Comparison and evaluation of the moral significance of emotions in Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990

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COMPARISON AND EVALUATION
OF THE MORAL SIGNIFICANCE
OF EMOTIONS IN AQUINAS, THE MANUALISTS AND

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CHAPTER 1

The Problem

1. Defining The Problem

“It is regrettable that moral theology has neglected the role that emotions play in the moral life” says William Spohn, S.J. (1991, p. 85). In his view, this seems to emerge from the influence of a rationalist natural law tradition which, unlike Aquinas, “did not pay as much critical attention to this dimension” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69). He points to the place of the emotions in the virtue-centred ethics of Thomas Aquinas and to contemporary philosophy’s rediscovery of character and virtue in which “it pays more attention to the affective side of the agent” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69). Aquinas, with other contemporary moral philosophers, recognised that “well-ordered affectivity guides moral decision-making through discerning perceptions and virtuous dispositions” (Spohn, 1991, p. 69). Such is the summary of one respected commentator’s survey of Catholic Moral Theology at the start of this decade.

These observations also have implications for various understandings of the human person within Moral Theology. This is particularly true in the light of the phrase used in the official Vatican commentary on No. 51 of Gaudium et Spes, that “human activity must be judged in so far as it refers to the human person integrally and adequately considered.” The final phrase “integrally and adequately considered” is, arguably, the dominant motif in the past thirty years of Moral Theology.

Spohn’s comments together with their inference have been an important catalyst for this researcher. The correlation of these two elements (emotions and the human person “integrally and adequately considered”) provides the springboard for this
study. Its aim is to examine the moral significance of the emotions firstly in Aquinas, secondly, within and beyond recent Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990), to compare and contrast them, then, finally, to evaluate these sources in the light of some contemporary views of emotions and of the human person. The problem generated by the convergence of these elements can be expressed in a statement:

There appears, until recently, to be an incomplete, and possibly inadequate, understanding and treatment of the emotions in the Christian moral life when measured against Aquinas, against some contemporary authors, and against the recent criterion of the human person “integrally and adequately considered.” These assertions indicate a possible need to explore whether and to what extent this first impression is true. It also involves making some preliminary soundings so as to establish some contemporary benchmarks against which the understanding of emotions, morality and the human person in Aquinas and recent Moral Theology can be measured.

The brief statement of the problem now needs to be explained.

(i) The first dimension of the problem can be stated thus:

There is an extended treatment of the emotions (The Treatise on the Passions) in the Summa Theologicae of Aquinas that could provide an historical benchmark for the understanding of the emotions.

The past twenty years have seen a re-examination of the writings of Aquinas, particularly in view of the renewed interest in character, virtue and moral development. There is evidence of recent research on emotions and morality in Aquinas (Jordan, 1986; Pinckaers, 1990; Barad, 1991; Harak, 1993). Emotions and the affective virtues are part of broader discussions on virtue and the moral life in
Aquinas (Wadell, 1985, 1989; Porter, 1990; Cessario, 1991; Nelson, 1992; Keenan, 1996; O’Connell, 1998). These works are supplemented and expanded in a recent synthesis on the Christian moral life where emotions have a central role (Vacek, 1994). These studies provide access to a rich, though neglected, resource within the Catholic tradition.

(ii) The second dimension of the problem can now be stated:

Catholic Moral Theology, immediately prior to and since Vatican II, seems, until recent times, to reflect an inadequate understanding and treatment of the emotions and of their significance in the Christian moral life.

The principal vehicle for the teaching and writing of Moral Theology until around 1960 was the theological Manual. Written predominantly, though not exclusively, in Latin, the Manuals and the Manualist tradition emerged as a “genre” during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries-just after the Council of Trent. The immediate aim of the Manuals was the formation and education of priests. Consequently, their origin and intellectual context was the seminary, not the university. The wider goal of the Manuals was the "cura animarum"-the care of souls but seen within a juridical context. Moral Theology, increasingly seen outside a theological context, became more closely allied with Law and especially Canon Law. Finally, the Manuals had a strong pastoral thrust and a well-developed strand of casuistry. All in all, their goal was to provide a priest with the knowledge and practical skills to be a wise minister of the sacrament of penance (Gallagher, 1990, p. 30; O’Connell, 1990, p. 20).

Moral Theology, just prior to Vatican II, in the 1940s and 1950s, was the “step-child” of the moral Manualists, among them Genicot, Noldin, Prümmer, Merklebach, Aertnys-Damen (McCormick, 1989, p. 3). Formation, theological opinions and
loyalties tended to follow the main theological “schools,” be they Dominican, Jesuit or Redemptorist. Overall, it was an approach oriented to sin, the confessional, and under the strong influence of the Magisterium, Canon law and the seminary (McCormick, 1989, p. 3).

This provides the first and immediate context for the understanding and treatment of the emotions in the Christian moral life. They are habitually given a relatively brief space in the Manuals (somewhere between 5-10 pages). In these texts, the emotions are viewed predominantly, if not solely, as “Passions,” or as “Concupiscence.” Special consideration is given to the emotion of fear. The moral significance of the emotions is seen by the Manualists in the context of the human act. The emotions or “passions” are portrayed as factors or influences (whether actual or habitual) affecting deliberation or freedom of choice. Their primary focus is on the levels of moral imputability, namely, the subjective factors influencing virtue or guilt. Such a focus is appropriate, even necessary, in any discussion of morality and moral action.

For all that, a brief perusal of the context and content of the treatment of the emotions in the Manuals raises possible questions, even at this stage. There may be prima facie grounds for asking whether the understanding and treatment of the emotions and of their moral significance in the Christian life is undeveloped, even inadequate, in these authors. Further, this raises questions about the nature and adequacy of the Theological Anthropology and the view of the human person underlying the understanding and treatment of the emotions by the Manualists.

This raises the other consideration of the second aspect of the problem, the period since Vatican II. Spohn’s regret at the neglect of the emotions within Moral Theology covered the period until 1990. Ironically, this comment is made within the only extended discussion of the emotions (passions) in the “Notes on Moral
Theology” in Theological Studies over a span of fifty years.

The “Notes” are both an excellent resource and barometer in three ways. Firstly, they provided, during the 1940s and 1950s, a tempering influence on the characteristics of the Manualist tradition noted above by McCormick. This was particularly due to the influence of two Jesuits, Gerald Kelly and John Ford. They seemed to dominate the field of Catholic Moral Theology, certainly in the English-speaking world. They brought an approach that was well-informed, realistic, compassionate, prudent and extremely pastoral (McCormick, 1989, p. 4).

Secondly, the “Notes,” particularly from 1965 under Richard McCormick’s authorship, encapsulated the main areas and lines of discussion on ethical issues in an international, ecumenical and multi-disciplinary setting. Their catchment area embraced the main European languages, Protestant and Catholic theologians and, increasingly, other disciplines such as Moral Philosophy, Law, Political & Economic Philosophy, Business, Biotechnology and Medicine.

Thirdly, the debates reflected in the “Notes” ranged from those in Fundamental Moral (Norms, Conscience, Proportionalism) to specific areas, for example, Nuclear War, Sexual Morality, Autonomous v Faith Ethics, Liberation Theology, Feminist Ethics and, increasingly, questions in Bioethics and Social Ethics.

In reviewing the “Notes,” if little or no attention is given to the emotions in their annual surveys, it does not appear to be due to myopia on the part of the author or authors. The “Notes” are no more or less a mirror of the state and preoccupations of Moral Theology at any given time. They seem to indicate that the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life was, until recently, a marginal concern.
This impression appears to be confirmed in an initial review of theological texts and writing since Vatican II. For instance, authors of recent foundational texts, for instance, O’Connell (1990), Gascoigne (1993), and Kennedy (1996) give little attention to the emotions beyond the standard treatment as factors that affect freedom. Lobo (1989) approaches the emotions from the same perspective but with some positive comments. Other authors, e.g., Häring (1963, 1965, 1967) and Peschke (1979, 1978) attempt to revise and renew their approach to Moral Theology using the framework of the Manualist tradition. Häring devotes ten or so pages to a “phenomenology” of the emotions, and discusses the various dimensions of emotions and their connection with values. Peschke’s discussion of the emotions appears to be confined to those factors that impede or enhance freedom, with a few additional comments about their necessity and positive function in personal growth. In their later work, Häring (1978, 1979, 1981) and Peschke (1986, 1993) appear to show no development in their view of the emotions. As has already been noted, it is only since 1990 that there appear to be renewed signs of interest in, and extended discussion of, emotions in contemporary Moral Theology.

To sum up: In this second aspect in articulating the problem, the discussion has addressed briefly the immediate context of Moral Theology and its view of the emotions in the Christian moral life. Both in the Manualist tradition just prior to Vat. II., and in renewing Moral Theology from 1965-1990, the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian life appears, overall, to be undeveloped and inadequate.

This raises the third dimension of the problem:

(iii) In contrast with Catholic Moral Theology, studies since the 1980s within Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental Psychology throw further light on the relationship between the emotions and morality. This involves the moral significance
of emotions, the dynamics of moral reasoning, self-esteem, empathy, moral development and affective Conversion.

Spohn’s reviews of the literature on the Passions (1991) and on the Virtues (1992) are indicators of the range and depth of the writing that has been done on the emotions. This is true, firstly, within Moral Philosophy. There has been much research and discussion on the nature of the emotions, especially on their rationality, i.e., their cognitive and intentional structure, their moral significance, and their relationship to virtue and character. Among those representative of such work are von Hildebrand (1958, 1972), MacMurray (1962), Solomon (1983), Nussbaum (1986, 1990, 1994) and Oakley (1992). The quantity of writing is further documented by Oakley (1992) in his 18 page bibliography with at least 22 books and 120 articles on the topic of the emotions and morality.

The research and writing in these three fields have developed the understanding of the nature of the emotions and of their significance in the moral life. This is true particularly in four areas. Firstly, there is the question of emotional rationality, that emotions are not mindless surges of affect that lack purpose or direction. They have a cognitive and intentional dimension. Secondly, the sense of the self is built on an affective foundation known as self-esteem. Thirdly, there is the moral significance of the emotions. They are not merely psychological facts. Carefully understood, the emotions have moral significance in themselves together with a role in moral decision-making in collaboration with the intellect. Finally, there is the matter of moral character and integration in relation to the emotions. The emotional configuration of a person’s life is an integral component of moral responsibility, personal growth and maturity.

To sum up: The prima facie evidence concerning the undeveloped, even inadequate, view of the emotions in Catholic Moral Theology in the period 1960-1990 contrasts sharply with the lively debate and fertile resources evident in other disciplines.

Finally, there is the fourth dimension of the problem.

(iv) The three facets of the problem can now to be correlated. The first and primary bearing of the compass for this project is Aquinas. He provides an historical benchmark against which the second bearing (the Manualists and authors within Moral Theology 1960-1990) can be measured. The third compass point consists of some significant insights from contemporary Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental Psychology and, to a lesser extent, from within the Catholic tradition. These offer a contemporary benchmark against which Aquinas, the Manualists and treatments of the emotions in Moral Theology between 1960-1990 can be evaluated.
Hence, there will be an examination of authors (Aquinas, Manualists and Moral Theologians since Vatican II), comparison and contrast between them and, simultaneously, an evaluation of these authors in themselves, then, finally, in relation to key insights from sources beyond the Catholic tradition. The latter can provide an initial resource from which Moral Theology can enrich its content and broaden its perspective. This process should provide a more adequate view of the significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life. It will also provide a means for Moral Theologians to develop and use a Theological Anthropology more consistent with contemporary understandings of the human person in the Church.

The outline of the problem now requires further clarification. This will involve a brief survey of the broader historical context. The explication of the first two aspects of the problem (Aquinas, Manualists and recent Moral Theology) centre on their immediate setting. The third dimension (other sources from which one could evaluate, enrich and expand the understanding of the emotions and of the person) can only be explained in the wider context of the Church. This is the setting where emotions, the human person and Moral Theology itself find their place and meaning.

This study’s aim is to explore the problem as it has been defined and explained. The next step is to examine the historical context noted above. This will clarify the need to explore the problem and some of the relevant criteria required in the process.

2: Historical Context

Central to any discussion of the historical context for this study is the concern of Vatican Council II that the various theological disciplines be renewed by a livelier contact with the mystery of Christ and the history of salvation. Special attention needs to be given to the development of
Moral Theology. Its scientific exposition should be more thoroughly nourished by scriptural teaching (Optatum Totius (OT), 1965, no. 16).

The Council further encouraged Moral Theology to reclaim its connections with Systematic Theology and the Fathers of the Church. This summons did not occur in a vacuum. It has already been noted that moral teaching had gradually been distanced from the comprehensive theological framework that characterised a work such as the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas. The context for Moral Theology was reduced to the juridical, centred on God’s Law, Canon Law and divorced moral life and teaching from Scripture, Theology and faith.

One principal characteristic of the Council’s vision for Moral Theology was that it be Christocentric. Morality is seen here as the response to God’s invitation made out of love. It is in and through Christ that God invites us. It is in and through Christ that we can respond to the divine call. The indwelling Spirit is at the heart of that process and of the Church. As a consequence, this understanding of morality brings into sharper focus the communitarian, ecclesial, sacramental and social dimensions of moral living (Lobo, 1989, p. 18ff; O’Connell, 1990, pp. 23ff). From this perspective, the moral life is not about observing rules or following commands. It is a way of loving that begins with Jesus Christ as the embodiment of God’s love. It is a response expressed in the personal relationship of discipleship.

The biblical renewal that forms the other characteristic of a renewed Moral Theology is a re-aligning with a long tradition. The word of God was central to the perspective of the Fathers, Augustine and Aquinas. The priority given to faith that opens a person’s mind and heart to God’s word has a profound importance for Moral Theology. As a discipline, it will be in a better position to emphasise what is uniquely, specifically Christian. With the life of Jesus as the model, moral teaching will find its primary content and take its thrust from the Gospel, the Sermon on the
Mount, the Beatitudes, the action of the Holy Spirit through grace, the theological virtues and the Gifts.

The Vatican Council’s summons to ground Moral Theology in Scripture has, in retrospect, proven to be more difficult than was appreciated at the time. The more scholarly appreciation by Scripture scholars of the range of literary forms and historical contexts in the Bible had repercussions for Moral Theology. For instance, it raised questions about moral teaching that was based in Scripture and claimed to be normative and universal. In the intervening thirty years, the relationship between Scripture and Ethics has generated both vigorous discussion and defended positions, reflected in Curran and McCormick (1984).

In the final analysis, Moral Theology is a science whose goal is to bring people to “live the faith in a more thorough and mature way” (Gaudium et Spes (GS), 1965, no. 62). It should, then, enable the Holy Spirit active in the word of God, in the Christian person and at the heart of Christian morality to produce the integrated vision and judgement that is wisdom. Surveying the scene in Moral Theology since 1965, one author sums it up thus: “In my opinion the chief task of today’s moral theologians is to reopen the lines of communication between Christian Ethics and the Word of God” (Pinckaers, 1995, p. xviii).

The importance of the Scriptures as the basic diet for Moral Theology is germane to this study in two ways. Firstly, it places the person of Jesus Christ in his humanity in central position. He models authentic humanness that mediates the face of God. This is particularly evident in his emotional responses to situations and people. His anger at deliberate “blindness”, his tears over Jerusalem, his fear in Gethsemane betray his deepest attitudes and values. In fact, his affective life seems to have its centre in his empathy and compassion-where he is most human and divine.
Secondly, the Scriptures have a formative role. Personal growth in the likeness of Christ is closely related to the role of images, stories, parables and metaphors in shaping a person’s emotions. It is especially the life of Jesus that Christians use as the central image to organise and interpret the affections (Spohn, 1983, pp.107ff).

The second topic that stands out is the human person, the focus of Theological Anthropology. Since the second Vatican Council, there have been significant developments in the understanding of the human person. This is particularly evident in the growing appreciation of the role and importance of personal conscience and of the personal dimension of the moral law. Mention has already been made of the model of the person “integrally and adequately considered.” The wording of the answer is found in the official Vatican commentary on Gaudium et Spes. In No. 51, in the context of marriage and sexuality, the Council document states: “…the moral aspect of any procedure ... must be determined by objective standards ... based on the nature of the human person and his (sic) acts” (GS, 1965, No. 51).

McCormick (1984, p. 49) notes that the 1965 official commentary on this passage made two points:

i) The expression formulates a general principle that applies to all human actions (not just to marriage and sexuality which was the original context).

ii) This expression is chosen to signify that “human activity must be judged in so far as it refers to the human person integrally and adequately considered” (*personam humanam integre et adequate considerandam*).

What does it mean to use the human person “integrally and adequately considered” as a criterion of moral methodology? This phrase is a formal description that requires material content. It needs to be expanded, given flesh, so that one has a
more detailed, specific picture of the integral human person which is both coherent and adequate. Such an account should incorporate the essential components of the nature of the human person (“Who I am”) and of the goal of personhood (“Who I am called to be”). It should also indicate the sorts of actions that promote or impede that process of integration and fulfilment.

In the Church’s view, then, it is whatever enhances or diminishes the human person that is the criterion of rightness and wrongness in the moral life. The thirty years since the above official clarification have stimulated much discussion amongst Moral Theologians. In trying to interpret and understand the original phrase, to make it more specific, debate has tended to concentrate on questions arising from Sexual Morality and from Bioethics. A significant issue has been the relationship between the human person’s use of intelligence, on the one hand, and natural processes (especially biological), on the other. In the exercise of “right reason,” when is nature to be followed, or when should it be improved, corrected or even transcended by the person for the subject’s good? More precisely, what is the relationship between the physical end of an act and the end (s) sought by, and for the good of, the person?

The purpose of this study is not to be part of that particular debate but to highlight that, in this model, the emphasis is on the person, not so much as a moral agent, but as the measure of morality. As noted above, such an understanding places more stress on the human person rather than on nature or human nature as the criterion of moral norms. This view of the person continues to provide the grounds for a renewed understanding of Natural Law and for the methodological shift evident in Catholic Social Teaching.

This personalist thrust also embraces the total person. Hence, it gives greater prominence to the relational and social dimension of personhood. The Council says
“(the) subject and goal of all social institutions is and must be the human person” (GS, 1965, no. 25). Morality is intimately connected with what promotes or undermines relationships. Lobo points out that

The social is not something added to man. The human person is essentially social. Today, especially, there is need for emphasizing the social aspects of morality, since the person finds his fulfillment in society and is impeded from attaining perfection through adverse social factors (1989, p.21).

An evolving construal of the human person as a social being is contained in the Social Encyclicals of Pope John Paul II beginning with Laborem Exercens (1982). The descriptive account, with its normative implications, revolves around three key concepts, namely Solidarity, Interdependence (between humans and with the natural environment) and, significantly, the reality of Structural Sin.

The human person is portrayed as in God’s image (Gen. 1:27) in Conciliar documents. There, and particularly in post-conciliar documents, one finds a concern for an holistic understanding of the human person. The human person is created through love to be God’s image and to develop in God’s likeness, to be in intimate union with God (GS, 1965, nos. 8, 19). Integral to this is the capacity to know oneself, to choose good and reject evil consciously and freely “as moved and drawn in a personal way from within”(GS, 1965, no.17).

Each human person, then, is endowed with a physical body, with emotions, intellect, will and human spirit (GS, 1965, nos. 14, 15, 29). The Theological Anthropology of the person “integrally and adequately considered” embraces the corporeal, intellectual, affective, social, psychological, and spiritual. Each of these facets of human personhood needs cultivation if a person is to reach integration. One author sees it as a rediscovery of the Hebrew notion of the person (Lobo, 1989, p. 86). It is
embodied in Jesus Christ who is the Image of God, revealing in his humanity the mature and complete human being.

One can find in other local official Church resources an evolving picture of these various aspects of personhood, particularly touching on the need to identify, accept and direct the emotions. For instance, the *Perth Archdiocesan Guidelines for Religious Educators* (PAGRE 1987) indicate in a brief fashion how the physical, emotional, intellectual, volitional and spiritual dimensions of the body/spirit reality of the person can become authentically human and hence more like God (PAGRE, 1987, G1-5).

A recent benchmark is the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (1994). The human person and the moral life are seen under the heading of *Life in Christ* and as a vocation to life in the Holy Spirit. This is the context in which the dignity of the human person, human community, the need for salvation and grace are explored. The morality of the “passions” is treated briefly but positively (Nos. 1762-1770). Passions or feelings are “natural components of the human psyche...[(that)...form the passageway and ensure the connection between the life of the senses and the life of the mind.’” They can “dispose” a person to beatitude “and contribute to it.” In Christ human feelings “are able to reach their consummation in charity and divine beatitude.”

The historical context reveals, then, an expanding understanding of the human person as the image of God. Integral to this is the possession, development and integration of the emotions. Emotions are an important aspect of the human person “integrally and adequately considered.” Such a Theological Anthropology provides another benchmark against which one can examine and evaluate the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life.
The third concern from Conciliar and post-conciliar documents and developments is the crucial link between Moral Theology and other disciplines, cf., Spirituality, Philosophy, pastoral practice and the secular sciences, especially Psychology and Sociology (GS, 1965, no.62; Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education: Formation of Future Priests, 1976). The methodologies differ; scientific observation in the life sciences, self-awareness, reflection and interiority in Christian Ethics; but they are ways of knowing and understanding that complement each other. They are important resources for Moral Theology.

Social sciences can provide data that can be useful and, at times, essential in understanding and explaining moral behaviour. Yet they have limits in that, from statistical data alone, one cannot arrive at moral norms. Psychology has provided invaluable insights into the makeup of the person and those factors that facilitate or inhibit personal growth or moral responsibility. It has deepened our appreciation of the psychological structure of the human person. This is particularly true of the dynamic relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. The role of the emotions is central in the various mechanisms used by the psyche in developing self-awareness and in the integration of the self. The emotions, especially the negative ones, can be indicators of health or of pathology. Dealing with them constructively is essential to physical and psychological well-being (Gaylin, 1979, pp. 1ff).

The use of these resources from other disciplines, then, helps to broaden one’s view of the human person and of the process of human growth and integration. Such considerations can assist in providing a suitable and adequate framework within which this study can examine the moral significance of the emotions.

The fourth aspect in this survey of the historical context concerns Spirituality.
Naturally, authors are indebted to the seminal works of Jonathan Edwards’ *Religious Affections* (1959), James’ *Varieties of Religious Experience* (1963), and Otto’s *The Idea of the Holy* (1977) for their probing of the nature of religious emotions. Over the past two decades there has been a virtual explosion of literature in this field. For the purposes of this study, one noteworthy aspect of this has been the research done on the Ignatian Exercises and discernment. Central to this is the notion of desires and the role of emotions, feelings and affect in prayer. Desires and affections, properly understood and used, can mediate God’s love and can be the indicators of the state of a person’s relationship with God (Moore, 1989; Barry, 1990, 1993).

Again, there is evidence of a growing body of research and discussion on the relationship between Psychology and Spirituality (Lonsdale et al., 1990). Some have attempted to explore an integrated vision of personal maturity (Au, 1989; Au and Cannon, 1995). There has also been writing on the spirituality of the negative emotions (Whitehead and Whitehead, 1994).

Some work has been done on Spirituality and Morality by Bastianel (1986), Duffey (1988), O’Keefe (1995), Billy & Orsuto (1996) and Spohn (1997). Lonergan had earlier seen Spirituality and Ethics as integrally related, as expressing two distinct levels of consciousness within the intending subject- “the desire to attain the truly valuable and the impulse to respond to the holy” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 673). It must also be acknowledged that the shift from the grace-nature dualism and the growing politicisation in Christian Anthropology have suggested possibilities for the integration of Spirituality and Ethics. These go beyond the extrinsicism of the Manualist tradition that “reciprocally instrumentalized prayer for moral attainment and ethical behaviour for spiritual progress” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 672). The roots of this were principally in the separation (rather than distinction) of Systematic, Moral, Ascetical and Mystical theology. These studies mentioned above indicate the
retrieval of a more integrated approach to spirituality, morality and theology in the first order sense (lived experience) as in Spirituality, Ethics and Theology in the second order sense (academic and systematic reflection) (Spohn, 1997, p. 111f).

It is interesting that there appears to be little written that explores the relationship between Psychology and Moral Theology apart from the work of Kiely (1980), or between these two fields and Spirituality. One wonders whether, more by default than by design, Spirituality as a discipline has taken up issues such as emotions and affectivity neglected by Catholic Moral Theologians. It may be symptomatic of a more integrated vision of the Christian life in which the old divisions between disciplines are breaking down. One must also be aware of a trend noted by one author that “holistic, creation-centered spiritualities and some narrative-based ethics risk the danger of losing the distinction between the spiritual and the ethical” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 673).

Finally, examining the historical setting leads to the fifth consideration, the phenomenon referred to as the “feminising of consciousness.” This has emerged from the wider cultural context that surrounds the Church. This “paradigm” or “sensibility” shift has many sources, especially in the feminist movement, environmentalism, the need for, and interest in, spirituality, the reaction to consumerism and to the scientific mentality in the Western world. It is perhaps best summed by Tarnas as being a move from a “dualistic epistemology” (with its roots in Descartes and Kant) to a “participative epistemology” (1991, pp. 430ff). A person’s relationship with the world is that of both observer and participant. Knowledge and truth are attained not just by the detached process of scientific observation or by analysis but also (and just as validly) by synthesis, intuition and engagement. Knowing can also be non-discursive, relational and by way of union (which has parallels in the Biblical understanding of “knowing”).
These considerations indicate some of the central influences at work that raise serious questions for the rationalistic and, at times, Kantian approach to the moral life which still seems to lurk in Catholic Moral Theology (Spohn, 1991, p. 85). They also point to the need to explore or perhaps to rediscover a fuller notion of “rationality.” The rational does not just entail intellect and will, but embraces, in various ways and degrees, our emotions, affectivity, psyche, body and senses. The human person, as a rational being, cannot function or develop to maturity without these facets of the personality working in harmony with each other. Such ideas have been raised in the 1930s by the Scottish philosopher John MacMurray (1962) and, as had already been noted, more recently, by Callahan (1988, 1991), Oakley (1992) Nussbaum (1986, 1990, 1994) and others.

This has been a brief examination of five aspects of the historical context, both past and present, that provide landmarks in this project. The five issues are: the importance of the Scriptures and of the person of Christ; an integral Theological Anthropology; the use of other sciences and disciplines; the role of Spirituality and finally one cultural phenomenon that influences our perceptions and our sensibility. These factors help explain how the understanding of the human person has deepened and expanded over the past thirty years. Such a process has implications for this project as it explores the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian life.

How does Catholic Moral Theology measure up? Is it sufficient that spontaneous desires and emotions be seen merely as factors that can inhibit freedom, or, more often, as hindrances or dangers to the Christian moral life? If not, in what sense are they good? In what sense are they moral and enhance freedom? In what sense are they integral to, even indispensable in, helping human beings to act morally, grow in virtue and become morally integrated? How do emotions contribute to answering the
question “Who am I called to be?” which is the goal of personhood, of Theological Anthropology?

So far, then, this study has attempted to define and to explain the problem. Next, there has been an examination of the historical context so as to further clarify the problem, to establish the appropriateness of the project and to indicate some benchmarks for the process. This provides a better appreciation that this study does meet a need and that the five aspects of the historical context provide both resources and criteria for the task. The next step is to survey the related research.

3. Related Research

A literature search revealed that, so far, no extended studies have been done on the emotions as they are treated in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 (Manualists and others). Studies have been done on Aquinas but not by way of comparison and contrast with the Manualists and other writings since 1960. Nor does there appear to be any evaluation of these sources in the light of contemporary studies in Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental Psychology. Particular aspects of the topic of this project such as, emotional rationality, the moral significance of the emotions, their role in moral integration, Aquinas on the emotions, have been the subject of a number of scholarly studies in the past thirty years or more. Specific reference to these books or articles has already been made either as background to, or as resources for, this study.

Other studies either in books, journals or dissertations have been done on topics related to this study. These can be discussed under three headings.

3.1: Emotions, Religious and Moral Life
Beyond the standard works on religious emotions already mentioned, there are studies by Saliers (1980) and Spohn (1983, 1995). Lauritzen (1985, 1988) rejects the dichotomy between reason and emotion. He develops a “constructivist” theory of the emotions. Such, in his view, places one in a better position to explain how a religious vision of life can facilitate significant moral changes in the believer. Christian faith, then, has the capacity to transform dispositions, intentions, and especially the emotions, particularly that of anger. Roberts (1992), from another vantage point, examines how different classes of virtue disclose their structural dependency on the Christian emotions.

Aquinas’ account of the need for well-formed affective and intentional habits is the focus of the dissertation of Calogero (1994). Drawing on Aquinas and Jonathan Edwards, the work of Lewis (1991, 1994) presents a critique and modification of Lauritzen’s work. The alternative perspectives from the Catholic and Protestant traditions converge to reveal a fuller anthropology in which humans are seen as the “embodied possessors of a rich repertoire of powers which interact in complex ways” (Lewis, 1991). Both Aquinas and Edwards assume a teleological world-view. This influences their understanding of the moral life, the Christian transformation of these innate, human powers and enables these two writers to hold “a more finely-textured understanding of the emotions” (Lewis 1991).

A broader religious spotlight is used by Gilman (1994). He pursues Nussbaum’s notion of “narrative emotions” and the interdependence of narratives and emotions. He sees this as a means of overcoming the dilemma of modern theism, of being caught between being irrelevant to the modern world or unfaithful to the Christian tradition. Emotions can mediate a practical kind of universal truth and narratives can mediate those meanings that are distinctively Christian.
The specifically and uniquely Christian account of character and community, central for Hauerwas, is the object of a critical study by Jung (1983). She tries to address the limits of an ethics of character and to expand Hauerwas’ interpretation of the moral meaning of sanctification. Jung argues that an adequate vision of holiness and maturity must incorporate embodiment and embrace the body/spirit scope of human existence. In her view, sanctification involves more than a transformation of one’s perceptions. It also entails “an affective change in the agent’s value orientation, the competent retraining of the agent’s emotions, and the gracious triggering of an adoptive disposition towards the agent’s incarnate situation” (1983, p, 75f).

3.2: Moral Development-Education, Moral Philosophy, Developmental Psychology

The emotional basis of moral attitudes is the concern of Mailloux (1985). In her dissertation on Aristotle’s theory of moral education, Sherman (1982) argues that a theory of the development of character requires an analysis of the emotions and desires that constitute a person’s character. In her interpretation of Aristotle, moral training is not just a matter of habituation and of the practice of certain skills. It also involves the training (especially within the family) of the emotions-in the cognitive dimension (beliefs and perceptions) and in the desiderative aspect (attachments to certain ends and objects of value). Such moral training (paedia) also encompasses the communal and the cultural. A common core of values is mediated through music and tragedy (drama and art) which reinforces attachment to certain characters and values through the process of identification.

Critical evaluation of the role and influence of the Kantian view of moral agency has already been noted (Oakley, 1992) and others. Four dissertations take up this issue.
Naukhoff (1994) argues that Kant’s mature moral theory actually considers that it is one’s ability to cultivate feelings which helps a person to form a virtuous disposition. Jones (1994) examines how emotions reveal a person’s ways of seeing the world, and help a person arrive at the right view of a situation. O’Hagan (1994), relying on de Sousa’s account of an emotion, argues that emotions can be “assessed as objective, appropriate responses to morally relevant situations.” Finally, moral growth is discussed by Kavanagh (1990). Building on Charles Taylor’s notion of strong evaluation second-order desires, she argues that moral education is essentially the broadening and refining of these desires and the propensity for them already present in a child. Moral education, then, is an unfolding from within rather than an imposition of principles external to the child.

3.3: Compassion and Empathy

Radcliffe (1994) addresses the Kantian position that since emotions are not under a person’s direct voluntary control, they cannot be at the will’s bidding in any morally meaningful way. Through an analysis of compassion, the author argues that a construal of this emotion as subject to a person’s will means that it provides an instance where an emotion is the possible object of a moral imperative.

McCarthy (1993) suggests that the question of empathy is basically one of epistemology, a way of knowing. The processes and dynamic that distinguish an empathetic response are the same as those that enable a person to engage in and enter diversity (especially in another culture). Empathy is a spiritual discipline, a call to being-in-relationship, to a continual and expanding openness to others, to diversity, and entails the capacity to tolerate uncertainty. The Incarnation with its self-emptying and not clinging to the divinity (Phil. 2:6-7) is a central metaphor for empathy and its demands.
Davis (1993) reflects on McCarthy’s view and offers a more qualified interpretation of the role of empathy, especially in women’s experience. Empathy, in her view, requires a higher level of emotional functioning and is expected (unfairly) more of women than of men in Western culture. From these ideas emerge a less optimistic view of the possibilities of empathy, a need to reconsider expectations of women with regard to empathy, and particularly the need for women to find a better balance between self-care and care of others. This has implications for how one interprets Jesus’ self-emptying and how one sees Christian self-giving in relation to nurturing and caring for others.

In brief, all the studies in this literature search or noted earlier in this project relate in some way to emotional rationality, to the emotions and their role in the Christian religious or moral life, to personal integration or to growth in empathy and compassion. None sought to examine and critically assess the treatment of the emotions in the Christian moral life within Catholic Moral Theology prior to or since the second Vatican Council nor to appraise the categories mentioned above in the light of that topic.

Having defined the problem, examined its historical context then surveyed the relevant research, the next task is to indicate the method to be used in pursuing this study.

4. Methodology

The primary methods employed in this study will be document analysis and historical research. This will entail an examination and critical evaluation of the context and content of selected texts by a form of qualitative research (Bogdan &
Biklen, 1992; Miles & Huberman, 1984). This method, inductive rather than
deductive, seeks to identify the presence of particular content, both manifest or
inferred, within selected texts or documents. The presence or absence of certain
content is an indicator from which an hypothesis can be inferred or certain
interpretations can be made. Such an instrument will enable this study to gain access
to commonly held perspectives amongst Moral Theologians with regard to the moral
significance of the emotions and of the human person.

The nature of this project, then, requires the use of document analysis for it is
through the texts analysed that the researcher “can get access to the official
perspective” (Bogdan & Biklen, 1992, p. 136). In this study, particularly in those
sections dealing with Catholic Moral Theology prior to or since Vatican II, the
“official perspective” is not synonymous with “official” Church teaching. Amongst
the primary sources is a selection of Moral manuals used in the education of priests.
Hence, “official perspective” refers, rather, to the theological perspective “in
possession,” the received tradition of Moral Theology taught in seminaries
principally until the 1960s and, to a lesser extent, since that time.

The second aspect of the methodology will involve the use of comparison and
contrast. This will principally be between Aquinas and authors from the Manualist
tradition, i.e., Davis (1935), Prümmer (1935, 1963), Aertnys-Damen (1956), Noldin-
Schmitt (1956). The same process will be used with authors whose provenance is the
Manualist tradition and who attempt to renew it, cf. Häring’s Law of Christ (1963,
editions of Christian Ethics (1979, 1978; 1986, 1993) and, to a lesser extent, Grisez
(1983) and Maguire (1978, 1986). Comparison and contrast will be applied to the
treatments of the moral significance of emotions and to the Theological
Anthropologies.
The third facet of the methodology is evaluation of the above sources from within Moral Theology in themselves, then in relation to a contemporary benchmark, i.e., insights from contemporary Moral Philosophy, Psychology, Developmental Psychology and some writing from Theology.

The use of comparison and contrast in this study will further require a sensitivity to discrepancies which may emerge between “espoused theory” and “theory in use” in the selected texts. As noted by Lenihan (1995, pp.2, 34), the primary context for the use of these two categories is the comparison and contrast between sets of documents, where one is “official” or “normative” and others are applications to a particular or local situation, for instance, programmes, courses, guidelines. The “official” position on a particular topic may embrace a certain content. The document applying that perspective, while claiming to “espouse” the “official” position or “theory”, may, in reality, be “using” another position or theory. This may arise from interpreting or applying the “espoused theory” in a way that departs from or contradicts the original content or intention of the authors.

These two categories of theory will be helpful tools in probing the selected texts in this study. A particular author, for instance a Manualist, may ostensibly adopt a certain Theological Anthropology. In fact, the same author may employ it in a manner that is either inconsistent or in conflict with that “espoused” position, for example, when treating the emotions and the moral life.

The focus of this analysis and critical appraisal will be

1. Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions (Passions);
2. Selected texts and writing in Catholic Moral Theology from c. 1960-1990, namely, Manualists and their successors;
3. Selected authors from recent literature in Moral Philosophy, Psychology, Developmental Psychology and relevant Theological writing.

The use of selected texts is dictated, firstly, by the parameters of time and the size of the study. Secondly, the nature of some key sources indicates that a selection of texts be the target of this study, for instance, the Manuals of Moral Theology. As a specific theological genre, the Manuals developed a distinctive structure and content. In other words, one Manual was much the same as another. While recognising the neo-Thomist revival initiated by Leo XIII in *Aeterni Patris* (1879), the moral Manuals emerging from that period were “basically in continuity with the morality of earlier centuries” (McNamara, 1985, p. 9). These Manuals became the received tradition, the theology taught in Catholic seminaries until the 1960s (Gallagher, 1990, pp. 29ff).

Because of this similarity in structure and content, this study will concentrate on authors writing in Latin (Prümmer, Noldin-Schmitt, Aertnys-Damen) and one author writing in English (Davis) as representative of the Manualist tradition. They also represent different schools-Dominican (Prümmer), Redemptorist (Aertnys-Damen), Jesuit (Davis and Noldin-Schmitt). One can find a precedent for this in Gallagher’s study of the development of Moral Theology (1990). He uses a representative group of authors (including Manualists) to provide a reliable sample from which he can draw certain conclusions.

Thirdly, in examining the period since the second Vatican Council until 1990, this study will review the literature within Catholic Moral Theology in so far as it deals with the emotions and the Christian moral life. The study will pay particular attention to two authors, Häring and Peschke and, to a lesser extent, to Grisez and Maguire. The format and content of their texts indicate that they have their roots in

Fourthly, this researcher has formed the initial opinion that Aquinas’ *Treatise on the Passions* could be a major point of reference in this project. It is a standard against which one could evaluate the past (Manualists) and the present (recent Moral Theology) and can itself be measured against insights from Moral Philosophy Psychology, Developmental Psychology and recent Catholic scholarship. Given this, an extended examination, analysis and critical evaluation of Aquinas’ work on the moral significance of the emotions (passions) is crucial to this study.

Fifthly, when this study comes to examine recent writing in Moral Philosophy, one particular author has been selected. Oakley (1992) is a comprehensive study of morality and the emotions which draws on many sources. He approaches the task within an Aristotelian framework of virtue and character. Such an approach is consonant both with the thrust of this study and with one of its key facets, the work of Aquinas on the emotions. Oakley’s work also provides a coherent account of the moral significance of the emotions that could enrich Moral Theology.

Again, Psychology throws light on the place of self-esteem in the moral life,
particularly in relation to the capacity for empathy (Dominian, 1975, 1998; Jackson, 1989; McDargh, 1983). From this field there is also the work of Callahan (1988, 1991) on the role of emotions in moral decision-making. From Developmental Psychology there are the studies of Gilligan (1982) on moral reasoning and moral development in women. Shelton (1990) investigates the role of empathy as the psychological foundation of the Christian moral life. Shelton’s focus on empathy has a bearing on this study. It underlines the importance of one particular emotion in three ways, in having inherent moral meaning, in being a factor in moral integration, and in playing a crucial role in the Christian moral life. This could lead to a more adequate view of the human person and of the moral significance of the emotions.

The aim of this project is to probe the texts mentioned above and to respond to the focal question of this study, namely:

How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of the emotions in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 when measured against the work of Aquinas and some contemporary authors?

In this process, the following three research questions will be used:

1. How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character?
2. What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?
3. What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person in these authors?

The study will contain the following substantive considerations (Chapter 1):

1) an explication of the problem,
2) a description of the context with which the study is concerned,
3) an identification of the texts to be examined and analysed and their relevance to the problem being studied,
4) an explanation of other literature that is pertinent to the problem being studied,
5) a description of the methodology used in this study,
6) a definition of terms,
7) a discussion of the limits of the study, its significance and possible implications for Moral Theology.

An attempt will be made to formulate a working definition or “understanding” of an emotion (Chapter 2).

The process of examination (analysis, historical research), comparison and contrast within and between texts, evaluation of texts with regard to the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life will entail the following steps (Chapters 3-7):
1. **Employ** the three research questions formulated above to investigate the focal question for this study;
2. **Examination** of the documents using the first two research questions. The pertinent documents are:
   2.1: Aquinas’ *Treatise on the Passions* in the *Summa Theologiae* I.II. qq. 22-48 and his discussion of the Affective Virtues in I.II. qq. 55-61 (Chapters 3 and 4);
   2.2: The first volume in each of the courses in Moral Theology of the selected Manualists, Prümmer (1935, also 1963), Davis (1935), Noldin-Schmitt (1956), Aertnys-Damen (1956) (Chapter 5);
   2.4: The texts of Oakley (1992), Gilligan (1982), Callahan (1988, 1991), and
Shelton (1990) will involve the highlighting of a significant aspect of each author’s work in relation to the moral significance of emotions, moral virtue and character. Other authors will also be used as resources, e.g., Jackson, McDargh, Dominian, Lonergan, Gelpi (Chapter 7).

This study will investigate, in these authors (especially in Aquinas, Manualists and post-Manualists), structure, context, content and form-for instance, formulations of questions, forms of argument, phrases, words and imagery. By this method, it is hoped there will emerge answers to the first two research questions:

i) “How do these authors (Aquinas, Selected Manualists, Häring, Peschke, Grisez, Maguire and other post-Manualists, then Oakley, Gilligan, Callahan, Shelton etc. portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character?”

ii) “What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?”

3. Comparison and contrast will be done between

3.1: Aquinas and selected Manualists in their understandings of the moral significance of emotions and of Theological Anthropology (the person) (Chapter 5);

3.2: Aquinas, Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990) especially Häring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire (Chapter 6);

3.3: Aquinas, Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology (1960-1990) with Oakley, Gilligan, Callahan, Shelton and others (Jackson, McDargh, Dominian, Gelpi) (Chapter 7);

4. Cumulative evaluation is the other aspect of the process. This will involve an on-going appraisal of Aquinas, Manualists, Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 among themselves and, finally, in relation to the contemporary authors examined in Chapter 7.

By the use of comparison, contrast, evaluation, it is hoped that the answer to the third research question will surface:
“What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person in these authors?”

4. **Recording and presentation** of the findings, with conclusions, implications of the study and recommendations for Catholic Moral Theology (Chapter 8).

5. **Definition of Terms**

**Church**
The Roman Catholic Church, specifically the People of God, which includes the hierarchical leadership and teaching authority, the Magisterium.

**Manualists**
The authors of theological textbooks (Manuals), in this instance, textbooks of Moral Theology, written predominantly in Latin, for use in seminaries from the sixteenth century until the 1960s.

**Moral Theology**
A term used almost exclusively within the Roman Catholic tradition in contrast with Christian Ethics which, until recent times, has been used predominantly amongst Protestant theologians. Currently, the term Christian Ethics is increasingly found in course descriptions at Catholic Theological Institutes and in the work of Catholic authors. Symptomatic of this is the use of the term Christian Ethics in the title of the book and in the definition of Moral Theology of Pinckaers when he says “Christian Ethics is a branch of Theology which studies human acts to direct them to a loving vision of God, seen as our true, complete happiness and our final end, in the light of revelation and reason” (1995, pp. 8ff)
Practical Reason

The process by which a person judges actions as right or wrong according to objective criteria. It is conscience acting in a concrete situation. Aquinas, following Aristotle, saw the virtue of phronesis (Prudence, practical wisdom) as necessary for a person “to judge an ethical situation correctly and to form his conscience accordingly” (Stoeckle, 1979, p. 211).

Value

Like “good,” value can be understood in a non-moral (pre-moral) or moral sense. Something can be “good” or “have value” in a range of non-moral senses—as useful, instrumentally (as a means to an end), inherently (an experience of something that is rewarding), intrinsically (worthwhile in itself) etc. (Frankena, 1973, p. 81f). Moral “good” or value denotes something that is good on moral grounds. Namely, it is an activity or state of affairs (e.g., being just, honest, faithful) that is worthwhile in relation to “persons, groups of persons, traits of character, dispositions, emotions, motives, intentions” (Frankena, 1973, p. 62). To realise such values by embracing and promoting such values is praiseworthy, right, or fitting, hence a person is morally “good.” To neglect or reject such values is blameworthy, wrong, not fitting, hence a person is morally “bad.” The difference of judgements between moral and non-moral value is partly a question of the objects called “good” or “bad” and partly the difference in “the grounds on or the reasons for which they are made” (Frankena, 1973, p. 62). In other words, what counts as a moral or non-moral value is significantly influenced by the descriptive and normative accounts of the person.
**Voluntarium**

One needs to explain the Latin term *voluntarium* since the English words “voluntary,” “voluntarily,” “volunteer” do not have the same connotations.

*Voluntarium* is a formal term in Moral Theology that describes an act, omission or effect that proceeds from an internal principle, for instance, the will, with knowledge of an end or object (Prümmer, 1935, p. 40). An act is perfectly a *voluntarium* (in the full sense) when it is done with full advertence and full consent (i.e., freely). It is imperfectly a *voluntarium* (in a limited sense) if advertence and/or consent is partial (Davis, 1935, p. 12). The English equivalent of *voluntarium* would be “a human act done with deliberation and consent.”

The *voluntarium* or human act in the proper sense involves freedom. This is not just immunity from external coercion but also protection from internal pressures. The will, in order to be free in its consent, requires a certain indifference (*indifferentia*) or impartiality with regard to possible objects of choice. It is a condition of not being weighted more in one direction, to one object, than to another. When this weighting exists, from external or internal sources, the freedom of the will’s consent is diminished or removed.

For instance, intense anger can make someone so intent on a course of action, that the capacity to choose otherwise is lessened or removed. In this instance, there may be neither deliberation nor freedom. Again, a person may know and consent to an act, for instance, robbing a bank teller. But a third party may have a gun in the person’s back. Here, the action is deliberate and intended but the consent is not free. So, as Prümmer (1935, p. 41) points, out every free act is a *voluntarium* but not every *voluntarium* is a free act.
6. Significance of the Study

The proposed study is significant for a number of reasons. Principal among these is that, until now, there appears to be no substantial examination of the emotions in the Christian moral life as they are treated in Aquinas in relation to recent Catholic Moral Theology, particularly in relation to the neo-Thomistic Manualist tradition just prior to Vatican II. A project such as this in which there is an attempt to explore what is, as yet, unexplored, has merit in itself.

Secondly, one needs to recall Spohn’s concern that in Catholic Moral Theology, until recently, there has been a neglect of the emotions and a correlative influence of a Kantian model of moral reasoning. This study could help redress the imbalance in two ways. One is by investigating how humans are more fully rational if they have emotional involvement in seeking, doing and achieving what is good through desires, love and delight. Further, this study could help counteract the view that with negative emotions (for instance, hate, fear, and anger), emotional discomfort is tantamount to moral discomfort, that to feel bad is to be guilty. In others words, it is helpful to explore how negative emotions can have a constructive psychological and moral significance.

Thirdly, the understanding of the human person in theological disciplines and in Church documents has expanded and deepened in the past thirty years. The behavioural sciences, Sociology, Anthropology and especially Psychology, have made a considerable contribution to our understanding of the human person. This is true, in particular, with regard to the emotions and their role in human life and growth. There is a need to examine whether the views of the person and of the moral significance of the emotions in Moral Theology is consistent with such developments. This raises issues to do with the adequate treatment of an area within
a discipline and of its presentation in various forms of education.

Fourthly, there appears to be a dearth of studies within Catholic Moral Theology that draw on, or engage in, a mutual critical evaluation with work done in Moral Philosophy, Psychology and Developmental Psychology. This provides another positive reason for engaging in this study.

Finally, this study brings a point of view that is part of a larger setting. That setting is the retrieval of classical and medieval authors, (for instance, Aristotle, the Stoics, Aquinas) by reputable scholars, amongst them Nussbaum, MacIntyre, Sherman, Rorty, Westberg, Lisska, Torrell, Pinckaers. To harness some of these resources, particularly with regard to Aquinas and, specifically, studies on his Treatise on the Passions, to compare and contrast them with the Manualists and subsequent treatments of the emotions, could contribute to the field of Moral Theology.

7. Limitations of the Study

The particular parameters of this study are fourfold:

7.1: Its perspective is limited to Moral Theology in the Catholic tradition as distinct from the Reformed tradition or the traditions of Moral Philosophy, Psychology or Developmental Psychology;

7.2: It has a limited time-frame. The possibilities for such a study in this field could embrace hundreds of years. This study has as its main focus the period immediately prior to and after Vatican II (1962-1965). Hence it covers the period c. 1960-1990;

7.3: It is limited in terms of authors (Chapters 5-6). The primary sources are selected Manualists and writers whose provenance is mainly the Manualist tradition. These are indicators of the state of Moral Theology. Secondary authors are used only by way of overview since 1965 to assess developments;
7.4: It is limited in having a specific focus as far as the emotions are concerned. The discussion of Aquinas (Chapter 3 and 4) will focus on the moral significance of the emotions and the Affective virtues in his work as also in the Manualists and post-Manualists (Chapters 5 and 6). In Chapter 7, key aspects are discussed with special reference to representative authors in Moral Philosophy (moral dimension of emotions and moral reasoning in Oakley), in Psychology (dynamics of the emotions in moral reasoning in Callahan) and in Developmental Psychology (moral reasoning and development in women in Gilligan; empathy and moral character in Shelton). Self-esteem and affective Conversion will also be explored using the work of Dominian, Jackson, McDargh and Gelpi. These are sources against which Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 can be critically assessed.

8. Format of the Study

The study will be presented in eight chapters as follows:

1. Definition of the problem, including historical context, related research, methodology, definition of terms, significance, limitations and format of the study;
2. Emotion: a working definition;
3. Benchmarks for emotions and morality in Aquinas I: Foundations;
4. Benchmarks for emotions and morality in Aquinas II: Specific issues;
5. Emotions and the Moral Life in the Manualist Tradition c. 1960;
7. Contemporary Soundings and Benchmarks;
8. Summary of findings, conclusions, implications, recommendations, postscript.

Chapter one will articulate the problem in the form of a statement about an aspect of Catholic Moral Theology that needs to be addressed at this time. It will provide an
historical overview of the context from which the focus of the study emerges. It will summarise the related research, focusing on the emotions and affectivity in relation to rationality, religious or moral experience. The chapter will explain the methodology to be used together with the research questions to be employed in probing the problem. It will provide a brief working definition of relevant terms, note the significance of the study, identify the reasons for pursuing it, point out its limitations and outline its format.

Chapter two will offer, in a more developed form, a working definition or “understanding” of an emotion.

The following five chapters will be the focus of the three research questions. The aim will be to uncover in an author or authors the view of the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life, the manifest or inferred Theological Anthropology and, finally, the significance of different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person (points of comparison and contrast). In Chapters three and four, these questions will be used in Aquinas’ Treatise on the Passions. In Chapter five, the focus will be selected Manualists and, in Chapter six, writings within Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, particularly Häring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire. In Chapter seven, the spotlight shifts to establishing some contemporary benchmarks from within Moral Philosophy (Oakley), Psychology (Callahan, Dominian, Jackson, McDargh) and Developmental Psychology (Gilligan, Shelton) and using them in critical evaluation.

In Chapter eight, the researcher will attempt to present a summary of the study, its findings, its conclusions, its implications for Catholic Moral Theology, suggest any recommendations that may emerge from the implications and conclusions and will close the project with a postscript.
CHAPTER 2

Emotion: A Working Definition

1. Clarifying Language

Humans all experience themselves as “being moved,” as affected in some way. It may be when one is gripped by fear, burning with anger, surprised by joy, teary from compassion. Yet, attempting to define these and other emotions is to join company with those who almost despair of finding any rational common definition. Spohn (1991, p. 70) cites the questions raised by Amelie O. Rorty, “Are they rational or irrational, active or passive, motives or intentional states, value moods or directed to specific objects, caused by social, genetic, or individual factors?”

One cannot discuss the moral significance of the emotions without some form of coherent and adequate account of the nature of an emotion. For the purposes of this study, an attempt to formulate at least a working definition is an imperative.

At the outset, it is important in this discussion to note that human activity is integrated. Human capacities, powers and activities are distinct while not being separate. An emotion is often associated with, mediated through, or modified by intellection (concepts), volition, behaviour (action), bodily changes or inner psychological states but is not identified with any one or all of them. For instance, knowing what something is does not convey the value of that object to a person. This comes through an emotion. Or, many emotions lead to action but not necessarily so, e.g., the emotions of wonder or joy are often experienced in and for themselves.
Spohn (1991, p. 71) notes in reference to affective states that usage seems to indicate a ranking based on increasing focus, self-awareness and purpose. The states range from moods, feelings, wants through desires, passions, emotions and affections to dispositions and motives.

Emotions are distinct from the following (Gonsalves, 1985, p. 24; Solomon, 1983, p. 132ff):

a) **Moods**: These are emotions that are generalised (on the object side and sometimes on the side of the subject). The mood, e.g., depression, is precipitated by an emotion or emotions whose focus is the world as a whole rather than a specific object (person, situation, thing);

b) **Desire**: This is a wanting or a striving for something valued or valuable (or to withdraw from something by aversion) but not always based on, or associated with, emotions, e.g., “primitive” needs such as hunger or thirst or, alternatively, the desire for meaning or holiness with the desire to avoid evil (aversion);

c) **Feelings**: This word is often used to mean the equivalent of emotion when this is seen as the experience with its psychological effects or as “our subjective awareness of our emotional state” (Gaylin, 1979, p. 1) or as bodily modification.

Lonergan distinguishes intentional from non-intentional feelings. These are responses to objects apprehended precisely as satisfying / dissatisfying or as values/disvalues-values. Non-intentional feelings (or affects) include certain states, e.g., anxiety and trends, e.g., hunger. These have causes (anxiety) or goals (hunger) that are known only after the emotion has occurred (Doran, 1993, p. 12). Intentional feelings as understood by Lonergan have the same meaning as “emotions” as defined in this study. Affectivity is used in this study to include both sorts of feelings, plus desires and moods.

d) **Passions**: This word is used in common parlance as meaning “emotions” or
“feelings.” Etymologically, passio in Latin seems to focus on what happens to the subject, the “being moved.” Emotion (from ex-movere) seems to stress more the subject moving out of the self in relation to an object within a form of relationship.

2. Categories of Emotions

According to Williamson, citing Griffiths, emotions are explained according to three main theories, namely cognitive, evolutionary and social reconstructionist (Williamson, 1997; also Callahan, 1991). There appear to be two principal methods for categorising emotions. The first is primary/secondary. Primary emotions are a limited set that are innate, occur regularly across cultures and have a range of intensities. They are usually listed as interest-excitement, enjoyment-joy, surprise-startle, distress-anguish, anger-rage, disgust-revulsion, contempt-scorn, fear-terror, shame-humiliation (Callahan, 1991, p. 102; Williamson, 1997, p. 14f). Some would also include remorse-guilt and affection-love in this category. Secondary emotions appear either to derive from the primary types or combine them. Examples would be jealousy, envy, moral indignation, sympathy, guilt (for some).

The second classification is positive/negative. This is commonly used but its provenance is nowhere explained. One could suggest Accounting, i.e., profit and loss, credit and debit. The unfortunate result is to reduce positive emotions to be assets and negative ones to being liabilities. A more appropriate source may be electricity where the generation of current requires both a positive and a negative pole. Biology could also be a suitable point of origin. Homoeostasis is defined as “the tendency towards relatively stable equilibrium between interdependent elements, especially as maintained by physiological processes” (Turner, 1987, p. 510). Equilibrium in a sensate organism is associated with comfortable (positive) emotions and disequilibrium with the uncomfortable (negative) forms. The electrical
and biological analogies can easily accommodate the need for positive and negative emotions together with the constructive or destructive potential of both forms of emotion.

