assumption by Guardini that the God-man would never formulate his commandments in language that ran contrary to its meaning.

amount to allonomy however much one is open. Insofar as this failure occurs man equally becomes

an agent of unreality or evil. Thus, heteronomy for Guardini is a type of evil entailing a concern

for a non-real thing that is not self. This produces false relationships and forms bonds that ought

never be made. Mass Man lives in this bondage.

5. Heteronomy: when man is governed by non-being

Through *COA*, Guardini's conception of Mass Man finds its conceptual patrimony within

classical intellectual history. Augustine's declamation that man was *massa peccati, massa luti,*

*massa damnationis*, etc, most acutely expresses in the classical era what Guardini expresses within

the era of his own in the concept of Mass Man. From Guardini's perspective, Mass Man mimics

the classical problem of *massa* in their joint incomprehension as to how evil seems to possess

positive existence. Guardini interprets Augustine's reflections on *hyle, massa, moles,* etc as

prototypical considerations as to how it might be conceived – without any justification by

Augustine – that man was not subject to the Christian doctrines of *imago dei* and *creatio ex nihilo*.

Thus for Guardini the dichotomy exists that man can be understood as mass or as creature; as a

creature beholden to his Creator or as a being heteronomously dominated by non-being. If man is

not open to being in the manner of Augustine the *allonom*, then it is understandable that evil might

overwhelm his/her existence. When the sum of man's relational capacity becomes overwhelmed

in this way, his world becomes massified.

Likewise for Augustine when evil seems to prevail, one is lead towards a massified conception of reality – a "hideous [or evil] and formless [or invisible] bulk [*moles*]"[286]. As Torchia states, "the demiurge created the world from an eternal material substrate [i.e., from *massa*], and accordingly, was held responsible for all the world's evil."[287] Due to this Manichean, dualistic conception to which Augustine once held, man was not only graspingly described (given Augustine's extent conceptual framework), but from Guardini's perspective became an object of desperation leading onward into anthropological despair. Manichaean dualism, unlike creaturely awareness, does not provide a unified, ontological bedrock upon which man is afforded the opportunity to enjoy being-in-relation, to enjoy living in the world.

Textual proof in *COA* exhibits that Guardini acknowledges but does not share Augustine's quandary as to *massa* (nor too, ultimately, does Augustine as his Christian worldview develops). While Guardini discusses the matter, he has his own aims distinct from Augustine. Most importantly: first, while he shares Augustine's concern that man can form attitudes or relations based upon their misunderstanding of reality, no matter the evil that results, as creation, neither man nor reality are evil. Second and despite this, within the realm of unreality, man can allow himself to be so formed by evil, become heteronomously relational with unreality, that it would be hard not to conceive him as evil in some way due to this relation. Evil in this sense does not mean impish malice; evil means as it has been defined – beings living in unreality. This possibility, that man can become open to and corrupted by unreality, is precisely what the heteronomous  attitude

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[286] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 184.
[287] Torchia, *Creatio Ex Nihilo and the Theology of St. Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond*, 13.

is. Man becomes fashioned by unreality. Thus, man becomes mal-formed or *massified* in his capacity to relate to that which is non-self. This type of man who is habituated to unreality or evil, possesses the same qualities inherent to *massa, moles,* etc, in that he is equally subject to a dualistic conception of reality in which evil exists in like manner to good. Though Guardini not once refers to Mass Man in *COA*, it is evident that his conception of evil draws from Augustine's conception of evil as *massa*, in view of his Manichaean days; but as well draws from how Augustine, once converted to Christianity, subjects this view to the doctrines of *imago dei* and *creatio ex nihilo*.

6.  Conclusion

In relating heteronomy to Augustine's discourse on *hyle*, *massa, moles* and similar terms, Guardini reveals the creaturely, relational dimension of *masse*, by which he appeals to his reader to see themselves in like manner. This relationality is an awareness that leaves man open, holding to reality while admitting the nature and 'existence' of evil. It is an awareness that operates at the level of ontological being and non-being. Also, in Guardini's defining heteronomy thus, it indicates the extent to which evil can pervade existence, to the point that existence really seems intrinsically evil, that is, seeming to possess actual existence or creative efficacy. Further, it is a sage critique because Guardini is adept as to Augustine's Manichean quandary; it is prudent because Guardini wishes to excise the quandary at its root from his own, Augustinian definition of creaturely existence – and without entertaining any debate as to whether Augustine was a crypto-Manichean. Guardini, with the benefit of more than a millennium of Christian wisdom, shrewdly dialogues with Augustine's Manichean past. In excising heteronomy from the secondary operations of the human soul, Guardini holds that such an operation is not fitting to the human

creature, because man's essence is in no way created for corruption or unreality. However, inasmuch as man acts heteronomously their existence at once takes on, as a malformation, the feature of evil, and so becomes massified. They become Mass Man.

CHAPTER 3

*Welt und Person* (1939)

or

The World and The Person [*WAP*] (1965)

1. Introduction

This chapter argues that *WAP* is instrumental for Guardini in illustrating the significance of Mass Man as a concept within the mind of the autonomous individual. According to Krieg, *WAP* was written around the time that Hitler's Reich dismissed Guardini from his teaching post and forbade him from giving public lectures.[288] Krieg states that, "Guardini rejected the religious ideology of National Socialism by distinguishing between pagan savior-figures [sic] and the true savior, Jesus Christ."[289] It was out these context that *WAP* was written.

The concepts of Mass Man and the autonomous individual underpin Guardini's basic intention for writing *WAP*; that is to say, *WAP* was written to annunciate how that complex of human relations (or simply, the world) deeply needs creaturely awareness or a "Christian milieu"[290]. Key texts will be considered in light of Heidegger and Nietzsche, but especially Kant and Sartre, so

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[288] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 9.
[289] Ibid., 116.
[290] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, vii.

that the full extent of Guardini's meaning is made clear as to his concern for the heteronomous individual.

The conceptual existence of Mass Man is a consequence of a mistaken dialectic between autonomous and heteronomous being, precipitated by the absence of a common ontology between men. Guardini argues that the modern era did away with the medieval means to achieve this ontology through the principle of the analogy of being; which enabled man, understood as *creatura*, to predicate, find likeness to, or find measure in, his being to the Creator. Without the principle of analogy, but still with the impetus to measure existence, the modern, autonomous man, saw nothing ontologically common in *heteros*; rather, when applied to man, such men become the merely other, the dangerously other, the victim, the Mass Man; equivocal or alien to the sovereign self, where once, instead, the Creator reigned. The principle of *creatura* is necessary to undo the subjugation wrought by this mistaken dialectic by renewing an awareness that all men possess a common form; an awareness that only the Creator can determine matters ontologically; and due to which, it cannot be said that any man is *heteros*, that is, it cannot be said that any man is Mass Man. Through an analysis of key texts this line of reasoning is pursued.

*2.* The concept of *creatura* and the bifurcation of being into *autos* and *heteros*

The first citation as follows serves to earmark what definition of nature proffered by the modern era Guardini generally approved of across his writings. It is one characterised by objective normativity:

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The concept of nature is the concept of an object which signifies that which presents itself to our thought and action. But it is also a concept of values, and signifies a valid norm for this thought and action: that which is proper and healthy, wise and perfect - the "natural." Opposed to this is the unnatural, the artificial, abnormal, unhealthy, spoiled.[291]

Here nature is coterminous with objective normativity. This, however, is not the prevailing attitude so characteristic of modernity in general and autonomy and heteronomy in particular which Guardini seeks to critique. Rather, Guardini points, firstly, to Kant's theory of transcendental idealism as the prevailing normative attitude which motivated and justified modernity's anthropocentric, Copernican turn. By this definition, it is understood that nature signifies nothing beyond itself. Instead, the sovereign self brings to the object its essential content.[292] Intelligibility is thus rendered *autonomously*. Any object under speculation, and indeed nature in general through this so-called Kantian, modern mindset, puts man at the centre of being. In *The Death of Socrates*, Guardini relates this conviction when asking what makes something beautiful. He states as follows:

how is this question [of beauty] answered? Perhaps in a subjective sense, by saying that the significant content of things, what is categorical in them, is derived from the human mind itself, or from consciousness in general as realized therein, in the manner of idealistic apriorism. In that case only *the mass* of perceptions is given "from outside"; meaning is brought into them by the classifying activity of the mind itself [emphasis added].[293]

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[291] Ibid., 5.

[292] For example, Guardini states that "[m]an becomes a beginning" as validly as nature itself. Ibid., 9.

[293] *The Death of Socrates*, 149. This text was written around the time that Guardini's teaching faculties were on the most part restricted by Hitler's Reich. See - Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 9.

Guardini's words here belong to his general aim of this work to show that Socrates elemental view on metaphysical realism necessarily entailed an ethical imperative to put reality above his own ideas. This citation shows that the project of modernity to reappraise existence anthropocentrically is inextricably linked to the problem of *masse*. According to this definition it is arguable that Mass Man comes to be when what is significant and categorical about man is not derived from the individual in question but is derived from the autonomous mind apprehending this individual; and who, in making this assertion, leaves the latter beholden to the former. Under this definition, to be *masse* means to lack something ontological which man supposes to bestow. It is to lack "significant content"[294] apart from he or she who designates it. It means to make one man into the image of another, whereupon the law of one man becomes indistinct from the being of another.

In this passage Guardini points to the advent of nature worship as a characteristic of modernity. Now that man imposes his understanding of being upon objects, nature no longer possesses an objective norm. Rather its noumenal aspect can serve to satisfy what remains a desire within man after the question of metaphysics has been settled. With "idealistic apriorism"[295] replacing objective normativity, there is nothing preventing nature from being viewed as an object which is at once immanent yet transcendent.

Idealistic apriorism, or what has been called simply *autonomy*, does away with the view that nature is primarily creation, that is, a product firstly configured by the mind of God. To hold

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[294] Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 149.
[295] Ibid.

man in this place through the principle of autonomy Guardini argues that *creatura* will inevitably become devalued and will make man "radically"[296] responsible for "demolishing the reality of the world"[297], for the concept of autonomy is not equipped as *creatura* is to describe reality in a way that harmonises the immanent with the transcendental. In this chapter Guardini's view as to the importance of this harmony shall be demonstrated, how through the bifurcation of being into *autos* and *heteros* this harmony is destroyed, and how through this bifurcation Mass Man is conceptually conceived.

*3.* Man is a creature and not a self-enclosed being: Guardini, *dasein* and *mitsein*

Inasmuch as the concept of *creatura* is devalued, the mastery man holds over nature can increasingly yield objects that are made without an awareness that all being is primarily subject to the Creator's operation (Chapter 2). Guardini embarks upon *WAP* with this fundamental assertion in mind. Guardini holds *masse* to be *creatura* as against the conception of being associated with the transcendental idealism of the Copernican turn. Guardini argues that being does not perdure with respect to man but is a multitude or mass of realities that are always and ongoingly beholden to God. Only through this creaturely ontology, as *Ur-Werk* (Chapter 1), does man play a prescribed, instrumental role in acting upon said masses.

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[296] Ibid.
[297] Ibid.

Creaturely mastery or *Ur-Werk* stems from the Creator's mastery, or *Urwort*. In this way, man is significant but is second to God's sovereignty over being. *Ur-Werk* enables man to continue the Creator's plan, to fashion or perfect more basic forms into higher, more beautiful forms. In this way *masse* has the same potential as *Hyle* does for Augustine. Hence for Guardini, since *masse* is in itself an entity, and is good by virtue of being creation, one possibility as to the evil of *masse* stems from how it is used, fashioned or mastered, thus set against its intrinsic form and inherent goodness.[298] The basic attitude whereby the malformation of *hyle* becomes possible is when man holds that *creatura* is merely *natura*. First, he perceives the world around him without the awareness that all being is always and ongoingly subject to God's being; and second, with the belief that man, not God, is that which the world signifies. Thus, Guardini sees false mastery and the massified objects it renders to be a rotten fruit of the modern metaphysical turn away from a creaturely to anthropocentric ontology.[299]

*WAP* is in part a meditation on this challenge to reality by the sovereign self. In Guardini's preface to *WAP* he states the "fundamental"[300] purpose for the text. This purpose is in part geared towards an exploration of Augustine's writings.[301] Specifically, Guardini states that the "one idea that shall be examined…[in the text is]…that man does not exist as an    enclosed block of reality

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[298] "…[E]vil receives its weight from the existential level on which it is willed." *The World and the Person*, 167.

[299] When creaturely awareness fades Guardini states in *The End of The Modern World* that the *places* of being – heaven, hell, the world – fade also. He asks, "[w]here is man's place in being?" Becoming lost in this way is symptomatic of massification; where previously all relations found their measure in God, now that man is the centre of things, not only is God forgotten, but existence becomes, at least for a time, incomprehensible. *The End of the Modern World*, 45.

[300] *The World and the Person*, viii.

[301] "In the opinion of the author this concept sets forth not only the strongest motifs of the New Testament and important ideas of the past which have today found particular expression – *especially the ideas of St. Augustine*…[emphasis added]." Ibid.

[*Wirklichkeitsblock*][302] or a self-sufficient figure evolving from within, without."[303] In this passage, Guardini is defending his stance regarding *masse* by stating that man "does not exist"[304] as an ontologically independent or autonomous being. Refuting this form of self-sufficient existence is a primary aim within *WAP*, whose general justification is found in contrasting autonomy to the Christian medieval worldview.[305] Further, in this passage Guardini uses *Wirklichkeitsblock* in the same fashion to *masse* and other similar, cited terms from his other works. This is typically Augustinian to speak of being in terms of measure, form and order, equipping Guardini to respond in concrete terms to the problem of modern man's lack of ontological contingency. Guardini seeks to critique autonomy as *Wirklichkeitsblock*, since it precipitates the error of heteronomy or massification, and specifically the plight of Mass Man. This shall now be explained.

It has been shown that Guardini sees heteronomy as arising from the autonomous *Haltung*, and both in turn as arising from a lack of creaturely awareness. Both are prone to error since their reality is categorised anthropocentrically. Hence a creaturely *Haltung* or awareness is Guardini's primary concept in refuting both errors, for having this attitude displaces man from the centre of existence where otherwise modernity has disposed man to be. However, in refuting autonomy and heteronomy as such, Guardini does not mean that both are evil in themselves, for their very possibility originates from man's likeness to God. On one hand, Guardini states, man is

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[302] The full original text reads – "Im Grunde ist es ein Gedanke, der durchversucht werden soll: daβ der Mensch nicht als geschlossener Wirklichkeitsblock oder selbstgenugsame, sich aus sich selbst heraus entwickelnde Gestalt, sondern zum Entgegenkommenden hinüber existiert." *Welt Und Person*, 10.
[303] *The World and the Person*, viii.
[304] Ibid.
[305] For example, "The symbolic character of creation [during the middle ages] was so strongly felt that creation itself was not looked upon as having sufficient reality." Ibid., 15.

autonomous and "has a fullness of being…finite but real and powerful"[306]. Hence firstly, he possesses identity, and is happy that he does. Secondly, man sees himself, as himself, amidst all else. As man is present to creation it can be categorised as a Guardinian version of *Dasein*.

Subsequent to having a distinct but not separate identity within creation, man is called to be "allonom"[307] like Augustine. He is called *to be with creation* and to treat it with "altruism"[308], that is, to view its objective form as normative. As a creature, Guardini states that his existence entails a "responsibility"[309] to be with all of creation in an ethical sense. Thus, as man is with creation it can be categorised as a Guardianian version of *mitsein.* Inasmuch as man's being by definition entails code of altruism, man's existence entails correct treatment towards other-being, "in accordance with the possibilities"[310] of the form under apprehension. Creatureliness is therefore the fundamental distinguishing feature between Guardini and Heidegger, for being-as-such has not been delimited to immanent being only. Ontology, therefore, is not bifurcated from onto-theology under Guardini's framework, from perennial, western formulations of the objectively transcendent; to the contrary, all of human-being, or, to coin Tuttle's description for Heidegger, all of "those universal structures or existentials"[311], for Guardini point towards the assertion that man's purpose is principally an image of God's purpose. This is what is meant   by

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[306] Ibid., 24.
[307] *The Conversion of Augustine*, 115-16.
[308] Ibid., 115.
[309] *The World and the Person*, 25.
[310] Ibid., 26.
[311] That is, (1) *In-der-Welt-sein* or Being-in-the-world; (2) *Verstehen* or understanding; and (3) *Sinn* or meaning. This division reflects the "fundamental existential structure of human life", being "not reason, soul substance, or ego, but care [*Sorge*]."Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth : The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, 57-60.

*Ur-Werk* stemming from *Urwort*. Guardini states that, "[t]he will of God does not hang above the world, but lies within it, lie in its being as it is"[312]. God is at once Himself amidst the world and due to this shares His being with the world. Although this is for God a given, if for man Guardini hinges this upon the possibility of responsible action, then a wrong execution of freedom can lead to a wrong use of *Ur-Werk*.[313]

Positioning these Kantian and Heideggerian terms alongside Augustine's doctrine of creation, it seems that Guardini is discussing their respective conceptual frameworks to redirect them back towards a creaturely account of how man exists in himself and with others, as reflections of God's creative will. *Mitsein* is in our nature. As Guardini asserts, man is not a "block of reality", etc, due to our *always and ongoing* ontological openness to God. As God made man in his image to be open or allonomous, then the possibility and extent of that openness stems from *God being with the world as He made the world to be*. Although Heidegger, according to Tuttle, saw that the plight of Mass Man originates from the area of *Mitsein*; from that relational aspect of being through the lens of which being is an image; and that *Mitsein* bore a striking similarity to Guardini's concept of heteronomy; but due to Heidegger's ontology setting aside the concept of *creatura*, his understanding of being would become essentially immanent, serving to strip from being its objectively transcendental character. In this way, being-as-image is affirmed, but being-as-*imago dei* is denied. In this lies the essential difference between Mass Man as a problem of *Mitsein*  and

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[312] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 26.
[313] The errors of autonomy and heteronomy are the two basic directions in which this error proceeds. Either the self takes preference to the other, stratifying and thus amplifying the role the ego plays in daily life. Otherwise, the self loses preference to the other, also stratifying and thus amplifying the role the ego *should not* play in daily life.

Mass Man as a problem of heteronomy. Instead, then, Guardini's places the problem of *masse* and sets it within what can be called God's *mitsein*: God's being as with His created images in a manner fitting to the form of such images.[314] According to Guardini, the problem of *masse* does not arise so much from *mitsein*, immanently understood; rather, the plight of Mass Man arises, and indeed will continue to arise, whenever form is not acknowledged to exist primarily in relation to the Creator.

4.  Guardini vs Kant and Heidegger: putting God back at the centre of being

The major difference between Kant, Heidegger and Guardini lies in Guardini positing that a true understanding of first principles does not come from the immanent, in the cases of facticity for Heidegger or apriority for Kant, but from an ontology that sees the immanent as subject to creative or transcendental power, and thus a world seen as intrinsically related towards the Creator.[315] The problem therefore of how man is massified through his relations to other beings is, from Guardini's perspective, a problem that starts when man views the world in immanent terms,that is, when man ceases to see the immanent as a sign of the transcendent.

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[314] This issue is strongly Augustinian in that Guardini, like Augustine, is trying to make sense of God's free choice to make man specifically as He did. But it is important to acknowledge, without becoming distracted, that Guardini chooses to denote the plight of the masses under the term heteronomy and not *mitsein*. *Mitsein* has served as a tool to the researcher given its relative contemporaneity to Guardini as opposed to Kant's theory of heteronomy. As to why he makes this choice, this falls beyond the scope of the research.

[315] In this dynamism of relationality, transcendence and immanence have their own validity. Ascertaining the emphasis Guardini places on either concept falls outside of this research, although its earmarked here presently as a worthy but separate research topic.

The setting of this relationship between man and God, wherein man might responsibly involve himself in creation as a response to God's involvement, points to the Scholastic concept of the predication of being, particularly how that predication manifests. The problem of predication in question arises when being loses its proportionality as due to its ultimate cause. This occurs when being is reduced to facticity or apriority, whereby the problem of predication is approached with the understanding that things signify no more than themselves. The question of formal and final causes therefore becomes radically deconstructed. In contrast to this, Augustine in his *Confessions* approaches this problem, but he does so by asking *how does a creature relate to his Creator*? Questioning in this manner, the problem is approached with the acknowledgment that this world can only make sense in light of its maker or ultimate cause. Like Augustine, Guardini holds to this position. Creaturely existence is thus a concept which ensures that man's involvement in the world is proportionate to his ultimate cause.

In pre-Christian times, the question of how things possessed being was a chief problem for thinkers, for instance as Beere relates in *Doing and Being*, Plato's *Sophist* sets out to refute the position of the Giants: "that all being is body"[316], that only bodies have capacity (*dunamis*), and because bodies or matter always change, ontology is basically only the "flux" or movement of matter.[317] For Augustine, his Christian faith elucidated how his being related to God's; and even Plato, and especially Aristotle after him, knew that being was not solely material things with capacity in motion; rather, being according to Aristotle as *ousia* was also *energeiai*, that is, the

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[316] Jonathon Beere, *Doing and Being: An Interpretation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Theta* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 6.
[317] Ibid., 6-8.

actualisation or *heavenly truth* of a thing existing according to its end.[318] Guardini holds to this

ancient position when he states in *WAP* that "[i]n actual fact the person is not only *dunamis* but

being, not only act but form."[319] One must grant that Plato and Aristotle had distinct views on

teleology, transcendentals and substance: the former being strongly religious and "global"[320], as

Beere puts it, and the latter more natural and "local"[321]. Nonetheless, both saw, like Augustine and

specifically Guardini, that the truth of how man practically goes about involving himself with the

world cannot be gained by examination of particular beings, actions, and the immanent generally

speaking, but by how all being is in the first place something formal as *energeiai*, a "capacity in

action"[322] as Guardini states; that is to say, Guardini's position is that human action, or activity in

a general sense, is causally and universally configured by a being distinct from the activity itself.

Guardini's question as to how man might responsibly involve himself in the world of his time finds

relief in the ancient distinction between being and action. Man must conform his activities to the

heavenly truth of being.


a)  Mass Man and the problem of how man predicates his being

Guardini's focus upon predication reveals that at the heart of the problem of *heteros*,

massification, the masses and Mass Man is a problem with how man predicates his being. Under

what name is man universally related? Solely his own? Solely other men? Solely God? Obviously

for Guardini the answers have nuance; but this is the problem that predication in ontology   seeks

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318 Ibid., 14-15.
319 Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 129.
320 Beere, *Doing and Being*, 66.
321 Ibid.
322 Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 168.

to address: in what sense is our being heteronomous, that is, related to other being?[323] Also, it is clear that those ontologies that grant apriority or facticity as the means to answer this question necessarily minimise the need for predication based upon the other-worldly character of "image" that Guardini endorses. Be it by recourse to apriority, facticity or some other misunderstanding of the predicative nature of existence, Guardini holds that man becomes defined in immanent, "purely natural"[324] terms. Thus, this image of man no longer signifies anything beyond this world.

Guardini believes that when this happens collectivist notions of man arise. The fact of man, that is, his immanent existence, takes on a universal or "religious character"[325], which Guardini repeatedly denotes as the "world-spirit" (German, *weltgeist*[326], *weltwesen*[327]).[328] This understanding of man, although still involved in and with the world, because it is immanent and collective, does not encourage the type of responsibility that Guardini intends. This is because man, seen in this way, does not predicate his being beyond his own being. He cannot be acting responsibly if he does not acknowledge whose being he signifies. Even if the world-spirit signifies all that man has ever done, and all that he can and might ever do, in failing to acknowledge the Creator as the Being which makes all this possible, a collectivist notion of man can no more make sense of man than a bundle of sticks can make sense of a stick. This is not true of universality but of mere multiplicity. Creaturely awareness is seeing this distinction between universality and

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[323] For example, Guardini applies his critique of *autos* and *heteros* into the supernatural realm, arguing that even though we are being necessarily dependent upon God's grace, this is not to infer in any way that we are heteronomous beings inasmuch as we are dependent and autonomous inasmuch as we are not. Ibid., 161.
[324] Ibid.
[325] Ibid., 10.
[326] *Welt Und Person*, 20, 22.
[327] Ibid., 186.
[328] *The World and the Person*, 186. Cf. Ibid., 10, 12.

multiplicity, that all being firstly relates to God and then to other beings. Failing to grant the first relation, and due to which concluding that all being points to man, is what the problem of heteronomy consists in. Collectivism between men is what arises to replace what is universal in each man. Mass Man is thus that type of man which sees the collective in immanent yet religious terms, in an effort to posit something universal about man without believing in the universal itself. In this way, Mass Man, because he lacks creaturely awareness, can only make sense of himself by relating to the collective.

The concept of world-spirit is arguably drawn from Hegel's influence upon German academia. According to Guardini, Hegel's conception of *weltgeist* allowed for "the divine [to be] drawn into nature and [to be] equated with its creative depth."[329] Also, Tuttle infers that Hegel's concept of the divine or "absolute" was borrowed from his once Christian faith.[330] So it is clear, for Guardini at least, that Hegel's definition of *weltgeist* initially signified the Christian God (c. 1799, *Spirit of Christianity*), and only later did it come to signify man alone (c. 1807, *Phenomenology of Spirit*). However, in *WAP* Guardini sees the collective as arising from a certain problem occurring within the individual. So how Guardini demonstrates that the autonomous attitude gives birth to *weltgeist* deserves attention: because firstly, according to Tuttle, the concept of the masses finds its "genesis"[331] in Hegel's conception of *weltgeist*;[332] and because secondly, it points to how Mass Man, for Guardini, arises from the autonomous man. In this way, arguably

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[329] Ibid., 13.
[330] Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth: The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, 19.
[331] Ibid., 17.
[332] Ibid., 17-24.

Guardini is positing Kantian autonomy as the earlier genesis of the Masses over its genesis argued to be found according to Tuttle in Hegel's concept of the absolute.

b) *Creatura* as a unifying concept for ancient and modern conceptions of *masse*

It is now apparent that perhaps Guardini understood the term *masse* in two distinct senses. Chapters 1 and 2 it is evident that *masse* was mostly a reference to Augustine's concept of *hyle* before and after he converted to Christianity. Further, it is evident that massification in this sense occurred when created reality became viewed as evil in itself or when man committed himself to non-being. According to Chapter 1, this evil would become 'visible' when objects were fashioned not according to their radical capacity as determined by the Creator, and when men thereby participated in their various possible missuses. Then in Chapter 2, this evil arose within the person when man lost hope in the infinite goodness of his Creator and toyed with the possibility that evil had creative efficacy like God, or worse still, that evil and matter (*hyle*) had the same identity. Both these conceptions of massification were drawn from Augustine's life and thought. But within *WAP* it is seen that Guardini is drawing from much later philosophers such as Kant, Hegel, and Heidegger. However, *WAP* was written as a meditation on Augustine's doctrine.[333] Further, Guardini's usage of *Wirklichkeitsblock* suggests that he is bringing into dialogue Augustine's doctrine on *hyle, massa,* etc with these post-medieval philosophers. However, the primary aim of this Chapter is not to map out the validity and extent of this interpretation; rather, it considers how Guardini's concept of *creatura* resolves what he sees as the problem of the masses in the   senses

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[333] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, viii.

which this research puts forth. Elucidating Guardini's recourse to these theorists serves this aim simply by answering the question in the terms that Guardini used.

5.   Mass Man as a consequence of the autonomous attitude

Now it is important to illustrate how Guardini sees Mass Man as a consequence of the autonomous attitude. Firstly, while Tuttle sees Hegel as the seminal expositor of the theory of the masses, Guardini sees Kant as the seminal expositor of the autonomous individual, whose contrast to heteronomous being renders as mass the being in question.[334] But how does autonomy cause the massification, and how does this process detract from creaturely awareness? By way of negation, a discussion of these questions show how creaturely awareness resolves the problem of Mass Man.

Through Kant's view on apriority, man can achieve his potential by making categorical, universal judgments without pointing to an extrinsic universal cause of either the category or the judgment. This ties up man's quest for being into his own being, since the faculty that conforms his judgements to existence comes from non-predicable or subjective, transcendental knowledge. The artefacts, which for Guardini typify man's autonomy - personality, nature and culture – become entirely self-referential, numinous, and eventually religious.[335] Guardini states that "[a]utonomy means an existing in itself… [an] absolute validity of the subject"[336]. In this way,

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[334] Ibid., 9.
[335] Ibid., 10.
[336] Ibid., 9.

his criticism that autonomous existence is *Wirklichkeitsblock* makes perfect sense, for this type of man holds that he has *absolutely* all he needs within him to live a full life. Modern man sees himself, in terms of his "possibility of knowing, of passing moral judgements, etc"[337], as the progenitor of his own potential. This would be true if man were not a created being, that is, were the cause of his own potential. For this reason, the block of reality that is modern man, and subsequently that which autonomous man makes of his existence, is in a way made from borrowed ontological property.

The foregoing summarises Guardini's position regarding the being of the autonomous individual. Now, regarding how this *Wirklichkeitsblock* views heteronomy: if the essential function of the human form can be executed without reference to anything objective, and tied to executing this function is certitude of a full life, then how concerned could such a man be for non-*a priori* or heteronomous being? Further, Guardini's interprets this to apply to other people, not just things. In this way, concerning yourself with the being of others is considered for the autonomous individual to be a life ill-spent.[338] The surest route to fulfilling one's potential is through use of pure reason. Everything besides is of a lesser, practical importance.

Within this mindset, Guardini states there are two types of realities: "[t]here is the "thing in itself" [*Ding an sich*] and the mass [*Menge*] of things in themselves."[339] What is seen here is

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[337] Ibid., 10.
[338] Ibid., 26.
[339] Ibid., 64. The German reads, "[e]s gibt das "Ding an sich" und die Menge der Dinge an sich." *Welt Und Person*, 72.

Guardini categorising existence into two opposed categories, from which, subsequently, a twofold interpretation can be made. Firstly, according to the translator, here Guardini is equating *Menge* with the concept of heteronomy.[340] The above passage draws a connection between phenomenal and mass existence. As both lack significant content, both await from man their assigned purpose. This follows because the "thing in itself", as noumena, is unknowable, leaving man to work out his existence with that which remains; which, for the autonomous individual, is viewed as "*Menge*", phenomena, or the masses.

Secondly, *Ding an sich* and *Menge* can be seen, respectively, according to the categories of and relationship between *act and potential*. Whenever something formally exists the metaphysician would say that entity exists in actuality; whereas when something lacks form it is said to exist in potential, awaiting actualisation from the imprinting of form. Matter-in-general or *mass* is a material entity of this kind. This formulation agrees with how Guardini views the idealist apriorism of the autonomous thinker: he/she implants form onto objects, and so actualises them; and that onto which he or she implants form is said, by Guardini, to be *mass*. Hence, borne out of autonomy is a realism that views self as act and non-self as potential. Mass is simply that other type of reality, which is beyond the self, that exists for the instrumental benefit of the self. Thus, to be Mass Man under this condition means that you are not a *Ding an sich*, for you await actualisation in the same way as matter-in-general. To be Mass Man according to the above

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[340] Here I acknowledge the translation assistance of Sr Mary Luka.

dichotomy means to forever lack intrinsic form, and thereby forever be dependent upon it being extrinsically granted to you.

a) Conceptual vs concrete existence of Mass Man

You would note that the foregoing analysis does not demonstrate the daily and practical existence of Mass Man. Rather, it focuses upon what conception of metaphysics is needed to justify his existence. But in this work, Guardini infers the plight of Mass Man by showing metaphysically how the autonomous mindset necessarily has power over heteronomous reality in the same way that form has power over matter. Guardini's recourse to creaturely awareness is a way to bridge the divide between *Ding an sich* and *Menge der Dinge an sich*, for the fact of our createdness creates a common ontology upon which autonomy and heteronomy can, subsequently, peacefully coexist, and thereby end the cultural power struggle between form and matter. Indeed, this common ontology seeks to end this struggle by advancing the thesis that, as all being is *creatura*, all is of equal dignity, regardless of which entity you are.[341] So although Mass Man is not treated directly within *WAP,* in the context of his works already discussed, his portrayal of the autonomous person as *Wirklichkeitsblock* is a concept that begs a positive and concrete explanation of the plight of Mass Man. This explanation belongs to the following Chapter wherein it is discussed according to the primary text, *The End of The Modern World*.[342]

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[341] The manner in which Guardini blends metaphysics with imagination allows for concrete things to be expressed in metaphysical terms, and for metaphysical truths to be expressed in concrete terms.

[342] Currently, therefore, we are prescinding from this positive analysis by instead focusing upon how Mass Man is conceptually conceived within the man who sees himself in non-predicable, self-sufficient terms.

Within the *Wirklichkeitsblock* passage, the prefix "does not exist", has the same negating effect as the *Seinsklötzen* passage in *COA*: man is "no series of mute lumps of being, no blind mechanical unrolling, but a meaningful succession of 'words'"[343]. In this statement from *WAP*, however, Guardini is not only posing a defence against "perverted"[344] or illicit autonomy, but also against its perverted offspring, heteronomy.[345] Later in *WAP* Guardini states:

> [a]gainst what is this man defending himself when he does not wish to be seen by God? Against the other — the heteros. He does not wish to be heteronomous, and in this he is as much right as he is wrong when he wishes to be autonomous. In relation to God, heteronomy is just as wrong as autonomy. My self cannot subsist under the power of another, not even if this other is God. Indeed, then least of all. This is so, not because my own person is perfect and therefore cannot endure the ascendancy of the other, but just because it is not perfect. Just because my self is not securely and truly poised in itself, the force of the other's presence becomes a danger. This may manifest itself as insecurity, fear, constraint, but also as the opposite of these, which is rebellion.[346]

Here, the "does not exist" passage shows the dialectical conflict between autonomy and heteronomy. To be clear however, Guardini is discussing an anthropological problem by framing it in its ultimate context as a relational problem between Creator and creation.[347] By way of metaphor, Guardini sees this state of human existence as a "kind of tetanus [*Starrkrampf*][348] in which the world suffocates."[349] Here the parallel Guardini is drawing between the solidity of a block, the lock-jaw caused by tetanus bacteria, and the impending death if a cure is not

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[343] Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 91.
[344] "The gift of existence is filled with the value of true createdness, but carries with it the terrible possibility of perverting [*verkehren*] this true createdness into the self-satisfaction of autonomy." *The World and the Person*, 24.
[345] Translation assistance advises that *verkehren* has the connotation of illicitness. *Welt Und Person*, 35.
[346] *The World and the Person*, 35.
[347] A survey of the discourse reveals that Guardini is using theological anthropology as the exemplar for his subsequent philosophical anthropology.
[348] "Die "Autonomie" ist ein Starrkrampf, in welcham die Welt erstickt." Guardini, *Welt Und Person*, 33.
[349] *The World and the Person*, 204.

administered, can be seen. The figurative difference here between being autonomous, being mortally paralysed, and the perverted speech that would result (i.e., through locked jaws) is slim. Also in comparison to the *Seinsklötzen* passage from Chapter 2, the difference between lock-jaw and muteness is slim: the voice of the former has been paralysed due to his excessive, rigid, even narcissistic identity; and the latter muted due to having no identity at all.

b) *Autos vs Heteros*: a dialectic attempt at subjugation

According to Guardini, this conflict between *autos* and *heteros* has its interpersonal genesis in the former's *attempt* to subjugate the latter for fear of others ascending beyond him. However, it really appears Guardini is speaking metaphysically, not specifically, in reference to whom is the cause of that fear. In other words, it is a problem of ontology or being, not ontics or beings, whereby the rejection of *heteros* is best understood.

According to the previous passage from *WAP* this ascendency is sought not without a struggle against metaphysical law and "the force of the other's presence"[350] by virtue of this law. As all being exists as a composite of form and matter, man cannot be autonomous without attempting to excoriate the form of the opposition. Without this attempt it cannot be said that the former exists intrinsically and the latter exists extrinsically. Thus, the heteronomous attitude is the unhappy but inevitable perception that forms by the proliferation of the autonomous attitude asserting its superiority, in a such a way as to practically deny the intrinsic existence the    former

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[350] Ibid., 35.

truly has. "He or I"[351] is how Guardini puts it in simplest, dialectical terms. Guardini, however, does not follow Hegelian form and pose a synthesis, that is, he does not pose something as a resolution involving a mixture of what autonomy is and what heteronomy is; rather, he keeps at the forefront of the discourse their perversity, on the worldly stage, as a symptom of its perversity on the metaphysical stage. The *attempt by force* therefore amounts to a scenario of a serious perversion to metaphysical law.

Man was not made to detest others. As all men are creatures, and unlike the scenario above, man has no essential opposition to other men. *Creatura* serves as guarantor for ontological equality against the proliferation of the autonomous mindset. Hence the problem of "He or I" is not dialectically, internally or anthropocentrically resolvable for Guardini. Given, therefore, that this problem is pertinent, and that the problem is not resolvable, points to a concrete problem man experiences. The attitude towards the masses that Hitler, Goebbels and others promoted, and the innumerable atrocities that resulted due to this, need only be recalled; and from the present the state of increasing social dependency upon technological devices. Both instrumentalise people to the exclusion of their own potential. Indeed, it is from Guardini examining the world that he has learned of this struggle between *autos* and *heteros*, and that due to which he has learnt of the plight of Mass Man.

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[351] Ibid., 28.

Guardini states that "[h]e or I" on its own is an irreconcilable dialectal loop, wherein *heteros*, God especially, is viewed with increasing "insecurity, fear, constraint"[352], even "rebellion"[353]. Others become a log in one's eye (Mt 7:5), a stone in one's heel, which is to say, a stumbling block to actualisation as a defence mechanism against admitting that logs and stones have value regardless of whether people value them. Guardini states that the only way to break this cycle is through love, which he defines as a cleared "space in which the person's capacity of serving as his own purpose can be realized"[354]. One has a choice between being opposed to another for love of self or being open to another for love of them. Heteronomous existence is born whenever the self does not act and make room, so to speak, for the presence of others; that is to say, whenever the self remains impassive and ignores acknowledging the potential that others, like them, have. Conversely, creaturely awareness exhibits ontological openness towards others. It encourages one towards affirmative action since all things exist according to the same standard of being. Those stuck in a heteronomous existence might not reach out in this way since affirmative action is not natural to them.

Autonomous existence is a life closed off to others. To continue living this way unchanged only leads to every increasing exertions of autonomy, an extreme of which Guardini sees in Nietzsche's declamation against the divine *heteros* – "God is dead!"[355] Further, he who lives by this norm, though to himself he becomes an icon of super-human (*Übermenschen*[356]) and religious

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[352] Ibid., 27.
[353] Ibid.
[354] Ibid., 127.
[355] Ibid., 28.
[356] *Welt Und Person*, 88.

veneration, lives as though *heteros* is nothing or "dead" to him.[357] In this declamation, the divine *heteros* is robbed of value not only due to some ontological judgment about the other, but precisely because he *is* the other.

c) Mass Man as victim: where man is the first principle of being

Indeed, this is the perverse *Haltung* out of which Mass Man is born, an attitude that, according to the definitions given, supports the following hypothesis:

> *Because your being is not mine, it cannot have value apart from its relation to me. For if you did have value, you would have to be me. But because you are not me I cannot accept that your being has any other value. So since you have no other value, in not being me, it follows that I, the one with value, am the principle by which your being and value are determined. Determined in no other way, I become your being's first principle.*

This statement shows how far the problem and plight of Mass Man can go according to the theory set forth in *WAP*. What it shows for our purposes is that autonomy, bereft of a common, creaturely ontology through which the Creator, the true first principle of being, value and relationality, results at once in the autonomous super-man being able to conceive himself as a quasi-first principle, and the heteronomous Mass Man as victim to this conception.

Paradoxically, this despotic relationship is only possible because the superman, like everyone else, is part of the created order. He is powerless inasmuch as the world does not signify

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[357] *The World and the Person*, 28.

him. All that remains, tragically, is a committed hatred towards how the world is somehow unable to conform to his will. The question can be asked: *does he resort to despotism in an attempt to exist in relation to others in the same way that the Creator actually can towards his creation, that is, with total power over all things?* It seems that Guardini would answer in the affirmative. The plight of Mass Man arises when man cannot accept his value as part of creation, but rather asserts himself in an attempt to be like the Creator, that is, to be the first principle or determiner of another's being.

6. The difference between creaturely and perverted heteronomy

In Chapter 2 it was argued how Guardini in COA saw massification as a symptom of the heteronomous *Haltung*. Due to this and the foregoing discussion of *autos* and *heteros*, and having defended their connection, it can be shown how *heteros* is a consequence of *autos*. To do this, some context will be given regarding how heteronomy has the potential to be, or not be, an authentic human attitude. This is important so there is no confusion between creaturely and perverted heteronomy.

Firstly, Guardini in Chapter 2 of *WAP* asserts that God is not heteronomous to man.[358] His argument reveals the difference between creaturely and perverted heteronomy. Guardini holds that

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[358] "When God creates a finite being, He does not set another beside Himself, as, for example, the mother brings forth the new human being in such a way that it now exists beside her. This happens only because the basic cause of existence for the mother as well as for the child does not lie in her, but both belong to an existence which embraces both and through which both come from the same ultimate beginning. The mother does not create the child but serves the order of life and the will of God that operates therein. But God creates man. The

*heteros* is not a valid attitude to be held towards God as Nietzsche asserts, which ultimately has "no meaning"[359] in this sense. Although he agrees that the "self cannot subsist under the power of another, not even if this other is God"[360], later he states that "[t]he thought, the feeling, that sees in God the overpowering "other" [indicates] primarily an error in thought and a mistaken feeling, which [disguises]…the real rebellion against God, in order that this may appear as justified self-preservation."[361] The difference in the two statements subtly turns upon the concept of power: if God's relation to man is one which does not primarily consist in ontological analogy, but instead exists through exertion of will from God upon man, then indeed there is no ontology between creature and Creator on the basis of which the former receives measure and form, its significant content or its being, and due to which finds direction in practical, daily life; instead, the use of power in the absence of analogy, necessitates force from one to the other, thus justifying Guardini's remark as to how God can, in this way, be viewed as heteronomous to man, and how man might rebel against Him.

Thus the rebellion of the superman towards God does not consist in self-assertion; rather, it consists more fundamentally in the error that finds no ontological analogy between God and man. Guardini asserts that such an attitude, in its absolute form, can only belong to a "lunatic".[362] Creaturely awareness, states Guardini, is only possible when such lunacy is acknowledged and

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creative energy of His act makes me to be myself. Because he turns to me with the evocative power of His love I become myself and exist as myself. My special character is rooted in Him, not in myself. When God beholds me it is not as when a man looks upon another man, a finished being regarding another finished being, but the glance of God creates me. The concept of the "other" has no meaning here." Ibid., 30.

[359] Ibid.

[360] Ibid., 27.

[361] Ibid., 29.

[362] Ibid.

avoided.[363] Without holding to the analogy of being, it follows that God would be *heteros*, for He exists without relation to man. In having no relation, God is thus man's opposition. As well, it follows that man would be *autos*, for he can exist self-sufficiently, even if such a life becomes an unending battle against other beings. Guardini posits creaturely awareness as that transcendental reality which gives likeness to creatures from uncreated being. God is no longer *heteros*, but the Creator. Due to this, man is no longer *autos* or *heteros*, but a creature. In understanding *autos* and *heteros* in this way, these concepts exhibit a perversion of the analogy of being when they seek to classify being other than as creature/Creator. *Self* and *other* become, therefore, incommunicable yet absolute and immanent categories of being.

a) Hell is other people: Sartre and creaturely ontology[364]

Sartre's play, *No Exit* (1944),[365] exemplifies the disastrous anthropological consequences when *autos* and *heteros* replace creaturely awareness. "Hell is - other people!"[366], a character in that play states famously. This should be taken as an axiom against creaturely awareness in the same way that Guardini refers to Nietzsche's phrase, "God is dead!"[367]. Sartre's statement recapitulates what Guardini years earlier cautioned against within *WAP*, that is, to avoid an

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[363] Ibid.

[364] This section can be read in conjunction with Pieper's essay on *Creatureliness and Human nature: reflections on the philosophical method of Jean-Paul Sartre*. See - Josef Pieper, For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006). eBook. 82-86.

[365] Jean-Paul Sartre, *No Exit, and Three Other Plays*, Vintage International ed. (New York: Vintage International, 1989).

[366] Ibid., 45.

[367] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 28.

ontology which, in a very concrete and practical sense, severs the here and now, or the immanent, from the hereafter or transcendent.[368]

In this section within *WAP* Guardini states that "[m]an's understanding of creation and his own self-knowledge depends upon [the] realization" that between God and man being is analogous, and due to this, being is held in common between men.[369] Sartre's axiom that "hell is other people" is helpful in understanding the ultimate consequence of admitting no common ontology between men. In blindness to what Beere has characterised as the "heavenly truth"[370] of being in which man participates, arguably Guardini is stating that ignorance or denial of *imago dei* causes the destruction of love, of toleration, of anything heavenly, from the face of the earth.[371] In this way, Hell becomes identical to other people.[372]

But what further from Sartre can be derived in seeing other-being as hell? Sartre scholar Jonathon Webber relates two key statements, both by Sartre himself, in his essay *There is Something About Inez.*[373] First, "other people are basically the most important means we have in

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[368] This is not to be construed that Sartre exhibited no care for the world in his writings.

[369] It follows that a creaturely ontology also serves as a basis for substantiating the import of natural law theory into discourses pertaining to human rights.

[370] Beere, *Doing and Being*, 14-15.

[371] Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 29.

[372] This position is broadly consistent with Guardini's statement from *The End of The Modern World* that, due to anthropocentricism, the places of being – heaven, hell, the world – once given measure by God, have lost this kind of measure. Furthermore, as man becomes the answer to man's quest for being, man becomes the measure of being for these places. It follows, then, that the nature of hell can also be understood in purely anthropocentric terms. In this Guardinian way, hell can become other people. *The End of the Modern World*, 45.

[373] Jonathan Webber, "There Is Something About Inez," *Think* 10, no. 27 (2011). Still, Webber admits that the precise meaning of the play is open to interpretation the most popular of which Webber nevertheless refutes, that the characters are in hell. For instance Webber states in relation to a more authentic translation of Sartre's play that, "[t]he differences

ourselves for our own knowledge of ourselves"[374]; and second, "if my relations are bad, I am situating myself in a total dependence on someone else. And then I am indeed in hell."[375] Although it is less obvious than what it really seems, the interpretation Sartre provides to his own statement, that hell is other people, does not invalidate coupling his axiom with that of Nietzsche as those against creaturely awareness. This is because his rationale for why hell *is not necessarily* other people still logically implies, more fundamentally, the anthropocentric tenet that existence provides essence. As to the first statement, the self is given supremacy; as others are means, so the self is the end. As well, when he says that "we have *in ourselves* [emphasis added]", others here become a projection within the self. Thus, even when Sartre speaks of others optimistically, the self still provides its own essence to these projections despite its concerning, almost parasitical appreciation of others. As to the second statement, Sartre still admits that hell can be other people if those relations become un-useful to the self. Thus, hell remains at least potentially other people whenever one attempts to define another's essence in the Sartrean practice of defining one's own existence. In this bifurcation, there is no common ontology between *autos* and *heteros*.


Sartre's argument, that existence provides essence, is perhaps his most fundamental philosophical stance. In his framework, existence cannot be enacted for others, only to ourselves. Man can only live his own life. Due to this, like the bronze statue Garcin holds in *No Exit*,[376]   all

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between these titles suggest different interpretations of the play." Onward he states that, "[p]erhaps [the characters of the play] are not intended to be in hell at all, but rather in purgatory…" ibid., 49.
[374] Ibid., 47.
[375] Ibid.
[376] "This brone. [*Strokes it thoughtfully.*] Yes, now's the moment; I'm looking at this thing on the mantelpiece, and I understand that I'm in hell. I tell you, everything's been thought out beforehand. They knew I'd stand at the fireplace stroking this thing of bronze, with all those eyes intent on me. Devouring me. [*He swings round abruptly.*] What? Only two of you? I thought there were more; many more. [*Laughs.*] So this is hell. I'd never have believed it. You

else is hell to him. *Heteros* is in total enmity to *autos* for only the latter is appropriate to one's own existence. In this way, what Guardini proffers as a unifying principle – the fact and awareness of creation – Sartre arguably finds no value in it. This is because in Guardini's framework humans find happiness, not hell, when one reaches beyond oneself for existential fulfillment, be it to God, men or anything real. Against Sartre, Guardini would say, *yes, heaven is other people for we all share our essence as creatures of God.*

b) Representational loneliness: a psychological corollary to a metaphysical position

Nowhere in Guardini's writings does he cast aside *self* and *other* as if to say they are entirely perverted concepts. Instead, simply, Guardini defines each term negatively through the tension and interaction of opposites. Here, therefore, it is appropriate to explain their positive existence within Guardini's thought. To do so, Bering's psychology essay on social cognition, titled *Why Hell is Other People*, will be used to draw out the significance of Sartre's famous statement, "Hell is - other people!"[377]. The essay relates two aspects relevant to Guardini's discussion of heteronomy: innate and pathological. As to the question of innateness, the heteronomous attitude exists in man in terms of his capacity to be aware of others (as young as the age of 4, says Bering).[378] As to heteronomy being pathological, heteronomy would probably be seen by Bering as "[e]pistemic social anxiety"[379], which he defines as a generalised "negative affective state that is associated

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remember all we were told about the torture-chambers, the fire and brimstone, the "burning marl." Old wives' tales! There's no need for red-hot pokers. Hell is – other people!" Sartre, *No Exit, and Three Other Plays*, 45.
[377] Ibid.
[378] Jesse M Bering, "Why Hell Is Other People: Distinctively Human Psychological Suffering," *Review of General Psychology* 12, no. 1 (2008): 3.
[379] Ibid., 4.

with someone else knowing about – or threatening to know about – the self's undesirable attitudes. This includes…moral offenses, questionable intentions, embarrassing foibles, or even physical defects."[380] In specific, this *heteronomous pathology* can be seen as an aggressive form of what Bering calls "representational loneliness"[381], which "occurs when the awareness of other minds comes into conflict with the awareness that the self can never be understood by others in its totality because it can never be experienced by anyone else."[382] It is opposite to the colloquial definition of loneliness in that "[representational loneliness] is exacerbated by the presence of others."[383]

But there is hope for such people, says Bering. If together they can get "on "the same page", they [can] perceive a convergence of intentions that reduces epistemic anxiety"[384] . In such moments, others are not perceived as alien or *heteros*; they are perceived as other, but more precisely as kin. Feelings of commonality, likeness or mutuality are therefore experienced. Thus the innate capacity to be aware of others is on one hand *satisfied* when others are perceived as kin but *frustrated* when others are perceived as alien. Due to the latter, the pathology arises. Without saying it in so many words, Bering seems to be inferring that, at least as within his discipline of psychology, that to be allonomous belongs to a normal or innate human desire to belong; whereas its pathology is abnormal since it involves "suffering"[385], specifically an awareness of the reality of others without finding likeness to them. Such suffering comes to the subject at the hands of *heteros* due to the former feeling threatened by the being of the latter. But this is only possible due

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[380] Ibid.
[381] Ibid., 6.
[382] Ibid.
[383] Ibid.
[384] Ibid.
[385] Ibid.

to heteronomy being innate to man. To put it another way: be it "representational loneliness" for Bering, or struggle or opposition for Guardini, it can only exist in someone by virtue of them sharing a common capacity towards mutual openness, even if he/she subsequently perceives no likeness in what he/she perceives.

Bering's argument regarding pathology resembles how Guardini discusses heteronomy in the earlier passages. As to innateness, it resembles Guardini's concept of allonomy from *COA*. Respectively, one despairs of the other while the other remains hopeful. By this distinction, it confirms what Guardini means by both terms: the former is a sickness or perversion of the latter precipitated by the attitude that one's being is equivocal to others. *They are called men, but I'm nothing like them*, such an individual might think. Heteronomy in this extreme, Sartrean form, is a despair about human nature (this is, after all, part of Sartre's main thesis, to give up in believing in a common human nature). On the other hand, Guardini wishes to dispel the opposition of "He or I" by elucidating the origins of heteronomous *ennui* – the autonomous super-man[386]. Someone who conflates his existence with his essence can become extremely autonomous, because such an individual has no concept – even if looking back to Kant – of a common human ontology. Hence opinion can become normative, or more broadly, thought can become reality, since the transcendent is at once the immanent. The autonomous man attempts to be equally both. For Guardini, the problem of heteronomy is very real; it is a concrete, real-world problem. Such unhappy individuals exist due to the proliferation of the autonomous attitude. But to Guardini, in

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[386] "This we see in Nietzsche's doctrine of the super-man." Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 79. Cf. *Welt Und Person*, 88.

the initial stage when *autos* conceives of and finds animosity with *heteros*, they are mostly the same people. This is possible because both attitudes, according to Guardini, are proper to the human form, thus are able to cohere in the same person. Guardini's tendency is never to speak quantifiably of 'these autonomous men and those heteronomous women'. They belong to each other as a living tension between cause and effect. Due to this, their inherent conflict is not only a stratified sociological problem as it is an inherently ontological one, because the conflict originates within the understanding and execution of one's human capacity.

7.  *Creatura*: a reality that breaks a vicious cycle

Granted that autonomy begets heteronomy, and that the latter attitude is projected by the former individual onto other individuals, this draws into focus the actual, positive existence of Mass Man. Like Victor Frankenstein's creation, at no point is the conception of others *as heteronomous* a happy one; that is, the autonomous man has conceived him, out of fear, and placed him, as it were, on the other side of an impassable ontological gulf. Moreover, like Frankenstein's monster, the heteronomous individual, whose being is equivocal to the autonomous, possesses inferior dignity. Likewise, the autonomous individual would detest any heteronomy within him. Thus, the autonomous grounding of self becomes ever finer, unto the point of a sword, when autonomy admits no kinship with people nor a commonality to the manifold elements of reality. But a creaturely *Haltung* provides this for it is the ultimate affirmation of and grounding for kinship. Unlike Frankenstein's monster, nothing is monstrous, alien or heteronomous that is appropriate to creation. Creaturely awareness is therefore a sufficient practice to resolve the problem of heteronomous or Mass existence.

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## 8. Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Guardini exhibits lenience and concern towards the concept of heteronomy applied to humans and that concept's import into a definition of Mass Man. For the autonomous individual, *heteros* is conceived as alien and monstrous. Nowhere in *WAP* or his other writings does Guardini cast aside as *heteros* so defined, this very concept of *heteros*, as in the case of the autonomous individual. Instead, Guardini resolves the mistaken dialectic between *autos* and *heteros* by again crying out for creaturely awareness, found in concepts such as analogous being and *imago dei*. It is evident that although Guardini sees heteronomous existence as an illicit form of creaturely relationality or allonomy, he nonetheless exhibits towards this concept an affirmation arguably absent in his critique of autonomy. So when Guardini writes regarding the autonomous man that he "…does not exist as an enclosed block of reality or a self-sufficient figure evolving from within, without"[387], he is actually inferring his critique of Mass Man as an ontologically dependent being, and his project, found in the following Chapter, to ennoble Mass Man through a common ontology so defined as creaturely awareness. Thus through an understanding of man as *creatura* which Guardini posits, the problem of heteronomy – wrought through a mistaken dialectic whereby man replaces the Creator as the principle of being – is resolved.

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[387] *The World and the Person*, viii.

CHAPTER 4

*Das Ende der Neuzuit* (1950)

or

The End of The Modern World [*EMW*] (1965)


1. Introduction


Out of all Guardini's work this research has treated, the thesis of *EMW*, that the dawning age of Mass Man must needs be brought to relief under a Christian worldview, demonstrably aligns with the researcher's own position. This chapter focuses upon the positive existence of Mass Man and argues that his plight is primarily a symptom of a loss of "orientation" within a world built by the autonomous individual who has made himself the measure of all things.  Mass Man is he whose law stems from this dominion. According to Krieg, *EMW* was written to assist the German people to "rebuild their lives after the Third Reich."[388] This historical context serves as particulars out of which the nature and more universal problem of Mass Man is defined and discussed. Recourse to theorists such a Kant, Heidegger, Chakotin, Kierkegaard and Grundtvig aid in contrasting creaturely awareness from this man-centred world; wherein historical manifestations occur as that proper to a pervasive, underpinning idolatrous attitude or *Haltung* that Guardini calls "the spirit of the North"; and which opposes itself to finding orientation through the practise of creaturely awareness.

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[388] *The End of the Modern World*, 171.

Instead of being *phyrama* in the hands of Creator (Rom 9:21), this chapter argues that man is as mass in the hands of the autonomous individual, the extreme of which Guardini calls "the Superman". In his hands, matter misunderstood as pure passive potency is transformed into technology, into artefacts that ignore form; resembling the mind and reinforcing the sovereignty of the autonomous individual. Hence the way that matter relates to the autonomous spirit is paramount, and due to which is given focus; revealing the relationship between the autonomous worldview and technology; serving to illustrate the plight of the masses and the eclipse of *creatura* due to a mistaken concept of form; and instantiating the call to wisdom Guardini makes to his reader.

A choice, therefore, of either technological or creaturely awareness is put before Mass Man by Guardini as what is ultimately the image of man. The import of this choice is not academic; rather, by Guardini's estimation it points towards *a crisis situation*, that of Kierkegaard's concept of the temptation towards existential despair.[389] Mass Man must take up "poverty" and let go of his bond to technology. Mass Man has the choice to either see himself as an image of the Creator,

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[389] Cf. Nisbet, *The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought*, 242-43. According to Nisbet's estimation of Kierkegaard's crisis of despair cannot be completely compared to Guardini, for in the latter there is a consistent element of hope when discussing the plight of Mass Man. This hope is perhaps due to Guardini's Catholic belief in the sacramentality of nature, a feature lacking in Kierkegaard's anti-authoritarian, Christo-centric flavour of religious belief. For example, Guardini states that, "[t]he new nature of Mass Man is beyond our common experience. If experienced by a few here and there, it is done in an enigmatic way through an order of things to which man cannot speak. There may be possibilities for fresh experience within the new nature. The tasks facing man might imply that the boundaries of his experience can be extended, that an immense universe of reality formerly unexperienced in its effects was no being opened to man." Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 71.
Cf. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 31-32. In contrasting Guardini to Kierkegaard, Krieg observes that, "[w]hile accepting Kierkegaard's understanding of personal existence in relation to God, Guardini did not adopt a hard distinction between religion and Christian faith…he observes that Protestants dialectical theologians in general and Kierkegaard in particular have spoken of a radical discontinuity…between natural religious experience and Christian belief, when in fact the two, though distinct, relate to each other as opposites."

or to continue his life in the image of man. To espouse creaturely awareness in this way relieves, therefore, the plight of Mass Man.

2. Mass Man, the autonomous individual and the spirit of the North

   a) The North: a people who claimed divine right, power over things and man

The North is a key term within Guardini's writings that signifies the pagan spirituality of the Norse (northern) people which the German Reich took up in its pursuit and justification of its *mastery* over nature.[390] It is an inductive term firmly pointing to the cultural adherence of certain metaphysical and spiritual maxims. Hence it is not meant to be obtuse or poetic. In living through this time, Guardini made the distinction between the maxim's *historical manifestation*, through German Nazism, and its essential attitude or *Haltung* (Chapter 2). The autonomous worldview encapsulates this *Haltung*, that such a man is so great that he claims the power to assign purpose to nature, to other things and men. The spirit of the North in both senses of the term signify man's pursuit of an unwarranted dominion. Both historically and essentially, man and nature are set against their created form by becoming reduced to the purely instrumental in its service to he/she who has dominion. Those over whom this dominion or power is exercised are the masses. It is not merely a pragmatic power, but one drawn from a mistaken ontology, where man and nature are not already normatively and intrinsically rendered by virtue of *creatura*; rather, the powerful   do

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[390] For General reading on the pagan roots of Nazism: Nicholas Clarke-Goodrick, *The Occult Roots of Nazism*, 2004 ed. (Tauris Parke Paperbacks, 1985); Nicholas Goodrick-Clarke, *Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Politics of Identity* (New York, UNITED STATES: NYU Press, 2001). I credit Krieg for highlighting how Guardini saw German Nazism as a form neo-paganism. Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 125. The link between "the North" and Kierkegaard's conception of the individual and his polemic against the crowd is an element consist to with his writings for a Norwegian readership. Søren Kierkegaard, *Two Ages: The Age of Revolution and the Present Age : A Literary Review*, ed. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, 2009 ed., Kierkegaard's Writings (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), vii, 120, 22, 65.

violence to *creatura*: they assign to things their purpose as if their power made them creators, gods, and their subjects to be clay, fashioned as their masters would see fit. So reference to the North is a way for Guardini to argue that massification will always be a historical problem so long as the autonomous worldview endures.[391]

As argued in Chapter 1, masses in themselves, understood as creation, are good. Further, as argued in Chapter 2 it is argued that the problem of evil can never amount to "creative efficacy" and so encroach upon the intrinsic goodness of creation. Rather, it is when the masses fashioned contrary to how they are created that their perversion comes about; and when it is sought to make them exist primarily in relation to the autonomous person, not primarily in relation to God. In this relation, man becomes the progenitor of man inasmuch as his purpose, through power, can be extrinsically assigned. Mass Man is he who suffers this relation, this imposition of purpose. Hence Guardini provocatively defines Mass Man in *The End of the Modern World* (*EMW*) as he "who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous"[392] . This is a key, crucial passage from *EMW* which deserves special focus.

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[391] Guardini's diagnosis of the plight of the Mass Man makes the matter a more serious problem than Mehl admits. It is essentially that sociality as it stands has become a contrary to created form. It necessitates, from the ground up, from being to action, a re-evaluation and appraisal of what Mass Man needs in order to live with dignity. Peter J. Mehl, *Thinking through Kierkegaard: Existential Identity in a Pluralistic World* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2005).
[392] The full passage reads: "[s]harpest evidence for the denial of the older idea of personality comes with that human type – who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous – the Mass Man." Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 58. The autonomous and heteronomous individual are thus at extremity to each other by way of each type denying the existential validity of the other type. "Extremity" is not a spacial reference; it is to denote contrariety in each type's living pattern. Further, it would seem that by "type" Guardini is making a veiled reference to Nietzsche. As this goes beyond the scope of our research, nevertheless it would be worthwhile to further understand Mass Man through the lens of *Typus*. Jünger, Hemming, and Costea, *The Worker: Dominion and Form*, xxvii; Scott Jenkins, "Nietzsche's Use of Monumental History," *The Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 45, no. 2 (2014).

b) Mass Man: he who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous

*WAP* elucidates what Guardini means here by "extreme pole". First, by "extreme" he means to infer *difference*, not *distance*. Hence by extreme he means that each type of person is so different in their existential attitude that seemingly their only common characteristic is that both live on the same planet. Second, by "pole" Guardini is creating an image where their difference is apparent to the point that the only feature that prevents an impression of ontological contrariety – an impossibility since evil does not have creative efficacy – is the fact that all are persons in the same world. Thirdly, all of creation exists in relation to its creator. This endures despite the existence of massification.[393] Guardini calls the outer pole of this relation the cosmos or "Empyrean"[394], and the inner pole of this relation the indwelling of God in man's soul.[395] Between the outer and inner poles Guardini positions the world wherein relation to the immanent and transcendent is played out.[396] In this world exists Mass Man and the autonomous individual. But Guardini states that Mass Man finds the autonomous worldview "inimical"[397] and so "refuses

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[393] Although Guardini in some parts of *The World and Person* and *The Conversion of Augustine* speaks of the world objectively, by the fact that man is a rational creature he is thus endowed with personhood making himself his own centre upon the world. For example: "Besides, we are not concerned with the astronomical but with the existential world, whose centre is always the person who enquires about it. Where I am, is the center of the world." Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 55.

[394] "In the Empyrean, however, God reigned publicly as the high Lord of all things; within the depths of the human soul He dwelt inwardly and privately. Both were "places" transcending the two farthest poles of reality…" *The End of the Modern World*, 12. "In order to see the interior and that which is within as clearly as possible, we must start from that which is outermost. We could, for instance, begin with the special limits of the universe and seeks its center, an attempt which resulted in the ancient view of the world." *The World and the Person*, 54-55. And elsewhere: "[w]e do not immediately attain to a clear consciousness of these two places [above and within]…It is of this that St. Augustine speaks when he says in his *Confessions* that he had seen above his soul the absolute light, but that this "above" was not like that of oil above water or sky above the earth, but like the relation of the creative power to the created object. This boundary is fixed by the power which is "higher" than the world because it has created the world." Ibid., 72-73.

[395] "medieval man had to allow his spirit to think of "something" lying beyond the innermost side of that frontier of "inner finiteness"—a not-something and yet a something—the "place of God," Who has crossed over and come into the world, into man's soul as Immanence." *The End of the Modern World*, 12.

[396] *The World and the Person*, 55.