Callahan clarifies this further noting that positive emotions are “characterized as inducing movement toward an object, or motivating continuing contact.” Negative emotions “induce movement to avoid or overcome obstacles and dangers” (1991, p. 102). Gelpi expresses this slightly differently: positive emotions “put us in ongoing communication with other persons and with our world” where negative emotions “set us in a confrontational opposition to other realities” (1998, p. 75).

In Scholastic Philosophy, e.g., in Aquinas, passions were manifestations of the sensitive appetite and its two parts. There is the Concupiscible appetite which aims at pleasure or pain and involves the emotions of love, desire and pleasure and their opposites—hatred, aversion and sadness. The Irascible appetite, on the other hand, is concerned with achievement or failure, in overcoming obstacles. It includes anger, fear, courage, hope, despair. It is intriguing how this division approximates to the definitions of positive and negative emotions suggested above by Callahan. Aquinas’ treatment will be explored later in this study. Suffice it to say that these are emotions that affect humans profoundly. Today, perhaps it is best summed by saying that “passion” is used to describe any intense or violent emotion (Nuth, 1993, p. 720).

A loose definition of emotions is suggested by Callahan as “distinctly patterned human experiences that, when consciously felt, produce qualitatively distinct subjective feelings and predispositions: ‘I am angry and want to attack’, ‘I am afraid and want to flee’, ‘I love and wish to approach’ ” (1988, p. 10).
This is a point of departure. This study will suggest the characteristics that constitute an emotion, explain them, suggest some modifications, then offer a working definition. It is proposed that an emotion is an interactive response which is a complex of the cognitive, the affective, desiderative, the intentional, evaluative, subjective, and formative. The account will draw on, qualify, and integrate the insights found in a range of authors from Aristotle through Aquinas to various modern or contemporary writers such as von Hildebrand, MacMurray, Oakley, Nussbaum, Solomon, Spohn, Callahan, Vacek and others. It also converges with the work of others researchers, among them Fuentes (1992), Turski (1990), Kitchen (1983), Nash (1986), Sherman (1982), Calhoun (1981), Aultman-Moore (1992), Wong (1991), Ihara (1991).

3. Characteristics

3.1: Cognitive

An emotion entails firstly the apprehension of an object (person, thing, situation). One becomes, in some way, aware, conscious of a specific object. This knowledge is mainly pre-reflective and diffuse. It can involve a range of ways in which one apprehends the world covering beliefs, convictions, thoughts or imaginings (Oakley, 1992, pp. 14f). Some of these are culturally conditioned, others combine affect and a subject’s earlier experiences retained in the memory (Spohn, 1991, p. 71). For instance, John may be afraid of his neighbour’s dog because he knows that the dog really is a threat. Or, he may know from experience that the dog is harmless. However, due to an incident in his childhood, the possibility or thought that the dog may attack is enough to instigate fear in John. People can also have emotions in their dreams, day-dreams, fantasies and in relation to fictional characters, e.g., Bart of The Simpsons can cause a parent watching TV to bristle with anger just as he can arouse
the same emotion in his own parents Homer and Marge. The cognitive aspect is
summed up by Oakley: “While emotions always have a cognitive component, there
is no particular kind of cognition which we always have when having an emotion”
(1992, p. 15).

Solomon (1983, p. 240) holds that emotions are “rational judgements.” They are, in
other words, basically cognitions. He seems to expand the common understanding of
a judgement as a conviction about the way something is (its intelligibility) to being
more active in giving the object meaning and worth (its value). It must be conceded
that this has some truth. For instance, a moral judgement about an action being right
or wrong is an evaluative action. Nevertheless, Solomon’s use of the term “rational
judgement” is, perhaps, too confusing and associates the cognitive aspect of an
emotion with the intellect.

It is true that cognition is essential to an emotion and is often the basis for
differentiating emotions. Our experience, however, indicates that an emotion is more
than just cognition. Vacek sums up the second aspect of cognition as involving the
consciousness of “the value of a specific object” as one “moment” of an emotion
(1994, p. 12). Someone can know a particular object and not be attracted to it,
repelled by it, or moved in any way. For instance, John may regularly go past his
neighbour’s house and the dog in the yard is just a part of the scenery, like the tree or
the shed. Or he may judge “that is a dangerous dog”, but by that very judgement, is
not “affected” or moved to fear. That is, one can have an evaluative intellectual
judgement without an emotion just as one can have an emotion without an evaluative
intellectual judgement.

Again, to say that an emotion is essentially a cognition leads to another difficulty.
One must explain how one form of cognition can have different affective outcomes.
Mary may know someone she dislikes is very ill. By that knowledge, she may be moved to sadness, compassion, or perhaps pleasure, even a certain malicious delight. Is that knowledge sufficient to explain the different emotions? Callahan sums up the relationship between emotions and cognition when she notes “While emotions and cognitions are often combined, emotions differ from cognitions in their subjective intensity, specificity, and nonverbal richness” (1988, p. 10).

Given the connection with some form of cognition, emotions can be modified when a belief or a perception of the truth is modified (because it is false, unjustified or both). For example, Mary may be angry since she believes Anne has maligned her behind her back. If Mary finds out that her belief was not true (either because it did not happen, or that Anne did not say what was attributed to her or because someone else made the comment) her anger will dissipate or turn to another person (object). Hence, as Nussbaum notes (1994, p. 81) when using the terms “rational” or “irrational” of the emotions, there is not a simple division between the emotions and the normatively “rational.” To some extent all emotions are “rational” in a descriptive sense (i.e., they are cognitive to some degree). They may then be evaluated, as are any beliefs, in a normative sense as “rational” or “irrational”, i.e., as true or false, or, in their intensity and/or outcome (behaviour), as appropriate or inappropriate.

3.2: Affective

Vacek notes that emotions require in a person a foundational “openness -to-good”, an alertness in one’s “general emotional consciousness” (1994, p. 12). There can be variations in this sensitivity to values or disvalues. For instance, some people can be easily moved in general while others are moved only in specific situations.
An emotion entails a disturbance of a person’s affectivity. For Vacek, being “affected by that valuable object” is another “moment” of an emotion (1994, p. 12). Often, but not always, this will change the person in a bodily way, for instance, a faster heart rate, perspiration etc. Or it may change someone’s inner psychic state, for example, one becomes excited at the prospect of going on holiday, or one has a sense of sadness or anguish on hearing that a friend has died. It is possible also to have an emotion without feeling the emotion, in the sense of noticing it (Oakley, 1992, p. 9), that is, without subjective awareness of it (Gaylin, 1979, p. 1). One can be unaware of the emotion one is experiencing. For instance, the hostess might be angry with some guests for arriving very late for dinner. But she may not have feelings of anger (i.e., be conscious of them) because she is preoccupied with getting the meal on the table. Again, it is only after John has passed the neighbour’s house with the dog outside does he notice that his heart is racing and that he is afraid.

One can also have emotions over a long period of time without the feelings that accompany those emotions being present all that time (Oakley, 1992, p. 8). A widow may grieve for her dead spouse without always feeling the grief. She may also have a contrary emotion, for example, anger (at being left on her own unexpectedly).

If having an emotion is not the same as having associated bodily changes or of feeling something, that is, noticing it, how, then, is someone “affected”? Oakley suggests that people experience what he refers to as “psychic affects.” When we are joyful or despairing without necessarily attending to these emotions “…it seems that we may thereby be (inter alia ) mentally ‘buoyed’ or ‘drained’ respectively, and our perceptions, thoughts, desires and actions may well express these psychic modifications without our realising it” (1992, p. 10).

Some examples. Felicity may be proud and elated at her graduation ceremony. But
she is more focussed on her delighted parents and on her boyfriend’s success at gaining the university medal. The “psychic affects” of her success and excitement which touch her now cluster around her parents and boyfriend rather than around herself. She does not notice what she is feeling but her behaviour is influenced by it.

Emotions, then, change the psychic dimension of a person’s affectivity. They can induce a certain emotional tone that can colour the way one sees the world, people, one’s desires and actions, sometimes consciously, often without one being aware of it, and can do so over extended periods of time. For instance, Felicity’s parents’ love for each other has often entailed bodily changes and feelings over the twenty five years of their marriage. But, more often, their love involves mutual interest, looking forward to and enjoying each other’s company, an easy comfortableness, or finding pleasure in each other’s successes. They and their relationship have a certain emotional resonance often without their being aware of it.

To sum up: an emotion has a cognitive and affective dimension. It can change a person’s bodily state and inner psychic state. These are aspects of what happens to each person in an emotion. What about the “looking outwards” aspect of the emotion, the “wanting” dimension?

3.3: Desiderative

It would seem that certain emotions cannot be sufficiently explained in terms of cognition or affects without reference to desire (Oakley, 1992, p. 15; Spohn, 1991, p. 75). This need not necessarily be expressed in a conscious effort or in action. With anger, the desire to do something about a situation, to rectify a wrong, seems central to it as an emotion. A “nonchalant activist” or an “apathetic radical” would appear to
be oxymorons.

Again, can Joan be said to have the emotion of compassion just because she knows someone is in distress and is moved by it? Isn’t the desire to be with the other person in their distress, to ease their pain, integral to compassion? Desire here also seems crucial to the intention and the motivation to move towards action (even though a part of Joan wants to run away).

One can also have desires without being aware of them. Bill, for instance, may be angry with Joe and wants to get even next time he sees him, but just now he is absorbed in fixing his car. Or there is the “he doth protest too much” example. A person disavows a certain desire, e.g., to own a lavish home, but betrays their real desires by their attitude and demeanour. In the popular television series Keeping up Appearances, Hyacinth Bucket’s proclaimed love and devotion for her family clashes with her chagrin whenever Onslow, Daisy and Rose belch into view in their blue car.

Desire, so understood, also helps to distinguish emotions from each other. Take fear, for instance. Bill is terrified of fires and Harry is captivated by them. They both know there is a fire in nearby bushland and both are agitated. There is a common knowledge and affect. What differentiates the emotions? It is the different desires. Bill wants to run for his life. Harry cannot wait to grab his picnic basket and thermos and have a day out watching a fire!

Oakley’s treatment of desire as the third component of emotion requires, in the opinion of this researcher, some development. Desire and affect both seem to come under the heading of affectivity. It may be helpful to broaden the context in which to discuss desire. By doing this, its specific contribution to the emotions is more intelligible.
Emotions are seen by Oakley within the context of Aristotelian flourishing and happiness. Aquinas, with Aristotle, sees happiness as the goal all humans seek. In Christian terms, this is beatitude or union with God. Aquinas asks what people want and answers “happiness.” In examining happiness he found inside it the yearning for God (Williamson, 1987, p. 31). Humans are drawn to happiness by desires, their attraction to what is beautiful, lovable and good. This is teleological goodness.

Aquinas, as Aristotle, understood this attraction in terms of appetitus, natural, sensate or intellectual. Appetitus is a form of orexis, a “reaching out for” an object seen in a certain way, that is, as good, attractive (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 81). The word is best translated as “appetites”, “desires”, “inclinations.” These words denote movement towards (approach) but not the sense of movement away from (avoidance) of the Latin word (Harak, 1993, p. 61). Appetitus denotes drawing towards and a subsequent movement away from, approach and avoidance, desire and repugnance. For Aquinas, appetitus is “other generated.” In his view “We are drawn by, are attracted by or repelled by, and in each case, and moved by the other” (Harak, 1993, p. 61).

Desire captures the orectic configuration of the human person. Humans are beings with a telos, the goal of happiness, of full flourishing. That objective must truly attract them, be knowable and achievable. Their being is drawn to that end through inclinations, desires-spiritual, bodily, affective, intellectual, social. As Dunne notes “We experience an inner pull to direct our own nature through our intelligence, wisdom, and love, and particularly through our desire to do what is intelligent, wise, loving” (1993, p. 266).

Human beings are attracted to and seek what appears to promote their well-being, are
repelled by and avoid what appears to violate it. In terms of teleological goodness, that is, in the non-moral sense, each person seeks good and avoids evil.

Humans are, however, beings who seek happiness consciously, by knowledge and choice. They strive for their goal not by instinct but through freedom and by the process of self-determination. Seeking and finding happiness, then, is a moral enterprise. Human beings achieve teleological goodness (their telos) principally and necessarily by seeking and embracing moral goodness, moral value, through right action. This is at the core of the human call to seek good and avoid evil. This first principle, this primordial attraction is seen in Gaudium et Spes no. 16 as a “summons” aimed at the human heart for a response. The foundational moral experience is a knowing that is “connatural”, “an affective reaction to value” (Maguire, 1978, p. 84). It is a moral imperative with its centre in the knowledge of the heart and is impelled by desire. As mentioned earlier in this study, humans are drawn to choose good and evil consciously and freely “as moved and drawn in a personal way from within” (GS, 1965, no. 17). Drawn to that goal, part of that task is the ordering of our desires, seeking to have the right objects for those desires seen in relation to God who alone satisfies the deepest longings of the human heart.

Desire, as integral to an emotion, is best understood, then, within this broader teleological framework of the makeup of the human person. Human beings are drawn to their goal by the magnet of desire. It follows that there must be a descriptive account of what constitutes happiness if desires are to be properly understood, have the proper objects, and point to right and wrong action. This is the task of Theological Anthropology. Desire and affectivity seen in such a context make an emotion more intelligible. It is a form of seeking what is good and avoiding what is evil. The emotion is a response to the goodness or badness of an object, to a value or a disvalue. This will be examined later.
So far, this study has examined three elements that constitute an emotion, namely thoughts/beliefs, affect, desire. An emotion such as fear is susceptible to such an analysis—John thinks or imagines the dog will harm him, has feelings of anxiety as he passes the house and a desire to put distance between himself and the dog.

Oakley (1992) does not proceed beyond these three aspects in his discussion of the nature of an emotion. There is, however, in the view of this researcher, more that can be said on the topic.

3.4: **Intentional**

It is “almost always” (Gonsalves, 1985, p. 24) a specific object which defines and structures the emotion. This is tantamount to Lonergan’s definition of intentional feelings as responses to apprehended objects. The emotions are intentional since they are, in some way, cognitive and have objects to which they are directed and by which they are specified (as final causes are first in the order of intention). They are forms of “intentional awareness”, forms of awareness “directed at or about an object” seen from the subject’s point of view (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 80; also Vacek, 1994, p. 11ff). Fear, for instance, is not just a bodily reaction or a movement of affect. An adequate account of it must incorporate the object towards which the fear is aimed (“What is John afraid of? It’s a snake”). This will also entail how the person experiencing the emotion (fear) sees the object. In reality, the fear may be based on a misunderstanding of what is really going on in the situation (“It’s not a snake, only a big lizard”). The fear then dissipates. Another example is that of love. John’s affections are directed at Mary and are simultaneously about creating a set of conditions or states of affairs to express, nourish and sustain that love.
3.5: Interactive Response

“Response” is the term used by Solomon, Gonsalves, Lonergan, Harak and Vacek as the movement around which the cognitive, affective, desire, and the intentional aspects constellate. For the sake of clarity, it may be desirable to restrict “judgement” to the deliberate, reflective and articulated act of the intellect, and “choice” to the act of the will.

Language is a difficulty here. An emotion does not appear to be a simple reaction to a stimulus (Gonsalves, 1985, p. 25; Harak, 1993, pp. 19ff). It is a non-deliberative, unreflective movement by which an immediate appreciation is made of an object as the way the subject perceives that object. “Response” may not be the best word. Yet, it does seem to capture the dependence on the object, the “being moved”, how the subject is affected by the other.

In order to compensate for the limitations of the word “response”, interactive is proposed as a modifier. It suggests the subject-object pole, the self-other dimension of an emotion, in other words, the relational context of human existence. With Harak, Vacek sees these elements as part of the structure of an emotion, namely being affected by, and responding to, an object’s value (1994, p. p. 12). There is not only the passive aspect, being affected. One is changed, moving towards or away from the object or being content to rest in its presence (Vacek, 1994, p. 12). There is also the active aspect, the moving out of the self towards the object as valuable in which “we affirm the valuable object in its own right and perhaps foster its growth, or we reject its evil and perhaps seek to destroy it” (Vacek, 1994, p. 12). The emotions involve a change, even a trans-forming of the subject. Joan, for instance, is slowly altered, gradually becoming more compassionate the more she is moved by, and responds to, compassion as a value.
This aspect is crucial. An emotion is an interactive response to apprehended objects precisely as evaluating them. “Each emotion intends one or more values, and each value is experienced only through an emotion. Properly functioning emotions give access to objective values” (Vacek, 1994, p. 16). Each emotion is a pre-reflective estimate of the object not as a fact, not as true or false, but as important, meaningful, good or bad to the subject or to others. The person, event, thing may be real or imaginary but its presence as evaluated is what constitutes it as the object (Solomon, 1983, p. 176). Change the object so defined, and the emotion changes.

Contrary to Solomon, objects outside the self can have intrinsic value not given or constituted by a person’s perception of them. In other words, one has the capacity to relate to objects in and for themselves, not simply in and for oneself. In discussing the subjective aspect of value, Vacek talks of Bestowal Value. “Among all the valuable objects which are important in themselves and could be important to me, I freely let some have a special importance in my life” (1994, p. 18). However, he also is insistent that some things are experienced “as important in themselves. We recognize that they are good in themselves, whether or not they satisfy any need in us” (1994, p. 17). For instance, one may find working with the poor to be personally difficult, even distasteful. Yet one could still be moved by the evil of poverty and convinced of the importance of overcoming it in people’s lives.

The emotion, then, is constituted by the evaluating of the object as desirable / not desirable, good / bad relative to the self, others, itself or God. “Our emotions reveal the value that an object has, either its present actual value or the value it can become” (Vacek, 1994, p. 16). The response to the perceived value or disvalue is attraction or repulsion. Emotions enable a person to experience a self-involved participation in
the goodness or badness of an object (von Hildebrand, 1972, pp. 233ff). Love, as the “emotional participation in a valuable object” is the paradigmatic expression of an experience that can transform the self while affirming the other (Vacek, 1994, p. 21ff). Emotion brings a level of subjective engagement, a blending of cognition, the affective and desire that brings a positive or negative attunement, a form of unity between the subject and the object of the emotion. This is particularly true when one is affected (moved) and then responds. For instance, one may listen to Fauré’s Requiem, be soothed by its submerged joy, then respond by being carried out of oneself with the beauty of the music. It is a form of being “at-one-with”, “in-tune-with” the world and inner experience of the composer.

Again, Joan’s empathy somehow enables her to be “tuned-in”, inside the “skin” of someone who is in pain, a sharing whereby she is “con-formed” to the other through the emotion. John’s fear of the dog is a form of inhabiting the “dog-as-threat, dog-as-bad-for-me” world. It is something discordant, a negative attunement, something he wishes to distance himself from, hence he flees. He can become so invaded by the fear, by the discordance, that it can grip him in the form of a phobia.

There are two classes of objects to which emotions respond: the satisfying / dissatisfying and, alternatively, values / disvalues. Their relationship entails the interaction of the objective and subjective facets of experience. For instance, what is personally satisfying may be truly (objectively) worthwhile, for instance, helping a migrant to learn English and to get a job. Something, however, may not be subjectively satisfying, may be even disagreeable, yet be worthwhile in itself, for example, sitting up all night for three nights with a sick child, or nursing a dying AIDS patient while surrounded by an unpleasant stench. What is the difference between the satisfying / value or the dissatisfying / disvalue? Values draw us out of ourselves towards the objective realm by calling us to self-transcendence. This
provides the basis for an order of values, according to Lonergan. Values have an ascending order from vital, social, cultural, personal to religious (Doran, 1993, pp. 14f). It also involves the task of understanding the proper sense in which one seeks values in emotional responses.

In discussing the connection between emotions and value, mention should be made of an on-going debate. As noted above, there are, in Lonergan’s view, different forms of value. Moral value is a special kind of value, with distinctive qualities, and it is not co-extensive with value as such (Smith, 1967, p. 352). There are, however, differing views concerning value. The subjectivist position asserts that when any object is called “good” or given any value term, it means no more than it is the recipient of human interest, desire or approval. Value is a matter of personal assessment or convention (Willumsen, 1993, p. 990). The value term is “constituted” by the feeling aroused in the person. In this view, “value does not reside in the object as something antecedent to the mind that judges, but depends on the subjective response” (Smith, 1967, p. 352).

Conversely, the objectivist view would counter by noting that many objects (things, facts) of human interest, desire or approval are not, in fact, good but are evil, hence to be avoided. Value can be misplaced. It requires, then, some standard or benchmark. The problem for the subjectivist is how to actually provide any grounding at all for the notion of value. For the objectivist position, appealing to the Natural Law raises problems about physicalism or cultural bias.

The objectivist version (from Socrates, Plato to Hartmann, Scheler) holds that value is an intrinsic part or aspect of a particular object or reality, acknowledging the different senses of good, cf., moral or non-moral (aesthetic, instrumental, extrinsic or intrinsic) noted by Frankena (1973, pp. 81f). Since value is seen to be independent
of the observer and is present even when it is not recognised or is only partly appreciated, it follows that one should cultivate the sensitivity needed to perceive values (Smith, 1967, p. 352).

It is not the task of this study to resolve this question. It is suggested that Lonergan’s theory of value appears to avoid the extremes of each position by suggesting that self-transcendence is the bridge between the subjective and objective domains. He argues, as does Vacek, that the apprehension of values is through feelings or emotions. Such a stance enables one to account for and to incorporate the subjective component of human experience, “to identify values as the content of a person’s consciousness in deliberative responsible activity” (Willumsen, 1993, p. 991).

Vacek also points out that “it is important to insist that our affections can attain something true about their objects. That is, they can be objective, revealing what is true.” Citing von Hildebrand, Vacek concludes that they have “‘intentionality, transcendence, and meaningfulness’” (1994, p. 7; also von Hildebrand, 1972, p. 85ff).

How, then, does one arrive at valid value judgements, at true worth? According to Lonergan, they are assessable, like other truth claims, against the criterion of authentic subjectivity. True, objective value is affirmed by the subject who is morally self-transcending. Given that one’s perceptions and responses can be distorted or ignored, valid judgements of value presume conversion and moral education. One author sums it up when he notes

The notion that objectivity is the practical achievement of authentic subjectivity is derived from Lonergan’s general empirical method. Its application to a theory of value insists that value judgements are objective if they are the result of moral self-transcendence (Willumsen, 1993, p. 991).
Understood thus, an emotion differs from a reflective judgement about a subject’s emotion (“Where did that come from? Why did I react like that?”). It differs, too, from a recognition of an emotion as justified or unjustified whether because of a wrong interpretation of facts (hence it is true or false) or because it is expressed in an appropriate or inappropriate form (a normative element). Ultimately, the foundation of a subsequent intellectual judgement that something is morally good or bad is in the emotion (Gonsalves, 1985, p 22). Yet, this is only partially true since other considerations may lead a person, through reflection and choice, to assess or to alter the moral status of an emotion. Often someone can misread his or her emotions or does not know the real self beneath them. Again, a person can make up values that are not there in reality.

One should also remember that a person can choose to re-shape emotional responses, attitudes and habits. Though emotions are predominantly pre-reflective or pre-volitional, the mind and the will can, and sometimes should, intervene and work with them. Scrutiny and reflection can refine the emotions so that they become more discriminating and responsive and can better confront future situations (Nussbaum, 1994, p. 97). People can also make choices that direct them to liking or disliking yet find they like or dislike despite their acts of will. Emotions can also become reflective and deliberate without necessarily losing their intensity. In fact, that intensity may be increased, hence the proverb “Revenge is a dish best eaten cold.”

Emotions are evaluative responses about the present. They can be influenced by judgement, beliefs, habits and past emotions, (especially when associated with the attraction / repulsion of the original context). For instance, Harry’s long-standing anger towards his father has carried over to authority figures all his life. Emotions are also responses about the past in which one shapes past incidents and acts into coherent patterns, depending on the judgement of the present situation, for example, the parent of adolescent children who says “Now I know how my parents felt when I
was a teenager.” Emotions assess and appreciate the future through one’s intention to act, to change the world and oneself in some particular way, if that is possible. For instance, a football coach may feel buoyed up and filled with new strategies for his team since they have beaten two leading teams in their first two games.

Summing up the evaluative aspect of the emotions Spohn notes that “Emotions are not rational in the sense of engendering ‘reflective awareness.’ They operate, rather, according to a prereflective, intuitive logic that exhibits the basic feature of rationality, i.e., intelligent, purposive activity” (1991, p. 72). This is confirmed in Nussbaum (1994, p. 96) and, in a broader context, by von Hildebrand (1972, pp. 210ff), MacMurray (1962, p. 19) and Vacek (1994, p. 5ff). In their view, reason is our capacity to behave consciously in terms of the nature of what is outside ourselves, i.e., the capacity for objectivity. Emotions are integral to rationality in that they are not just a reaction to a stimulus but are intentional and have objects. For MacMurray, an emotion is “an immediate appreciation of the value and significance of real things. Emotional reason is our capacity to apprehend objective values” (1962, p. 31). Another author, building on MacMurray’s work, sees emotional rationality as reason and emotion working interdependently to reveal reality to human beings as the condition for authentic human love and the incarnate medium for divine revelation (Morrissey, 1989, p. 42ff).

3.7: Subjectivity

The agent with the emotion has subjectivity. While the emotion can have inner and outer dimensions, that is, a psychic state, a form of cognition, with bodily changes or involving behaviour, it is the subject who experiences the emotion. Emotions, as subjective experiences, especially of the inner variety, while not capable of empirical measurement, are not, for that reason, invalid or untrue. For instance, a person can
have a deep inner joy or sadness that is not apparent to others yet is very real. Again, subjectivity is a prerequisite of the emotions if one is to examine the moral dimension of the emotions, as somehow under the umbrella of deliberation, choice and responsibility.

Solomon (1983, pp. 96ff) considers that the ultimate object of the emotions is self-esteem and personal dignity. Unless carefully understood, this can be seen as an assertion that ego-centrism is necessary to human flourishing. Emotions are integral to self-definition, self-esteem and protecting the self. For instance, in anger one is driven towards an object, fear drives someone away from the object, love drives the lovers towards, to be with, each other. As already explained, emotions facilitate and mediate the orexic, desire-based make-up of the human person. Emotions, then, are essential to human growth. As interactive responses, they are expressions of a meaningful world that is relational. They need to be adequate to our total affective and personal needs, hence have parameters beyond the self, namely, others and God.

The development of personal worth requires and increases mutuality and self-transcendence. Defective self-esteem struggles to see beyond survival and the self. Responding to value / disvalue is integral to self-transcendence and brings with it self-growth. But a focus on self-growth does not necessarily lead to self-transcendence. The greater the sense of self through integrating the conscious and the unconscious, plus the inner and outer worlds, the greater one’s openness to values that draw one beyond oneself. The thrust of human personhood is towards self-fulfilment-that is true. But this is achieved through self-transcendence. It is autonomy found in relationship, losing the false self in order to find the true self, finding the true self through love.

3.8: Formative
Emotions, as has been explained, are evaluative responses to objective reality in relation to the subject and others. They are an important, but not the only factor, whereby a person shapes his or her world. One’s standards, values, paradigms, schemata, narratives come from many sources, for instance, parents, upbringing, culture, religious communities. “The people who are important to us and the communities we live in modify, direct, and reinforce our emotional experiences, refining them or blunting them” (Vacek, 1994, p. 8). Beliefs, habits and earlier choices colour a person’s evaluations whether they be pre-reflective or reflective. They can also create specific cultural configurations, even biases and prejudices, that require critical evaluation and modification.

Emotions are crucial in developing a person’s sense of identity and self-esteem. They contribute to the standards and evaluations that structure each person’s world. It is from that framework that each person experiences his/her knowledge of the world as having value and relevance at the personal level. Emotions help a person discover the world, have it revealed to the self. Without emotions, there is no world beyond the self to have values. Emotions uncover the moral texture of a person’s world. As Oakley notes, quoting Sherman (The Fabric of Character), “Through the emotions we come to recognize what is ethically salient, what a human being counts as suffering or cruelty, what is unfair” (Oakley, 1992, pp. 202ff).

According to Unger (1984), as reviewed by Spohn (1991, p. 73), emotions are also expressions of human solidarity in the world. They help foster interpersonal engagement and protect each person from domination and depersonalization. Emotions as “passions” provide energy not only in forming individual character but also in transforming society, especially through love, hope and faith.
Reference has been made to the different ways emotions can be seen as justified or not either as true or false or as appropriate/inappropriate, that is, as fitting or not to the occasion or situation. They can even be morally right or wrong, for example, if deliberately cultivated or, if destructive, are ignored (this will be pursued later). The shape of a person’s world, their very person and character are subject, then, to moral appraisal. One can also expect a morally mature person to have strong emotional reactions when deeply held values are threatened or violated (Spohn, 1991, p. 76).

Emotions have a conative dimension, in other words, they entail a tendency to action. As operant conditioning indicates, an emotion is reinforced by its expression or, contrariwise, extinguishing the behaviour goes a long way to extinguishing the emotion. Behaviours, even postures, can foster an appropriate emotion, for instance, when feeling flat, Fiona whistles a happy tune and it lifts her spirits. Different behaviours can be associated with the one emotion. For instance, one can be rigid or trembling with fear, beaming or jumping for joy. Again, there can be the same behaviour for different emotions, for example, rigid either with anger or from fear. There can be different behaviours for the same emotion, for instance, with fear one can be either agitated or paralysed.

Many, but not all, emotions involve action. For instance, admiration of Caesar or of Weary Dunlop or of Mother Teresa can involve neither bodily nor behavioural change. Again, the emotions of peacefulness or of wonder are emotions which the person experiences without any necessary or accompanying behaviour.

For all that, with an emotion there is a thrust towards action, towards creating or shaping the world as one would like it or oneself to be, which does not (and should not) always eventuate (Solomon, 1983, p. 216). For example, acting on one’s anger does not always make one’s world or the world a better place. While anger is often
rational, acting on the desire to retaliate is, for the most part, irrational. Again, often the meaning of a person’s life depends on the continuity of their emotions rather than on their satisfaction through action. For instance, the sense of comfortableness, of “at-home-ness” in marriage or religious life is an on-going emotion that may be more significant in giving meaning to a person’s life than the constant satisfaction of a particular emotional need, for example, the desire for intimacy. Or, one may find that the desire to help others with the accompanying compassion may pervade and integrate someone’s life in a way that satisfying those yearnings by actions would never do. Can love ever be satisfied?

It has been noted that emotions can be positive (characterised by love and attraction) and negative (characterised by repulsion and division). For example, peace and joy (positive) are signs of harmony and well-being. Anger, fear, guilt (negative) are pointers to dysfunction, to whatever threatens the self, someone’s relationships and world. Their function is to demand a person’s attention. Emotions are the indicators of the healthy or unhealthy state of a person and their world, and are, to a significant degree, the instruments of health and growth. Emotions are meant to be constructive but can, at times, be destructive to oneself and others.

Given that the emotions are central in the overall well-being and growth of the person, then the dynamic relationship between the self and life, between the inner and the outer world, is integral to such processes. The self-awareness leading to integration necessarily entails a creative handling of a person’s emotions. This is particularly true in the relationship between the unconscious and the conscious. The presence and influence of unconscious states takes the form of psychic energy which rises to the conscious level in various forms, for example, depression, projection, or in physical or psychological disguises, namely, conversion reaction or reaction formation. The integration of these emotional forces, especially in their negative
forms, is largely dependent on their being acknowledged, understood and responded to at the conscious level.

It is justified to say, also, that the destructive or constructive character of the emotions is related to a person’s overall emotional resonance and sense of inner worth. For instance, a person’s recurrent anger or violence can have roots in low self-esteem, as can the opposite, deficit of affect. Positive, harmonious people, on the other hand, have strong self-esteem. The purpose of the emotions is healthy functioning and growth to maturity. In that light, no emotion, in Häring’s view, can be totally negative since a positive base is presupposed (Häring, 1963, p. 196 ff). An emotion can also be psychologically negative yet morally positive, for instance, hatred or anger over an evil that leads to an act of heroism.

Emotions can be shaped by one’s choices and the cultivation of habits. They are also influenced by forces in people that are sometimes beyond their control. Antecedent and consequent emotions are important considerations in assessing responsibility and moral imputability (which will be explored later). Like reflection and choice, then, emotions contribute in a significant way to personal identity and value.

4. Summary

Emotions are vital signs. They are, at once, indicators, facilitators and mediators of health, well-being, growth and maturity. They do this in collaboration with other functions of humanness, viz., mind, will, body, psyche and spirit. Without emotions, a person’s world “would be experienced as valueless” while through them “we become attached to those great goods that inspire out lives” (Vacek, 1994, p. 6). The same author cites Charles Taylor in that without emotions “we become incapable of understanding any moral argument at all” (Vacek, 1994, p. 7).
This study has singled out what appear to be eight constitutive aspects of an emotion. They are listed here in relation to the definition constructed from them:

1. Interactive response
2. Evaluative
3. Subjective
4. Affective
5. Desiderative
6. Intentional
7. Cognitive
8. Formative

Relating these categories to each other, the following definition is suggested:

*An emotion is an interactive (1), evaluative (2) response whereby a subject (3) relates to (4, 5) a specific (6), apprehended object (7) precisely as good or bad (4, 5, 2) to the self or others and thereby helps shape (8) his / her world.*

This is in substantial accord with Vacek’s analysis (building on von Hildebrand’s work) of the four “moments” of the structure of an emotion, i.e., “the self (1) as an openness-to-good (2) becomes conscious of the value of a specific object, (3) is affected by that valuable object, and (4) responds to the object’s value” (1994, p. 12).

In returning to Rorty’s questions (p. 39), it is apparent that one can give a qualified “yes” to all her alternatives. Again, Callahan’s loose definition (p. 42) is true but only in a partial way. Ultimately, any definition of an emotion tries to capture something that is elusive. The process of grappling with this task highlights that perhaps all one can offer is a working understanding rather than a definition. It underlines how hard emotions are to grasp, to articulate, how they have their own unique nature and are evasive in their actual subjective experience.
So far, this study has attempted to state and explain the problem, provide a context, to present the relevant research, propose a methodology, offer some definitions of terms, note the limitations, significance and format of the study, and to suggest a working understanding of an emotion. One is now in a better position to understand the significance of the central issue in this study, the moral significance of the emotions. Emotions are, in sum, value-responses in a relational framework, for the sake of a person’s happiness and integration. This is their contribution to the human person “integrially and adequately considered.”

If one regards the emotions as mindless surges of affect beyond human control, then Ethics is solely about acts (how one behaves) and not about character (who one is and how one feels). In other words, the sort of person one is and one’s emotional configuration is not a moral concern. Such a view is not acceptable if measured against an adequate and integral understanding of the human person and, even more, against the vision of the Christian Gospel.

If, however, one sees emotions as purposeful and value-oriented, they are, nevertheless, predominantly pre-reflective and pre-volitional (as has been noted). The question arises, are they in any way under human control, subject to the person’s choice, and hence moral? From that question, the primary concern of this study emerges, the moral significance of the emotions. This, in turn, opens the door to four underlying issues behind the research questions:

1) How, and to what degree, are emotions moral, either in their outcomes (behaviour) or in themselves (as movements of one’s affectivity)? How far are they subject to, or assessable in relation to, deliberation and choice as human acts? The focus here is on Ethics as concerned with acts.

2) How, and to what degree, are emotions moral in so far as they both shape a person and reflect who the person has become? How far is a person subject to praise
or blame, credit or discredit, for their character and, in particular, for the contours and content of their emotional life? The focus here is on Ethics as concerned with the subject.

3) How, and to what degree, are emotions moral in so far as they are instruments of, and integral to, virtue-ordered and habitual inclinations to right action, done in the right way and to the right degree? How are the emotions the tools of practical reason, of phronesis—the habit of right moral judgement? How do the emotions and intellect instruct and guide each other? The focus here is on the emotions as an aspect of virtue, the bridge between the subject and his/her acts.

4) What is the vision of the human person “integrally and adequately considered” that is the descriptive account underpinning these questions and any responses?

This study is now in a position to proceed with its task.
CHAPTER 3

Benchmarks For Emotions and Morality in Aquinas

I: Foundations

In approaching the three research questions proposed in the methodology, this chapter and the following form a unity; the first explores the general picture, the following chapter pursues more specific concerns. This division facilitates both clarity of presentation and the development of the principal arguments.

The aims of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, to respond to the research question: “What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in Aquinas?” The procedure will be to examine the context within which The Treatise on the Passions is discussed. That context will be studied in the light of its overall structure and content. Once this is done, the nature and place of the emotions will be explored. It is hoped that, by this stage, Aquinas’ view of the human person will have begun to emerge.

Secondly, the chapter will then pursue another research question: “How does Aquinas portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character?” This will be done by investigating q. 24 of the Prima Secundae which deals with the morality of the passions. It is envisaged that this particular exercise will throw some light on one aspect underlying the research question noted at the end of Chapter Two, “To what extent are the emotions human, hence, moral acts?” The other aspects (concerning virtue and character) are discussed in Chapter Four. The third research question on the significance of differences between authors will be covered in the compare/contrast/assessment section in Chapters Five, Six and Seven and, finally, in the
evaluative overview in Chapter Seven.

1. Context

1.1: Structural Considerations

The moral significance of the emotions is discussed in Aquinas’ Treatise on the Passions found in the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologiae. This magisterial theological synthesis is constructed around the two poles of the exitus and the reditus. Everything created has its origin and destiny in God. In the Prima Pars, the exitus unfolds in the theology of God, Creation and Providence. The Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae are concerned with humankind’s journey to God with the reditus reaching its completion in Christ (Tertia Pars). The Prima Secundae begins with an investigation of the ultimate goal of human life, namely beatitude or happiness in God (qq.1-5). In qq. 6-48, there is a study of the acts themselves and in qq. 49-114, the sources of those acts are discussed, e.g., dispositions, virtues, grace, beatitudes, sin. Aquinas examines acts that are specific to humans (qq. 6-21), then those acts that humans have in common with other animals (qq. 22-48). Aquinas refers to this class of acts as the “passiones animae” or “passiones” (passions). It is this section of the Prima Secundae that constitutes the Treatise on the Passions. Given Aquinas’ use of the term “passions,” it will be used interchangeably with “emotions” during this chapter.

At the outset, the reader is struck by the length of the treatment Aquinas gives to the emotions. It is approximately the equivalent of a book of 200 pages. The Treatise

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1 The author of this study has consulted three editions of the Summa Theologiae: the Latin text published by Libraria Marietti (Turin, 1928); The English Dominican version (New York, Benziger Brothers, 1947); the Latin/English (Blackfriars) version of the English Dominican Province (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1963-1975). Translated passages from the Summa are those of the Blackfriars edition. Summaries or paraphrases are the researcher’s. For significant passages, this will normally be accompanied by the original Latin. Translations of the other Latin or French texts are the researcher’s, unless otherwise stated.
has 27 questions (132 articles) plus 2 later questions (8 articles) on passions and moral virtues. A further 47 questions on the Affective virtues (Fortitude and Temperance) constitute another book of equivalent length. All together this material totals more than that on beatitude and human acts combined, or the virtues and the gifts or on Law and Grace (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 379). While this consideration alone does not indicate that the emotions are more important than these other topics, it does underline that, for Aquinas, they have a significant role in moral activity and the moral life.

Again, the particular interest in, and detailed treatment of, the emotions in the Prima Secundae appears to be unique amongst theologians in the Catholic tradition prior to and since the time of Aquinas. Usually, the emotions, seen as “passions,” are either ignored or viewed as mainly, if not exclusively, disordered or sinful. The theologian’s interest is primarily in the moral dimension of the emotions and their role in spiritual development. A treatment of the psychology of the emotions is presumed and not seen to be the task of the theologian.

Why, then, asks Reid (1965, p. xxi) does Aquinas undertake this task of elaborating a psychology of the “passions”? Principally, because such had not been done before or, if it had, it was not at a level suitable for Aquinas’ purposes. His overall aim was to have “an orderly and systematic account, in scientific terms, of the truth revealed by God and embodied in the articles of the Catholic faith” (Reid, 1965, p. xxi).

Beyond this historical consideration, there is another reason which is intrinsic to the task of Theology. As a science, Theology uses human experience and reflection on it in understanding and interpreting divine revelation. The emotions are an integral part of human life. In a theological treatment of the human journey to God involving, as this does, human action and hence morality, a systematic analysis and
understanding of the emotions within human psychology is essential. Emotions both mirror and facilitate the delicate relationship between body and spirit that is embodied in human affectivity. Human beings are essentially good, though flawed, in their created nature. While human emotions do disturb, can overwhelm (even destructively), they are basically positive and healthy, hence integral to human and Christian life (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxvi). It is the total human person who seeks an ultimate destiny. We are drawn to that end, to God and happiness, by desire. God “seizes man in his capacity and need for sense gratification, appealing to him through his loves and desires, hopes and fears, as well as through his higher faculties of rational insight and free choice” (Reid, 1965, p.xxi).

Another consideration pertinent to this discussion is the question of Aquinas’ motivation as reflected in the structure of the _Summa_. In his examination of the sources of the _Treatise on the Passions_, Jordan (1986, p. 85) notes a shift in Aquinas’ methodology between the brief discussion of the passions in his _Commentary on the Sentences_ of Lombard and that found in the later _de Veritate_. There is a move from reflection on specific and occasional topics concerning the emotions to a more explicit and systematic treatment on fundamental questions concerning the emotions particularly in their relationship to moral judgement (Jordan, 1986, p. 86). This transition by Aquinas towards developing a taxonomy of the emotions is paralleled by a change to a more “pedagogical” motivation. There are signs of this in the _de Veritate_ but it comes to dominate the _Summa_ and, in particular, to shape its structure. Within the _Prima Secundae_, “...the pedagogical innovations of structure give the discussion of the passions a proper independence as a topic in the moral account of human life” (Jordan, 1986, p. 86).

Keenan (1992, p. 39) also notes that the _Summa Theologiae_ is not speculative but pedagogical. Its aim was to help preachers and confessors in pastoral judgements.
Aquinas provided a theological context from which determinations and assessments could be made about specific acts. “Thus, the practical interest of Thomas’s students was to understand why certain ways of living were described as right or wrong” (Keenan, 1992, p. 39).

There is a final aspect to the structural dimension of the context for the passions. Within the Summa’s overall design, the Secunda Secundae is more specific in its focus. By contrast, the Prima Secundae deals with human activity in general. That is certainly how Aquinas views it as he opens the Prima Secundae. The focus for the Prima Secundae is the human person as the image of God, as self-directing, free and responsible for his/her actions (I.II. prol.). While recognising the overarching theological setting of the Summa, the Prima Secundae provides “something like a fundamental philosophical anthropology designed to undergird a moral treatment of human life in particular” (Jordan, 1984, p. 86). This brings this study to the next aspect of the context.

1.2: Doctrinal considerations

Having examined the structural context that frames the Treatise on the Passions, attention must now be given to the doctrinal character of the context with its philosophical, psychological and theological components. Central to this is the teleological configuration of the created world. This study now approaches one of its research questions noted in the methodology: “What is the vision of the human person manifested or inferred in Aquinas?” In other words, what Theological Anthropology underpins his view of the emotions and the moral life?

For Aquinas, creation has its origin in the God who is love. In the very core of God there is love and mutual sharing. From that love, the Trinity creates so as to
share love with creatures. Through participating in being, through their uniqueness and through being sustained in existence by God who is good, all creatures participate in the good and in God’s love. Aquinas’ theology on creation has its roots in the theology of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob—hence in a personal, historical approach to God. It is also influenced by an optimism towards creation which relates creation to the Trinity in an analysis that is both psychological and metaphysical (Carroll, 1987, pp. 250f).

Pivotal in Aquinas’ perspective on creation is that it is relational, a relationship that arises from the gift and reception of existence between creator and creature. As creatures, humans come from God and are made to return to God to find the fulfilment of their being, to find completion. This is the final goal of life. This process has two aspects to it—the individual and the relational. A human being is drawn to be fulfilled as an individual, in oneself, while being ordered to other beings proportionate to it. Hence, as creatures who are persons, humans need to have sustaining and ordered relationships in order to reach integration and happiness. As one author remarks “creatures need relationships to be fully individuated, and need to be individuated in order to be in relationships with others, and both are the dynamics of love” (Harak, 1993, p. 58). Made in God’s image, humans are persons in relationship called to grow in God’s likeness through loving relationships.

In the *Summa contra Gentiles*, Aquinas explores how all beings have God as their natural end and tend to God as their Supreme Good. All things arrive at their perfection by acquiring their designated likeness to God. Ranging from the simplest to the most complex, all beings are inclined to the goal or purpose for which they are created. In ontological terms, this can be expressed as the metaphysical principle of

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2 S.C.G. III. 2 and 3.
finality: all substances and persons exist and act in view of a definite perfection which is their completion (esse completum in bonitate) (Walgrave, 1984, p. 203). What is specific and different for human beings is that they have dominion over their actions. They move themselves to their final end, to perfection, to the ontological good, and hence, to happiness, through free will (I.II.1.2).

The foundation of Aquinas’ ethics is that the final end of a rational being can only consist in the vision of God. There is in each human being an inbuilt, natural desire or inclination to the goal of existence, viz., fulfilment or beatitude. This naturale desiderium is an ontological relationship “although in man it manifests itself in the disappointments of experience when one tries to find a final beatitude in something else than God” (Walgrave, 1984, p. 205).

This ontological dimension manifests itself in the immanent teleology of the human person within Aquinas’ Philosophical Psychology. At the heart of the will there is a basic thrust or necessary orientation to the good that underpins any act of choice. It is a basic act that is “unfree and yet implied in every free act...called by Thomas voluntas ut natura. It is the condition of possibility of any free act which he refers to as voluntas ut voluntas” (Walgrave, 1984, p. 205). In other words, humans cannot will universal evil. “The power to reject the universal good, which is the power to be bad, rests in the power we enjoy not to consider the good” (Keenan, 1992, p. 54). A deliberate choice of evil is not of evil qua evil but of something under the aspect of good for this person, in these circumstances (I.II.27.1 ad 1). Pinckaers (1995, p. 327 ff) refers to this necessary inclination of the will to seek the good as freedom for excellence compared to the freedom of indifference of the Scotist voluntarist tradition that denies this necessary internal orientation of the will to the good.

So far, this study has given a brief overview of the basic teleological character of the
created world and, in particular, of the human person, who seeks the goal of existence through deliberation and free choice. The study will now proceed to a more specific aspect of Philosophical Psychology and Anthropology, namely the nature and role of the emotions within that teleological perspective.

1.3: The Nature and Function of Emotions

At the outset, it is necessary to clarify two concepts of Aquinas’ Philosophical Psychology in order to understand the emotions. Firstly, there is the immanent teleology of natural forms that underpins the faculty psychology of Aquinas. Simply put it is this. Each human power, cf., intellect, will, passions, appetites, bodily functions, memory etc., is distinguished from the others by its act which, in turn, is determined by its object. For instance, the will performs a different function from the intellect or from the sense of sight. It does this because it has a different object, namely, good, compared with the intellect whose object is abstract knowledge or sight whose object is sense knowledge. While these capacities are distinct, they are nevertheless interrelated and interdependent.

The second idea that needs mention is that of the hylomorphic makeup of the human person. As a rational animal, a human person is a being constituted of soul and body with a unifying spiritual centre and range of powers. Some powers are the province of the soul, others are shared by both soul and body. Amongst the latter are the

3 An object as used here is “anything considered as terminating and specifying an elicited act, cognitive or affective. The emotions are constituted formally by the aspects of sensible good or evil under which something attracts the subject’s attention and arouses appetition” (Reid, 1965, p. 188).

4 A power is “the capacity or ability to act or react. The sense appetites are powers...A power is spoken of in the line of psychic (psychosomatic action). The term ‘faculty’ has misleading and unacceptable connotations and is better avoided” (Reid, 1965, p. 189). One presumes Reid’s hesitations refer, in part, to the view associated with faculty psychology, that each power (faculty) is located in an organ and to the impression that the faculties tend to take on a life of their own (Researcher).
emotions. For Aquinas, “passion” is properly found where there is bodily change. He goes on to describe an emotion or “passion” as a spontaneous feeling that is located in a physiological modification but it is essentially an affective response to an object (I.II. 22.3). For Aquinas, an emotion is an experience of the whole person involving intellect, sense knowledge, spontaneous volition, bodily change (all of which will be developed later). Emotions such as fear, love, hatred (among the eleven listed by Aquinas) are all actions of both soul and body, an affective experience made up of psychic and corporeal elements (Barad, 1991, p. 399).

As has been outlined in Chapter 2 of this study, emotions are manifestations of the orectic makeup of the human person, namely, humans are drawn to their goal (happiness) by desire. Aquinas saw this attraction in terms of appetitus whether natural, sensate or intellectual. A being or power has the in-built inclination to act in accord with, and to fulfill, its specific nature or form (I. 80.1). In human beings, with intellect and freedom, the natural inclination or appetitus is directed at apprehended objects to which it tends in so far as they are fitting or good (I.II. 9.2). Appetitus or orexis is a reaching out for an object as good or desirable or a recoiling from what is evil and undesirable. As has already been noted, these two words are best conveyed in English by “appetites”, “desires”, “inclinations.” Appetitus combines movement towards and movement away from, approach and avoidance.5

Aquinas approaches his subject by asking where the emotions are seated (q. 22). He argues that they are in the soul in so far as the soul forms a composite with the body. Each emotion has a physiological modification of its materia (I.II. 22.1). The bodily changes cause the emotion only in the sense that they are its material embodiment.

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5 D’Arcy tries to capture this dual aspect by translating appetitus and appetitiva as orexis and orectic. He does this to convey the dual movement together with the intellectual (will) and sensory level of the emotions. He also notes the usage in modern psychology of orexis and orectic to distinguish the affective and conative dimensions of human activity from the cognitive (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxiv).
Bodily change is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an emotion, since alone it does not account for the different types of emotions. The emotions are in the appetitive (affective) part of the soul rather than the cognitive (*apprehensiva*) part. Finally, the emotions are in the sense appetite rather than the intellectual appetite (will). It is necessary to recall Aquinas’ division of human powers into vegetative, sensory and intellectual, with a sensory and intellectual power of *apprehensio* and a sensory and intellective *appetitus*.

It may be helpful to give a diagram of Aquinas’ division of the powers of the soul.6

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<th>Apprehensio</th>
<th>Sensate</th>
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<td>(Knowledge)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intellective (Will)</td>
<td>Hope</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Appetitus</td>
<td>Desire</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(Appetite)</td>
<td>Love</td>
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<td>Sorrow--Anger</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Concupiscible</td>
<td>Irascible</td>
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6 Adapted from Hill (1966, p. 141).
The distinction between the intellective and sensate *appetitus* is one between “two moments of a single power” (Jordan, 1986, p. 88). The apprehended object as present to the knowing subject constitutes the cognitive moment of the appetite. The sensitive moment lies in the actual inclination, being drawn to what is apprehended or known as good and desirable (I. 81.1; I.II. 9 ad 1). Jordan notes that, for Aquinas, there is an implicit teleology, an essential interconnection in this process, “the apprehensive moment is always tending toward the sensitive” (Jordan, 1986, p. 88).

Aquinas divides the sensitive *appetitus* (*orexis*) into *appetitus concupiscibilis* and the *appetitus irascibilis*. Again, this is teleological in character where the end or goal is sought in two ways-directly or indirectly. Since they have different formal objects, they are different functions or powers. The concupiscible power (affective *orexis*) seeks the good directly, in so far as it is agreeable or pleasing, or by fleeing from evil as harmful or unpleasant. The irascible power seeks the good indirectly by opposing whatever attacks it. Its object is the good (sense) or pleasant that is difficult to attain or an evil (sense) that is difficult to avoid (*bonum arduum vel malum arduum*). “The irascible is teleologically subordinate to the concupiscible from which it begins and in which it ends” (Jordan, 1986, p. 89). It is based on this division that Aquinas classifies the eleven principal emotions, six under the concupiscible appetite (love, hatred, desire, aversion, joy, sadness) and five under the irascible appetite (hope, despair, audacity, fear, anger) (I.II. 23.1).

In employing a teleological framework, Aquinas uses movement as the model by which he describes the emotions. The analogy is with physical movement. A human power has an inclination and a function determined by its goal. This enables
Aquinas to understand the structure of an emotion in terms of inclination/movement/repose which is paralleled by love/desire/pleasure and hatred/aversion/grief. This provides the basis for the eleven different emotions in terms of movement in relation to their goal or objects (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxvii ff).

Aquinas’ naming of the faculties discussed here is also taken from the most significant characteristic of each (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxv). Hence, “concupiscible” since concupiscentia (desire) is the one felt most keenly; “irascible”, since anger (ira) is the one felt most readily (I.II.25.2 ad 1 and 25.3 ad 1). As is noted by D’Arcy (1967, p. xxv), to modern ears, it sounds unusual to classify grief and hatred as emotions of the desiring orexis, and even misleading when it comes to hope and fear as emotions of the irascible orexis. It is perhaps even more confusing trying to relate Aquinas’ division of the appetitive powers and types of emotions to the modern distinction between negative and positive emotions. Generally, D’Arcy uses “emotions” in his translation of “passiones animae” since the term covers the eleven different forms of principal emotions listed by Aquinas, whereas the word “passions” connotes more intense movements of emotion (D’Arcy, 1975, p. xviii).

In Aquinas’ discussion of the emotions, there appear to be three understandings of the term. There is the sense of it as an “emotion.” Here the stress is on the agent

7 D’Arcy presumably considers hope and fear too distinct from the object of anger to be included under the rubric of “irascible.” Reid’s rendition is possibly more suitable; “impulse emotions” (concupiscible) and “contending emotions” (irascible). The impelling drive of pleasure or pain towards the agreeable or from the disagreeable needs an added mobilisation of resources when this enjoyment or avoidance encounters difficulties and obstacles (Reid, 1965, p. 139). Reid notes that, for Aquinas, “the distinguishing principle within each appetite is not simply an opposition of positive and negative values at the sense level” (p.139). Positive emotions are characterised by harmony, a sense of well-being, energy within the self, towards others and life, e.g., joy, love, delight. Negative emotions bring a sense of dissonance, unease, flatness, upset indicating something is wrong with the person, with others, or with life, e.g., anger, fear, sadness. These are descriptions of the quality of the affective movement in the person, the texture of subjective experience. Aquinas, in using the analogy of movement, is concerned with the object of the emotion, the aspect that attracts or repels and which differentiates one emotion from another. It is a question of using different criteria (subjective or objective) which generates two (complementary?) models.
responding, moving by attraction or avoidance in relation to a known object.

Secondly, there is the sense of being-acted-upon, where the emphasis is on the object arousing a response in the agent who is “passive”, hence, a “passion.” The third sense is as a “passion” whereby a subject suffers pain, damage, harm, deterioration of some kind. Aquinas refers to this usage as being “passion” in the fullest sense of the word (I.II. 22.1). In this instance, the subject is drawn away, by the affective shift, from what is not fitting or suitable for it. For Aquinas, this pejorative meaning of “passion” is most properly applied when the emotion is for the worse rather than for the better, hence sorrow is more a “passion” than joy (I.II. 22.1). Fear, too, is properly a passion, less so than sorrow (concerning a present evil) since it concerns a future evil and the motivation is not as strong as that of sorrow (I.II.41.1).

Behind this usage is the notion of passivity as an ontological concept. It connotes two things: an inherent imperfection together with a capacity to be perfected or aroused to self-determination (Reid, 1965, p. 151). Passivity implies receptivity, the quality associated with the interdependence of a subject on external sources for its perfection. The change may be for the enhancement of a perfection already existing in a subject by which it moves towards fulfilment. But where it involves a lessening (worsening) of a “native perfection” this is a “more radical passivity and more representative of the root condition. Such a condition is indicative of a more complete and unmixed passivity than that which results in a gain or added perfection” (Reid, 1965, p. 151f).