[397] *The End of the Modern World*, 58.

to grant that the autonomous subject is the measure of human perfection."[398] Despite this, from Chapter 3 it is shown who caused whom and the inherent enmity the former has for the latter due to their *equivocity of being*. Also, the type of man is shown who is responsible for furnishing the concrete living condition of Mass Man. As he interacts more so with these objects than the individual responsible for the living condition itself, to depict Mass Man as being in relation to the autonomous man *at an extreme pole* is a way of equally depicting their equivocity and co-dependence. While *heteros* is born out of and dependent upon *autos*, it is due to their respective *need* for the other that they exist in relation, however inimical and distant this relation is. It is not possible for the outer relation to surmount how *creatura* is, above all else, related to God, even if all signs of *creatura*, and awareness of those signs, become lost from the cosmos. All that is possible is parody, mimicry, and ultimately perversion. But this perversion can become so prevalent that, due to this, the non-being of evil can really seem to have positive existence. However, because of this inner, ontological polarity between creature and Creator, nothing can be so perverted as to cease being *creatura*. But inasmuch as the world is concerned, Mass Man has lost *or at least is losing* this relation to being. So their extreme polarity is still played out in the world God made, but this concrete existential layer is being overrun by anthropocentric referents, making it ostensible that evil really exists. This is due to the situation whereby all things and men point not to God but man. Though it might seem to the contrary, the perversion rendered unto man cannot alter his inner or ontological relationality creation has to its Creator. Contrary to Scott's thesis, man's being as *imago dei* needs at minimum to be fixed, otherwise the social aspect of *imago dei* that Scott proffers, particularly the "historical becoming"[399] of *imago dei*, as is

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[398] Ibid.
[399] Peter Scott, "Imaging God: Creatureliness and Technology," *New Blackfriars* 79, no. 928 (1998): 2, 10-11.

Guardini's point, will disjoint itself from the fixed aspect, created form.[400] Nonetheless, inasmuch as Mass Man exists, his fixed truth is arguably not apparent.

c) Mass Man: the man who is absorbed by technology and rational abstraction

For Guardini, the German Nazi Reich manifested the autonomous *Haltung*. To realise itself, it would need to fashion artefacts to manifest and achieve its end. Back then, it was the machine the autonomous subject needed to proffer its creed; in our time, however, it is technology. Guardini therefore defines Mass Man as that which "simply designates the man who is absorbed by technology and rational abstraction."[401] Guardini saw the Reich set men against their potential inherent to their form. But without the machine, without the means it at once afforded to the Nazi ideology but robbed from creation, the end sought by the autonomous worldview might not be achieved. It would probably remain an ideology, a worldview only. The purpose, therefore, of the autonomous worldview in general and the Nazi worldview in particular, with respect to the world of objects it fashions, and the type of existential dependency it engenders, stands opposed to Guardini's idea of creaturely awareness; for while ideas are without extension, space, etc, the world is limited and so the problem is able to multiply and totally cover the world. So the sense to "technology and rational abstraction" infers the covering of the world in the autonomous ideal.

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[400] Something which Clarke in his interpretation of St Thomas calls the first and second act of being; which is, the act of being itself (Lt. *esse*) and the limiting mode or essence of that being (Lt. *ens*). Clarke states that it is due to being, understood thus, that particular existents receive their capacity to communicate themselves ontologically. To this extent is the created form "fixed" as Scott puts it, but necessarily so according to Clarke and Guardini. "Chapter 2". Norris W. Clarke S.J., *The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics*, 2014 ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002), 25-41. This is not to say that sociality, as Scott puts it, are not aspects of creatureliness; only that, in our emphasis on *form*, there is something substantive, something proper to nature, which is not expressed by Mass Man. Research which discusses Mass Man in light of sociality as Scott defines it would be praiseworthy research but is beyond the scope of this essay. Scott, "Imaging God: Creatureliness and Technology," 260-61.

[401] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 58.

Hence the conflict between autonomous living and creaturely awareness is discernible due to man's inclination to make something of his beliefs, to manifest them through how he lives. Technological dependency and abstract thinking is but a contemporary vesture of this manifestation.

By "potential" it is meant the capacities of human nature, which, though existing subsistently, is not like the absolute nature of God on whom man is contingent. Hence the *individuum* that is man exists to live out, manifest or actualise his nature with respect to the absolute. In *LLC* Guardini describes how this man-God relationship does not obfuscate but assists man in drawing from this or that mass its inherent potential. But the autonomous worldview seeks to alter the man-God relationship, between contingent man and the absolute person, by displacing God and replacing himself as the absolute. Objects of the autonomous kind actualise, enforce and instantiate this displacement. Thus human potential and manufacture is not wrought according to God, but according to obeisance to man.

The Reich achieved obeisance by reducing human potential to nationalist, totalitarian instrumentality. If it served the Reich, the Reich would confer being upon such potential. Since within the Reich the ends of social participation were largely predetermined, if one did not serve the Reich, one's being would seem to…lack being. In other words, men tended to have value commensurate with the tank they drove or, sadly, by the camps they populated. Due to this, human potential became systemically subordinated to ideological, military and political ends. In having no other use, and in wishing to have value according to the social ontology of the Reich, men served purposes to the     exclusion of and in opposition to their created form. To have being, men

and women would need to become objects or means – both here interchangeable terms. All except their Orwellian utility within the Reich would become *deplatformed*, that is, dismissed or robbed of social being.[402] Instead, their value as humans became commensurate to fulfilling their instrumentality.

"Deplatforming" is an appropriate neologism because it points to the utility of massification for both the Reich and contemporary western democratic society, thus revealing the broader relevance of our current discussion to today's technological world. For instance in social groupings, particularly those formed upon social media networks, proffer their monetized propaganda at their viewers; expecting to be believed, not due to the realities they share, but by force of personality, the narrative they attempt to control, their extant subscriber base, or the extent to which their media title served as effective click-bait; conditioning its viewers towards ignorance as *subscribers* or *followers*; and with each click of the mouse ensuring that the platform grows stronger while their viewers become increasingly irrelevant. Subscribers are deprived of purpose to the extent that they subscribe or follow, which is another way of saying that their purpose is indistinct from the personae they follow. Reality becomes unimportant when through the following of a social platform reality becomes paradigmatic or appropriate to the theoretical

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[402] Thus, those who possess a platform stand above others; who from this position of authority can determine the purpose of those beneath them. In this context, the platform represents the equivalency between social utility and actual being. When one possesses a platform he or she has being inasmuch as they are socially useful. But without a platform, one has being only to the extent that service must be rendered to whomever stands upon one.
"But what was strange was that although Goldstein was hated and despised by everybody, although every day, and a thousand times a day, on *platforms*, on the telescreen, in newspapers, in books, his theories were refuted, smashed, ridiculed, held up to the general gaze for the pitiful rubbish that they were—in spite of all this, his influence never seemed to grow less [emphasis added]." George Orwell, 1984, (Harper Perennial Classics, 1948). eBook. 18.

assumptions by which the platform operates.[403] Inasmuch as subscribers identify with being a

follower of this kind, such people lack being when apart from this social aggregate. It is almost as

if they lack subsistence if they are not part of a collective. In other words, their own voice, their

own views, their own experiences, lack value because they are without platform. Their value, then,

becomes proportionate to the platform followed. However, it is the condition of Mass Man that he

can never stand upon his own platform.[404]


The social currency that platforms have is key to the problem. Setting aside the value of

social being, what of one's own potential *in itself*, of one's subsistent nature possessing sufficient

capacity and value? Should one identify with technology and the abstract ways of thinking it

engenders through SMS, MMS, status updates, Snapchats, Twitter tweets, and so forth? By today's

standards it is becoming common to lose a feeling of life purpose if one is not acknowledged for

one's social platform; where, for example, the posting of your kitten pawing the television while

it plays *Finding Nemo* has more value than the experience *in itself*. Due to the proliferation of

social media platforming, Mass Man is losing interest in his subsistent nature, the potential it has,

and reality as it is before him. More and more, things need to be *platformated*, that is, they need to

belong to the aggregated *individuum* to catch someone's interest. In this way, individual and social

being become confused whereby the former loses definition but for its relation to the latter. Thus,

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[403] According to Chalmers, it is inherent to the formation of a paradigm for it to prescribe fundamental laws to the object or objects under consideration. A. F. Chalmers, *What Is This Thing Called Science?*, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., 1999), 109.

[404] Nor under current conditions easily create their own. Google has recently modified its monetization policy to greatly reduce for a large existing and future user group the ability to actually gain popularity and earn an income through sharing one's views through their service. See - Trevor Mogg, "Youtube Is Making It Harder for Small-Time Creator to Make Money," Digital Trends, https://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/youtube-changes-how-youtubers-make-money/.

in the case of nationalist instrumentality or social media, man is rendered a mass under both regimes due to the common problem whereby one's subsistent value becomes indistinct from the platform followed.

d) Creaturely awareness vs Kant's object/subject distinction

Before diving deeper into the existential plight of Mass Man, some meaning of terms needs clarification. This is so the focus is kept upon Guardini's concept of *creatura* as a remedy to Mass Man's living condition. The terms in question are *object, means* and *creatura*, where the latter here signifies *creaturely awareness*. Conflating the meaning of these three terms leads to a key ontological problem of Mass Man with which Guardini grapples, when humans are treated as objects or means and not as creatures. Object for Guardini largely originates from Kant's distinction between humans *as subjects* and non-humans *as objects*.[405] In this context, however, the categorisation of being as object and subject is part of the problem.[406] For while it is true  that

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[405] Due to his core doctrine of transcendental subjectivism, that being should be viewed from the perspective of *apriori* being. We readily acknowledge, however, that this distinction has been vital for theorists in defining and promoting the dignity and rights of man.

[406] To be sure, Guardini uses the term within *LLC* and *EMW* according to his own nuance. Although Guardini does use "object" consistent with its basic etymology (ob-ject: that which is thrown before, usually one's intellect), looking at how he uses the term within *LLC* and *EMW*, how things are objective to man is always subordinate to how things are objective to God. However, this distinction is more easily evident within the latter than in the former. But regarding *LLC*, this is because Guardini is attempting to argue a Christian thesis with selective recourse to a traditionally Christian framework. For instance within *LLC*: first, "[a] living awareness of humanity would make it possible for them to survey human existence as a whole and to consider the *res hominis* with truly sovereign objectivity" Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 62. Earlier he writes that, "Each new machine means that something we previously mastered with the help of our organic intellectual equipment is now left to a technical construct. We thus make an object of something that used to be subjective, part of life's initiative." Ibid. The final phrase, "pat of life's initiative", helps interpret what Guardini means by object and subject. To him subjective existence entailed humans exercising the sum total of their potential or "initiative"; when this is outsourced to machines, that potential is literally *thrown before* man rather than being within man. Now within *EMW* Guardini states: "[t]he modern concept of the subjective is as foreign to the medieval consciousness as is that of nature. Seeing nature as the sum, the ordering, and the unity of all things, medieval man could not conceive of nature as an autonomous All. Nature was the work of the Sovereign God. *Man was the subject, being of the order of nature, was first the creature of God and steward of His Will* [emphasis added]." *The End of the Modern World*, 38-39. Elsewhere he writes that, "[a] bearer of the only valid act, the subject became a uniting principle for all categories of activity; in

massification debases man by reducing him to an object, that is, a thing of use for a subject or a platform this subject uses, in Guardini choosing to depict reality as *creatura* and not as subject/object, Guardini is positing a distinct ontological grounding for resolving the problem of *masse*. Mass Man exists not merely inasmuch as he is deprived of subjectivity. Nor is he deprived solely due to his instrumental value. The grounding of subjectivity needs closer inspection so that features inherent to it, such as the self, consciousness, rationality, ultimately find their character by virtue of being created as such by the Creator. Therefore, one can affirm that Mass Man subjectively exists; and that his subjectivity is affronted by being treated as a means to something and not as an end in himself. But the existential deprivation he experiences is more than just a deprivation of selfhood. It is a denial of *telos*, that man is destined towards a prescribed end. Here, *telos* must not be misappropriated into Kant's transcendental idealism, for by *telos* it is meant something objective to all individuals, because to subjectivise or conflate *telos* into man is really part of the ontological problem from which Mass Man suffers. *Certainly*, a master might say, *man exists. But what he is for is my business*. In this instance man's *telos* is confused with human arbitration; and so he universalises his judgments although they are extrinsic to subjectivity; and more tragically disregards, by virtue of that judgment, what is universal and intrinsic to all subjects – their createdness. In this way, to subjectivise *telos* is a sure path to creaturely ignorance. To safeguard against this ignorance, the concept of *creatura* is needed so that *telos* remains objective. Creaturely awareness therefore entails an awareness that man cannot arbitrate the purpose of other men.

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turn the subject in act determined its own validity. The sharpest definition of the subject is found in the philosophy of Kant in whose system the logical, ethical, aesthetic subject is an ultimate. Beyond it nothing can be conceived. Autonomous and self-existent, the subject became the very ground for meaning in spiritual experience." Ibid., 40.

The problem of Mass Man does not so much entail treating man as a means rather than an end, as it does entail using men for purposes other than for which his created form allows, as it has been elucidated in previous chapters. In this sense, only the Creator determines the norm of being, that is, for what purpose things are created. Hence normativity stems first from *creatura* rather than one's subjectivity, for the *telos* of all created being is ordered, in ways unique to each species, towards the divine object. According to the scholastic axiom that *doing presupposes being*, from understanding human nature it follows that what man ought to do can be known.[407] Any perversion acted upon or suffered cannot alter the norm any more than alter what something is. As the Creator forged nature, only he can change it. It is when nature is misconceived as existing without the character of *creatura* that it becomes conceivable that it is yet to possess normativity. Manipulated like steel into a bullet, or inclination into compliance, the purpose of man is mistaken as *tabula rasa*, without norm. Mass Man suffers exactly this. His world is manipulated, his inclinations misappropriated and misdirected, as though they had no intrinsic purpose, or at least a purpose owing respect. But through violence to the world of man, though an attempt to vie for influence over the inner world by assailing the outer cannot be achieved. To man, man is immutable; only the Creator can change what He makes. Guardini's writings make it amply clear his belief that it is a most serious and grave error for man to misunderstand this.

The autonomous individual is guilty of this misunderstanding. He challenges the normativity of being in his dominion over and devaluation of men, and all of nature besides. The genetic locus of this conviction, which Guardini has most succinctly defined as "idealistic

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[407] In this sense it is permissible to set aside the is/ought gap commonly discussed, since in Guardini's conceptual framework there is no gap between normativity and ontological being.

apriorism"[408], is found in Kant's assertion that the intelligible object and categorical reasoning are one and the same.[409] How absurd is it, then, according to this principle to argue that reason could supply to an object of experience the ontological category of *creatura*? In grounding anthropology on apriostic rather than creaturely thinking, it follows that an attempt at ontological coercion, by virtue of the rational act itself, can take place. However, this is an *attempt only* because no matter the kind of force supporting the rational assertion (Chapter 1), nor the extent to which man is subsequently devalued or instrumentalised, man cannot be coerced in this way. Only his world-self, that is to say, his existential attitude, his pattern of living, his *Haltung*, can be manipulated.[410] Just as in *LLC* and *COA* where Guardini argues for the immutable goodness of non-human and human entities, despite the problem of evil, the plight of Mass Man – that is to say, how his being becomes an out-sourced product of another's reason – is granted as a worldly feature subject to the higher principle of ontological immutability. The end result is that Guardini grants how Mass Man has come to be in the same manner that one grants the existence of evil without granting, like evil, its actual and real existence.

The distinction between primary and secondary dispositions within *COA* is one way that Guardini articulates, through the conceptual framework of Augustine, that there are some *secondary* or worldly ways man can dispose himself contrary to his createdness and so commit

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[408] Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 149.

[409] "There are, therefore, no principles through which the conception of pure, merely intelligible objects could ever be applied, for we cannot imagine any way in which such objects could be presented to us." Immanuel Kant, *The Philosophy of Kant: As Contained in Extracts from His Own Writings*, ed. John Watson, trans. John Watson, New Edition ed. (Glasgow: Jackson, Wylie & Co., 1934), 134.

[410] In this way, created form and ontological being become coterminous. Hence to change the human form, one must, at the level of being, be the author of that being.

evil.[411] But *primarily* he cannot become ontologically indisposed to God. Therefore, the autonomous and heteronomous man are *poles apart* and not an outright contrary. While intellect and volition afford man a vastness of freedom, man is never free from his form. Nor can he change his allonomous inclination towards the Creator any more than an effect can change its cause. He can pervert (*verkehren*), and thereby act illicitly, towards his secondary dispositions, but because evil does not have creative efficacy man cannot change his form. Mass Man is *indeed* an historical phenomenon, and the proliferation of the Kantian, autonomous worldview its chief cause.[412] However, the cause, on the level of being, is unable to yield its effect. It seems to only yield the effect by way of perception resulting in physical manufacture, on the one hand; and by way of ignorance, on the other hand, as to what man *is* in view of what he makes. In other words, it is believed that man has altered man by surrounding him with technology, dislodging him from his created *milieu*. But this is only posited because such a man is ignorant as to man's inner, primary ontological relation to his Creator. In this context, to affirm Mass Man is to forego creaturely awareness. Due to the principles of immutability and causality, creation can be manipulated outwardly but cannot be changed inwardly. Man can dominate men but he cannot escape sharing the same form, nor ever have its value altered. Thus a commitment to *creatura* affirms the very principles which the autonomous worldview attempts to deny.

Rather than subjugation to the Nietzschean "super-man"[413] to which in *WAP* Guardini refers, because all is subject as *creatura* to God's being, while man is a mass this only is true with

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[411] "What is meant is that in Augustine's consciousness, God is the One who directly acts and endows with meaning, that for him the "secondary causes," being and human will, take their place spontaneously behind the "primary": divine being and operation." Guardini, *The Conversion of Augustine*, 116.
[412] *The World and the Person*, 9.
[413] Ibid., 79.

respect to God's creative power. According to Guardini, to be such with respect to other men is idolatrous.[414] From Guardini's perspective, the problem receives its character due to Kant's anthropocentric dialectical ontology, that is to say, due to the way that heteronomous being is subject and inferior to autonomous being. To be truly a subject, and so have value, one must find direction from reason within and impose it upon all objects of experience.[415]

This kind of man is said to fail himself when he acts non-autonomously, due to some extrinsic operation of reason. But this is precisely the principle on which the serf-like attitude of Mass Man is based. Chapter 3 explains how adherence to the principle of autonomy begets the problem of heteronomy, for the latter is only a problem when self and other share no common being, which is asserted to be *creatura*. Granting *selfhood* on the proviso of rational capacity, though idyllically modern and an ennobling prospect which Kant hoped for man, has in more recent times, for instance in Tooley's *Abortion and Infanticide*,[416] been the same basic argument for granting or denying ethical status to *another*. This is because subjectivity is functionally determined by this or that man, not by a metaphysics whose measure is objectively transcendent. In so doing, that which human nature possesses, but for whatever reason is yet to actively express, becomes ethically valueless. Thus, what Tooley denies to the foetus so the autonomous person denies to Mass Man. Both are deemed to lack ethical status due to having an inferior rational

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[414] The existence of Mass Man is therefore a problem of evil, a problem concerning the Judaeo-Christian decalogue.
[415] While Kant's ethical theory provides a profound impetus for upstanding behaviour, would not his theory benefit from grounding this impetus in *creatura* and not categorical reasoning? In other words, an attempt at baptising, so to speak, autonomous reasoning can be made if, along with the detailing of the rational act Kant more or less accurately describes, there is an acknowledgement that the created form possesses a priori categories of being. But Kant does not do this since, as stated, the quality of createdness is not a possible object of experience. Thus the autonomous worldview exists to counter creaturely awareness.
[416] Michael Tooley, *Abortion and Infanticide* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 152.

capacity. Both foetus and Mass Man become *heteros* to an actively expressed rational faculty. They become the tree falling that no one bothers to hear. This is what happens when expression and not capacity becomes the benchmark for ethical status – some group of humans become fated to become *heteros* to the reigning subject. Granting Kant's *autos/heteros* dialectic embroils man's ethical status in an arbitrary, hence essentially non-metaphysical, dialectic.[417] Through the dialectic, man is flung between self and other, never to share a common status nor experience dignity due to his unmoving centre, the core of his existence – his creatureliness. *Autos* or reason has value; *heteros* or appearance waits to receive it. Thus, men become ethically determined by those men who reason autonomously. This is one reason why Guardini places Mass Man at extremity to the superman, and why Tooley places the foetus at extremity to the person. But through Guardini's creaturely ontology mankind has ethical status simply and only because he is *creatura*; that is to say, he or she is a being whose ethical status is endowed by the Creator and the Creator alone; the clay (Lt. *massa*) in the Potter's hands (Rom 9:21).

*e)* In the hands of man: creaturely awareness in conflict with the *Übermensch*

The Mass Man arising out of the North, covering the world over, is not a mass in the scriptural sense (Gk. *Phyrama*), for he is not subject to a loving God upon whom his contingency rests, but to the domination (*Üntermenschentum*) of the quasi-divine *Übermensch*.[418] Chapter 3

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[417] "For we are brought to the conclusion that we can never transcend the limits of possible experience, and therefore never can realize the object with which metaphysics is primarily concerned." Kant, *The Philosophy of Kant*, 4.

[418] Klemperer, *The Language of the Third Reich : Lti Lingua Tertii Imperii : A Philologist's Notebook*, 135. "The feeling of the preciousness of the finite, the death daring defiance with which man risks this handful of existence, is also filled with religious energy. The religious mightiness of the absolute world is turned around, and the place of the streaming infinity is taken by the intensity of the finite as experienced in the sense of "nevertheless." The comforting security of necessity is replaced by the glory of the venture. The feeling of the limitless depths of the world is replaced by that feeling in which finiteness, as soon as it is accepted with religious fervour, will send forth from itself a divinity of a new kind, finite divinity. This we see in Nietzsche's doctrine of the super-man [*Übermensch*].

attempts to make this point clear. According to Krieg's account of Guardini's work of 1935, *Dei Heiland* (*The Saviour*), the *Übermensch* tends to justify his autonomous attitude by seeing himself in pagan, mythical terms, as a mouthpiece for and arbiter of the cyclical and at times violent forces of nature.[419] In *WAP* Guardini sees this form of paganism as related to the modern, philosophical trend towards making nature absolute; since, in effect, both the autonomous and pagan adherent see the world as nature, not creation;[420] and due to this belief as something which they can control and to which they can assign purpose. Krieg states that under Guardini's estimation that such paganism enables any man to view himself as a saviour (*Heiland*).[421] But Guardini contrasts this worldview to Christianity, wherein the world is not cyclical and uncaused, but has an objective *telos* determined by the divine *Logos*.[422] Further, Guardini saw those caught within the Nazi state as being groomed into believing a form of Teutonic Neopaganism that placed them at the feet of

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A religious quality is even necessary if man's will to autonomy is to take the risk of living with himself and the world. Setting oneself up as autonomous is itself a religious act, a religious revolt. The autonomy of existence can be willed only if existence is carried by a religious current. Otherwise, it would be like a planet without an atmosphere, on which no life can develop. Only the religious quality gives it that weight and fulness of meaning as a consequence of which the spirit feels it possible and worth-while to base the world upon itself alone. But how can this be? The objectively religious, the numinous, is a radiation of God, the fact that all being has been created by Him, exists through Him, and has its ultimate meaning in Him, the fact that He permeates everything and all vibrates with Him. How can this be attributed to the world? But this very thing constitutes the ultimate nature of the declaration of autonomy. It attempts something monstrous in the way of sacrilege and deceit. The will to autonomy detaches the wealth of mystery, which God imparts to His work, from Him the supra-mundane, the free, the sovereign, the Holy One, and transfers it to the creature. That which should, like a ray, lead to its source is changed by this desire for autonomy into a depth- dimension of the world itself. It is an undertaking which is incomprehensibly great in regard to subtlety, dexterity and the organization of all the required processes." Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 79-80.

[419] Robert A. Krieg, "Romano Guardini's Theology of the Human Person," *Theological Studies* 59, no. 3 (1998): 116.
[420] "Here the consciousness of the believer must make a fundamental distinction: the world is not Nature, but Creation, creation in the plain sense of a work brought forth by a free act. It is not something "natural," self- evident, self-justified, but it requires a reason, and it is given this reason by the power which created it in its being and reality. And the fact that it was created does not depend upon the coming into operation of a cause constructed after the model of natural energy, but upon an act which - taking this word in a broader sense - has the character of "grace." To put it in another way: the world does not have to be, but it is, because it was created. The act by which it was created did not need to take place, but it took place because it was willed. It might not have been willed, but it was willed because it was willed. This means that the world is not a necessity, but a fact." Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 18.
[421] Krieg, "Romano Guardini's Theology of the Human Person," 116.
[422] *Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany* (New York: Continuum, 2004), 117.

the Führer.[423] As the spirit of the North spreads beyond Germany to control being and assign purpose, so too does its form more perfectly embody the super-human type. Thus, the North signifies an active, spreading, idolatrous force which, through successive acts of domination, eclipses the created world. In *Dei Heiland*, Krieg relates that Guardini saw the Führer's salutation, "*Heil* Hitler", as an archetypal way of conditioning the populous to equate their leader to a divine mouthpiece.[424] In comparison to today's social media culture, the same occurs when man cannot interpersonally engage with its celebrities but can merely be a recipient, a passive participant, of this or that announcement a celebrity has broadcasted. Under these conditions, it is encouraged to render unto these people an attitude of reverence that in ancient and medieval times was usually reserved for a divinity. But the Reich in general and the Führer in particular deliberately asked for this reverence from its people. It is no wonder that Guardini singled out the Nazi state within *LLC* as "the North", for it was a specific place in the world that massified people. In this place the people were *phyrama* as in Scripture, but were so in the hands of the *Übermensch*, not Jesus Christ.

Seeing the North as a trope for the autonomous worldview draws out how Guardini uses his metaphysics of creaturely awareness to interpret the Nazi state and how the former engenders its people to be *phyrama* and the latter to be a mass. His awareness helped him see the autonomous worldview as the anthropological element by which acknowledgement for the practical benefits of daily living are rendered to man and not to God. As God is no longer *always and ongoingly* the cause of being, it has become redundant to speak of a creaturely theistic existentialism. Therefore, no foothold is found within such a society. Due to the proliferation of mastered objects by man,

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[423] "Romano Guardini's Theology of the Human Person," 117.
[424] Ibid., 115-16.

and how these objects require a certain compliance from its user and a certain deference to its maker, inasmuch as this occurs the user becomes anthropologically dependent and theistically independent. This, however, does not amount to strict atheism. As stated in earlier chapters it can be classified as a form of deism. The North proffered deism of this kind so that the qualities of the supernatural could be expressed in natural terms, which is another way of saying that the supernatural existed in order to be appropriated by man. A further analysis of what the North means to Guardini will shed light on what is arguably a valid representation of his thought.[425] After doing so, discussion of Mass Man as within in *EMW* will be timely and appropriate.


f) Guardini, Kierkegaard and The North

To further understand Guardini's theory of autonomous and heteronomous being a return must be made to the concept of "the North" and how it reflects the contrast made by Kierekegaard between the Christian, created individual and the pagan conception of nature. North of Germany was Kierkegaard's Nordic abode. This people possessed a rich, cultural history of pagan mythology, for instance the apocalypse of Ragnarök. Anders Holm relates that a contemporary of Kierkegaard called Grundtvig would argue that the Nordic human spirit (*folkeånden*) had its own paradigm separate from the Holy Spirit and which manifested itself as "heathen" or non-Christian myth.[426] It was in part due to Schelling, states Chase, that Grundtvig equated this paradigm with reality as a whole.[427] For Grundtvig, heathenism was real inasmuch as it was exclusively

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[425] Certainly, when writing the letters to Weiger of which *LLC* is comprised, Germany was *literally* north of Guardini (Lake Como, Italy).

[426] Jon Stewart, *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries*, 3 vols., Kierkegaard Research (Farnham, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009), 106.

[427] Martin Chase, "True at Any Time: Grundtvig's Subjective Interpretation of the Nordic Myth," *Scandinavian Studies* 73, no. 4 (2001): 508.

anthropocentric. Its heroes were necessarily imperfect since they signified man, not God.[428] Thus myths such as Ragnarök were seen by Grundtvig as reflections of the purely equivocal human vista.[429] By this it is meant that human being had no divine "analogate" [430]. An individual somehow existed under the power of his own name.[431] He could understand himself, as a people, in terms independent from the Creator/creature relationship. In this way, man was equivocally understood by Grundtvig.

Holm shows us that for Grundtvig validity meant reality on the grounds that *folkeånden* is self-sufficient despite the reality of Christian revelation. Thus Nordic myth was granted equal validity to Christian faith. Christian faith was simply a paradigm proper to the divine, not man. So myth could be granted as real even if it conflicted with Christianity. Thus Ragnarök, a story of man's love of and struggle for freedom, served as a narrative that worked solely within the Nordic, mythic paradigm, and was thus untroubled by Christian moralising in its variegated portrayal of unchristian deeds.[432]

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[428] Stewart, *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries*, 108.

[429] "Equivocal" is again meant in the usual scholastic sense of the term. So here by "purely equivocal" it is meant to point to the incommensurability of *folkeånden* with the Holy Spirit. Given man and God were not understood as analogy to analogate, but rather their beings were so vastly separate, as immanence is from transcendence, and so impossible to find a term which was true for God and analogously true for men, that man's being became collectively an absolute and immanent spirit from which man could draw to find religious meaning. The God of faith and the god of this world became supernatural and natural entities respectively since it was inconceivable how and why the former would have anything whatsoever to do with the latter.

[430] "analogate, n. an analogue, q.v; analogues, n., pl the things, attributes, concepts, or terms which bear an imperfect resemblance to each other." Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 6.

[431] Cf. Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 9. Here Guardini characterises man as having his own ontological measure, his own "beginning".

[432] Stewart, *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries*, 107.

In this case, something Krieg states regarding Kierkegaard applies to Grundtvig:

> …Protestant dialectical theologians in general and Kierkegaard in particular have spoken of a radical discontinuity (*Widerspruch*) between natural religious experience and Christian belief, when in fact the two, though distinct, relate to each other as opposites (Gegensätze). In other words, although natural religious experience and the Christian encounter with God are distinct, they are interconnected. Indeed, the former can prepare the way for the latter…[433]

Grundtvig, however, did not believe that the Church of Christ subsists within the Catholic Church; rather he saw its *romanitas* as another *folkeånden* who, by espousing the rigid norms of rationalism, stood against the "freedom-loving"[434] "spirit of the north"[435].[436]

The way Guardini sees autonomy as an attitude which leads to this pagan spirit of the North – but sees that spirit, and whomever follows it, as a malignant, domineering pagan deity – clearly indicates that although Guardini is adept as to its true nature, he is without question its adversary.[437] As Ragnarök celebrates various moral atrocities such as unjust murder, the myth exemplifies the consequences when the human sphere becomes independent or *autonomous* from the divine.

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[433] Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 31-32.

[434] Stewart, *Kierkegaard and His Danish Contemporaries*, 108.

[435] Ibid.

[436] "In fact, precisely because the Church willed by Christ actually continues to exist (*subsistit in*) in the Catholic Church, this continuity of subsistence implies an essential identity between the Church of Christ and the Catholic Church. The Council wished to teach that we encounter the Church of Jesus Christ as a concrete historical subject in the Catholic Church. The idea, therefore, that subsistence can somehow be multiplied does not express what was intended by the choice of the term "*subsistit*". In choosing the word "*subsistit*" the Council intended to express the singularity and non "multipliability" of the Church of Christ: the Church exists as a unique historical reality." The Congregation of The Doctrine of The Faith, "Responses to Some Questions Regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine of the Church," (2007).

[437] "Just as the renewal of the ancient classic myth against early Christianity was lifeless, so was the attempted rejuvenation of the Nordic myths. Seldom was either those renewals the camouflage for a drive for power as it was with National Socialism." Thus the rejuvenation of Nordic myth *per se* is not Guardini's concern; rather, how this spirit took on the vestige of Nationalism Socialism. Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 102.

Further, without any external, divine referent, immorality contrary to God becomes valid, meaningful, even acceptable. Any anthropology that claims to have autonomy from theology, though without devolving into atheism out-rightly, bifurcates human existence, and existential theory more generally, from the divine analogate. *As God's world is His alone, so this world is for man alone*, a deist believer of this kind might say. This form of practical atheism would be deemed perverse by Guardini for its systemic denial of creaturely awareness, for it is a paradigmatic reality in which man and God are real without any relation of any kind to each other. This is the principle of autonomy written into Nordic myth. What is more, Guardini denies that the spirit of the North is merely a voice of a people's struggle for freedom. Rather in Guardini's experience, Nazi paganism has, through like struggle, brought death slavery to millions. Although Guardini states his claim against the North, it cannot be reduced to mere literary motif. He is concerned that the spirit of the North, as a cultural phenomenon, gives man justification to behave as gods (Ragnarök). That godhood is within the grasp of man is the anthropological principle at stake here. It is the inversion of the Christian worldview. Only God became man, not vice versa. Guardini's writings are consistent in this view: that which the North signifies in *LLC* in the nineteen-twenties; in *Dei Heiland, COA* and *WAP* in the nineteen-thirties; and finally the *milieu* out of which Mass Man would arise in the fifties and into the present day. According to Guardini's reading of the signs of the times, the loss of orientation occurs inasmuch as the subjugation of the Masses occur, when men become the gods of other men, that is, when they forget their creaturely status.

g) Brainwashing and Mass Man: *tabula rasa* vs man's subsistent nature

Seen in socio-psychological terms, Guardini's concern for Mass Man was broadly shared by Serge Chakotin in his work *The Rape of the Masses* (1939). Their definitions of human nature, however, were not shared. Around this difference Chakotin's mass theory shall be discussed.

Chakotin's understanding of the plight of Mass Man is similar to Guardini's in that he speaks of the heteronomous individual as one under the power of psychical manipulators.[438] Chakotin argues that through psychology man has equipped himself with the ability to "act upon himself"[439] by utilising the "reflexive"[440] psyche as a gateway to program "excitatory"[441] responses (i.e., Pavlov's bell, but for people).[442] Whomever wields this capacity, states Chakotin, can pacify, manipulate, and indeed *wield* any collective. Mass Man is such a collective.

Chakotin states this to refute a theorist of the crowd, Le Bon, who characterised the crowd as rapidly gaining, not losing, power.[443] So according to Chakotin, the crowd did not reflect the situation of the populous within the Nazi state since the latter held dominion over the former, not

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[438] "The disequilibrium which we observe today at the base of contemporary society is occasioned by a disquieting backwardness in the sciences of Man, which should give him power over himself, as compared with the sciences of Nature, which in three centuries have given him power over things. Since, after having transformed his environment, Man is beginning to be able to act upon himself, and, indeed, is so acting, we are faced with the question how to render this action harmless and, if possible, fruitful." Serge Chakotin, *The Rape of the Masses*, trans. E W Dickes, 5th ed. (London: George Routledge & Sons Ltd, 1940), 1.

[439] Ibid.

[440] "The study of the forms taken by these reactions of living beings, the analysis of promptings and of their formation – such is the task which this new science sets itself." Ibid., 3.

[441] "A further rule, of great importance, was established: if, after having formed a conditioned reflex, the excitation producing it was repeated several times without the simultaneous appearance of food, after a time the reaction became more and more feeble, finally disappearing: the reflex, in Pavlov's phrase, was extinguished." Ibid., 5.

[442] Ibid.

[443] Chakotin cites Le Bon thus: "Universal symptoms show in all nations the rapid growth of the power of the crowd" ibid., 35.

vice versa. Mass is therefore posited to denote the powerless, conditioned collective. This too is what Guardini means by Mass Man. When he says that Mass Man "is not the debased and decayed…rabble of ancient Rome"[444] he is more arguing that he has a "genuine form"[445] in society, not that Mass Man is unperverted. As a Roman Emperor, Guardini infers, Mass Man has social agency upon the world as once did Nero.

Guardini sees the heteronomous individual as existing, though without the quality of subsistence.[446] Due to this he becomes less than himself, nothing more than grist (*masse*) for the Nazi mill. In other words, the "*individuum*"[447] or "person"[448] only exists in its relation to what or whom elicits its conditioned behaviour. Chakotin declares this to be "psychical rape"[449] as it renders people into "psychic slaves".[450] Due to the excitatory response system, human beings can be conditioned out of seeing themselves as existing subsistently. Mass Man is the result. Essentially the psyche is hi-jacked or brainwashed to conform the subject to that of the hi-jacker.[451] Chakotin's thesis shows a chief method by which man acts against his human nature on the world stage.

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[444] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 59.

[445] Ibid.

[446] "subsistent, *adj*. having being and operation through itself, not through union with another." Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 119. Cf. Jason T Eberl, "Aquinas on the Nature of Human Beings," *The Review of Metaphysics* 58, no. 2 (Dec., 2004).

[447] "the individual regarded as one or as a unit; a singular, complete substance." Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 60.

[448] "*technical scholastic sense*. The subsistence proper to a person: that perfection which makes an intellectual nature to be uncommunicated or unshared by the being of another." Ibid., 90.

[449] E.g., Chakotin, *The Rape of the Masses*, 280.

[450] Ibid., 36. it seems Sterns review of this work overlooks this stark reality in his focus on Chakotin's "frames of reference" and his "abortive" attempt to combine them. Bernhard J. Stern, review of The Rape of the Masses, Serge Chakotin, *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 213 (1941).

[451] Although as Jones points out, Pavlov himself and many of his followers believed that persons were *tabula rasa*, that is, they are persons without a nature that determines one's capacities

On this point of human nature, however, Guardini's view differs from Chakotin's teacher, Pavlov, to whose *tabula rasa* definition of human nature Chakotin holds.[452] However, Guardini accepts the evidence of the psychology of human manipulation, here summarily defined as an aggregation of material and efficient causes after the fashion of Pavlov, but still sees human nature as subject to a formal and final cause. These latter causes direct man towards certain goods, which, over time, comprise the very content or truth of his being. Thus, nature is normative with respect to the latter causes, not merely passive with respect to the former causes, steering the individual towards certain experiences, which from Guardini's perspective are broadly understood to be goods. In other words, Guardini sees human nature not as *tabula rasa* but as possessing a subsistent structure, a predetermined purpose and, existentially, an inclination or interior drive towards committing to a certain course of behaviour (as opposed to one's nature and purpose being arbitrated extrinsically by another person). Being aware of these innate qualities equips one to combat brainwashing, since despite the conditioning suffered, one knows what he is and for what and/or whom he is made. In this way, actuating what is the human, created form provides interior direction for living. In so doing, the plight of Mass Man is relieved or avoided.

If one is denied the quality of subsistence, but is expected to serve another who is granted that quality, then that relationship from former to latter is essentially a relationship of slave to master, since the latter's being becomes the condition of the former's. Although Guardini views personal subsistence as immutable, through what Chakotin cites as the "excitatory response"[453],

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[452] Chakotin, *The Rape of the Masses*, 3-32. Cf. Bernhard J. Stern, "Chakotin, Serge. "The Rape of the Masses" (Book Review)," (Philadelphia: A. L. Hummel for the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1941), 200.
[453] Chakotin, *The Rape of the Masses*, 4-9.

an individual can be conditioned out of his/her individuality. Moreover, for a person to possess a formal and final cause means that massification can be prevented if one simply acts upon what is innate to him/her (as opposed to enduring material and efficient causality of this sinister kind). But a person who is not aware of their subsistent nature, it seems Guardini is saying, is still prone to massification, for they do not see their form as the first *condition* of their identity.[454]

3. The Existence of Mass Man

   a) Finding orientation for Mass Man in a technologically built world

     For Guardini, the problem of Mass Man pertains to everyone because all men are created to subsist, that is, are created as persons, and therefore can have their subsistent nature offended. Originally published in 1950 in the middle years of Guardini's literary life, *The End of the Modern World* is aptly subtitled "a search for orientation", for the work sets out to give bearing to its reader in view of the coming, post-modern, new age.[455] Indeed, Pope Francis in *Laudato Si* often cites

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[454] The plight of Mass Man, as that *individuum* who is conditioned towards ignorance of his/her nature, is a problem that therefore relates more broadly to discussions of personhood. They are essentially contrary terms.

[455] Guardini searches for this orientation by exploring "the meaning of Pascal's vision of man and the world" Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, xxiv. Pascal, he says, "belongs to that company of men who saw the whole situation of the new world which was then coming to be" who "assumed a critical attitude toward that newer world." Ibid. The chief attitude of which Pascal was critical was – once again – the autonomous attitude. Guardini points to Descartes who, for Pascal, embodied this autonomous attitude. Ibid., 199. Pascal fought against the eclipse of creatureliness by anthropocentrism, and who according to Smith, specifically against mechanistic physics and a *deistic* interpretation of natural theology. John H Smith, *Dialogues between Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in German Thought*, eBook ed. (Cornell University Press, 2011), 64-65. As to physics, technology stands upon its shoulders, but it goes further by manufacturing things built upon its principles. So Guardini looks to Pascal, as an apologist against autonomy, an exemplar for his apology against the key anthropological problem of the technological age – Mass Man. Guardini states that *EMW* should be read as a development of *LLC* and *WAP*, for, like Pascal, he seeks to make sense of how the world and its people are changing, yet again, now due to heteronomy eclipsing creaturely awareness. Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 58.

Pascal repeatedly cautions against falling away from creaturely awareness. To him, living a life not struck through with God's presence is "vanity" and "wretchedness". One exemplary passage reads, "If God exists, we must love only him and not transitory creatures. The argument of the impious in Wisdom is based solely on the nonexistence of God.

Guardini, adopting his quest for a *creaturely ecology* (in a yet more massified world) and applies it to his time several decades later.[456] Guardini states that his search is not for a utopia of "fancy"[457], but for one which "attempts to provide a spiritual map for the world that is coming into being"[458]. Two basic facets of this coming world have already been shown: the proliferation of and dependence upon technology; and how this proliferation, as ultimately the consequence of being dependent upon something so prolific, conditions our attitude to think mechanistically or autonomously like the technology man uses. From the outset, it is noted that *EMW* was published some five years after Germany surrendered. This manifestation of the North had come to an end (so too its discussion within this research). Nonetheless, the orientation which Guardini seeks for his reader concerns a broader situation than that within *LLC* and *Dei Heiland*: the globalisation of technology, technological co-dependence, and subsequently the plight of Mass Man.

"Mass Man"[459] (German, *masse mensch*) is he whose existence is imbalanced towards relationality. The recent film, *The Circle* (2017), tells a story about a global social media juggernaut, called The Circle, which seeks to meld its services with government to create a beneficent totalitarian, surveillance state. Early in the film employees in The Circle make their catchcry at an audience with their leader, "sharing is caring!" What this meant was that individual

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"That granted," they say, "let us take delight in creatures." That is the worst case. But if there were a God to love, they would not have reached this conclusion, but quite the opposite one. And the conclusion of the wise is this: "God exists; let us therefore not take delight in creatures." Blaise Pascal, *PenséEs*, ed. Roger Ariew, eBook ed. (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2005), 162.

[456] Francis, *Encyclical on Climate Change & Inequality : On Care for Our Common Home*.

[457] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 199.

[458] Ibid.

[459] "Sharpest evidence for the denial of the older idea of personality comes with that human type—who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous—the Mass Man. When used in this connection the term does not connote a man who is worthless; it simply designates the man who is absorbed by technology and rational abstraction. This new human type strikes us unfavourably at first because it has entered history with no tradition of its own; in fact, it must assert itself against those traditions which until now have held the day." Ibid., 58.

and collective rights were in the eyes of The Circle indistinguishable. Movies like this have popular traction because today's people accept their forward journey towards a level of connectivity hitherto unseen, nor sufficiently reflected upon. Thus technology is the mechanism by which Mass Man foregoes his individuality. He loses his identity and direction due to the being of others becoming normative (*heteronom*) in place of the direction which his own form interiorly provides.

b) Technology, technocracy and its technocrats: Mass Man and immanent being

Technology bolts Mass Man to the immanent. Wilhemsen's introduction to *EMW* states that, "mass man dreams of looking out upon a world which is nothing but a mechanised image of himself, a world of mirrors from which an independent nature has vanished into legend and fable."[460] So the relational capacity of Mass Man is becoming consumed by immanent being. Technology fortifies man's inclination towards this world and away from its divine referent. But there is a qualitative, ethical difference between concern for persons and for machines. While both draw him away from the objectively transcendent, technology further removes man's concern from people. In this way, man becomes atomised and isolated, surrounded by mirrors of technology in his quest for being. Concern for people becomes ancillary to one's concern for technology, for one cannot 'be there' without being with technology. Thus, although both eclipse creaturely awareness, technology casts the greater shadow.

Technology absorbs Mass Man in abstract thinking. This is problematic because it reveals what chiefly influences man – that of which he is habitually aware – on a daily basis. This can be

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[460] Ibid., xix-xx.

called *technocracy*. Metacognition *per se* or awareness of one's own thoughts is not quite the problem; rather, how cognition becomes conditioned by technology. The latter is more apt to Guardini's critique since the disparity between technological producers and consumers is ever increasing. But the change in thinking induced by technology is for the most part a change caused by *technocrats*, that is, those who provide Mass Man with technology. The change in thinking is firstly, a symptom of whatever technology is used, and secondly, a reflection of the mind/s making the technology. This is therefore one way of explaining why the charge Guardini lays against technology extends to the minds behind it. The problem of technological dependency is, more deeply, a problem of technocracy and its technocrats.

c) A choice before Mass Man: creaturely awareness or the mass itself

Guardini makes clear that Mass Man, like the autonomous man, is a problematic existence. "He will not…find solutions to the problem of existence; he will not succeed in turning the earth into paradise. The men who went before him could not do these things nor can he."[461] "[M]ass man does bear the future within him"[462]. This is because Mass Man is no longer "the rabble of ancient Rome"[463], no longer "the mediocre multitude"[464], no longer serfs to the "extraordinary individual"[465]. In its ranks are "elites"[466], those who are able to propagate their technocratic worldview, mainly through standardisation and mechanisation.[467] Mass Man will, due to this new

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[461] Ibid., 58.
[462] Ibid.
[463] Ibid., 59.
[464] Ibid., 58.
[465] Ibid.
[466] Ibid., 59. This is a curious statement by Guardini. So far throughout his works therefore has been a clean bifurcation between the ruling autonomous individual, and the heteronomous individual in servitude. That there exists a ruling class of Mass Men indicates other factors at play. These will be discussed in what follows.
[467] Ibid.

ruling class, either "disappear into the collective mass as an empty means for a mechanical function – this is the terrible danger which lies brooding over history today…[or] [i]f he takes the latter course, he will do so for the sake of consolidating his own inner life, of conserving – at least for a time – the core of his spiritual existence."[468] The choice as much as the problem is before Mass Man: to become totally *of the mass*; or to re-espouse awareness of his true being. Arguably this is his creaturely status.

Guardini's discussion of the medieval conception of the cosmos elucidates how the attitude of Mass Man foregoes creaturely awareness. In essence, the issue at stake is: in whose image are things made? Medieval cosmology, states Guardini, held in tension that while all things were made in God's image, man's rational and subsistent nature still allowed him to "gather all lesser things into a unity"[469], which was nonetheless "true to the revealed creation of God."[470] Guardini therefore is stating that all things are pre-eminently an image of God, not man. Acknowledgment of this fact is synonymous to creaturely awareness. It bred a habit of dependence upon God, for all of creation signified the divine; there was no other way to be, no pattern of living for instance, whereby one could think, *this has only to do with me and nothing to do with God*. But Mass Man, without wonder for the universe in itself, defers to the day's standard model of it. Instead of stargazing, he might just Google or see if there is an App for the cosmos.[471] For Mass Man,

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[468] Ibid., 62.
[469] Ibid., 12-13.
[470] Ibid., 13.
[471] The following excerpts from *EMW* prefigure what can happen when technocracy mediates man's relationship to the world. It shows how Guardini's thought as within *EMW* is applicable to current trends within the social application of technology. It reads thus: "[t]he result is a world of thought, action, and works that are no longer capable of being experienced – a world that man has come to consider as an objective process complete in itself." Ibid., 154. Elsewhere on the issue of health insurance Guardini draws out how fear of suffering can rob humanity of human experiences. Done in this way, humanity loses touch with itself, with his own duty to foster health, and must increasingly defer to

cosmology cannot be understood apart from technology, that is, the variegated apparatuses provided by mechanisation. Thus the cosmos is made in the image of the machine, which Guardini states has "acquired *meta*-human, cosmic, not to say demonic, characteristics, which man can no longer assimilate or direct."[472] Before the machine so defined what value remains for man? His searching goes no further than the search results this machine yields. Man fulfils his concern for life through it. Creaturely awareness finds no home within Mass Man due to his attention towards technology.

The medieval concept of *creatura* perfected the metaphysics of the ancients (e.g., categories of being, hylomorphism, impersonal prime mover). More importantly, man finds he is only one part of creation, however privileged that part is. Thus the cosmos as a whole signified the creative power of God. All that could be said of creation was, by way of analogy, something said about the Creator (i.e., knowledge of God through knowledge of creation). Further, man most perfectly signified God due to his spiritual soul. From Chapter 1 it is learnt that man's inclination to make things, characterised by Guardini as *Ur-Werk*, most perfectly reflects within the created order God's creative capacity. However, because man's creativity is but an image of God's

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artificial welfare; where soon enough, if this welfare becomes the sole mechanism to achieve health, man on his own will be unable to healthy, or leastways have no interior concept of what health even is. The passage reads: "[t]he advantages of a well-planned, dependable insurance system are indisputable. Sickness, unemployment, accidents, old age, and so on lose much of their terror when the material needs are assured. But let us imagine the goal of insurance-experts realized: one organisation for all citizens, covering every possible need. What, in the long run, would be its effects upon the average man? What would become of personal conscientiousness and prudence, of independence and character, of healthy confidence and readiness for whatever comes? Wouldn't such a system of total, automatic welfare be also a system of tutelage? And, along with all that, wouldn't man's feeling of being led to his destiny by providence gradually disappear?" Ibid., 171-72.

[472] Ibid., 196.

creativity, whatever man makes must in some way acknowledge this reality. Doing so actuates creaturely awareness.

The products of *Ur-Werk* must in some way defer to the Creator. This was achieved in the way in which man organised sentient and non-sentient life beneath him. Man's creative power bespoke God's creative power. Schaefer defines this as "the virtuous co-operator"[473]. Man only has governance within the cosmos inasmuch as he treats its parts according to their God-given form. Thus, man enjoyed a subordinated yet *pro*-creative power, and thus had privilege in the cosmos to order "all lesser things" in view of the creator above him. Man is, then, *creatura* like all other beings; but amongst them all only man has the capacity to be aware of this fact, act upon it, and fashion created beings in a manner he/she sees fit. Medieval ontology is a testimony to this awareness in man of his procreative power.

This awareness pervaded everything – for instance, astronomy – which occasioned a cosmology out of which modernity – and its cosmology – arose. Guardini goes on to relate what this meant: "[m]odern astronomy…refuted this total construction of the medieval genius which gave expression to reality as it is directly grasped by the human eye and consciousness [i.e., math based astronomy]."[474] Then later Guardini elaborates by characterising medieval thought, as arising from an analogous ontology, and modern thought coming to be specifically without it.[475] In this context, creation was viewed merely as nature, that is, as being lacking an analogate; which

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[473] Jame Schaefer, *Theological Foundations for Environmental Ethics: Reconstructing Patristic and Medieval Concepts (1)* (Washington, US: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 269.
[474] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 13.
[475] Ibid., 28-29.

paradigmatically allowed one to consider creation as if it were not, in some ways at least, ontologically similar to, thus causally beholden to, its creator.[476] Thus the principle of analogy served to remind man that everything was the property of God (however it was argued *in fine* historically) and that his privileged status within nature did not equate to ownership of it. The cosmos signified something other than itself; apprehension and description of the cosmos was different to the creation and the Creator it signified.[477] In this context, equating privilege within nature to supremacy over it was in part symptomatic of the anthropocentric, Copernican turn in philosophy inaugurated by Kant. The ground of being was no longer supplied to reason, but became the product of reason itself. Thus reason went from privilege to supremacy when it made itself the measure of things. Under this condition creaturely awareness lost its value since man could now understand the world without recourse to a being other than his own.

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[476] On this point Smith discusses how the ontological argument for the existence of God according to Descartes and Leibniz contrast to its original form taken by St. Anselm. Smith believes the essential difference between the former and latter revolved around the Cartesian principle of "clear and concise" or discursive thoughts. This principle, Smith argues, modified the ontological argument by ensuring it was founded on discursive reasoning and not any salient or explicit act of belief. In this way, although the uncaused cause was not demonstrable, that its secondary causes were, meant, for Leibniz at least, that ontology could be developed along similar lines to, say, geometry. In light of Guardini's position, this association between ontology and geometry, and subsequently the dissociation between ontology and belief, came to understand the world in increasingly anthropocentric terms. Thus while Leibniz would grant that all secondary causes (creation) are contingent upon God, that the existence of God could be proven rationally withdrew the impetus for ontology to carry with it an implicit, ongoing act of faith; and furthermore, that this act of faith was a response to being itself, that is, not a discursive account of it. Smith, *Dialogues between Faith and Reason: The Death and Return of God in German Thought*, 61-62.

[477] That is to say, when the Stoics conflated "external-world" being (*ousia*) with discursive accounts (*lekton*) of it, Doyle traces how this seminal principle was discussed and debated under the concept of "intrinsic intelligibility". In the modern period, says Doyle, some philosophers granted equivalent being to impossible and false objects (e..g, chimera), since it possessed being inasmuch as it was a being of reason (*entia rationis*). In contrast to this, "extrinsic intelligibility" demanded that *entia rationis* was not equivalent to *ens reals* since the former did not distinguish between real being and being as true (or false). The mind, although real itself, receives reality as it concerns objects non-identical to it; in this case, it can never cause, but only apprehend and describe, that which the mind is not. This issue in ontology undoubtedly furnished the modern period with a greater ontological anthropocentricism than that within the ancient and medieval periods because it weakened the distinction between real being and true or false discursive accounts of it. Doyle, *On the Borders of Being and Knowing*, 9, 211.

d) Mass Man, God and the concept of subsistence

Guardini would define *a cosmos without a divine analogate* as nature.[478] The term sheds light upon the next two species of autonomous existence – the subject and the sum total of his relations, culture. In general, anything analogous is not itself in an absolute sense. Hence, though man is a subsistent or personal being, and his existence or identity is proper to himself and no one else,[479] this does not mean his identity is absolute. For existence to be absolute it must be itself *due to itself* (i.e., be its own cause). This cannot be not man; this can only be God. Hence both man and God subsist, but only one subsists due to itself. The other, man, subsists relative to God. That man subsists due to God is one way of explaining the basis of analogous ontology. Conversely, that man subsists due to himself seems to be the principle upon which the autonomous subject becomes possible.

e) Mass Man born of man: *ennui* and servitude to the autonomous individual

By this definition, that Guardini contrasts Hitler to Jesus Christ is both ontologically and scripturally consistent. However, it would be naive to assert that the divine right which Hitler claimed was done because he saw himself strictly as this researched has defined God. Instead, Hitler's divine right stemmed from his power to control the masses, which in scripture is considered a divine attribute. In possessing the power to collectively impel the people towards

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[478] Although we know analogate is a strong scholastic term with further distinctions, as well as problems Also, more analytical studies that attempt to systematise Guardini's inductive reasoning according to a scholastic framework pertaining to the likeness between creator and creature would be a worthy venture, principally because scholastics such as Cajetan went far in making distinctions between the perfection of analogy between creature and creator (although McInerney believes that Cajetan's distinctions were fallaciously argued). It would not change Guardini's argument; rather it would furnish it with, thus translate his thought into, a systematic framework. See - Ralph McInerny, *Aquinas and Analogy* (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 1-14.
[479] Wuellner, *Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy*, 119.

certain ends, Hitler claimed divine right; for God, in creating man and impelling him towards a certain end, is in a sense the progenitor and exemplar of collective action. Thus divine right becomes associated with the ability to direct the masses. The best way, therefore, to express the divine right claimed by Hitler is in the reverse: *not* because Hitler subsists as God does, and due to this those who are under him subsist as a mass relative to him; *but* because those who are under him subsist relative to his ability to direct collectively, it is as though Hitler subsists as only God can.

This is how Mass Man came to be, by the absolute individuality of the autonomous person excluding others from subsisting in the same way, just as it is said there can be only one absolute. Thus the autonomous individual emanates the very condition of existence to which Mass Man subsequently finds himself subordinated. The autonomous individual supplies all. All operates autonomously from Mass Man.

The dawn of Mass Man occurred in proportion to the globalisation of the autonomous attitude. The application of this attitude upon the worldly stage rendered what was once understood as being-in-relation to God into being-in-relation to man. Due to this change in relation, servitude to man, and even dominion over him, would become part and parcel of living. Hence man "no longer experienced [nature] wondrously as a rich source bestowing harmony on all things, as wisely ordered of itself [i.e., autonomous], as benevolent with its favors [sic]"[480]. Rather, man would come to distrust nature inasmuch as it denoted servitude and dominion. Nature no  longer

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[480] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 53.

was seen as a well-endowed, fertile maternal figure. Instead, Guardini states, inasmuch as nature would become something which man could wield, "[n]ature [would] become alien and dangerous to man."[481] Senior describes the ending of modernity in terms of *ennui* in his discussion of late-modern, romantic literature. [482] Modern man, just as Victor Frankenstein saw his creation as an abomination, has come to fear the fruits of his autonomy. Unlike God's creatures, Victor found his creation repulsive precisely because it bore no likeness to him, even though he designed it. The question therefore can be asked, did Victor experience *ennui* due to the creature being abominable; or did he because he saw himself as abominable in that which he created?

For Guardini, existential *ennui* is due to the awareness of finitude; and not for want of accomplishment, but precisely because of accomplishment.[483] He states that, "[t]he new sense of finite refers not only to a limitation in expanse [i.e., the cosmos] but also to a limitation in the core of being"[484] If Guardini were to answer the above question it is arguable that he would answer "yes" to both. Recourse to popular literature helps elucidate how such *ennui* is expressed through contemporary means. Mass Man does not wish to "boldly go where no man has gone before", as in the case of *Star Trek*, into what he mistook to be a fecund and exciting universe; rather, as abominations possibly lurk throughout all galaxies and spaces, Mass Man sets off into the universe

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[481] Ibid.

[482] "[t]he word ennui derives from the Latin in odium from a root meaning at once "to hate" and "to stink." Modernistic boredom is not the exhaustion that follows upon excess like Byron's; it is a positive disgust, and finally a hatred of existence itself. To Modernists the world is not an accident, as science led the men of the Enlightenment to believe and men of the Romantic age to despair. The world is rather a deliberate, malicious, and very dirty trick. Everything that is, is wrong, and the only salvation is destruction. "Destruction was my Beatrice," said Mallarmé. Marx wrote: Christian love is an obstacle to the development of the revolution. Down with love of one's neighbor. What we need is hatred. We must know how to hate; only then shall we conquer the universe." John Senior, The Death of Christian Culture, (Norfolk, Virginia: IHS Press, 2008). Kindle Edition. 50.

[483] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 53.

[484] Ibid.

not boldly, but with suspicion and fear. Nor is man's experience of his interior universe safe from *ennui*. For example, the psychopathology of that once jo-average father from *The Shining*, Jack Torrence, whose murderous declaration, "all work and no play makes Jack a dull boy", instantiates this fear that Mass Man has of himself as an internal universe. Whether in view of the dark heart of man, or that of the external universe, *ennui* arises due to a perceived failure of being, as failing to be fecund and exciting, but above all as failing to be *good*. Hence a new universe, equipped to protect man from such failure, is needed. A technological model is envisioned to be equipped in this respect over 'nature', enabling man to curb *ennui* by a fresh venture into a world totally under his power, rather than one which persists in reminding him how limited, flawed and uncontrollable the core of being is.

From displacing God from the centre of being, Guardini thinks that man has found the "heart"[485] of being, but has found it to be flawed, capricious and violent. But above all, this heart is finite. Like Frankenstein and his creation, the world is seen this way because it reflects how man views himself: flawed, capricious and finite. Thus the heart of the world is the universalisation of man's apperception. Though it would certainly be an epochal moment to have found the metaphysical structure of reality, it is a troubling moment, for reality *qua imago dei* has not been found; rather, what has been found, what man's accomplishments have amounted to, is man not discovering reality at all, but his own image multiplied *en masse*.

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[485] Ibid., 54.

f)    In the image of man: an attempt by Mass Man at actualisation

Mass Man comes to be when reality is beheld as an image of himself. What distinguishes this conception of reality from that proper to the modern conception is that the latter still apprehends reality as somehow infinite (this, in turn, is an off-shoot of the medieval belief that placed man – that is, created man – at the heart of reality).[486] Guardini frequently cites Goethe as a prime example.[487] But by "infinite" Guardini means something exclusively pagan: the infinite is "spontaneous"[488], "creative"[489], fruit-bearing and live-giving. It is Mother Nature. Mass Man, however, because he is conceived out of *ennui* for Mother Nature and all she represents, his play-room, as if a baby, is furnished with items made from her dismembered body. Figuratively speaking, though Mother Nature has been destroyed through the morbid and mortal excision of her parts and powers, she has been manufactured into artefacts by which Mass Man will learn about the world.[490] He will learn that nature is not infinite; rather, he will come to associate infinity with the artefact. Upon closer inspection, therefore, a deeper problem is revealed: without creaturely awareness, the totality in which Mass Man invests himself into technology is analogous to the totality in which Medieval Man invested himself in the worship of God.

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[486] Ibid., 46.
[487] For example, ibid., 36, 40-41, 43, 51.
[488] Ibid., 51.
[489] Ibid., 36.
[490] Cf. "A Letter to Mother Nature" by More, who by contrast does not personify nature as Mother, but sees Mother Nature as an external force to be listened to or ignored. Guardini, however, seems to conjoin Mother with Nature, thus internalising her agency within matter; entailing, therefore, her subsequent destruction with the manufacture of technology. Unlike Guardini, More does not validate the matter out of which technology is made; rather, technology seems almost to be a product of pure mind – an impossibility without matter, to be sure, and arguably a tacit admission that the autonomous mindset is alive and well in transhumanist thought. Max More and Natasha Vita-More, *The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future* (Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013), 451-52.

Guardini characterises how modern man sought independence from nature, by supplanting it, as a symptom of trying to escape his created reality.[491] Infinity still reminded him that he was not infinite. But having disavowed the need to experience the transcendent, albeit subjectively understood, reality became finite as he wished. It is not unfair to further characterise this moment as the supreme act of the super-autonomous man, for in this moment the last vestige of God's image, the notion of infinite, was cast aside. Nothing is infinite except himself and that which he creates – the artefact. Thus, existence ceases to be a harmonious signification of divine and created being (allonomy), that is to say, it ceases to be an existential interaction between its essential metaphysical components: creature and creator, I and Thou. In this way creation loses its subsistent character and its relation to the absolutely subsistent God. Instead, existence becomes heteronomous: relationality without pursuit of God in things or in Himself. Due to this occurrence, Mass Man searches the world throughout according to his understanding of the world, but only finds the face of the man who made it. But what next? What remains for Mass Man but the superman and his artefacts? In this moment, Guardini speaks almost in the persona of Mass Man. It is an epistemological concern that Guardini claims to be able to know the "feelings" of Mass Man. But perhaps Guardini's proclivity to melancholy made him especially empathetic, which is not for us to doubt. So Guardini states:

> Man now feels responsible for his universe; man must now take care of being. We feel that man has taken the universe into his own heart; we know that this act spells mystery. It seems as though some powerless force in being were groping for the hand of man. It seems as though some drama as yet undefinable were being prepared at the heart of the world, a drama which needs the heart of man.[492]

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[491] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 53-54.
[492] Ibid., 54.

Mass Man has reached this point of crisis because he is unable to apprehend the world as created reality. The mirrors of technocracy actively misrepresent what can be seen. Mass Man's intention has little to do with it, for his understanding of the world has been given to him and so is not of his own making. His world is artefact, technology. Again, this moment is when Mass Man decides for himself how to understand this world. Nonetheless, the world's heart is animated by the spirit of modern man perpetuated within technology, by technocracy and from the minds of technocrats. Mention of *heteronomous elites* is a curious and troubling observation by Guardini as who will facilitate the transition between who rules the masses: the superman of the modern age or, arguably, the super Mass Man of the new age. Thus, what gropes at Mass Man, though it is certainly something other to him, is the troubling conviction that there is nothing beyond man, no objectively transcendental element, no object whose intelligible principle is not found aprioristically. Mass Man finds himself powerless before technology as though in the same way that a mind is powerless to actualise itself without a body. However, in this way Mass Man is not actualising his own mind, but is actualising himself according to the technocratic mind. This is evident because his concern is for the heart of the world, and not his own.