Can it be inferred that Aquinas sees the emotions (“passions”) as undesirable, harmful? If emotions are considered per se-the answer is no. If they are considered per accidens the answer is yes, namely, when emotions are immoderate, and hinder psychological and moral well-being. The serious, extensive and positive treatment of the emotions within a broad context captures his fundamental attitude towards them.
This pejorative view of one aspect of emotions reflects an attempt, on Aquinas’ part, to capture their complexity and richness. In life, one is more conscious of those emotions that cause upset or distress than of those that accompany healthy and happy living. When one is physically or psychologically well, one tends to take good health for granted. The emotions associated with this state are not pervasive elements in self-awareness. It is only when something is wrong, when there is pain, dissonance, when life is not going well through, for example, fear, pain, sadness, that a person starts to notice what is happening.

These negative emotions, then, intrude in our consciousness in a way the positive emotions do not. One feels oneself in their grip. Aquinas alludes to this sort of pattern in I.II. 29.3. There, he notes that love is felt more keenly in the absence of the object loved. The unbecoming or dissonant nature of what is disliked is felt more keenly than the becomingness or fittingness of what is loved. Often, too, one has to move to self-awareness consciously so as to notice and be aware of many positive emotions. But without conscious choice, one feels, is aware of negative emotions more quickly and more acutely then positive emotions. That is the nature of those emotions that indicate that something is amiss, is ‘out of sync.’

For Aquinas, what are the characteristics of an emotion? It is an affective response to a specific, apprehended object by which it is determined and classified to be “this” emotion (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxx). An emotion is cognitive, intentional and involves physiological change though Aquinas “does not regard the perception of those changes as essential to its cognitive element” (Barad, 1991, p. 402). While Aquinas

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8 A valuable insight is that “the feeling of strangeness and the fact of being powerless to exercise control over some expressions of emotionality both point in the direction of an anomaly or living tension which has beset man since his expulsion from Eden...In extreme situations this aspect (passivity) is felt subjectively as an overpowering and darkly mysterious affliction, almost as if emotionality were an alien realm...”(Reid, 1965, p. 153).
sees an emotion as “passio” (being-acted-upon), this does not connote “pure, inert passivity” (D’Arcy, 1967, p. xxii). D’Arcy suggests “reaction” as activity produced by some other agent, ‘acte reçu’ is one rendition in French.

As explained in Chapter 2, this study adopts a similar interpretation of an emotion as “interactive response.” An emotion as cognitive and affective involves a movement towards and away from, entailing attraction and avoidance. There is also the element of desire. Once an object is known, the emotion involves an affective movement as the object is perceived to be useful or harmful, pleasant or unpleasant. It is a response to value, i.e., the agreeable or disagreeable, good or evil. Hence the emotion is evaluative. It is desire, the affective response, that mediates the apprehension and communicates it to the body (Barad, 1991, p. 402). Aquinas notes that emotions like anger and fear (as all emotions) can be produced only if there is apprehension and desire on the part of the soul. In such cases “the emotion begins in the soul as far as the soul is the mover of the body and so enters the body.” (Barad, 1991, p. 402).

Aquinas, then, portrays the emotions in terms of a process of apprehension, affective movement, desire and bodily change. An emotion has active and passive dimensions. A person can act out of fear, hatred, anger or love. Or the same person can be disturbed, even overwhelmed by fear, hatred, anger or love. “Emotion” captures the first sense; “passion”, the latter sense. What is central here is the unity of the human being. Emotions are psychosomatic phenomena. For Aquinas, emotions are the bridge between the sensate and spiritual worlds (an aspect he pursues more specifically in a later discussion of love and pleasure). As Pinckaers notes, Aquinas’ discusses the emotions not from the perspective of either Physiology,

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9 Quaestiones Disputatae 26.2.
Psychology, or Philosophy but by integrating these within the horizon of the theologian. It is the emotions as contributing to moral action and the journey to God that is Aquinas’ principal concern. For Aquinas, it is affectivity (“sensibilité”) that provides the primary metaphor and basic language to express spiritual realities.\textsuperscript{10}

The soul and body with the various powers act as a single principle of operation. They are interconnected and interdependent. One author notes a consequence of this (to be pursued later), “Because of continuous interactions between the rational and emotional factors in the human being, rational judgement may modify physical feelings, and physical reactions may obstruct rational judgements” (Barad, 1991, p. 403).

Barad’s observation brings this section of the study to a critical stage. The Prima Secundae has a teleological framework built on the highest human end. Aquinas begins with the goal of human life because this alone gives intelligibility and coherence to everything else. The various factors influencing the approach to, and achievement of, that end (especially freedom and grace) govern the development of the various questions and articles. Acts are named “human” through their relation to rational will. Those acts that are both human and animal are called “passions of the soul” or emotions (I.II. 6. prol.). Having probed Aquinas’ vision of the person (his Theological Anthropology) and his view of the nature and function of emotions, the study must now consider another research question. ‘What is the moral significance of the emotions for Aquinas?’ The question explores how emotions are related to the power of reason, in what sense they are rational, human, moral and, finally, the way in which they contribute to the moral life of a person. This is taken up by Aquinas in q. 24, whose main focus is the emotion as a human act.

\textsuperscript{10} “...il découle aussi du fait que la sensibilité fournit à l’homme une première image et un vocabulaire de base pour exprimer les réalités spirituelles” (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 382).
2. The Moral Significance of the Emotions

Aquinas’ division of the eleven emotions captures the principal affective movements of human life. The strength of this approach is its intentional character, the specific, other-directed, relational quality of emotions. In seeing them as responses to value/disvalue, there is an understanding of reality that attracts human affectivity “by satisfying desire, meeting need and enhancing perfection” (Reid, 1965, p. 188).

The category of “concupiscible” or “affective” emotions captures the overall dynamic of human experience and the moral life as the movement towards good and away from evil. It is built on love as attraction to the good, desire as movement towards the good which, once possessed, brings happiness and joy. Conversely, one hates what is perceived as harmful or evil, one moves away from it in aversion, and if the presence of the evil persists, one experiences sadness (I.II.23.2; 23.4). Such a description implies the formation of the affections-to learn to love what is truly good and hate what is truly evil. It also involves seeking loving intermediate goods in right relation to the ultimate good.

The moral life, however, is not a smooth path. Obstacles that hinder progress can arise within and outside a person (Wadell, 1992, p. 98). At times it is a struggle and it is here that the emotions called the “irascible” or “spirited” make their contribution. The five emotions (courage, fear, anger, despair, hope) give us the strength and impetus when we are “dispirited” and “the good we seek is hard to attain and evil hard to avoid” (Wadell, 1992, p. 98). These emotions are at the service of the affective emotions, empowering and confirming one’s resolve to pursue what is essential to one’s happiness and well-being.

Against this backdrop, the morality of the emotions is addressed in a general way by
Aquinas in one question that contains four articles (I.II.24. a.1-4). It is discussed later in more specific terms in relation to pleasure (I.II.34), in relation to sorrow or pain (I.II. 39), and on moral virtues in relation to the passions (I.II.59).

2.1: *Emotions as Morally Good or Evil*

In q. 24. art. 1, Aquinas asks whether one can find moral good and evil in the passions? He replies with his customary distinction. Emotions can be seen in two ways: in themselves (intrinsically) or subject to the control of reason and will. In themselves, “emotions are simply movements of the non-rational orexis; one cannot therefore ascribe to them moral good or evil, which we have shown to involve reason” (I.II. 24.1). For instance, the surge of anger a person may feel when he or she is addressed in an abrupt manner happens spontaneously. It is not something a person thinks about or wills. Hence, there is little control over the immediate presence of anger inside the person. So in a restricted sense, emotions are neither morally good nor morally bad. As contemporary language would have it, they are “psychological facts.” Understood thus, emotions are not voluntary since voluntariness requires an act of knowledge in the same way as it requires an act of will; namely, in order that it be in one’s power to consider, to wish and to act (I.II. 6.3 ad 3).

Aquinas, then, makes the point that, “in so far as the emotions are subject to the control of reason and will, moral judgements do apply to them” (I.II. 24.1). They are called “voluntary to the extent that the will commands them, or at least does not check them” (I.II. 24.1) The angry person mentioned above may be responsible for how he expresses or acts on the emotion of anger but not for the initial onset of the emotion. Even then one could ask: isn’t the person accountable because they misread the situation (the other person was in physical pain) or because the anger
was an overreaction (influenced by a family argument before coming to the office)?

In q. 24. art. 2, Aquinas asks whether all emotion is morally evil. In the first article and later, in articles 3 and 4, Aquinas draws on passages from Augustine’s *De Civitate Dei* to provide the context for the discussion of this aspect of the emotions. Art. 2 is built on the debate mentioned in Augustine between the Stoics and the Peripatetics (Aristotelians). Aquinas sees his treatment of the emotions within a broader historical and philosophical context. For the Stoics, all emotion was evil. They did not distinguish between sense and intellect, hence between sensory and intellectual *orexis* nor, consequently, between emotions and movements of the rational will. The term will described, for the Stoics, an orectic movement under rational control whereas emotion described any movement not under rational control. Hence, as in Cicero, emotions were seen as diseases of the soul (I.II. 24.2).

The Peripatetics, holding to the distinctions rejected by the Stoics, used emotion to describe every movement of the sensory *orexis* (in contrast with the intellective *orexis*). They were thus able to distinguish morally good and morally evil emotions—those under rational control and those that were not. This is Aquinas’ position. Emotions are subject to a mean and can be moderate or immoderate. They “are not ‘diseases’ or ‘disturbances of the soul’ except precisely when they are not under rational control” (I.II. 24.2).

2.2: *Emotions as Intrinsically Good or Evil*

After considering emotions a) in themselves and b) as moral, Aquinas poses the question in art. 4: “Is there any emotion which is always morally good or evil (by its very nature)?” (I.II. 24. 4).
Firstly, it is necessary to clarify an issue of terminology in this article. Earlier, in q. 24, art. 1, Aquinas argues that emotions, considered in themselves, i.e., intrinsically (*secundum se*), cannot be called good or evil in a moral sense. Here in art. 4, how is the question different? The phrase *ex sua specie* (by its very nature) gives the clue. Aquinas, in this context, is referring to an emotion in *its moral species*, i.e., as intrinsically good or evil morally. *Secundum se*, used in art.1, denotes, from the context, the emotions as psychological facts or experiences. Aquinas expresses this same meaning in art. 4 by making a distinction similar to that made in art. 1. In art. 4, he refers to the emotions not *secundum se* but *in genere naturae*-translated by D’Arcy as “natural phenomena” which is tantamount to “psychological facts.”

Beneath this use of language is an important consideration. Aquinas seems to imply that, while an emotion can be viewed in itself, that is not sufficient. An adequate understanding of an emotion must view it as essentially relational. Its full significance can only be appreciated through its interconnection with other human powers, with the total person, especially when it is considered under the guidance of reason.

The question that opens art. 4 assumes that context of relationality. The emotions are an integral part of the immanent teleology characterised by the positive, mutual interdependence of powers, guided by right reason, that drives the functioning and developing human person. Aquinas here is asking: are there some emotions that of their very nature, *or per se*, conform to the teleology of rationality in the human being? Are there, conversely, emotions that of their very nature, *or per se*, are opposed to that teleology? From a developmental perspective, the question could be re-framed: are there some emotions that, in all situations, either facilitate or prohibit happiness and personal integration, foster or impede growth in love, cultivate or undermine inner and outer harmony in the person and in relationships?
Aquinas’ answer is again based on a distinction. Emotions may be classified merely as natural phenomena; from that point of view, moral considerations are irrelevant. But second, the passions and emotions may be classified from the moral point of view, in so far as they are part of the life of free and rational choice. In this way a particular kind of emotion may be good or evil of its very nature, because its object is one that is in tune with right reason, or at odds with it (I.II. 24.4).

Hence, there are emotions that, of themselves, always foster or always oppose healthy human, moral and spiritual functioning and growth.

What is interesting is that having acknowledged the general principle, Aquinas now qualifies it by the types of examples he uses. Having listed eleven principal emotions, he has laid the foundation in order to examine each one in subsequent questions. He will unfold their place in the immanent teleology of human powers and of the total person. He will show an acuteness of observation in capturing the multivalent character of emotions as revealed in a variety of contexts.

But he has a problem. If any one of these eleven principal emotions is intrinsically evil, it should never have been included in the list. As D’Arcy notes (1967, p. 42), Aquinas does not want to say that any of “the supreme species of the emotions is good or evil by its very nature.” Also, those emotions that are good *ex obiecto*, can be vitiated by the evil intention of the agent. Hence, he uses a sub-species of fear and sadness (those “more properly” called “passions” [as seen earlier]) to qualify his general statement. He cites modesty (fear of being unchaste) as an example of an emotion good in itself, and envy as an example of an emotion evil in itself (I.II. 24.4). The intrinsic good or evil of these emotions seems to rest on their correspondence with the good or evil of the external action which they produce. In other words, they belong to the same moral species as the external act.\(^\text{11}\) One can

\(^{11}\) This is because of their relationship with the will. The interior act of the will and the external
reasonably infer that they retain the same moral species even if there is no external act. It could be argued that the very existence of these two emotions in a person reveals, even reinforces, underlying attitudes that unavoidably influence that person’s behaviour. In other words, if one has these types of emotions, it says something significant about the moral texture of that person, about their character.

The full significance of these examples (and the interpretation suggested) can be appreciated by linking them with art.4. ad 2. There, it says that those emotions are good which “create a favourable attitude towards something truly good or an unfavourable one towards something really evil; and those emotions are evil which create an unfavourable attitude towards something truly good, or a favourable one towards something really evil” (I.II. 24.2 ad 2).

Aquinas seems to be arguing that certain emotions have moral significance since they reveal the moral configuration of a person in terms of both the origin and the consequences of those emotions. Beneath the sources and outcomes of the emotions are the attitudes. Certain emotions are intrinsically good or evil because of their formative influence on the whole person and on others by either reflecting or creating certain attitudes and dispositions. They reverberate in both the inter-personal and intra-personal domains.

Modesty is, by definition, a mean between exhibitionism and prudery. It protects and respects the intimate centre of persons. It enables humans to deal with the demands of shame in the realm of sexuality. The fear of being shamed, of public exposure, whether physically or psychologically, is a healthy emotion. Shame, in the broad sense, is a virtue since it is a praiseworthy emotion (II.II. 144.1). A good action, considered morally, are one act, cf., I.II.17.4; I.II.20.3.
person would feel ashamed if he/she did something dishonourable. Hence, Aquinas sees shame as a sentinel of moral sensitivity and integrity (II.II. 144.4). Emotions combined with the virtue promote an attitude towards a value that is good in itself, namely, respect for oneself and for others.

Envy is the sadness at another’s good fortune and gifts. Taylor (1988, pp. 234f) notes two forms of this “destructive” envy. It can take the form of “object-envy” where the object is the good(s) the other person has. It can lead to an immoderate desire to acquire them for oneself, even unjustly. Sometimes, this envy takes the form of “state-envy” where the object is the other person precisely as possessing a particular good. The other is seen as a rival whose success is linked with, or highlights, ones failure. There is a pattern of comparing oneself with another, feeling deprived and attempting to build oneself up by undermining the other person. It is corrosive and life-denying especially as reSENTIMENT. There is something repellent about being that sort of person. While modesty as self-respect promotes integration, envy impedes it.

What move has Aquinas made? He has carefully restricted the understanding of his answer that there are some emotions either good or evil “ex sua specie” or of their very nature. He would be aware that it is very difficult to describe and define emotions as inherently right or wrong, i.e., as, in themselves and always, promoting or hindering human flourishing. He has attempted this by using specific examples that include, in their moral description, the object (a certain form of fear (shame) or sadness (another’s success), the end (creating a favourable or unfavourable attitude concerning a good or an evil), and a circumstance (fear in regard to one’s body or person in a public context; gifts that are another’s). In other words, the intrinsic good or evil of these emotions is described in synthetic terms.
Having examined the moral status of the emotions, Aquinas broaches a question implied in the research question and in the three articles just discussed: 'How and to what extent are emotions to be under the control of reason?'

The best strategy for a response is suggested by Jordan (1986, p. 89) that one starts with Aquinas’ language. Throughout q. 24, the reader finds words connoting authority, especially having political overtones, e.g., “power”, “to obey”, etc. together with images of limits, moderation, proper order (ordinatio), commanded by or regulated by reason.\(^{12}\) Jordan notes that the use of such metaphors is congruent with Aquinas’ use of explicit political images in a prior discussion of the relation of sensitive appetite to reason.

Earlier in the Summa, Aquinas asks whether the irascible and concupiscible powers obey reason. He draws on a quotation from John Damascene in the sed contra to the effect that the lower powers are capable of being persuaded by reason. Aquinas then develops the metaphor of persuasion as the core of his argument. The sensitive powers are directly guided by the vis cogitativa in the knowledge of particulars. This power in turn is guided by universal reason in the process of abstract knowledge. The will, too, exercises control but over the irascible and concupiscible appetites. These wait on the imperium of the higher power—the will. In the ad secundum, Aquinas proceeds to use a political metaphor to express the whole of the relationship of reason to the sensitive appetite. It is a relation that is political and regal, not

\(^{12}\) It may help to note the original Latin (as does Jordan, p. 91). For instance: q. 24, a. 1 corp., “quod subjacent imperio rationis, et voluntatis”; q. 24, a.1 corp., “quod a voluntate imperantur”; q. 24, a.1 ad 1m., “quod a ratione imperantur”; q. 24, a.4 ad 1m and 3m., “obedit rationi”; q. 24, a.2 corp., “extra limites rationis”; q. 24, a.1 ad 3m., “a ratione ordinatur”; q. 24, a.3 corp., “per rationis regulam dirigantur”; “per rationis regulam”; “regulatae per rationem”; “inordinatos motus.”
despotic. The latter is characteristic of a man ruling his slaves who do not have the right to resist commands. Political and royal power is that of a man ruling over free subjects who, though they are subject to the ruler’s authority, still have their power to resist (I. 81.3 ad 2; I.II.9.2 ad 3; 17.7). By contrast, in The Republic, Plato “portrays reason as the helmsman of the soul and ship of state, beleaguered by the motley crew of rebellious passions. For Kant, practical reason finds no truth in the counsel of experienced interests and desires” (Spohn, 1991, p. 70).13

What is Aquinas trying to say? Later in the Summa when Aquinas examines law, he defines it as an ordinance of reason for the common good. Authority is not based on rational will but on reason as mind. Only then can the use of power have limits and avoid dictatorship, oppression or tyranny. Authority, properly understood, is exercised by the direction of reason for the sake of the whole, the common good, the polis. The same image of the common good of the person is used in Aquinas’ description of the will as coordinating and directing the other human powers in view of a common goal (I.II. 9.1). The will must work in concert with the intellect and the emotions to rightly choose the right objects. True authority must weigh all that contributes to the total good. True authority has the quality of reasonableness. It has a coordinating function which acknowledges and respects the fact the members in a community have a certain freedom, or autonomy, in their life and roles. As a result, in their participation in the life of the polis, there is the possibility of refusal, even opposition (often to the individual’s detriment and that of the community). In Damascene’s view, this is the style of governance or authority reason has in regard to

13 Also, note the following comment: “The political experience of the philosopher’s culture provides different analogues for intrapsychic order. Robert Merrihew Adams rejects Plato’s autocratic model of the soul for ‘something like the American system of representative government with ‘divided power,’ with opposing tendencies and competing interests retaining an independent voice and influence...the everpresent possibility of internal conflict is not only a vexation...it is also a wellspring of vitality and sensitivity, and a check against one-sidedness and fanaticism’ ” (“Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical Review 94 [1985] 10-11). In Spohn (1991, p. 70, footnote 4).
the emotions.

Emotions are not subject to the direct control of reason (as are bodily members or movements) but to indirect control. As Aquinas says the sense appetite is subject to reason not immediately but through the will (I.II. 46.4). Each emotion has itself its own power of freedom to cooperate or to resist. It is the role of the virtues to guide the emotion, to overcome any resistance “but in such a way so as not to suppress the power itself” (Barad, 1991, p. 413). Such an approach rests on and needs persuasion and instruction. It appears closer to coordinating than ordering, to collaboration than domination. This is a more developed form of the model that Jordan (1986, p. 89) argues is adopted by Aquinas to describe the relationship between the orectic powers (the emotions) and right reason.  

This study has now uncovered the template that Aquinas uses to design his moral account of the emotions. It provides both the basic configuration and the boundaries to the emotions’ participation in reason, the mode of their moral responsibility in relation to practical reason, and the pattern of the mutual instruction between practical reason and the emotions. How does this happen?

14 This interpretation of Aquinas’ language and imagery seems to be consonant with the idea of “democracy.” Aquinas is aware of the term (in the discussion on Law in I.II. 95.4). Naturally, for him, it does not have the modern connotations of mutuality, equality, human and political rights. Aquinas draws, instead, on a political system of his acquaintance, namely, monarchy. He uses the image of the benevolent ruler combined with the “democratic” qualities of participation and the collaboration of free persons for a common goal. One could speculate about the influence of his Dominican background. From its origins, the Dominican order had an ethos and form of governance characterised by structures that encouraged both participation and individual autonomy. It was the community, especially the Chapter, that was the locus of authority and wisdom (Zawilla, 1993, p. 288; Tarnas, 1991, p. 179).
Emotions are susceptible to rational guidance when they come under the consideration of intellect and will. Only in this way, can they become good or bad in the moral sense. This means that the person needs to engage in some form of reflective self-awareness. Once emotions arise, it is a person’s attitude towards them that shapes how they are integrated with reason and will into the person’s life. A person may refuse, or even not be ready, to deal with a certain emotion.

Given that emotions are spontaneous and, for the most part, involuntary, are they, therefore, irrational? Alternatively, is a human activity against reason if it is not deliberately and consciously willed?

Aquinas addresses this question. In q. 34. art.1, he discusses the emotion of pleasure as one that can hinder or undermine the use of reason. He notes pleasures not in accord with reason. He then takes the example of conjugal intercourse as a pleasure “perfectly in accord with reason which hinders reason; nevertheless, it impedes the exercise of reason because of the physical reactions involved” (I.II. 34.1 ad 1). This pleasure is not morally evil, hence irrational.\(^{15}\) He then suggests sleep as a further example. Moderate sleep is an instance of reason itself demanding that the use of reason be, at times, interrupted (I.II. 34.1 ad 1).

\(^{15}\) Aquinas, having asserted the absence of moral malice (mortal or venial sin) in the pleasure of conjugal intercourse, then proceeds to say that it proceeds from a kind of moral malice (\textit{se illicit ex quidam morali malitia}) due to the sin of the first parent. He refers back to I.88.2. where he states that the lower powers in the state of innocence were completely subject to reason, but that after the fall there is a certain deformity of excessive concupiscence.

Is Aquinas trying to have it both ways? Or is he struggling with (and does not resolve) two forces in human sexuality: the emotional component of self-giving love embodied in surrendering oneself into the hands of the other and, on the other hand, its explosive and destructive power? Grace working in the fallen human being? Could one argue that sexual surrender (“loss of control”), done out of love, is a sacrament of the ecstasy of divine love, of the total self-donation of the three persons in the life of the Trinity? This possibly is what John Paul II alludes to when he speaks of discovering “in the body the anticipatory signs, the expression and the promise of the gift of self, in conformity with the wise plan of the creator” \textit{Veritatis Splendor} No. 48. It also captures something of the sexual dynamism as viewed by Rahner, that “human \textit{eros} is the deep potentiality and longing in the person (\textit{obedientia potentialis}) for divine \textit{agape}” (Crossin, 1985, p. 27).
Emotions, consequently, are a form of momentary and, at times, extended, temporal “interruptions” to the use of reason that are not contrary to reason. It is not irrational for emotions to perform their function as spontaneous responses to value or disvalue. Elsewhere, Aquinas notes that one can be clouded by passion, yet still have sufficient freedom to hold oneself in check. One can have sufficient self-awareness to distance oneself from the emotion and not be overwhelmed by it (I.II. 10.3 ad 2).

These points highlight two aspects about “control” of the emotions. Firstly, Aquinas sees this in terms of “moderation”, of balance or equilibrium. Secondly, control may not be solely, nor most importantly, temporal (simultaneous) but spatial (attitudinal). It is one’s stance towards the emotions that is in question. It may be one of proximity (engagement) or distance (denial, suppression, repression). This underlies their role in the moral life and in personal integration.

Aquinas notes that emotions, the lower orectic faculties “may be called rational to the extent that there is a sense in which they have some share in the life of reason, as Aristotle says” (I.II.24.1 ad 2). He suggests that emotions are more intimately connected to reason than our bodily members. Since bodily movements and actions can be called morally good or bad in so far as they are voluntary, *a fortiori* this can be said of the emotions (I.II.24.1). Implicit in both these considerations is the notion that the emotions, by participating in some way in rationality, are designed to contribute, in an appropriate way, to the process of moral evaluation. If emotions share, in an incipient but real way, in rationality, they are, to that degree, incipiently moral. This is another way of saying that they are responses to value or disvalue.

Aquinas goes on to say that emotions are morally good or bad to the extent that they are voluntary and hence “to the extent that the will commands them, or at least does
not check them” (I.II.24.1). A person may feel a surge of anger before having time to think about it. The experience, considered in itself, is morally neutral. It becomes moral, i.e., right or wrong, when the person expresses that anger immoderately thereby going beyond rational or reasonable limits. To deliberately arouse oneself to a blazing rage can be as morally blameworthy as neglecting to restrain one’s anger. It can also be a moral issue when a person feels no anger, nor another emotion, e.g., compassion, when one could reasonably expect such an emotional reaction of the normal person in a particular situation (finding a battered child at the door).

Considered apart from reason (intellect and will), the emotions are inadequate in guiding moral action. “Emotions lack an internal system of controls” notes Barad (1991, p. 405). It is their organic relationship to the rational powers that provides that system of direction and restraint. Without this, even positive emotions can become destructive. When one experiences an emotion, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways of responding. There must be some determination whether the object of the emotion is truly good or bad and whether the emotion is appropriate in the situation (Barad, 1991, p. 405). That evaluation requires reasoning through the intellect which can understand causes and make comparisons.

For instance, a person’s anger at a belligerent comment can be assessed as reasonable or not by comparing what caused the feeling of being attacked with the person’s knowledge of what actually could endanger his/her well-being. If it is clear that the anger fosters the person’s human development, it is morally good (right). If the anger does not meet this standard, (namely, it is based on a mistaken belief or, while perceived accurately, is an overreaction), then it is morally bad (wrong). The status of emotions as morally good or evil emerges from their relationship to the human good, as compatible or incompatible in achieving it. But more of that later.
“Does emotion add to or detract from the goodness or evil of an act?” then asks Aquinas (I.II. 24.3). He replies by noting, against the Stoics, that a feature of human excellence and maturity is the “existence of the emotions and their control by reason. For the root of all human goodness lies in the reason; human excellence will therefore be the greater, the greater the number of human elements under rational control” (I.II. 24. 3). The more the emotions are directed by right reason, the more they facilitate the use of reason and draw a person more intensely to what is good. It is better that a person “be bent on the good, not merely with his will, but also with his sensory orexis” (I.II. 24. 3). It is a morally better action that is done, not just by choice, but also with an accompanying affective element, namely, done from the heart. There is a deeper investment of the person. This is another example of a general principle. Personal integration with its moral, psychological, or spiritual components will be greater the more the various facets of the human person are under rational control. In other words, they are moving in a life-trajectory in a way that is increasingly coordinated, harmonious, self-transcending and centred on love.

There is a two-fold relationship between reason and emotions in the formation of the moral judgement. This is central to the working blueprint for the emotions. In relation to deliberation and will, emotions can be antecedent or consequent.

Antecedent emotion is experienced prior to a moral judgement. Given that emotions are inherently characterised by attraction or avoidance, they can colour the judgement by presenting it with an object as more attractive or repellent than it really is. They can be powerful enough “to cloud rational judgement on which the moral worth of an act depends, and so detract from it” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1). Antecedent emotion can also diminish or remove imputability when a person, under the influence of an emotion, performs a harmful action, for instance, homicide from fear for one’s life.
What is an instance of an emotion diminishing the goodness in an action? One could envisage someone helping another person motivated more by what other people will think (embarrassment) than because the action is good in itself. Aquinas uses the emotion of pity as an another example. “An act of charity is more praiseworthy when done from deliberate choice than simply from a feeling of pity” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1). The condensed form of the example makes it difficult to understand Aquinas’ point. Prima facie, he seems to be saying the following: one may help someone in need, in a spontaneous manner, simply because one feels sorry for them. A more considered evaluation of the situation may indicate that, in terms of practical reason, it requires another form of intervention that is more loving and effective to be morally good. Later, one can see this interpretation confirmed. In discussing the virtue of pity, Aquinas describes the act of the virtue of pity as a movement of the soul “complying with,” “at the service of” reason, viz., when pity is bestowed so that justice is preserved (human rights recognised) as when help is given to the poor or forgiveness to the penitent. Pity as a virtue leads one to be compassionate according to reason, i.e., to render what is due. Acting solely from the emotion can lead to misguided actions that do not promote justice or continue to violate a person’s rights (I.II. 59.1 ad 3).

Antecedent emotions limit reason’s scope in weighing and assessing the alternative choices available and highlight or diminish their attractiveness. Aquinas shrewdly

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16 In this context, Barad (1991, p.408) says “When an emotion becomes the sole motive for an act, the act is no longer voluntary and loses its moral value. This is why Aquinas says, ‘It is more praiseworthy to do a work of charity from the judgement of reason than from the mere emotion of pity.’” This researcher considers the use of “mere” is misleading. Barad’s “sole motive” is more accurate, hence “solely (simply) from the emotion of pity.” It would seem to be straining the language of this and I.II. 24.3 ad 1 above, to arrive at Barad’s interpretation that the act “loses its moral value.” In both instances, a comparative, not an absolute, measure is used (“diminuunt actus bonitatem,” “more praiseworthy”-laudabilius). Goodness is diminished not removed. There are circumstances where Barad’s statement would be true e.g., the homicide case mentioned above, but proof for it is not found in these particular texts. (Also I.II.10.3).
illustrates how perceptions are shaped by emotions. To a person affected by passion, things seem greater or smaller than they really are (I.II. 44.2). For the lover, the beloved is perfect. For the fearful pedestrian, the barking spaniel appears as a snarling Doberman. Strong emotion makes the object so appealing or repellent that nothing else matters as being worthwhile. One hears it said that “hanging concentrates the mind.” The trajectory of someone’s emotional state (ranging from distraught to agitated to calm) shapes the trajectory of moral judgement (from erroneous to sound).

Antecedent emotion, as defined by Aquinas, obscures the judgement which provides the basis for the moral value of an act, even to the point that the act is no longer voluntary. For this reason, antecedent emotion does not have normative status.

On the other hand, Aquinas sees consequent emotion (which follows the judgement) as having normative status. It provides a benchmark for moral evaluation primarily because of its goodness/rightness, but also for its evil/wrongness.

Consequent emotions contribute to the goodness of an action, firstly, by an overflowing of intensity downwards so that the emotion is both the result of the will’s intense orientation to goodness and a sign of the action’s greater moral worth. “But when emotion is subsequent to rational judgement, there are two possibilities. First, it may take the form of a kind of overflow; the higher part of the soul is so strongly bent upon some object that the lower part follows it” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1). The presence of the emotion is a sign of “the will’s intensity, and hence an index of greater moral worth” (I.II. 24. 3 ad 1). For example, a person judges she should help street people. She is moved to pity when she meets one begging for food on the street on a freezing day.
Harak renders *per modum redundantiae* (I.II.24.3 ad 1) as the emotions “resonate” with the will as it moves towards the good (Harak, 1993, p. 79). Elsewhere, Aquinas uses identical terminology in speaking of the intensity of the yearning for wisdom and other spiritual goods “overflowing” or “resonating” in the emotions. They seek higher goods in their own way and the embodied affectivity is at the service of spiritual values (I.II. 30. 1 ad 1). This rendition captures well the reverberations that can affect the total person through the interrelationship of powers. It also adds another dimension to the political, spatial and participative metaphors used by Aquinas to portray the embodied and mutual quality of the relationship between reason and the emotions.

Secondly, the intensity of an action may result from a deliberate decision to cultivate a certain emotion precisely to act more promptly and intensely for good. Consequent emotion “may be the outcome of choice, i.e., a man may make a deliberate decision to be affected by an emotion so that he will act more promptly” (I.II. 24.3 ad 1). Besides increasing the goodness of an action, consequent emotion enables a person to act more promptly and easily than would be the case without the emotion. When the emotion is attuned to the will’s choice, there are psychological and physical reverberations that facilitate the act. Aquinas uses the example of courage. When a person has the virtue of courage, anger following on that choice facilitates the eager performance of the act.\(^\text{17}\) “The increased adrenalin brought on by a person’s anger can give him the physical boost he needs to deal more efficaciously with a perceived wrong” (Barad, 1991, p. 410).

It must be noted that what is true of consequent emotion with regard to good actions is also true of evil actions. There exist the same two forms of influence between the

\(^{17}\text{Quaestiones Disputatae} \text{ 26.7.}\)
will and the emotions. In this instance, there is an increase both of the malice of the action and of eagerness in its performance. The emotion facilitates a morally bad judgement. For instance, if a person judges that Aborigines should not be given charity, his cultivated hatred or anger towards them would increase the malice of failing to help them or be an indicator of it (I.II. 24.3 ad 3).

In the instances discussed, the emotions follow a judgement and, therefore, they are voluntary. A person is responsible for any act that results from those emotions. They can be evil. But Aquinas’ principal concern is to argue that consequent emotions are praiseworthy because they increase the moral worth of an act and intensify a person’s commitment to the good act.

3. Overview and Comments.

It is time to recapitulate the discussion of the morality of the emotions thus far. To adapt Jordan (1986, p. 93), in q. 24, Aquinas takes the following steps:

a) there is an aspect of an emotion that is truly rational and, hence, morally good;
   but...

b) not all emotions are rational, i.e., morally good/right. Some are evil/wrong. What is true is that...

c) there is a teleological interdependence between reason and the emotions that involves a “positive mutual causality” in determining morally good and evil emotions (Jordan, 1986, p.93). Nevertheless...

d) there are some emotions, that, in themselves and carefully defined, are consonant with right reason (intrinsically good/right), just as there are some emotions that, in themselves and carefully defined, oppose right reason, i.e., are intrinsically evil/wrong and are, consequently, excluded from the principle of positive mutual causality.
The overall focus for Aquinas has been on emotions and morality as human actions, as personal acts that are right behaviour. Emotions, for him, are neither sickness nor irresistible forces. While they can sway a person, even destructively, they are basically human powers with a positive role in life. Human life is the task of a rational being. Emotions must somehow be related to, contribute to, the good, to the life-project of the total person. Since emotions have no internal controls, their true function is exercised within a relationship with reason, i.e., in its most proper sense.

With the discussion so far, however, does Aquinas demonstrate that reason governs the emotions? This question is rightly asked by Jordan (1986, p. 95).

From q. 24 there appears to be no single argument to the question. It is rather a cumulative one that is contextual in character, namely, from the content and structure of the Summa and, in particular, of the Secunda Pars (as discussed earlier). Firstly, to consider content. The teleological principle at work in creation, in the organic and human world, in society, is also the organising principle of the human being. There is a dynamic movement towards a goal at each level. The human being comprises a teleological and hierarchical order of powers, each with its own specific purpose, but directed to the common end or goal of life by the highest of those powers, viz., intellect and will (the “rational” proprissime dicta). Secondly, there is the structural factor. Within the framework of the Summa, the placement of the Treatise on the Passions reflects the relative, yet integral, place the emotions have in the overall scheme of human life.

The immanent and hierarchical teleology (involving a dependence of lower on higher) is described by Aquinas in language or imagery that has particular qualities, as has been noted by Jordan (1986 p. 95). The language of “participation” is at work in the idea of the emotions as participating in reason (to a certain degree). There is
also a dimension of this in the subordination in animals to the higher reason of God in striving for their purpose in life. The grammar of embodied experience is reflected in the “resonance” process associated with the emotions. Together with the imagery, there are the spatial metaphors that have already been discussed, e.g., emotions as “subject to” reason, “under the control” of reason, “closer to reason than the bodily members.” (Jordan, 1986, p. 95). These are modified, even amplified, by the political images employed by Aquinas. The languages of participation and resonance, the spatial and political images converge in q. 24, art. 3 where the positive mutual causality between reason and emotion is analysed (an aspect that will be pursued further in the next chapter). Overall, Aquinas uses these devices to correct any residual dualism in his work, to overcome the constraints of his world view and his language and to capture both his sensitivity and insight into human experience.

Underlying all this, there is an integrated vision of the human being within the plan of God. For Aquinas, there is the teleological structure of creation, of the organic world, of the human being, of human powers and of the human community.

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18 Harak aptly elucidates the interactive nature of emotions in Aquinas (between the subject and the object poles). He also highlights rationality as permeating the whole person, including the passions. As Harak points out (1993, p. 162), Aquinas avoids mechanistic dualism of the spirit directly acting on the body by proposing the “heart” as the driving centre of the person (24.2 ad 2; 37.4). Or he locates the centre of the person in the imagination. One stresses the physical, the other, the intellectual aspect of human operations. One author notes, “What is remarkable, given the limitations of time and opportunity, is St. Thomas’ continuing interest in the role of bodily resonance in man’s emotional life and the extent and diversity of his comments on the subject” (Reid, 1965, App. VI, p. 172).

Harak chides D’Arcy for his translation which shows how “committed he is to the Cartesian model of control of the passions” (Harak, 1993, p. 162, footnote 22). Later, Harak notes how D’Arcy translates such phrases as *limites rationes* (sic), *moderationis rationis, ordinatae a ratione*, and even *conveniunt* (24.3) as “under rational control” (p. 164). While Harak may have a point in the rendition of *conveniunt*, he seems to be less than fair to D’Arcy. Any translator is subject to the limits of the language of the original text. D’Arcy notes that Aquinas occasionally uses dualistic language (D’Arcy, 1975, p. xxvii). The evidence indicates that Aquinas does use phrases mainly concerned with control, order, higher / lower, superior / inferior to describe emotions in relation to reason (cf. footnote 12). This terminology mirrors Aquinas’ world view which saw hierarchy, orders of being, powers within persons, the society and the cosmos as the ontological foundation of existence. Aquinas’ achievement was to attenuate and transcend the limits of language and his mindset by the complementary images he uses to convey the collaborative and mutual relationship between the intellect and the emotions.
Emotions are part of the teleological makeup of the human being, epitomised, for Aquinas, in the soul—the guiding and integrating principle. As a given component of a moral being who arrives at his/her goal by self-direction (through knowledge and choice), the emotions are subject to the control of reason. They are part of the moral realm. Emotions, carefully understood, can be described as human, hence, moral acts.

The vision of the human person and the moral significance of the emotions are, for Aquinas, necessarily interrelated and interdependent. Aquinas seems to offer a blueprint of the human person that is best understood through the image of a series of transparencies containing different models meant to be placed one over the other. The core design is the teleological shape of the real which gives intelligibility and purpose. The models are as follows:

i. A theological model framed on the Exitus/Reditus that reveals God’s loving providence;

ii. A cosmological model, delineating the design and direction of the created world;

iii. An organic model to describe living beings in their internal structure and external relationships;

iv. A moral model to describe the unique human expression of the organic model in which the end is sought through the use of freedom;

v. A social/political model describing a) the human being in relationship in community and b) the human powers in relationship with each other.

These models complement, amplify and correct each other. In them, one can discern the interpenetration of the macrocosm and the microcosm.

This chapter has examined the vision of the human person in Aquinas together with
the moral significance of the emotions. What has emerged is a coherent and consistent understanding of the human person in Aquinas. The study has also disclosed Aquinas’ understanding of the moral significance of the emotions in so far as they are acts of the person that are rightly ordered. He has also signalled the formative role of the emotions as moral activity that influences attitudes and character. He has outlined a normative account with regard to consequent emotions and, initially, concerning moderate emotions. Aquinas has done this in the form of general considerations. The working assumption for Aquinas is that emotions are not the enemies of freedom. The question arises: “Does q. 24 represent the full extent of Aquinas’ thought on the moral significance of the emotions?” The pursuit of an answer to this question will enable the research questions to be completed in this section of this study. Such is the concern of the following chapter.
CHAPTER 4

Benchmarks for Emotions and Morality in Aquinas

II: Specific Issues

The aims of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, to conclude the probing of the research question begun in Chapter three; “What is the moral significance of the emotions in Aquinas?” The focus now becomes more specific. The method used will be to examine specific emotions of the concupiscible and irascible appetites under the modern rubric of positive and negative emotions. One must acknowledge the risk of portraying Aquinas as “a good deal more ‘modern’ than his account really warrants” (D’Arcy, 1975, p. xv) or, conversely, of underestimating the significance of that account. It has already been noted how Aquinas’ two-fold classification approximates the positive/negative division used by Callahan. As explained earlier (Chapter three, footnote 7), positive emotions entail a sense of harmony and well-being, cf., love, desire, happiness, pleasure, joy. Negative emotions bring a state of unease, uncomfortableness, dissonance, e.g., sadness, hatred, anger, fear. These descriptions of the subjective quality of emotional experience offer a useful hermeneutical lens that gives a contemporary slant on Aquinas’ view of emotions in terms of human acts. Further, it is hoped that from this methodology will emerge Aquinas’ view on the emotions as they influence two other aspects underlying the research question—virtue and character (the moral subject).

Secondly, this section of the study will conclude with an overview and evaluation of the study’s discussion of the Theological Anthropology and the moral significance of the emotions in Aquinas.
One could get the impression that q. 24 represents Aquinas’ complete treatment of the topic under discussion. Further examination of the text of the Prima Secundae reveals that this is not the case. One can glean further insights that expand and enrich one’s understanding of Aquinas’ work on the emotions and the moral life. These are found in q. 24 itself and in the discussion on the individual emotions. This is especially the case in the treatment of the morality of pleasure (I.II. 34) and of the morality of sorrow or pain (I.II. 39). To begin this, it may help to retrace a few steps.

1. The Moral Significance of the Positive Emotions

1.1: Love, Fittingness and Pleasure

1.1.1: Love

Human beings are incomplete and need others to complete them—other people, goods, experiences. Through needs, humans are attracted to food, drink, sleep, friends, company, love. Experiencing these is pleasurable and can bring degrees of contentment. Failure, suffering, violence can make people fearful or angry. When Aquinas talks of the emotions being ‘subject to reason’ does he mean that human beings are to reach a point where they no longer need emotions so that they can think and will their way through everything? Basically, his answer is no. Human beings

19 Jordan’s aim is to detect and decipher the sources of article 24, and to expose the philosophical underpinnings of Aquinas’ moral account of the passions. Barad’s focus is the relationship between the emotions and and moral judgement and activity. She constructs her case around q. 24, and does explore the role of specific emotions e.g. sadness, fear. While acknowledging the centrality of happiness and pleasure, she does not develop the point. Harak builds on and develops the work of these and other authors. He arrives at a more integrated and, consequently, adequate portrayal of Aquinas’ view of the emotions in the moral life. Nevertheless, he still leaves some issues unresolved, e.g., the role of the negative emotions; the political model suggested by Aquinas and its relationship to the limits of Aquinas’ language, to his world view and to the structure of his Philosophical Psychology.
are embodied spirits (or enspirited bodies? depending whether one is Greek or Hebrew). Aquinas’ view was both radical and unpopular in his day, according to Chenu (1981, p. 194). His conviction flowed from the “principle of consubstantiality of body and soul that he defended when analyzing the morality of the passions as actions of the sensitive powers of people” (Chenu, 1981, p. 194). The possession and use of emotions is part of our created and gifted reality from God. And so one returns to the question: if they are to be subject to right reason, exactly how is one morally responsible for how one feels, for one’s emotions? How are emotions rational? How are human beings to have emotions in the right way, at the right time, to the right degree, towards the right person?

With further and more careful examination of q. 24, one can detect that Aquinas makes three other moves. Firstly, he cites Augustine who says that all our passions are good or bad according as our love is good or bad. Aquinas notes later that love is the first of the concupiscible passions (I.II. 25.2). D’Arcy (1967, p. 139) notes that “love” is better understood primarily as “liking”, an attachment to some objects arising from a sense that the object and oneself are naturally fitting to each other. This arouses the desire to move towards attaining the “good” object that has stimulated love. There is the pattern of love (inclination), desire (movement) and rest (I.II. 26.2). Once the object loved and desired is attained, there emerges rest and delectatio. This pattern is true of the sensitive and the intellective appetite.

A difficulty arises in this context in the translation of amor. D’Arcy notes that there are “important differences between loving and liking; but St. Thomas has to give a single account of amor” (1975, p. xv). The movement model he uses for the emotions meant that he had to “squeeze his concepts” into its framework in a way that doesn’t do justice to ordinary language, to experience or to his own “sensitivity or acumen” (D’Arcy, 1975, p. xxv). Overall, there seem to be three
usages of “Love” as response to good in the Summa: a) Amor concupiscentiae or passion-love. This is the desire for what is good for the subject (or another), implanted in the person by the Creator God and having continuity with grace; b) Amor benevolentiae which is good will towards another (or the self) or disinterested affection which does not involve intensity or desire (I.II. 27.2). One form of this is loving God precisely as good; c) Friendship (philia, amicitia) transcends the two forms just noted. It is the union of one or more persons with common interests, sharing, companionship. Charity (Agape-love, caritas) includes and surpasses friendship (Hill, 1966, pp. 142, 184).20

It may help to make some distinctions. Human faculties need virtues to fulfill their purpose. The will needs the human virtue of love as it does of justice. The sense appetite or affectivity needs virtues for the same purpose. Love as part of affective life needs the habit of sound inclinations toward objects of value or away from objects of disvalue that Temperance brings. But more than that, just as love as kinship with, or aptness for, something as good, underlies all the activities of the will, so too with the emotions (I.II. 27.4). All the emotions arise from a single source, viz., love, wherein they are connected with one another (I.II. 41.2 ad 1). Human life, however, entails a conscious embracing of what attracts a person, a process facilitated by the virtues in the various human faculties. Consequently, just as beneath a person’s choices there is a fundamental attitude or direction, so beneath the emotions there is a dominant attitude or “love.” For a person to be integrated, right reason requires human beings to have a single attraction, a dominant love which unites and coordinates their desires, attractions, repulsions, their emotions, in fact, their whole being.21 This relationship is the paradigm “from which and through

20 In his discussion of Love, Vacek distinguishes three kinds of love “by asking ‘for the sake of’ whom we are loving. We love our beloved for the sake of the beloved (agape), or for our own sake (eros), or for the sake of a ‘friendship’ we share with them (philia)” (Vacek, 1994, p. xvi).

21 S.T.III. 24.2: “ On the other hand Augustine says that when a man loves aright, all his emotions
which all our other passions must be ordered” (Harak, 1993, p. 77).

The love by which human beings are most perfected and developed is the love of God (I.II. 28.5). This love measures reason and is not measured by it (I.II. 64.1-4; II.II. 24.7). It is the infused virtue of Charity (as supernatural love) that animates the moral life and regulates human loves and the acquired virtues. As Vacek points out: “For Aquinas, the religious relation makes a difference: ‘the end of all human actions and affections is the love of God,’ and this end measures all our other affections and actions” (1994, p. 2).

A full account of love in Aquinas is not part of this project. However, it is important to pick up D’Arcy’s point above and pursue it. Aquinas’ effort to go beyond his framework and language elaborated earlier is also apparent in his treatment of love. In I.II.28, Aquinas discusses some of the effects of love, i.e., union, mutual indwelling, ecstasy, zeal. In 28.5, he talks of a certain “melting” or “dissolving” of the heart that occurs in which lovers become what they love and take into themselves what they love. Love brings the experience of living in the other and the other in the lover. Such language does not fit with a metaphysics of substance. Aquinas is here engaging in a phenomenology of loving, points out Vacek. “Aquinas rightly saw that the life of the beloved becomes even more rooted in us” comments Vacek (1994, p. 53). Aquinas is also capturing the transcending dimension of love where as one goes out of oneself, one is inwardly transformed by the person or value to which one extends oneself. Love, as mutual indwelling accompanied by ecstasy, is a self-transcending emotion that transforms the lover. For this reason, Aquinas rightly sees love as the standard for the other-directed and transcendent dimension of emotions as responses to value as in, for instance, courage or compassion.
1.1.2: *Fittingness*

In the second move, Aquinas has said that the objects which are the specifying cause of emotions must, themselves, have a yardstick. Aquinas has earlier spoken of the emotions as being already naturally ordered to reason (I.II. 24.1 ad 2). The measure of “ordered to”, “subject to” etc. explored earlier in the discussion of q. 24, is expanded by the important work of Keenan (1992) which is confirmed in Torrell (1996, p. 244). Keenan argues that in the *de Malo* 6 and q. 9 of the *Prima Secundae* one can discern a significant development in Aquinas’ thought.

Prior to this, Aquinas tended to the view that the will was moved by reason (by way of final causality). It was the indeterminacy of the preceding judgment that was the basis for the freedom of the deliberative will (Torrell, 1996, p. 244). Aquinas advances a new position concerning the autonomy of the will. He makes a distinction within the will itself: the will *quantum ad exercitium* in which the will moves itself under God’s providence (in terms of its innate inclination to the universal good as its final cause) to move the other powers (including the intellect) as efficient cause willing the means to the end. The other movement of the will is *quantum ad specificationem* where it is specified as to its object by reason, i.e., as regards this good. The will is autonomous in that it moves itself (carefully understood) to universal good but needs the counsel of reason about the appropriate means, i.e., moving to a particular good (Keenan, 1992, pp. 38ff). Aquinas, then, sees four factors converge: “reason as formal cause, the passions of the sensible appetite, which influence the way in which the object is presented to the will, the will that moves itself because of the end that it pursues; and finally God himself” (Torrell, 1996, p. 245).
In q. 9, Aquinas discusses what moves the will. He explains that the sensitive appetite (passions) is moved by an object (real or imagined) as fitting or harmful. In art. 1 he explains that the intellective appetite (will) is not moved just by knowledge (the truth) but by the truth precisely as good and desirable (I.II. 9.1; 9.1 ad 3). It is the practical intellect not the speculative intellect that moves the will (*quantum ad specificationem*) (I.II. 9.1 ad 2).

Associated with this distinction, is a shift in terminology about right reason as a measure. Aquinas starts to use words such as “fitting” (*conveniens*), “consonant” (*consonans*) or “dissonant” (*dissonans*) to describe actions being subject to, ordered by, right reason. The act is good because reason judges it fitting or appropriate, i.e., to achieve the goal of human life. The “fitting” gets its meaning from the teleological framework of the human person. As a person approaches what is fitting, the more a person becomes fully human. As a person withdraws from what is fitting, he/she becomes “alien” to the truest self. The more immoderate passion increases by act or habit, the more a person becomes alien to the self and there emerges a disfigurement of the soul (Harak, 1993, p. 72).

It is the notion of the “fitting” that links the will’s in-built orientation for the good with an object that is apprehended by practical reason as good. In other words, something is good because it is fitting. In Aquinas’ terms, something is good because reason judges it fitting or appropriate. The concept of fitting has two roles. Firstly, it requires that an object, presented by reason, can only be accepted by the will to the extent that the will has a disposition towards it. The will is inclined to what appears fitting to it. A well-ordered will tends towards, has a “connaturality” with, what is truly and rightly good. A disordered will tends to what is perceived as

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22 S.T. I.II. 22.1.
fitting but is, in reality, evil. The object is apprehended as good, and willed as such (Keenan, 1992, p. 50) but is, in fact, disordered. Secondly, the notion of the fitting distinguishes what is good from what is true. The fitting implies the good since both terms involve a relation between the object and the moral agent. “Whether the good is truly or rightly so, that is, whether it, in fact, perfects us, is a subsequent judgement” (Keenan, 1992, p. 50).

There are two consequences of these considerations. In the articles in q. 24 and others (to be discussed later) about the emotions and morality, Aquinas uses the terms “good,” “bad,” “goodness,” “badness.” Keenan’s work enables this study to say that the measurements of fittingness that “yield what Thomas calls ‘goodness,’ we call “ ‘rightness’ ” (Keenan, 1992, p. 66).23 In other words, when Thomas describes an act that reason judges to be fitting, he calls it “good,” contemporary usage would call it “right.” If it is not fitting, Aquinas would use “evil,” rather than “wrong.” Secondly, the will’s attraction to any given object tells us not whether the will is good but whether the will is rightly ordered. If the will is inclined to the right object, it is well-ordered; towards the wrong object, it is disordered. Hence, the will and the virtues are subject to a “right-wrong” measurement.

Aquinas now proceeds to examine whether the emotions move the will. Something that is a value (good, fitting) or a disvalue (evil, unfitting) can arouse a person either from the condition of the object or the condition of the person. Fittingness is a relationship. An emotion modifies a person’s disposition or affectivity. Hence, something can seem fitting in that state which does not appear so when the subject is not so affected. For instance, for someone who is angry, something seems good, valuable when he is in that state that is not seen in the same way when he is calm.

23 The distinction of “good,” “bad” for persons from “right,” “wrong” for actions has its roots in Principia Ethica of G.E. Moore.
Through its object, then, the emotion moves the will. Further, in noting that the emotions can oppose or facilitate the task of the will, Aquinas again employs the political metaphor discussed earlier to describe their relationship (I.II. 9.2 ad 3).

In I.II. 24.4 one finds similar language (conveniens -fitting), (dissonum -at odds with) in referring to the emotions. If this is true, then the emotion is fitting, in tune with the whole person who is made up of body, senses and spirit. The other (object of the emotion) must be fitting for the person. Here, rationality as fittingness is the principle governing human interaction in relationships, with the world, and in emotions as interactive responses. Emotions are “good” (“right”) or “bad” (“wrong”) due to their being “fitting” or not in the judgement of practical reason. The benchmark is whether or not they protect and promote the values that facilitate or impede happiness.

1.1.3: Pleasure

The third move made by Aquinas in q. 24 is in his comment, already noted, that it is better rationally to not only will and do what is good, but to desire and to delight in it (I.II. 24. 3). It is also more godlike to be drawn by God through love (with its emotional component) than simply through a person’s own power of choice (dilectio) (I.II. 26.3). This is inherent in the notion of a creature’s “receptivity” within the passivity described earlier. It is the “potentia obedientialis” at the core of human self-transcendence. Humans are more fully rational if they have emotional

24 S.T. I.II.9.2: “...that which is apprehended as having the meaning and force of being good and fitting sets the will in motion after the manner of an object. To be good and fitting, that is a relative notion, which depends on the condition of both sides, the object presented and the subject to which it is presented. The disposition of the latter can vary, so that there is no uniformity of taste: what is agreeable to one strikes another as disagreeable...Clearly an emotion of the sensitive appetite so affects a man’s dispositions that an object he would not otherwise approve of can chime in with his feelings, for instance, when he is in a rage an action may appear good, though this would not have been the case had he not lost his composure. In this manner, through an influence coming from the object as it affects a person, the will is moved by the sensitive appetite.”
involvement in seeking, doing and achieving what is good through desires, love and
delight. Without this dimension, one is prone to be less rational, hence less
integrated as a human being. Aquinas sees its extreme form where a person abstains
from all bodily or emotional pleasure as the vice of insensibility (II.II. 142.1). One
also runs the risk of diminishing, even losing the ability to have feelings.