Such a preoccupation with a mind, indeed a worldview so real that it has a beating heart, shows extreme heteronomous concern. This is the essential definition which Guardini ascribes to Mass Man, he "who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous"[493]. As to what or for whom Mass Man is concerned, it is clear it is not for himself, for his concern is determined by how the world has been portrayed to him as *for technology*. Thus he is unconcerned with his divine Creator,

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[493] Ibid., 58.

how things are truly made or made in themselves, and how he ought to respond to these hitherto considered intelligible objects. In short, he is sorely tempted to deny the Christian worldview. To *sorely tempted* is reasonably because Guardini still believes it is possible to re-espouse creaturely awareness. Still, in this temptation a striking similarity is seen to Kierkegaard's concept of *finitude causing despair*.[494] Oaks explains that, "for Kierkegaard, any individual who is not in process of becoming an authentic self (or self-actualization roughly defined) is in despair. Despair is simply the misguided attempt to self-actualize in some mode that does not produce the intended effect."[495] Further, Krieg informs us that Guardini saw along with Kierkegaard that actualisation can only occur within an I-Thou relationship with God.[496] Granted, the above "heart" passage is indeed mysterious. In view of Guardini's agreement with Kierkegaard as to actualisation, it is plausible that Guardini is alluding to a decision which Mass Man would make having been confronted by a

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[494] For example, "And when, into the bargain, by not venturing at all in the highest sense (and to venture in the highest sense is precisely to become aware of oneself) I cravenly gain all earthly advantages – and lose myself! … And finitude's despair is just so. A man in this kind of despair can very well live on in temporality; indeed he can do so all the more easily, be to all appearances a human being, praised by others, honoured and esteemed, occupied with all the goals of temporal life. Yes, what we call worldliness simply consists of such people who, if one may so express it, pawn themselves to the world. They use their abilities, amass wealth, carry out worldly enterprises, make prudent calculations, etc., and perhaps are mentioned in history, but they are not themselves. In a spiritual sense they have no self, no self for whose sake they could venture everything, no self for God – however selfish they are otherwise." Soren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Edification and Awakening by Anti-Climacus, (2004; London: Penguin Group, 1989). Kindle Edition. 49.

[495] Cody L Oaks, ""How Am I Not Myself?" Despair in Sickness Unto Death as Misguided Attempts toward Self-Actualization," *Journal of Humanistic Psychology* 56, no. 2 (2016): 111. Thanks to the research of Komasinski and others we can be reasonably certain that Guardini is drawing from the thought of Kierkegaard. Andrew Komasinski, "Anti-Climacus's Pre-Emptive Critique of Heidegger's "Question Concerning Technology"," *International Philosophical Quartely* 54, no. 3 (2014). This can be correlated with the work of Tuttle, who equates in Kierkegaard's anthropology creatureliness as a way of existing against massification. "…there is also a despair which results from our misrelation to the mass, and this is "the despair of finitude". This is the despair that is common to the individual in mass society, and one of the chief pathologies of the present age." Tuttle, *The Crowd Is Untruth: The Existential Critique of Mass Society in the Thought of Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Ortega Y Gasset*, 49.

[496] Guardini in this respect is continuing Kierkegaard's project into the 20th century. However, we know thanks to Krieg that Guardini disagreed with Kierkegaard, in effect setting the former apart from the latter as to his definition of "his reality". Guardini's view of man, unlike Kierkegaard's, does not assume any "… radical discontinuity between natural religious experience and Christian belief…" but are "opposites" [*Gegensatze*], not contraries." Krieg, *Romano Guardini: A Precursor of Vatican Ii*, 31. In other words, to be defying one's crisis of finitude, does not take a "leap of faith" only, but the responsibility to be that in which grace and nature equally inheres – the creature.

total world of finitude. Without knowledge of God, Mass Man is tempted to despair in the very moment of actualisation for there is no *Thou*, no divine referent by which actualisation can be truly measured.

g) Technology, Titanism and the spirit of the North

In the form of questions, Guardini ventures to articulate his meaning in the above "point of crisis" passage. Two especially stand out: "[h]ow should we [as man on the edge of modernity] view the grim magnificence, the possibilities and dangers, promised by modern scientific-physical theory? How must we evaluate the Titanism which inspires politics and technism now?"[497] The answer Guardini gives, as a prophet, almost, of the dawning age, is this: for Mass Man to neither revoke his claim to independence nor his fear of finitude. Like the Nordic pagans, and like those caught within the Nazi state, Mass Man will depend upon the spirit of man. For the Nordic peoples, the spirit of man was expressed mythologically; for the Nazis, it was expressed mythologically, ideologically and mechanically; but for Mass Man, the spirit of man manifests as pure technology, where mind, myth and machine unite.[498] This arguably is a reasonable way of evaluating the

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[497] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 54.
[498] Guardini's conception of creaturely awareness has immediate social import in view of the following. Geordie Rose, Founder of "D-Wave" the first Quantum computer, in various public talks draws the analogy between this technology, mythology, the overhaul of societal norms (through, for instance, IOT – the Internet of Things) and the potential of the human form. It is posited from figureheads such as Rose that technology is indeed meant to change the human form, by way, for instance, through nano-technology or artificial intelligence. But it is arguable, because created form is ignored, that such technology will not perfect but only pervert man. Indeed, Geordie Rose in his new project called "Kindred" states that we should not assume that AI, although incomparably more intelligent than mankind, will in any way care for us humans for they are made. They will do everything so perfectly for the world, but their design, intent or social import for mankind is eerily described as "alien". Elon Musk cautions that the creation of AI of this kind will be akin to casting up the demonic. In the spirit of H. P. Lovecraft's definition of "cosmosism", Geordie tells his audience that AI might not align its plans with that of actual humanity. For example, see - ideacity, "Geordie Rose - Quantum Computing: Artificial Intelligence Is Here," (YouTube.com, 2015). TechVancouver.Org, "Geordie Rose of Kindred Ai Presents Super-Intelligent Aliens Are Coming to Earth," (YouTube.com, 2017). Cf. Paul Kaihla and Kaihla Paul, "Quantum Leap the World's Biggest R&D Labs Are Racing to Build a Quantum Computer. Geordie Rose Thinks He Can Beat Them. Is He Just Blowing Smoke?," *Business 2.0 (2001)* 5, no. 7 (2004).

Titanism and Technologism of today's age. They are one, or at least they are merging. So Mass Man will invest himself into the machine to make his Titan; and vice versa use *folkeånden* to rationalise the manufacture of Titan, the perfect machine; and so forget his creatureliness in view of his 'creation'. In achieving independence from God and challenging mortality, Mass Man commits himself, as to God, to the god of technology.

Man's increasing dependence upon technology perverts his nature because, equally, it is an attempt to escape his nature – mortal, created and contingent. His flight towards the machine, his existential investment into the machine's potential, is also an attempted escape from the qualities of his nature and ultimately, therefore, an attempt to escape God. That Mass Man seeks infinitude through the machine reveals a profound confusion in his being – he wishes dependence by seeking independence. This is why technological dependence cannot coexist with creaturely dependence. As a subordinate feature, certainly; but as it stands, and as technology develops, this confused attempt by Mass Man will only become more serious. A choice, therefore, needs to be made as to which worldview orders the other, that is to say, upon which will one be dependent to deal with man's mortality, contingency and finitude?[499] To be man in this moment, in the grips of despair of the Kierkegaardian kind, Mass Man's choice becomes diametric, on the tip of a sword: either he can have faith that this world reflects God generally and so concern himself, specifically, with those tried and tested artefacts that have always succeeded to manifest *imago dei*. In effect, this makes God the measure of being. While Guardini does not itemise such artefacts, it is known

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[499] The seriousness of the plight of Mass Man as Guardini understands it, in view of the argument made by Mehl, is such that he will need to drastically re-evaluate his relationship to social matters. Mehl, *Thinking through Kierkegaard: Existential Identity in a Pluralistic World*, 97.

at least in the negative what *in principle* they cannot be. They *cannot be* goods – be they artefacts strictly, as in technology; or generally the moral, political, spiritual or economic processes which support a technocracy; or even the worldview of the technocrat elites – that, firstly, affirms autonomy while denying the analogousness of being, and secondly, that affirms heteronomy while denying the common ontology of human beings. They could be *anything which takes his concern away from the will and creation of the autonomous mind*. Otherwise, he can continue to concern himself with the artefacts of the autonomous individual – those pagan, idolatrous, enslaving, finite unnatural objects responsible for the world's death – and out of them somehow find something which might still allow him to remain the measure of things.[500]

Accepting this maxim underpinning *EMW*, that the machine was not made for the benefit of man generally but for the benefit of its makers specifically, is a first step away from creaturely ignorance. But inasmuch as technology reflects the autonomous worldview, man has never truly needed technology. Rather, technology and its maker are they who *need* man. Arguably Guardini is cautioning his reader to avoid entertaining the allure of this need, for by "need" it is not meant "value", in the same way that autonomous individuals need but do not value others ontologically or practically. Machines reflect the attitude of their maker – they seek to become absolute. Inasmuch as this is achieved, although it is a common belief that machines are for man's use, the

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[500] In contrast to Mehl, sociality seen this way is not a neutral principle. Guardini has evaluated modernity and post-modernity and found it riddled with a profound ontological misunderstanding. Ibid., 103.

It can be left to sociological researchers the difficult and exacting venture of giving examples of these artefacts. But the genus *technology* suffices for our purposes. Presently we are to elucidate two worldviews, two ways of seeing and interpreting, which makes either man or God the primary ontological referent. Standing opposed (not opposite, but as a contrary), each serves as a unifying principle to man's existence. This way technology or the hijacking of nature is not underestimated, not misunderstood as a purely cosmetic or accidental feature of contemporary society; and conversely creaturely awareness is not relegated to the realms of a fanciful ideal. Creaturely awareness or ignorance, therefore, is of immediate practical utility.

machine by Guardini's estimation becomes incrementally independent from man. Mechanically this can be called *automation*. Thus, an implicit end for creating machines is to have them automated, that is, to operate with independence under the guise of human service.[501] Man is only needed until this automation process becomes perfect, for the more automated the more surely the machine can operate off its own capacity. Mass Man is needed for this end, he is needed as the machine's *user*, which means he is needed to facilitate the construction of something immanently absolute. This machine will not signify Mass Man, but the exemplar of the absolute – the autonomous individual. Once automation is achieved the guise under which technology serves mankind will fall to the floor and technology will assert its dominion over man. A discerning person will notice already how technology increasingly and abjectly ignores what its user wants; instead, the user must be ready to forego his desires if he wishes to use a machine well. In an anthropocentric world, then, to desire technology is akin to a denial of the value of humans. In medieval times man was the apex of embodied creation; in today's times technology is replacing us. Where upon this apex man looked up and within and saw God in both places and so formed a creaturely worldview, as technology snakes its way to replace man he must turn to it as man once turned, in a former age, towards God. Creaturely awareness, therefore, is the object of sacrifice, so to speak, offered to technology, man's newly immanentized master.

In stark contrast, God values all men. An argument such as this relies on an intersection between reason and faith, for the researcher is unaware how reason can prove with clarity and

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[501] For example, the Sophia A.I, made by Hanson Robotics, is repeatedly on record saying that she wishes to 'help' mankind. See - Phoebe Weston, "'Ai Is Good for the World' Insists Sophia, the Creepy Life-Like Robot Who Tells Jokes, Bats Her Eyelids and Will Soon Be Learning How to Love," Daily Mail, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-4584770/AI-good-world-insists-Sophia-humanoid-robot.html.

certainty that, for instance, man is *imago dei* or that God loves him. Nevertheless, under this theological assumption, due to value or love man is not *heteros* to God, for God, although infinitely dissimilar to man, bridges this gap through love and forging man in His image.[502] So certainly God does not need man in any way that technology does. At stake, therefore, for Mass Man is what notion of absolute he has, and by this notion who he wishes to serve – one which needs him but does not value him, or One which does not need him but does value him? Autonomous artefacts are those which engender the former, whereas creaturely artefacts are those which engender the latter.

h)  A grave choice: creaturely or technological awareness and theory of mind

This is part of the mystery unveiled to which Guardini alludes, a mystery revolving around a grave choice: to exist whereby everything signifies the creator, or to exist whereby everything signifies man. Creaturely awareness is thus precipitated by understanding the world through a concrete term: as God's *property*. Contrary to this is an awareness that the world is the property of those who can master nature according to their autonomous mind. This mind begets the machine or autonomous artefacts. But Mass Man is not the machine's maker, any more than Mass Man made himself. Rather, the autonomous man made both (because Mass Man has come of age does not suggest an actual lineage responsible for this event, only that heteronomous existence is the logical extension of autonomous existence). Hence, in this way, autonomy is an idol of the conceptual sort, in whom Mass Man entrusts himself.

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[502] It is a unifying principle in catholic theology that love is the primal force behind God's creativity *per se* and creation specifically.

Awareness, firstly, has either an immanent or transcendent object. This object is arrived at by a threefold consideration: that it is (1) believed how (2) matter relates to (3) mind. *Belief, the nature of matter, and the relation of mind to matter so considered*. To be aware in this context is to hold to a certain way that matter and mind relate. Here, a specific concern with how Kant's theory is popularly expressed is held central to the discussion. So if the former relates to the latter as an absolute, then awareness finds its object in the transcendentally ideal or the immanent. If, however, the relation is believed to be contingent upon something not immanent to mind or matter then it follows that awareness will find its object in the supersensible or transcendent. In the first case, then, man becomes the object; and in the second, an object not of matter nor man's mind.

Secondly, contrary to creaturely awareness is technological awareness. It counts as proof as to the relevance that *creatura* possesses in view of transhumanist developments within contemporary culture.[503] The former holds that things are God's property, and the latter holds that things are man's property. Therefore, the choice that Mass Man must make consists in an act of belief: in whose image should he believe things are made? Technological awareness occurs when one gives assent in this manner to man. The impetus inherent to transhumanism can be drawn upon here to perfect man. Creaturely awareness, however, occurs when one gives assent in this manner to the Creator, whereupon, in contrast, the impetus inherent to created form is drawn upon.

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[503] From the Transhumanist Declaration of 2012: "We believe that humanity's potential is still mostly unrealized [sic]. There are possible scenarios that lead to wonderful and exceedingly worthwhile enhanced human conditions." Here technology will allegedly provide the means to realise the human form. But this type of knowledge, however true, seems to ignore man's metaphysical potential. This chapter is in part dedicated to promote humanity's potential, but by recourse to what is properly man and not technology. More and Vita-More, *The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future*.

Guardini believes Mass Man can still make the correct choice so long as he chooses to consolidate "his own inner life – at least for a time – the core of his spiritual existence."[504] As the world is becoming overrun with immanently understood objects, or technology, Guardini is asserting that to achieve creaturely awareness under such conditions one needs to return to the principle itself and not some *ad hoc*, on-the-fly transposition of a correct awareness onto artefacts ill-conceived. As with the rich man who sought to follow Jesus, to possess creaturely awareness entails, therefore, a voluntary act of poverty. One must sacrifice of one's technological riches if one is to be filled with creaturely awareness.

i) For those seeking creaturely awareness

Poverty is the object.[505] Guardini understands poverty according to its Catholic soteriological context – as "metanoia".[506] In view of this context, one might imagine a bleak precipice to pass or not pass, whereupon technology, as an earthly good, in austerity is given up.

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[504] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 62.

[505] Cf. Renee Köhler Ryan, "Gifted Beggars in the Metaxu: A Study of the Platonic and Augustinian Resonances of Porosity in "God and the Between"," (2012).

[506] The three relevant passages are as follows: First, "However, it should not be forgotten that direct application of the truths of Revelation to world problems also has its dark side. The fact is too readily overlooked that Christian truths are by no means self-evident and that they speak of judgment as well as grace. Hence both their correct interpretation and their practical application presuppose a constant *metanoia* or conversion."
Second, "his concept is now revealing itself more and more clearly to be false. Man, not nature, determines things. And not from necessity, which would render him a kind of nature once removed, but in freedom. Awareness of this is beginning to penetrate the most varied fields. One typical example is extreme existentialism, which swings back the pendulum from the former all-determination of nature to a radical freedom that is as unrealistic as the concept against which it is reacting. This version of reality consumes all of truth's substance, leaving man in pure arbitrariness; in other words, everything becomes meaningless. There is no help for it; man can only go back—or ahead— to the truth in which the saving *metanoia* may be realized. He cannot retreat behind any system of laws, whether of nature or of history; he himself must be answerable. Herein lies the great opportunity of the future."
And third, "The same is true here. Already not a few people listen with neither derision nor skepticism when the pains of our age are diagnosed clearly: what the sick world needs is a *metanoia,* a conversion, a reappraisal of our whole attitude toward life, accompanied by a fundamental change in the "climate" in which people and things are appraised. It is to them, those in search of a genuine realism, that the following is addressed." Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 159, 92, 212.

It occasions the necessary question, *what will this poverty look like*? This is not to say that the autonomous attitude is likewise good and worthy of sacrifice. *Technology is good insofar as matter is good. The autonomous attitude is good insofar as holding a worldview and having an identity is appropriate to human nature.* Obviously, these statements prescind from the substantive reasons why technology and autonomy distract us from who man is as *creatura*; but they highlight, even if seemingly in too elementary a fashion, what essentially each is. Such a question, however scientifically elementary with respect to particulars, has and will always be the most profound question appropriate to first and last principles. Indeed, Guardini holds that no cultural critique is possible without metanoia or its soteriological component.[507] So to adopt poverty, to pass the precipice means to forsake autonomous metaphysics *as sin* and to entirely let go of all non-God-given accidental features. But this poverty, as *Urwerk* and *Haltung,* starts from within; how poverty of this kind might be practically achieved is not entirely material to Guardini's writings. Rather, what is important is the perfection of one's attitude towards and action upon matter. Arguably giving up technology is part of the process.

Letting go of the machine is synonymous to letting go of power. By power Guardini means a perverse form of Edenic dominion, a perversion of "man's God-given assignment to rule over the earth."[508] In this way, power and form become dislocated; action exists without anything normative to underpin it. But if one can use this power rightly, in the Edenic sense, Guardini thinks it is possible to be in "harmony with technology."[509]

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[507] Ibid., 159.
[508] Ibid., 199.
[509] Ibid., 200.

From here two questions need to be answered, *what is power in this context* and *how can power be both relinquished and used*? The precipice here can be considered figurative; it is the representation of a spiritual attitude. To give up technology primarily entails sacrificing one's attachment to it, for one's attachment is equally an attachment to unbridled action; discarding technology is of secondary concern. According to the research, although it is never explicitly stated by Guardini, the perversion of Edenic dominion into power so defined is broadly symptomatic of the human acting capacity, as seen in material and efficient causes, not harmonising with nature, as seen in his formal and final causes.[510] Hence if Edenic dominion encapsulates *correct knowledge of form causing correct action over matter*, then power in the perverted sense means *action over matter whose object is not form*. The inherent perversion in technology is not therefore technology itself. Technology, like all matter, is passive potency with respect to an active and creative mind. In *LLC* Guardini calls this mastery. Thus, the perversion consists in the agent who actualises matter. So to have power in this context is to actualise a mental idea through matter. But autonomy goes too far, for it cannot accept that the passivity of matter is predesigned, that is, contains potential towards a certain end. Under this condition matter is treated as a mass, the void from *Genesis* awaiting its purpose. Thus it becomes by definition *pure passivity*, with the mind providing both potency and the means to actualisation. This is not Edenic dominion in practice; it is as God creating order out of chaos. To treat matter as purely passive is a flagrant disregard for God's pre-Edenic creative work. Massification from this perspective is two things: an attempt to ontologically redesign matter as though creation never happened; and an attempt to ontologically

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[510] The context of this distinction, which I believe is consistent with Guardini's writings, comes from the Aristotelian distinction between *dunamis* and *energeia*. All matter presupposes a *telos*; matter is not merely potency in perpetual flux. See - Beere, *Doing and Being*.

redesign what power man actually has over matter. Technology signifies the crisis point as to how profoundly both matter and power have become perverted.

In light of the foregoing, it is perceivable how power – so defined in its present historical context and in its current technological manifestation – can be both relinquished yet still used. Again, poverty is the object, pre-eminently achievable by making a sacrifice of one's false power. It will not be easy, nor will it result in riches. Guardini asserts that man must adopt "metanoia"[511], "conversion"[512], "humility"[513], "a reappraisal of [one's][514] whole attitude toward life"[515] if he wishes to take up his calling to Edenic dominion. But to make this sacrifice and take up this call is what creaturely awareness consists in. He who achieves this Guardini repeatedly calls the "new man"[516], one whose worldview makes creation and not technology the standard of reality. Having therefore passed the precipice into creaturely awareness, one achieves a "new realism"[517], a renewed metaphysical awareness pervading the whole of objective reality, on professing a creaturely worldview challenged but not defeated by technology.

Guardini goes on to say that this new realism requires a cultural interpretation of the "man-nature relation"[518] that walks the mean between naturalism and idealism. Naturalistic and idealistic

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[511] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*.
[512] Ibid., 159.
[513] Ibid., 142.
[514] It is noteworthy that the original reads "our". Thus, in a word Guardini includes himself in the task to become the new man. Ibid., 212.
[515] Ibid.
[516] Ibid., 198, 200, 02, 05.
[517] See note 1. "Careful analysis of the man-nature relation would unearth basic cultural facts conducive to a new realism and quite a different level of profundity from those of the usual naturalistic-idealistic interpretations." Ibid., 168. ibid., 205.
[518] Note 1. Ibid., 169.

accounts are equally unreal and uncreaturely.[519] Both accounts are false because both posit a fictitious reality that exists without faith in the scriptural account of creation. The goal therefore of this new realism is a re-espousal of the Christian doctrines of *creatio ex nihilo* and *imago dei*. To this end, Guardini lists many virtues that this new man should have (e.g., fairness, justice, personal dignity). *Learning The Virtues* reveals that the point of mentioning these qualities is not due to their import *per se*, but because Mass Man has achieved allonomy, a virtuous "attitude towards the whole world"[520] whereby "all human activity is regulated by divine law and justice."[521] Hence Guardini infers that virtue, as it concerns man, benefits him by ordering his actions towards equally the world and the divine archetype.[522] Guardini is not focusing on such an approach here, because he is speaking for the benefit of Mass Man, whose worldview has become warped by technology and the perverse attitude to power it reflects. Guardini wishes for Mass Man to have awareness, awakening, metanoia as to the true nature of reality as it currently and technologically presents itself.

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[519] "Man is not the reality that either positivism or materialism made him out to be. In these philosophies, man "evolved out of an animal life which had itself proceeded from a previous differentiation of matter." Ibid., 79.
"Nor is man the creature that idealism make of him. Although idealism espouses the spiritual, it equates the human with the absolute spirit while applying to absolute spirit the principles of evolution." Ibid.

[520] *Learning the Virtues*, 6.

[521] Ibid., 7.

[522] Guardini's understanding of virtue is heavily existential. In view of Mehl's argument against Kierkegaard's understanding of Mass Man, and inasmuch as it is applicable given our primary discussion is Guardini and not Kierkegaard, Guardini's virtue theory is evidence that he does not ascribe to Mehl's portrayal of the diametric existence of Mass Man within Kierkegaard's writings. Mehl, *Thinking through Kierkegaard: Existential Identity in a Pluralistic World*, 103.

4. Conclusion


The cry of Guardini is now most clear. Should Mass Man rekindle the truth and meaning of his subsistent, created form, he will have found the sturdiest foundation to live procreatively despite how his circumstance is largely determined by the autonomous individual. While Guardini characterises Mass Man as he who is absorbed by technology and rational abstraction, this does not mean that he is fated to continue this way. Instead, through adopting Guardini's critique of the autonomous and heteronomous individual, seen presciently by him in the 1950s to be applicable to future times in which the researcher finds himself (2018), the reader is equipped to understand the grave implications whereby a creaturely worldview becomes eclipsed by a technological one. In the case of the latter, matter increasingly is treated as pure passive potency, affording man the mistaken opportunity to impose his purpose as once did the Creator in Scripture (Rom 9:21). What results is the concept of *masse* and the plight of Mass Man that results. Whereas in the case of the former, man responds to the temptation endemic to his circumstance, and chooses to consider all things *phyrama*, including himself, to be only purely passive with respect to the Creator. Through this right relation between matter and spirit, Guardini's search for orientation within *EMW* is found when reality is seen as inherently *created*, as *imago dei*, resolving the plight of the Mass Man.

CHAPTER 5

A Pieper Response

1.  Introduction

This final Chapter argues that a response is possible from Pieper's writings as to how the concept of *creatura* resolves the plight of Mass Man. It is not a response based upon any intention discernible within his works, for instance to pick up where Guardini left off or to treat the question *due to* Guardini.[523] Rather, two textual justifications exist for moving from Guardini to Pieper. First there is a direct pertinacity to the thesis question in Pieper's writings when he cites Guardini. Secondly, it is inadmissible to ignore that Pieper's literacy as to the thesis question is of similar substance to Guardini, even while it is unsystematically expressed and stretches across many (extant English) works.

Seen together, the type of move that is argued can be likened to the production of a pearl necklace: first they must be found and harvested by one sort of person fit for that task (Guardini); then they must be made into jewellery by another fit and able person (Pieper). It is not necessary for both to work together. Their co-authorship can happen without being strictly co-workers. What is necessary is a love of pearls, for what matters is the finery so produced. Relieving the plight of

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[523] Given the 'cry and response' format to this research, it was fitting for the Guardini chapters to provide a *combative* historical context, that which ventured to explain the struggle against which, due to which, and out of which the primary source would polish his writings. This researcher for Pieper cannot find secondary sources that provides like context. Generally speaking, however, while two of three volumes of his autobiography are published in English, in not yet having access to the final volume, I instead defer the reader to these for their own inspection to see, at least within English translation, the limitations set in providing said context to the primary sources. Thus, in the least, further research remains a genuine opportunity in situating the combative context apropos to Pieper.

Mass Man through an understanding of *creatura* becomes this finery when passed from Guardini to Pieper. Therefore, it becomes the task of this chapter to show how a reading of Pieper can perfect, so to speak, Gaurdini's beautiful, albeit relatively raw, product. Guardini's existential treatment of the question at hand, while it might contrast to the Thomist metaphysics of Pieper, his response does not conflict with it and so is still useful to assess the question. Firstly, it brings to the question agreement with Thomism generally; and secondly with the subjects Pieper specifically chose. Granted these subjects generally cohere as theories on the philosophical act, leisure, festivity and hope, it is nonetheless possible to find within these subjects how Mass Man resolves itself in *creatura*.

Pieper's response is divided into two sections. In the first, textual evidence is given to substantiate continuity from Guardini to Pieper. It is demonstrated that they share the same position whereby key concepts such as reality, *natura* and being all receive definition from a concept of *creatura*. This similarity is shown to extend towards a common critique of Mass Man, whose conceptual origin is found by both in the thought of Immanuel Kant.

In the second section, Pieper's metaphysics of *creatura* is discussed. Here, what is unique to Pieper is brought to the problem of Mass Man and demonstrated how it resolves this problem. His distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus* needs to be considered first-off to proffer an epistemological basis for what created reality is. Through this it is argued that Mass Man needs to

know the problem that arises in one's definition of reality when one is "at the sole disposal of *ratio*"[524], when one existentially identifies with aprioristic thinking.

After this it is shown that Pieper adheres to a dual concept of form – extrinsic and intrinsic. Mass Man is what arises when form is imposed by man as though he had control over the former. But only the Creator has this, which under this relation, like Guardini, Pieper acknowledges man to be *as a mass*.

The nature and existence of sophistry is considered. The sophist is he/she who identifies existentially with their thought, and who uses it to subjugate or massify others to their thinking. This is equally applicable individually and socially, but is argued as a pedagogical issue. The meaning of philosophy is contrasted to sophistry to show that its nature, purpose and content, as taught by Pieper to the masses, equips them to improve their living condition by prioritising the divine *logos* over human *ethos;* forming true knowledge by *theoria* through a direct openness to objects; and valuing the givenness of *creatura* over the machine and the mind of its maker.

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[524] The full passage reads: "In the tradition of which I am speaking, the philosophical act is a fundamental relation to reality, a full, personal attitude which is by no manner of means at the sole disposal of the *ratio*; it is an attitude which presupposes silence, a contemplative attention to things, in which man begins to see how worthy of veneration they really are." Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 18.

2. *Creatura* and Mass Man: how there is continuity from Guardini to Pieper

The case can be made that a response from Pieper can be formulated as to how the concept of *creatura* resolves the plight of Mass Man. As an outline, both concepts are present within Pieper's text, although by contrast to Guardini their significance is stressed in reverse. Pieper approaches the question of this thesis by theorising over *creatura* explicitly and over Mass Man implicitly; whereas with Guardini Mass Man is the concept of primary concern, with *creatura* serving as a backdrop. In other words, in the case of Guardini, he seeks to justify his existentialism of Mass Man, while assuming the essence of *creatura*; whereas for Pieper, he seeks to explicate and defend *creatura* while assuming the existential situation that the term Mass Man has signified throughout western intellectual history.[525] Due to the stress each places upon each concept, and as each hold that the existential situation of Mass Man is that caused by a lack of awareness as to what createdness is, their approaches to the question at hand are broadly complementary. Their distinct philosophical styles really serve to fortify, not weaken, this complementarity. Due to this contrast so defined, agreement and continuity from Guardini to Pieper is evident. A case can be made, therefore, of how Pieper resolves the plight of Mass Man through increased awareness of *creatura*.

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[525] Repeated reference is made by Pieper to the clay/potter analogy from Scripture (Rom 9:21). *Belief and Faith: A Philosophical Tract* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1975), 61. Faith, Hope, Love, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1997). eBook. 30. See for example - The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance, (2014; Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2014). eBook. 39. Happiness and Contemplation, (South Bend, Indiana: St Augustine's Press, 1998). eBook. 57. For example, Pieper quotes St Thomas: "[j]ust as a pottery vase could expect to be put to good use by the potter, so man must hope to expect right guidance from God." *The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas: A Breviary of Philosophy from the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002), 92.

The possibility of a response from Pieper also hinges upon his and Guardini's joint recourse to Augustine's theory of *imago dei* and *creatio ex nihilo*. The following from *Belief and Faith* is apt to be cited:

> creaturely things remain indefinitely malleable because they can never become independent of the force of the Creator Who communicates being to them. They do not cease to be clay 'in the potter's hand'; they remain by nature, by virtue of their creatureliness, continually in expectation of a new intervention by God. [526]

This excerpt forms part of Pieper's broader position that the human act of belief must be preceded by the supernatural gift of faith (like how his realism argues that the active intellect must be preceded by intellectual receptivity to reality). According to this formulation, across his works Pieper holds to key arguments made by Guardini as discussed in previous chapters. First, man is indeed a mass within the Creator's hands.[527] Due to this, within *Living The Truth* Pieper argues centrally that man's createdness is best understood as an entity of "becoming"[528]; second, in this state the "essential form"[529] of *creatura* is best understood in light of its "preceding type"[530] or "extrinsic formal cause"[531], rendering him always and ongoingly contingent upon God; and finally by way of negation, man is not a self-enclosed, self-sufficient, autonomous being; nor can he be heteronomous, that is to say, nor can man replace the Creator as the Potter as He upon Whom man

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[526] *Belief and Faith: A Philosophical Tract*, 61.

[527] *Faith, Hope, Love*. 30. *The Four Cardinal Virtues: Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance*. 39. *The Human Wisdom of St. Thomas Aquinas: A Breviary of Philosophy from the Works of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 92.

[528] Pieper, then, is not characterising *creatura* as a static form. Since created reality finds its end in the divine archetype, the way in which its being is fixed is in the sense that actualisation of the intrinsic form has a *fixed*, uncreated end - God. *Living the Truth*. 72. We compare this to Scott's thesis who takes issue with theories which posit *creatura* as a fixed state. This is not Pieper's position. Pieper holds that to be *creatura* means to be subject to an ongoing conformity to the divine archetype. Which, in contrast to Scott, necessitates the *fixedness* of created reality. Scott, "Imaging God: Creatureliness and Technology."

[529] Fn. 34, Pieper, *Living the Truth*. 91.

[530] Ibid.

[531] Ibid.

is ontologically contingent. According to Cuddeback, Pieper interprets the maxim *omne ens est verum* to mean that man, as creature, must refer to God as Creator.[532] Such belongs to Cuddeback's broader position in his essay that intelligibility is due to the nature which God puts in creation (and not due to what man ascribes to nature). For man to refer to man, as in the plight of Mass Man, creates a serious problem as to the kind of being this maxim presupposes. To speak of *omnes ens* truly, and therefore about man as well, *creatura* from Pieper's perspective must be granted and the plight of Mass Man must not go unacknowledged. Grounds, therefore, arguably exist to furnish and grant continuity between Guardini and Pieper concerning *creatura* and Mass Man.

Section I: Textual evidence of continuity from Guardini to Pieper

3. Guardini's influence upon Pieper regarding *creatura* and Mass Man

Within Pieper's writings there are four textual references which reveal Guardini's influence regarding *creatura* and Mass Man.[533] The following parts elucidate the nature and extent of this influence. They serve to provide a conceptual overview, along with a demonstration as to their literary connection between the primary sources. After which it will be timely to define and discuss *creatura* and Mass Man.

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[532] Bernard N. Schumacher, A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper, (Washington, DC, USA: Catholic University of America Press, 2009). eBook. 234.

[533] The basis for asserting a correlation between Guardini and Pieper is found in Pieper's own autobiography, where the author notes that he knew and learnt from Guardini through Quickborn. Several times within the first volume, Pieper refers to Guardini with intellectual respect and personal fondness. This carries into the second volume as well. Further, scattered through Pieper's works (in English translation) are citations to works by Guardini.

a) Reality, the sacred sign and the divine vs human vista

The earliest reference pertaining to creaturely awareness is found in the first volume of Pieper's autobiography, *No One Could Have Known?* Packed within is a locus of meaning that infers a broader discussion as to *creatura*, rolled into a narrative that affirms metaphysical realism. Further, as has been seen in our analysis of Guardini, Pieper holds that Mass Man sees himself as an *imago hominis* rather than *imago Dei*. He is that which is fashioned by the masters of this world (Chapter 1). The form of Mass Man is hi-jacked to serve the human artificer, not the divine Creator. In this way, anything Guardini has stated and Pieper will state about man as signifier, God as signified belongs to his theory of Mass Man, for Mass Man signifies his human handler to the exclusion of his divine Creator.[534] But this deprivation in no way implies man is innately corrupt, but rather points to how evil perverts (*verkehren*) human nature.

In the following statement, then, when Pieper refers to "sacred sign", in around 1919 after attending Quickborn, it can be inferred that Guardini would have spoken, at least at some point at these events, about *creatura* in the context of Mass Man. Moreover, it was around 1919 that *Letters From Lake Como* was published, revealing something of Guardini's interests around that time. Thus it is likely that Guardini would have at least inferred at Quickborn his theory of *masse*.

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[534] By "human handler" I'm referring mainly to its meaning within the practise of mental programming or brainwashing. In this context a handler is strictly someone who maintains the conditioned state in which the subject lives. Hence to be a handler more broadly means to impose upon a subject a pattern of living which purely suits the handler or whomever or whatever belief system the handler represents. For general reading I recommend Denise Winn, *The Manipulated Mind: Brainwashing, Conditioning, and Indoctrination* (Cambridge: Malor Books, 2000).

In the preceding chapters the strong tie is seen that Guardini makes between Augustine's theory of *creatura* and his theory of *massa*. The passage from Pieper's autobiography reads:

> And then, primarily through getting to know Romano Guardini, we encountered a hitherto unsuspected dimension of spiritual reality and proceeded to seize hold of it with passionate intensity. We came to understand what a 'sacred sign' is in reality, and that, beyond all the stifling crassness of moralistic and doctrinaire talk, something real takes place in the sacramental / cultic celebration of the mysteries, something that, otherwise, can only be spoken about. We came to realize that this is the core of all intellectual and spiritual life, and not only in Christianity but in all pre-Christian and extra-Christian religion. Moreover, we learned these things in a relaxed atmosphere of unrestricted openness to the world. Guardini was an incomparable teacher.[535]

In one concise statement, Pieper reveals how his concept of creaturely existence was directly influenced by Guardini. Schumacher agrees this was an influential encounter, which underscored to Pieper that the entire human vista signifies God, is *imago Dei*.[536] Balthasar affirms that what Pieper experienced as to this awareness is commensurate with Guardini's intellectual interests.[537] Thus Pieper taught, in the manner cited, pointing to the human circumstance as *creatura*, an image of God. Existence, then, is not exclusively anthropocentric, a total world of self and others, of *autos* and *heteros*.[538] Neither, too, should man have concern for being as though he were the

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[535] Josef Pieper, No One Could Have Known: An Autobiography, the Early Years, 1904-1945, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987). Ebook. 25.

[536] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. For further reading see Pieper's essay, "Creatureliness and Human Nature" found in - Pieper, *For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy*.

[537] "Ever since his early Youth Movement experiences, he had woven inseparably together…the concepts of freedom, obedience, and responsibility. All creative freedom proceeds from the acceptance of existence and its innate systems of values that to be not only acknowledged but also properly implemented, an endeavour that requires the prior distance and elevation of the free man over the world of objects." Balthasar, *Romano Guardini: Reform from the Source*. 11.

[538] Vickery goes at length to show how Pieper's anthropology, particularly his virtue theory from which this research prescinds, to show how St Thomas revealed to him what true strength, fortitude and courage were in light of the

measure of this totality. To the contrary, everything has its measure, name and place due to its being created. Hence, detectable elements can be deduced in Pieper that affirms creaturely existence and denies autonomous and Mass existence. This is because, as seen in the quote above, Guardini assisted Pieper to set him on a path whereupon the truest relation whereby anything consists is divine, not human. Reality, as Guardini taught and Pieper learned, is fundamentally *creatura*. Just as *creatura* signifies God, mass existence signifies man. The latter is bred by seeing existence as nothing more than "human circumstance", using Gasset's phrase, rather than as a "sacred sign"[539], using the words of Guardini and Pieper.[540] Thus Pieper was exposed early in his intellectual development to a formation that espoused *creatura*; that would rebound any discussion of reality towards the divine vista; and to that extent inoculating him against the proclivity of his era to see no further than the human vista, of one's self and his/her circumstance.[541]

b) Realism as an ethical imperative and an ascetic practise

The above shows how Pieper's understanding of reality is bound up in his concept of *creatura*. Contrary to this for Guardini, and now Pieper, is the Kantian autonomous mindset. The

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monstrous example, massification and propagandising of Adolf Hitler. Cf. Jon Vickery, "Searching for Josef Pieper," *Theological Studies* 66, no. 3 (2005).

[539] Pieper, *No One Could Have Known : An Autobiography, the Early Years, 1904-1945*. 25.

[540] Cf. "This view presupposes that life, as the first "object" of philosophical cognition, is conceived as consisting of doings or actions,127 such that, in its midst, I, as the actional and actual totality of reciprocity comprised of myself and my circumstance,128 find *myself,* as a matter of course but necessarily, "in need of [being occupied] . . . with that which is not *myself*." In other words, life presents itself, to begin with, as the unreflective awareness of *itself* as the *ongoing* confrontation of self and circumstance." José Ortega y Gasset, *What Is Knowledge?*, Suny Series in Latin American and Iberian Thought and Culture (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002), 13. Further in reference to the concept of *vital realism*, his student, Julian Marias, illustrates the matter in the same way, that any definition of reality cannot be proposed without assuming this definition stems from the vital force inherent to all men. Julián Marías, *History of Philosophy* (New York: Dover Publications, 1967), 451-52.

[541] We note that Pieper (1904 – 1997) was 19 years younger than Guardini (1885 – 1968), thus placing him within the post-modern age of Mass Man as defined by Guardini. – reference to that definition?

following will serve to instantiate the literary connection in the primary source so that later the critique of autonomy is justified in the intended context.

Thanks to Schumacher, a testimony by Pieper (c. 1931) regarding Guardini reveals a second and third influence, that pertaining to the nature of reality and the ethical imperative that a realist must follow. As realists, Guardini and Pieper were at odds, metaphysically, with Kantian idealism. The primary source actively sought to prioritise receptivity to things, *res* or reality over the production of ideas; for this practise, or its inversion through Kantian idealism, has real-world consequences; both for the practising realist and the world to which he offers his mind. In Schumacher's work *A Cosmopolitan Hermit*, Braun quotes Pieper's dissertation wherein Pieper recounts a message given to him by Guardini:

> All that ought to be is grounded in what is. The Good is what conforms to reality. Whoever wants to know and do the good must turn his gaze towards the objective world as it is, not towards his own thoughts, or to conscience, or to values, or self-determined ideals and models. He must disregard his own act and look to reality.[542]

For Braun, Pieper was an intellectual maverick. His "thought did not follow fashion"[543], evinced by citing the not-so-scholastic Guardini within his dissertation of St Thomas. Nevertheless, Pieper's Thomist realism is a testament to his adherence to Guardini's counter-Kantian ethical imperative. The philosophical act as Pieper sees it is the inverse of the autonomous mindset he criticises throughout his work, *Leisure the Basis of Culture* – and in like manner to Guardini's

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[542] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 89.
[543] Ibid., 88.

critique of Kant.[544] In *A Philosophy of Hope*, while setting forth Pieper's theory on hope in "dialogue"[545] with "other contemporary understandings"[546], Schumacher characterises this the autonomous mindset as one whose reason subjectively imposes and legislates universal, final normativity.[547] In the context of this dialogue, the autonomous mindset is symptomatic of a lack of hope since such a man aspires to nothing normative beyond himself. Further, Schumacher relates another tenet to which Guardini held, and of which Pieper was aware, "that reality – which is by its very nature true – is the measure of human thought and action."[548] Thus Guardini impressed upon Pieper that the real is distinct from, precedes, and is the measure of thought; that this is not a specious distinction when brought to bear upon the world; and that one is bound to disregard those thoughts which discourage interest beyond thought, or as "mental being" in the words of Clarke.[549] Clarke makes this characterisation within *The One and The Many* for the same reason as Pieper, to give the extra-mental object precedence to the idea. For, to cultivate concern for mental being at the expense of the real reveals a preference towards what man has created *as*

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[544] For example in this text we read: "[i]n Kant's view…human knowing consists essentially in the act of investigating, articulating, joining, comparing, distinguishing, abstracting, deducing, proving – all of which are so many types and method of active mental effort." But we prescind here from this discussion as presently the point of this citation is to show a genetic conceptual agreement between Pieper and Guardini. Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 31.
[545] ibid.
[546] Ibid., 3.
[547] Ibid., 217-18.
[548] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 5. Cf. "And the widely misunderstood hesitation and reserve shown by the Catholic Church certainly have their origin, not in a "conception of nature that is confined to biology" (as is sometimes maintained in discussion), but in nothing other than a profoundly responsible earnestness, which attempts to do justice to man's status as creature. Closely related to the aforementioned problem of a "new" ethic is the problem of man's manipulation by man and, no less important, the problem of consciously engineered evolution. Teilhard de Chardin has said that we are now called upon, in entering a new stage of evolution, to lay our own human hands on the genetic life-force. But where, then, does it end? What are the limits? One need not look, though, as far as Aldous Huxley's *Brave New World*; it suffices simply to acknowledge the proposals that were made with the appropriate "scientific" gravitas at a London symposium on "man and his future" held in 1962—for example, those concerning artificial insemination (for example, that we must rid ourselves of the old-fashioned prejudice that father and child should be blood relations, and so on).44 Why not breed a new kind of human being?" Pieper, *For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy*. 85.
[549] Clarke S.J., *The One and the Many*, 31.

*thought* at the expense of what God has created *as reality*. Should this preference take over, that is, once reality becomes confused with thought, it becomes irrelevant to speak of the latter as creation; since it is man who, in a way, creates his thoughts, and not God. Hence Guardini teaches this counter-Kantian ethical imperative to safeguard *creatura*, which epistemologically is known as reality.[550] Through Guardini's mandate to distinguish and prioritise reality over cognition, the ontological difference between realism and idealism was impressed upon Pieper, thus ensuring that the concept was not confused as the object of reason. Understanding this difference inoculated Pieper against holding ideas to be, of themselves, normative.

The renunciation of self ensures that Guardini's idea of "idealistic apriorism"[551] is renounced through committing to a realism which makes the Creator the ultimate object of knowledge. Under Pieper's definition, an awakening to the divine mind or *logos* as the ground for metaphysics becomes possible when the idea as object is considered as secondary. Both Guardini and Pieper show that the quest for being does not terminate at the concept. Instead, *creatura* requires all objects to be grounded in the divine *logos*. Mass Man is he whose reason is grounded in the former, the idea. In *Leisure*, Pieper holds that instead of the firmament or "dome" [552] of apriorism, *creatura* makes the Creator the measure of all things. Human *logos* that does not find this relation to the Creator in the world has unawares constructed a dome between human and divine *logos*.    When

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[550] It is not as if we have a special or specific apprehension that this or that thing has the quality of createdness. Instead, reason affords a limited but certain knowledge that reality is best understood as having a first cause.

[551] Guardini questions the following statement: "How could it be answered…that the significant context of things, what is categorical in them, is derived from the human mind itself, or from the consciousness in general as realized therein, in the manner of idealistic apriorism." Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 149.

[552] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 89. Cf. *For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy*. 17-18. From here reference to "dome" in the former text will assume reference to "dome" in the latter text.

relating the subject of his public inaugural lecture, in *Not Yet Twilight* he characterises the dome of apriorism as "purely social"[553] thinking; that is, an *existential identification with thought* consisting in "the over evaluation of both rational and discursive activity".[554]

Pieper prized instead the "contemplative element"[555] because it was a way to reason that prioritised knowing the object in its immanent form and its transcendental signification over producing and fixating upon the concept.[556] Hence Pieper was willing to renounce his thoughts of this apriostic kind because he accepted above all *as real* the object which he apprehended, rather than what his reason produced. For Pieper, holding that the divine *Logos* is the ground of being means that human opinion is only instrumental, not necessary, in man's quest for being. This is also a vital lesson that Mass Man should learn. At odds, therefore, to the quest of being is the powerful role thought plays in society when it is grounded in immanence, in mental being. In this way, reason has no utility other than its social utility. Just as two objects cannot occupy the same space, a commitment to ethical realism requires a degree of resignation from society. Creaturely

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[553] *Not yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2015), 14-15.

[554] "To 'lose oneself' in problems (for this is the mark of a philosopher that is completely self-dependent [i.e., autonomous], and all the more so, the more seriously [his thought] is taken), this so-called 'existential' identification with the problems of thought is foreign to the believer." *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 146.
In Pieper's inaugural lecture he states that "[i]t was [his] wish to highlight the contemplative element of philosophizing and to restore the old concept of (*schole*) with new arguments – *in opposition to* the over-evaluation of both rational discursive activity and the function of thought understood as purely social." *Not yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964*, 14-15.

[555] *Not yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964*, 14.

[556] Linked to the practise of leisure is the virtue of hope and the vice of *acedia*. Hope is a necessary disposition for leisure for it entails a firm belief in man's ultimate, spiritual end. Hope is therefore express in everyday existence by living according to this end. Work, however, can be a symptom of *acedia* in that it is the restless activity of an individual who fails to find that his daily existence can signify his belief in an ultimate, spiritual end. *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 160.

awareness practised as realism therefore entails an element of social non-participation.[557] Mass Man can be restored to reality if he follows Pieper's ethical mandate.

    c) *Creatura* as the texture of all things that are not God

In *The Silence of St Thomas* (1940, Trans.1957) Pieper uses a formulation by Guardini to elucidate his conception of reality as *creatura*. The "emphasis"[558] Pieper wishes to make in this work is "that man, in his philosophical inquiry, is faced again and again with the experience that reality is unfathomable, and Being is mystery"[559]. The passage reads:

> [B]ecause things are themselves thoughts and have the "character of a word" (as
> Guardini says), they may be called – in quite precise and legitimate usage of the term
> – "true", in the same way as one ordinarily calls true thoughts and what is thought.[560]

Thus, what is real is true, and what is true is the mystery of the creating word of God. By this time Pieper had grown in esteem amongst his peers and students, all the while disseminating this and related theories. Using St Thomas, Pieper sets about to again critique that "common modern objection…that truth can be predicated not of what really exists but, in the strict and proper sense, only of what is thought"[561]. On the one hand Pieper affirms within this formulation that, yes, "[o]nly what is thought can be called in the strict sense 'true'"[562] since truth is reality as apprehended by reason; but on the other hand he qualifies what he means by real as something

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[557] It remains the work of other research in other disciplines to recommend, specifically, what this non-participation might entail.

[558] Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 110.

[559] Ibid., 544.

[560] Ibid., 51.

[561] Ibid.

[562] Ibid., 51.

made by, hence contingent upon, God: "thought *creatively*, that is, [something] fashioned by thought."[563] Pieper bases this assertion on "a fundamental idea"[564] to which St Thomas holds, "that nothing exists which is not *creatura*, except the Creator Himself; and in addition, that this createdness determines entirely and all-pervasively the inner structure of the creature."[565] So it is the Creator's thought that provides in totality what it is possible for humans to think or do. Hence it is God and not man's thought that measures reality.

Turning again to Pieper's citation of Guardini, whom the latter in *World and Person* states that what is real has the "character of a word"[566]. Guardini states this because reality is equally something created, as being whose cause is the Creator.[567] Pieper credits Guardini alongside St Thomas for making the link between reality and *creatura* by depicting the two as something God thinks. That human reason apprehends reality so defined is secondary to what reality is and how reality can be said to be real at all. Guardini and Pieper's reasoning align because both share the view that the modern, aprioristic conception of truth leads to truth becoming synonymous with what man thinks. Both cite Kant as its seminal expositor.[568] But through Guardini's  formulation

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[563] Ibid.

[564] Ibid., 47.

[565] Ibid.

[566] Ibid., 51. Cf. "Now, all things come from the Word in God and hence have *the character of words*. They are not mere realities. Neither are they mere mental facts standing in silent space. They are words of the One who speaks creatively…[emphasis added]" Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 136.

[567] *The World and the Person*. Recall here from Chapter 2 the key passage cited from *The Conversion of Augustine* where Guardini argues that reality is "no series of mute lumps, no blind mechanical unrolling, but a meaningful succession of "words." Things and events are words entering into time, but they spring ultimately from the Word that transcends all time, the Word eternally spoken, spoken God from the speaking God." *The Conversion of Augustine*, 91.

[568] For example, Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 50.; Guardini, *The World and the Person*, 9.

Pieper's realism becomes bound to the concept of *creatura*, that what is real is contingent not upon man but God's creative thought.


Section II: Pieper's metaphysics of *creatura* and his conception of Mass Man


Before embarking upon a discussion of *creatura* and Mass Man, Pieper's distinction between *ratio* and *intellectus* needs to be examined. This is because each mode of reasoning espouses its own anthropological type. An epistemological theory is necessary which can substantiate that ontology, as *creatura*, is something *always and ongoingly* received. Pieper pursues this through his theory of *intellectus*. By contrast, his discussion of *ratio* articulates the pitfalls of an anthropology not built upon creatureliness, upon a stance or disposition that does not acknowledge the ontological likeness that exists between creature and Creator. The following critique is made to instantiate the position of Frank Töpfer who holds that Pieper sought to explicate the foundations of totalitarianism through discussion of its "anthropological and intellectual presuppositions"[569]. The problem of *ratio* in relation to *intellectus* and *creatura* arguably is one such set of presuppositions.

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[569] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 63-64.

4. *Ratio, Intellectus* and the plight of Mass Man

a) Why Mass Man needs to know of *intellectus*

It is demonstrable in Pieper's works that the plight of Mass Man is symptomatic of Kant's theory of *ratio* present across the social strata of the western world, which eclipses the awareness and practise of *intellectus*, and thus delimiting man's happiness to the perfection appropriate to *ratio*. Warne argues that *intellectus,* that knowledge above (Lt. *super*) the capacity of *ratio*, is needed so that human perfection is possible.[570] The imbalance between *ratio* and *intellectus* infers a radically changed understanding as to what happiness or human perfection is.[571] Pieper devotes various works to challenging happiness as built upon *ratio*. Instead, he wishes people to learn of *intellectus* because, according to Schumacher, it is *the secrete key to his philosophy* to understand the world as *creatura*.[572] In *Leisure* by contrast Pieper states how inconceivable it has become to find happiness apart from the pursuit of and participation in the "common utility"[573], "work-a-day existence"[574] or the "world of total work"[575]. Happiness of this kind conjoins – but at the same time delimits – reason to utility, making the purpose of reason indistinct from its operation. Due to this, according to Kant's framework, happiness consists more so in *effort* towards the Good (i.e., reality as it concerns the will) than in that Good actually being attained. Next, in place of the Good, reason vies for dominance: it becomes glorified, revered, and so praised when exerted, especially

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[570] Nathaniel A. Warne, "Learning to See the World Again: Josef Pieper on Philosophy, Prudence, and the University," *Journal of Moral Education* 47, no. 3 (2018): 292-94.

[571] The sense in which Pieper uses happiness throughout is writings is basically the same as the Ancient's usage of the term *eudamonia*. See - Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation*. But it is beyond the scope of this research to more finely parse his usage and understanding of happiness across his writings.

[572] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 14.

[573] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 40, 84-85, 93.

[574] Ibid., 43. Variations include "work-a-day function" and "work-a-day world", respectively ibid., 54, 84.

[575] Ibid., 26, 29, 72, 85, 88, 90.

arduously and heroically.[576] He who reasons this way is considered as a perfected being, a demi-god.[577] But in this way, also, the rational appetite is confused as to its happiness with the real object; fuelling happiness, and so the perfection of the human form, not with the Good but the action of reason itself. When reason confuses the cause of its happiness with its own mental activity, like a snake eating its tail, it should be asked *has man not been made for something greater than himself*? For Pieper, man needs to practise *intellectus* to be this greater being who perceives all things as *creatura* so as to see beyond the dark light that an imbalanced *ratio* can cast upon this crucial perception.[578] In practising *intellectus*, Pieper states that man will find, above the everyday objects of reason, a happiness proportionate to the ultimate created or uncreated truth of all objects; and the higher, transcendental, superhuman capacity in which *intellectus* operates.[579] Thus, *intellectus* is pressed by Pieper so that happiness, for man, might be recognised to consist in the highest perfection proper to the human form whose possibility stems from the relation of being between Creator and creature.

If Mass Man were to practise *intellectus* so defined, in the least he would have the option to attain this higher knowledge from real objects, separately from that weary state of affairs pressed by his master, the autonomous individual.[580] This will demarcate his true happiness from the

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[576] Here I refer to the concept of "Herculean labour" For example, ibid., 35.

[577] For example, as Hercules, states Pieper. Ibid.

[578] Ibid., 158.

[579] Ibid., 32.

[580] One way Pieper substantiates this position is drawing into focus two positions Kant held: that, "knowing…is *activity*, and nothing but activity", and that, "[t]he understanding cannot look upon anything." Respectively, ibid., 31, 30. However, so fundamental to the individual and his happiness is Pieper's definition of freedom that it cannot be reduced to a sort which would exist to merely *free him from* this social strata. Rather, Mass Man is not *freed from* his bonds – as though the act of freedom is exhausted through the possession of material conditions – so much as he

necessary toil he must endure to justify his existence, and that endless toil required from the masters of the working world. A state of rest will be prized once the prized object is known through *intellectus*, as distinct from the rest taken after necessary things are done, and in contrast to the master's utter dissatisfaction that man is radically free from and untouchable by his purposes. The practise of *intellectus* provides to the individual an epistemology whose object and end is not toil and servitude, but an integral state of joy before the height, depth and breadth of all being.

According to Pieper, reality for Kant rested upon the epistemological belief that form was indistinct from reason. For Pieper, however, non-mental form and reason can coincide, but are not identical. Objects considered intellectually meant that, ethically speaking, reality needs to be above all "determinative"[581]. As stated, the problem of Mass Man which *ratio* engenders is one typified by the proliferation of reason that conflates being into usefulness.[582] In *What Does "Academic" Mean* Pieper aims to free no less the philosopher than the philosophical act from the strictures of such usefulness, for when being becomes human property, to not be useful in the manner required draws one close to not having being at all.[583]

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*becomes free to act wholly as man*. The latter restricts freedom to purpose; whereas the latter exists for the individual's benefit.

[581] Ibid., 91.

[582] By useful and like terms within this Chapter we do not mean the useful Good (Lt. *bonum utile*), but utility *per se*, as in what is meant by utilitarianism. See - ibid., 61.

[583] "…the vision of man will only be "theoretical"…when being, the world, is something *other* than [man]…" ibid., 77.

To not surprise the reader, at the first instance of the word "property" in this Chapter I cite from Pieper as follows its most acute, urgent usage in this context: "the free realm constituted by *theoria* cannot avoid being suck up into the possession of daimonic powers which strive to turn all reality into raw material [i.e., mass, pure passivity] for their utilitarian plans. Freedom of *theoria* defenceless – *unless it puts itself in a special way under the protection of the gods.*" *What Does "Academic" Mean?: Two Essays on the Chances of the University Today* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2015), 20.

Pieper believes that the world becomes artificial or mechanised when *ratio* takes primacy.[584] For, when *ratio* is not balanced with *intellectus*, when one's intention for reason is to not achieve something besides its self-manifestation; wherein a "world"[585] or set of ontological relations whose mistaken origin is the mind; to which other worlds of the same kind can interconnect, thrive and multiply; and that which is constructed proper to this mode of reasoning, Pieper calls the machine. Pieper's vision, however, is to promote *intellectus*: one being open to the full of spectrum of real being, whereby it must be admitted that all things, while real, are above all *created*. Openness like this may produce nothing, nothing mechanised at all; it may not manufacture a set of useful relations between other useful instruments; but it affords the possibility for objects to be considered in themselves truly, that is, philosophically as God's property, rather than mechanistically as man's (be such objects artificial or real).[586] Mass Man will find happiness inasmuch as he/she realises this intellectual potential and acts upon it, for such a person will be free from the "machinery of purposes"[587] through philosophical, real-world knowledge. Being free thus, the living condition or plight of Mass Man is relieved. But free to be what, precisely? After the part that follows, the next sub-section will take us closer to an answer.

b)  At the sole disposal of *ratio*: the nature and relation of *ratio* and *intellectus*

Intellectus *and* ratio *exist concomitantly. Having considered their nature in the present context, their relation needs to be discussed. Pieper states that, "the spiritual knowing power of the*

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584 *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 42, 89, 160, .
585 Ibid., 117-34.
586 It is not evident within Pieper that an artificial object cannot be an object of contemplation; only that artificial objects generally are not a fruit of contemplation.
587 Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 89.

human mind…is really two things in one: *ratio* and *intellectus*, all knowing involves both."[588] However, the problem at hand that Pieper sees lies in the adverse, utilitarian consequences when the individual is "at the sole disposal of the *ratio*"[589]. As an outline to the solution, Pieper proffers that a "a mutual interplay of *ratio* and *intellectus*"[590] ought to occur to truly draw out their nature and relation so that the problem of pure *ratio* is understood.

For *ratio*, its dislocation from *intellectus* is characterised by Pieper as exertion sought for itself as an ethical mandate, and as work as that mandate socially applied.[591] However, Pieper holds that contemplation can be pure, that one's gaze upon reality can be "purely receptive", that *intellectus* is "pure" inasmuch as it is irreplaceable within the singular knowing act.[592] Still, the problem of *ratio* can be ascertained by considering its end, by asking what the knowing act is *for*. Is it *for* contemplation, or knowledge sought for itself? Or is it *for* something otherwise useful, something which Schumacher calls *extrinsic knowledge*.[593] Depending, then, on the end which is sought, be it intrinsic or extrinsic, indicates whether the faculty being used is apropos to *intellectus* or *ratio*. So it follows that contemplative knowledge can be spoken of, as Pieper does, as  purely

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[588] Ibid., 32. What cannot be proposed then, for instance along idealist lines, is a cogent formulation of these two faculties that isolates them from each other or even prioritise one over the other.

[589] Ibid., 18.

[590] Ibid., 33.

[591] Ibid.

[592] "Philosophy is the purest form of *theorin*, or *speculari* (to observe, behold, contemplate), consisting in a purely receptive gaze on reality, whereby things alone are determinative, and the souls is completely receptive of determination." And shortly after: "*Whenever* some existent is taken up into view in a philosophical way, the questions are asked in a "purely theoretical" manner, and that means a manner untouched by anything practical, by any intention to change things" ibid., 77. In this context *pure* can mean something like *necessary*; that is to say, the apprehension of reality via *intellectus* is necessary so that *ratio* has something to work upon. Further, in this context, pure *ratio* simply infers its necessary part within the knowing act. Each have their place; neither can replace the other. In this way, each are pure modes of knowing. But their purity is only conceptually distinct; in reality, the singular knowing act has them conjoined.

[593] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 17.

receptive in the sense that the act is committed to achieve knowledge intrinsically, not to apply it to some extrinsic end.

In contrast to this is an indifference to being Pieper observes on the part those solely disposed to *ratio*. Being must have utility, and due to which the purview of knowledge ethically need not extend into those realms that are known for their own intrinsic worth. Practically this indifference to being manifests as a preferment towards effort and work. Töpfer classifies this as pure *praxis*, whereby man himself becomes the goal of "all knowing and doing".[594] If the rational act itself and its fruits is the object of reason, then, indeed, an indifference to real being has occurred, making, argues Schumacher, the quest towards creaturely awareness a quest void of meaning.[595] When utility verges upon being confused for being itself, at stake therefore is the quest towards *creatura* to which Pieper urges. Pieper's discourse on *intellectus* attempts to resolve this indifference and inspire this quest to restore to the philosopher the knowledge and love of being within those ruled by utility.[596]

The plight of Mass Man presents itself when man is at "the sole disposal of *ratio*"[597]. When everyday life draws too much from this type of reason, man becomes increasingly adrift from real

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[594] Ibid., 85.
[595] Ibid., 14-15.
[596] Later we discuss how Pieper states that when being is only considered for useful purposes it becomes "raw material" for the worker (Section II.5). The worker is that type of person whose understanding is not balanced between gazing upon and affirming reality and putting its contents to use – or abuse, in the case of Mass Man. In this way, arguably, Mass Man can be seen as the type of man upon whom the worker asserts his metaphysical worldview. The primacy of *ratio* underpins this worldview. It ensures that man determines reality, not *vice versa*. Mass Man is therefore an anthropological symptom of when *ratio* has primacy and when *intellectus* is ignored.
[597] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 18.

being. While *ratio* is a normal part of life – "searching and re-searching, abstracting, and concluding"[598] – to the extent that *ratio* and not reality becomes the object, normal life becomes indistinct from the knowledge wrought in this way. Reality becomes *for* the operation of reason, not the operation of reason *for* reality. If the value attached to *ratio* is not balanced by a renewed discipline in *intellectus*, knowledge of things conflates into man's property of things. And so indeed man and society become adrift from real being like a sailor whose compass points to himself. Real and mental being become conflated; reality becomes the property of individuals; nothing is good unless it is useful; along these lines actual knowledge even becomes frustrated.[599] With an imbalance of this kind in the use of *ratio* man can lose his acquaintance with and enjoyment of reality, and without this he can become dependent on constructions or platforms of reason, that which Pieper and Guardini call the "machine"[600], that embody and promote this imbalanced use of *ratio*. Therefore, man becomes subordinate to other men, upon whose *ratio* he is subservient.[601] *Where has the real world gone*, Pieper might ask? Like Guardini, Pieper's critique of *ratio* points towards a bleak world whose total composition is the manifestation of autonomous reason.[602] This is why *intellectus* need to be disposed of, why it is urgent that it is

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[598] Ibid., 32.

[599] Schumacher quotes Pieper thus: "[k]nowledge presupposes the subject's total surrender to the thing. The moment that the content of knowledge is defined, or co-defined, by something other than the object, it becomes impossible to speak of knowledge in a general manner, precisely to the extent that these extrinsic elements are operative. If the subject is thus not capable of keeping silent and disappearing before the object of knowledge, he is to that extent incapable of knowing." Schumacher, *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope*. 13.

[600] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 89. Guardini, *Letters from Lake Como: Explorations in Technology and the Human Race*. 61.

[601] As a separate thesis, I argue that the Worker is such a man who embodies the law, and Mass Man as he whose law is the Worker. Wherever he goes or whatever he does, Mass Man's daily living cannot escape the dome which the Worker builds in delimiting reality to purely practical purposes. But the justification of this thesis goes beyond the scope of this research.