When humans love a thing by desiring it, it is because it is perceived as belonging to
one’s well-being (I.II. 28.1). What is the most fitting other, the good most in tune
with human needs and desires? It is God, and human beings are improved, perfected
through love of God. God, in Jesus incarnate, wants to meet humans in their total
humanness. It is fitting, good for the human person to delight in the good physically,
to reflect on it. Given this, the question that arises in the Treatise on the Passions
“How can I be fully rational?” can be expressed alternatively as “How can I best be
delighted?” (Harak, 1993, p. 78).

Among the emotions listed by Aquinas that entail a sense of, or an inclination to,
well-being are love, desire (concupiscientia) and pleasure (delectatio) epitomised in
delight. Having discussed love in Aquinas, attention must be given to desire and
delight.

1.2: Desire (Concupiscientia)

The reader of Aquinas cannot help but be struck by the positive portrayal of desire
when compared with the Manualists. The phrase normally associated with
concupiscence is that it is the fomes peccati, the kindling wood of sin, hence it has a
dominantly pejorative sense. While Aquinas does not deny the power and
attractiveness of “lower” desires, his basic view of desire is that it is positive and
healthy. He recognises the participation of the emotions in the spiritual dimension through the sensitive appetite’s “yearning for wisdom” (I.II. 30.1 ad 1). Good is the object of love, which inclines towards satisfaction (pleasure, repose) through the mediation of desire.

*Concupiscentia* has an integral part to play in human teleology. On the one hand there are natural desires, e.g., food, drink, as suitable to animal natures and, as such, are common or necessary. On the other hand, there are elected desires proper to humans through their knowledge and choice of something as good or suitable beyond what nature requires. These are acquired and vary from person to person. Aquinas, quoting Aristotle, refers to the former as *irrationales* and the latter as *cum ratione*. These terms refer primarily to knowledge and choice absent in the first and present in the second form of desire. Emotions are not “irrational” (against reason) as opposed to “rational” (according to reason). The meaning is rather “sub-rational” or “non-rational” compared to “rational” (I.II. 30.3). The modern equivalent in Psychology would be the unconscious as non-rational compared to the conscious as rational. Nowhere does Aquinas refer to *concupiscentia* as, in itself, *contra rationem*. Its object is the good, natural goods which are limited, but also spiritual goods which can arouse limitless desires. *Concupiscentia* is God’s gift enabling humans to be creatures drawn by desire while acknowledging the need for desire to be well-ordered.

Desire is also affected by hope. As desire, so hope connects love and joy. In Aquinas’ categories, it is a response to some good object perceived as possible but difficult to achieve. As a positive emotion it “adds to desire a certain drive and a buoyancy of spirit about the prospect of winning the arduous good” (D’Arcy, 1975, p. 158). It can also be a source of pleasure when, in doing good to another, “one may
Sometimes hope, more than love, may be more keenly experienced in daily life. It is through hope that love “stays alive and moves to fulness” (Wadell, 1992, p. 103). Hope also keeps our eyes on the big picture. As a virtue it fixes our attention on the best thing that can happen to us as possible of realisation (Wadell, 1992, p. 103). With hope goes magnanimity and courage. Magnanimity, Pieper notes, is “the aspiration of the spirit to great things” and that a “person is magnanimous if he has the courage to seek what is great and becomes worthy of it” (cited Wadell, 1992, p. 103f).

1.3: Pleasure as Delight (Delectatio).

“How can I best be delighted?” is the question Aquinas takes up in I.II. 34.3 in his discussion on the morality of pleasure. Pleasure and sadness are the principal passions of the concupiscible appetite because all others converge on, and are completed, in them. The objects of these two emotions are present good and evil (I.II. 26.1). In response to the question whether some pleasure is the greatest good, Aquinas replies thus:

Happiness is the greatest good, for it is the supreme end of human life. But perfect happiness includes pleasure...Accordingly one may say either, that the ultimate end of man is God himself, the supreme good without any qualification; or, that it is the enjoyment of God, which includes the pleasure of enjoying one’s ultimate end. In this sense one may say that there is one pleasure that human beings may enjoy which is the greatest of human goods (I.II. 34.3).

Since happiness is the greatest good and happiness brings pleasure (delight), the greatest delight for humans is God, the ultimate good. For Aquinas, the most rational thing a person can do is to delight in and with God. All pleasures, delights, passions
must be in tune with, permeated with, a desire for God. Other pleasures, goods, values must be related to, lead to, and promote the core emotion of delight which is happiness as experienced. To choose any one of these true but lesser goods or pleasures as one’s ultimate good, is neither in harmony with, nor leads to, our final goal that is found in God. It is irrational.

How exactly does Aquinas relate rationality to the emotion of delight? He does this by arguing that pleasure in the appropriate object is the benchmark by which we measure good or evil.

Now the repose of the will (or of any orectic power) in some good object is, precisely, pleasure. A person is therefore judged good or evil chiefly in terms of what his will finds pleasurable. That person is good and virtuous who takes pleasure in good deeds, that person is evil whose pleasure lies in evil deeds (I.II. 34.4).

It is not any pleasure but that associated with the actions of the virtuous person, for such actions are enhancing human flourishing. A central argument in Aquinas, as in this study, is that humans are drawn to God primarily through appetitus, which generates desire, then love, and love brings delight (I.II. 26.3 and 26.4). When the will achieves its goal, it is at rest in it. That rest (quies) brings delight. Hence, rest and delight in the truly good are an indicator, even more, a measure, of whether a person is good or evil, and, by implication, whether actions leading to that state of rest and delight are right or wrong.²⁵

²⁵ This raises the question of the person in a state of invincible ignorance who performs an action that is objectively disordered / wrong but without guilt (i.e., in good faith). Associated with this state of good or “peaceful” conscience is rest and delight. One could make three observations. There is a discordance with an objective hierarchy of values. Secondly, such an action still seems to impair full moral development since it is not “fitting” as promoting human well-being. Thirdly, ultimately one would have to test the quality of the person’s subjective experience of moral awareness and of God against that of the truly virtuous person in which right will, right affections and right reason are coordinated—where the objective and subjective are in harmony with each other.
What, then, according to Aquinas, is rational pleasure or delight? It is pleasure moderated by reason which ensures that it is not excessive and possibly harmful (I.II. 37.4). To do so would be irrational because intemperate pleasure can emerge as pain and that is not desirable. One gauge of whether our emotions are rational and, hence, moral, is consistent delight in true values that emerges from inner harmony.

Aquinas tests this by looking at the effects of pleasure on the person and on others when good actions are performed. When one is the recipient of good actions, there is a reinforcing of self-esteem (“it helps one appreciate one’s own goodness”), increased motivation in oneself to give pleasure to others, together with the strengthening of bonds of friendship and common interests (I.II. 32.5). When one does good to others, there results a stronger self-image, a deepening sense of one’s goodness, of possessing a self that is worth sharing with others (I.II. 32.6). Solidarity is strengthened whereby the welfare of oneself and others seen to be interconnected. The pleasure associated with good actions intensifies habits and impels a person to further good actions so that “it can become second nature to do good to others; and this makes it a pleasure for the open-handed man to make gifts” (I.II. 32.6). Enjoyment in virtuous action means that a person “gives it his more eager attention and performs it with greater care” (I.II. 33.4). It can also have a transforming effect since what one does or suffers for a friend brings pleasure since it is done out of love (I.II. 32.6). Pleasure or delight, then, is a significant factor in the process of consolidation and habituation in the moral life.

Why, one asks, is delight so crucial for rationality for Aquinas? Because pleasure, or delight associated with happiness, is purposeful, namely, it is integral to the teleological view of the created world. It flows from arrival at the goal, the point of completion. Each created pleasure or good should draw a person, guided by rationality, in the organic unity of the human being, closer to God. Each person must
see and respond to life’s pleasures and delights in the light of the greatest delight which is found in God (I.II.34.3). In this way, one sees and experiences the meeting of horizons—the particular and the universal, the historical and the eternal, the objective and the subjective. This underlies Aquinas’ argument in I.II. 34.4 about delight as the measure of morality. All desires, delights and values must be aligned with and in tune with God. Further, this movement towards God, impelled by and bound by love, integrates lower and higher desires. Delight is etymologically connected with joy and dilation (Latin: delectatio; laetitia; dilatatio). “The term laetitia derives from dilatatione cordis, swelling of the heart—one might almost have latitia” (I.II. 31/3). Pleasure and delight that is rational (attuned to deepest human needs and inclinations) educates a person, makes one more expansive, open to the embrace of God (Harak, 1993, p. 93). Maguire sums this up when he says that, for Aquinas, “In delighting, we are stretched and enlarged as we strain to contain the new good...The good delighted in is experienced more expansively and thus is better known” (Maguire, 1986, p. 261).

As the will, so the person, finds happiness (delight) when it arrives at, and is at one with, the good suited (connatural) to it. “Pleasure is to the experiences of the soul what natural rest is to the body: each takes place in something naturally congenial” (I.II. 31.8 ad 2). For this reason, Aquinas notes that delight is more perfect than the other passions since its object is a good attained, while their object is a good sought (I.II. 31. 2 ad 3).

What is it about delight that is special for the rational animal, the human being? With other animals, a human can advance towards a goal (e.g., get food), be satisfied (experience rest (quies)), then pleasure (delectatio) and does so with the knowledge (awareness) that the goal has been attained. The difference is in the next stage. Humans can reflect on their knowledge and on their experience (I.II. 31.5). Once
humans have achieved their goal, they can reflect on their happiness, on their delight. This consciousness of a being reflecting on its happiness and delight (in God) takes the form of joy (gaudium), the pleasure that “results from interior perception” (I.II. 35.2), which can be experienced, in a real though imperfect way, in this life (I.II. 11.4 ad 2). As with other forms of self-awareness, reflection on the experience of delight reveals its meaning, doing so from within the delight itself. It is from this process that joy emerges. In God, one’s deepest desires are satisfied and the total person is flooded with the fruits of happiness. Understood thus, joy can be viewed as the epitome of the human being’s moral life as a response in love to God.

2. The Moral Significance of the Negative Emotions.

Having explored the relationship between the emotions, morality, desire, happiness and pleasure (especially joy), this study comes to another stage. Firstly, there is the final systematic discussion on the emotions and morality by Aquinas. This occurs in I.II. 39 on the goodness and evil of sorrow or pain. Secondly, there are also insights into the significance of other negative emotions in personal and moral integration, for instance, sadness, hatred, aversion, fear, anger.

2.1: Pain and Sadness

Pain (dolor) has earlier been described by Aquinas as the reverse side of delight and sorrow or sadness (tristitia) as the reverse of joy (I.II. 35.3). Pleasure (delectatio) perfects an operation since it is “the repose of the orexis coming to rest in the good which, we are assuming, has been attained” (I.II. 33.4). While pleasure leads one to grasp it firmly, it also means that “one opens one’s heart to it, the better to enjoy it” (I.II. 33.2 ad 3). It expands the mind, imagination and the affections. Hence, pleasure in the truly good fosters life, integration and the drive of the person towards God.
Pain’s object is principally bodily dysfunction arising from an external source through sense knowledge. For sadness, a species of pain, its object is psychological and, in particular, spiritual distress arising from an internal awareness (intellect or imagination) (I.II. 35.1 ad 2). It is a feeling of depression and of resignation in the presence of an unavoidable evil (Reid, 1965, p. 189). Alternatively, it is seen as the “occurrence of and displeasure caused by some evil that had given rise to hatred and aversion” (D’Arcy, 1967, p. 139). One flees both types of pain from the urge for self-preservation, more from spiritual than from bodily form. One would endure bodily pain, even with joy, to avoid inward pain, i.e., “sorrow of the heart.” There may even be instances where “exterior pain can become a source of interior pleasure and joy” (I.II. 35.7).

Sadness or pain are life-denying, firstly, in terms of the quality of the person’s experience of these emotions. More importantly, sadness, in particular, inhibits the natural momentum of a person’s life, the élan vital, even the desire for pleasure (I.II. 37.2 and 37.3) There is something deeply repugnant about sadness. It can become a pall of ongoing disappointment and depression. It can also take the form of melancholy, weariness, dissatisfaction. Aquinas considers that “the body is harmed by sorrow more than by any other emotion” (I.II. 37.4). Its pervasive character attacks the very dynamism of human life that springs from the heart and animates the rest of the person (I.II. 37.4).

If, for Aquinas, it is not natural for humans to be sad since it hinders vitality, spontaneity and undermines inner and outer harmony, on what grounds and in what sense can pain or sadness be called “good” morally? The grounds are the interrelated, orectic makeup of the human person, the pattern of attraction and avoidance in relation to the good that is epitomised in the emotions. Human beings
need emergency emotions such as anger and fear to warn them about dangers to life or well-being. So too with pain and sadness. They are needed so that one can respond to, to distance oneself from, an evil that is a threat to one’s well-being, happiness or joy. “Given some saddening or painful object, it is a good thing if a person feels sorrow or pain about it. For if he did not, it would have to be because he did not feel it, or did not look on it, as unwelcome; and each of those attitudes would obviously be an evil” (I.II. 39.1). It may be pain (*dolor*) and distress that alert one to a bodily or psychological evil (illness). When sadness is a form of sorrow, of internal pain at something concerning values being amiss concerning oneself or others, it has a significant moral role. If one did not feel this emotion, it indicates either a deficiency in a person’s emotional capacity or in the practical reason’s capacity to discern that this object is evil.

In other words, it is indicative of the moral attitudes and moral sensibility of a person that one’s right reason and right will “resonate” through having a “nose” for evil, a refined sensitivity to what is fitting or dissonant with true human happiness. A sign of that is a certain spontaneous uneasiness (*anxiari de malo praesenti* [I.II. 39.1]) that becomes an ache or a sadness that something evil is present or going on. It will be *tristitia*-that can take the form of uneasiness, sadness, spiritual distress concerning a moral evil. If it is evil to delight in evil things, so it is morally good to be sad about evil (I.II. 39.1). Aquinas later elaborates in saying

> In the case of interior sorrow, the recognition of evil is sometimes due to a correct judgement made by the reason, and the rejection of it to a will of such habitual goodness that it detests evil. Now all moral goodness consists in these two things, viz. correctness of reason and of will. Clearly then, there can be moral goodness in sorrow (I.II. 39.2).

Sadness, then, has a positive role in workings of practical reason. It also indicates the presence of virtue in a person and deepens its influence.
2.2: Duty of Self-Care and The Negative Emotions

Having examined Aquinas’ treatment of some positive and negative emotions, one can observe that he does not appear to be overly concerned with issues of morality when it comes to individual emotions. He has already examined the principles governing them in q. 24 and clarified these in a systematic yet more specific manner with pleasure and sadness. It is the task of practical reason to apply the general principles to particular situations and emotions.

Overall, it is characteristic of, and consistent with, Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology, that his view of the emotions is within a setting of the normal rather than the pathological. His balanced and realistic view of human nature and behaviour is reflected in his portrayal of the emotions as essentially positive and healthy. Their conflicting, even destructive, side is acknowledged, but only in relation to their normal and natural functioning. How they are viewed and handled is seen through the lens of well-being whether that be psychological, bodily, spiritual, rational, emotional or moral in form. While Aquinas does not systematically examine this in every emotion, one can detect sufficient evidence to construct a picture about emotions in relation to the duty of self-care. This is the point where the psychological and the moral converge.

Firstly, from Aquinas’ discussion of hatred, emerges an insight into care for oneself and the relationship between self-esteem and the moral life. Confronted by the question whether one can hate oneself, Aquinas makes a distinction. Properly speaking, one cannot hate oneself since there is an in-built inclination to seek happiness, towards the good. *Per accidens*, a person can mistake and choose something as good or a value which, in reality, is evil and against their true good. That is a form of self-hatred (I.II. 29.4). Each person has a frame of reference. A
person can have a restricted view of life, of themselves, or a defective self-image and low self-esteem. They can also deny their deeper needs in a way that is contrary to right reason, and this can manifest itself in a form of self-hatred. Either way, this affects attitudes and behaviour (I.II. 29.4). The roots of self-hatred lie here, together with the self-deception about the truth that accompanies this which is used to justify one’s actions or way of life (I.II. 29.5).

It must be acknowledged that Aquinas seems to view the factors arousing self-hatred as the result of deliberation and choice. There is no mention of the role of defective upbringing, trauma or environmental dysfunction as factors contributing to a person’s perception and evaluation of themselves and of the world. For all that, for Aquinas, a person’s basic emotional stance towards the self shapes one’s character, view of life and behaviour.

A clearer indication of Aquinas’ thought can be found in an article which asks whether self-love is the cause of all sin (I.II. 77.4). He responds that the cause of all sin is inordinate self-love and concludes that a properly ordered love of self is both obligatory and natural so that one may will for oneself those things that are good and fitting for oneself. This is seen again when he states that love of the body is integral to charity (II.II. 25.5) as is, more importantly, love for oneself. In self-love, a person is “one with himself” which enables and originates love with and for another. In reality, love for ourselves is the model and root of friendship; for our friendship for others consists precisely in the fact that our attitude to them is the same as to ourselves. Aristotle remarks that friendly feelings towards others flow from a man’s own feelings towards himself (II.II. 25.4).

A second aspect of self-care is evident in Aquinas’ discussion of pain and sadness.
In this study, mention has already been made of the emotions viewed either as psychological or as moral realities—as “psychological facts” or “moral” events. This distinction, found in Aquinas and in contemporary parlance, is important. With negative emotions such as hate, anger, fear or shame, one feels uncomfortable, upset about something. It is easy and common for a person to then think that a) such feelings are bad (wrong), or b) one is bad (wrong) to have such feelings. In other words, emotional discomfort equals moral discomfort, feeling bad = being guilty. On this basis, negative emotions are morally disordered emotions.

The distinction between the psychological and moral aspects of an emotion, enables one to understand and interpret emotions correctly. It underpins the appropriate attitude towards them as intelligible phenomena in life. The correct attitude will lead to a suitable strategy in dealing with emotions. Emotions, including, even especially, negative ones, are basically healthy and normal. Their contribution to well-being depends on their source and particularly on how they are viewed and handled. Their function as indicators and facilitators of growth requires a person to be conscious of them in a reflective manner. Emotional health requires awareness leading to self-awareness. Only then can the moral significance of emotions be properly assessed without collapsing the psychological into the moral.

In dealing with emotions responsibly, a simple process of four steps is suggested (adapted from Whitehead and Whitehead, 1994, p. 175ff), namely, to name, claim, tame and aim one’s emotions. A method such as this avoids unwarranted denial and repression while fostering a balanced life and emotional integration. It also offers a modern benchmark in approaching Aquinas’ discussion of the remedies for pain and sorrow in q. 38. articles 1-5. There, one finds a similar 5 step strategy to deal with sadness, depression, loss, grief. Experience indicates that this process can be used with other negative emotions, e.g., anger, fear. Aquinas’ treatment reveals his acute
powers of observation and insight into psychological and inner movements.

1. It is permissible to cry, to wail, to express what is happening inside oneself by talking about it and showing one’s emotions. It is normal and natural to react like this when one is in pain and to have a sense of relief in being able to communicate. “Hurtful things hurt still more if they are pent up within us, for the soul is then more concentrated upon them” (I.II. 38.2). It is more harmful to bottle up the distress, i.e., to repress it, which can also lead to self-absorption. Expressing and sharing one’s feelings of pain or sorrow entails certain pleasure because these emotions are lessened or dispersed. This can also be facilitated by actively engaging one’s imagination in the process, particularly in facing rather than denying one’s emotional state (I.II. 38.2 ad 3). For Aquinas, tears, grief and sadness are healthy, not signs of “breakdown.”

2. It is normal and wholesome to want to have an understanding friend to talk to about the emotion. Aquinas points out “It is natural, in sorrow, to be consoled if a friend shares our grief” (I.II. 38.3). Sharing the burden lessens it. More importantly, one feels one is not alone, that one is cared for, accepted and loved. This acceptance brings consolation, a certain pleasure and easing of the load (I.II. 38.3) So far these steps mean that a person has been able to identify, experience, acknowledge and enter the cage with the emotion. This is to name, claim and tame it.

3. When one engages in such a process, one can then consider another perspective, see and assess the emotion of pain or grief against a larger canvas. Contemplating the truth or reflective self-awareness and the nourishment this provides is the next step. Aquinas highlights the backdrop of “the things of God and the happiness to come” (I.II. 38.4) Seeing one’s situation in that context can be a source of pleasure,
especially “the more perfectly one loves wisdom” (I.II. 38.4). This can “spill over” from the “higher powers,” can have a resonating effect on the emotions, mitigating the negative state and inducing a certain consolation. One can begin to reclaim a renewed vision, vigour and motivation to direct the emotional energy in a creative manner, hence to aim it constructively. Imagining things differently is a crucial step in change, integration and conversion.

4. Love of self and the instinct for self-preservation is stronger than the love of another person who has died or is, in some way, absent. Ultimately, the desire for happiness drives out sorrow, loss or grief. Generally, people have a basic urge to live, to experience life and its pleasures and joys (I.II. 38. 1 ad 3).

5. Anything that stimulates a person to a sense of vitality (“the body’s vital motion”) and prods the person towards normal functioning is worthwhile. “By restoring the system to normal, these remedies are a source of pleasure”(I.II. 38.5). Inner sorrow, loss, grief can be modified and lessened by one’s behaviour and the way one treats one’s body. In modern parlance, “listen to one’s body” is really what Aquinas means. He is equivalently saying that, in such circumstances, give oneself a treat by taking a long soak in the bath and getting a decent night’s sleep (I.II. 38.5). It is good for the heart and, consequently, for the whole person (38.5 ad 3).

Q. 38 is evidence that Aquinas’ methodology was not simply a priori, focussed on the intellectual dimension of the human psyche, “abysmally unmindful of empirical observation and practical therapy” (White, 1952, p. 103). The same author sums up the discussion on this topic in professional terminology:

In Question 38...on the remedies of depression...we find a surprisingly up-to-date application of the principle of functional opposition and compensation, recognition of both the organic and the psychological function of weeping, an
exact description and explanation of the releasing effect of transference through “a certain imagination that others bear the sufferer’s burden” (“quaedam imaginatio quod onus alii cum ipso ferant”), and more than a hint of such “modern” methods as hydrotherapy and prolonged narcosis (White, 1952, p. 103).

The sanity and wisdom of Aquinas’ remarks is all the greater when one recalls that he did not have the advantage of modern understandings of the person from the work of Freud, Jung, Erikson, Rogers and the various schools of Psychology. For the purpose of this study, it has been important to record Aquinas’ advice. It blends attitudes and strategies that appreciate correctly the role and psychological significance of the emotions. Such is the necessary condition for understanding and assessing correctly the role and moral significance of the emotions. To look, listen and learn with regard to the emotions is not just a psychological ploy. It is integral to one’s moral responsibility to strive to have emotions appropriately. In Aristotle’s words, “Anyone can become angry—that is easy. But to be angry with the right person, to the right degree, at the right time, for the right purpose and in the right way, this is not easy” (cited Goleman, 1996, p. ix). By moderating the emotions, one is also exercising responsibility for the configuration of one’s emotional life. In all, one is allowing the emotions to be wise guides.

2.3: Virtue, Character and The Negative Emotions

This discussion has shown earlier how a negative emotion such as sadness can have an important role in moral reasoning and in reflecting the shape of one’s character. The same is true of hatred and aversion (though Aquinas’ understanding of aversion is inferred rather than stated). These emotions are indicators of a person’s basic moral response as of they are of the state of a person’s moral development. Hatred is a “felt antipathy towards a disagreeable object, whether person or thing...(it)..is the most primitive and undifferentiated emotional attitude towards the sensibly
unpleasant” (Reid, 1965, p. 187). Aquinas describes hatred in terms of “dissonance” with what is perceived as repugnant or hurtful (I.II. 29.1). Hatred originates in and finds its meaning in love (I.II. 29.2). The greater one’s love, the greater the hatred (and hence aversion) for what threatens that love and its relationships (I.II. 29.3).

Earlier, in examining the role of pleasure and sorrow in moral evaluation, an important aspect to this study has emerged. These two emotions can motivate a person towards making right choices because the good is appealing (pleasure) and evil unappealing (sadness) (I.II. 59.3). One may, for instance, watch an appeal for money on TV to help a family with a sick child needing expensive surgery. One is moved with sadness and pity for the child and family. One may then reflect on those emotion as worthwhile, even prompting pangs of conscience to make the judgement “People in that sort of situation should be helped.” One then sends off a cheque. Moderate sorrow can also bring insight (I.II. 37.1 ad 1). Loss of money, even one’s home in a fire, may initiate a radical review of the one’s life. What are the things that really count and make one happy? Without those losses and the ensuing sorrow, personal reflection may never have occurred nor its repercussions for the moral life.

Further, these are instances where moderate emotions can be stimulants in forming moral judgements, in forming virtue and in shaping character. The emotions can urge someone to reflect on a moral issue or situation, perhaps more deeply than previously (Barad, 1991, p. 408). Aquinas uses fear and anger as other instances of this process.

2.3.1: Fear

“Is fear a sin?” asks Aquinas (II.II. 125.1). No, he replies, when one is moved to fear what should be feared and avoided. When the fear is out of proportion to the object,
this is irrational. When a person is fearless this can be “a moral fault whether caused by insufficient love, or by swelled head, or by sheer dimwittedness” (II.II. 125.1). Moderate fear can make one more careful and attentive in one’s work and can help one be open to counsel (I.II. 44.4). Disordered fear can prompt a review of oneself. Habits of perception and evaluation of people and situations can produce fear and can, in turn, be enhanced and confirmed by the same fear (I.II. 41.4; 42.5). They can also be based on wrong information or a wrong interpretation of facts (I.II. 42.2). For instance, a fearful reaction to a foreigner who is Asian may move a person to reflect on the fear. Does it come from a prejudice, or from something about the other person’s character that is a threat? From this process may come an insight into a negative side of one’s character, to form a moral judgement about it, i.e., it is an undesirable attitude and emotional response, then to try to do something about it. “Thus, deliberating or learning about the object of an emotion can draw one’s attention to the moral aspects of a situation one has never previously considered” (Barad, 1991, p. 409).

2.2.2: Anger

Anger, as fear and sorrow, can urge a person to reflect on a moral issue or on the shape of one’s moral life and responses (even when those emotions take immoderate form). Aquinas notes that while, of all the emotions, anger can be the most manifest obstacle to reason, it is, in a sense rational, and hence it is natural to be angry (I.II. 48.3; 46.4). The brave person makes uses of anger in action, provided it is confined and controlled (II.II. 123. 10). Moderate anger reveals a) a person’s capacity to measure and respond to personal relationships in terms of justice, b) the depth of one’s love and c) produces in the subject a greater magnanimity and openness (I.II. 46.5; 46.6; 48.2; 48.3).
In I.II. qq. 46-48, Aquinas engages in an analysis of the dynamics of anger. This is examined in a recent book reviewed by Westberg (1997). The object or objective cause of anger is, firstly, an unmerited or unjustified attack on one’s self esteem (“excellence”) or on values or persons that one esteems. This is the evil done. Subjectively, one experiences a natural desire to repel that sorrow/hurt from the slight since it involves a sense of loss and is accompanied by hope of retaliation. Vengeance is the desire to correct the default, to maintain justice in relationships and to counter the inappropriate low regard of a person that prompts the offence. The goal of anger is to make the offender realise the needs and vulnerability of all human beings, to re-establish just relations where equality in difference is recognised. Ultimately, reconciliation involves confession, repentance and forgiveness.

This “remarkably astute” analysis has recently been measured against the experience of a black woman growing up. “The experience of numerous slights to excellence, when her identity as a black woman is insulted, generates anger and illustrates the Thomistic pattern of injuries to self-esteem, sorrow, and desire for vengeance” (Westberg, 1997, p. 93). This is another example of Aquinas’ ability to notice and articulate the subtle calibrations of human experience. It is also an instance of the how emotions are social in their origin and their goal.

Barad sums all this up by noting that, regrettably, Aquinas does not offer a normative account of moderate emotions. He describes rather than prescribes the effects of the emotions. He treats the effects of the emotions in descriptive rather than in prescriptive terms, suggests rather than explicitly states “how moderate emotions may stimulate the formation of moral judgements” (Barad, 1991, p. 409). Perhaps, as will be discussed later, the contextual nature of the emotions and of the affective virtues in establishing a mean makes it difficult to elaborate a general normative account of moderate emotions.
Overall, for Aquinas, the negative emotions, even when disordered, can stimulate a person to evaluate and re-shape attitudes, modify emotional responses and the habits from which they flow. More importantly, they are necessary, in their moderate form, as responses and virtues, to foster and reflect moral development. Negative emotions, then, assist in forming a person’s character.

In examining the moral significance of the emotions it must be remembered that their quality as positive (attraction) or negative (repulsion) is related to a person’s overall emotional resonance and sense of inner worth. Further, positive and negative are psychological descriptions. At times the moral categories of positive and negative (or right and wrong) can be contrary to the psychological experience. For instance, hatred or anger may be psychologically negative yet morally positive or praiseworthy, e.g., as a response to disvalues or to evil, the hatred of evil may even lead to heroism. Conversely, a positive emotion e.g., desire, love, pleasure can be morally negative (wrong, disordered) if it is against right reason, by violating the right order of values (the person’s total good), e.g., sexual desire for, or pleasure with, a person who is not one’s marriage partner.

3: The Moral Significance of the Affective Virtues in Character

In approaching this aspect of the research topic, some reminders are necessary. At the outset, it should be noted that the general framework of the moral dimension of the emotions discussed in q. 24 applies as much to the virtues and character as it does to human acts. Further, Aquinas’ treatment of human acts, passions, habits and the virtues can easily be read as a philosophical discussion. Such an approach would be to take the treatment out of its context which is theological. The direction and the parameters are set in the Prima Pars and, more proximately, in the Prima Secundae in
the discussion of man’s last end. They are resumed explicitly in the analysis of the
virtues, especially of the infused theological and moral virtues and the need for, and
role of, grace.

specifically Christian experience in favour of very general philosophical analysis.”
A more recent article has noted that some treatments of virtue tend to view grace as a
type of “topping up” of the person and the natural virtues with faith, hope and
charity. The same author points out that grace, for Aquinas, is primarily understood
as a formal cause, a form of life whereby a person participates in deeper levels of
God’s life and is transformed in one’s capacities for knowledge and love (I. 43.3). It
is grace “that is the intrinsic form mediating between the divine and the human”
(O’Meara, 1997, p. 265).

The participation in Trinitarian life is characterised by a relationship that is one of
friendship, which, for Aquinas, is the foundation of the Christian moral life. A
human being is a dynamic reality, existing to live, act and grow in terms of a goal
and fulfilment. Grace finds concrete expression in concrete, incarnate, historical
events, actions and people. The person is capable of free choice, of secondary
efficient causality, in the direction of his or her life. It is the dispositions, habits,
virtues that, flowing from the transformed self, enable the person to seek and find
God with powers commensurate to the task “through the gift of the Spirit out of
which the human person acts” (O’Meara, 1997, p. 265). The infused virtues
(theological and moral virtues) are effects intrinsic to the reality of being “graced.”
O’Meara notes that some authors tend to identify charity with grace or with the Holy
Spirit. Charity emerges from the presence of the Trinity but has its own proper,
coordinating activity in the graced moral life of a person.
The predominant focus of this section of the study will be the moral significance of the emotions as they have bearing on virtue and character. This concerns the moral virtues that form the sense appetite or affectivity—the affective virtues.

The principal moral virtues are the cardinal virtues. Prudence is concerned with right judgment, the ability to know what needs to be done. Justice deals with right action, doing what needs to be done in a way it needs to be done. The two affective cardinal virtues are Fortitude and Temperance. Their objects are emotions as hindering rather than facilitating doing what is good. Fortitude overcomes fear, difficulty, pain or whatever obstructs the seeking of the good. Temperance concerns well-ordered affections in tempering down excessive emotions or arousing those that are listless. “Temperance does not suppress the emotions but shapes them to their most appropriate expression, using them to empower virtuous behaviour rather than obstructing it” (Wadell, 1993, p. 1006).

3.1: The Necessity of the Affective Virtues

The question arises of the necessity of the virtues, especially of those concerned with the emotions. Firstly, it needs to be noted, that human life and growth is characterised by a certain degree of continuity. In a good or virtuous life, it is necessary but not sufficient to perform individual actions that are morally significant. For a life to be called good in its entirety or without qualification, there is required an overall direction that can be “best characterised as sustaining a course of activity, rather than performing a series of discrete actions” (Porter, 1990, p. 102).

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26 An extended discussion of the various parts of these two virtues is found in II.II. q. 123-170. The substance of this material is used by the Manualists. To avoid repetition, it will be examined in the following chapter of this study.
Secondly, how is a person to sustain such a course of activity without having to be consciously aware of “one’s overall aim at every moment, and so determine one’s actions and reactions?” (Porter, 1990, p. 102). Aquinas points out that conscious and continuous awareness of one’s goal is not necessary for a person to be directing one’s actions towards that goal (I.II. 1.6 ad 3). More specifically, Aquinas’ response to the question centres on the role of the moral virtues. These shape the person as a being of desire such that one spontaneously desires and seeks what is in harmony with the truly good life that one is endeavouring to pursue (I.II. 55.4). The different aspects of human desire require different moral virtues that modify the will, e.g., justice, and human affectivity, e.g., Temperance and Fortitude, all of which are governed by Prudence (I.II. 56.4 ad 4; 61.2) and are animated and integrated by love, “the mother and the root of all the virtues” (I.II. 62.4).

The necessity and possibility of a person having affective virtues is implied in the content of Chapters 2 and 3 of this project. It is explicitly discussed by Aquinas in his treatment of virtue in relation to the passions (I.II. 59.2; 59.4; 59.5). While the emotions are not fully rational, they do participate in reason as an aptness for the good, as revealers of value or disvalue and as having a cognitive dimension that is susceptible to change and re-direction by reason. For instance, it is possible to modify one’s fearful response to the dog next door because, despite its barking whenever one passes, it really is friendly once it sees the passer-by is known by its owner. Again, one can lessen, even eliminate, one’s initial movement of anger to a fellow-worker’s belligerent comments by taking into account his stressful family situation. One modifies one’s belief system or way of viewing a situation. Aquinas’ points out that the imagination is central to how one perceives and interprets things then reacts emotionally (I.II. 44.4 ad 2). It will be Ignatius of Loyola who develops ways of modifying our imagination and mental scenarios in order to change attitudes and emotional responses (Harak, 1993, p. 98).
While acknowledging that other factors assist in shaping and changing emotional responses, it is substantially true, then, that “the formation of the affective virtues consists precisely in the reeducation of one’s emotional responses in this way” (Porter, 1990, p.103). The more this is carried out, the greater is the convergence between one’s immediate rational response and considered rational judgments in a given situation. The same author sums it up:

And that is precisely why the truly virtuous person does not require constant conscious deliberation on his final end in order to act in accordance with it. His immediate responses will reliably direct him to act appropriately, at least in normal circumstances (Porter, 1990, p. 103).

The final consideration for the need of virtue involves the woundedness and the effect of sin on human beings. Humans are prone to error and deception in seeking the truth or to obsession or addiction in seeking the good. They can recognise what is true and good yet fail to pursue it. These tendencies reflect a loss of harmony, an alienation within oneself, with God, with others and the world. Humans are neither completely sick nor completely healthy. People can have conflicting objectives, have a bent toward disordered activity in the intellect, will and emotions (I.II. 82.1; 82.2 ad 5; 85.3). This disharmony, the tendency to distort the tension between matter and spirit, felt especially in the sensitive psyche has been called “concupiscence” within the Catholic tradition (Doran, 1993, p. 13). Human beings need grace to overcome this tendency and the capitulation to it that is sin. It is grace that restores and preserves an inner harmony, felt as equilibrium. What is significant for this study is that Aquinas, with Anselm, differed from Augustine by locating the essence of Original Sin in the disordered human will rather than in the disordered sensual concupiscence (Principe, 1993, p. 1031). This more positive and balanced view did not prevail, as will become apparent in the Manualists.
Central to Aquinas’ discussion of the emotions and virtue is the question of the location of the virtues. Here, the principle of consubstantiality of body and soul is most clearly at work. Against the voluntarist position of Bonaventure, Aquinas holds (with Aristotle) that some moral virtues are grounded in and modify the seat of the emotions (“sense appetite”) rather than the will (“intellective appetite”). They can do so since the emotions and their source (human affectivity or the irascible and concupiscible appetite) participate, to some degree, in reason and can therefore be a subject of virtue and a principle of human acts (I.II. 56.4; 41.1 ad 1). If they are not permitted to share in reason, that is precisely how they are frustrated. As one author says “Since individual and repeated acts of the appetites for sense objects are capable of and indeed call for rational control, these appetites should be impressed by reason and habituated to the spiritual, not simply repressed by the will” (Hughes, 1969, p. 243).

It is ordered emotion, then, that modifies a subject’s affectivity just as the vice does so as a disordered emotion. For instance, Courage and Temperance are virtues because they are ordered emotions rather than actions proceeding immediately from the will as virtues perfecting that power, e.g., justice. With the affective virtues there is “no need for virtue in the will” (I.II. 56.6 ad 3. Also I.II. 50.3 ad 3). As habitual and firm dispositions to do what is good, affective virtues achieve the values and purpose inherent in them. In so doing, they are components in the task of practical reason presenting the fitting object to the will. One author sums it up by saying

Amid the exuberance and the dejection, the foolhardiness and the fear of anyone’s emotions, moderation, stability and rectitude are possible. The rule of reason does not refuse to recognise the good within the object of the appetite, but is aware that a particular good is to be loved as such. At the time, in the place and in the way the limitations of the sense object allow, the appetites may
give themselves to their proper objects (Hughes, 1969, p. 246).

The radical nature of Aquinas’ position on the body/soul relationship is particularly evident in his understanding of the moral function of emotions and of the affective virtues. He rejects any dualistic position whereby true virtue lies in the superior dimension of the spirit. In such a view, the affective powers are “the subject of virtue only insofar as they participate in reason, being penetrated and finalized by the mind and the will” (Chenu, 1981, p. 196). Understood in this way, the emotions and the body are external and even superfluous to the Christian spiritual and moral life. For Aquinas, on the other hand, while the affective powers are integrally related to mind, will and freedom, they have their own proper perfection. For this reason Aquinas uses the governing metaphor of political rather than despotic rule. As Chenu points out “the human dignity of the passions is such that they enjoy in the active outflowing of the spirit (derivatio) their natural energy and even their freedom of direction. In this way they are subjects of virtues and possess authentic moral value, for better or for worse.” (1981, p. 197).

3.3: The Immanence of the Affective Virtues

So far, the discussion has examined how emotions, as ordered, can be morally good. Further, a person’s affectivity can be gradually modified in its habitual disposition so that the subject is transformed and seeks, recognises and responds to what is truly fitting and good with greater promptness, ease and joy. There is, however, a particular way in which the moral agent is shaped by affective virtues.

The very term “virtue” denotes “a determinate perfection of a power” (I.II. 55.1).
Aquinas asks the question “are moral virtues engaged with what we do different from those which are engaged with our emotions?” (I.II. 60.2). He distinguishes between moral virtues that are about actions and those concerned with emotions. In the former, the operation terminates outside the person (transitive). In this instance, “the good or evil in certain actions is judged from their very nature irrespective of the mood in which they are performed, namely in so far as they are commensurate with something else” (I.II. 60.2). Matters of justice come under this category. Virtues concerning the emotions involve an operation that terminates and remains in the moral agent (immanent). In this case, their activities as good or evil is weighed only by how they fit the person acting. It should be evaluated by how well or badly he is affected by them. Accordingly also in their case virtue is necessarily chiefly a matter of internal affections, called passions of the soul, as appears with temperance, courage and the like (I.II. 60.2).

The conclusion is that happiness as delight (I.II. 31.1 ad 2) and other affective virtues e.g., Fortitude and Temperance have an intrinsic reference to the good of the agent (I.II. 56.6 ad 1). It is still true that the moral subject becomes whatever he or she does whether by way of transient or immanent action. What is significant is that a person is responsible for both forms of activity. In this discussion, this involves accountability for the shape of one’s emotional life especially through the affective virtues. Specifically, to pick up Porter’s point earlier, “we are responsible for how we take things-for the meaning that things have for us” (Harak, 1993, p. 97). It is meaning that connects the cognitive and affective aspects of emotion. It underpins and shapes one’s emotional responses and the affective virtues.

3.4: Emotions as Instruments of Virtue

Emotions can intensify a person’s moral life by becoming instruments of virtue
The activity of the moral virtues requires the direction of Prudence and the right intention of the end, which, in the case of the emotions, is due to their good disposition (I.II. 56.4 ad 4). The activities of the affective virtues, by definition, require appropriate emotions. If not, such capacities are superfluous: they are not doing their job (I.II. 59.5). One can only be exercising the virtue of Temperance if one actually experiences certain physical desires and emotions in a moderate way. Courage can co-exist with and even require fear. For the brave person, virtue is in overcoming a justified fear and in confronting the danger (II.II. 123.3) (Barad, 1991, p. 411). Moral virtues residing in the will are enhanced by accompanying emotions (as a form of consequent emotion) and are more meritorious (I.II. 77.6 ad 2). Justice requires the capacity to experience anger at perceived harm and injustice in order to move to effective action. Joy can result from an act of justice and can overflow into the emotions (I.II. 59.5) Mercy operates more fully when accompanied by, or overflowing into, pity and empathy (II.II. 30.3).

These considerations highlight the mutuality in the relationship between emotions and reason. For Aquinas, they tutor each other in what can be called a “symbiotic relationship” (Barad, 1991, p. 411). It is significant that the metaphor of political rule used by Aquinas of the emotions is also used of the affective virtues (I.II. 56.4). As noted earlier, the analogy is that of civil rule over free agents within a community. The exercise of the moral virtues is not just an intellectual activity. The individual emotions, the affective virtues and reason share the common ground of human life and have a teleological unity of purpose. Virtues, such as friendship, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance must somehow foster the satisfaction of the emotions and assist in developing the implied good of these emotions (Baillie, 1988, p. 227). For Aquinas, when emotions function correctly, they are responses that draw a person to what is truly good and incline one to avoid what is truly evil, on the basis of sensual pleasure or pain rather than on that of intellectual judgment (I.II. 151).
While the emotions are not sufficient for moral decision-making on their own, they can orient and guide moral choices by directing reason to noble, good responses to value. They can also limit a person’s choices by ensuring that one takes into account the emotional and human dimension in the context of each situation in one’s moral decisions. For instance, Aquinas notes that profession of faith is a desirable good. Yet, there is nothing commendable in doing so publicly if it were to cause upset to unbelievers and be of no benefit either to the faith or the faithful (II.II. 3.2 ad 3).

3.5: Habituation, Transformation, Character and Affective Virtues

In his treatment of the necessity of habits, Aquinas elaborates the psychological conditions that make habituation possible, whether of good or bad habits. Firstly, the human agent is only capable of developing a habit “because of being only partially formed, half way between capacity or potentiality and complete actualisation” (Fearon, 1969, p. 234). Secondly, the capacity for habituation assumes that the agent has more than one available option, i.e., the habit has further to develop. Thirdly, it requires many repeated acts and experiences “to develop an acquired manner of responding than a single experience” (Fearon, 1969, p. 233).

Virtue, as a good habit, then, is transformative, a modification of the subject (I.II. 52.2). A person is changed whereby one takes on qualities one did not have before or loses those one did have. This change is intensive so that the person has an increasing participation in a quality in the same way that people can be more or less healthy or knowledgeable (I.II. 52.1). As mentioned in the discussion on pleasure, the orientation to what is good becomes “connatural” or second nature (I.II. 32.6). It is the moral subject who becomes more just, or becomes more courageous by
consistently overcoming fear. Conversely, the virtue can be diminished or lost by lack of exercise or by behaviour that falls short of the level of virtue already acquired (I.II. 53.1; 52.3).

Nelson points out that, in Aquinas, the role of the virtues is not solely to provide motivation for the agent. Their function is to give the human powers direction and, above all, the capacity to work well, to achieve their purpose. We need good habits to be human and “to act in a truly human fashion” (Nelson, 1992, p. 65).

From the discussion of the virtues as immanent and transforming, a significant point has emerged. The acquired virtues enable a person to achieve a particular good, to act promptly, easily and with satisfaction and joy. In the case of affective virtues, the sensitive appetite (human affectivity) can be an authentic location or subject of virtue. This means that the terminus of the affective virtues is not an action but the changes in the subject (power, faculty) from which emerges the appropriate level of emotional response. The locus of the virtue (affectivity) is “ordered” by its harmonious relationship with reason. “Moral virtue perfects the appetitive part of the soul by directing it to the good of reason” (I.II. 59.4). In contrast with Bonaventure and the voluntarists, this reinforces Aquinas’ understanding that the sense appetite or human affectivity is perfected in itself, in that it achieves its own internal harmony because of its right relationship with right reason. For Aquinas, intellect, will and sense appetite or human affectivity are meant to be modified and transformed by virtues as habitual perfections.27

It is worth noting that Aquinas, in I.II. 52.1, and I.II. 59, 60 and 74 uses “subject” for the moral agent (rather than for the faculty or power that is the seat of a virtue). This

27 It is interesting to compare the definition of human virtues as “firm attitudes, stable dispositions, habitual perfections of intellect and will that govern our actions, order our passions, and guide our conduct according to reason and faith.” (Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1994, No. 1804).
highlights the danger of personifying the human powers (will, intellect, appetites, virtues) so that they seem to have separate realities. Such terminology may help for the purposes of clarification and analysis. Ultimately, however, “the substantial unity of the human person is the most fundamental assumption of all in the psychological writings of Aristotle and Aquinas” (Fearon, 1969, p. 244). In this present discussion, one must keep in mind that behind action, habit, emotions and affective virtues lies the human person, who can grow or fail to do so. Developing the affective virtues, then, is growth in character. One becomes a certain type of person with a configuration to one’s emotional life that is increasingly integrated and hence admirable and praiseworthy.

3.6: Affective Virtues and The Mean

Aquinas, with Aristotle, sees virtue as consisting in a mean established by Prudence. Right reason measures and guides actions, emotions and virtues so that a person “avoids the extremes of excess and defect in moral matters” (Cessario, 1991, p. 130). Emotions and their virtues are right (ordered) or wrong (disordered) in terms of a measure or a mean. With regard to the moral virtues, there is a distinction between the “real” mean and the “reasoned” or “rational” mean. The moral virtues involving operation (transitive) e.g., Justice, observe an objective or “real” mean based on an object or benchmark that determines the measure of the just act, i.e., right relations between people. Affective virtues (immanent), i.e., Temperance, Fortitude, observe a “rational” or “reasoned” mean that cannot be quantified in the same way, since it is determined by the agent (Porter, 1990, p. 116). Subjective factors such as stage of development, particular gifts, strengths, capacity, context and circumstances all contribute to the prudential judgment of the right balance of emotion and, where appropriate, of action by this person, in this situation (I.II. 64.2). For instance, temperance in emotional responses, intimacy and sexuality will differ according as
one is married or a religious. Or, the level of appropriate anger when a child is
treated unfairly will vary between the child’s parent and a stranger who observes the
incident. The mean for courage in the face of a barking dog will be influenced by
whether or not the person was attacked as a child by a dog.

Aquinas understands a mean as a property of virtue where Aristotle saw it as its very
essence. “As a property, a mean is not a factor in the nature of virtue itself, but
rather is a relation of that nature to its existential situation” (Hughes, 1969, p. 249).
The transformation in Aquinas is to view the mean as contextual in character. This
has a significant implication for the affective virtues of Fortitude and Temperance.
The descriptions of the kinds of actions that are examples of these virtues (and their
opposing vices) “will have an open-ended quality that will give them sufficient
flexibility to be applied to persons in different conditions” (Porter, 1990, p. 116).
Certainly, a description of the central characteristics that constitute temperate or
courageous behaviour is essential. Nevertheless, before one can judge that a
particular emotional response or act emerging from an affective virtue is moderate or
ordered, one “must know enough of the individual’s proclivities and the
circumstances of his action to be able to say that this action is truly in accordance
with his overall individual good” (Porter, 1990, p. 117).

There is a further implication for affective virtue and the mean. One could ask
“Do phrases such as ‘ordered emotions’ or ‘ordered habits’ (virtues) connote, for
Aquinas, ‘dominated by the reason or the will’? ” Is affective virtue a matter of self-
control? In approaching the issue, Porter (1990, p. 112) points out that Aquinas,
following Aristotle, distinguishes between the true virtues of Temperance and
Fortitude, on the one hand, and self-control (continentia - “continence”) or skill in
facing dangerous situations (II.II. 155.1; 123.1 ad 2). These latter may have
elements or semblances of virtue but cannot be described as virtuous in the
unqualified or full sense of the term. This again raises the unity of the human subject. The various capacities of intellect, will, senses and emotions can be distinguished as different ways the human subject lives in, and interacts with, reality. One can be mistaken, or torn by conflicting urges or between conflicting desires and duties. One may, at times, require self-control through dominating an emotion by sheer will power. But ultimately, for Aquinas, the person of true virtue, i.e., in the unqualified sense, is the one who has a harmony, a unanimity, an integration of the emotions, judgments and will (II.II. 155.4). A person will want to do what he or she knows one ought to do and will act easily and readily in the process (Porter, 1990, p. 114). This is a far cry from the Stoic, Kantian and voluntarist models of the moral life, especially in relation to emotions and affective virtue.

This brings this study to the importance of the virtue of Prudence. To follow right reason is to act virtuously, to have reason governed by right desire. We cannot act rightly without Prudence since to determine right or wrong actions, one has to discern whether they are reasonable and virtuous. This is an ability that needs to be learned, especially through habits that incline one to what is truly fitting and good with facility and ease. Such a person desires, loves, fears, enjoys only the right things, in the right time and place and to the right degree. Prudence depends on the moral virtues, and especially, virtuous affectivity in performing its function.

It is also here that one should recall that ethical reasoning is different from its speculative counterpart. It incorporates pre-discursive knowledge, intuition, pre-volitional responses and emotions, and, as Aquinas would say, a “connaturality” or attunement for the good and the order of values. Moral reasoning demands “that practical conversion called wisdom—an evaluative sensitivity to relative importances, their interrelation, their densities, their urgencies, and an assessment of their probable consequences” (Vacek, 1985, p. 297). It is worth noting the comment of one author
about the central role in Aquinas’ moral vision of the Holy Spirit and of the wisdom (rather than Prudence) which the Spirit imparts (Mahoney, 1987, p. 78).

Aquinas agrees with Augustine’s view that virtue is the art of right conduct (I.II. 58.2 ad 1). There is an artistry in living a good life. Like the gifted pianist, years of practice make it appear effortless. Yet Christian virtue is not just about techniques for living but about the person and the capacity for being changed. “It amounts to possessing a talent or genius for doing the good human action in the same way that a true artist possesses a creative spirit that defies description according to the conventional norms” (Cessario, 1991, p. 53). A beauty is revealed in one who does what is good with style and grace, with a balance of mind and heart, intellect and emotion (II.II.145.2; 145.4).

3.7: Acquired and Infused Virtues and Human Affectivity

Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology and the exitus-reditus framework of the Summa Theologiae imply that human beings have at their disposal the means (natural and supernatural) by which it is possible to return to God. Amongst these are the virtues which enable the person through intellect, will and emotions to be disposed regularly and easily to what is true and good. There is, however, a difference between aretaic descriptions of virtue (the good life lived especially through the cardinal virtues) and a theology of knowing and loving God through responding to grace. For human beings as created and especially through their unique powers and actions, to intend God as their ultimate goal, i.e., as a supernatural destiny, the divine gift of grace must be given or “infused.” This is a participation in the inner life of God. “Just as grace perfects nature, so the infusion of the theological virtues of faith, hope and charity perfects and gives a supernatural finality to the actions which were performed under the acquired virtues of prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude” (Walter,
The person, then, has acquired (natural) and infused (supernatural) virtues that differ, not as habits, but in their finality or “the kind of goodness to which they regularly dispose us, in the kind of merit that is gained, and in the degree of perfection that is reached by the powers of the soul” (Walter, 1987, p. 1083). There is a reconstructing of the self that is both humanising and sanctifying. Made in God’s image, the person now grows in and into God’s likeness in Christ. Aquinas’ position, while grounded in the radical change in the state of being at the metaphysical level, also embraced human nature as a principle of action. This “new creation” is not just a static reality but a dynamic one—the human person growing and moving through new powers of action towards personal union with God.

This raising of rational beings above their natural order, while a gift and needing some form of conscious consent, engages the total person, especially in head and heart, “at more intensity than on the natural level, and with a heightened and wider scope” (Hughes, 1969, p. 247). This process is not an addition for Aquinas but a transformation, since grace permeates nature.

Can a person experience the infused virtues, i.e. Theological (Faith) or Cardinal (e.g., Temperance, Fortitude) at the affective level? The natural (acquired) affective virtues of temperance, courage, pity are more tangible and verifiable in terms of emotions, physical and normal well being. The supernatural virtues (Theological or Cardinal) may have less psychological, emotional and physical effects but may carry more conviction. For all that, the phenomenon of emotional resonance and overflow does have a role here though it is not developed in Aquinas. One cannot have absolute certainty from experience or deduction that one is in the state of grace. One can only have a moral certainty which, as Aquinas points out, is “conjectural.” One
can reasonably infer the presence of grace and a share in divine life through certain “signs”: when one is conscious of delighting in God, is aware of inner peace and harmony through not being conscious of grave sin and is conscious of a certain sweetness (I.II. 112.5). One experiences a certain harmony and equilibrium of one’s being.

This understanding concurs with Aquinas’ vision of the goal of the moral life. It is an increasing harmony, integration and equilibrium within the person in which the various human powers collaborate for a common goal, namely, human flourishing and deepening response in love to God. His account of the emotions and the affective virtues is consistent with this. Nevertheless, the predominantly metaphysical vision underlying his view of grace and his Philosophical Psychology may account for his hesitations in elaborating the psychological reverberations of the infused, especially the Theological, virtues.

If Prudence gives direction to the moral life and friendship with God through grace and the indwelling Spirit provides the context, it is Charity that gives it energy and life. For Aquinas, it is love that gives the virtues their shape and meaning especially when transformed by the infused virtue of Charity. The virtues, especially the affective virtues, are principally strategies for loving.

The other-directed and transcendent quality of certain emotions with regard to values e.g., courage, compassion, mercy, anger for justice, highlights the paradigmatic role of love in the moral life for Aquinas. For him, Charity and love, infused and acquired virtues, form the bond, the unifying principle and form of the virtues. As Vacek points out

Above all, as a prerequisite for doing ethics, love is required. If love can be
described as an emotional, participative union with the dynamisms of beings and Being moving in the direction of their value-enhancement, then love is necessary not only for living ethically—as almost all religious persons agree—but also for doing ethics (Vacek, 1985, p. 297).

4. Overview and Evaluation

This study has examined the first research question “How does Aquinas portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character?” This part of the discussion has confirmed the findings in Chapter three concerning the emotions as such. The emotions, and their affective virtues, are inherent in, not external to, the search for human fulfilment and happiness. They are part of the human person’s need and ability to adapt constantly, at the intellectual and affective level, to his or her milieu, doing so with deepening self-possession, greater trust and a more inclusive love in the image of Christ. The affective virtues are measurable according to human and graced excellence and integration. They are also contextual in character, shaped by the individual’s temperament, development and circumstances. Human rationality is richer if one seeks, does and achieves what is good through right actions and ordered emotions and affectivity. Such emotions, whether positive (e.g., love, desire, hope, courage, pleasure, joy) or negative (e.g., hatred, aversion, sadness, fear, anger) and their associated virtues make a necessary contribution to moral growth and integration. Overall, Aquinas gives a coherent and internally consistent account of the moral significance of the emotions and the affective virtues.