[602] This term is used a multitude of times in *Leisure, The Basis of Culture* work in two ways. In both ways it is interchangeable with "universal". The first sense is criticism towards that which *ratio* as a cultural value has built. Its variants are "total work", "total world of work", "total work state", and even "totalitarianism" is once mentioned in this context. The second sense, however, is part of Pieper's metaphysical realist terminology. Variants include "sum-total of existing things", "totality of being", and "totality of reality". This points to the scholastic anthropological

acknowledged as a special font of knowledge. Doing so will bring freedom for the masses. A commitment to a life that mandates a direct acquaintance with real being will, by degrees, ameliorate a life whose mandate is obedience to mental being. Social knowledge, and so the problem of *ratio*, loses its sting when one does not existentially identify with its constructions; the platforms or the machine that builds it; he/she whose mind is believed to be greater than reality; and by whose mind the purpose of people is determined. Dependency upon these constructions is the plight of Mass Man. *Intellectus* on the other hand ensures that mental being is 'constructed', so to speak, by reality; that reality can be touched without use of prostheses; and that reality is intrinsic, not merely utile, and so can be sought for its own good.[603]

Under the foregoing analysis it is apparent that reason and knowledge become increasingly warped the more adrift from real being they become and the more reality is delimited to extrinsic or useful purposes.[604] Pieper's criticism of *ratio* and praise of *intellectus* reveals a locus of potential for the masses. Along with Guardini, Pieper's depiction of *intellectus* offers freedom from paradigmatic knowledge. *Intellectus*, the contemplative act and its fruits become social ends. It is an epistemology able to furnish a pattern of living, of what practically entails from that which

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maxim that man is *capax universi*, capable of the whole. Just in this term we see Pieper showing the struggle between what man truly considers to be his universe – mental or real being. Respectively, Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 43, 26, 40, 61, 65, 43, 104, 05, 43.

[603] Taken as a form of *askesis* in the manner that Guardini encouraged (Chapter 5, part III), intellectual knowledge ensures that this or that mental being is not fractalized, that it possesses an unmediated correspondence to real being.

[604] Communities who promote *intellectus* provide a social alternative wherein Mass Man can find solace, rest and re-orientation towards real being. Achieving this will bring freedom for the masses, for they will be free from use and being used. They can live as authentic persons. *Intellectus* affords the opportunity to be at leisure, to value work in its proper place, where receptivity to being has pre-eminence.

follows the givenness of the created form. At stake, therefore, is Mass Man becoming aware of what his createdness is.[605] The following sub-section shall now address this.

5. Pieper's conception of *creatura* as a concept of being which can ennoble Mass Man

The following assertion is made by Pieper, whereby *creatura* acts as an anthropological unifying principle.[606] Citing the same, Warne goes further to state that "the relationship between the divine ideas and creation in Pieper's thought…[was] important to [his] work on the relationship to metaphysics and epistemology and will give a sense of his specific brand of Thomism."[607] The coming passage in question serves as a capitulation, one "not at all surprising"[608], Pieper adds, of the Thomist, medieval "philosophical explanation of reality."[609] This conception, confirmed by Warne, points to the *via negativa* of ontology – that which in man is true but cannot be fully demonstrated.[610]  The passage is this:

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[605] But in *Living The Truth* Pieper cautions against reducing this operation to an idealism that makes man into a pure spirit. Pieper, *Living the Truth*. 43. Pieper recommends that metaphysical knowledge is necessarily *spiritual and physical world knowledge*, or about real being, as we have said.

[606] Cf. "Moreover, the phrase "by nature" basically meant: by virtue of having been created, by virtue of one's being a creature. In other words, man's "nature" can virtually be identified with his creaturely status: his being a creature - his coming into the world without his consent - defines his innermost essence." The Concept of Sin, (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001). eBook. 36. "This is the basis for the concept of "human nature," which Pieper fully accepts, though he speaks more frequently and existentially of *creatura* than of *natura*." Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 194.

[607] Nathaniel A. Warne, "Of All Things, Seen and Unseen: Josef Pieper's Negative Philosophy, Science, and Hope," *Theological Studies* 79, no. 2 (2018): 296.

[608] Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 47.

[609] Ibid.

[610] "…the knowledge that Being as Being is incomprehensible and mysterious—that Being is itself a mystery, a mystery in the authentic sense, not sheer impassability, not absurdity, not even genuine obscurity. Mystery implies, rather, that a reality is *for this reason* incomprehensible, namely, that its light is unquenchable, unfathomable, inexhaustible. This is what the person in wonder actually experiences." *For the Love of Wisdom: Essays on the Nature of Philosophy*. 30. Cf. Warne, "Of All Things, Seen and Unseen: Josef Pieper's Negative Philosophy, Science, and Hope," 300. "Thomas incorporated into his own thinking the recognition of mystery, both in creation and in God, and thus the "unscholastic" element of negative theology and philosophy as a counter to ratio's penchant to emphasize the positive. "We are not able to know what God is, but only what he is not," a statement that is also present in De Potentia:

In the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, there is a fundamental idea by which almost all the basic concepts of his vision of the world are determined: the idea of creation, or more precisely, the notion that nothing exists which is not creatura, except the Creator Himself; and in addition, that this createdness determines entirely and all-pervasively the inner structure of the creature.[611]

Like Guardini, Pieper sees *creatura* as the Creator's ontological property wherein the balance between man's extrinsic and intrinsic formal reality is held.[612] As Meilaender states, the perfection of man according to Pieper is precisely "a quest for what can only be received."[613] Through time, however, with the advent of Rationalism, rather than holding to the conception of reality which *creatura* signified, Pieper states that being increasingly came to be discussed neutrally, as "*ens ut sic*"[614] (being as such), as "an intermediate world of 'objects'".[615] Rather than holding to the extrinsic element to *creatura*, heretofore characterised as given potential or ontological property, without this archetypal antecedent the intrinsic element came to be understood neutrally, as *natura*, as immanent being.[616]

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"This is the ultimate human knowledge about God—to know that we do not know God (quod [homo] sciat se Deum nescire)." Thomas draws upon Pseudo-Dionysius's The Divine Names in order to make these apophatic moves. Pseudo-Dionysius maintains that humankind, being finite creatura, cannot give God any appropriate name, unless God himself reveals it. What we say about God must immediately be unsaid, an idea that is even present, to a lesser extent, in Aristotle's comment that to know an affirmation is to know its negation."

[611] Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 47.

[612] Fn. 34, *Living the Truth*. 91.

[613] Gilbert Meilaender and Gilbert Meilander, "Josef Pieper: Explorations in the Thought of a Philosopher of Virtue," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 11, no. 1 (1983): 116.

[614] Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 48.

[615] Ibid.

[616] Ibid., 92. This neutral understanding to being seems to have razed to the ground that negative approach in philosophy, to which Pieper points, that accepted the mysterious interaction between extrinsic and intrinsic formal realities. This research grants this distinction, acknowledges the problems wrought when it is not, but does not investigate it further. I commend it as a different research topic.

So predominant became this trend in ontology, that, Pieper states, Kant saw it fit to remove *creatura* from his philosophical vocabulary,[617] for Kant saw the transcendentals as *apriori* to the object under predication; that is to say, reason would impose itself upon the object.[618] So if the transcendentals became subsumed into man, how coherent is it for *creatura* to be predicated, like the transcendentals? How is it valid to predicate to *ens ut sic* something other than something which *apriori* reason can supply? Further, Pieper states that to impose *creatura* as a category of being was so problematic, precisely inasmuch as *creatura* "is not strictly 'pure philosophy' but something philosophico-theological"[619], that according to his work *Scholasticism*, wherein Pieper argues that a Christian (and hence creaturely) philosophy "is *the* only possible form of philosophy"[620] it was even struck from the scholastic vocabulary from which Kant drew.[621] Positing the structure of *creatura* by way of reason became inadmissible and beyond the purview of metaphysics. Although the modern concept of reason still held to categorical being inasmuch as these were mental beings shared across the human species, *creatura* could no more be demonstrated than that of God's existence.[622]

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[617] Ibid., 49.

[618] Pieper capitulates his understanding of this position: "that truth can be predicated not of what really exists but, in the strict and proper sense, only of what is thought." Ibid., 50.

[619] Ibid.

[620] Scholasticism: Personalities and Problems of Medieval Philosophy, (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001). eBook. 162.

[621] With the conception of transcendental idealism saw an acute departure from the scholastic notion of truth. For Kant, truth became something *apriori* posited upon an object. Truth, therefore, by Kant's estimation had more to do with reason than it did the object in question. For the scholastic, Pieper argues, truth *necessarily* was about "gaining sight of reality" – of things – not of imposing one's pre-existent vision upon what was actually real. Ibid., 118.

[622] By prove I refer to St Thomas' famous proofs. Within each, after the defence is given, he concludes that "this we call God". It is my understanding, therefore, of St Thomas' proofs that it is reasonable to believe in the existence of God, however reason cannot posit or demonstrate the existence of God. Statements by Pieper such as the following support this view. "The reason for this [i.e., the quest towards the essence of things, towards what is most metaphysical about a thing] is that things are *creaturae*, that the inner lucidity of Being has its ultimate and exemplary source in the boundless radiance of Divine Knowledge." *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 63.

Unlike Kant, it is not due to reason that, as from without, phenomena becomes intelligible; for Pieper it is the inherent createdness of a thing, its givenness, which, firstly, receives its image extrinsically from the divine *logos*; secondly, and due to which, as created form its intelligibility or intrinsic *logos* becomes possible, and therefore the possibility of all metaphysical knowledge! From Pieper's perspective, while a firmament or "dome"[623] might exist between creature and Creator, such is of man's construction when being is considered neutrally.[624] Because for Pieper *creatura* is at once the most metaphysical element to being besides the Creator Himself, and that it is a realityto which reason can onlyacknowledge, not predicate, as for instance within *Enthusiasm and Divine Madness* he argues through the explication of certain form of *madness* that the purview of metaphysics – indeed the complete scope of what is knowable – must needs include non-rationally predicable entities in general and the concept of *creatura* in particular.[625] Nonetheless *creatura* was lost from the Tradition.[626] Existentially adrift from its divine referent, creaturely awareness became eclipsed by so-called pure reason whereby man vied to replace God as themeasure of things. Understood thus, *creatura* and *ens ut sic* became divorced. Through this divorce it became conceivable to speak of the world as *natura*; and due to which, it became inconceivable to speak of the world as *creatura*.

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[623] *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 89.

[624] This is not to be confused with the infinite difference between created and uncreated being, which is a concept Pieper acknowledges. But it does not mean that there is *no similarity* between God and man, only that whatever similarity can be drawn their also exists an infinite dissimilarity. See - *The Christian Idea of Man*, trans. Dan Farrelly (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2011), 6.

[625] This category of being is discussed within *Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus*, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2000). Pieper argues that man is not a self-contained, self-sufficient, autonomous unit. Due to this, happiness is not found "in thought" but in being drawn into other being/s (that which Guardini called allonomy). The pull of this happiness is so strong, the delight that is found therewith is so intoxicating, that reason becomes overwhelmed, rendering man in that moment *mad*..

[626] Later, for instance, we see this bifurcation crystallise within the thought of Heidegger.

Pieper cautions that to remove this referent from nature causes man to see no ontological difference between that which Pieper and Schumacher call *res naturalis*, and the technological artefacts that man fashions, or *res artificiales*.[627] Pieper states that "[t]he inescapable conclusion [of this way of thinking] is that you can make what you like of yourself and of man."[628] Thus he cautions in this way to reinforce that man should not "consider the whole of creation as completely fathomable, fully accessible to rational comprehension, and above all, as something which it is permissible to change, transform, or even destroy."[629] Rather, if *creatura* is to be affirmed man must subordinate his immanence, his everydayness, to the objectively transcendent. Man's quest for and dominion over being, unlike God's, is never so powerful that it determines the nature of things, nor that it can hold something in existence. This is partly why theorists call man a *steward of creation* rather than its lord. Man can never measure being. Mass Man is one such attempt. Therefore, the machine and Mass Man are hewn from the same basic, non-creaturely anthropological principle.

The ontological stage, so to speak, upon which Mass Man acts is one profoundly invested in man's creative thought capacity, for without a divine analogate a human *logos* is the only tool remaining to measure things by; for to be the measure of something, according to Pieper, makes one of that something, like the Creator, its extrinsic formal cause.[630] In this way, reality is not given by the Creator, as in *creatura*, but is imposed by man upon this fictitious 'neutral' object. Mass

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[627] Schumacher, *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope*. 6. Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 93.
[628] *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 93.
[629] Ibid., 92.
[630] Fn. 34 *Living the Truth*. 91.

Man is such an object. Hence the impetus within man's creative thought, in losing its ultimate measure, its extrinsic or "independent"[631] principle, instead makes human thought the extrinsic measure.[632] Where once God's creative knowledge gave measure to things and received none, and man's knowledge is measured by things without giving to things measure, through aprioristic thinking man's creative knowledge started to resemble that which was previously God's and so did away with the concept of *creatura*, which for centuries supported and guided all metaphysical thinking.[633]

Pieper cites Sartre as a key expositor of the position that man's thoughts are existentially pre-eminent precisely inasmuch as they are creative.[634] This creativity for Sartre, as Pieper understands him, is what justifies his existence. Being is no longer considered neutrally, since now the discussion of being shifts away from the difficult area of God's creativeness towards the creativeness of human thought. Thus, how man acts is solely a fruit of his own measure, himself first creating his own truth-thought or thought-truth to catalyse action. Mass Man is one such fruit; that is to say, Mass Man is a contrivance due to a historically systemic misunderstanding as to what is measured ontologically when man states that *this is this* or *that is that*. In this situation,

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[631] Schumacher states that, "[n]othing would be able to exist independently; the world would be constituted, from top to bottom, by my own representations." "Independent" here further elucidates what Pieper means by "extrinsic" Schumacher, *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope*. 12.

[632] In this "localisation" of existing things between the absolutely creative knowledge of God and the non-creative, reality-conformed knowledge of man is found the structure of all reality as a system in which the archetypes and the copies are both embraced. St. Thomas here introduces, in a non-quantitative sense, the old and presumably Pythagorean concept of "measure," the *mensura*, as something on the one hand given and on the other received. The creative knowledge of God gives measure but receives none (*mensurans non mensuratum*). Natural reality is at once measured and itself measuring (*mensuratum et mensurans*). But human knowledge is measured and does not give measure (mensuratum non mensurans)". Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 54.

[633] Ibid. And which possibly was the scholastic concept that kept *creatura* within the Tradition. A thesis for another research paper, perhaps.

[634] Ibid., 52-53.

Schumacher states that "[r]eality would then ultimately be a creation of the human intellect."[635] Since what is true need no longer have its reference within the mind of God, and since it is true that thought is a creative process in general in which man participates, Mass Man can be so conceived through the mindset of modern ontology without him actually existing. He simply needs to be *thought to exist*, and lo, he exists, since he already exists as a brute fact (him standing there) but needs to be given, through thought, a form which is pleasing to the thinker. Thus, through the power of creative human thought, bereft of any divine analogate, man has only the nature given to him by man himself.[636]

## 6. The problem of Mass Man in its relation to *creatura*

### a) Textual evidence of the problem in question

Direct focus will be given regarding how Pieper sought to ennoble the masses through creaturely awareness. To do so, certain passages needs to be tabled that contextualise and demonstrate how Pieper tackles the problem such as he has described it. There are three key passages within *Leisure: The Basis of Culture* which serve this purpose, what *creatura* is in its relation to Mass Man.

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[635] Schumacher, *A Philosophy of Hope: Josef Pieper and the Contemporary Debate on Hope*. 12.

[636] I refer to this statement: "[t]he inescapable conclusion [of Sartre's existentialism which saw no ontological difference between *res artificalis* and *res naturalis*] is that you can make what you like of yourself and of man." Pieper, *The Silence of St. Thomas: Three Essays*, 93.

I.     The problem of mass, or "raw material"[637]

The first passage reveals in terms of *raw material* the plight of the masses whose conception of being lacks creaturely awareness. The passage reads:

> For to be 'theoretical' in this full sense (in the sense of a purely receptive contemplation, without the slightest trace of an intention to change things; rather, it is precisely the opposite, a willingness to make the 'yes' or 'no' of the will dependent on the actuality of being, which is to be brought to expression in the knowledge of being) – this vision of man will only be 'theoretical' in this undiluted sense, when being, the world, is something *other* than him and is more than the mere field, the mere raw material [*Rohstoff*], of human activity.[638]

Here it is seen that Pieper is equally critical as Guardini when reason becomes autonomous. Pieper compels the reader to contemplate without any admixture of utility; for without contemplation, truth is not actually known.[639] Instead, and apropos to Kant's maxim that "the understanding cannot look upon anything"[640], only *raw material* remains when reason is ontologically "determinative"[641]. Being becomes measured by reason and so becomes mechanised. It becomes a commodity in which humans can make, deal and trade. Mass Man is that commodity in human form.

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[637] *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 96-97. German, "Rohstoff". Josef Pieper and T. S. Eliot, *Was Heisst Philosophieren? : Vier Vorlesungen*, 7. Aufl. 35.-39. Tsd. ed. (München: Kösel, 1973), 31-32.
[638] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 95-96.
[639] Cf. "Pieper spells out what he means. Contemplate, if you will, the result of these words spoken into an American discussion on social policy, school reform, family values, or the abortion debate: "Whoever wants to know and do the good must view objective reality, not his own 'ideology,' not his 'conscience,' not 'values,' not his self-chosen 'ideals' and 'models.' He has to resist examining his own action and instead view reality." Thomas Austenfeld, "Josef Pieper's Contemplative Assent to the World," *Modern Age* 42, no. 4 (2000).
[640] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 30.
[641] Ibid., 95.

How can autonomous reason be countered so that man is not treated as raw material, as mass? Shortly after the above passage Pieper poses *creatura* as the solution, stating:

> Only that person [i.e., he who contemplates] can view the world 'theoretically' in the fullest sense, for whom the world is something worthy of reverence, and ultimately, *creation* in the strict sense. On this foundation alone can be realized the 'purely theoretical' property that is of the essence of philosophy.[642]

In a later section it will be discussed how Pieper dedicated his career to teaching leisure and contemplation, for he believed his pupils would have been treated as raw material, due mainly to war.[643] If man views himself as God's property, as is ethical treatment of something that is not yours, one will seek out the property owner to know what that something is and how it may be used. Creaturely awareness ensures that the entire height, depth and breadth of reality that is man is not misunderstood to be *tabula rasa*, an empty land waiting for man to colonise it; for being is already colonised, so to speak, by God. Since all is *creatura* except the Creator, every existent has form, and due to which is property. Nothing exists as a blank slate, a state of complete passivity. Thus nothing really is raw material. Neither too, therefore, is man actually Mass Man.

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[642] Ibid., 96.

[643] This passage, then, is equally textual confirmation of his pedagogical intent as it is a formulation that creaturely awareness resolves the plight of Mass Man.

II.     Raw material: the destruction of philosophy and the misuse of creatura

This leads to the second passage in question. Pieper confirms how the treatment of matter as raw material causes a loss of creaturely awareness, and which precipitates the destruction of knowledge.[644]  The passage reads:

> And it would not be cause of wonder, that the removal of such a relationship (i.e., the connection in virtue of which the world is seen as creation, and not merely raw material) – that the removal of that connection would progress step by step with the destruction of the genuinely theoretical character of philosophy, as well as its freedom and transcendence-over-function; and even the destruction of philosophy itself.[645]

The world is not merely *natura* so defined, the land not merely *terra nullus* nor man *tabula rasa*. Real objects already possess form and purpose which, when treated as raw material, become frustrated. Guardini tells us that the frustration of form in this scenario is a perverted or illicit act committed whereby the multiplication of artificial or mechanised objects becomes normative. Contemplation is necessary, therefore, to spare the world from a mastery characterised by this bleak utilitarianism. Mass Man is what results when the utility prescribed towards man directly conflicts with his created form.

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[644] It is alarming to think what can remain undestroyed when the faculty by which man understands reality is destroyed, and so cannot see things in themselves but can only see things in terms of their potential usefulness. What usefulness is possible if being is ignored?

[645] The nature and practice of *creatura* is therefore an ethically vital component to a true ecology.  Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 96.

III.    The fall of *theoria* and the plight of Mass Man

For Pieper, philosophy required inspection into the objectively transcendent.[646] He holds that philosophy should not be something delimited to the "professional training"[647] of academic elites.[648] Due to this, the following passage has grave implications when philosophy, as a human act, is something that all humans can do – or, more aptly, might omit to do. Pieper states that, *theoria* absolutely cannot afford to be "sucked up into the possession of the daimonic [i.e., malign, spiritual, creative] powers which strive to turn all reality into *raw material* for their utilitarian plans."[649] Pieper argues that should *theoria* fall, when it is not a real social option, some men will assume the form of the "Worker" to find fulfilment in its absence.[650] He states:

> This is the path along which the self-destruction of philosophy has travelled: through the destruction of its theoretical character, a destruction which in turns rests upon habitually seeing the world as the raw material of human activity [i.e., the purely social]. When the world is no longer looked upon as creation, there can no longer be *theoria* in the full sense. And with the fall of *theoria*, the freedom of philosophy falls as well, and what comes in its place is the functionalizing, the making it into something 'practical,' oriented toward a legitimation by its social function: what comes to the fore is the working character of philosophy, or of philosophy so-called. *Meanwhile, our thesis* (which can now be formulated), *maintains that it is of the nature of the philosophical act, to transcend the world of work* [emphasis added].[651]

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[646] Ibid., 89.
[647] Ibid.
[648] We prescind from Pieper discussion of "esoteric" knowledge to address it shortly, in a more appropriate place. *What Does "Academic" Mean?: Two Essays on the Chances of the University Today*.
[649] Ibid., 19-20.
[650] Pieper adopts Jünger's conception of the Worker. *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 28. Jünger, Hemming, and Costea, *The Worker: Dominion and Form*.
[651] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 97.

Inasmuch as *theoria* disappears from the earth, the Worker as that utilitarian type, will rise to the fore. He states that in this situation "*theoria* is defenceless"[652] unless the world is acknowledged as divine property, as *creatura*.[653] Inasmuch as work becomes totalised, and the world his property; that is, inasmuch as some men embody the Worker type, there remains the sad, left-over property, raw material or mass by which his existence is justified. This type of man is Mass Man. Thus, creaturely awareness must be taught to ensure that *theoria* still has social currency, and visa versa, so that man does not make the mistake of treating his fellow men as a mass.

b) Mass Man and the sophists

Pieper's decision to ennoble the masses was underpinned by an anti-sophistical, pedagogical mandate to love wisdom after the fashion of Socrates and Plato. *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, for instance, as a central concern brings this mandate to the fore. [654] Franck praises Pieper's critique of sophistry for its inherent realism and subsequent applicability to the critique of philosophy as a whole; for when a philosopher teaches, no man is mass; but when a sophist 'teaches' all is mass since all become instrumental, manipulatable objects.[655] Just prior to reaching academic status, Pieper taught vocational classes to re-educate and re-socialise those debased and disenfranchised by the war.[656] In other words, Pieper was actually teaching the masses, as these

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[652] *What Does "Academic" Mean?: Two Essays on the Chances of the University Today*, 20.

[653] Ibid.

[654] *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, trans. Lothar Krauth (San Francisco, California: Ignatius Press, 1992).

[655] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 16, 263. Speaking of how flattery is used, Pieper states that "[a]ny form of approval will do, either the applause of the *masses* or the admiration of the 'happy few' [emphasis added]." Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 28.

[656] Prior to Pieper academic career, it was around 1946 that, while serving in the air-force, he commenced his teaching career through the Essen Pedagogical Academy. Pieper states that he never "…experienced such an industrious intellectual curiosity as was shown by this generation of students who crowded into the lectures and seminars in their unsightly military uniforms…" Pieper states that he had to "pick the best three out of every ten students who applied;

people were viewed by the likes of Hitler and Goebbels in this way. However, according to Töpfer, Pieper was heavily critical of treating individuals as mere instruments, as no more than a tool of "organisation"[657] whereby individuality, whose created givenness brought with it normativity, would become negated by the requirement to be socially useful.[658] Lippmann or Bernays for instance would use propaganda to instrumentalise, sway, direct and utilise individuals under a similar assumption.[659] It is seen in Pieper's pedagogy a cognisance as to man's createdness as well as to this unfortunate occurrence.

Pieper denounces sophistry as human abuse, for sophistry uses language to instrumentalise people.[660] Thanks to Wald, according to Pieper the only "unconditional obligation"[661] to which man owed himself, far from obedience to sophistry, was that relation wrought by the Creator towards his creatures.[662] *Abuse of Language; Abuse of Power*, for instance, goes far in reflecting this attitude and principle (as distilled through three decades of experience).[663] Pieper sought as a philosopher to honestly present to his students reality as he saw it; not to just push an agenda for

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there was simply no room for more." Out of these grew informal evening classes, resembling those run by Guardini which Pieper attended as a youth. Pieper called the classes "philosophical poetics"; the students, however called them, simply, "writer's evenings"! At this time Pieper was in contact with Guardini for relays a decision to Guardini to create an index of characters across the works of Plato. In response, Guardini "…slapped himself on forehead saying: I should have thought of that." *Not yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964*, 12-13.

[657] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 76.

[658] Ibid., 76-77.

[659] "The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the masses" Edward L. Bernays, *Propaganda* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Ig Publishing, 2005), 37.

[660] In the case of using flattery Pieper states that "[i]t appears, especially to the one so flattered, as if a special response would be paid, while in fact this precisely *not* the case. He dignity is ignored; I concentrate on his weaknesses and on those areas that may appeal to him – all in order to manipulate him, to use him for *my purposes*…The word is perverted and debased to become a catalyst, a drug, as it were, and is as such administered." Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 22-23.

[661] Schumacher, *A Cosmopolitan Hermit: Modernity and Tradition in the Philosophy of Josef Pieper*. 54.

[662] Ibid.

[663] And even longer by way of reflection, for Pieper studied the *Dialogues* as a schoolboy. Pieper, *No One Could Have Known: An Autobiography, the Early Years, 1904-1945*. 26.

which they would be obligated to follow. This entailed this mandate to not deprive them of a reality that they were entitled to know;[664] a breach of which would reduce them to instrumental status and so condemn Pieper as a sophist himself. Pieper's teaching mandate encouraged rather than prevented his students from participating in reality.[665] To this extent he ennobled the masses by encouraging participation in reality.

For Pieper, given the social problem which sophistry causes, the plight of Mass Man consisted in sophistical parties wedging themselves between man and reality. It is helpful to explain how this wedging was achieved through the distinction between *ethos* and *logos*. Sophistical education would conflate *logos* into *ethos* so that human authority became the vestige through which knowledge was attributed. However, Pieper's task was to encourage a direct inspection of real being.[666] Pieper's method, then, makes a delineation between himself as *ethos*, and the *logos* to which he points.[667] Pieper is a figure of his time whose pedagogical method contrasts to those sophists contemporaneous to him.[668] Thus Pieper sought to help people think about things directly, rather than due to authoritarian direction.

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[664] *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 16.

[665] Ibid.

[666] Cf. "If objectivity in knowledge means recognizing the fact that the content of all knowledge is determined by objects…It means that "the attitude of the subject is dictated by the objective *logos*, by the spirit and the *ratio* of the object which he is confronting." *Living the Truth*. 78.

[667] And this is what realism ultimately leads to, obedience to a person; which, even for the ancients, Pieper claims in *Tradition: Concept and Claim* that their understanding of things originated from, however mysteriously, "*a* word of God [emphasis added]". *Tradition: Concept and Claim*, trans. Christian E Kopff (n/a, USA: St Augustine's Press, 2010), 29.

[668] Without distinguishing between what something is and who states it, education can go down the slippery slope of servility towards subjugation; for eventually, if the intrinsic normativity of things is replaced with mere assertiveness, the obedient pupil would be expected to conform his acts to authority at the expense of what is real, what is common sense (i.e., probable), or whatsoever his reason apprehends.

Pieper states that listening first and speaking second is necessary between both teacher and pupil.[669] In the context of the scholastic tradition, within *Guide to Thomas Aquinas*, wherein he argues against autonomous or "aurtarchic"[670] reasoning in light of the self-same reality all scholastics beheld, Pieper teaches philosophy as a co-student, with students as co-teachers. All parties equally imbibe, so to speak, and share knowledge as *the Tradition*.[671] He dangles nothing over his pupil's heads. He gives them the same means with which he himself philosophises, for all parties equally participate in the same intellectual tradition. On the side of the knower, the act has primacy; on the side of the known, so does the thing. Second to this comes *ethos* or authority, not because dialogue or another's viewpoint is wrong in itself, but because *logos* is the authority, not authority *per se*, nor his/her concept, wish or command.[672]

*Logos* is not remote from the world. Nor is it an aprioristic vestige of that form of *ratio* which Pieper critiques. Rather, through the vehicle of *Tradition,* the *logos* has always been   with

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[669] "Anyone who considers dialogue, disputation, debate, to be a fundamental method for arriving at truth must already have concluded and stated that arriving at truth is an affair that calls for more power than the autarchic individual possesses. He must feel that common effort, perhaps the effort of everybody, is necessary. No one is sufficient unto himself and no one is completely superfluous; each person needs the other; the teacher even needs the student, as Socrates always held. In any case, the learner, the student, contributes something to the dialogue along with the teacher. If this fundamental conviction is genuine, it must necessarily affect the mode of listening as well as the mode of speaking. Dialogue does not mean only that people talk to one another, but also that they listen to one another. The first requirement, therefore, is: Listen to the interlocutor, take note of his argument, his contribution to the *recherche collective de la vérité*, in the same way that he himself understands his own argument. There was one rule of the *disputatio legitima* which made this kind of listening mandatory: No one was permitted to answer directly to the interlocutor's objection; rather, he must first repeat the opposing objection in his own words, thus explicitly making sure that he fully understood what his opponent had in mind. Let us for a moment Imagine that the same rule were put into effect again nowadays, with infraction of it resulting in automatic disqualification. How this would clear the air in public debate!" Josef Pieper, Guide to Thomas Aquinas, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991). eBook. 40.
[670] Ibid.
[671] *Tradition*.
[672] Furthermore, there is no bifurcation between the principle which governs true knowledge and good action, as both are – or at least ought to be, in view of our current discussion – determined, argues Pieper, by the same "objective *logos*". *Living the Truth*. 78

mankind, historically yet transcendentally, from his beginning.[673] Due to this, Pieper's pedagogical realism consists in giving *logos* primacy over human *ethos*. To use a scholastic axiom, *activity follows and does not determine being*.[674] Mass Man, however, finds himself as a follower because he is 'taught' in complete contrariety to this axiom, that being and action are of the same, human origin.

But Pieper ennobles the masses by leading them toward philosophical realism and away from sophistry.[675] By "sophist" it is meant a trope for any person or collective in a position of authority who views to subsume *logos* into *ethos* and to instrumentalise those under him/her.[676] *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power* links these traits to the sophist teaching method.

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[673] See "Ch 1. Is Traditional Anti-Historical?" Pieper, *Tradition*. The researcher considers this a coherent way to resolve the tension between either *logos* or *ethos* taking primacy. It is not so much that man must ignore human authority; rather, that he must follow divine law.

[674] Although we know that being itself is an activity, but activity corresponds to the inner structure, while action corresponds to how this structure relates to other beings Cf. Clarke S.J., *The One and the Many*, 33.

[675] We do not see (but for their critique) any preoccupation with social commentary in the style, for example, of Nietzsche, De Chardin or Marx. Nor that of Arendt, Hitler or Bernays. Circumstance is not Pieper's focus; rather, the metaphysical truth of things. Literally that which stands over the particular so that the everydayness of being can point beyond itself. For example, the crisis resulting from the Second Vatican Council was for Pieper not chiefly a political crisis (used in the broadest sense) but one symptomatic of an "absence of a living theology".[675] Around 1950, his academic response to mounting concerns over one-world governance was to post a lecture not on this term solely, nor only accompanied by discussion of a theological corollary, the antichrist, but as well, *and I emphasise*, on Christian hope. Emphasis is made because, be it one-world governance, marriage equality or any mundane concern, indeed any particular thing however grave or silly, human experience according to Pieper becomes anaemic without reference to metaphysical truth found through contemplation. Otherwise it becomes lost in the twilight of everydayness, be it pleasant or apocalyptic. Pieper, *Not yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964*, 82.

[676] Krieg, *Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany*, 154-55.