Secondly, the text of Aquinas has surfaced further evidence of his efforts to go beyond his framework, language and metaphysical categories. The findings of the previous chapter are confirmed even further by Aquinas’ display of sensitivity and acumen in his phenomenological analyses of love, anger and sadness.
Thirdly, the collaborative implications of the political model seem to best capture the place of emotions and their virtues within Aquinas’ view of the person and his Theological Anthropology. In Freudian terms, the relation of reason to the emotions is not that of repression wherein the will prevents the non-rational participating in the rational through conscious awareness. Human affectivity and emotions share in reason “not by being subject to frustrating commands, but by finding contentment in the proper scope of their own function of loving limited objects for what they are worth” (Hughes, 1969, p. 246). The affective virtues are necessary for the will itself to function well. Experience points out that “anyone who attempts to live according to sheer will-power in defiance of his other appetites, is a candidate for a neurosis or an ulcer” (Hughes, 1969, p. 246).

The study has uncovered a further important insight in Aquinas. Affective virtues, as immanent in character, are not primarily dispositions to virtuous action but to virtuous emotional responses (which may or may not lead to action). This constitutes their proper function or perfection. The habits of well-ordered emotional responses, especially in presenting the appropriate object to the will, are essential in order that Prudence perform its task. Not only are emotions needed for our most elementary moral responses. They are needed for the on-going process of moral reasoning.

This study has addressed the second research question “What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in Aquinas?” His anthropology of the person is grounded in a Christian reading of Aristotle. He attempts to provide a solid psychological foundation for a realist Moral Theology in which “virtue can radically transform human behaviour of every sort” (Cessario, 1991, p.65). The specific context for Aquinas’ treatment is that of a need theory of value, that “the experience of obligation is implicit in the practical knowledge that an act is desirable or that an
act is necessary to realise a good appropriate to man in virtue of certain appetites rooted in human nature” (Fay, 1961, p. 42). Its general metaphysical context is one “which considers the tendencies of the moral agent as ordered to the conservation and expansion of its own being” (Fay, 1961, p. 42). The Natural Law ethics of Aquinas emerges from a Theological Anthropology built on the goodness of creation and emphasises the moral significance of human affectivity.

In Aquinas, the ontological unity of the person means that human affectivity possesses an autonomy which entails a participative relationship with mind and will. The phenomenon of bodily resonance, for instance, is a central indicator that the human sensibilities are virtuous not by simple docile subordination or by simple habituation “but by an intimate penetration. It is thanks to this penetration-or better interpenetration-that the spirit finds home in our sensibilities or passions” (Chenu, 1981, p. 197).

On the disputed question of the degree to which rational control can effectively shape emotional behaviour, most Christian thinkers agree that rational powers do have some form of control over emotions but disagree on the exact dynamics of the process (Cessario, 1991, p. 63). The political or collaborative model proposed by Aquinas combined with his occasional use of a form of phenomenological method give him the means to temper and transcend the limits of his world-view and his language. It also enables him to avoid the extremes of repression based on religious sanctions and the over-optimism of later romantic humanism in the tradition of Rousseau. Aquinas endeavours to capture a moral realism that “rejects all forms of anthropological dualism” (Cessario, 1991, p. 63). This stance also ensures a balance between accepting the fundamental goodness of human nature and the reality of moral evil (personal and social) with the consequent need for reconciling grace.
The building blocks for Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology are found in his Philosophical Psychology, which he adapts from Aristotle. Understandably, his language and style seem strange to the twentieth century reader. As with any philosophical framework, that used by Aquinas has limits and inadequacies, particularly by modern standards. Although his psychology is more a Philosophical Anthropology which contrasts with the more experiential approach of modern Psychology, there are nevertheless perennial truths and insights combined with an acute understanding of the human psyche and spirit.

One must recall that Aquinas was strongly influenced by the scientific method of his teacher Albertus Magnus. Observation, experiment and the inductive method are integral to his methodology. This, together with his emphasis on the bodily component of human life, even of psychic activity, e.g., imagination, emotions, memory, places him closer, from one perspective, to modern empirical schools of Psychology. Yet, Aquinas was intensely aware of the total human being as a blend of body, psyche and spirit. He was conscious of the inherent limitations of the method of observation and description and of the validity of realities that transcend empirical observation (White, 1952, p. 103f). This is something he shares with analytical and psychodynamic schools of Psychology.

One must be cautious in judging Aquinas solely from a modern perspective. Within the confines of his view of the human person, his Theological Anthropology is basically coherent and consistent. For instance, in his treatment of the emotions, this discussion has shown no evidence of a voluntarist position lurking beneath the surface-a “theory in use” that is at odds with the “manifest” theory. The emotions and affective virtues are consistently linked with happiness and full human functioning in terms of “right reason” or “ordered emotions.” The psychological and moral function of emotions and affectivity converge in the overall well-being and
harmony of the integrated and virtuous person. The normative and the descriptive meet in the true virtue and character. In Aquinas’ vision, there is an inherent connection between being and action that gives his moral theory its ontological and epistemological foundation.

Recent studies of Aquinas have highlighted the profoundly existential quality of his metaphysics. In his thought, argues Clarke (1986), existential presence and action entails self-possession (awareness and self-direction), self-communication (in relationships) and self-transcendence (in love for God and for others). Such a modern interpretation of Aquinas’ thought captures the centrality of conscious knowing, willing, self-direction, love and response in human life. Emotions are integral to a self who is transformed and finds fulfilment by giving, communicating, loving and self-transcending. One sees Aquinas portraying emotions as expressions of these qualities—anger at another’s injustice, courage in saving another in the face of fear, compassion, mercy and love leading to unselfish action. More significantly, emotions are, for Aquinas, the expressions of human need, desire, incompleteness. They manifest the interactive nature of human life, with other humans, with God, the world and with values. These provide the objects by and about which humans are moved and respond. Emotional experience, as human existence, is essentially embodied, social and interdependent.

For all that, the philosophical underpinnings of Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology still have inadequacies. One cannot avoid comment on what has come to be known as his “faculty psychology.” According to Philibert (1987, p. 111), this term has become identified with the caricature of it that resulted from the ridicule it suffered from the nineteenth century philosopher Johannes Herbert. In attempting to understand the human person, Aquinas distinguished the various “faculties” or powers of the human person. He also attempted to determine the organic location of
various human capacities, i.e., memory, imagination, interior senses, sense appetite. From a modern perspective, this appears at times reductive, even misguided.

A further criticism is that the various faculties tended to take on a life of their own, fragmenting the total unity of the personality (Hughes, 1969, p. xxi; Cessario, 1991, p. 58). This was particularly the case with the virtues, since Aquinas places the seat of the virtues in various faculties, i.e., intellect, will or sense appetite. They then seem to become “a plurality of partial moral subjects within the human personality” (Philibert, 1987, p. 111).

Aquinas, in reality, was attempting to capture the body/spirit unity of the human person, its subtlety and variety while solving the problem of how body and spirit relate to each other. Mention has been made of Aquinas’ on-going interest on the place of bodily resonance in human emotional life (Chapter three, footnote 18). One is also aware that though the intellect, will, memory or imagination may not have a specific location inside the body, brain injury can certainly impair their function. It can also affect some emotional responses. Aquinas’ teaching about various faculties and, in particular, on the varying seats or subjects of virtue was intended as “a heuristic description of the rich versatility of the human psyche” (Philibert, 1987, p. 111). He was attempting to clarify, analyse and understand the riches of the human person. Distinctions to achieve this are secondary and derived. However we name the range of human activities and powers, what matters is that it is the person who knows, wills, remembers, imagines, feels and that these functions, though interdependent, are somehow different from each other.

In the last analysis, argues Keenan (1995, p. 723), Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology is built on the question “what is it?” The answer emerges from an investigation of what the human person has and does, as a being of a certain nature
with given powers that are perfected by the virtues. The human being is an object, something to be known. The modern turn to the subject assumes that humans know. The question then becomes “who are we?” In this case, humans see themselves as agents or subjects who are relational. From this perspective, the virtues “do not perfect what we have or what we do; rather they perfect who we are in the mode of our being, which is as being in relationships. Virtues do not perfect powers or ‘things’ inside of us, but rather ways that we are” (Keenan, 1995, p. 723).

Again, there is, in Aquinas, explicit recognition of the social nature of human beings. The satisfaction of human needs and the process of development requires family and society together with associated responsibilities. Porter, however, points out (1990, p. 176) “it might be said that he still assumes that the human person is finally a self-contained individual, capable of knowledge and free choice apart from the conditioning influences of society.” One can ask whether Porter’s reservation concerning Aquinas’ treatment of the social nature of the person is true of his approach to the social and relational context of the emotions. Perhaps it true that the awareness of emotions as developmental influences within the person and within relationships is more implied than elaborated in Aquinas. More specifically, a person’s emotions and affectivity, together with the beliefs that underpin them, are influenced by previous experiences, by social structures, and by “culturally conditioned patterns of evaluation and response” (Spohn, 1991, p. 71). This is a dimension that is not evident in Aquinas. While not succumbing to determinism, human freedom must understand these influences in order to rise above them. It will only be in the twentieth century with the work of Erikson, Kohlberg, Gilligan, Fowler and others that the formative influences of family, society and faith community will be identified and examined.

Again, there is an inadequacy in Aquinas in the domain of the subjective. Since the
time of Aquinas in the thirteenth century, there is a deeper insight and more acute
description of human self-awareness, the emotions and inner movements of the
psyche and the spirit. It is only through phenomenology and the personal
philosophies and psychologies of this century one is able to explore the rich and
subtle texture of subjective experience. Aquinas cannot be condemned for being a
creature of his time. Despite his occasional detailed probing of the experience of
some emotions, his dominant metaphysical and philosophical methodology makes it
difficult for Aquinas to locate and clarify the human experience of grace. In this
study, it has been shown how Aquinas does pursue the bodily reverberations of
human emotions. He also has a positive attitude to the role and significance of
emotions and human affectivity. Nevertheless, unlike Ignatius, there seems to be a
hesitation, perhaps an inability, in Aquinas to describe and account for the
psychological and affective reverberations of the influence of grace and the infused
virtues.

More pertinent to this study, however, is the issue of the roots of emotional responses
and behaviour. Again, Aquinas cannot be convicted for failing to be aware of the
existence of the unconscious and its relationship to, and influence on, the conscious
life-something that comes with Freud and Jung. An important aspect of this is the
impact of negative states and their associated emotions that are hidden in the
unconscious but which influence psychological and moral functioning. Awareness
of these states comes by means of devices employed by the psyche to gain a person’s
attention (cf. by establishing a position in the conscious through, for instance,
depression; by emerging in disguised form in a physical condition [conversion
reaction] or in a psychological form [reaction formation]; by displacement or
projection etc.). These states, with their potential to be constructive or destructive in
a person’s life, are significant factors that colour one’s view of emotions being
“moderated by reason”, or being “ordered emotions.”
Porter and Harak, as mentioned earlier, saw Aquinas’s view of the emotions as centred on the “meaning” one gives to things. Hence, change the meaning, or belief or interpretation, then there is a change of attitude and, consequently, of emotional response. This is generally true. But it can raise difficulties when it comes to intense emotions that surge up from negative states in the unconscious. One must first attempt to identify the emotion, acknowledge it, and try to discern what prompted it. Its roots may well be in the memory or in a forgotten hurt or trauma that needs attention. This may even require professional help. Only when the meaning of the emotion and its roots are clearer can one begin to shift to a new meaning, or belief and hence to more accurate self-appropriation. One cannot see things differently merely by judgement, will power, or choice. A number of preliminary steps may be required. The re-education of the emotions and the formation of habits may be impaired by a failure to engage in these processes. The moral responsibility of emotional self-care may be more complex than it is portrayed, or is interpreted to exist, in Aquinas.

How does Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions measure up against contemporary feminist thought? Porter points out that Aquinas’ attitudes to women are ambiguous, “negative in many respects, at least by our standards, but also positive in some important ways” (1994, p. 323). Aquinas insists that every person, man or woman, possesses the image of God in the primary and essential sense, i.e., has the capacity to know and love God (1.93.4 ad 1) (Porter, 1994, p. 325). Aquinas’ understanding of the emotions confirms this. For him, they are essential components of human nature, i.e., for men and women. Nowhere does Aquinas associate emotions or a specific emotion with those instances where he regards women as less rational (to a certain degree) than men (1.92.1 ad 2). Further, when he describes the dynamic of emotions, his mode of language either centres on the emotion rather than on the person or on
emotions emanating from the “agent” or the “soul” (life-principle). When he does appeal to human experience or attempts to generalise, where English translations use “man”, Aquinas consistently uses more inclusive Latin words such as aliquis (someone), homo (human being), humanus (human), and never a gender-specific word such as vir (man). Overall, one can agree with Porter when she says that “no amount of sympathetic interpretation will turn him (Aquinas) into a feminist” (1994, p. 315). Nevertheless, from a modern vantage point, the content and language in his treatment the emotions tend to support those instances where he affirms the equality of women and a form of implied inclusiveness.

In Aquinas, the Gospel narrative, symbols and parables are not part of his understanding or treatment of the virtues. He grounds his discussion on a common human nature where natural virtues are elevated and transformed by grace. However, in evaluating Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions and the affective life, one could well keep in mind the point made by Alisdair MacIntyre in Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Aquinas’ synthesis is original, cohesive and comprehensive because it emerged from someone who inhabited both the Augustinian and the Aristotelian traditions. Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions and the affective virtues exemplifies this. The presence of Aristotle is obvious but so is the influence of Augustine and the place of love, desire and affectivity in Aquinas’ view of the person.

It has been observed recently that, in Aquinas’ later years, there is a greater emphasis on the role of affectivity and that his whole anthropology appears in the sequence: intelligence, affectivity, heart (Torrell, 1996, p. 31 and xii). The same author, citing Ramirez, sees an increasing influence of Augustine on Aquinas and on his thought as they matured. In the Secunda Pars, First Truth as the proper object of faith is also the end of all human desires and actions. Again, knowing is not just discursive and
analytical but also by way of affective connaturalilty. To see Aquinas simply as the speculative, analytical, metaphysical thinker in the Aristotelian mode, does not do justice to the man, to his thought and to the two dominant schools of his time (Torrell, 1996, p. 39). Aquinas’ religious psychology has some key features, namely, it is centred on Christ, on love of wisdom that flowers in theology, on love as the soul of morality and the perfection of Gospel spirituality, on love of peace as the fruit of Charity. These are the “fundamental traits that are distinctively his, and they are bound up with deep personal experience” (Leclercq, 1968, p. 332f). It is true to say of Aquinas that his own life and writing mirror his age “when the door between Theology and the experimental knowledge of God was not yet closed” (Leclercq, 1968, p. 336).

The modern sensibility, with its sense of the self and the role of subjective consciousness as the ground for truth, insight and certitude, finds more resonances with the voice in Augustine’s Confessions than that found in the Summa Theologiae. Conversely, twentieth century existential angst, the plurality of moral languages and the postmodern unintelligibility of reality would be beyond the experience (even the comprehension ?) of Aquinas and his contemporaries. Presumed certainties (for instance, in Theology, Cosmology), a confident epistemology, academic convention and personal style converge in Aquinas’ method of detached, scientific and objective analysis, couched in the third person and set in a formal style which is, in reality, a conversation.

Generally, in Aquinas’ writings, there is a reticence about himself. One rarely sees the man behind the veil of scholarly detachment. Nevertheless, particularly in Aquinas’ discussion of morals, emotions and the virtues, one can occasionally detect the influence of personal experience, even faint echoes of his own voice. It may be that the nature of the material demands a constant correlation with, and testing
against, life. It could also reflect the development in his own life, in his perception of reality and in his thought. Something of Aquinas the human being is betrayed in his psychological insight, his understanding of the subtle shifts of the human heart and the psyche examined in this study, e.g., his discussion of the emotional repercussions of love, fear, anger, pity; his considerations on the effects of pleasure and good actions on people; his practical method for dealing with sadness and depression. Again, his discussion of friendship (II.II. 23.1) has a “delicate sensibility” that it is “difficult to think that the man who spoke in this way had nothing but a literary knowledge of affection” (Torrell, p. 1996, p. 283).

Aquinas’ view of the emotions emphasises their organic character-a position that is consistent with his faculty psychology. It has been argued in Chapter two that the bodily dimension in emotions is a necessary but, for all that, not a sufficient part of their description. Aquinas’s view of them as interactive responses underlines the relational quality of the human existence, the need for habits in affectivity and the embodied nature of the human person. As the Whiteheads point out, emotions are neither passive nor private but are social in both their origin and goal (1994, p. 8ff). They capture the historical, incarnational and interactive dimensions of human and Christian life.

Perhaps the best summing up is that of O’Meara when he notes that, strictly speaking, Aquinas’ Moral Theology is not an ethics of virtue. The emotions and the affective virtues are one “set of forces” amid various instructive resources and instruments that are part of human life and of participating in the divine life. “Aquinas’s theology does not begin with human virtues nor does it end with them. It proceeds from two vital sources, the total human personality and divine grace, and it ends in the instinctual Gifts of the Spirit” (O’Meara, 1997, p. 279). Its horizon is beatitude, its guide is Prudence and its impulse is Charity. Exploring the role and
moral significance of the emotions and the affective virtues, returns one to the sapiential tradition in Aquinas, something that can help bridge the polarisation between virtue ethics and Natural Law theory (Kennedy, 1995, p. 176).

This study has engaged in its first task, namely, an examination of the moral significance of emotions in Aquinas and the underlying view of the human person. The next step is to investigate selected authors from the Manualist tradition using the three research questions and to measure them against the historical benchmark of Aquinas. This is the purpose of the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5

Emotions and the Moral Life in the Manualist Tradition c. 1960

The aim of this chapter is to examine selected Manualists in the light of the three research questions outlined in the methodology in Chapter one. The validity of using a representative selection (4 authors) to provide a reliable sample has also been explained in the same discussion of the methodology.\textsuperscript{28}

1. The Moral Significance of the Emotions

The chapter has three sections, built on the three research questions. It commences by investigating the first research question: “How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in relation to human acts, virtue and character?”

1.1: Emotions and the Human Act

1.1.1: Context

\textsuperscript{28} A note on the availability of primary texts. The most recent editions available of Noldin-Schmitt and Aertnys-Damen were both published in 1956. Davis has a fourth edition published in 1943 but it was not available to this researcher. Its treatment of the emotions and the material discussed in this chapter is identical with the 1935 edition. Prümmer’s \textit{Handboek of Moral Theology} (1963) contains a concise summary of the treatment of emotions found in the edition of 1935.

In the bibliography of Davis (1935) are some of the commonly cited Moral Manualists, namely, Aertnys-Damen, Alphonsus Ligouri, Genicot-Salsmans, Koch-Preuss, Lehmkuhl, Merkelbach, Noldin-Schmitt, Prümmer, Slater, Vermeesch. The widespread acceptance and use of these Manualists is perhaps indicated by the numerous editions of their works, for instance, Davis (1943), 4th. edn.; Prümmer (1935), 8th. edn.; Prümmer (1956), 5th. edn.; Noldin-Schmitt (1956), 21st. edn.; Aertnys-Damen (1956), 17th. edn. These authors, with Merkelbach, and later, Zalba, seem to have been among the commonly used texts for teaching Moral Theology in English speaking seminaries in the late 1950s. A turning point was the English version of Häring’s \textit{The Law of Christ} Vol. 1 (1961).
The moral manuals, especially the neo-Thomist ones,\textsuperscript{29} are a theological genre-convenient ways of classifying particular forms of written or oral expression. Manuals of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries were eclectic. Those after 1879 and \textit{Aeterni Patris} are described as summaries of St. Thomas (Gallagher, 1990, p. 37). Their structure was virtually identical-General Moral Theology, Special Moral (Sins, Virtues or Decalogue), Canon Law of the Sacraments. They were “culturally invariant texts” considered suitable for all seminaries (Gallagher, 1990, p. 40).

The immediate context for the treatment of the emotions is that of human acts in General Moral Theology. The Manualists discuss the first intrinsic principle of the human act which is knowledge or deliberation and its defects, namely, ignorance and inadvertence. They then proceed to the second principle (the \textit{voluntarium}) drawing on Aquinas’ work in I.II. 6. a.1-8 on the Voluntary and the Involuntary.

It is significant that the Manualists, unlike Aquinas, discuss the emotions under the heading of “obstacles to the human act” (Davis, 1935, p. 16) or of “impediments to the human act” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1940, p. 56). Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 41) uses more neutral language (\textit{de Involuntario}) when he sees emotions as one factor that can make the human act an \textit{involuntarium} because of absence of deliberation or consent. In the heading used by Prümmer (1935, p. 49), the language is the strongest when he refers to “enemies of the human act” (\textit{hostibus voluntarii}). The same author then expresses the disclaimer that passion and habit are not always the enemies of the human act.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{29} Neo-Thomism was a movement of Catholic Theologians, especially influenced by Joseph Kleutgen, that endeavoured to establish the teaching of Aquinas as the authoritative foundation for Catholic thought. From \textit{Aeternis Patris} (1879) until Vatican II, Neo-Thomism was the driving force of Papal theology. At the same time, it offered “a coherent, unified, systematic theology and philosophy as an alternative to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and other modern philosophers” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 49).

\textsuperscript{30} “Passio et habitus non semper sunt hostes voluntarii” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 49).
The distinction is made between actual impediments (ignorance, concupiscence [passion], fear, violence [force]), and habitual impediments (evil habits of mind and will, pathological states) (Davis, 1935, p. 16; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 51; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 42). This study will confine itself to examining concupiscence (passion), fear, conditions of mind, will and pathological states in so far as these are actual or habitual obstacles to the human act.

1.1.2: Definition and Types of Emotions

Only Prümmer (1935, p. 55) directly cites Aquinas (I.II. 22.1) in his definition of an emotion as a “movement in the sensitive appetite caused by the imaginative awareness of the presence of good or evil and productive of some change in the body” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 17). He notes the distinction between the Stoic view of emotions as any movement of the sensitive appetite not under rational control and the Aquinas’ view of an emotion developed in Chapter three of this study. Here, an emotion is a response of the sensitive appetite which has a both a psychological and a moral dimension. Further, an emotion can be ordered or disordered, moderate or immoderate.

All four authors use “concupiscence” as a synonym for “emotion” (de passione seu concupiscentia) (Prümmer, 1935, p. 55; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 45). Prümmer and Noldin-Schmitt distinguish the three senses of the word concupiscentia:

a) The particular emotion that is desire (desiderium). Aquinas uses concupiscentia to describe this particular emotion (I.II. 31.3 ad 2).  

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31 “S. Thomas hanc passionem non nominat desiderium, sed concupiscentiam” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 57).
b) Inclination\(^{32}\) of the appetite to moral evil or sin through the influence of Original Sin, as witnessed in Scripture (Gal. 5:17) and human experience after Baptism (Davis, 1935, p. 20). This is the sense often used by modern authors.\(^{33}\)

c) Emotions involve the activity of the whole affective dimension of a person’s life (\textit{total vitam affectivam}) (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 55; also Prümmer, 1935, p. 55; Davis, 1935, p. 20). An emotion is the movement of the sensitive appetite towards good and away from evil (as described above). This is the sense used in the Manualists’ treatment of the emotions or “passions” as impediments to the human act.

Davis notes that the word “passion” indicates “excitement in an intense degree, whereas the human act may be only partially disturbed by concupiscence in the sense in which it is used here” (Davis, 1935, p. 21). This is a variation of the distinction of “passion” from “emotion” explained earlier, the former being an intense form of the latter.

While three authors note the distinction between concupiscible and irascible appetites together with the eleven principal emotions enumerated by Aquinas, Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45) seems to assume this without explicitly mentioning it. Davis (1935, p. 21) and Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 55) list the emotions briefly whereas Prümmer (1935, p. 56-59) outlines the salient characteristics of each in a paragraph drawing on Aquinas’ treatment in I.II. qq. 22-48. By implication, Prümmer’s summary expands his earlier comment that emotions (and habits) are not

\(^{32}\) \textit{Inclinatio} is discussed by Aquinas in I.II. 49.2. Fecora defines it as “the innate ordination of a power, or the training given it by repeated actions of the same kind, or by the endowment of grace. Applies to habit, vice, virtue” (1969, p. 249).

\(^{33}\) “... moderni autem auctores sub nomine concupiscentiae intelligere solent \textit{totum} appetitum per peccatum originale corruptum, ut iam dictum est” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 57).
always “enemies of the human act.”

Davis develops an apologia for emotions understood as “concupiscence.” “It must at once be obvious that concupiscence has no connotation of evil. The appetite stretches out instinctively towards its own object, and exercises its own natural activities” (Davis, 1935, p. 21). This is pre-moral in character. Experience indicates that humans can reach out for the wrong things, that emotions can “distract right reason or incline the will to be improperly ordered” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 81). “The first movements of our appetites are like undisciplined children; they do not wait upon reason, but anticipate it. They have to be taught to obey” (Davis, 1935, p. 21).

The appetites are gifts from God, meant for self-preservation and thus essential for humans if they are to change and develop. God, in his wisdom, has associated natural faculties and activities with a sense of pleasure, part motivation, part indicator of an orderly and harmonious functioning. The desire for truth, for the good, for happiness exist “so that we may truly live and exercise all our faculties with pleasure, but according to right reason, which should dominate every activity, an orderly and harmonious microcosm. Concupiscence, in this sense, as is evident, is in itself neither good nor bad; it is simply a natural tendency” (Davis, 1935, p. 21; also Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 137). In this view, natural inclinations, tendencies, affections are integral to the understanding of Natural Law and as concurrent causes in the morally good action by participating in right reason. This has been developed more recently by Grisez and Finnis (Gallagher, 1990, p. 81). It contrasts with the understanding of Natural Law as right reason that participates in Divine Law without cognisance of pre-moral dispositions embedded in human nature (Prümmer, 1935, p. 105; 1963, p. 29).

Davis proceeds to use a ruling metaphor for the role of the emotions and their
relation to right reason. They are analogous to the “mechanical forces in some
delicate piece of machinery, with their mutual interdependence at play, all of them
directed to one grand effect by some ruling power extrinsic to them. We may look
upon reason as the ruling power extrinsic to concupiscence” (Davis, 1935, p. 21f).
The emotions (“movements of concupiscence”) “sometimes distort the clear view of
reason, and baulk the activities of the rational will” (Davis, 1935, p. 22).
Concupiscence has a bearing on human acts as moral realities by diminishing or
augmenting responsibility (Davis, 1935, p. 22). This is the next topic of this study.

1.1.3: Antecedent and Consequent Emotions

The main concern of the Manualists in their treatment of emotions is the influence on
the human act or the voluntarium.34 The three authors discussed here present, in a
compressed form, the key ideas developed in I.II. 24.3, already discussed in Chapter
three of this study. The most summary discussions are those in Noldin-Schmitt
60f) follows that of Aquinas the most explicitly. Davis (1935, p. 22ff) is similar in
substance but offers more examples and a more pastoral thrust. Rather than repeat
the full discussion of Chapter three on this aspect of the emotions, the salient points
in these selected authors will be highlighted.

The distinction between antecedent and consequent emotion is assumed by the four
authors (Prümmer, 1935, p. 60; Davis, 1935, p. 22; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 55;
Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 45). Davis notes that, in one sense, every passion or
emotion is “antecedent to an action done under its influence” (Davis, 1935, p. 22).
The distinction is to assist in determining the morality and imputability of actions in

34 Cf., Definition of terms, Chapter one.
so far as they are willed. Antecedent emotion precedes the consent of the will and arises from causes independent of the will, for example, a sudden surge of anger leading to an act of violence. Consequent emotion follows the consent of the will. This can occur by way of:

i) deliberate consent of the person to a spontaneous emotion or “failure to check it when” one “could or should do so” (Davis, 1935, p. 24; Prümmer, 1935, p. 60; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 55).

ii) deliberate choice of a person to arouse or foster certain emotions.

iii) overflow (redundantia) from the will to the emotions.

How do emotions, then, influence the morality of the human act? Prümmer (1935, p. 60), Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 56) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45f) sum up what is common to the Manualists.

i) Antecedent emotion (concupiscentia, passio) diminishes freedom and, at times, removes freedom completely. This is true of any impediment, here an emotion, that influences the deliberation of reason. It is also true of any pressure on the will that affects or removes its impartiality (indifferentia) with regard to its objects of choice. Prümmer notes, citing Aquinas, that, simply speaking, an emotion can increase the voluntarium by increasing the thrust of the will towards its object while diminishing its freedom.\(^{35}\) Again, Davis makes the point that spontaneous emotion “has certainly anticipated the will, and is, therefore in itself and before advertence, not blameworthy” (Davis, 1935, p. 23). There can be instances where a spontaneous emotion is antecedent to the will’s consent but becomes a consequent emotion when

\(^{35}\) “... concupiscentia seu desiderium boni sensitivi auget quidem voluntarium simpliciter dictum (quia ea adiuvante et impellente, voluntas furtur maiore impetu in obiectum), sed minuit voluntarium perfectum et liberum, quia minuit indifferentia voluntatis” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 60, footnote 109). Also Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 45).
someone deliberately consents to it or fails to check it when obliged to do so.

Further, a person may be responsible for the effect of the antecedent emotion if it leads to a wrong action. A person may not be responsible for the particular act because of lack of deliberation or free choice. However, the person may be culpable by reason of negligence with regard to the cause of the action. “He may be antecedently blameworthy for his remissness in trying to overcome vicious propensities” (Davis, 1935, p. 23). One should not be quick to blame such a person, even then, but encourage them to have resort to the helps provided by God.

ii) **Consequent** emotion deliberately chosen or aroused by the will increases the voluntarium, hence moral imputability. The will is more intensely ordered to its internal and even its external act through the involvement of the emotion(s) (Prümmer, 1935, p. 60; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 56; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 46). Hence, this form of consequent emotion can increase both the rightness of the action and the praiseworthiness of the person. Conversely, it can augment the malice of an action and the blameworthiness of the agent.

iii) **Consequent** emotion that arises by way of an overflow from the will (*per modum redundantiae*) neither increases nor decreases the act of the will or its freedom but is a sign of the will’s intensity (Prümmer, 1935, p. 61; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 56).  

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36 “Alio modo per modum electionis, quando scil. homo ex iudicio rationis eligi affici aliqua passione, ut promptius operetur, cooperante appetitu sensitivo; et sic passio animae addit ad bonitatem actionis” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 61).

37 “Ex illa igitur colligitur intensio voluntatis praeviae; inde S. Thomas de ea dicit: ‘Quanto aliquis cum maiori libidine vel concupiscentia peccat, tanto magis peccat’ ” (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 46).

38 Prümmer (1935, p. 61) says that the consequent emotion, in this instance, does not increase the intensity of the will or voluntarium (*non quidem auget voluntarium*) but is a sign of that intensity. Noldin-Schmitt, however, says that spilling over from the will to the emotions neither increases nor decreases freedom (*libertatem, nec auget, nec minuit*) but is a sign of the freedom’s intensity. In this sense, it is sometimes said to increase the voluntarium (*hoc sensu dicitur quandoque augere voluntarium*) (Noldin-Schmitt, 1940, p. 62). Interestingly, consequent emotion seen *per modum redundantiae* is omitted in Aertnys-Damen.
There is a stronger movement of the will and affectivity towards the object.

Prümmer cites mostly I.II. 24.3 in his treatment. Unlike the other authors, Prümmer notes that Aquinas sees this form of consequent emotion as a sign of the intensity of the will’s consent but also that the emotion adds to the goodness of the action (and by implication indicates a greater moral level of praise for the agent).\(^{39}\)

The discussion of antecedent and consequent emotions is the hub of the Manualists’ treatment of the moral significance of the emotions, particularly with reference to human acts. One finds here the general principles by which the moral function of the emotions is assessed in terms of their influence on the voluntarium.

1.1.4: Fear

The specific emotion in relation to the human act that attracts the most attention of the Manualists is fear. The earlier discussion concerning emotions in general as impediments to the human act applies equally to the emotion of fear. The separate and special treatment of fear arises from its impact in civil law, for example, on contracts and in “several practical applications in the body of positive Ecclesiastical law” (Davis, 1935, p. 27).

1.1.4.1: Definition of Fear

Fear as a “shrinking from an impending evil” (Davis, 1935, p. 27)\(^{40}\) captures one but

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\(^{39}\) “... uno modo per modum redundantiae...et sic passio existens consequenter in appetitu sensitivo est signum intensorius voluntatis; et sic indicat bonitatem moralem maiorem” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 61 citing I.II. 24.3 ad 1).

\(^{40}\) “Mentis trepidatio instantis vel futuri periculi causa” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 51).
not all of the meanings of the word. This disturbance, involving a movement away from an evil, affects the appetites. The will withdraws from spiritual evil (*metus*). The sensitive appetite withdraws from an evil perceived by the senses and causing the emotion of fear (*timor*). Fear can be with regard to oneself or another, for instance, a parent afraid for her child.

Fear can be *antecedent* - the cause that moves the will to action (*ex metu*), for example, lying from fear of punishment. Fear can also be *concomitant* - accompanying though not causing an action, for instance, fear experienced by a person at impending death at the hand of another (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57; Prümmer, 1935, p. 52).

1.1.4.2: Division of Fear

1.1.4.2.1: By reason of quantity, fear is grave or light in so far as the evil that induces the fear is grave or light. *Grave fear* has the following qualities:

a) Grave fear requires an impending grave evil that would upset even people of resolute character, 41 for example, death, mutilation, extended imprisonment.

b) Grave fear demands that the evil (light or grave) can be averted only with difficulty, otherwise it is light fear (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57).

c) Grave fear is

i) *absolutely grave* if the evil feared is truly a grave one, namely, it would disturb any person of firm disposition.

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41 “… non tantum movet mulieres et homines timidos, sed etiam constantem virum” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 51).
ii) relatively grave if the evil prompting the fear is light in itself but is perceived as grave because of the condition of the person, for instance, being youthful, scrupulous. In moral matters, relatively grave fear is tantamount to absolutely grave fear in its effects on deliberation and freedom.42

1.1.4.2.2: By reason of cause fear is

a) intrinsic: from a cause internal to a person or from nature, for example, illness, disease, or natural tempest.

b) extrinsic: caused by another free agent (Prümmer, 1935, p. 63). Extrinsic fear can be incurred justly in so far as the person inducing the fear has the legitimate right to bring about the evil, for instance, a ruler threatening punishment. Unjust fear arises when a person is threatened without sufficient reason or in an excessively harmful way, for example, when a parent threatens to disinherit a son if he does not succeed at university.

1.1.4.2.3: Reverential fear is “the shrinking of a subject from the possible displeasure of and punishment by another in a position of authority” (Davis, 1935, p. 29; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57f; Prümmer, 1935, p. 52). It can be a real impediment to the free human act by diminishing liberty of choice and action.

Usually, reverential fear is light but can be grave in both the internal and external forum, according to circumstances, persons, temperament (Davis, 1935, p. 29; Prümmer, 1935, p. 52). Because of its bearing on the free act and the validity, for example of contracts, grave reverential fear, even in the external forum, requires clear proof that the displeasure of the person in authority does cause grave harm. An example of this is the placing in doubt of the validity of a marriage through the

42 “Metus relative gravis in re morali aequiparatur metui absolute gravi, quia eandem mentis trepidationem inducit et proinde eundem in actionem influxum exercet” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 57).
defective consent prompted by reverential fear (Prümmer, 1935, p. 52).

1.1.4.3: Fear and the Human Act

As an emotion, fear causes a state of excitement “in which the judgement is easily distorted and freedom of choice thwarted” (Davis, 1935, p. 27). In general, then, fear can diminish a person’s responsibility for a particular act. It does so under certain conditions, outlined by Davis (1935, p. 27ff), Noldin-Schmitt, (1956, p. 58) and Prümmer (1935, p. 52ff).

1.1.4.3.1: If a person acts as a result of, and under the influence of, antecedent grave fear, this diminishes moral culpability. However, if the fear is extreme and is sufficiently overwhelming to impede the use of reason, it can remove all culpability.

Davis notes (1935, p. 27) that, except in the extreme case (frenzy), even with fear, “a man is responsible for his actions, at least to some extent...” Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 58) expresses this in other terms. An action under the influence of grave fear is “per se simpliciter voluntarius et secundum quid involuntarius est” (also Prümmer (1935, p. 52). There is deliberation and consent while freedom can be undermined or removed by the fear. While fear can diminish responsibility, there is the common opinion in society that fear does not excuse from certain obligations. For example, a soldier being obliged to remain at his post until death; a crew, for fear of drowning, taking life-boats and leaving passengers behind (Davis, 1935, p. 28). According to Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 58), fear does not excuse when it comes to actions intrinsically evil. While culpability may be diminished, fear does not change the species of an action so that a mortal sin becomes venial.43

43 “... si agitur de re intrinsecus mala nullus metus a peccato excusat nec culpam adeo minuit, ut peccatum mortale propter metum fiat veniale;” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 58).
1.1.4.3.2: Positive Laws (human or divine) do not oblige under grave fear or grave inconvenience (Prümmer, 1935, p. 53). Grave fear never excuses from the negative Natural Law which binds under all circumstances, for instance, murder, theft. Grave fear would normally excuse some from “immediate compliance with human law, divine positive law, and the affirmative Natural Law, such as the obligation of restoring ill-gotten goods” (Davis, 1935, p. 28). One is not bound to observe such laws when its is morally impossible to do so. There is a limit to this in that fear cannot excuse when the violation of a law “does great harm to the common good” (Davis, 1935, p. 28; also Prümmer, 1935, p. 54) or would foster hatred of the Church or of religion (Prümmer, 1935, p. 54; Davis, 1935, p. 28; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 58).

1.1.4.3.3: Acts and contracts undertaken from grave fear unjustly induced to extract consent are per se valid, but can be subsequently rescinded because the unjust pressure has constituted a grave injury (Prümmer, 1935, p 54; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 58). On the other hand, some contracts or acts undertaken under the influence of fear can be rendered null and void by positive law (Prümmer, 1935, p. 54). This fear “must have been induced by some extrinsic rational agent, acting wrongfully, and for the purpose of compelling at least the outward acquiescence of the person who is intimidated” (Davis, 1935, p. 29). Examples would be marriage, admission to novitiate, religious profession, absolution from censures and other ecclesiastical penalties (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 58; Prümmer, 1935, p. 54).

To sum up: it is evident that the treatment of fear is predominantly in the context of its influence on human acts as a significant impediment. Its context is primarily that of Law-divine, human, ecclesiastical. There is no discussion of its positive role in practical reason, in moral discernment, in virtue or in the development of the moral life.
1.1.5: Habitual Impediments to the Human Act

The Manualists, having treated the role of actual impediments to the voluntarium, customarily proceed to examine habitual obstacles. As this chapter has confined itself to the emotions, especially fear, it will be concerned predominantly with habits that influence the sensitive appetite or human affectivity.

1.1.5.1: Definition and Types of Habits

A habit is a constant inclination, superadded to a faculty by repeated action, whereby it can produce similar acts easily and promptly. Habitual impediments are twofold:

a) those affecting the will, either directly or through the emotions. These can be

i) natural inclinations to evil (for instance, anger, lust, drunkenness) that arise from temperament, bodily constitution, hereditary factors;

ii) acquired habits inclining a person to morally evil actions;

b) those affecting the full and free advertence of the intellect. These can be either erroneous opinions or mental illnesses (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 60; Davis, 1935, p. 66). Fear can directly influence the intellect by distorting perception.

1.1.5.2: Influence of Habitual Impediments on the Human Act

Two of the selected Manualists observe that, in relation to an evil object, emotions (passions), whether from natural inclinations or acquired habit, if wilfully adhered to, reinforce the inclination to evil and lessen the strength of the will to overcome that

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tendency (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 60f; Davis, 1935, p. 30). Conversely, resistance to the same emotions and tendencies strengthens the will, gradually forms an opposing inclination of the will towards good, diminishes the hold of the emotional habit or tendency and subjecting it to the will. Interestingly, Noldin-Schmitt notes that there is a modification in the seat of the emotions such that there is induced a fitting disposition to virtue (as there is to vice).45

1.1.5.2.1: Voluntary Habits

A habit, resulting knowingly from free acts and not effectively removed or checked, when one could or ought to do so, increases the impetus of the will (voluntarium) and does not diminish freedom (Prümmer, 1935, p. 62; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 50). If a person, under the influence of such a habit, “fully adverts and consents to each act of sinning, each act is fully imputable” (Davis, 1935, p. 32).

If a person, under the influence of the habit (natural inclination or acquired) does not advert to each act, then the act is not imputable, though the habit is imputable “if it is voluntarily fostered or retained or not disposed of as far as possible” (Davis, 1935, p. 32; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 50). For instance, one is responsible for the habit of anger (iracundia) that leads to frequent and immoderate outbursts, even though these are done without advertence. If the acts involve grave harm (“grave material sin” [Davis, 1935, p. 32]), there will be a grave obligation to get rid of the habit “and therefore grave negligence in the matter will be serious sin. There will not, however, be grave sin, if some measure of diligence be used to get rid of the habit, even though such diligence is, in point of fact, insufficient” (Davis, 1935, p. 32).46

45 “... quin et ipso corporis organa experientia teste dispositionem virtuti consentaneam induunt” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 61).

46 “Per se patet, peccatorem habituatum vel consuetudinarium stricte teneri ad remedia efficacia adhibenda pro exstirpatione pravi habitus, ut infra tractatu de poenitentia explicabitur” (Prümmer,
What has been said applies principally, in this context, to habitual tendencies and acquired habits affecting the emotions, affectivity and the will. It is also true of beliefs and opinions that may be false or may distort the truth. It has already been noted in Chapter two that these undergird emotional responses. Change in a belief is often required to modify an emotional response so that one seeks the truly good and does so in a way that is appropriate or moderate. This is noted by Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 62) especially in reference to false views on matters religious or moral. Together with Davis (1935, p. 32), he notes the importance of education, family life in the formation of sound beliefs and attitudes as the foundation of good habits.

1.1.5.2.2: Involuntary Habits

A habit resulting from free acts but renounced by a definite act of the will or by sincere sorrow (in the case of sinful habits) becomes either partly voluntary or completely involuntary (Prümmer, 1935, p. 62; Davis, 1935, p. 32). This depends on whether advertence is partially or totally removed. Hence, one can say “if one seriously endeavours to break off a habit of sinning, no sin is committed by an inadvertent act done from such a habit, for the act is not voluntary in any way” (Davis, 1935, p. 32).

1.1.5.3: Pathological States

What has been said in relation to habits in relation to the human act applies to medical conditions that diminish or remove culpability since a person may be “practically incapable of clear thought or deliberate volition” (Davis, 1935, p. 33). This is an area in which there is an evident connection between bodily, psychological
and spiritual well-being. The point is made that spiritual powers such as intellect and will can be said to be “sick” only in so far as they are impaired in their function by other faculties, e.g., imagination, emotional disturbance (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 62; Prümmer, 1935, p. 62ff). One must also be aware of a “pressing duty,” arising from true charity to ourselves, “to have a moderate care for our health” (Davis, 1935, p. 33). In an earlier edition of their work, Noldin-Schmitt point out that the advances in psychiatry, in the knowledge of pathologies of the psyche and the emotions assist Moral Theology in understanding factors that diminish imputability or excuse from positive laws. These advances also provide pastoral resources in the guidance of the spiritual and affective life of people (Noldin-Schmitt, 1940, p. 69). The later Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 62ff) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 51ff) make the crucial distinction between psychoses and psychoneuroses. Psychoses so impair deliberation or place a person under such compulsion to evil action, that all culpability is removed. With psychoneuroses, such as phobias, depression, hysteria, obsessive-compulsive disorder, a person, per se, enjoys basic deliberation. However, people with these conditions exhibit a certain disposition in their affective life which, in certain circumstances, can undermine or remove judgement or the will’s indifference. Then, actions can be partly voluntary or completely involuntary.

Overall, by the circumstances of history, the Manualists are more aware of emotional states and the influence of the unconscious on motivation and imputability than was Aquinas. More recent editions of their work (published in the 1950s) seem to betray a greater knowledge of, and confidence in, dealing with insights from Psychology.

1.2: Affective Virtues and Character

1.2.1: General Considerations on Virtue
This section of the study will give a brief survey of the foundation provided for the affective virtues in the authors under consideration. In three of the four authors (Prümmer, Davis, Aertnys-Damen), the treatment of the virtues (Theological and Moral) follows that of Conscience, Law and Sin. In Noldin-Schmitt, the Cardinal virtues precede the discussion of Sin.

1.2.1.1: Definition of Virtue

Having dealt with acts and the moral norms determining their morality (Law and Conscience), the departures from those rules (Sin), attention must now be given to the principles (Virtues) by which a person is strengthened in performing acts in accordance with moral norms and in avoiding evil (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 255). Prümmer, in similar vein, proceeds to distinguish extrinsic principles of human acts, such as divine grace, from internal principles, namely “human powers instructed by habits” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 298) that perfect intellect, will or the sensitive appetite. He refers the reader to Aquinas’ discussion of psychology and assumes his teaching on potency and act and on the role of habits in this process with regard to human powers (Prümmer, 1935, p. 299).

Drawing on Aquinas, all four authors commence with Habits in general and provide a definition of virtue as a “good operative habit that gives both the power and the impulse to do readily that which befits rational nature so as to achieve true happiness” ((Davis, 1935, p. 253; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 255f; Prümmer, 1935, p. 299; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 241). In his treatment of virtue, Prümmer, citing Aristotle, highlights an important aspect when he notes that “virtue is that which confers goodness on its owner and makes his acts good” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 78;
Prümmer alone proceeds to clarify the nature of virtue by examining the Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit and the Beatitudes. Whereas the virtues (acquired or infused) enable a person habitually to live well whether by reason or faith, the Gifts are “habits accompanying sanctifying grace whereby a man is well disposed, to receive the inspirations and movements of the Holy Spirit” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 78; Prümmer, 1935, p. 307). With virtue, the precise disposition to be moved towards goodness arises from right reason or faith. With the Gifts, the disposition is to be moved by God towards goodness that is in harmony with the divine life. The Gifts enable a person to be more receptive to divine movements and more prone to go the extra mile, even to the heroic act (Prümmer, 1935, p. 307). The Fruits of the Holy Spirit (as in Gal. 5) are acts that “results from the gifts of the Holy Ghost and refresh man with holy and sincere joy” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 79). The Fruits and the Gifts are expressed in the Beatitudes-external acts which “in their own special way lead man to happiness both on earth and especially in Heaven” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 79; Prümmer, 1935, p. 311).

1.2.1.2: Division of Virtues

a) By reason of origin or efficient cause:

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47 This is the same used in I.II. 56.3

48 These are discussed by Davis (1935, p. 256) and Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 281ff) but not in the developed form found in Prümmer. Prümmer is an example of the comment that “the Dominican school emphasized the gifts of the Spirit. Moral theology did not end with an ascetically developed set of virtues nor with a high degree of will power or rational discussion, but with a familiarity with the divine that is intuitive and instinctual”(O’Meara, 1997, p. 276).

49 One could possibly argue that the Beatitudes are more attitudes from which emerge certain types of behaviour.
i) **Natural / Acquired virtues** (whose object is a rational good or natural happiness known by reason) are intellectual, for instance, Wisdom (perfecting the speculative intellect) or Prudence (perfecting the practical reason) or moral (perfecting the appetitive powers of will and affectivity (sense appetite)). Natural moral virtues are acquired by repeated action and “give one facility in action and induce one to act rightly” (Davis, 1935, p. 253).

ii) **Supernatural / Infused virtues** have, as their object, God or a supernatural good known by reason illumined by faith. They are good qualities “of the soul enabling man to live well, which no one can use for evil, produced in man by God without mans’ assistance” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 78). They are either Theological (where God is the object) or Moral (concerned with a created good, e.g., the goodness of an action in relation to one’s final goal) (Prümmer, 1935, p. 299ff; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 255ff; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 241f; Davis, 1935, p. 253f). Supernatural virtues give the appropriate power of supernatural action “but they do not give the facility of an action” (Davis, 1935, p. 254). The consolidation of supernatural virtue comes through the power of God “on account of meritorious acts” (Davis, 1935, p. 254). The same author acknowledges that the “facility in eliciting supernatural acts issues from the exercise of the infused virtues at least indirectly, since those acts and that exercise remove contrary dispositions”(Davis, 1935, p. 256).

b) **By reason of the subject**: i.e., intellect, will, affectivity (sense appetite).

i) **Perfect virtues** (Theological or Moral: Acquired or Infused) are those “that dwell in a free faculty, viz., one that is itself free or one that is under the control of freedom” (Davis, 1935, p. 253; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 256). Davis (1935, p. 253) notes that the Moral virtues are perfect virtues in that “they make a man good.”

ii) **Imperfect virtues** are those that are acquired and intellectual, for instance,
Wisdom, Science, Understanding (speculative reason); Art (practical reason). These virtues may “be in a power not under the control of freedom or independent of it” and make a person “capable of good work” (Davis, 1935, p. 253).

iii) By reason of the subject, Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 242) distinguish the proximate subject (the faculty in which the virtue resides and from which acts of that virtue emerge) from the remote subject (the person possessing the virtue). On the same basis, Prümmer (1935, p. 300) distinguishes entitative from operative habits.

The former immediately perfect a person’s nature, modifying one’s being in some way, for instance, sanctifying grace. This sharing in the divine life does not per se and immediately dispose to action, but does so through the mediation of the infused virtues. Operative habits, conversely, immediately perfect a power to act promptly easily and with a certain pleasure as in the case of the moral virtues.

1.2.1.3: Acquired Virtues-various aspects

The authors discuss the mean of virtue. While Theological virtues have no absolute mean or limit, all moral virtues require a rational mean (medium rationis) which varies from one person to another. For example, in the matter of the emotions and moderation, the particular exercise of the virtue of Temperance and Fortitude in one person may be excess in another (Prümmer, 1935, p. 317; Davis, 1935, p. 258). Justice, however, demands a truly objective mean (medium rei) that provides a consistent, general standard of what is rightly due (Davis, 1935, p. 258; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 243f; Aertnys- Damen, 1956, p. 259f).

The infused moral virtues are interconnected through grace and charity but they do

50 Noldin-Schmitt use the terms substantive and operative habits (1956, p. 241)
not necessarily entail the acquired moral virtues (unified by Prudence). For instance, a baptised child will possess the infused moral virtues while not having the acquired forms. Conversely, an adult may have the acquired moral virtues while lacking the Theological virtue of Charity, i.e., being in a state of sin (Davis, 1935, p. 256).

Acquired moral virtues can have unequal levels of development in a person. In a person who has not reached perfection various virtues can co-exist in a perfect and imperfect form. They can increase and decrease (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 244f; Prümmer, 1935, p. 319ff). In other words, for most people, a high level of virtue in one moral area does not always and necessarily mean a correlative development in other moral virtues.

The discussion of the increase and decrease of virtue in these authors summarises that of Aquinas. Increase in virtue is not quantitative but qualitative. Repeated acts, at an increasing level of intensity, perfect a power in its specific capacity. Decrease in virtue results from either contrary acts, cessation of virtuous acts or by actions at a level of intensity that is less that the capacity of the acquired virtue (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 258).

There is a gradation of virtues according to their objects. Firstly there are the Theological and other infused virtues, especially Charity. The intellectual virtues then precede the moral virtues by virtue of their object. However, citing Aquinas, the moral virtues have priority over the intellectual virtues in the order of action since they move the other powers to act. Finally, there are the moral virtues in order-Prudence, Justice, Fortitude and Temperance (Prümmer, 1935, p. 321; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 246f).

Prümmer (1935) is the only author to discuss duration of the virtues. Drawing on Aquinas, he employs the axiom that the moral virtues endure beyond earthly life as
far as their formal, not their material, object is concerned. What endures is the right order of reason existing in them. As regards their material acts, i.e., precisely as embodied, “those virtues which control our inordinate passions will not be found in heaven where such passions no longer exists” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 80). The affective powers will function totally in harmony with the order of reason.

1.2.2: The Affective Virtues

1.2.2.1: Definition and Nature

The discussion of the affective virtues is under the heading of moral and Cardinal virtues and precedes that of the Theological virtues in Aertnys-Damen (1956, 265f) and Davis (1935, p. 254ff). It precedes Sin in Noldin-Schmitt (1956, p. 244ff) and follows the treatment of the Theological virtues in Prümmer (1963, p. 218f).

Moral virtues are habits (acquired or infused) that perfect human powers (will and sense appetite) to right and good action in accordance with right reason or reason illumined by faith (Prümmer, 1935, p. 313; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 359). As discussed earlier, the two Cardinal affective virtues are those located in the concupiscible appetite (Temperance) and in the irascible appetite (Fortitude). The qualities of virtue discussed immediately above apply to these virtues. The interrelationship and mutual dependence of the affective virtues and Prudence is noted by Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 260f) and Davis (1935, p. 155, p. 259). There is

51 “Virtutes morales durent post hanc vitam quantum ad earum formale, non autem quantum ad earum materiale” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 322).

52 “... et vis appetitiva omnino movebitur secundum ordinem rationis in his, quae ad statum illum pertinent” (Prümmer, 1935, p. 323).
the initial impression that they are seen in a restrictive sense. Temperance is
whatever restrains and suppresses the passion. Fortitude is the strengthening of the
person against all passions (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 267). As special virtues,
Temperance curbs desire for pleasures of touch and Fortitude strengthens one against
dangers of death (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 267). By contrast, another author sees
Fortitude as what strengthens a person against any sort of difficulty and, citing
Aquinas, describes Temperance as moderation in all things (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p.
248).

1.2.2.2: Location of the Affective virtues

Davis (1935, p. 255) explicitly cites Aquinas’ discussion on the location of Fortitude
and Temperance. The appetitive powers, considered as part of the sense appetite, are
not a competent subject of virtue in themselves. They are so only in so far as they
participate in reason by having a natural aptitude to obey reason. On this basis, they
can be the principle of a human act. The virtue in these powers is essentially an
habitual conformity to reason. Fortitude and Temperance perfect the appetitive
powers “giving them the facility to act well, and causing them to act well” (Davis,
1935, p. 254). It is noted by Aertnys-Damen (1956, p. 278) that the will can be
impeded by desires that attract a person contrary to right reason or by whatever
repels a person so that the right and good are difficult to perform. It is under the
heading of these two Cardinal virtues that the moderation of emotions involved in
attraction and repulsion is discussed.

53 “...et omnis virtus, quae cohibet passiones et deprimit, dicatur temperentia; et omnis virtus, quae
facit firmitatem animi contra quascumque passiones, dicatur fortitudo” I.II. 61.3.
54 These authors cite Aquinas I.II. 61.2-4.
55 I.II. 56.4.
The name “Fortitude”, considered in what it has in common with other virtues, can be used of any virtue that strengthens the mind against any passions as it seeks the good of reason. In this sense, Fortitude is involved in the practice of every virtue requiring perseverance and stability of will (Davis, 1935, p. 264). If it is considered in the strict sense, as specifically different, with its own object and matter, Fortitude is the virtue strengthening a person against the dangers of death (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 267). Fortitude is now defined as “that cardinal virtue which strengthens the irascible appetite (and will) enabling it to continue its pursuit of difficult good even in the face of the greatest dangers to bodily life” (Prümmer, 1963, p.218; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 278; Davis, 1935, p. 264).

Prümmer (1963, p. 218) notes that Fortitude “resides in the irascible appetite to the extent that it is subject to the control of the will, since it strengthens this appetite to curb the passion of fear and recklessness easily and promptly at the approach of supreme danger.” Davis notes that Fortitude urges us, through the emotions, “to go forward in enterprises where we could unreasonably be apt to shrink from difficulties” (Davis, 1935, p. 255). It must be noted that it is reasonable for a person to be apt to react in fear (shrink from difficulties) yet not be overcome by it. The formal object of the virtue is the reasonableness of the moderation of fear or recklessness-the medium rationis-since it befits a person’s dignity that one “should not be overcome by either” (Davis, 1935, p. 265).

The two acts of Fortitude are overcoming fear and curbing recklessness says Prümmer (1963, p. 218) citing Aquinas (II.II. 123.3). Since, according to Aquinas (II.II. 123.6), allaying fear is more difficult than moderating daring, the principal act

56 The author explicitly cites I.II. 61.3.
of Fortitude is endurance (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 278; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 258f). It is understandable, then, that the vices opposed to Fortitude are Timidity (excess of fear and lack of daring or cowardice), Fearlessness (insufficient fear of danger) and Recklessness (excess in meeting danger). Fortitude helps a person to face dangers that can be “reasonably and honestly faced, otherwise it would degenerate into ferocity and temerity” (Davis, 1935, p. 265). Dangers noted are, of war, private hostility, persecution for conscience sake, exile, sickness, imprisonment, death. Christian Fortitude reaches its peak in Martyrdom—“the endurance of death in witness to the truth of Christianity” (Davis, 1935, p. 218).

Finally, the authors outline the integral and potential virtues that facilitate the acts of Fortitude and concern less difficult matters.

i) Magnanimity: This is the virtue inclining a person to perform, with God’s help, great works in all virtues. These are works that deserve high honours and involve, in the person, moderation in prosperity and adversity (Prümmer, 1963, p. 219; Davis, 1935, p. 265; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 278). The person with this virtue takes a restrained delight in even the greatest of honours offered him, is not ambitious, has no fear of people (Prümmer, 1963, p. 219). The contraries of this virtue are Pusillanimity (by defect) which inclines a person to refuse to undertake something as being beyond his or her strength when in fact it is not the case. By excess there are the vices of a) Presumption which leads a person to undertake tasks beyond one’s strength; b) Ambition which involves an inordinate desire for honour; c) Vainglory is an inordinate desire to manifest one’s personal excellence, for acknowledgment and praise from others. These vices seem to be compensatory devices to overcome inadequate self-esteem.

ii) Magnificence (or Munificence) inclines a person “to undertake great expenses in
external works and with a royal generosity, but always in accord with reason” (Davis, 1935, p. 265; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 279). As a virtue, it moderates the love of money not in small things but with regard to the special difficulties attached to the risk in incurring heavy expenses for external works (Prümmer, 1963, p. 219). Its contrary is unreasonable Lavishness (by excess) and Niggardliness (by defect) by which someone refuse unreasonably to incur necessary expenses.

iii) **Patience** is “the virtue which inclines a man to endure present evils so that he may not be unreasonably sorrowful” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 220; Davis, 1935, p. 266). It is the virtue that moderates the emotion of sadness at the delay in achieving a particular good or benefit. It may also regulate anger that can underlie impatience. The opposing vices are (by defect) Insensibility, or in modern terms, deficit of affect. This a lack of that level of feeling reasonably expected in a person by which they are moved by the plight of oneself or of others. By excess, there is the vice of Impatience which inclines a man to excessive sadness and, because of this, draws him away from the good (Prümmer, 1963, p. 221).

iv) **Perseverance** is the “virtue which inclines man to continue in the exercise of the virtues in accordance with right reason notwithstanding the irksomeness which results from protracted action” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 220; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 279; Davis, 1935, p. 266). There is a particular and admirable goodness in seeing things through to the end in spite of accompanying difficulties which may prompt emotions such as sadness, anger or despair and emerge in impatience and recklessness. The opposing vices are Inconstancy (by defect) by which a person inclines to cease some work because of difficulties. By excess the virtue is Pertinacity which is the inclination to persist in a course of action when that is unreasonable.
1.2.2.4: Temperance

In the broad sense, Temperance curbs and moderates the concupiscible appetite (even the spiritual component) in anything that attracts it against the order of reason, especially in regard to honours and pleasures. Understood in this way, Temperance includes four forms of pleasure:

a) the purely spiritual arising from intellectual activities concerning spiritual objects, e.g., joy from the Theological virtues; the Beatific Vision;

b) the broadly spiritual that comes from intellectual activity concerning material things, e.g., a rich man’s enjoyment of his money;

c) those of the sense from perceiving pleasing object, e.g., music, a beautiful scene;

d) sensual pleasure from taste and touch, e.g., from food, drink, sexual intercourse.

In the strict sense, Temperance is a special virtue “which regulates, according to reason, the sensitive appetite in the pleasures of taste and touch, so as to preserve the mean in the use of food, drink and sexual matters” (Davis, 1935, p. 267; Prümmer, 1963, p. 122; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 279). It is the “imperious” nature of these appetites and the strength of their pleasures that require a special virtue moderating them (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Davis, 1935, p. 267). This is the sense in which these authors, following Aquinas, consider it to be a Cardinal virtue. The virtue is immanent, i.e., its principal effect is to modify the person (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262). Its subject is the concupiscible appetite. Its material object is the pleasure of touch, taste and sexuality. Its formal object is the moderation of these pleasures in a way that is fitting to a rational being (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Davis, 1935, p. 267). As the mean between extremes, Temperance is a medium rationis, that is relative to the person

57 “Temperentia in genere seu latiore sensu accepta appetitum concupiscibilem (etiam spiritualem) refrenat et moderatur in quacunque re contra praescripta rationis alliciente, praeertim quoad honores et voluptates” (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262).
“for what would be temperate for one person would not be so for another (Davis, 1935, p. 267).

The pleasures moderated by Temperance are intended by God to ensure the conservation and propagation of the human race and, hence, to be enjoyed in harmony with these goals (Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 262; Davis, 1935, p. 268). Considered as a natural and acquired virtue, it “has no other purpose than man’s health” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222). This is the good of personal well-being and harmony which the virtue, its emotional responses and any resulting acts are meant to promote. This differs specifically from the supernatural/infused virtue of Temperance “which is under the direction of faith and has as its chief effect man’s spiritual welfare” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222). This particular virtue may sometimes motivate practices such as fasting, sexual abstinence which “are abhorrent to natural temperance” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 222). One could well question this last comment and its underlying assumption. Overall, Pieper sums the matter up by saying that “the purpose and goal of temperentia is man’s inner order, from which alone this ‘serenity of spirit’ can flow forth” (1966, p. 147).

The vices opposed to Temperance are Insensibility (by defect) and Intemperance (by excess) through Lust, Gluttony or Drunkenness. Insensibility here is not physical insensibility but “psychical, that is, unwillingness to use sensitive pleasures when they should reasonably be used” (Davis, 1935, p. 267).

Having defined and discussed Temperance in the narrow sense, these authors follow Aquinas’ approach to the problem of how virtues moderate other activities of the concupiscible appetite. In other words, how does Temperance, in the broader sense, modify the affectivity and the person so that one is inclined to appropriate forms and levels of emotional response and, possibly, to certain actions? It is done by annexing
to Temperance many virtues that have no reference to the pleasures of taste or touch but which moderate “psychical pleasure and satisfaction” (Davis, 1935, p. 268). In other words, these are virtues that regulate the positive emotions of love, desire and pleasure. The Manualists use Aquinas’ division into integral, subjective and potential parts of Temperance.

a. **Integral parts of Temperance.**

These are, properly speaking, not virtues but the necessary conditions for a perfect act of virtue (Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280; Prümmer, 1963, p. 223). They emerge from the emotional tone of one’s self-esteem and from self-love.

(i): **Love of Propriety and Decorum** (*honestas*) is an attraction to what is fitting, an attunement to whatever undermines or offends one’s person and others especially in social relationships.

(ii): A sense of **Shame** (*verecundia*) is a “praiseworthy feeling which makes men blush as soon as anything shameful touches them” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 223). It is the response to unwarranted public exposure, to the invasion of personal privacy.

b. **The Subjective parts of Temperance.**

(i): **Abstinence** is the virtue inclining a person to the moderate use of food for his own moral good (Prümmer, 1956, p. 223; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 263). Prümmer then proceeds to examine in detail Fasting and Church Laws. The opposing vice is Gluttony, lack of moderation in the use of food and non-intoxicating drink.

(ii): **Sobriety** is the virtue “regulating man’s desire for and his use of intoxicating drink” (Prümmer, 1963, p. 228). The aim of food and drink is to promote health. Hence, the opposing vice is Drunkenness which is the deliberate excess in the use of...
intoxicating drink or drugs to the point of forcibly depriving oneself of the use of reason to satisfy an inordinate desire and not for the sake of fostering health (Prümmer, 1963, p. 228). Such a state differs from sleep which is a deprivation of the use of reason in a natural manner. The forcible deprivation of the use of reason which involves a moral fault or sin of Drunkenness is manifest by a) acts totally contrary to normal behaviour; b) inability to distinguish between good and evil; c) forgetting afterwards what one had done while drunk (Prümmer, 1963, p. 228).

In terms of the moral significance of Drunkenness, a person is responsible for wrong acts committed in this state to the extent one could or should have foreseen them (Prümmer, 1963, p. 229). It is more appreciated these days that such a pattern of behaviour can be prompted by psychological and emotional factors. Drunkenness may be the presenting rather than the real problem. It is these underlying affective states and influences that shape the moral significance of the inordinate desire. They should provide the focus for the moral responsibility entailed in the duty of self-care.

(iii): Chastity is the virtue moderating the desire for sexual pleasure, especially in intercourse, in accordance with right reason (Prümmer, 1963, p. 229; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 263; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280). The virtue is relative in that it moderates the desire and use of sexuality and excludes it in those with vows and those unmarried. Prümmer (1963, p. 229ff) gives a full treatment of the opposing vice of Impurity and Lust.

(iv): Modesty or Purity (puicitia) is distinct from Chastity in that it is concerned with the attendant circumstances of the sexual act, e.g., pleasure from kissing, touching (Prümmer, 1963, p. 223; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 280).

c. The Potential parts of Temperance.
These are secondary virtues that moderate the emotions in the concupiscible appetite (love, desire, pleasure) in their impulse towards something and concerning matters less difficult to control than those of touch and taste. The four authors follow substantially Aquinas’ treatment in II.II. 143. 4 with some minor variations.

c.1: **Interior Movements.**
c.1.1: **Continence** is a virtue inclining the will when moved by desire to resist evil desires concerned with touch.
c.1.2: **Meekness** as a virtue moderates the movement of anger and its inclination towards revenge. Its vices are Anger (by excess) and Indulgence (by defect). **Clemency** moderates the effect of anger, namely, punishment. Its vice is Cruelty.
Anger is an emotion of the irascible appetite. At times, anger may need to be aroused in order to respond when the rights of others are attacked. Davis points out (1935, p. 268) that “it is praiseworthy to be angry when cherished objects are attacked.” The opposing vices are unjust Revenge (by excess) and Excessive Leniency or Supineness (by defect).
c.1.3: **Humility** moderates the movement of the emotions towards hope and daring, curbing a person’s immoderate desire for honour or the esteem of others. This virtue inclines one to recognise one’s own worth in its true light (Prümmer, 1963, p. 238; Davis, 1935, p. 269). The moral significance of Humility is twofold: to check an immoderate desire for personal excellence and to subject a person to God by recognising that all one has comes from God (Prümmer, 1963, p. 238). Humility is grounded in the truth and is not incompatible with Magnanimity. Humility also presumes a sound level in feelings of self-esteem. Its opposing vices are Self-depreciation (by defect) and Pride (by excess).
c.1.4: **Studiousness** moderates the desire for knowledge and learning by being inclined to acquire necessary knowledge in a reasonable manner. It is a virtue that
checks a form of obsession, also involving Fortitude. Vices are excessive Curiosity and Negligence (Prümmer, 1963, p. 238; Aertny-Damen, 1956, p. 281; Davis, 1935, p. 269).

c.2: Exterior Movements.
c.2.1: Modesty in external behaviour inclines a person to reasonable decorum in bodily movements, in recreation, dress, conversation, in the light of place, time and persons. Opposing vices are Insolence or Rusticity.
c.2.2: Eutrapely (Courtesy, Urbanity) is the virtue bringing moderation in the use of recreation and laughter. Its opposing vices are Moroseness (by defect) and Buffoonery (by excess).

To sum up. The understanding of the affective virtues stems from, and basically concurs with, that of Aquinas. It reflects a refined sensitivity to variations in emotional life. Compared with the emotions as human acts, the textual evidence on the virtues portrays a more positive view of the role of the human powers and of the person from which the virtues emerge. This is partly due to the nature of virtues as good operative habits. While the seat of the virtues and the various aspects of habituation are summarily treated, there is no development of the relationship between emotions, virtue and character.

On the other hand, there is still some unease in that the moderating role of the virtues is exercised mainly by restraining the emotions. Again, the various categories of virtues inherited from Aquinas are put under strain at times. For instance, Temperance governs physical needs as well as emotions. Again, from one angle, Magnanimity could well come under Temperance and Meekness under Fortitude. The language used by the Manualists replicates that of Aquinas - “moderates”,

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“curb”, “control”, “appetites participating in reason” and able to be the “location of virtues”. Yet, overall, the Manualists’ understanding of the affective virtues does not exhibit the degree of ambivalence present in their treatment of the emotions in relation to human acts.

2. Theological Anthropology in the Manualists

This study now examines the second research question “What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?” After some initial comments, there will be a discussion of the structure and content of the Manualists’ Theological Anthropology underlying their view of the moral significance of emotions.

The overall context for discussing the emotions follows Aquinas’ design of the Exitus/Reditus. The Manualists draw on the structure and content of the Prima Secundae beginning with general principles that provide the substance for teaching Fundamental Moral Theology. There is an investigation of the ultimate goal of human life—the glorifying of God through beatitude or happiness in God, the role of desire and of human acts in achieving life’s purpose (Davis, 1935, p. 11ff; Aertnys-Damen, 1956, p. 3ff; Noldin-Schmitt, 1956, p. 15ff; Prümmer, 1935, p. 18ff).

In terms of content, the vision of the human person is, prima facie, a truncated version of that found in Aquinas. The human person is a body/spirit composite, a relational being, possessing reason and free will, with desires for what is true, good, beautiful and “placed in the hierarchy of nature to preserve the order established by God, an order that is made known to him by the light of reason, and by God’s positive legislation in this regard” (Davis, 1935, p. 6f). Humans are beings elevated by divine grace, redeemed by Christ-needed to achieve one’s destiny in God.
In essence, the Manualists draw, in summary form, on the ontology and the teleological framework found in Aquinas. As already discussed (infra 1.1.2), the Manualists see the emotions as the working of the human person’s affective life through the movement of the sensible appetite (concupiscible or irascible) towards good and away from evil. Davis (1935, p. 21) notes that emotions understood as “concupiscence” are neither good nor bad but natural tendencies. From such a statement together with Davis’ apologia for emotions noted earlier, one could infer a positive role for the emotions in the Manualists’ vision of the human person. A closer examination of the context and content of the evidence emerging from the study of the emotions in the Manualists seems to indicate otherwise.

2.1: Context

The structure of the treatises on Moral Theology in the Manualists is significant in itself, in relation to the emotions and to the Summa Theologiae. In outline these are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prümmer</th>
<th>Davis &amp; Aertnys-Damen</th>
<th>Noldin-Schmitt</th>
<th>Aquinas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man’s Last End</td>
<td>Man’s Last End</td>
<td>Man’s Last End</td>
<td>Man’s Last End</td>
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<tr>
<td>Happiness</td>
<td>Happiness</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conscience</td>
<td>Conscience</td>
<td>Laws</td>
<td>Virtues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>Conscience</td>
<td>Gifts/Fruits/Holy Spirit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sin</td>
<td>Sin/Vices</td>
<td>Cardinal Virtues</td>
<td>Sin/Vice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virtues (Moral/Theol)</td>
<td>Virtues (Moral/Theol)</td>
<td>Sin</td>
<td>Grace = New Law</td>
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</table>

The Manualists and Aquinas commence with Man’s Last End, Happiness and Human Acts (including Passions). Aquinas then discusses aspects of the positive human response to God through Virtues, Gifts and Fruits of the Holy Spirit followed
by the negative response in Sin and Vice. Finally, he comes to the Law and to Grace as the New Law of the Indwelling Spirit. As one author notes “If one were to ask ‘what is the most central and most dynamic factor in Aquinas’ view of Christian morality?’ the correct response would be, ‘the energising and transforming power of grace’” (Philibert, 1987, p. 106). Aquinas starts with God’s invitation to our deepest desire for love. He then moves to human participation in the divine life through Grace and its transforming effects in a person’s deepest being. The virtues and human actions (including emotions) emerge from and manifest this state of transformed existence. The emphasis is on the momentum of life-giving response to God through human acts impelled and guided by the virtues and the Holy Spirit. Sin and Vice, as failures to respond, have a real, though secondary place, in Aquinas’ overall perspective.

By contrast, after the common beginning with Aquinas, the different ordering of the material results in a significant change in the overall structure of the approach to Moral Theology in the Manualists. As one author notes, “the neo-Thomist manuals were the product of displacement and combination “(Gallagher, 1990, p. 44). For pastoral and pedagogical reasons, the first two parts were separated from the unified view in the Summa Theologiae and combined with a third part assimilated from the Summa Confessorum (Gallagher, 1990, p. 44).

In all four Manualists noted, Conscience and Law immediately follow Human Acts. In three of the Manuals, the next topic is Sin/Vice. Conscience, Law, Sin, Vice now take centre-stage not only in the order of the topics but in the space devoted to them. Grace is not treated as part of Law (interior dwelling of the Holy Spirit as the New Law) but as a separate treatise in Dogmatic Theology. The preoccupation is now with the requirements of the human act as a moral reality. This involves Conscience
in so far as it observes or transgresses Law (Divine, Ecclesiastical, Civil). Further, the working assumption appears to be that Sin and Vice predominate in people’s lives and that the principal task of the moral life and of Moral Theology is to the avoidance of sin. The central thrust towards human flourishing, strengthened and transformed by Grace, no longer pervades and directs the Manualists’ Theological Anthropology as it does that of Aquinas. It has been reduced to one that is centred on external acts and Law, “a mongrel account that took key ideas from the *Summa* and relayed them through juridical structures” (Philibert, 1987, p. 113). Growth from inner sources has been replaced by conformity to external benchmarks. This shift in perspective and emphasis is mirrored in the treatment of the emotions.

2.2: Content

The structural considerations are reinforced by the evidence that has emerged in the examination of the texts of the Manualists.

Firstly, the style of language betrays certain attitudes to the human person. Emotions are discussed under a rubric that is restrictive and negative as “obstacles,” “impediments,” “enemies of the human act.” Prümmer expresses the disclaimer that they are not always enemies of the human act, no doubt foreshadowing the treatment of consequent emotions which outlines, in principle, their positive moral significance. Noldin-Schmitt see them as involving a person’s total affective life. Davis also offers an apologia for the emotions. For all that, any constructive elements of the emotions seem to be muted by the terminology, concerns and attitudes of the Manualists. In treating emotions as human acts, the view emerges that they are, at the most, antagonistic and, at the least, obstructive to human well-being and moral activity.58

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58 Prümmer is chided by his Dominican confrère Pinckaers for parading his negative picture of the
This is not so much the case when it comes to the affective virtues. While virtue does, at times, need to curb the destructive energy of the emotions, it also has the capacity to incline a person towards what is good and can thus guide the energy of the emotions. There is not the same level of uncomfortableness towards the affective virtues as is shown towards the emotions. The question arises: “How can one evaluate this uneven understanding of the emotions as acts or as virtues in the Manualists?” The language noted earlier (Footnote 12) may provide the key.

A closer examination of the terminology (especially the verbs) used by Aquinas and the Manualists reveals different shades of meaning. These variations indicate that between the emotions and “right reason” there appear to be three levels of relationship.

Levels of Meaning.

1. Emotions as commanded
   - obeying, subject to reason
   - Virtues as curbing, repressing
   - Virtues as strengthening against passions
   - _imperium, impero_.
   - _obedire, subjacent imperio rationis._
   - _cohibet et deprimit passiones_
   - _facit firmatatem animi contra passiones_

2. Emotions as regulated, adjusted
   - disposed, guided
   - Virtues as inclining to the good
   - _dirigatur per rationis regulam_
   - _moderatur, ordinantur, moderatione regulatae per rationem; inordinatos motus_
   - _inclinatur, disponitur ad bene operandum_

emotions as the traditional one in Moral Theology when he says “... mais ce morceau reste un organe-témoin introduit dans le contexte d’une appréciation négative qui s’imposait comme traditionnelle désormais en théologie morale: les passions sont des obstacles à la liberté et à la qualité morale des actes” (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 380).
3. Emotions/Virtues guiding right reason

Aquinas sees the emotions as acts and as affective virtues in terms of all three levels. He attempts to account for the reality of experience where emotions do need 1) to be curbed, or 2) to be guided by right reason or 3) to act as a guide to right reason (though this is the least developed in Aquinas). The Manualists see the emotions as human acts mainly in terms of the first level of meaning, requiring suppression and restraint since they undermine freedom and imputability. They treat the affective virtues in terms of levels one and two-restraint plus guidance or moderation by reason. But in their treatment either of the emotions or the affective virtues, no evidence appears of the third level of understanding.

Secondly, there is the formulation of questions and topics for discussion in the Manualists. The predominant concern concerning the emotions is their effect on the voluntarium. The general principles governing the moral significance of the emotions draws on Aquinas’ discussion in I.II. 24.3 on antecedent and consequent emotions. As for specific emotions, the focus does not move beyond fear and emotional states that constitute habitual obstacles to the human act. These issues are valid and necessary in any treatment of the human person and the moral response. As they are presented in the Manuals they rely heavily on Aquinas. Nevertheless, unlike Aquinas, other than with fear, there is no treatment of individual emotions in the Manualists. Anger, sorrow, as fear, can have a positive moral significance just as

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In Chapter four of this study, there is a discussion of Fittingness and how the object of the emotions, precisely as good, moves the will. This is the basis for the educating role of the Affective virtues. It is interesting to correlate this notion with these three levels of meaning. The primary instance of the fitting (conveniens) appears to be Level three; its secondary instance is Level two (most common in Aquinas), and it is present in Level one (sense used least in Aquinas yet most common usage in Manualists).
love, desire and pleasure can be emotions that are morally negative. In the light of
the earlier discussion (Chapters three and four), the Manualists lack the formulation
and discussion of related questions that enabled Aquinas to account for the harmful
effects of emotions while recognising their positive function in the human person.
Further, their treatment of the emotions and Affective virtues appears, at times, too
philosophical and mechanistic, at a distance from people’s lives.

Thirdly, the treatment of emotions in the Manualists generally takes the form of
statement and explanation, usually in a truncated form. Prümmer generally has a
fuller treatment through a more extensive citing of Aquinas. The justification of
positions through arguments is generally minimal or done through a form of elision
by brief reference to arguments that can be found in Aquinas. Overall, the probative
force of discussion in the Manualists rests on authority. This takes the form of citing
Law (Divine, Ecclesiastical), the Fathers (especially Augustine), recognised authors
(particularly Aquinas). As one author says, the authority of the manuals is one of a
“self-authenticating tradition” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 51). In discussing the emotions
or the affective virtues, Scripture is rarely quoted. There is also, by inference, a
reliance on the authority of a pastoral tradition for confessors that underlies the
purpose and style of the Manuals.

Fourthly, there is the question of imagery. For Aquinas, imagery enabled him to
temper the connotations of language and to transcend its limits. This does not
emerge with the Manualists. The restrictive and, at times, pejorative, understanding
of emotions that seems to characterise the Manualists is perhaps best summed up by
the metaphor of Davis mentioned earlier. In his view, emotions are part of a delicate
machine directed by reason-a power extrinsic to the emotions. The basic setting is
mechanical, the relationship of emotions to reason is to something extrinsic to them.
The shift is from Aquinas’ organic, living model with an internal relationship of
mutual interdependence of powers to one that is mechanical, inanimate, where emotions are controlled by an external power. Human growth is through conformity to an external criterion (Law) rather than through interiorisation and inner transformation. Aquinas’ Theological Anthropology has suffered distortion.

Finally, does the point raised in the outline of the methodology of this study apply to the Theological Anthropology found in the Manualists? Is there a discrepancy between “espoused theory” and “theory in use”?

In evaluating the Manualists, the Theological Anthropology underlying the emotions seems to be more manifest than inferred. The considerations outlined above regarding structure, language, formulation of questions and issues, forms of argument, imagery converge towards that conclusion. To that extent, the “theory in use” is evident and is consistent with the “espoused theory.” However, Aquinas’ vision of the teleological structure of existence, of the human person and the role of emotions within that context does have a lingering presence in the Manualists. Given that, there seems to be a continuing tension, even conflict, within the Manualists’ understanding of the human person. At one level, they attempt to replicate Aquinas’ view of the human person. But, in reality, their Theological Anthropology emerges in the form of a juridical, mechanical, extrinsic model which seems unable to incorporate those residual elements from the organic, animate, developmental model characterised by the internal interrelationship of various powers. The discrepancies are such that it could be argued that they cannot be resolved. One is, in fact, faced with two irreconcilable Theological Anthropologies.

3. Comparison and Contrasts in Manualists and with Aquinas
This study now addresses the third research question “What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person in these authors?” This will be discussed, firstly, in relation to the Manualists and then with reference to Aquinas.

3.1: Comparison and Contrast among Manualists

One area of contrast is that of morality centred on virtue. Noldin-Schmitt (1956) devotes some space to it. Aertnys-Damen (1956) and Davis (1935) have more extended discussions. But it is Prümmer who gives it a more central place in both editions (1935, 1963). Overall, if this variation is seen in the light of the above discussion, what seems significant in the Manualists are not their differences but their similarities. In comparing the Manualists—the structure, content, issues, language, arguments, imagery, inclusions and omissions—one arrives at a map of their domain. This evidence indicates a substantial unanimity amongst the Manualists in their view of the human person as also in their understanding of the emotions as human acts and of the affective virtues.

3.2: Comparison and Contrast of Manualists and Aquinas

What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person in the Manualists in relation to Aquinas? To some extent, this has already been answered in the discussion above on Theological Anthropology. This section will pursue the precise significance or import of these

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60 The point is made that Dominican Manualists such as Merkelbach and Prümmer “wrote large multivolume handbooks for priests, which, despite their deviation from Aquinas’s order, occasioned by arrangements of practical issues drawn from the 19th. century, managed to retain something of the pattern of virtues” (O’Meara, 1997, p. 272).
contrasting positions in terms of coherence and adequacy, of a governing metaphor, of the history of Christian Anthropology and, finally, of moral theory.

The Manualists omit aspects of the emotions discussed by Aquinas that enabled him to hold in balance the different and, at times, opposing aspects of emotions. Aquinas was thus able to portray emotions as having a creative, life-giving role in a person’s life. In I.II. q. 24, for instance, in his discussion of the goodnessrightness or badness/wrongness of emotions, Aquinas provides and justifies distinctions that give a foundation to a coherent and adequate account of the moral significance of emotions. This colours his discussion of individual emotions and of the affective virtues.

Conversely, the Manualists highlight antecedent and consequent emotions, fear and habitual impediments. They do not offset this by providing the accompanying context and the moderating treatment of individual emotions found in Aquinas. Even when the positive moral significance of emotions is acknowledged, this is not developed, except in the general principles of consequent emotion. The restricted focus in discussing emotions as human acts means that the Manualists have difficulty in going beyond a portrayal of the emotions simply as factors that hinder or oppose personal well-being. The process of selection combined with the neglect of the original context and surrounding content seem to have resulted in the Manualists misrepresenting Aquinas and transmitting a distorted view of the moral significance of the emotions and, hence, of the human person.

The import of this takes the form of three areas of unresolved internal conflict in the Manualists’ understanding of the emotions. Firstly, the uncomfortable position towards emotions is indicated in the discussion of consequent emotions as facilitating moral goodness under the heading of Impediments to the human act.
Secondly, Aquinas sees emotions, whether positive or negative, as having the potential to be either constructive or destructive to the human person and to relationships. For him, emotions are principally meant to be friends but, as experience shows, they can easily become enemies. The Manualists, on the other hand, seem to work from the assumption that emotions are either obstacles to, or destructive of, the truly human. Emotions are principally enemies and are seldom, or with difficulty, one’s friends. Consequently, there is a conflict for the Manualists in accounting for the experience of emotions as constructive factors in human life and for the common estimation of moral growth as having an affective component.

Thirdly, the Manualists’ ambivalence towards, even negative understanding of, the emotions in relation to human acts is at odds with the less ambivalent and more constructive treatment of the affective virtues. It is difficult to weave together these contrasting strands into a consistent whole. Authors such as Prümmer, Davis and Aertnys-Damen are indicators of the neo-Thomist revival and the effort to restore the place of the virtues. Nevertheless, by retaining the order and extensive treatment of Conscience, Law and Sin, the Manualists, in fact, did not effect any notable shift from the juridical model. The evidence indicates their inability to retrieve the finely balanced and carefully calibrated construal of the Prima Secundae with its interplay of human acts, emotions and virtues.

These three unresolved issues, then, render the Manualists’ understanding and treatment of the moral significance of the emotions and of the human person less than coherent and, to that extent, inadequate.

The second area of significance is the dominant metaphor. In terms of their moral significance, the emotions, for the Manualists, are more forces of conflict than of creative tension, working in opposition to, rather than in collaboration with, practical
reason. This is epitomised in the image shift in Davis from the organic to the mechanical model, from the governing metaphor of political rule to that of despotic or autocratic rule. Such an understanding of the moral significance of the emotions and of the human person has more affinity with Cartesian dualism than with Aquinas’ nuanced vision of the person as body/spirit meant to be an harmonious composite. For him, human powers are mutually interdependent, emotions participate in rationality and human affectivity perfects itself by serving the spiritual assisted by the virtues which tutor it. Without emotions, one is less a person. The human person moves towards integration through fostering this mutual relationship of emotions and practical reason. It is precisely here that the moral significance of emotions is to be found.

Thirdly, the fear of the emotions in the Manualists is part of a deeper distrust of the goodness of the body, of sexuality and of all forms of human spontaneity. As one author notes, this kind of Christian Anthropology has its roots in Stoicism and Neoplatonic dualism conveyed to the West by the Fathers of the Church (Principe, 1993, p. 1031). While Aquinas, mirroring the vital spirituality of the twelfth century, has a more positive and integrated perspective on these matters, the more anxious and pessimistic spirituality prevailed from within later Medieval spirituality until the middle of the twentieth century. The Manualists are symptomatic of this.

Finally, the incompatible views of the human person epitomised in the image shift mentioned above can be interpreted in terms of moral theory. Firstly, the pre-occupation of the Manualists with individual acts brings with it one of the strengths associated with Nominalism noted by Haring- “the analysis of the moral act in its

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61 “Dans cette vue, la sensibilité se parfait en servant l’esprit, avec l’aide des vertus qui l’éduquent. C’est donc grâce à l’union naturelle entre le corps et l’âme et à l’harmonie de fond qu’elle crée entre nos facultés, que peut s’opérer un passage spontané des passions au spirituel et que le spirituel peut, à son tour, rejaillir sur le sensible, pour le bien comme pour le mal” (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 383).
singularity and uniqueness, in its subjective and objective presuppositions” (Häring, 1961, p. 15). The Manualists also “functioned as voices of reason” against the tendency to multiply laws for ordinary people (O’Connell, 1990, p. 20). The cost of this was that, in the Manualists, morality as a response to the question of happiness where moral norms emerge from a teleological account appears to move to the margins. Emotions have few if any claims in a morality preoccupied with establishing and defending the constraints of law (Pinckaers, 1990, p. 381). The overall impression is that, for the Manualists, morality revolves around the question of obligations. Historically, this can be traced to post-Occam Nominalism where morality is grounded in the imperium of divine will rather than in the intelligibility of the created world. The centrepiece of morality becomes individual acts to the detriment of the virtues.

Secondly, despite the acknowledged place given to natural tendencies and inclinations in right reason in authors such as Davis, the overall picture in the Manualists on this topic is of the more restricted understanding of right reason. The helmsman of the moral life is not practical reason understood as the cooperation of intellect, will and emotions through the guidance of the virtues. Practical reason has moved closer to Kant’s rational will where desires and emotions have no part to play and where they are either repressed or rebel. Duty, now separated from happiness, is the guiding star. Freedom is seen through the lens of will, law, obligation. In other words, the moral theory of the Manualists that underlies their treatment of the emotions seems to be predominantly voluntaristic in character.

This study has made significant progress in investigating the focal question of this study: “How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of emotions in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 in the light of the work of Aquinas and of some contemporary authors?” After investigating the work of Aquinas, this present
chapter, pivotal in the study, has been made up of three elements: firstly, the selection of four Manualists whose dates of publication span the thirty years prior to the second Vatican Council (1935-1963); secondly, controlled soundings made in their writings; thirdly, an investigation of these texts using the three research questions which include an evaluation in the light of Aquinas. The next step will be to use the same process and the same three investigative tools with representative authors published in the thirty years since the commencement of Vatican II (c. 1962-1990). This is the task of the following chapter.
CHAPTER 6

Emotions and the Moral Life in Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990


The publication in German in 1954 of Häring’s The Law of Christ was a turning point in Moral Theology. It was a significant trigger in a process that would see the decline of the Moral Manuals in seminaries in Europe and the English speaking world (Gallagher, 1990, p. 170). Häring’s work both foreshadowed and stimulated developments in the following four decades. Peschke’s subsequent work is a witness to this influence. The impact of Conciliar renewal is evident in the mature thought of Häring’s later synthesis Free and Faithful in Christ. Although not designed to be an “abridged or revised edition” of his earlier work, it does have substantial continuity with The Law of Christ (Häring, 1978, p. 5). While the volumes of Häring and Peschke deviated from the Moral Manuals in both structure and content (whether that of theological presuppositions or moral theory), they still had roots in, and some commonality with, that particular theological genre.

As in the preceding chapter, this chapter is constructed on the three research questions. In the first section, the first research question will be explored: “How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in relation to human acts, virtue and character?”
1. The Moral Significance of the Emotions

1.1: Emotions and The Human Act

1.1.1: Context.

Häring notes, at the outset, that the structure of his treatment is largely traditional (1963, p. x). After a brief history of Moral Theology, he develops the essential concepts of the discipline. In his second work, Häring commences with “Biblical Perspectives” and proceeds to the development of Moral Theology (1978, p. 8ff). Both volumes then pursue key notions. Christian moral life is inherently religious. It is not built on a reasoned understanding of the human person and perfection as in Autonomous ethics. Häring is closer to the position of Faith ethics. This entails a conception of “the Holy as a Power which advances towards (man) and to whom he can turn in dialogue” (Häring, 1963, p. 35). Religious ethics, in its pure form, has the nature of response in which “moral conduct is understood as response to the summons of a person who is holy, who is absolute” (Häring, 1963, p. 35; 1978, p. 62ff). For Häring, the key elements in Christian morality are clear: relationship of persons (human and divine), dialogue, invitation, response, responsibility. This is sharpened later in his desire to “deepen the vision of responsibility in Jesus Christ by giving greater attention to its expression in creative liberty and creative fidelity” (Häring, 1978, p. 1).

For Häring, the human person is inescapably religious. His vision of the moral life is built on call and response. It is not found simply in fulfilling a set of impersonal norms or principles. God addresses the person through the laws of morality, conscience, the need of one’s neighbour and pre-eminently through the coming of God’s Kingdom in the person of Jesus Christ. This is a revelation event demanding
decision which is embodied in the Christian life. The Christian moral life then is an affirmative response to the call of Jesus Christ that emerges from an identification with him through membership of his body and results in the imitation of Jesus animated by the Holy Spirit. It is the person responding in love to the invitation revealed in God’s self-gift to us in Jesus by a commitment to doing gladly what God wants us to do. “The principle, the norm, the center, and the goal of Christian Moral Theology is Christ. The Law of the Christian is Christ Himself in Person” (Häring, 1963, p. vii; also 1978, p. 60).

Part Two of his first volume sees Häring outline a Theological Anthropology—“...the teaching on the subject and bearer of moral value” (1963, p. x). The parallel volume of Free and Faithful in Christ has a more elaborate Theological Anthropology (four chapters) and a greater emphasis on the person as called to faithful response in a covenant community (Häring, 1978, p. 3). The total human person (body and soul) responds to Christ’s invitation to follow Him and does so as a relational being. It is both the individual person and the community that are the subjects of moral value. Each is capable of responsibility, of praise or blame, of moral worth and a certain “objective spirit” (Häring, 1963, p. 79). They are also bearers of moral value in so far as the person and the community embodies such values and have a mutual influence in the process of moral growth and integration. The human person is simultaneously an historical being who in the innermost depths is called to worship. In Häring’s view, “all moral goodness is holiness, all right human action is worship and the highpoint of life is adoration of the living God” (Kennedy, 1990, p. 207).

The centrality of Scripture and of Christ shows Häring’s indebtedness to the earlier
work of Fritz Tillman.\textsuperscript{62} Subsequently, the scriptural foundation, its themes, with a Christocentric, Trinitarian and Communitarian perspectives will emerge as the renewed vision of Moral Theology after Vatican II. These are evident in foundational moral texts of, for instance, Lobo (1989) and O’Connell (1990) though, in the latter’s case, there is not the development of the Trinitarian and Communitarian dimensions. This brings us to the first volumes of Peschke.

Peschke’s two volume works on Moral Theology are presented in the light of Vatican II. Volume I on General Moral Theology was first published in 1975 and the revised edition in 1986. The structure of both editions is almost identical apart from the omission of the chapter on the history of Moral Theology in the 1986 edition. As with Häring’s two first volumes, the content is substantially the same with some development or refinement in certain sections.

Peschke builds his vision of Moral Theology on the same foundation as Häring—Scripture (call, response, conversion) and the centrality of Christ. He does not explore the Theological Anthropology of the human person and community as the subject and bearer of value and of the human vocation to worship. Further, in Part Two, Chapters one and two of both editions, Peschke treats the Nature of Morality and the Moral Law prior to Conscience and the realisation of moral value in Human Acts, which reverses Häring’s order of treatment.\textsuperscript{63} Alternatively, in both volumes, Häring discusses the true basis of morality. It rests on human freedom where responsibility requires the knowledge of values, personal conscience together with inner disposition and spirit. Both authors approach the emotions (“passions”) as in

\textsuperscript{62} Tillman’s approach to Moral Theology centred on Scripture and the call to follow Christ. Two of his works published in 1934 reflect this in the titles: Die Idee der Nachfolge Christi and Die Verwirklichung der Nachfolge Christi. A later work was translated into English and published in 1960 under the title The Master Calls: A Handbook for Christian Moral Living.

\textsuperscript{63} Häring’s order for treating Conscience follows that of St. Alphonsus Liguori.
the Manualist -as factors in the “Diminution or Destruction of Liberty” (Häring, 1963, p. 108) or as “Obstacles impairing human acts and voluntariness of their effects” (Peschke, 1979, p. 188). This is the next concern of this study.

1.1.2: Content

In his 1978 work, Häring replaces the earlier detailed treatment of morality with a discussion of bondage and freedom in Christ. His earlier volume (1963) and the work of Peschke essentially follow the traditional schema found in the Manuals for impediments to the \textit{voluntarium} examined in the preceding chapter. The “passions” (the term used by both authors) understood as concupiscence, fear, together with habits, and pathological states are the main influences diminishing free consent. The treatment of both authors concurs substantially with that of the Manualists. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat this material. It suffices for this study to highlight the significant elements and to note differences and advances in thought in these and other authors.

1.1.2.1: With regard to \textit{antecedent and consequent emotions} both authors retain this classical division under the rubric of either “unbridled” or “disordered” concupiscence. They also retain and apply the same principles governing the influence of the emotions on the \textit{voluntarium} (Peschke, 1979, p. 192; 1986, p. 257) or on freedom (Häring, 1963, p. 109), (also Lobo, 1989, p. 365). In this context, both explain the difficult distinction between \textit{voluntarium} (the force of the will) and \textit{liberum} (the power of free decision). The confusion arises from the use of “voluntariness” in English to describe \textit{liberum}, that a person acts freely. Peschke notes that if passion diminishes voluntariness (i.e., power of free decision), it increases the inclination of the will (\textit{voluntarium}) “In other words, what is willed through antecedent passion is willed with greater intensity but less freely” (Peschke,
At the end of his treatment of fear, Häring notes that what is true of fear holds for other emotions, e.g., sadness, joy, anger. He is primarily referring to general principles governing antecedent emotions. He also alludes to those governing consequent emotions when he says that “the passion which is controlled and channelled properly by the free will increases the force of the free action” (Häring, 1963, p. 109).

Pertinent to this topic is the significant treatment of the emotions by Grisez (1983). While not using the accustomed terminology employed above, he draws on Aquinas in a probing discussion on the relationship between emotions and the will.

Experience witnesses to the fact that will and emotions do not directly affect each other. The will can resist the pull of emotions towards an evil object yet it cannot arouse feelings by choice (Grisez, 1983, p. 414). The relationship between will and emotions is indirect. Through the will, one can choose what one thinks, imagines or does and, by such means, can alter “one’s emotional actuations” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414). For instance, thinking of happy things or acting in such a way can ease or remove a person’s sadness.

Conversely, emotions affect the will indirectly. Here Grisez cites I.II. 9.2 and 77.1 and 2 as the basis of his argument. He elaborates, in contemporary language, this aspect of Aquinas explored by Keenan and discussed earlier in Chapter four of this project. Grisez is offering another version of Aquinas’ account of how emotions present the object to the will. The arousal of an emotion fixes a person’s attention. “If one sees some intelligible good in a possible course of action which would satisfy the emotion, one spontaneously wills the course of action and carries it out, unless
Grisez notes two ways in which emotion influences the will through attention. Firstly, it causes a person to attend “to certain possible courses of action and ignore others” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414). These possibilities must have some emotional base so as to “seem interesting and really possible for oneself” (Grisez, 1983, p. 414). Secondly, Grisez notes that a strong emotion can compel a person to “reconsider a possibility previously rejected as unacceptable” (1983, p. 414). This phenomenon explains “persistent temptations to commit certain sins of weakness” (1983, p. 414).

Grisez points out that “underlying every choice is some emotion” (1983, p. 415). Often, one is not particularly conscious of emotions unless they are strong or have some noticeable bodily effects. If choices for what is good involve emotions, so also do sinful choices. Emotions can dispose one to act otherwise than in a fully reasonable way. Strong emotions can resist reason and result in sins of weakness, i.e., from antecedent emotions. Emotions can influence the morally required act by a) inhibiting or delaying it, b) distracting from its gravity, c) prompting an action inconsistent with a person’s virtuous character and d) propelling towards an act as a “quasi-compulsive” influence within a pattern of struggle in a person’s life (Grisez, 1983, p. 417f).

What is significant (and unique among the authors examined in the post-conciliar period) is the analogy used and developed by Grisez to characterise the relationship between emotions and reason (intellect and will). It is that of the deliberative assembly. At times, the desire of some members of that body to have their own way is apparent in their effort to keep presenting a rejected proposal. At times, for the
sake of peace and harmony, it is passed. “Similarly, the temptation to commit a sin of weakness arises when emotions are strong and unruly enough to resist a reasonable decision, distract attention from other matters, and keep demanding reconsideration for a rejected proposal” (Grisez, 1983, p. 415). What is not stated but is assumed is that other proposals can have the approval of all members of the assembly as the best action to help promote overall well-being, i.e., emotions guiding and facilitating practical reason. Grisez, in reality, has reformulated the political analogy discussed in Chapter three as Aquinas’ ruling metaphor for emotions and their relationship to reason.

1.1.2.2: With regard to Fear, Häring and Peschke are authors who follow the classical approach and distinctions e.g., grave/light; extrinsic/intrinsic; antecedent/concomitant. They then develop the principles governing its influence on freedom or voluntarium (Häring, 1963, p. 108; Peschke, 1979, p. 194f; 1986, p. 257f).

Häring advances on the Manualists in noting the distinction in modern Psychology between fear and anxiety. In his view, fear concerns a specific object, is proportionate to what causes it and hence is more readily controlled. Conversely, anxiety is that free-floating fear in which “the individual does not know what he fears” (Häring, 1963, p. 109). He then carries on to say that anxiety results when a person succumbs entirely to the fear so that the feeling of anxiety (acute anxiety) “is out of all proportion to the cause of fear” (Häring, 1963, p. 109). When such is the case and a person’s mind is wholly or partly unbalanced, freedom is lessened or removed and guilt is diminished or absent. O’Connell takes this further in the light of the work of Abraham Maslow who made the distinction between people motivated by the desire to eliminate “deficiencies” in their lives and those motivated by a desire for being and for living. O’Connell points out that “the anxiety generated by
deficiencies in one’s life makes a decision for fuller being difficult, if not impossible” (1990, p. 54f). He also makes the interesting observation that the input of the social sciences has confirmed the “older wisdom” in its understanding of fear as an obstacle to freedom and human growth (1990, p. 54).

Peschke, in his second edition, also goes beyond the Manuals. Häring mentions the impact of mass suggestion and of being carried along by the herd as factors affecting freedom (1963, p. 112f). Peschke mentions one form of fear—the impact of social pressure. The often unrecognised need for acceptance, esteem, safety etc., can pressure human beings to “conform to prevailing opinions and behaviour patterns” (1986, p. 257). When it comes to questioning erroneous beliefs, prejudices or false ideologies, it can be difficult either to recognise and resist them or, once recognised, to stand up against them (Peschke, 1986, p. 258).

1.1.2.3: Again, dispositions and habits receive the standard treatment with the accustomed distinctions between natural inclinations and acquired habits, good and bad habits, voluntary (deliberately admitted habit) and involuntary (an opposed habit). There is also the familiar application of the principles governing the influence of habits and dispositions on the human act (Häring, 1963, p. 111; Peschke, 1979, p. 197f; 1986, p. 261f). This is also true of pathological states which in Häring covers 6 pages (1963, p. 114ff). With his usual brevity and clarity, Peschke devotes half a page to the topic. In his view, Psychic defects or illnesses “can ultimately be reduced to the other impairments of human acts and their freedom” (1979, p. 198f; 1986, p. 262f). They either result in defective knowledge (deliberation) or in psychic compulsion along the line of dispositions and habits that impede freedom of the will.

Grisez cautions against the reduction of morality to issues of emotional health and sickness. Emotional pathology and immaturity entail a lack of harmonious
functioning often through emotional extremes that cannot be easily explained by “the actual situation and the content of consciousness” (Grisez, 1983, p. 415). Consequently, guilt will be diminished or, more often, removed. On the other hand, a person can have proportioned and appropriate emotions that are explained by the situation and the content of consciousness. In this instance, sinful weakness or malice have their roots in the conflict or disharmony between emotions and the mind-between the appeal of a “sentient satisfaction” and the possibility of an intelligible good (Grisez, 1983, p. 416). It should be noted that even in such a case the influence of a bad habit if regretted can diminish malice.

1.1.2.4: **Understanding the emotions** is a further consideration. In Chapter five of this study, the nature of emotions was discussed prior to examining their moral significance. In this chapter, the order is reversed principally to highlight the developmental aspect of the topic under discussion.

1.1.2.4.1: **Continuity with Aquinas and the Manualists: Peschke**

In both editions of Peschke, the definition, classes (concupiscible, irascible), of “passion” or “concupiscence” are identical with those used by Aquinas and the Manualists (1979, p. 192f; 1986, p. 255f). Emotions are gifts from God with the constructive role of ensuring the self-preservation of the individual and the human race. A person without them would lack the capacity for self-defence, growth or improvement. These points mirror those of Davis noted in the preceding chapter (p. 159f). Emotions are integral to the lives of the saints and of Christ himself. Lobo notes that without emotions “human existence and freedom would lack vitality and vigor” (1989, p. 365). O’Connell refers to them as “the fuel of energetic moral action” (1990, p. 54).
On the other hand, it is immediately evident to human experience that emotions can become destructive and evil if they are not controlled by reason or, as Lobo says, “directed to the good, pressed into the service of freedom ...which is done by a process of integration into the total personality with its values (1989, p. 365).

O’Connell points out that it is the mark of an adult “to be aware of the extent to which anger, envy, sexual desire, and other emotions can limit one’s freedom of choice” (1990, p. 54). Peschke sees the process of gaining control over the emotions as constituting probably the most significant aspect of moral education in early and more mature years (1986, p. 256).

Significantly, Peschke points out that it is not the conceptual but the affective grasp of moral value through “devoted, effectual love” that is the beginning of virtue (1979, p. 345). In his brief exposé and assessment of the ethics of values, Peschke notes that such a school is correct in understanding the human grasp of the “moral task in an act of intuition and faith” (1979, p. 87). He notes that it “has accorded a fairer role to man’s emotions in the realm of morality” by “giving attention to the value responses that re-echo in the heart of man” and “call forth emotions of love, devotions and enthusiasm” (Peschke, 1979, p. 87). While Peschke goes this far, he does not elaborate on the way in which emotions can facilitate and assist in the task of moral reasoning.

1.1.2.4.2: Retrieval from within a Tradition: Maguire

The affective dimension of practical reason found in Aquinas, while noted in Peschke, is not elaborated by him nor by the Manualists and other recent Moral Theologians. One exception is Maguire who attempts to underline the affective component of moral consciousness and moral judgement. He explores this in an article “The Knowing Heart and the Intellectualistic Fallacy” that is the final chapter

Maguire’s concern is the fallacy in modern ethical deliberation that morality is essentially analytical and rationalistic in form, with the clarity of logic and mathematics. He notes carefully the limits of the evidence. Aquinas does not explicitly or substantively systematise the idea of affective knowledge. It is an implication of his view of practical reason which orders behaviour to what is good. For Aquinas, emotions and affectivity are involved in practical reason’s role of determining what is truly reasonable, truly good (Maguire, 1986, p. 258). This enables right reason to be the measure of moral action. A later commentator, John of St. Thomas, explicitly develops the notion of affective knowledge and makes it “the controlling category for an understanding of the gifts of the Holy Spirit” (Maguire, 1986, p. 262). It is also discussed by Maritain (1942, p. 22ff).

The first concern here is moral judgement. “Right reason, perfected by moral virtues, has a *connatural* orientation to the good” (Maguire, 1986, p. 158). Earlier in this study there was the discussion of how Aquinas develops the implications of this in his treatment of Prudence, the moral virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit (especially Wisdom) as factors that perfect moral reasoning. These help deepen a way of knowing that is “affectively qualified” (Maguire, 1986, p. 259). These influences so attune a person to the morally good that it becomes second nature to judge correctly about what is good (1986, p. 259). A virtuous person has interiorised and integrated the moral norms so that “his moral reasoning is facilitated and made certain” (Grisez, 1983, p. 81). The phenomenon of affective knowing is even clearer in Aquinas’ notion of “connaturality through love” or “affective connaturality.” The Philosophy and Theology of Aquinas “include love not only as a stimulator to knowledge but as an illumining factor in knowing” (Maguire, 1986, p. 262).
The second concern is more pertinent here, that of moral consciousness, in particular the foundational moral experience. Maguire address the question of that primordial experience that makes humans morally aware and gives “meaning to moral language and judgment” (1986, p. 263). It is the epistemological issue of what grounds moral consciousness. For Maguire, it is born in “awe, in affectivity. The foundational moral experience is the experience of the value of persons and their environment” (1986, p. 264). Such an evaluative knowing is universally available to all persons, though it may be embraced or applied in a limited way.

Maguire argues that the foundational moral experience is a sure way of knowing that can neither be seen nor proved. He offers two examples. Jean-Paul Sartre was once holding an infant and realised at that moment that all he had ever written or done would not outweigh the value of this precious human life in his arms. Again, Maguire cites the instance of the soldier who is executed for refusing to shoot hostages in war (who would die anyway). Could one prove the preciousness of the infant or the rightness of the soldier’s action? Both instances indicate that “the value of persons and the environment that undergirds all moral consciousness and civilization is believable, but beyond proof” (1986, p. 267). It is closer to a form of faith that, according to Aquinas, “lends a kind of certitude that is in the genre of affection” (Maguire, 1986, p. 267).

Maguire, then, retrieves and expands an epistemology which underlines the cognitive significance of affect in moral knowledge. He sums it up when he cites his earlier work:

The foundational moral experience is an affective reaction to value. It is not a metaphysical or a religious experience primordially. It is not a conclusion to a syllogism, though it may be supported by syllogisms and reasoning. The value
of persons cannot be taught, subjected to proof, reasoned to, or computerized. It can only be affectively appreciated (Maguire, 1979, p. 84).

1.1.2.4.3: Creative interpretation from within a tradition: Grisez

The other author who explores the affective component of practical reason is Grisez. With Maguire he acknowledges, though in a qualified way, the primordial moral consciousness (“conscience”) available to every person “for its demands are ‘written in their hearts’—that is known spontaneously” (1983, p. 77). In citing Gaudium et Spes 6, Grisez reminds the reader that “heart” for both Paul and Vatican II does not indicate “a power of feeling what is right or a disposition to love what is good” (1983, p. 77). The Biblical notion of heart is the focus of a person’s psychic energy which embraces one’s mind, will, emotions and desires, in other words “the whole of one’s interior life” (Grisez, 1983, p. 77).

More significantly, while heavily dependent on Aquinas, Grisez does offer a circumspect yet insightful account of the emotions and their moral significance. Where free choices are made from judgements about what promotes or hinders personal fulfilment, emotions are aroused by “sentient awareness of what is suited or unsuited to the person as organism” (Grisez, 1983, p. 119). Normally, a person’s outward behaviour will be a combination of both emotion and will. In many instances, “emotion and will work together in motivating action. Emotion advances possibilities, intelligence considers reasons for acting on the possibilities proposed, and will initiates action” (Grisez, 1983, p. 119).

Generally, Grisez sees a positive function for emotions in terms of the survival and health of the human organism (suitable, unsuitable; agreeable, disagreeable). Felt pleasure, pain and their accompanying emotional reactions have intelligibility and value (Grisez, 1983, p. 120). As such, in one passage, he notes that they “are not
moral evil” and uses the example of Jesus (1983, p. 190). Elsewhere, citing I.II.75.2, he remarks that “emotions, though good in themselves, are not in themselves rational, and these nonrational motivations can make sinful possibilities appealing” (Grisez, 1983, p. 320). This is substantially Aquinas’ position, though the rational component of emotions through the incipient relationship to reason could be clarified by Grisez. Grisez acknowledges that often emotions and intelligible good compete to be the determinant of behaviour. One can allow oneself to be determined by emotion “to the detriment of a fully reasonable judgment of conscience” (1983, p. 190).

Further, through emotions, a person is moved towards limited goods in fulfilling the sentient self. Grisez goes on to say that “by contrast, left to themselves, intelligent love and unrestricted reason would move us towards integral human fulfillment” (1983, p. 190). If this implies that appropriate emotional responses and the affective virtues are not needed in the truly virtuous and integrated human being, such a view does not appear to represent the position of Aquinas.

Grisez does not see calm and cool judgement as the criterion of moral reasoning. Emotions are at work in any particular instance of good (experienced as real or imagined) (1983, p. 190). Emotion plays a role in all choices, normally by not calling attention to itself. Awareness of its influence arises “if it is not entirely integrated or brings about unusual physiological symptoms” (Grisez, 1983, p. 190). Grisez rightly notes that people are attracted to definite goals by imagination and emotion. This explains their immediate appeal when contrasted with more general, intelligible values (1983, p. 191).

In differentiating between forms of emotions, Grisez explicitly draws on Aquinas, for instance, I.II. qq. 25-28 (and other texts). All emotions are “based on love or closely
related to it, since their whole function is to enable creatures with cognition to fulfill themselves by action” (Grisez, 1983, p. 574). Love is the basic disposition which “adapts one to a known good” and leads to desire and satisfaction (pleasure or joy) (1983, p. 578). Grisez says that an emotion such as love is difficult to isolate. A person can only be aware of what one loves and others love emotionally by observing what arouses desire and gives pleasure (Grisez, 1983, p. 574).