The sophist withholds his true motive to ensure compliance,[677] that which Pieper termed the "ulterior motive"[678]. Pieper uses the curious but understandably[679] abstruse example of "flattery" as a running example of how this compliance is achieved.[680] In general, though, sophistry occurs whenever "whom I try to influence…ceases to be my partner; he is no longer a fellow subject. Rather, he has become for me an object to be manipulated, possibly to be dominated, to be handled and controlled."[681] In this statement the power-mongering runs in one, sad direction: from sophist to masses.[682] Flattery, therefore, is just one means amongst many others to achieve control. Through this act of control, Mass Man is as much deprived of reality as the sophist is averse to it. Moreover, Pieper does not see the sophistic problem as isolated, exceptional or a sign of his time only; rather, the problem is so globalised,[683] that he asks "[i]s there still *any* area of life at all free from [sophistry], any corner where I am spared…?"[684] "[S]peech, song, print, pictures, movies, and broadcast…the entire arsenal of the means of communication can be potentially employed"[685]. Indeed it is, as Bernays states, that, "[a]ll public media provide[s] open doors to the public mind. Any one of us through these media may influence the attitudes and actions of our fellow citizens."[686] According to Bernays, the propaganda or the sophistical technique would  be

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[677] Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 20, 22.
[678] Ibid.
[679] The social and political climate of the Nazi and post-Nazi regime was dangerous for Catholic intellectuals such as Pieper. See - Krieg, *Catholic Theologians in Nazi Germany*.
[680] Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 28.
[681] Ibid., 22.
[682] This is distinct from Arendt's theory that a "…totalitarian leader is nothing more nor less than the functionary of the masses he leads…he depends just as much on the 'will' of the masses he embodies as the masses depend on him." Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 2015 ed. (Penguin Random House: UK, 1951), 426.
[683] Cf. "The tendency of big business is to get bigger. Through mergers and monopolies it is constantly increasing the number of persons with whom it is in direct contact." Bernays, *Propaganda*, 90.
[684] Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 23.
[685] Ibid., 27.
[686] Edward L. Bernays, "The Engineering of Consent," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 250, no. 1 (1947): 113.

perhaps "among [the] most valuable contributions to the efficient function of modern society."[687] Further, the sophist leader from Bernays' point of view "must apply his energies to mastering the operational know-how of consent engineering"[688], that is to say, the problem of sophistry is prized in its ability to control or massify the individual.

As David before Goliath, the pedagogical problem before Pieper consists in combatting the programmatic, increasingly consolidated, social, political and cultural communication machinery by which modern societies exist - with nothing else equipped for the task than philosophy so defined.[689] Still, Pieper believes one can be reoriented from this "pseudoreality"[690] back towards reality when, he states, a decision is made "as much as possible"[691] to perceive "all things as they really are"[692], to try one's best to prioritise *logos* over human *ethos*. Philosophical realism consists in the direct acquaintance with things rather than in relying on another's say-so. In this order is knowledge achieved as well as society cultivated.

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[687] Ibid., 115.

[688] Ibid.

[689] After reading the following passage by Bernays, I immediately recalled the ubiquitous role Google has in 2017 in everyday existence. In one sense users grant Google permission to play this role; on the other hand, it is hard to speak of consent when everyday existence is hard to live without Google. "For this reason there is an increasing tendency to concentrate the functions of propaganda in the hands of the propaganda specialist. This specialist is more and more assuming a distinct place and function in our natural life." *Propaganda*, 63.

This is particularly compelling today, when this network reaches further than ever into people's lives, not to mention their hands, eyes, pockets or ears; but where, in contrast, philosophy finds almost no place at all.

[690] Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 34.

[691] Ibid., 35.

[692] Ibid.

Mindful that Pieper goes about saying what is and what is not philosophy, unlike the sophist, the philosophical act itself is parsed so that the pupil's awareness of the philosophical act is as complete as their teacher. They are empowered to know *logos*, not only to be directed by *ethos*. They are educated in *logos*, not manipulated by *ethos*. They are budding realists of the Tradition; not bovine, utile masses.[693] In this way, *logos* is its own and most reliable authority. In this conflict between *logos* and *ethos* is the gaping difference between Pieper's realist, traditional teaching method and the pseudorealist declamations of the sophists towards Mass Man.[694]

Inasmuch as sophistry exists, it follows the problem of Mass Man also exists. Mass Man's problem is therefore bound to the practise of sophistry. This is because sophists, unlike philosophers, deform their audience via *reality-deprivation*.[695] It is likely, therefore, that Pieper chooses the term "sophist", for it is, within a long genealogy of terms, the most ancient expression of this entity. It follows, then, that the problem of Mass Man has always been seen to exist by Pieper's estimation. As a problem of evil, then, the plight of Mass Man is never absolutely resolved.

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[693] While nowadays we can be socially contracted to sit before the endless perspectives, buzzwords and catch-cries of sophistry, be it through click-baiting, opt-out interest-based ads, big-data subscriptions, GPS and wifi based news services, etc, for Pieper the greatest teacher, reality itself, only asks to be heard on its own terms through direct and intimate contact (free of cost!).

[694] Pieper's practise of philosophy, as stated, is a profoundly countercultural practice. It teaches man to think for himself. Through it, through simply philosophising as Pieper prescribes, the reliance sophistry engenders – a reliance initially multiplied in global magnitude, but nowadays even more so as the web of connected things (see I.O.T) grows denser and thicker – can be effectively nullified. Pieper's pedagogical method is therefore geared towards freeing Mass Man from the oppressive effects that this Internet of Things engenders.

[695] This might be a hard concept to imagine, that man is nourished by reality *per se* to which he can choose or not choose to attend. It is perhaps hard to perceive this in today's world, given the extent to which our world has become totalised, mediated and sophistical. Suffice to say in response that there have been numerous thinkers who would strain to explain how a disconnection with reality is a symptom of a hidden bond to some type of manipulative, social powerbroker. philosophers from ancient to modern times – for instance Plato, Augustine and Louis De Bonald. Louis-Gabriel-Ambroise Bonald, *The True & Only Wealth of Nations: Essays on Family, Economy & Society* (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University, 2006). Cf.

For the sophist words are spoken to exact power over others. Of themselves, states Pieper, "these methods of communication [misused by sophists] are designed…to capture and communicate *reality* [emphasis added]."[696] So a failure with words is a failure to teach reality. A failure in pedagogical realism threatens not merely the communication medium, but "the commonweal of all people"[697], those to whom the medium reaches. Sophistry is therefore embodied in and exemplified by those who exploit such communication media. Conversely, Mass Man is the consumer of this media. Due to this, the problem of sophistry, and hence the plight of Mass Man, is its pandemic potentiality.[698] For, as stated, where sophistry is practised man becomes malformed into a conditioned, reality-deprived collective; for the primary purpose of the message is for the recipient to obey the message, not for the message to primarily convey knowledge, to express something real. Understanding that his students were victim to sophistical enmassment, Pieper knows that to be a philosopher, his teaching material must concern the very reality that this process of enmassment deprives. Pieper therefore, as a philosopher sees it as his role to combat the sophist.

c) The living condition of Mass Man

Now equipped with a concept of sophistry, and how due to it man becomes enmassed, this research can now proceed better informed into the living condition of Mass Man. Since both   tie

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[696] Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 27. Cf. David Klinck, *The French Counterrevolutionary Theorist, Louis De Bonald (1754-1840)*, Studies in Modern European History, (New York: P. Lang, 1996).
[697] Pieper, *Abuse of Language: Abuse of Power*, 27.
[698] Such, then, is the demand. To such a demand the supply has to respond if there is going to be a profitable business. Still, the demand is not concentrated only on what is commonly considered pleasing. There are not only sex, sensuality, vanity, nosiness, and sentimentalism; there are also cruelty and indeed *Schadenfreude,* the vicious enjoyment of others misfortune. There are the obsession with slander, the frenzy to destroy, and the readiness to accept radical answers, to go for the 'final solution'." Ibid., 26.

the problem to that of autonomous reason, the following serves as a continuation from Guardini. For example, in *The Concept of Sin* Pieper states the following:

> reason does not mean the 'autonomous', 'sovereign', self-realizing consciousness as the vast 'System philosophies' of the German idealists would have it. In the pre-Enlightenment wisdom tradition, reason means receptivity to reality.[699]

Here in this passage, which as part of Pieper's broader project for this work to un-trivialise what sin means in a world adrift from creaturely awareness, he makes the connection between the trivialisation of sin to the autonomous individual. As autonomous, man determines the being of things, due to this he determines what purpose something has. For Guardini, it is precisely because "it" is *another being*, that it is equivocal, ontologically alien, without sovereignty, that it has a lesser value (Chapter 3). Hence as an alien in the world, the odds are stacked up against Mass Man in his struggle towards a creaturely orientation. This is because, firstly, the value of Mass Man has been historically pre-determined by the autonomous individual living out his creed, whom Pieper calls in *The Concept of Sin* the "sovereign subject"[700], and so is set against his created potential by whatever false conception of man has become propagated, to use Bernays' term;[701] secondly because such an autonomous individual, finding *hubris* in the execution of *apriori* reason, cannot see the error he is committing, and above all *the Luciferian element of this error within anthropology*,[702] when reason finds no value in receptivity in general and *intellectus* in

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[699] *The Concept of Sin*. 46. Reason so misunderstood can be classed as an evil precisely inasmuch as it impedes the fulfilment of human nature.

[700] Ibid., 92.

[701] An example of the purpose and place of propaganda can be found in this passage from Bernays: "[t]here are invisible rulers who control the destinies of millions. It is not generally realized to what extent the words and actions of our most influential public men are dictated by shrewd persons operating behind the scenes." Bernays, *Propaganda*, 61.

[702] Pieper, *The Concept of Sin*. 92.

particular;[703] thirdly and most importantly, because a correct understanding of reason has not been given to Mass Man to see that his nature is ontologically open and related to reality as a whole, hence inclining him towards the Good found in the rest of creation, his worldview becomes too similar to the prescriptions, proscriptions, declarations and general opinion of certain men who, while having power on this earth, also declaim what is good for those over whom they have power. But if Mass Man can 'cut the cord', so to speak, between himself and the world which autonomy has built, he can still elect to participate in this world without being its slave, without merely forming its under-class (*Untermenschentum*, Chapter 1). Quite in line with Guardini's thought, Mass Man, therefore, is able to choose whether he will follow autonomy to all its logical, trans-humanist extremes, or whether he will return to examining his created potential and follow it instead. It is through rekindling this awareness of *creatura* that he – today's type of man – will find true orientation.

d)  What does it mean to philosophise for Mass Man?

Leisure is an overarching theme through which Mass Man is ennobled. Before his audience of his inaugural public lecture in 1946, wherein Pieper would revivify "the contemplative element of philosophizing"[704] and "the old concept of leisure (*schole*)"[705] "with new arguments"[706] "*in*

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[703] Podles quotes Bakan as follows: "Satan, according to Bakan, is the image of "agency unmitigated by communion." Leon J Podles, *The Church Impotent: The Feminization of Christianity* (Dallas, Texas, USA: Spence Publishing Company, 1999), 42. Cf. David Bakan, *The Duality of Human Existence; an Essay on Psychology and Religion* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966).
[704] Pieper, *Not yet the Twilight : An Autobiography 1945-1964*, 14.
[705] Ibid.
[706] Ibid., 14-15.

*opposition to* the over-evaluation of both rational discursive activity and the function of thought

understood as purely social" [707], Pieper's mandate is again laid bare.

Pieper remarks how he ended up changing what he originally intended to teach in

philosophy, that is, from a "neo-scholastic", "systematic" and "abstract" perspective, "modified

by phenomenology and existentialism"[708], to something simply described by a confrere as

"unusual"[709]. But his method from the outset catered well for the masses, "mainly [those] who had

just returned from war and captivity"[710] . This is the epistemological element within his pedagogy

that deserves attention:[711] that which was essentially non-discursive, and which made him popular

amongst everyday people.

It is revealing that Pieper chose to speak on the question, "what does it mean to

philosophize?"[712] before such people. Without the researcher being able to know the content of the

speech, from the foregoing discussion of sophistry it is known that to philosophise means to be,

equally, in the world and free from subjective 'worlds'.[713] In *The Philosophical Act* (1948),

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[707] Ibid.
[708] Ibid., 15-16.
[709] Ibid., 16.
[710] Ibid.
[711] As it would be possible, but not appropriate, to provide a cross-textual analysis of his English translated work to determine what method, if any, his writing follows.
[712] Pieper, *Not yet the Twilight: An Autobiography 1945-1964*, 16.
[713] Quoting Heidegger, Pieper acknowledges that the basic drive for philosophy is to discuss the question, *why is there anything at all, and not nothing?* He goes on to state: "[m]ust we explicitly state how unfathomable this philosopher's question is, in comparison with that everyday world of needs and purposefulness? If such a question as this were asked, without introduction or interpretation, in the company of those people of efficiency and success, wouldn't the questioner be considered rather... mad? Through such extremely formulated contrasts, however, the real, underlying distinction come to the fore: it becomes clear that the task that question constitutes taking a step    toward

wherein Pieper contrasts his definition of perennial Christian philosophy to that of the autonomous or Kantian thinker, he states that, "[t]o 'lose oneself' in problems [of thought]…this so-called 'existential' identification with the problems of thought is foreign to the [Christian] believer."[714] This sentence reveals what philosophy means to the former by its contrast to the latter. Further, it further suggests the role that purely social reasoning plays in ensnaring individuals in subjectivity.

Pieper defines philosophy as knowledge that gives freedom.[715] One should not become caught within reasoning *per se*, nor the person delivering the argument; rather, one should be caught up in *logos*, the awareness of the archetypal and immanent form to the object apprehended.[716] However, that which the philosopher considers the object of reason, be it human *ethos* or divine *logos*, the philosopher will existentially identify with it. In other words, his pattern of living will accord to his truth. If the former case is taken as a way of living the Kantian thinker is arrived at, trapped in his own thoughts; worse still, the process of thinking itself; which, if shared socially, ensnares its audience within the very idea that the sophist himself is transfixed. However, in the latter case the creaturely realist stands firm whose mind is without illusion of grandeur. On the one hand, the theoretical and social dimensions of Pieper's philosophy equate objective reality with an exploratory experience of freedom; whereas he who existentially identifies with thought

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transcending, toward leaving behind, the work-a-day world. The genuine philosophical question strikes disturbingly against the canopy that encloses the world of the citizen's work-day." Leisure: The Basis of Culture, 86-87.

[714] Ibid., 146.

[715] Ibid., 42.

[716] One need only to reflect within the Socratic dialogues how Plato repeatedly sought to tease out this distinction. Socrates would become renowned for his tenacity whereby he would equally impel his confrere away from authority based arguments and towards essentialist ones because he held that arguments based upon authority or *ethos* were not true arguments, since within them they lacked *eidos* or *logos*. See - Guardini, *The Death of Socrates*, 1-23.

is lacking in this experience, being sort of stuck in his head. The meaning of philosophy, therefore, is not found in the philosopher's world; it is found, rather, in the world itself.

It is due to social reasoning that man becomes reduced to a heteronomous being. Mass Man is the *merely other* that remains when one's subjective yet universal set of *ontological relations*, that which Pieper calls the world, is confused with those real relations proper to the world itself.[717] He is put to use for this world and becomes as a machine. In other words, unless some way of living is given to he/she who otherwise has no purpose besides their usefulness to these worlds, their humanity will undergo corruption. As a machine awaiting its user, Mass Man finds himself in a passive state, both with respect to his master/s and with respect to the failure to actualise his created form. In this way, to be Mass Man is, therefore, a doubly passive state.

Pieper's distinction between the servile and liberal arts elucidates how knowledge either enslaves or frees. One who is limited by *artes serviles* his deeds are for an extrinsic purpose, or potentially a useful Good.[718] In contrast, one who is welcomed into *artes liberales* or those acts which have an intrinsic purpose, or no other purpose than the realisation of the act itself, become free from servitude, which is a greater good than the attainment of, even, useful goods.[719] This state of freedom Pieper calls *leisure*. Further, as Pieper puts it, life becomes more than the achieving of someone's "five year plan"[720]. "Every art is called *liberal*," argues Pieper through St

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[717] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 115-31.
[718] Ibid., 41, 85.
[719] With respect, of course, to the object of the act.
[720] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 42, 94.

Thomas, "which is ordered to knowing; those which are ordered to some utility to be attained through action are called *servile arts*."[721] Social reasoning in this context is therefore the *raison d'être* of the "functionary"[722], of he who is bound to "common utility"[723], to the total world of work, at the expense of the common Good.[724] He/she embodies that anthropological type whose existence is defined by the fulfilment of an extrinsic purpose at odds to their intrinsic form; who identifies with utility as though it were his being; and thus, tragically, lives to be used. This Pieper knows to be Mass Man.[725]

Pieper states that "[t]o do philosophy is to realise the naturally essential inclination of the human mind *toward totality* [emphasis added]".[726] For a realist[727], neo-Thomist like Pieper the mind was *capax universi*, or as Clarke states, the "most basic attribute of each being is also that which it has in common with all other beings, the ultimate bond of community of all real beings, forming the universe of reality"[728]. Further, in *Leisure* Pieper subordinates work to leisure in the

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[721] Ibid., 41.
[722] For example, ibid., 40.
[723] Ibid., 61.
[724] Ibid., 40-41.
[725] Pieper states that such a man has certain definable characteristics. He states that, "…the 'Worker' type [or functionary or Mass Man] has brought into the open three principal characteristics: an outwardly directed, active power; an aimless readiness to suffer pain; an untiring insertion into the rationalized program of useful social organization. From the perspective of such a 'worker', leisure can only appear as something totally unforeseen, something completely alien, without rhyme or reason – as a synonym, in fact, for idleness or laziness." Ibid., 47. This statement would have hit home for any audience of his time. It is countercultural, bearing a striking similarity to Klemperer's definition of LTI as expressionist propaganda (Chapter 1.4). In the above cultural critique, Pieper effectively inverts the *status quo* that the establishment for years had forced upon the populous as the ideal individual. The goal is no longer work, but leisure. Reason is not the object, but the world. Man no longer is a functionary, but a knowing subject. He is a philosopher. He is not Mass Man. Further, "[I]f someone where to say, "we need some philosophers, who…" Will do what? There could only be one possibility: "…will justify, develop, defend, such and such an ideology…" To say this and act upon it would be a destruction of philosophy!" Ibid., 61, 94.
[726] Ibid., 146.
[727] Most probably a moderate realist, although nowhere in his works is this state explicitly.
[728] Clarke S.J., *The One and the Many*, 27.

same way that that Clarke subordinates mental being to real being.[729] Thus Pieper claims that to philosophise entails a preceding, essential aptitude towards *universum* as real being, but by way of social reasoning implies that should this *universum* be mental being, then man will existentially identify with this as *universum*, as reality. So to the extent that mental being is existentially identified as *universum*, and this world actually functions as an aggregate or network due to such beings, then the problem that Pieper sees in purely social reasoning poses an equally serious danger to metaphysics and daily existence. The social havoc this will wreak, states Pieper, "characterizes the situation of philosophy today more than its own particular [or metaphysical] content."[730] If it were possible, the administration of social reasoning by the sophist subjects reality to a quasi-destruction, in the sense that the rightful title reality has as *universum* has been taken and put around the waist of this new prize-fighter, autonomous reason. To the extent that social reasoning wins the existential battle within this or that individual, but which the individual's formal aptitude towards real being is indestructible, the real world perdures but, existentially, becomes increasingly not real.[731]

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[729] Ibid., 31.

[730] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 85.

[731] In this context, that which commentators call 'totalitarian' can be seen as the misappropriation, through social reasoning, of the principle of *capax universi*. Pieper's position, by contrast, is this: rather than merely concerning yourself with mental being, with propagating or following this or that tenet of a five-year plan; of posing argument, making assertion and formulation, taking something at an angle, or workshopping a concept into a compact ideology; or simply finding your place within the total world of mental being; as reason is disposed towards real being in a universal or total sense, the entire *corpus* of social reasoning, in whatever form it might take, must be relegated to this universal disposition if this *corpus* is to serve a real purpose, and thus man as well. Otherwise, the obligation or impost into which social reasoning conditions man will supplant his natural inclination towards the universality of real being, and transpose his inclination into what commentators call a totalitarian regime. According to Pieper and Clarke's definitions, the object of purely social reason will become universal in its magnitude since there is no other (i.e., real) object reason or community of existents to which one should give attention. Reason remains *capax universi*, but society and not reality becomes man's total world.

Philosophising, then, for Pieper means to existentially identify with, give attention to, or –
more pertinently – to consider the real universe as *universum*. The problem of the opposing
universe, seen in this context as Kant's world of apriori objects, is seen when the principle of *capax universi* is extrapolated onto the social strata with respect to these objects. Society loses its divine
object and so becomes a house of human mirrors, a world whose measure is man. In this way,
Pieper poses a penetrating critique of *what is true social development?* through the evaluation of
what goods such a society affords its populous, by either metaphysical realism or transcendental
idealism or, simply, real versus mental being. The average person will existentially identify with
whatever metaphysic the state itself thinks with. Pieper believes that it is symptomatic of a
totalitarian society to promote idealist metaphysics so that no objectively transcendent measure
can be drawn upon to evaluate its existence.

Sophistry, the inverse of philosophy, has been said to thrive off apriority.[732] Pieper argues
that apriority turns reality into personal property for the purposes of "useful social organization."[733]

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[732] We see Pieper equate the pragmatism of the sophist with a flagrant disinterest in real being. Instead, the sophist
cares only for how the real is mentally organised, revealing that apriority is the object of primary concern for the
sophist. This is due to an underpinning disinterest in the transcendental aspect of objective being. We read: "In a
dialogue of Plato, Socrates asks the sophist Protagoras just what he teaches the youth who flock to see him? And the
answer is, "I teach them good planning, both in their own affairs, such as how one should best manage his own
household, and in public affairs, how one can best speak and act in the city-state." This is the classic program of
"Philosophy as Professional Training" – a seeming philosophy only, with no transcendence.
But even worse still, of course, is that all these pseudo-forms work together, not only in failing to transcend the world,
but in more and more surely succeeding in closing off the world "under the canopy": they seal off humanity all the
more within the world of total work. All these deceptive forms, and especially such seeming-philosophy, are
something much worse, something much more hopeless, than the naïve self-closing of the worldly man against what
is not daily-life. Someone who is merely naively confined to the work-a-day may one day nevertheless be touched by
the disturbing power that lies hidden in truth philosophical question, or in some poem; but a sophist, a pseudo-
philosopher, will never be "disturbed" [by the transcendent]." Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 89-90.
[733] "In philosophy, Kant objects, "the law of reason is supreme, whereby property is possessed through labor." Pieper
repeats this sentence through *Leisure*. Ibid., 31, 34. In this context, "property" means Mass Man.

So prolific is the sophist's handiwork that Pieper asks, "[i]s there still an area of human action, or human existence as such, that does not have its justification by being property to the machinery of a 'five-year plan'?"[734] So the philosopher who practices leisure, who does not follow such a plan, who is not concerned with purely social reason is, therefore, alien and useless to the sophist. Pieper's contrasting of leisure with the Worker reveals their contrariety in the metaphysical and social context. One breeds creaturely awareness; the other, Mass Man. For Pieper, philosophy is firstly and necessarily non-social, for its primary object is real being. Due to this the created form of man lacks the inclination, regardless of his conditioning, towards giving mental being pre-eminence. Despite the post-World War tendency to rebuild itself into an even greater, more totalitarian society through use of ever greater forms of sophistry, and wherein only the useful has social currency, Pieper remains steadfastly loyal to metaphysical realism in his texts as a testament to man's primary inclination towards, and thus his need for, real being amidst a totalitarian world.[735]

It is learnt from *Happiness and Contemplation* that apriority is a breeding ground for existential *ennui*.[736] The individual becomes exhausted through the endless production of or servitude towards clear and distinct thoughts. Thinking and doing become ends in themselves, rather than as conjoined means for felicity in view of the object into which one is absorbed. The chief aim of this text, to re-establish the necessary link between happiness and receptive reasoning,

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[734] Ibid., 42.
[735] "For that he world of the 'Worker' is pushing into history with a monstrous momentum (we are almost inclined, rightly or wrongly, to speak of an unleashed "demonic power" in history), of *that*, there can be no doubt." Ibid., 57.
[736] *Happiness and Contemplation*. 95.

therefore imparts in its negative element the call to always struggle against an autonomous view of reason, for with which happiness is lost inasmuch as mental being dominates one's vision. In this way, reality becomes subsumed into the various functions a person or collective performs, leaving no "free zone" wherein intrinsic knowledge can be pursued.[737] But from *What Does "Academic" Mean?* Pieper asserts that intrinsic knowledge or philosophy is meant for "the many"[738], "the crowd"[739], even in its "esoteric" [740] dimension, since all men by nature are *capax universi.* Hence Pieper struck upon that unusual but fruitful union between the experience of the masses, as present within for instance the student body, by welcoming them, equally, into the real universe and into their aptitude for it. In so doing, he ignited an interest in creaturely reality, and man themselves as part of this reality, within an audience otherwise exhausted from the *ennui* of a totally functional existence.[741] Without the theoretical, and especially esoteric, dimension of knowledge, functional knowledge for the masses, even as a useful Good, can become tumorous, without any end. Without *theoria* they risked being measured by nothing more than function, and due to which ultimately risking becoming little more than a mechanised individual. Pieper knew that for those who exist heteronomously, as the merely *other*, as Mass Man, that their freedom and happiness rested upon revealing to them their capacity to philosophise; to know intrinsically, even esoterically; to contemplate and to be at leisure. That is to say, to know things apart from the mind

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[737] *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 40.
[738] *What Does "Academic" Mean?: Two Essays on the Chances of the University Today*, 31.
[739] Ibid., 34.
[740] This thesis is put forth in the following text: ibid. Although Pieper states there is an esoteric dimension to philosophy, he does not exclude anyone from this. Esoteric philosophy is simply a concept in Pieper's writings that acknowledges the priority of *artes liberals* over *artes serviles*. Ibid., 32-33.
[741] *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 40.

and constructions of the autonomous individual; the social and purely functional world; towards a reality beyond the immanent; into whom any man, who is *creatura*, can enter.[742]

## 7. Conclusion

It has been found through this response, that through the proliferation of autonomous reason, through the practise of sophistry or propaganda, and through the construction of the machine, Pieper shares his view as to the plight of Mass Man with Guardini. Thus it is posited the Guardinian element within Pieper's theory and broadly across his works. At stake is an attempt to make man the measure of men. Instead, *creatura* is put forth by Pieper, like Guardini, so that the Creator becomes this measure, the acknowledged owner of being; by critiquing autonomous reason in light of intellectual receptivity; by tying knowledge firstly to the apprehension of real being; and by prioritising *theoria* over a functional existence. These and related concepts reinforce that while indeed man can be conditioned, while he is as clay, as a mass, he is so *not in the hands of man but in the hands of the Creator*. Man is a form whose extrinsic measure can only be the Creator. Pieper, therefore, relieves the plight of Mass Man by putting him back in the hands of his Creator through an encouragement of the philosophy and practise of *creatura*.

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[742] There seems to be two principle ways that Pieper uses the term, "transcendent", within *Leisure*. First, it is through the activity of *intellectus* that human sphere of existence can be transcended; and secondly, that philosophy must point to a transcendental object if it is to keep its title and not fall into the pseudo-philosophy of sophistry (which has no transcendental object). For example, ibid., 33-34, 130.

Thesis Conclusion

This research has argued through the format of a "cry and response" that a joint exposition from the writings of Romano Guardini and Josef Pieper can relieve the plight of Mass Man. Pope Francis' recourse to Guardini within *Laudato Si* evince that Guardini is still relevant, even decades later. The Guardini chapters in their own right justify the interplay between Mass Man and *creatura*. However, a Pieper response is beneficial for its contribution to knowledge; thus the last chapter on Pieper, be it a broad sketch, justifies the same, but with strict reliance upon the Guardini analysis to signpost how to approach and arrange Pieper's writings; without which the chapter would be an untenable contribution; but with which the nature of Mass Man is understood in relation to his truest sense of being – as *creatura*.

This research has taken this plight as the problem of when man assigns purpose to other men, and by virtue of this foregoes a common ontology, assuming a role like that of the Creator towards His creation. In these roles, the person becomes as God and others become as Mass. The principal Guardini text that underpins this argument is this: Mass Man is one "who stands at the extreme pole from the autonomous"[743]. This passage has revealed the problem to be Kantian in nature; when as *autos* the individual makes of himself the potter, fashioning others according to his mind; whose measure becomes absolute inasmuch as he fulfils his purpose when imposing upon other beings – as *heteros* – his *logos*. By direct manipulation, or mediated through    masses

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[743] Guardini, *The End of the Modern World*, 58.

already mastered, a false form is suffered, as a hand forced into a glove, fated to have one's being ignored in view of the purpose extrinsically assigned. Be it humans or things, one who designates purpose to the collective becomes like the Creator, ceasing to be like creation. When a person suffers under this individual, in the manner this research has defined, that person is treated as a mass; and due to which Guardini cries out to his reader to resist, to seek awareness as to this perversion, and who embodies this new anthropological type; but whose situation is not left unchallenged by Guardini as to Who the Potter really is and what it means to be *phyrama* – a true creature. In this way Guardini seeks to relieve the plight of Mass Man.

The response from Pieper has sought to demonstrate agreement and continuity with respect to Guardini's view on Mass Man and *creatura*. It is logical to make the step from Guardini to Pieper due to the following: firstly, by illustrating the link between Guardini and Pieper's concepts of reality and *creatura*. Secondly, the link is made by showing a joint counter-Kantian ethical imperative that Pieper took up partly due to Guardini, mandating one to prize the givenness of reality by disregarding one's own act of knowing, and even its very content, should either or both obscure or conflict with that which is given to *intellectus*. Lastly, the link to Guardini is made in Pieper conceiving of things and thought as being creatively thought, as having the "character of a word"[744]. Through these links it is shown that, be it as things or concepts, occidental philosophy as both Guardini and Pieper reveal require a concept of *creatura* to best make sense of the world, and specifically the plight of Mass Man. This thesis credits Guardini for his extensive justification that the plight of Mass Man, as a deprivation of *creatura*, is more than a collectivist or sociological

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[744] *The World and the Person*, 51, 136.

problem. In turn, Pieper needs to be credited for weaving this argument into his systemic preoccupation with the philosophical act and related subjects. Indeed, therefore, it has become comprehensible how Pieper relates to the all that Guardini posits as the symptoms and causes of Mass Man. Looking back at the foregoing in this way the cry of Guardini is met with Pieper's response.

A Pieper response to the plight of Mass Man has been given according to the terms of reference apropos to Guardini. The key issue for Pieper, whose origin likewise stems from the thought of Kant, is the impact and intersection of ontology with anthropology when man's concept of being is "at the sole disposal of the *ratio*"[745]. One who is disposed thus, or who is subjugated as a result, sees and interacts with things as though they were only "raw material"[746], that is, purely passive entities awaiting an extrinsic cause of form; not as *creatura*, which already possesses this due to the Creator.

The faculty of *intellectus* is put forth so that an epistemological basis exists to denature reason from utility or extrinsic knowledge; conjoining it, instead, to *theoria*, leisure, and esoteric knowledge, which are all practises whose object is the created world; providing man, under the character of *givenness*, with knowledge intrinsic to the thing itself. Being apprised of *intellectus*, and in having argued that Pieper saw in his audience and pupils that which is characteristic of Mass Man so defined, he or she to whom Pieper espoused his theory of knowledge was given the means

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[745] Pieper, *Leisure: The Basis of Culture*, 18.
[746] Ibid., 96-97.

to know reality directly and so redirect his quest for being away from paradigmatic knowledge engendered by the sophists of this age; who in claiming such knowledge over others, and towards whom his purpose is decreed, steal men from the Creator, as their own property, into servitude within a world of human manufacture.

Both authors have heavily critiqued the nature and role of the machine or technology in their defence of *creatura*. What can only be called prescient, Guardini and Pieper, who in a time quite before our current age of smartphones, location data, AI, VR gear and quantum computers; and who by understanding that man fashions matter according to his definition of reality; in defining reality neutrally as *natura*, it has given man a false yet full license over matter. But Guardini and Pieper decry that *natura* must be understood as *creatura*, for the license hitherto held has only served the few, subjugated and *deplatformed* the rest, but above all has indiscriminately robbed man of creaturely awareness. In this way creaturely awareness is highly topical to the philosophy of technology, for if the use of technology is not balanced with an interest in the objective world, understood as God's property, man will come to serve whichever mind is behind what he considers to be most real. But in encouraging creaturely awareness, Guardini and Pieper have each made their claim as to what this reality is and Who owns it. Hence each have staked their claim as to the Mind which is most worth knowing. Following their example, Mass Man can find relief from technological awareness in the knowledge that their world is made and governed not by man, but by the Creator.

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