Grisez makes a significant distinction. Emotions are “consciously experienced” especially if they are “unusual or particularly strong” (1983, p. 575). Conversely, with Freud and others, one can (with good reason) refer to unconscious or subconscious emotions, for instance, love, hatred, anger. Grisez then points out that what is essential to emotions is not the conscious experience, the actually having of a feeling, but “...that one is disposed to behave in certain ways” (1983, p. 575). Perhaps it is more accurate to say that an emotion is essentially a disposition to respond in certain ways (which may emerge in action).

Grisez picks up the relational and social context of the emotions. Citing Aquinas (I.47.1; 60.5), humans are made for fulfilment in various forms of common life and relationships. “Emotional love of another is a compound of various degrees of sympathetic natural love of the other’s own good and care about the other insofar as the other is identified with oneself. All of these affections are mingled and brought to focus on the other” (Grisez, 1983, p. 576).

Grisez points out that emotions are spontaneous (similar to reflexes) and their character is not altered by their “duration, intensity or recurrence” (1983, p. 370). Citing Aquinas (I.II.74.4) he then says that “there can be no personal sin in the mere experience of an emotional reaction” (Grisez, 1983, p. 370). Nevertheless, given the fallen human condition, the normal emotion lacks and resists reasonable integration
into a good life. Grisez shows how emotions can be unreasonable, disruptive, abnormal and perverse—a state of affairs known as “concupiscence”, the “residual effect of original sin” (1983, p. 415). (As has already been noted, this pejorative sense of “concupiscence” is not its only nor primary meaning). Drawing on Becker’s The Denial of Death, Grisez sees the basic distortion of the emotions as resulting from anxiety concerning death. This results in a radical bias towards intense pleasure to offset an elemental fear (1983, p. 344). An individual’s emotional reactions can also be “badly conditioned by inappropriate habituation in childhood and by personal sins” (Grisez, 1983, p. 371). Consequently, emotions very often “are not easy to integrate, and one experiences in one’s members a law at odds with the law of one’s mind (See Rom. 7.23)” (Grisez, 1983, p. 415). Grisez captures the complexity of this by saying “emotional resistance to reasonable decisions cannot be accepted as humanly normal and healthy, even though in our actual condition it is virtually universal and not pathological” (1983, p. 415).

1.1.2.4.4: Discontinuity and development: Häring

Consideration of the affective response to value is continued in Häring, though not by means of an appeal to a Thomistic heritage. He explicitly acknowledges (1978, p. 90) that his methodology has its provenance in Existential Philosophy and the German school of ethics of value especially those from the phenomenological school of Husserl. Häring takes an innovative step when he engages in what is entitled “a phenomenology of the emotions” (1963, p. 196). He does not repeat this detailed analysis in his later volume (1978), confining himself to a more readable treatment that is summary in content and, at times, conversational in style. He examines the psychological structure of emotions, their object, nature, categories and their relation to the inner act-aspects that will be discussed here. His further considerations on the emotions, for instance on fundamental dispositions, will be examined in the section.
on the affective virtues and character. The initial task is to outline the context of Häring’s analysis of emotions.

(i) Context

Firstly, it has been noted that, for Häring, it is the whole person, body and soul, that is “formed in the likeness of the essential image of the Father” (1963, p. 63). It is not human nature that is the subject of Moral Theology. For Häring, it is the human person in relationship, whose dynamic of being and becoming is embodied in call and response from which emerges responsibility, moral goodness, holiness and, ultimately, worship. This pattern has reverberations in human emotions and affectivity.

Secondly, Häring’s unique contribution is the moral theory that he draws from his reshaping of the theology he had assimilated from Tillman. The role given to value distinguishes him from Tillman and the neo-Thomists. “The knowledge of value was the keystone of Häring’s moral theory” says Gallagher (1990, p. 172). Its foundation is the person’s status as created in the image and likeness of God. This entails the possession of a limited knowledge, an awareness of the divinity. For Häring, this knowing is not primarily conceptual or abstract intuition. It is either the “practical perception of value” or it is “the sense of value.” In the former (the less perfect) “value is plainly discerned in its clarity and splendor and its concrete worth and claim to our acceptance” (Häring, 1963, p. 125). In the latter (the more perfect) “one experiences the value not merely in the full radiance of its beauty and exaltation, but also with ardent devotion to it...the sense of value attains perfection only in the total response to its word of love” (Häring, 1963, p. 125). In a footnote, Häring points out that “This sense of value (Wertfühlen) is a kind of spiritual understanding, not at all an unspiritual sensation or mere feeling. But feeling and sensation also play their roles” (1963, p. 566).
explains that Christians, once they are aware of it, are drawn to “the ground of all value and all law, because it is essentially a personal relationship, it is dialogue” (cited Häring, 1963, p. 173).

For Häring, then, it is the awareness of value that is the basis of the consciousness of obligation. On the subjective level, knowledge of values “is based essentially and primarily on our affinity for the good, which is a kind of second nature (connaturalitas)” (Häring, 1963, p. 133). It is not only an awareness but an appreciation (1963, p. 126). The objective sources of knowledge are revelation, the believing and teaching community of the Church and the example of fellow Christians and saints (Häring, 1963, p. 131f). Häring’s convergence of these two dimensions enables him to overcome two difficulties associated with axiological ethics-the need for a) a superior, objective criterion beyond subjective experience and b) “a satisfactory basis for the categorical character of the moral demand” (Peschke, 1986, p. 86).

The knowledge of true value does not guarantee the right appreciation of all types of value or of particular values. Various forms of blindness or, conversely, lack of progress in virtue are influences here. Types of values refer to a set of specific values that share a more general value, for instance, charity and justice (Häring, 1963, p. 127f). Particular values refer to “the specific values realized in concrete human acts-the avoidance of scandal, feeding the hungry, appropriate sexual behaviour” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 174). Types of values are related to the virtues (Theological and Cardinal). They play an intermediary role between basic and particular value, placing the latter within a hierarchy of goods (Gallagher, 1990, p. 174). Particular values provide the basis of moral norms.

Häring, then, integrates the objective and subjective dimensions of the moral order. 238
Objective moral values are experienced by the Christians as a “summons and invitation to the exercise of liberty arising from the value in the object...to preserve and nurture value in freedom (Härning, 1963, p. 227). That call demands a response that has an inner and outer dimension—the third aspect in the context of Häring’s discussion of emotions. He distinguishes between the inner act that is turned inward and the exterior action that “is extended in its efficacy to the outer world” (1963, p. 189f). This external activity is human action “accompanied and sustained by an inner acts of insight and freedom” (1963, p. 190). The human act reveals the moral value or its lack in the person. The external action must “flow spontaneously from the heart of a man” if it is not to “soon prove inwardly false and shallow” (1963, p. 193). The sphere of moral activity requires interior moral disposition for action to have value and depth (1963, p. 196; 1978, p. 93). It is from the inner resources that arises the response to value “which actually and directly sustains value in the act” (Härning 1963, p. 190). This provides the immediate setting for Häring’s treatment of the emotions.

(ii) Psychological structure of emotions

At the outset, Häring notes the emotions have to be related to the control and direction of freedom if they are to become acts of the inner man, shaped by the attitudes of the “I at the very center of a man’s being” so that they become “free human sentiments, that is deliberate and responsible acts of the inner emotional man” (1963, p. 197). Affectivity and sensitivity to values are particular indicators of “the human longing for inner wholeness, for integrity and integration” (1978, p. 90).

Härning proceeds to outline the psychological structure of emotions. Most of the elements he describes have been noted in Chapter two in this study on the working understanding of an emotion. It will suffice to highlight the main points noted by
Häring. Emotions have the following characteristics:

- **cognitive**: they are a form of knowing involving non-abstract thought, memories.
- **affective**: they involve a special intimate relation or tendency of the heart that requires the direction of a higher sentiment or emotion for them not to be destructive (1978, p. 92).
- **intentional**: emotions have a purpose in that “they are specified and their natures are determined by the objects to which they are consciously directed” (1963, p. 198).
- **experience of value or non-value**: the tendency of the heart is the distinctive and primary character of an emotion through which its object or “the objective is immediately experienced as value or non-value” (1963, p. 198). Value or defect of value is the means by which emotions are aroused (1963, p. 199). The object is not merely known. It is appreciated.
- **interactive response**: in contrast with knowing or willing, every species of emotion is “a re-echoing response to a value or non-value centering in the subject which is the very depths of the human soul” (1963, p. 198; 1978, p. 91). Emotions cannot calculate or resolve to act. “The value invites: emotion essentially responds” (1963, p. 202; 1978, p. 91).
- **desiderative**: emotions often release or are accompanied by the urges to seek and yearn. Yet this is not their essence since some emotions entail rest and satisfaction, for instance, love, affection, friendliness (1963, p. 198).
- **participative**: emotion as response “re-echoes in the subject” but not in the sense of locking themselves up in “the psychic enclosure of man” (1963, p. 198; 1978, p. 91). Precisely as responses they are attached to the object, especially those not accompanied by desire or yearning. There is an “intimate relation with an object” that exceeds “the most intensive thinking and willing” (1963, p. 198). The response to value within the person “re-echoes within the object itself”
relational: there is an inward orientation of the subjective towards objective value that is so perfect “that the emotions and sentiments are like spiritual outpourings or impulses moving toward their object” (1963, p. 198). This can be impeded by contrary “repressive or convulsive dispositions” that lessen that power (1963, p. 199).

For Häring, then, affections such as love, kindness, reverence, are the positive expressions of the “psychological and moral aspects of the inner life of man” and have “a vitalizing, purifying, enriching effect” (1963, p. 199). Emotions are psychic energies that in some manner, “precede every decision and influence it” through being “an intimate approval of their object, a ‘purposeless’ confirmation of their worth” (1963, p. 199). The negative dispositions, conversely, tend to “dismay and denial, repudiation and disruption” as if “to blot out the very existence of the object of hatred, disdain, envy” (1963, p. 199). Emotions have a “direct and immediate influence” on the subject—either to “promote or vitalize” or “to scorn and isolate” (1963, p. 199). Emotions, for Häring, “make up the very heart of man, from which come both good and evil” (1963, p. 199; 1978, p. 92).

(iii) Object of the emotions

For Häring, the immediate object of the emotions is value or disvalue. Ordinarily, the object of an emotion is a person, for instance, God, oneself, a neighbour, a community. Material objects, possessions, plants, animals cannot “be the object of

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Aquinas and, for instance, Grisez would tend to use the word “goods” instead of values. There are various types of values—economic, political, social, aesthetic, personal, religious. Moral values or “goods” are those such as friendship, respect for life, keeping promises etc. that are necessary for human flourishing and, hence, obligate a person in the exercise of freedom. Moral goodness is attributable to the person who embraces such values and moral badness to the person who impedes or rejects them.
the emotions in the same profound sense as persons, nor can they be the object of emotion at all unless there is some reference or relation to persons” (1963, p. 199). Häring’s thinking here could be clearer if he attempted to account for the sense of wonder and awe that nature can arouse in human beings. The object of the emotions here does not depend on the presence of, or association with, persons. There is an intrinsic beauty and goodness in creation that can awaken emotions in the observer.

Häring notes the “sharp” distinction between emotions “directed primarily toward value or defect of value” and those directed “toward the person who is the subject of the value or defect” (1963, p. 199; 1978, p. 92). The emotion is more immediate and vital when it is a response to a person rather than a quality or virtue, for instance, love for a person compared to admiring the person’s courage. Conversely, one should reject, even hate, the faults (disvalues) in another yet love the person for their actual value in the eyes of God (1963, p. 200).

Personal values are capable of releasing “the most tremendous positive emotions” (1963, p. 200). If one does not discover “the personal values at their truest and profoundest” one “will readily be immersed in superficial values or in non-values” (1963, p. 200). The person will not develop depth of feeling in the heart. One who is spiritually free can really discern true values, discriminate between values, and not be overwhelmed by particular values or their lack. Such a person has a heart that is open to “those noble moral sentiments which are owing to men and women as persons, as sympathy, pity, reverence, and the like” (1963, p. 200).

(iv) **Nature of the emotions**

An emotion can be central, pertaining to “the actual centre of conscious life” and “occupying a broad zone of thought and conduct” (1963, p. 202). An emotion can,
on the other hand, be peripheral. One may submit to it or reject it but it does not “press to the foreground of consciousness (1963, p. 202). Häring uses hatred as an example. A feeling of hostility that “has taken a deep hold of a man’s heart” is more harmful and “morally more decisive than it would be if it occupied only a tiny sector of the spiritual life” (1963, p. 202f).

For Häring, emotion as inner disposition is subject to “dimensional depth.” From an objective perspective, this prompts the question “how elevated is the value and how profoundly is it grasped?” (1963, p. 203). Is it only that actual value that is “grasped and expressed” or also “its most profound source, which is God?” (1963, p. 203). Loving a neighbour in and for God’s sake is a higher value than “mere humane love of one’s fellows” (1963, p. 203). The depth of a person’s grasp has its roots in a “vital and affective sense of value, or an intimate and conatural (sic) grasp of value” (1963, p. 203). Häring draws the contrast between the “purely humane love of a noble man” which is “warmer and more vigorous than the religious love of neighbour of a superficial person” (1963, p. 203). This sensitivity to attractive and enriching values “precede and transcend particular actions” and are “richer and more profound than mere conceptual understanding” (1978, p. 91).

Another distinction made by Häring is between emotions that are genuine/authentic and those that are fraudulent/unauthentic. Genuine emotion will not be “fictitious” (the pretence that it is being experienced) nor identified with “vigor or vehemence of feeling” (1963, p. 203). For instance, there are counterfeit emotions which exaggerate “feeling far beyond the conscious sense of value” or are “artificially keyed up beyond the bounds of sincerity and reason” (1963, p. 203). Genuine emotion demands some warmth of feeling, especially if it is “to be permanently sustained” (1963, p. 203). On the other hand, a sign of the “genuine character of our inner dispositions” and deeper emotional orientation is perseverance in the spiritual
life at times of aridity “when feeling is lacking” (1963, p. 203). Häring notes the “psychosomatic feeling” that depends on the vigorous or defective state of the organism may “in no wise be made the test of the true depth and genuineness of dispositions or emotions” (1963, p. 204).

(v) Categories of emotions

Häring sees two tendencies in emotions and dispositions. Positive emotions “are characterized by affirmation and union, and they center on love” (1963, p. 204). By implication, the negative emotions are characterised by denial, disunity and centre on hatred, which Häring sees as “the extreme negative tendency” (1963, p. 204). It implies an “attitude of negation, aloofness, division regarding its object” (1963, p. 204). When negative emotions are not integrated into a “positive commitment and disposition” they can be signs of “emotional starvation” and of a “loss of responsiveness to positive values” (Häring, 1978, p. 92). For all that, Haring does not appear to appreciate the constructive potential of negative emotions.

Häring notes that this terminology is from a psychological perspective. The moral categories of “negative” and “positive” are often the very opposite (1963, p. 204). For instance, hatred or another emotion that is psychologically negative (anger, fear) must be deemed morally positive (right) if it is “the response to negation or defect of value, according to the true hierarchy of values” (1963, p. 204). By contrast, the love of something or someone more than God may be psychologically positive but morally negative (wrong) by violating “the right order of values” (1963, p. 204).

Häring says that no emotion can be totally negative. “The negation always presupposes a positive basis” (1963, p. 204). For instance, hatred of another’s gifts indicates a psychologically and morally negative disposition. But its actual basis is
“the psychologically positive disposition of disordered self-love” (1963, p. 204). Häring seems to be unclear in his thinking here principally from his use of the word “positive.” He appears to use the word to refer to an “actual” or “real” state (disordered self-love) that has definite presence and influence on a person. It no doubt has its roots in defective or absent self-esteem. This seems at odds with “positive” if the word is understood in terms of affirmation, union, love, well-being—qualities of the healthy functioning of a person.

The positive basis for emotions can be seen from another perspective in Häring. The setting and function of the emotions is the healthy equilibrium of the person, psychologically and morally, with a corresponding sense of harmony, peace and love. The role of positive emotions is basically to be the indicators of that state. The role of the negative emotions is that of the warning flares that there is the presence of a threat to that balance and harmony in the person and in one’s relationships. Häring further points out that though dispositions may be “morally positive and therefore good,” one must not “give them a motivation which is primarily negative psychologically” since this is “spiritually unsound” (1963, p. 204). For instance, if zeal is to be morally integrating, it should be for a good cause rather than a “righteous indignation against evil” (1963, p. 204). Overall, “the health, wholeness, responsiveness and creativity of the person depend greatly on whether positive or negative emotions prevail” (Häring, 1978, p. 92).

1.1.2.5: Summary

To sum up. This investigation of selected post-conciliar authors in relation to emotions and the human act has brought to the surface six key elements. Firstly, there is maintenance. The authors studied preserve the traditional (and necessary) treatment of emotions and the human act in terms of influence on the voluntarium in
the discussion of antecedent and consequent emotions, fear and habitual impediments.

Secondly, there is rediscovery. Maguire and, to a lesser extent, Peschke reclaim, from within the Thomistic patrimony, an affective component in moral reasoning and, more importantly for them, in fundamental moral awareness. Grisez acknowledges but does not give much weight to the primordial moral consciousness. He does, however, make an advance in analysing the function and moral significance of emotions through a creative and contemporary re-interpretation of Aquinas’s work. Amongst the authors studied he is unique in utilising and expanding Aquinas’ governing metaphor for the emotions in relation to reason. He preserves Aquinas’ detailed analysis of the process in which the moral judgement blends the affective and intellectual dimensions of the self.

Thirdly, there is the innovation that is apparent in Häring’s rich and detailed phenomenology of the emotions and in their central role as value responses in both basic moral consciousness and in moral reasoning.

From these emerges the fourth element—a lack of correlation by Häring between his analysis of the emotions and the discussion elsewhere in his work on consequent emotions. The normative account of these forms of emotions found in Aquinas (cf. Ch. 3 of this study) and, in more truncated form, in the Manualists, could be enriched and consolidated by Häring’s approach.

Fifthly, there is the aspect of commonality. The notion of connatural knowledge provides, to some degree, a shared understanding of moral epistemology for Peschke, Maguire, Grisez and Häring. On the other hand, there are the contrasting views of the human person and of morality but these will be explored later in this study.
Finally, there is the attitudinal shift present in these authors. An affirming and constructive view of the emotions takes a muted form in Peschke, is more apparent in Maguire and Grisez and provides the predominant tone for Häring.

1.2: Affective virtues and Character

It serves no useful purpose to repeat material already examined and discussed. As above, this section will note similarities and highlight differences in treatment.

1.2.1: Context

For both Häring and Peschke, the context of the virtues is that of conversion. For Häring the heading is “Imitation and Response to Imitation of Christ” (1963, p. 387). For Peschke it is “Conversion, Virtue and Perfection in Holiness” (1979, p. 255; 1986, p. 325). The summons is extended by God to every human being. Conversion entails the renouncement of sin (negative phase) and the return to God (positive phase). It is the reclaiming, under grace, of one’s true self and calling (Häring, 1963, p. 389ff; Peschke, 1986, p. 325ff). Conversion is needed for individuals, often for communities and nations. It becomes, in the process, historical in its transmission across generations (Peschke, 1986, p. 329). This is not a “mere moral conversion” where there is a renunciation of a non-value or a defect of value in order to enter a “new relationship towards moral values” (Häring, 1963, p. 393). Conversion is a religious event that is profoundly transforming since it restores the bonds of personal intimacy and friendship of the child with its heavenly Father (Häring, 1963, p. 393; Peschke, 1986, p. 331f). This conversion is an on-going relationship (the following of Christ) demanding “greater depth and purity” (Peschke, 1986, p. 328). This process is facilitated by the virtues.
1.2.2: Virtues in general

The early Häring and Peschke (both editions) outline the standard notion of virtue—“the habit that gives both the inclination and the power to do readily what is morally good” (Peschke, 1986, p. 339). Häring expands this when he says that virtue “...is the most basic harmony with what is good...” and perfect virtue ... “is the fundamental right attitude so deep-seated as to have become a kind of second nature” (Häring, 1963, p. 486).

Both authors explain the customary distinction between acquired and infused virtues, the relationship between them and their supernatural finality. Two points stand out. Firstly, virtue must flow from “the correct fundamental option which is an unequivocal orientation to God out of love, for “God’s glorification and for the realising of God’s saving plan for humankind and the world” (Peschke, 1986, p. 339). Secondly, Christian virtue is not centred on the human person and self-perfection as the ultimate goal in life. “Its source is Christ and leads to Christ as its fulfilment and goal” through the gift of the Spirit and its emergence in love of God and neighbour (Häring, 1963, p. 486f).

In discussing human fulfilment and virtue, Grisez (1983) employs the term “modes of responsibility.” These are “intermediate principles which stand midway between the first principle and the completely specific norms which direct choices” (Grisez, 1983, p. 189). They are named as such because “they shape willing in view of the moral responsibility inherent in it” (Grisez, 1983, p. 189). These modes make specific or ‘pin down’ the primary moral principle by excluding immoral actions that involve specific forms of willing inconsistent with a will directed towards “integral human fulfillment” (Grisez, 1983, p. 189). They are negative in form by excluding ways one limits fulfilment. Hence, they set boundaries in moral activity. It is the
virtues that embody the modes of responsibility. Choices made in accord with first principles of morality and the modes of responsibility shape “the existential self of the good person, this self shapes the whole personality, and so good character embodies and expresses the modes” (Grisez, 1983, p. 192).

1.2.2.1: Fundamental direction: the ruling passion

Virtue for Häring entails his emphasis on the fundamental option for God in terms of the dominant tendency whether it is named passion, emotions, sentiment. The understanding of the psychological and moral dimension of the emotions requires some determination of “what sphere of values occupies the principal place in a man’s emotions and sentiments” (Häring, 1963, p. 205). Häring cites the principal “value types” used by Edward Spranger. Each has a dominant value that corresponds to its “ethos or dispositional orientation” (Häring, 1963, p. 205). He lists six of these with the orientation in parentheses: (i) economic-value of profit (devotion to work); (ii) aesthetic-enjoyment of beauty (nurture of harmony in oneself and from culture); (iii) political-force of power (courage, self-mastery); (iv) theoretic-value of science (desire to seek truth); (v) social-good of community (devotion to the ‘Thou,’ community); (vi) religious-union with God, salvation of the person (devoted to God, detachment) (Häring, 1963, p. 205). To preserve the true hierarchy of values together with a balance between these as inner dispositions, religious value must occupy a central place in the heart (Häring, 1963, p. 206). A failure to do this can lead to the highest or noblest values being used as a means to serve the “predominant value” (1963, p. 206), for instance, the politician who attends Church to attract votes.

Häring distinguishes two things. Firstly, there is the basic orientation of a person, one’s total potential orientation, prior to any particular decision, “characterised by the predominant instinctive emotions and impulses of his temperament” (Häring,
The basic intention, on the other hand, is the option for value, “a deliberate ‘pre-decision’ with its source in knowledge and the depth of freedom” (Häring, 1963, p. 201). It determines the inner structure of disposition and temperament from which determined patterns of action emerge. “The basic good intention, if truly comprehensive and universal, affects all the particular inordinate impulses of the temperament” (Häring, 1963, p. 201). Even if such impulses do arise, the good intention or foundational attitude deprives them of “their full moral significance” (Häring, 1963, p. 201). The basic intention is transformed into a fundamental attitude “when the entire inner man with all his instinctive sentiments and emotions, his impulses and actions, is thoroughly animated by it...(and it)...dominates his whole life” (Häring, 1963, p. 201). This transformation takes place “in the dynamic area of the dominant passions” (1963, p. 202). Achieving this requires the dynamic power of the will and the education and cultivation of emotional life.

1.2.2.2: Morality of the “heart”

From what has been said, it is logical that Häring develops an ethics of the heart. This is a morality that finds inner disposition as the source which is ordered to action. “The Biblically orientated ethic of interiority stresses the primacy of love as an inward acquiescence in the love of the Creator and the Redeemer” (Häring, 1963, p. 212). Educating the heart sustains and deepens a person’s love. The Scriptures see the heart as the seat of disposition which, with actions, must be well ordered to seek true values. Conversion or metanoia (inner change of thinking, interior reorientation) is empowered and activated by the Spirit of Christ dwelling in us so that we put on the mind and heart of Christ. The good tree bears good fruit. Theological tradition since Aquinas has emphasised the importance of the will in relation to the emotions through the deliberate cultivation of the good emotional impulses and the whole emotional structure (Häring, 1963, p. 210).
The later Häring (1978) discusses the heart within a full chapter of over 50 pages devoted to the Fundamental Option. He goes beyond Spranger by using the contributions of Erikson, Kierkegaard, Maslow and Frankl to expand and deepen his treatment. It is built on basic freedom and knowledge, the centrality of the heart and the ethics of response- “that inmost point where the person is sensitive and open to the other” (1978, p. 185). This is the aspect that, for Häring, reveals the promptings of the Holy Spirit (1978, p. 201). The Fundamental Option is a fundamental response to God and the good and is embodied in basic attitudes, virtues and a whole life-style (1978, p. 195). It is the Fundamental Option that will provide the foundation of Häring’s mature theological vision (something to be explored later).

1.2.2.3: Systems and the diversity of virtues

Häring and Peschke note that the great ethical systems hold that one virtue is the fundamental or primary one including all other virtues in itself (Häring, 1963, p. 488; 1986, p. 340). The views on this have ranged from wisdom (Socrates), to justice (Plato), prudence (Aristotle), love of God (Augustine), universal sense of duty (Kant). Aquinas sees prudence as the central moral virtue and charity as the fundamental Christian virtue (Peschke, 1986, p. 341; Häring, 1963, p. 491ff).

The diversity of virtues arises from their plurality of objects- “the particular domain of value to which each virtue is related and directed” (Häring, 1963, p. 488; Peschke, 1986, p. 342). From Greek philosophy and the Wisdom tradition four important and basic virtues have been singled out-the Cardinal virtues. Aquinas sees all other moral virtues within this framework. Peschke (1986, p. 343), citing Fuchs, and Häring (1963, p. 546ff) see this scheme as not fully satisfactory, principally because
it omits certain basic and important Christian virtues, for instance humility, obedience, gratitude, fraternal love.

Associated with the need to supplement the traditional understanding of virtues is the question of morality itself. Peschke points out that it is from the ontological point of departure that one studies what human beings are, their possibilities and limits, the surrounding world in order to lay the foundation for a realistic moral discourse. (1979, p. xiv; 1986, p. 8). He suggests the need to complement this perspective ‘by the teleological and eschatological point of departure, which tells us more about the goal to be achieved, the kind of person he should be and the work he is to do” (1986, p. 8). The orientation and norms of morality must come equally from the new creation, “from the perfection of the kingdom of God which God has planned for the end of time” (Peschke, 1993, p. 3). Virtues (especially the eschatological) and actions then must emerge from the calling of human kind to cooperate with God in the task of bringing creation to its perfection and give glory to God. The need for this balancing approach is seen by Wendland as “the theological task whose solution is necessary for the theology of society and the Christian image of the responsible society in social ethics’ (cited Peschke, 1978, p. xiv). It is this viewpoint and the eschatological virtues that are stressed by the later Häring.

1.2.3: The affective virtues

The earlier Häring (1963, p. 497ff) follows the traditional order and treatment of the Cardinal virtues, adding Humility as the basic Christian attitude. Häring takes a slightly different angle. He cites Ambrose and sees the content of the Cardinal virtues as “the means and the approach to the love of God, the first rays of the life of grace in moral activity” (1963, p. 497). Peschke (both editions) compresses the central elements of the Cardinal virtues under the heading “fundamental
requirements of virtue.” There is a) moral knowledge and prudence, b) love of moral
value and c) dominion over passions (Peschke, 1979, p. 274ff; 1986, p. 343ff).
Peschke then investigates the content of the three Cardinal virtues as an exercise of
Prudence under the rubric “Christian Responsibility Towards the Created World”
after dealing with the Theological virtues in “Christian Responsibility in the
Religious Realm.”

The most decisive and essential element in virtue consists in “love of the true values”
(Peschke, 1986, p. 346). For Peschke and Häring this consists in a profound
appreciation or affective grasp of the moral good. Nevertheless, acquiring and
realising moral values can “still be impaired by insufficiently controlled passions”
(Peschke, 1986, p. 346). A person can still have a basic orientation to goodness
while still being imperfect in virtue and continues to strive to master passions.
Parents and educators are significant in this task. Peschke also makes the cautionary
note that “good behaviour patterns are not identified with virtue” (1986, p. 347). It is
love of true values that is the core of virtue. But repetition leading to habitual
dispositions in directing and controlling one’s emotions “renders the practice of
virtue easier and more efficient. No perfect virtue can exist without it. Habitual
dominion over passions, too, is an integral part of virtue” (Peschke, 1986, p. 247).

1.2.3.1: Temperance

Temperance as the result of the coordination of human powers is underlined by
Häring when he says “temperance restrains the affective life and its longings and
desires” (1963, p. 488). It maintains a balance in the appetites of desire
(concupiscible), “holding to the right mean between dullness and lust” (1963, p.
498). The focus of Temperance is the self in the need for self-preservation. It is an
expression of self-love, an immanent virtue that can be formulated as the duty of self-care. Its function is “to keep in balance the entire emotional and spiritual life.” Particularly in a fallen world, this requires “an orderly conformity with the varied world of values...(and)...direct control of spiritual faculties and activity” (Häring, 1963, p. 529. It requires both self-understanding and self-discipline.

Häring’s discussion follows the standard course-definition of the virtue, species and cognate virtues (in summary form), the role of discipline and moderation plus an extensive treatment of self-denial and mortification. It is substantially representative of what is found in the Manualists as discussed in the previous chapter. Häring departs from the Manuals and Aquinas in not treating Humility as a potential part of Temperance but as a separate and distinctively Christian virtue.

Overall, Häring sees Temperance in a positive light. It is an aspect of self-care, promoting inner and outer harmony, guiding between extremes in the desiderative aspect of the affective life. Intemperance is primarily a failure in self-love which undermines, even “destroys the capacity for true love”-of God and others (Häring, 1963, p. 530). Augustine correctly points out that the virtue of Temperance is “in the service of love” (cited Häring, 1963, p. 531).

1.2.3.2: Fortitude

Häring’s early work again continues the traditional approach. Fortitude (courage), according to early Häring, “controls the affective life in its impulses to vehemence and anger (aggressive acts)” (1963, p. 488). It keeps the irascible appetite under control “maintaining a balance between timidity and insolence” (Häring 1963, p. 498). Fortitude enables a person to control emotions of fear and terror, especially in the face of what threatens well-being, for instance, suffering or death. The virtue
also empowers a person to take advantage of the dynamic power of anger to oppose injustice and evil. It guides a person in responding with moderate fear, anger etc. For Aquinas, its principal act is perseverance and patience (Häring, 1963, p. 526). Constancy requires emotional integration and “real greatness of soul” since one’s emotional resources can be depleted in face of persistent evil and suffering (Häring, 1963, p. 526). Its apex is martyrdom.

1.2.3.3: Affective virtues: divergent approaches

1.2.3.3.1: Innovation from within a tradition: Grisez

Grisez delineates the content of the traditional account of the affective virtues in terms of modes of responsibility. He explicitly refers to S.T. I.II. 61 (Cardinal virtues) and to II.II. 141 (Temperance) and 123 (Fortitude).

The innovative aspect of Grisez’ account is his devising of general principles governing the emotions and their relation to the will either as responses of attraction or of aversion. Temperance as traditionally understood is re-formulated as the third mode of responsibility that “One should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of one’s pursuit and/or attainment of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself” (1983, p. 208). Impulse, habit, fixation can cause tension between the object of emotional desire and the intelligible good. A proposed choice can possibly provide “some sense of inner harmony through tension-reduction” (Grisez, 1983, p. 208). To settle for a choice of mere emotional satisfaction is at odds with a will directed “toward integral human fulfillment” (Grisez, 1983, p. 208). Grisez notes that this is different from a person who spontaneously does reasonable things or of gaining emotional satisfaction in acting for a true, intelligible value (1983, p. 208). The virtue corresponding to this mode of
responsibility is traditionally called “self-control.” It indicates that one has the discipline of a virtuous disposition “free from positive nonrational motivation” (Grisez, 1983, p. 209). It includes aspects of traditional virtues such as modesty, chastity, temperance etc.

Fortitude is encapsulated in the fourth mode of responsibility. “One should not choose to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one’s avoidance of some intelligible evil other than the inner tension experienced in enduring the aversion” (Grisez, 1983, p. 210). This mode is violated when one chooses not to act or to cease acting or one changes a reasonable course of action because of repugnance, fear (of pain) “or other concerns about obstacles that involve nothing intelligibly bad” (1983, p. 210). The emotion aroused is not commensurate with the evil to justify avoidance, i.e., intelligible. For instance, someone may feel unreasonably fearful and, in order to resolve the inner conflict they experience, refrains from action. This is not the same as a person spontaneously avoiding “what reasonably should be avoided” (1983, p. 210). Nor is it to be confused with the instance where “an upright person is restrained from moral sensitivity from doing things which someone less morally sensitive would do boldly and with moral recklessness” (Grisez, 1983, p. 210).

1.2.3.3.2: A renewed Moral Theology: Peschke and Häring

There are no entries for “Fortitude” and “Temperance” in the indices of Peschke’s Vol. I (both editions) and one only on “Temperance” in Vol. 2 (both editions). In the contents, there is no section on either of these two virtues. In both the indices and contents of all three volumes of Free and Faithful in Christ there is no reference to either Fortitude or Temperance. If one examines the texts of both authors, Temperance appears to have been subsumed under the section “Responsibility for

66 This is also the case in Lobo (1989) and O’Connell (1990).
health” (Peschke, 1978, p. 307ff; 1993, p. 243ff) or “Health and Healing” (Häring, 1981, p. 42ff). Peschke points out that health is not just bodily well-being. Health of mind and soul are crucial. A person is also “responsible for his psychological health” (1978, p. 309; 1993, p. 245). He then elaborates responsibility concerning food, clothing, housing, recreation, spirits, stimulants and drugs. Fortitude, conversely, seems to have been incorporated in the section on the virtue of Hope as part of its fruits (endurance in adversity or suffering) or vices opposed to it (despair, presumption, faint-heartedness) (Peschke, 1978, p. 57ff; 1993, p. 65ff; also Häring, 1979, p. 380 ff).

The structure and content of the later Häring’s work indicate the shift from his earlier view of the affective virtues in The Law of Christ. This is not the case with Peschke. However, in both authors there is an evident shift in perspective about Moral Theology as such that is reflected in the particular structure and content of their work. Having laid the foundation of General Moral Theology (Biblical foundations, nature of Morality, Moral law, Conscience, Human acts, Sin), they complete their first volumes with Conversion, Virtue and Perfection in holiness (Peschke, 1979, 1986; Häring, 1978). This is the springboard for Special Moral Theology whose theme is that of Christian Responsibility. This is exercised, firstly, in the religious realm (through the Theological virtues and the virtue of Religion). In this area, Häring, unlike Peschke, is more conscious of ecumenism and the modern ambience of criticism and unbelief. Secondly, responsibility is towards the created world (through Healing of Life and Public Life (Häring) namely in Justice, Bodily Life and Health, Community Life, Work, Poverty and Social Economy, Political and Cultural Life and finally Responsible care of Creation (Peschke, 1978, 1993; Häring, 1979, 1981). This design has a centrifugal direction that is complemented by its content. The affective virtues are not seen as immanent qualities of the moral subject, as perfections of faculties or powers. They are modes of response and responsibility of
the person within the context of relationships with society and nature.

It has already been noted that, for both Peschke and Häring, the foundation of virtue is the Fundamental Option and conversion. Both give an extensive treatment to this topic. However, the mature Häring’s Moral Theology goes further than Peschke. As the foundational response to value, the basic option and intentions penetrate “the desires, intuitions, and imagination of the individual...(and) .they become those fundamental attitudes of responsiveness to value which are called virtues” (Crossin, 1985, p. 30). For Häring, these virtues are not attempts at self-fulfilment or self-realisation (Häring, 1981, p. 235f) but are “responses in faith to God” (Crossin, 1985, p. 30). They are eschatological in focus and are gifts of the Spirit, the fount of virtue.

The Fundamental Option that generates certain attitudes, virtues and life-style shapes the structure and content of Häring’s work. It provides the grounding for Häring’s theology of the eschatological virtues which he considers more characteristic of Biblical ethics than the Cardinal virtues. Crossin considers Häring’s emphasis here is his distinctive contribution to understanding the virtues (1985, p. 30). The eschatological virtues (with the gifts and fruits of the Spirit) are, in many ways, dispositions towards time-humility and gratitude (grateful memory for the past and God’s deeds), hope (clear orientation and purpose in being open to horizons of the future) and vigilance, serenity, joy (attentiveness to the present) (Häring, 1978, p. 201ff). Growth, understood as entering more deeply into the Paschal Mystery, is characterised by a certain serenity, joy, peace and reconciliation-gifts of the Spirit. These virtues embody the basic option, point to the future and provide the impetus for cooperating with God in Christ in redemptive action in the world.

The influence of the Fundamental Option on the content of Häring’s vision is apparent in the second volume of *Free and Faithful in Christ*. “The Truth will set you
free.” For Häring, the human person is a relational and responding being who combines the human search for truth with the awe generated by the experience of beauty. The innate human thrust towards transcendent values and religious response moves the affective response of awe to one of adoration. This is the precise point on which Häring constructs his moral vision of response to a divine summons embodied in faith, hope and love from which emerges responsibility in and for the world. The *locus* of Häring’s moral subject is the world and the focus is on the coming reign of God. Häring and Peschke do not see the moral task principally as centred on the moral subject, on response leading to growth that is immanent and personal. The vision is of response and responsibility of the person to God, society and nature. For both authors, the momentum of the Christian moral life is outwards and inclusive, if one is to arrive at moral integration. The goal of Christian living, of conversion and the exercise of the virtues is not only personal but social and cosmic transformation.

In both these authors, the traditional affective virtues have been assimilated into the modes of response and responsibility whether religious, personal or social. Peschke recognises the need for “the critical scales of the eschatological realities...” (which) “…informs man about the goal to be achieved, the kind of person he should be and the work he should do” (1993, p. 8). But he does not pursue this by developing the nature and role of the eschatological virtues. This is the unique contribution of Häring.

If one considers the eschatological virtues as gifts of the Spirit (as infused), as they are described they have emotional reverberations. Gratitude, hope, joy, serenity, peace are both emotions and on-going affective states. They can be seen as the fruits of Fortitude and Temperance, those virtues that provide the necessary psychological and moral substructure for the presence and influence of their eschatological counterparts. Häring has not neglected the affective virtues and their significance.
Rather, he has emphasised forms of those virtues that distinguish the Spirit-guided character of the individual Christian but also of the Christian community. These virtues become more evident as a person comes to deeper self-possession and love reflected in an increasing inner and outer harmony that is embodied in emotions and the affective life. Moreover, to be grateful, humble, vigilant, hopeful, joyful, peaceful are the qualities not only of the integrated person but also of the loving community. They are the signs of the reign of God, of God’s reconciliation at work within persons, between them and with the created world. There is something about this that is like coming full circle and meeting Aquinas nodding (and smiling) in agreement.

1.2.4: Summary

This section can aptly be summarised around the notion of Response. The idea is central to the three principal authors examined. It has five aspects.

(i) Fundamental response (option) to the good or God or conversion is seen by all authors to be the linchpin of the moral life;

(ii) Virtues emerging from this are patterns of response manifest in attitudes, desires, emotions and life-style;

(iii) affective virtues (in the traditional sense of Fortitude and Temperance) are re-interpreted by Grisez in terms of response to or between values as modes of responsibility;

(iv) The traditional affective virtues are subsumed by Peschke and Häring in the call to respond and to be responsible to God and the world. The same virtues are assumed by Häring in giving prominence to the eschatological virtues. These are gifts of the Spirit through which the fullness of God’s reign in the future begins to be realised in the present in persons and communities who are grateful, humble, hopeful, vigilant, joyful and peaceful;
(v) Moral response, particularly in Peschke and Häring, looks outwards and is inclusive. It brings expanding horizons of understanding and love for people, cultures, societies and nature.

2. Theological Anthropology in the Selected post-conciliar Authors

The second research question now to be addressed is “What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?” This will entail an examination of the context and content of the Theological Anthropology underlying the moral significance of the emotions found in the selected post-conciliar authors.

2.1: Context

The remote context from which the works of authors such as Häring and Peschke emerged is a world disturbed by change. These authors either stimulate or reflect the Church’s summons to renew Moral Theology and to enrich its vision from Sacred Scripture, Theology and the human sciences. This indicates a more receptive stance towards contemporary culture and scholarship. Häring is representative of the engagement with, and influence of, the intellectual currents of Europe, of the nouvelle Théologie, transcendental Thomism and the rise of alternatives to the monopoly of neo-Thomism. The breadth and depth of the reservoir of philosophical, theological and scientific resources is apparent in the bibliographies of both Peschke and Häring. “Moral Theology for Clergy and Laity” is the subheading of each of the six volumes of Häring. The change of setting from that of the seminary to that of the university and the world is indicative of a shift in attitude. This is mirrored in the structure and content of the Moral Theology of these authors.

The proximate context or the structure surrounding the treatment of the human
person in these authors has already been mentioned, mainly with reference to Peschke and Häring. Grisez’ arrangement of his material follows most approximately the neo-Thomist manuals. Unlike Peschke and Häring, he does not commence with Scriptural sources and categories. Rather, he starts with the human functions of freedom, conscience, a modern interpretation of Natural Law, Moral norms, Law and finally with integration modelled in Jesus Christ and its setting in the community of the Church. Grisez’ account is essentially teleological in that it is constructed on the goal of integral human fulfilment. Peschke, also, begins with a teleological basis and explores the place of Natural Law. However, he both integrates and modifies this by the overall direction he provides from Biblical sources, the place of Christ, the process of conversion and the need for an eschatological perspective. Overall, Peschke is synthetic, concise and analytically more rigorous than the innovative, visionary and inspirational style and tone of Häring.

2.2: Content

In contrast with Aquinas and the Manualists, the Theological Anthropology of Häring and Peschke is not organised around the categories in Aquinas’ Philosophical Psychology of body and soul, faculties and purposes, nor from a metaphysical approach to nature and grace, or nature and supernature. The starting point is God’s initiative and invitation, human response and Conversion. It is the whole person who is formed in God’s image and called to develop in God’s likeness in eternal community of love with God (Gallagher, 1990, p. 171). It is not human nature but the human person who, in these authors, is the centre of Theological Anthropology and the subject of Christian ethics. It is a view of the person shaped by being “men and women in both their individuality and sociality, their body and soul, their instincts and spirit, their historicity and sense of the present” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 262).
The human person, so understood, is the outcome of philosophical movements such as Existentialism, Phenomenology and Personalism. Häring, and to some extent, Peschke, are shaped by developments in the understanding of the “self,” the move to the subject together with insights gained from various analyses of the structure of consciousness and of human experience. It is especially the person as a presence to the self that is significant. As Kennedy says

The person is at once immanent to the subject and simultaneously transcends it. That presence is the mysterious appeal of another. The response to this appeal brings about both an incarnation and a deeper interiority. Through this incarnation one becomes present to the other and this opens the door to communion (1996, p. 74f).

What has emerged is the view of the person as a being in relationship, called to response and dialogue. When this is viewed in terms of God’s call to relationship and response, it gives rise to a different view of moral agency. The spotlight is less on final beatitude or happiness in God and is more on the human person responding to values, to the transcendent and to the inviting God. The person is an inherently religious being and the moral life is, at the same time, religious. Morality and Religion, the morally good and the holy are inseparable (Gallagher, 1990, p. 170).

When considered as the underpinning to the treatment of the emotions, such an understanding of the human person has four implications. Firstly, emotions, as found in Häring, are part of an holistic view of the person. There is a move away from a setting of faculties and hierarchy of powers to one in which emotions are “modes” of being or of relationship mentioned earlier by Keenan. Seen as such, emotions are forms of response in a dynamic continuum ranging from bodily reflexes through involuntary emotions to consciously willed value-responses with virtue as the
moderating factor. In such a construal, there is less danger of viewing emotions
dualistically, i.e., as always in need of control. They are more readily amenable to an
intelligible and necessary significance in overall human functioning and growth.

Secondly, the capacity of the human person to respond to values and persons means
that the nature/grace distinction is susceptible to a more satisfactory interpretation.
The static model of grace building on nature (the two-tier model), is replaced by one
that is dynamic. The radical capacity to respond impels the subject to a widening
horizon of values, including those that are transcendent and to the transcendent God.
Without resorting to evolution or self-elevation in order to share in the supernatural
realm, such a momentum in the person is the aptitude (*obedientia potentialis*) to
respond to any person, even to the divine personal being who chooses to be self-
revealing, inviting humans to participate in God’s inner life through grace. By using
the notion of value, Häring is able “...not just to relate the choice of particular moral
values to the order of goods, but also to identify such choices as central elements
within the Christian response to the divine summons and invitation” (Gallagher,
1990, p. 175).

Thirdly, Natural Law is not a central concern in the General Moral Theology of
Häring. Moral norms principally take the form of God’s summons in Christ. This is
partly through the new law of the grace of the Holy Spirit “knocking at the door of
man’s heart” (1963, p. 257). It is partly through the various forms of Law in
Revelation, Tradition and human experience. Natural Law has a role as the rational
capacity to see norms for human acts discernible “through insight into the nature of
man in the world” (Gallagher, 1990, p. 175). For the later Häring, in particular,
Natural Law is a theological doctrine stemming from creation. Nevertheless, as
Gallagher points out, for Häring the new law of grace is under threat if law is
confined to eternal prohibitions of universal law and not built on a personal

Fourthly, one must emphasise the importance of the role given to value, incorporated in Peschke, but originating in Häring. It distinguishes Häring from the neo-Thomists and is the unique contribution he makes in relating a moral theory to Tillman’s theology (Gallagher, 1990, p. 178). For Häring, the person is the bearer and the revealer of value. Awareness of value is a dynamic awareness, an appreciation involving the whole person-mind, will, heart, emotions. Since a person is made for relationships, and has a personal attraction to the ground of all value and law (Gallagher, 1990, p. 178). Häring expands the nature of emotions as value responses so that, for him, they are the platform of religious morality. The appreciation of values is inseparable from the appreciation of the ultimate value (God). Such an awareness grounds primordial moral awareness, reveals moral norms, engenders virtue and guides practical reasoning. The shape of Häring’s Theological Anthropology has its base in emotions as responses to value.

Finally, while the Theological Anthropologies of Häring, Peschke and Grisez may differ in emphasis and, at times, in content, each has a basic coherence and consistency. From the textual evidence there does not appear to be any conflict between an “espoused” theory of the human person and a theory “in use.”

3. Comparisons and Contrasts amongst Authors, with Manualists and Aquinas

“What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of the human person in these authors?” This question is the next concern.
3.1: Comparison and Contrast amongst Selected Contemporary Authors

The language used in Peschke through Grisez to Häring conveys an increasingly affirmative understanding of the emotions. While acknowledging the responsibility for any Moral Theology to account for the destructive potential of the emotions and their need of control and guidance, in these authors there is not the pejorative terminology and tone that pervades the Manualists. Grisez’ retrieval of the political image of Aquinas (“deliberative assembly”) indicates an awareness of the delicate yet necessary interrelationship of emotion, intellect and will.

In examining emotions and the human act, the affective grasp of moral value central to Häring is also affirmed by Peschke, particularly when he acknowledges the contribution of axiological ethics. The same awareness of moral value, but in relation to primordial moral consciousness, is reclaimed by Maguire from the Catholic tradition after Aquinas.

The role of emotions in practical reasoning is elaborated in some detail by Grisez. He essentially reworks Aquinas’ treatment of the role and moral significance of the emotions. This is evident in his treatment of the manner in which emotions present the object to the will by attention, and in their relational character, within and beyond the person. Häring’s treatment is more consistently phenomenological in style, centred on the correlation of emotions as responses to value or disvalue and their contribution to the psychological and moral aspects of human life. Unlike Aquinas, the later Häring does not investigate the place of negative emotions such as sadness, anger and fear for their interpersonal significance and as propellents in the moral life.

Affective virtues and character have the common foundation of conversion which, for Häring and Peschke, is as much a religious as a moral event. Virtues emerge
from the Fundamental Option and originate in, and lead to, Christ. For Grisez, alternatively, the virtue embody the modes of responsibility. The role of the ruling passion and of the heart are significant, particularly for Häring. As has been explained, for Häring and Peschke, conversion as response generating responsibility shapes the structure of their work.

The traditional affective virtues of Fortitude and Temperance are acknowledged and briefly explored in the early Häring. They are reformulated by Grisez, drawing on Aquinas, using the setting of modes of responsibility. In Peschke and the later Häring, these virtues are absorbed in the process of conversion and in forms of responsibility. Häring highlights the eschatological virtues which, in fact, are indicators of affective equilibrium and well-being. In these and other modern authors, the thrust towards redemption and transformation of the world is consonant with the relational nature of the person apparent in the social repercussions of emotions and of the affective virtues.

Overall, these authors represent positions that range from the predominantly teleological, to a modified teleology to a dominantly eschatological thrust. Grisez is most dependent on Aquinas while there is a decreasing appeal to Aquinas in Peschke and Häring, especially in the later writing of Häring. Emotions receive minimal coverage in Peschke, are more detailed in Grisez (from a reinterpreted Thomistic perspective) and also in Häring where he employs a phenomenological and axiological methodology. Conversion and Fundamental Option are the hub of the moral life in Peschke and the early Häring but are given greater emphasis and exposition in the later Häring.

3.2: Comparison and Contrast of these authors with Manualists and Aquinas
Three headings seem to emerge that encapsulate the different understandings of the emotions and the human person and their significance.

3.2.1: Dynamics of human subjectivity

The first aspect here is self-awareness. The post-Enlightenment vision of the optimistic, autonomous human being was expanded with the Darwinian proposition that man “rode forth on the crest of evolution’s advance” (Tarnas, 1991, p. 327). Consciousness of the self was both deepened and questioned by Freud when he applied the tools of rational investigation to the conscious and, in particular, to the unconscious. This development merged with the tradition from Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger and the Christian personalism of Mounier. Experiential analysis focused on “being” itself, “on the lived world of human experience, on its increasing ambiguity, its spontaneity and autonomy, its uncontainable dimensions, its ever-deepening complexity” (Tarnas, 1990, p. 374). There was also the turn to the subject from theologians such as Rahner and Lonergan. All these exemplify what Kennedy notes earlier, the awareness by the self of the person as “a secret guest”, at once immanent yet transcending the subject (1996, p. 74).

Overall, these are some of the factors that created what Taylor refers to as “modern inwardness, the sense of ourselves as beings of inner depths, and the connected notion that we are ‘selves’ ” (1989, p. x). These sources provide the instruments for the detailed analysis of consciousness and of the emotions evident in Häring and, to a lesser extent, in Grisez but which is absent in the Manualists. This expands the coherent yet, by modern standards, inadequate account of Aquinas. This is exemplified in Grisez and Häring who advance on Aquinas by recognising the moral ramifications of unconscious emotions and affective states on conscious attitudes and behaviour.
Self-awareness was not only of the personal self but also of the self-in-relationship. The dark side of human personhood is uncovered by Marx in the social unconscious leading to a determinism from hidden political, economic and social forces. Conversely, there is the positive evolution of understandings of the person as a political/social subject of human rights, particularly in the face of totalitarian ideologies and institutions. The heritage of Locke, revolutionary Europe and emerging social theory finds its voice in Catholic Social Teaching from 1891 and Rerum Novarum. These are complemented by approaches to the person in writers such as Buber. The person develops as a self-in-relationship through intimacy, dialogue, response. This is reflected in H. Richard Niebuhr’s ethic of the responsible self. The person in society and the world is one of the dominant concerns of the second Vatican Council. Social and structural injustice becomes be an increasing theme over the past thirty years.

These are important considerations if one is to grasp the significance of how these authors understand the emotions and the person. The social context and the overall thrust of Peschke and Häring emerge from the confluence of these factors. There is a strong emphasis in Häring on the historical, social and interpersonal nature of the person and, hence, of response and responsibility (Gallagher, 1990, p. 206). In such a setting, emotions as value-responses have a social origin and goal that is more clearly delineated. The affective dimensions of the self contribute to the vision and the realisation of God’s reign.

This standpoint has a more cultivated awareness of the communitarian aspect of personhood. As has been suggested above, the moral significance and interpersonal connotations of emotions such as anger, sadness or fear evident in Aquinas seem to have been disregarded by these authors. Having said that, this stance in these authors also forms a marked contrast with what appears as a self-concerned, almost self-
absorbed portrayal of the person and the moral life in the Manualists. One author
goes so far as to say how he was “appalled by the egocentricity which dominated so
much pre-Vatican II Catholic ethics” (Vacek, 1994, p. xvi). Is this also true of
Aquinas? Mention has already been made of Porter’s reservations about the social
dimension of the person in Aquinas (1990, p. 176) and of Clarke’s counter argument
(Clarke, 1986). A recent discussion points out that Aquinas’ essentialist metaphysics
of the person tends to accord “priority to categories of substance over categories of

What can be said in the light of this project? Words such as “egocentric” and “self-
absorbed” seems too strong to use of Aquinas’ Moral Theology. Is there any truth in
the observation that it is difficult for Aquinas to avoid portraying the human person
as “finally a self-contained individual” (Porter, 1990, p. 176). Two observations may
help. Firstly, a distinction should be made. If by “social” one means “relational,”
i.e., between persons, the evidence indicates that Aquinas does pursue some
interpersonal implications of the affective virtues and of some emotions while not
adverting to their potential as tools for social change. If “social” connotes
relationships in the public sphere, i.e., economic, societal, political, environmental,
structural, then this domain, while not absent, is not the dominant context of
Aquinas’ moral vision as it is for these modern writers.

Secondly, both Aquinas and these modern authors are concerned with growth in
Christian discipleship. But, as Keenan points out recently, for Aquinas the virtues
are perfections of the emotions that enable a person to develop and realise the in-
built potentialities of human affectivity (Keenan, 1998, p. 139ff). The main context
is the harmony and integration of the moral subject through the exercise of the
virtues. In Peschke and Häring, we see early indications of the more relational
dimension of the virtues (both interpersonal and social/structural) and on the goal of
fellowship and unity of the Kingdom. The context is now the world-human and natural-and the vision of harmony and peace which emerges from human moral response and co-responsibility with God. It is through responding virtuously in such relationships that the moral subject comes to maturity in Christ.

3.2.2: Aspects of morality

The understandings of the emotions and the person shape the views of moral epistemology. The affective appreciation of value as the foundation of moral consciousness is shared by Peschke, Grisez and Häring. The contribution and moral significance of emotions in practical reasoning is elaborated by Grisez and Häring. These provide a marked contrast with the ambivalent and, at times, negative approach in the Manualists. It also counteracts the dualism lurking in the Manualists. In a way, this type of affective knowing is an initial form of the participatory epistemology mentioned by Tarnas (1990, p. 423) and explained in the first chapter of this study.

There is also a contrast in moral theory. Nowhere in any of the volumes of Häring and Peschke (nor Grisez) is there a section on the Canon Law of the Sacraments. More significantly, the structure and content of their works indicate a shift from the legal, voluntarist, externally-directed theory of moral life that underlies the Manualists. There is, simultaneously, a return to interiorisation begun in conversion, to the place of intentionality and the virtue-based ethics of Aquinas combined with the emergence of an emphasis on social responsibility and eschatological considerations.

Thirdly, moral agency has a different focus than that found in the Manuals, even those shaped by the neo-Thomists. Peschke and Grisez give greater weight to teleological categories. For Häring, fundamental end and happiness are realities.
However, they are not understood in terms of ontology, teleology or of human nature as a metaphysical essence with certain needs, potentialities and requirements. For Häring, as for Peschke and Grisez, moral agency is exercised and achieved in relation to the imitation of Christ. For Häring, in particular, final and efficient causality are not organising categories as in Aquinas. Gallagher points out that, for Häring, “exemplary causality tends to replace final causality” (1990, p. 205). Moreover, the contours of pastoral ministry precisely as the work of healing are different when the setting is not juridical but is rather the response to the invitation to follow Christ.

3.2.3: Moral Vision and Vocation

The Christocentric nature of the moral life is a key element in the three authors. The Biblical basis of morality is not given the place in Grisez that it receives in Peschke and Häring. In the later Häring, the need for the right vision has priority over normative ethics in Moral Theology (1978, p. 6 and p. 317). For all three authors, the Christian vocation is to follow Jesus Christ and to cooperate in responsibility in the religious realm and in and for the world. Growth in the affective virtues is not aimed at self-fulfilment. Highlighting the eschatological virtues shifts the gaze to love for and with God. We are partners with God- “God’s co-workers” (1 Cor. 3:9). As Vacek says neatly, citing de Chardin, “In cooperating with God’s love for the world, we want not only to affirm and promote the fulfillment of creation, but also to increase ‘Christ’s blessed hold on the universe’ ” (1994, p. 140).

This chapter can be summed up by in this manner. In looking back over the passage of this study on the moral significance of the emotions, one can observe a pattern. The three sets of soundings (Aquinas, Manualists, post-conciliar authors) have generated contrasting “world-views” or “sensibilities” that are as much cultural and
philosophical as they are religious and theological. While these may, at times,
converge or, at times, conflict and, often, may diverge, this is as it should be. Their
relationship should be one that is mutually critical. Nevertheless, such an evaluation
is generally done from inside the Catholic tradition. It may be helpful, even
necessary, to engage in a critical appraisal using benchmarks external to that
tradition. This will be the next and final task of this project.
Chapter 7

Contemporary Soundings and Benchmarks

In arriving at the final research chapter of this thesis, the focus remains the same but the tilling is done in different soil. The three research questions will be applied to writings from Moral Philosophy (Oakley), Psychology (Callahan) and Developmental Psychology (Gilligan, Shelton). Other sources, e.g., theological writing, will also be considered as influenced by, or converging with, these authors.

The first task is to address the research question “How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in the (Christian) moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character?” The bracketing of “Christian” indicates that this does not provide the context for the discussion of the topic in the specific authors mentioned (with the exception of Shelton). This chapter will entail an examination of key elements in their writings together with a correlation and evaluation of these and the authors discussed earlier in relation to each other, i.e., Aquinas, Manualists and post-Manualists.

1. The Moral Significance of the Emotions

1.1: Emotions and the Human Act

1.1.1: Emotions and morality: A view from Moral Philosophy

Justin Oakley’s Morality and the Emotions (1992) is one of the few comprehensive treatments of the topic published in English. His aim is to counter the view that
emotions just happen to us, that they are beyond our power or control. Oakley’s argument is that emotions play a fundamental role in the moral life and are necessary for the humanly flourishing life. They are “essential and enduring features of our moral character” (1992, p. 5). Oakley takes Aristotle’s claim that moral virtue demands not only acting well “but also having the right emotions in the right way towards the appropriate objects and to the right degree” (1992, p. 2). A proper appreciation of the moral significance of emotions requires an adequate account of the nature of an emotion which he attempts in Chapter one. He views emotions as “complex phenomena involving dynamically related elements of cognition, desire and affectivity” (1992, p. 2). This has already been discussed in Chapter 2 of this project. Suffice to say that, for Oakley, only such a model is sufficient to explain, firstly, the moral significance of emotions (through the balancing of the three elements) and, secondly, the characteristics of the right emotions entailed in moral virtue.

The remainder of the book revolves around three questions. Firstly, does one have obligations to have and to cultivate certain emotions? Oakley’s second chapter attempts to answer this affirmatively by examining the moral significance of emotions. He argues that emotions can help facilitate or impede the achieving of certain human goods or values, e.g., strength of will, psychic harmony, love and friendship, a sense of self-worth. Emotions such as sympathy, care, compassion, concern, courage assist in attaining such goods. Conversely, emotions such as envy, fear, self-pity, resentment undermine or oppose the realisation of these values.

Secondly, Oakley asks whether emotions can be appropriate moral motivations. After dealing with the Kantian arguments against emotions as moral motives, Oakley again gives an affirmative answer by demonstrating the moral values of certain emotions independent of the motivation they may provide for right action. The final
question concerns whether one can be held responsible for having or not having certain emotions. This is taken up in Chapter four where Oakley examines the nature and extent of one’s control of emotions. He then proceeds to elaborate a person’s responsibility to exercise control over emotions at a deeper level by endeavouring to develop, shape or modify emotional capacities over a period of time. A person has the responsibility to cultivate moral sensitivity because one has the power to do so and because moral sensitivity makes a notable difference in one’s actions. In the final chapter, Oakley examines the forms of moral assessments made in relation to the emotions and to the configuration of one’s emotional life (praise/blame, esteem/disesteem).

This study will discuss two aspects of Oakley’s treatment, firstly, his understanding of the moral significance of emotions and, secondly, his discussion of moral reasoning.

1.1.1.1: Moral significance of emotions

Oakley has an extended and valuable analysis of the moral significance of emotions. His overall emphasis is on emotions in terms of their goodness (rather than as impediments to moral growth). Mention has already been made of the need, in Oakley’s view, to explain the moral significance of an emotion in terms of all of its three components, i.e., cognition, affection, desire. For instance, if one sees an emotion’s moral significance only in terms of cognition and desire what is the outcome? It means that when John knows that someone needs help and desires to do something though he is not actually moved affectively (e.g., by compassion) it is, morally speaking, no different from Bill who has the knowledge, desire and is emotionally moved by the person’s plight. In fact, there is far less chance that John will act merely on the knowledge and/or the desire. Further, he may do so but fail to
give the help that is really needed, e.g., a sympathetic ear or shoulder, because he has no emotional involvement. Conversely, Harry may know this person needs help, is moved emotionally but has no desire to assist or act. One cannot attribute compassion to him in the same moral sense as that of Anne who knows, is sympathetic and desires to help the one in need. Finally, Mary may be genuinely moved with sympathy, have a desire to assist but, because of inadequate knowledge, can act in ways that are misguided or irresponsible. Her emotion of compassion is hardly the moral equivalent of Sophie's who, beyond the sympathy and desire to help, endeavours to gain a fuller picture of this situation so as to provide more adequate assistance.

Oakley’s main, and considerable, contribution is his effort to demonstrate the moral significance of emotions through their necessary involvement in achieving certain goods. The main elements in this process will be highlighted briefly.

For Oakley, clear perception, keen judgement, insight and understanding are essential to a good person both as values in themselves and in contributing to good actions. Certain emotions, e.g., care, interest, can deepen and expand one’s perception and understanding of the world (1992, p. 50). Emotions such as sympathy and compassion may be necessary to notice certain realities or situations in the world. More importantly, they are needed to enter another person’s world imaginatively so that one can feel for and with them in their need. Without these emotions, one’s perceptions, even desires, are constrained and blunted. Oakley also uses the example of the emotion of love expanding one’s perception and understanding of others. Love leads one to contemplate another’s well-being, to adopt the viewpoint of the beloved, see the world through their eyes, to experience “with them” (Oakley, 1992, p. 52). Overall, it is emotions such as these that, through art, literature and film, one’s insight and understanding are expanded by identifying
with the characters in pity, fear, admiration, sympathy. For such reasons they are important and, hence, morally significant.

Another value, according to Oakley, is strength of will—the transforming of values into action that is persevering. Emotions such as care, sympathy and courage are important in preserving action. Further, Oakley argues that when what a person values is in accord with what is morally good “we may be morally better if in carrying out what we believe good, our emotions harmonise with our values, than if our emotions and values are in disharmony” (1992, p. 54). He suggests four reasons for this. Firstly, emotional involvement will often help a person be more ready and reliable in successfully carrying out what they value. Secondly, such a harmony between emotions and values indicates “a certain moral integrity or wholeness” (1992, p. 54). There is a psychic harmony associated with human flourishing and moral integration. Thirdly, and crucially, “a person who values the right things and is emotionally moved to act on them seems morally better than someone who has and acts on these values in the face of conflicting inclinations, because the former person’s emotions are an indication that these values are really his” (1992, p. 55). This is nothing other than appropriation, internalisation and growth in affective virtues. Fourthly, psychic harmony associated with action in cooperation with emotions provides the necessary foundation for achieving goods such as love and friendship (Oakley, 1992, p. 55). A lover may act out of love (motive) for the sake of the beloved (reason for action). If it is a true act of love, there is a necessary connection between the motive and the reason for the action. This would not be the case if one were to act for the beloved’s good because it maximised self-interest (1992, p. 55).

Psychic harmony and strength of will, notes Oakley, can also be evil ends. One may believe something to be good which, in fact, is evil and one is moved emotionally to
morally wrong action with accompanying inner equilibrium and strength of purpose. These are instances of the influence of bias, prejudice, malice, even of corrupted consciousness. They will involve emotionally wrong responses. Conversely, psychic disharmony and emotional disturbance through remorse or guilt are indicators of the need for moral change to regain harmony and equilibrium. These are further confirmations of the moral significance of emotions.

**Love and friendship** involve relationships that require mutual understanding, shared interests, a desire to promote the other’s welfare and, importantly here, certain emotions towards and about each other. A friend or a lover is affected and motivated by whatever fosters or impedes the other’s good—an emotional valuing of their good (Oakley, 1992, p. 58). Love and friendship are worth achieving, valuable in themselves and in relation to other goods in life. They are necessary for a person to flourish. Emotions are morally significant because of the important role they play in such basic relationships in terms of continuity, sense of purpose, knowledge of life (1992, p. 60). The absence of these and of friendship and love from a person’s life “could be a grave loss” and indicators that, in those respects, a person’s life is “morally lacking” (1992, p. 62). The appreciation of the other, the concern for their well-being, can develop a deeper awareness of human needs and desires, of oneself and particularly of the qualities of one’s life “...as itself unified and continuous, in a manner that is unavailable to a person whose life lacks love and friendship” (1992, p. 62).

Emotions also have an important connection with **self-worth** whether it be one’s own and that of others. Oakley cites Solomon, Sartre, Heidegger in pointing out that it is through our emotions that we constitute ourselves—i.e. through our emotions we bestow meaning to the circumstances of our lives and invest ourselves in the world, providing opportunities for fulfilment and frustration, and it is in such
constitution and involvement that an appreciation of our self-worth is reached (1992, p. 64).

Emotions create interests, purposes, attachments which are important in shaping one’s identity, self-concept and self-esteem. So certain emotions are involved in attachments (to oneself, others, projects, goals, values) all of which are “essential to our reaching an appreciation of our own worth” (Oakley, 1992, p. 65). As will be explained later, the psychological foundations of self-esteem are found in the emotions, especially in basic trust. Self-esteem, self-care and self-concern are needed conditions for seeing and responding to the needs and worth of others. The moral significance of emotions emerges from their association with self-worth since the appreciation of the worth of the person is “of unquestionable moral significance” (Oakley, 1992, p. 68).

Finally, Oakley recognises that emotional deficiency has an important bearing on the moral actions and development of a person (1992, p. 46f). It could be due to a lack of appropriate cognitions, e.g., superficial understanding of others and of situations. It could result from lack of desire in having no motivation or direction in life. There may be absence of affective response in a person. All three of these affect a person’s perceptions, insight, sensitivity, self-esteem, respect for others, strength of will, psychic harmony, and the capacity for love and friendship. These qualities and the emotions associated with them, such as sympathy and compassion, are morally important for a person’s character. Their lack may indicate certain moral defects in a person.

1.1.1.2: Emotions and moral reasoning

Oakley has a helpful discussion on moral reasoning—that process for determining the moral rightness and wrongness of human acts. In discussing whether all emotions
are morally significant, Oakley suggest a helpful two-part test. Firstly, to ask whether this is “an instance of an emotion-type which helps constitute or undermine one of the goods central to human flourishing” (1992, p.79). The emotions he emphasises (e.g., compassion, courage, fear, envy etc.) fulfill these conditions.

Those such as awe, embarrassment, nostalgia, do not. Oakley refers to this test as “first-level moral significance” (1992, p. 79).

The second question concerns whether this emotion is morally appropriate in a particular situation or, in other words, are there some emotions always right or always wrong? For instance, is compassion for a thief engaging in illegal activities morally wrong? Is the possessive love of a parent for a child always a wrong emotion? Right or wrong in these contexts entails “second-level moral significance” (1992, p. 80). This is Oakley’s particular concern now. Oakley’s position is that one’s particular emotional response

    is right if what we take it to be directed at is in fact morally good, whereas an emotional response of ours is wrong if what we take it to be directed at is in fact morally bad, where ‘goodness’ and ‘badness’ are understood here according to virtue ethics: i.e. in terms of what contributes to or detracts from a flourishing life (1992, p. 80f).

How can one determine what is the right or wrong object of an emotion in an individual case? It is through practical reason or phronesis, says Oakley. “The rightness or wrongness of a particular emotional response is dependent on whether it is in fact aligned with an appropriate object, in the manner of a practically wise person” (1992, p. 81). If the object and the emotional response are consistent with

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67 This author disagrees with Oakley in his view of “awe.” An emotion such as awe (and wonder) has an especially self-transcending quality that reveals an openness and sensitivity to values or realities that draw a person out of themselves in responding to such experiences as beauty or love. From that perspective, they are central to human flourishing and, therefore, to moral growth.
those had by a practically wise person (*phronimos*), then one’s “emotional response is right in this situation” (Oakley, 1992, p. 83).

*Phronesis*, then, integrates the “perceptual, deliberative, affective, and practical faculties so that they operate well together” (Oakley, 1992, p. 81). It disposes a person to respond emotionally and act in certain ways. More importantly, certain emotions are indispensable in making one sensitive to values by directing one’s perceptions to “certain ethically salient features of situations” (1992, p. 82). Oakley cites the words of Nancy Sherman who says

...a sense of indignation makes us sensitive to those who suffer unwarranted insult or injury, just as a sense of pity and compassion opens our eyes to the pains of sudden and cruel misfortune...We notice through feeling what might otherwise go unheeded by a cool and detached intellect. To see dispassionately without engaging the emotions is often to be at peril of missing what is relevant (1992, p. 82).

To sum up: Oakley’s position is quite clear. There are emotions that are morally significant in themselves. Further, emotions and their corresponding virtues are integral to ethical reasoning. Without them, we cannot be moral beings and, hence, truly human. More comment will be made on Oakley later in this chapter. It is time to move on to the next task.

1.1.2. *Moral reasoning: the alternative of “seeing” differently*

Morality is concerned with the human purposes considered necessary to preserve certain qualities of life. There are divergent views on the amalgam of goals desired important and necessary for human flourishing. Oakley’s aretaic conception of the moral life does not hold a monopoly position. Different forms of moral reasoning emerge from the sets of standards employed to achieve human purposes and from the
ordering of priorities in human action.

Kennedy notes that “all human actions involve reason in reaching a decision” (1996, p. 152). He then proceeds to make an important distinction. Practical or moral reasoning involves (amongst others) two steps that are crucial. **Deliberation** identifies “the means needed to achieve an end” (1996, p. 152). From this emerges the judgement. **Decision** is concerned with saying “yes” or “no” to one of the alternative courses made clear by deliberation. There is an on-going debate about the factors needed to contribute to and facilitate the activity of moral reasoning. This thesis has been concerned with the significance of the emotions in this process.

Kennedy points out that moral reasoning “is a unique mode of knowing that does not correspond to any of our theoretic ways of knowing for knowing’s sake” (1990, p. 399). Aristotle (as Aquinas) appreciated this in his distinction between *episteme* and *phronesis* and the differences between them in terms of their grasp of facts and certainty concerning truth. Kennedy, reviewing a recent book of Jean Porter, draws attention to her argument that the development of mathematical reasoning as the paradigm for moral reasoning since Kant has influenced the deontological, utilitarian and consequentialist approaches. In Porter’s words “On this view, moral rules are to be understood as functioning, in the realm of practical reason, in the same way as mathematical functions work in the realm of speculative reason” (1995, p. 568). This provides the context for examining briefly the work in Developmental Psychology of Gilligan (1982) and others. The theory of moral development of Kohlberg was subjected to a radical criticism by Gilligan. She considered Kohlberg a child of the Enlightenment in “representing a typically formalistic view of moral criteria” (Philibert, 197, p. 105). He sees moral reasoning and moral development in terms that are ideal, universal, abstract and impersonal. Hepburn, citing Friedman,
notes that both Moral Psychology and Moral Philosophy have been preoccupied “...with universal and impartial conceptions of justice and rights and the relative disregard for particular, interpersonal relationships based on partiality and affection ties” (1993, p. 35).

Kohlberg is representative of such an approach. Feeling and caring as dynamic factors in moral reasoning cease at stage three in Kohlberg’s model. Affective and relational concerns, rather than having a place in further stages of moral maturity, are, in fact, impediments to it. This perspective mirrors the major approaches in ethics which stress values such as justice, personal autonomy, rationality and dispassionate enquiry. Gilligan argues that Kohlberg’s work confines his examination of moral development to males and proceeded to make his findings normative for men and women. Gilligan endeavours to understand women and their experience within their own frame of reference rather than through masculine categories. Her research highlights the different perspective women adopt in moral reasoning which is also reflected in the trajectory of their moral development. It can be formulated thus: contemporary moral theory emphasises the question “what is just?” Gilligan suggests as an alternative “how to respond?”

Gilligan’s core insight is summed up in one sentence, “...women not only define themselves in a context of human relationship but also judge themselves in terms of their ability to care” (1982, p. 17). Moral reasoning in the form of “how do I respond?” is, according to Gilligan, a “problem of care and responsibility in relationships rather than as one of rights and rules” and links the development their moral thinking “to changes in their understanding of responsibility and relationships” (1982, p.73). Care, as the typical preoccupation in moral concerns of women, has its roots in the experience of connectedness and the need to tend this “as a feminine duty,” rather than achieve separation and “dominative authority as a male duty”
Gilligan builds on the earlier work of Chodorow (1975) who attempted to counter the masculine bias of psychoanalytic theory. The thesis advanced by Chodorow concerns the different dynamics of gender identity formation for boys and girls. In shaping their masculine identity, boys separate their mothers from themselves and hence curtail their “primary love and sense of empathic tie” (Gilligan, 1982, p. 8). Girls, on the other hands, identify themselves as female in the context of ongoing relationships, especially with their mother. The experience of being female is fused with the experience of attachment. Women’s sense of identity has a built-in basis for empathy, for experiencing the needs and feelings of others as one’s own.

Gilligan’s uncovering of the role of response and relationships underscores the role of emotions (especially care and empathy), of personal commitments and affective dispositions in moral reasoning. There is a questioning of the Kantian view that moral action involves control over, even disengagement from, the emotions. For many women, deliberate detachment from feelings seems to “cloud rather than clarify thinking about moral action” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 28). There is the need to integrate, in some manner, the two forms of moral reasoning described by Gilligan. Hepburn points out that Gilligan and other feminist authors (e.g., Baier) underline the moral significance of emotions in that “deliberate attention to them may heighten moral sensitivity” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 27). This different way of “seeing” means that moral deliberation, decision, action and growth require the cultivation of “desirable forms of emotional response, such as loving” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 28).
One implication of this is that perhaps the central moral problem for women is the conflict between self and the other. This way of perceiving the ethical dilemma requires the reconciliation between being feminine and being adult, between compassion and autonomy, between virtue and personal power. Preserving a sense of self-in-relationship as a factor integral to resolving the moral problem will emerge in an outcome where no one gets hurt (Jackson, 1989, p. 226).

While a thorough critique of Gilligan and others is not within the parameters of this thesis, some observations are appropriate. Firstly, the detachment of Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”68 dominant in modern descriptions of moral reasoning (and assumed in Kohlberg) needs the balance of a perspective that appreciates the importance of personal meanings and relationships. The need for this is even reflected in contemporary shifts in language where people are portrayed in impersonal terms and appear to be alienated from each other. Babies as “products of conception,” people as “clients,” loss of a job as “retrenching,” or “downsizing,” suggest a trend where life and people are seen as commodities. Such language is a symptom of emotional disengagement for the sake of more “objective” judgements. As Hepburn remarks “In doing so we are able to justify our actions but by relegating the subjective and the person to the private arena we risk losing the insight born of experience and often regret the action taken” (1993, p. 28).

Secondly, there has been a reclaiming of the fuller understanding of rationality that is found in Aquinas (and in modern thinkers such as MacMurray). Emotions are responses to values embodied in people, events and the world around us. If human beings have the capacity to know and understand with the help of non-rational elements (emotions) “then it must be possible to admit such potentially morally significant insights to our consideration of ethical dilemmas” (Hepburn, 1993, p. 31).

Human beings are qualitatively different from other species through their ability to experience a plethora of insights and emotions that can inspire and transform at the deepest personal level. Art, in all its forms, testifies to that (Hepburn, 1993, p. 31).

Thirdly, a major criticism of Kohlberg is his reliance upon hypothetical moral dilemmas. Such tests in moral acumen foster a view of moral reasoning as an analytical exercise in problem solving. For the sake of impartiality, much information is omitted concerning the person’s life, context and relationships (Hepburn, 1993, p. 29). In the type of problems selected and the process used to address them, moral reasoning appears as out touch with everyday life. It seems to be unrelated, and even opposed, to the narrative continuity of a person’s life. It is not considered to be the constant presence of prudence or phronesis (perhaps in a richer sense than that understood by Aristotle and Aquinas) directing concrete judgements and effective action in that life.

Fourthly, as Philibert points out, despite socialisation and culture, “men too must learn to be caring, responsible in relation, and compassionate” (1987, p. 105). This entails the task of re-education and raising of consciousness. Further, Gilligan has been criticised for failing to give attention to the way attachment functions in men’s experience (Conn, 1989, p. 47). In other words, one needs to ask of Gilligan whether the alternative way of “seeing” is gender specific, i.e., only found in women? How, for instance, do her findings correlate with the Myers-Briggs Type Inventory? This psychological typology meets the requires scientific standards of validity and reliability. It is estimated that 12% of the general population has the N and F functions as their dominant preference where N = Intuition and F = Feeling (Keirsey & Bates, 1978, p. 60). Due to the influence of socialisation and cultural bias, allowance is made for a distribution of 60% women and 40% men in this figure (Myers & McCaulley, 1985, p. 45ff). This means that there are 7.2% of women and,
significantly, 4.8% of men whose perception, organisation and evaluation of reality together with their decision-making functions are characterised by intuition, feeling, and concern for relationships? One has to wonder whether care, concern and compassion as the form of moral reasoning is confined to women.

Fifthly, Gilligan and others are proposing a relational rather than a formal account of moral theory. Further, this account is a moral anthropology that is prior to moral casuistry. It broadens the understanding of the resources required to approach moral questions. “For Gilligan, this means that both male formalism and feminine contextualism are essential to an adequate account of morality” (Philibert, 1987, p. 113).

Finally, in the notion of “interconnectedness” there is a recovering of a more holistic, historical, relational and social understanding of the human subject. This notion also implies the interrelation of human values and of a person’s “anthropological endowments” (Philibert, 1987, p. 111). Body, mind, will and emotions are interdependent and meant to work in collaboration.

1.1.3: Mutual tutoring of reason and emotion: the psychological dynamic

Sidney Callahan approaches the question of ethical decisionmaking predominantly from the perspective of Psychology (1988, 1991). She offers a model of a mutual interaction of thinking and feeling. Reason should monitor and tutor emotions while “emotions should tutor reason and...emotions should monitor emotions (1988, p. 9). The goal is that a moral decision should emerge “through a personal equilibrium in which emotion and reason are both activated and in accord “ (1988, p. 9). Callahan’s specific contribution in the present project is twofold. Firstly, she explains in empirical terms the psychological basis for the moral significance of emotions.
Secondly, she provides a detailed account of the psychological mechanisms that activate and sustain the collaboration of thinking and emotion in moral reasoning.

1.1.3.1: Psychological foundations

It has already been noted in Chapter two how emotions are interpreted differently by various theories whether cognitive, evolutionary or social constructionist. Callahan tends to the psychoevolutionary view which sees the “emotions, like human cognitive capacities, to have been selected through evolution to ensure the survival of individuals and the group. Emotions are energizing and adaptive, and serve communicating, bonding and motivating functions” (1988, p. 10). Without emotions to enrich physiological drives and the processes of knowing, human beings would lack the incentive and care to live, mate, procreate, make friends and pursue art, literature and thought (1988, p. 10). There is cross-cultural evidence of a limited set of basic or “primary” emotions, e.g., interest/ excitement etc. (as discussed in Chapter two of this thesis).

At the psychological level, humans have “emotional and cognitive capacities that operate interactively” (1988, p. 10). The human organism has subsystems that balance each other. Within this context, reason understood as a verbal, knowing process can operate with greater speed, mobility and detachment than emotions. Whereas, “the emotional system...seems to respond to and encode in memory nonverbal, qualitative dimensions of experience” (1988, p. 10). Emotions and thinking are complementary, parallel processes, “constantly blending and interacting as a person functions” (1988, p. 10).

Callahan makes the important point that, in the human flow of consciousness, emotions interact in intricate ways in which memory has a distinctive role. As a
person thinks through a situation or a problem, a call is made on memory. The networks of memory may be triggered by “either a feeling or an idea; calling up one part of a scenario may activate the feelings or ideas stored with it” (1988, p. 10; 1991, p. 81ff). For instance, thinking of a dead parent may activate feelings of anger or sadness: feeling angry or sad may trigger thoughts of the deceased parent. Emotional states can affect a range of cognitive processes, for instance, the filtering and selective ability of memory, evaluations of oneself or of others, even the perception and evaluation of physical stimuli (1988, p. 10; 1991, p. 81ff).

Researchers into the emotional development of children have supplemented linear models (i.e., emotions cause thinking or vice-versa) with the image of a musical fugue. The cognitive-emotional relationship is an “interweaving process (that) goes on in human beings throughout life: emotions induce thoughts that may induce emotion” (1988, p. 10). This interplay in personal consciousness emerges in art, poetry, music etc. and “can become open to introspection” (1988, p. 10).

From a psychological standpoint, why are emotions important in moral functioning? Callahan begins by offering a cross-cultural argument. The emotions of guilt and shame develop in children in every culture and do so at the same age. Where there is lack of emotional response, for instance, of empathy, guilt, love, anxiety, this undermines or impedes a person’s moral responsiveness. Such a person “cannot feel the inner force of moral obligation” (1988, p. 10; 1991, p. 39f).

Secondly, emotions animate and “energize the ethical quest” (1988, p. 10). A person must have a sufficient degree of interest and care to both struggle with moral issues and to persevere in discerning the truth despite difficulties and distractions. Callahan even suggests that perhaps what gives moral thinking “its imperative ‘oughtness’ is personal emotional investment. When emotion infuses an evaluative judgment, it is transformed into a prescriptive moral judgment of what ought to be done” (1988, p.
Thirdly, and importantly, the very underpinnings of moral thinking appear to be “imbued with emotion” according to Callahan (1988, p. 10). The long-term memory seems to store thoughts and emotions that have been fused together. These “cognitive-affective constructs, the thing and the feeling-about-the-thing, appear to be complex or extensive enough to be called narratives, ‘scripts,’ ‘scenes,’ or ‘scenarios’” (1988, p. 11; also 1991, p. 105f). Moral sentiments are made up of the “fusions of things joined with feelings about the thing, as for instance, ‘torture = wrong, disgusting’ or ‘truth telling = good’” (1988, p. 11). In thinking through a moral question, stores within the memory are called on and, through the linked associations, shape one’s thinking (1988, p. 11). For example, a person’s initial emotional response to a situation may be anger/indignation (‘that’s not fair!’). There follows a testing against scenes, memories, paradigms to interpret the events (‘this is just like what happened when...’). One is then prompted by the emotion to “experience the scenario of characteristic action (‘Someone’s going to pay for this’)” (Spohn, 1991, p. 75).

Fourthly, selective attention and filtering are shaped by a person’s emotional commitments. The process of moral decision-making is influenced by one’s past experiences and, as has already been noted, by long-term memory. There is growing evidence that what appear to be spontaneous thoughts or emotions are not at all random. “Extensive preconscious selection and filtering interact with long-term memory to determine what reaches conscious awareness” (Callahan, 1988, p. 11). This activity will have personal significance. Further, emotional responses, especially in the form of moral sentiments, require that a person has the habits developed through past effort that “indicate the achievement of self-development and those ‘habits of the heart’ known as moral character” (1988, p. 11; 1991, p. 207f).
1.1.3.2: Thinking and emotion in collaboration

What, then, is the interrelationship of emotion and reason (thinking) in moral reasoning according to Callahan? Firstly, reason judges and tutors emotions. As one can be conscious of the ebb and flow of emotions during moral discernment, one can also “rationally judge, assess, and shape these emotions while being affected by them during the moral decision-making process” (1991, p. 127). Developing, according to rational criteria, proper desires and motivations together with justified and appropriate emotions is integral to moral agency. Assessment of emotional response to a particular course of action must also be consistent “with our larger moral purposes, or integrated with our other personal moral goals and emotional commitments” (1991, p. 128). Inducing, enacting and educating emotions is possible through personal strategies, for example, thinking of certain images or beliefs, recalling certain remembered states of feeling and the scenarios associated with them. If necessary, cognitive therapy can be used for this purpose in psychotherapy (Callahan, 1991, p. 129).

The rational assessment of emotions, as summarily noted above, has been valued and developed for a long time. One aspect that is usefully clarified by Callahan is the psychology of self-deception. Human beings desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain. They will engage in the most subtle manoeuvres or ‘defenses’ to protect themselves from pain. People will resort to ‘selective attention’ to “deploy attention away from painful reality, or if that fails, to distort what is perceived and felt” (1988, p. 11). The constant and inflexible activating of these cognitive-affective structures ends up by crippling their emotional capacities. Other psychological mechanisms such as mania, depression and regression can lead to a childish manner of thinking and feeling that produces irrational emotions and thinking.
Callahan helpfully points out the implication of this for moral reasoning. Often, emotion at war with reason has been portrayed as the dominant characteristic of moral conflict. In the light of the above considerations, especially the phenomenon of regression, the conflict is more often “a case of one immature thinking-emotive moral scenario in conflict with another more wholly owned and appropriately mature moral scenario” (1988, p. 12). Attending to these emotions, to their associated images, memories, prejudices, using strategies to engage with them, changing perspectives and beliefs—all these can assist in cultivating appropriate emotions responses and affective integration.

Secondly, emotion tests and tutors reason—a more controversial claim, according to Callahan (1988, p. 12; 1991, p. 129). The preconscious prefiltering process required by consciousness allied with the capacity of emotions to respond to reality means that “even momentary emotions can be seen as a message to myself, from myself and all that has shaped me: (1988, p. 12). They are personal signals or ‘vital signs’ that inform us “of inner processes or of interactions with the environment” (1988, p. 12).

Emotions tutor and monitor reason, firstly, in negative ways. In thinking through moral difficulties and arguments, negative emotions such as aversion or repugnance can be warning flares. The rational arguments may be logical and flawless, but one feels persistently that something is wrong but cannot say why exactly. One is morally restrained by the emotion and impelled to search for a morally acceptable solution. There are times when “pure logic can run amok” (1991, p. 130; 1988, p. 12).

Emotions can also have a positive function in prompting someone to go beyond “their habitual moral framework” (1988, p. 12). Emotions can activate the networks of memory, can evoke the scenarios and ideas stored with or near these emotions and
is able to produce new reverberations and possibilities (1991, p. 131 f). For example, one may have, at times, felt anger in being wronged which, combined with a desire for fairness, can trigger moral indignation when any person is mistreated that moves one to try to change social conditions. Anger and empathy in regard to the excluded and neglected can kindle revolutions in moral sensitivity. History provides evidence of this in changed attitude to slaves, women, children, the handicapped and other minority groups (1988, p. 12). From a positive emotional response such as empathy, one may be compelled to “confront a conflicting moral attitude concerning the group” (1988, p. 12; 1991, p. 132). The ensuing discrepancy and dissonance then prompts an expansion of one’s moral vision and response. Love, as had already be remarked, also expands one’s focus, perspective and commitments.

Thirdly, **one emotion can monitor or tutor another.** Love and sympathy can neutralise negative emotions. For instance, when a person cares for someone who is diseased or handicapped, sympathy overcomes disgust (1988, p. 12; 1991, p. 133). Anger can modulate sadness, depression, or apathy, converting them into “active assertiveness or aspiration” (1991, p. 133). Love can cast out fear, can subjugate and disperse anger, can transform hurt and emerge as forgiveness.

Finally, Callahan affirms the long-term effect of virtue on this mutual tutoring. The good and wise person (*phronimos*), properly formed, has emotions and intuitive reactions that are morally trustworthy. She points out that new psychological insights into the mind indicate that

...these appropriate emotions emerge because the good person’s past deployments of attention and previous moral decisions ensure a good preconscious self-filtering system in the present. The person of good character has built up values in long-term memory and so possesses a pattern of preconscious processing of information that will produce proper emotions. The nonconscious functionings of the mind, which we do not have access to, could constitute what has been called “the heart’s reasons which reason cannot
know.” (Callahan, 1991, p. 131).

Overall, Callahan’s contribution provides, in this one area, a psychological groundwork for what has been discussed with Oakley, Gilligan etc. So far, this chapter has uncovered three different perspectives on emotions and the human act-the morally virtuous person (Oakley), two complementary forms of moral reasoning (Gilligan and others), the inner workings of the psyche (Callahan). There is a confluence of their thought in that, for each author, “the most adequate moral decision making of conscience must achieve a congruence or a fusion of thinking, feeling, and willing into a unified whole” (Callahan, 1991, p. 134).

1.2: Emotions in Relation to Virtue and Character

The next task is to address the first research question in terms of virtue and character. Firstly, there will be a brief discussion of the function of self-esteem in moral capability and character. This leads into an examination of Shelton’s theory on the role of empathy in moral development. Finally, this section of the chapter will close with an investigation into recent advances in the area of affective conversion.

1.2.1: Self-Esteem: foundations of identity

The need for self-esteem as a condition for seeing and responding to the needs and worth of others is treated in Oakley (1992, p. 68f). He also discusses the capacity to notice situations and realities and the ability to enter another person’s world imaginatively to feel for and with them in their needs (1992, p. 50ff). Callahan emphasises the need of self-esteem for the moral life and for sustaining relationships with others (1991, p. 201). The correlation between self-esteem and empathy is discussed by Callahan (1991, p. 187ff), as also by Gill (1981) and Dominian (1975,
Self-esteem is an appreciation of one’s own worth. Self-image answers the question “How do you see yourself?” Self-esteem’s question is “Do you like and value yourself?” One’s attitude to oneself will influence relations with others, with God, one’s desires, hopes, expectations, feeling and actions. Dominian points out that “the whole of our childhood was based on receiving love from our parents and relatives, which made us feel lovable and made it possible to link appreciation to our bodies, minds and feelings” (1998, p. 131; also 1975, p. 158ff). Self-esteem is another way of naming the emergence of primal trust (or psychological faith). This is the foundation of the sense of the self and, as McDargh points out, is crucial for religious faith (1983, p. 70). How does the self develop? An individual needs a set of relationships or people who are perceived to be trustworthy, who genuinely love this unique individual and who can, in turn, be loved and esteemed by the infant as it grows. The infant values, loves and gives loyalty to those persons or realities by whom it hopes to be recognised, appreciated and loved. Meaning and value to the self or ‘self-esteem’ emerges from this process.

Significant insights into this dynamic have been provided by Object Relations Theory (Winnicott, Klein) as interpreted and developed by McDargh. This approach attempts to explain the importance of images in the development of the self and of faith (psychological and religious). This theory starts with those personal relationships that “constitute the matrix within which the human person is formed and comes to be” (Jackson, 1989, p. 119). It then proposes that the child’s interaction with significant others “is internalized and codified, later to be retrieved as representations out of which the infant perceives itself and relates to others” (Jackson, 1989, p. 120). At the same time, the child forms memories of how it felt, of its sense of what it was like and how it reacted in those relationships. These
images or representations provide the “conscious or unconscious constellation of values, feelings, impressions, and memories which constitute the basis of the individual’s posture of trust or mistrust to the world” (Jackson, 1989, p. 120). These “images” are the potent influences by which “persons make emotional sense of their lives, of their existence as selves” (McDargh, 1983, p. 106).

What is the relevance of these ideas to this project? Firstly, the building blocks of identity, the sense of the self, are in the realm of emotions and affectivity. How the infant emotionally responds to significant relationships shapes how it feels about itself as a child and as an adult. This is crucial to the psychological, spiritual and moral growth of the person. Secondly, when a person has a body, a mind and feelings that feel good, then one will try to reach out to others. The person has the requisite self-esteem to love so that “when others make demands on our own personality, there will be something positive to give them” (Dominian, 1998, p. 131). Thirdly, the core awareness of the self (self-esteem) and of each other (empathy) is inherently affective. From this emerges self-love and other-love and the emotional responses they generate. Loving others flows from an awareness of others in which “we feel their existence” (Dominian, 1998, p. 122). This is empathy-a “capacity to feel the inner world of others and to respond accurately to it” (Dominian, 1998, p. 132). We cannot be human without empathy. We cannot be moral beings without empathy. This is the concern of Shelton (1990) when he examines the role of empathy in the moral life. This is the next task.

1.2.2: Empathy and the moral life: The Shelton model

What are the two questions that occupy Charles Shelton? “What is it about being human that allowed us to care for and be concerned for one another?” (Shelton, 1990, p. 1). From the Christian perspective, what is the “constitutive element within
our own human experience” that can be transformed by grace and enable a person to respond to the message of Jesus Christ (1990, p. 1f). Shelton argues that some level of empathy is crucial, even indispensable, for one to experience oneself as a moral being, to live the moral life and to accept the call of the Gospel to love. Shelton then probes “the essential importance of an affective component for any theory of moral development” (1990, p. 3).

1.2.2.1: Psychological foundations

Using psychological research, Shelton attempts to describe a “psychological view of morality that establishes the unity of human experience with the Christian moral vision” (1990, p. 7). He starts with a critique of Kohlberg’s theory in which moral growth occurs through “increasingly moral structural transformations” or movements to a higher stage (1990, p. 14). Shelton recognises that Kohlberg does acknowledge that emotions play an initial part in moral development while not having a specific, significant or long-term role. Shelton’s concerns, as Gilligan’s, are the narrowly cognitive nature of Kohlberg’s theory and the need to incorporate an affective dimension in morality and moral reasoning.

Shelton’s disquiet emerges from his experience in pastoral or clinical contexts. In such settings, he found individuals’ understanding of themselves as moral persons centres on questions of attachment, care, self-sacrifice rather than on abstract justice that defines rights and duties. Instances would be the son or daughter struggling with the decision to send a frail parent to a nursing home, or a husband and wife adjusting their expectations and their relationship, or someone trying to reconcile the disclosure of a confidence by a friend. These are forms of significant relationships—parent, child, spouse, friend. These “investments in varying relational commitments...express our deepest affections and offer the groundwork for our
experience of being moral” (Shelton, 1990, p. 28). Shelton attempts to blend developmental theory and empirical research to provide a psychological basis for both moral experience and a developed orientation to care that resonates with the Christian moral vision (1990, p. 31f).

Shelton cites studies that indicate that when people think about morality and moral dilemmas, they tend to think in terms of relationships (1990, p. 34). There is an essential bondedness between human beings that generates empathy, an existential solidarity “with another’s life and struggle” (1990, p. 35). From the twenty or so definitions of empathy, Shelton suggests that it has one or more of three components-emotional, cognitive, and/or the communicating of a person’s feeling state to another (1990, p. 40).

Shelton’s discussion of the natural capacity for empathy as the psychological basis of morality draws on the research of others. He notes work on the biological foundation for the empathic experience in the presence of advanced neurocortical development as also of the nervous system (1990, p. 41f). Shelton particularly draws on the work of Martin Hoffman. Hoffman argues that anthropological evidence indicates that human survival and the adaptability needed for it rests on two motives-the egoistic (self-protective) and the altruistic (promotion of other’s welfare). The validity of an independent altruistic motive emerges from research that documents individuals (particularly those satisfied with their own social approval) spontaneously helping others (Shelton, 1990, p. 41).

Hoffman defines empathy as “an affective response more appropriate to someone else’s situation than to one’s own” (Shelton, 1990, p. 42). “Appropriate” captures the cognitive dimension in the accurate interpretation of the state of the other person. Emotional arousal in the empathizer is the “actual experience of empathy” (1990, p.
Thirdly, motivational empathy appears to be closely linked “to a naturally induced state to respond altruistically to another’s distress” (1990, p. 43). Shelton details the large amount of empirical evidence and research gathered since 1980 to point to the critical role of empathy as a basis for altruistic action (1990, p. 47). Nevertheless, Hoffman and others do not consider that empathy alone explains how people “formulate complex moral ideologies” and respond in caring behaviour (Shelton, 1990, p. 47f).

The cognitive and affective aspects of a person’s inner reaction to the plight of another (empathic distress) is also accompanied by a “feeling of sympathetic distress” (or ‘compassion’). Beyond feeling uncomfortable and upset for another, there is the inclination of concern and the desire to help the other person. This arises because “they feel sorry for the person and not just to relieve their own empathic distress” (Shelton, 1990, p. 50). In some ways, compassion defies rational explanation. Yet its incidence is a powerful testimony to the human spirit. Despite the instinct to avoid pain, there is “natural capacity inherent in the human species to suffer with another and to render aid” (1990, p. 51). Shelton, with Hoffman, acknowledges that, while having empathic distress does not guarantee compassion, “without the experience of empathy, the very experience of compassion would be impossible” (1990, p. 51). Compassionate acts, often of great beauty and nobility, emerge from the movements of the heart, penetrating consciousness and expanding one’s moral sensibilities.

Shelton and Hoffman maintain that empathy develops through the transformation of the affective response by cognitive processes, i.e., the child’s maturing ability to differentiate self from others (Shelton, 1990, p. 48). For instance, Shelton notes that Hoffman cites an example of the twelve month old child who has obtained “person permanence” (a basic sense of self). Such a child will be aware of, and respond to,
another’s distress by, for instance, offering the person (even an adult) its favourite toy, even if it is only to relieve its own distress. Through infancy into adolescence, the child becomes more adept at differentiating the feelings of others and at responding empathically to a widening domain of people. The advance in cognitive levels is accompanied by more sophisticated guilt processes concerning the effects of one’s actions on others (Shelton, 1990, p. 52).

Shelton expands his thought on morality of the heart by citing the work of psychologist Robert Kegan who sees morality as originating in the experience of emotion rather than in cognition (Shelton, 1990, p. 74; Conn, 1989, p. 50f). Shelton also draws on Jerome Kagan. Countering the argument that universal moral standards are not possible because of cultural differences, Kagan contends that there is a link between universal standards and emotion. Beneath the variety of ideals and behaviours, there “is a set of emotional states that form the bases for a limited number of universal moral categories that transcend time and locality” (Shelton, 1990, p. 74). Virtues are actions that promote those feeling states or prevent or remove unpleasant feelings (Shelton, 1990, p. 74f).

Shelton reiterates the contribution of emotion to the moral life. People tend to evaluate judgements of right or wrong in their guilt, hurt or uncertainty in failing to live up to standards through the intensity of feelings. Where empathy, says Shelton, provides the basic soil, emotions nourish “one’s growing moral sensitivity and sustain moral growth and expanding moral vision” (1990, p. 77). A person’s moral life will embrace a range of emotions that reflect personal values and the objects of attachment claimed through affective knowledge.

Shelton acknowledges the other side of the heart. Where empathy can make one sensitive to others’ needs and rights, it can also lead to bias. Emotions have the
capacity to blunt sensitivity, to distort perspective and to “warp the heart’s commitment to loving sacrifice” (Shelton, 1990, p. 86). Moreover, morality of the heart and associated emotions such as love, guilt and anger can be blind and need an adequate vision. Human beings need a frame of reference that grounds empathy and emotions, transforms them and gives a clear, directional focus (1990, p. 102, p. 58). For that reason, Shelton acknowledges that there are situations in which the use of an impartial method, as in an ethics of justice, is required. This can be seen in questions concerning the fair use of limited resources where rights of access have to be determined (1990, p. 57).

Shelton also raises the question of the adequacy of his case for an empathic morality. It is a variant of the question confronting Gilligan. According to Shelton, early research seems to indicate that females are more empathically inclined than males (1990, p. 56). Self-report measures indicate that socialisation encourages a female to be empathic in their caring, to be sensitive as women. Males, conversely, are encouraged to be more assertive and oriented to action (1990, p. 56). Differences here seem to be the result of upbringing rather than from natural inclination. Shelton draws on the work of Eisenberg and Lennon who in 1983 conclude that the reporting of empathic experiences by men and women depended on the instruments and methods of experiment. In 1987 they are still of the view that any conclusions from the existing empirical research to be “circumscribed and tentative.” In their opinion, the question of the real differences in empathy in men and women has not been resolved by research (Shelton, 1990, p. 56).

Shelton’s thesis, then, is that empathy is a constitutive element of the sense of the self, of being human. It emerges at the earliest stages of life and is arguably the basis of morality. This raises Shelton’s second question—the relation of psychological empathy to Christian morality.
1.2.2.2: Empathy, morality of the heart and christian vision

Shelton seeks a metaphor that encapsulates the psychological dynamics of empathy, the morality of care, moral sensitivity and character together with a moral vision. He proposes the metaphor of the ‘heart.’

Shelton makes the point, mentioned elsewhere in this project, that moral evaluations of people are often articulated in terms of the heart. He moves on to cite Rahner’s understanding of the heart. It is the core experience of who we are as persons-related to others, to God, with “one’s most authentic desires...as tied to a sense of loving care for another” (Shelton, 1990, p. 63). Again, in the Bible, the word for the heart occurs over 850 times and has a variety of meanings. These range from the depth of one’s desires, the catalyst for understanding and insight, the source of feelings, the origin of ethical judgment and a way of describing a person’s very self (Shelton, 1990, p. 62). Elsewhere, McKenzie makes the point that when ‘heart’ is made the subject of vital acts (as are the eye, hand, loins etc.) “the total person is identified with the organ, in which the sum of psychic energy comes to focus” (1990, p. 1295). Further, in Hebrew idiom, the ‘heart’ is not the seat of the emotions but is closer to the modern usage of ‘mind.’ Nevertheless, the ‘heart’ is emphasised as being the principle of morality. Actions and words shape moral character but they must have their roots in morality that is interior, imbedded in conviction and desire (McKenzie, 1990, p. 1305).

Shelton offers the person of Jesus Christ as the model of the morality of the heart. The vision is embodied in Jesus as the compassionate High priest portrayed in the Letter to the Hebrews (2:18; 4:15; 5:2). Not only has God in Jesus identified with humanness, he has transformed it “with the piercing power of his own compassionate stance through the act of complete self-donation” (1990, p. 102). The dynamic of
empathic experience is manifest in Jesus’ sympathetic distress or compassion during
his ministry where he is moved to pity (Luke 10:33) and is later confirmed in the
theology of Hebrews. This reveals the inner life of God. If the very core of divine
life is compassionate love, then in God there exists, in eminent form, the dynamic of
the emotion of empathic response. In Jesus, then, we find a convergence of
theological and psychological truth. An empathic Jesus who offers both a theology
of the human and an anthropology of God also finds validation in social
psychological research. People respond to others with greater empathy when they
have had similar experiences (1990, p. 103). In the Jesus who ‘lives in the
limitations of weakness’ we have a God who suffers and empathises with human
struggles, pain and suffering.

Yet there is more to the Christian vision. God’s Reign calls for the personal and
social transformation of the world, to continue the work of Christ’s reconciliation.
Empathy not only promotes an openness to the hurts of others, it moves one to
behaviour that advances God’s Reign. The specific Christian direction of this vision
is modelled in the person of Jesus Christ. It is also nourished and guided by images
in Scripture, for instance, the body image of first Corinthians, or the parable of the

Shelton draws together his reflections on Christian empathy when he describes it as

*the human capacity, transformed by grace, that leads to experiencing to some
degree on an affective level another’s situation; meaning is given to this
experiencing through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, thus
motivating one to offer willingly his or her gifts, nurtured in a believing
community of faith, for the building of God’s Reign.* (1990, p. 107). (Italics in
original text)

These considerations of Shelton’s work bring into prominence the difference
between Christian and psychological or therapeutic empathy. Firstly, Christian empathy finds its true meaning in following the self-emptying Jesus. Secondly, Christian empathy does not stop at emotional response to another’s situation. It also prompts the person aroused by empathy to probe the meaning of and to evaluate one’s internal state in terms of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. Empathy is shaped by and, in turn, shapes the relationship one has with Jesus Christ and, through him, with others. Christian empathy, then, needs the on-going sustenance of worship, prayer and a believing community. Finally, Christian empathy is more than understanding and sensitive co-feeling for another’s pain. It is part of the call to redeem the world in and with Jesus Christ. It is inseparable from the summons to change whatever contributes to misery, oppression and suffering. Empathy fostering altruism blends with the goal of the Christian life-loving self-donation in Jesus through service of others (Shelton, 1990. p. 106f).

1.2.3: Affective conversion: an emerging understanding

Emotions in relation to character involve integration. The word “conversion” has been mentioned many times in this project, especially in discussing Peschke and Häring. In the Christian context it entails radical change of mind, heart, behaviour in the deepening response to God’s merciful love. The term has a variety of meanings in the Christian tradition particularly in the twentieth century. It has also taken on a secular connotation.

Most authors would agree that conversion involves a personal and social transformation. It is personal in the radical reorientation of the conscious operations of the person (desires, thought processes, choices, actions). It is social in the transformation of society’s structures and, more recently, in the human relationship with the natural world. Conversion is a developmental reality that needs the
sustenance of a community of faith. Conn sees it as “the radical drive for self-transcendence realized in creative understanding, critical judging, responsible deciding, and generous loving” (1986, p. 1).

In surveying the literature on conversion, it is evident that its theological explanations are informed by various psychological theories found in, for instance, Piaget, Erikson, Kohlberg, Freud, Jung and others. For the purpose of this project, the model developed by Lonergan will be briefly explained. Special attention will then be given to subsequent interpretations developed concerning affective conversion.

Conn’s definition above captures the essence of one model of conversion. Lonergan begins with the operations of consciousness and attempts to set up categories that explain its functioning. He sees conversion as “a set of judgments and decisions that move the human person from an established horizon into a new horizon of knowing, valuing, acting” (Fragomeni, 1993, p. 234). Each form of conversion involves a transition from a conventional wisdom or morality to a more responsible, self-critical, adult level of autonomy in some realm of human experience (Gelpi, 1998, p. 39). Lonergan has three categories of Conversion. Intellectual conversion is concerned with the clarification of perception and meaning so that one actively and critically appropriates the truth about reality. It entails the need “to advance beyond ideologies, prejudices, and oversights that blind one to the truth” (Gelpi, 1998, p. 34). In Moral conversion there is a move from satisfying the self or being influenced by bias in oneself or the culture to the pursuit of true value, of the truly good as providing the criteria for moral decisions. Gelpi makes a further distinction. Personal moral conversion “evaluates interpersonal relationships in the light of individual rights and duties.” Socio-political conversion “evaluates the justice or injustice of social institutions in the light of the common good” (Gelpi, 1998, p. 32).
In Religious conversion a person is radically grasped by ultimate concern or love. “It is a falling in love unconditionally, leading to surrender to the transcendent, and a gracious being-in-wholeness” (Fragomeni, 1993, p. 234). Faith in a self-revealing God differentiates this form of conversion. Christian conversion for Lonergan is the phenomenon of God’s love being poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit given in Christ. It is possible for a person to experience this without naming or “thematizing the phenomenon in Christian categories” (Fragomeni, 1993, p. 234f).

The purpose here is to outline briefly the emerging interpretation of Lonergan advanced initially by Robert Doran, S.J. and elaborated by Gelpi. Drawing on the work of Jung, Gelpi (1988) argues that Lonergan’s model of conversion should be modified to include ‘affective’ or ‘psychic’ conversion. Here, a person takes responsibility for their emotional development along lines that are psychologically sound. Affective conversion, then, involves identifying and rejecting biased archetypes, scenarios or paradigms that distort one’s emotional responses and affective life. The ‘raising of consciousness’ concerning, for instance, racism or sexism, is an effort to reconfigure one’s perception and to restructure one’s emotions (Spohn, 1991, p. 80).

In a recent work, Gelpi expands this idea of the responsibility to promote personal emotional health. He examines affective conversion in relation to the negative emotions. These emotions contribute positively to one’s emotional life and growth when they lead a person to perceive and respond to reality in a realistic manner. In other words, there are times when we should feel shame and guilt, or situations that should arouse fear and anger. When there is systematic suppression of these emotions, there results a “predictable degree of personality dysfunction (Gelpi, 1998, p. 34ff).
Gelpi suggests that mid-life provides the material for another level of affective conversion. In the first half of life, the creation of the adult ego demands that one repress and ignore a range of unconscious negative emotions. Nevertheless, they remain on the back-burner in the unconscious. In mid-life, a new stage in the emotional structure of the personality demands conscious attention to these emotions. This can become manifest in various forms of dysfunctional, even destructive, behaviour (Gelpi, 1998, p. 36). The negative states in the unconscious use various devices to gain attention. For instance, overwhelming and seemingly spontaneous surges of emotion may be prompted by emotions associated with past memories and events or by aspects of the contra-sexual self. These emotions can also emerge through projection onto others.

Gelpi argues that affective conversion involves the decision to consciously attend to, to understand, to learn from, and hence to integrate these negative emotions into one’s conscious personality as life-giving forces (1998, p. 37). d’Apice makes the same point. The re-experience of pain or of intense rage for something minor indicates that its true source lies in the past.

To permit oneself to feel these emotions and to sit with them will often bring to mind a time of hurt or unjust treatment in the past, possibly even in childhood. This memory, like a deep-festering wound, may have lain hidden for many years. As it comes back now, it is crying out to be remembered and reconciled (d’Apice, 1995, p. 160).

Adult growth requires conscious appropriation. Hence, reflection and, as d’Apice notes, the prayer of healing can play “a vital part in the spirituality of midlife” (1995, p. 161).

From this emerges a final consideration on the education and shaping of emotions.
and character. The social nature of the person means that example, models, symbols, images and stories transform and shape us on the affective level. Worship and prayer are central in shaping personal and social identity, fostering relationships, renewing consecration, and in deepening and activating values and motivation. Specific religious objects evoke and habituate the value responses that characterise one’s emotions. What one knows, love and values one identifies with, wishes to imitate and to share in its goodness. This is particularly facilitated by the processes of memory and active imagination in relation to the values and attitudes of significant persons (saints) and especially the person of Jesus Christ. Story, image and tradition have the power “to reveal, constellate and prioritize values and disvalues” (Vacek, 1985, p. 297. Also Spohn, 1983, p. 30ff). The transforming and elevating power of religious emotions and of Grace, mediated through cognition, affective response, conscious awareness, identification, imitation and deliberate cultivation, develop the ease of exercise that is characteristic of virtue.

Overall, by exercising one’s responsibility to develop a healthy emotional life, one is growing in the affective virtues and in the capacity both to respond appropriately and to make good moral decisions guided by one’s emotions.

1.2.4: Overview

In surveying this section, key insights have surfaced concerning the moral significance of emotions in relation to virtue and character. Recent psychological theory and research offer persuasive evidence for the presence of two constituents in the emergence of the human person. Firstly, the very basis of psychological and moral life seems to rest on the constellation of primitive emotional responses whereby a child arrives at a sufficient level of trust and value of itself and others that is embodied in self-esteem. Secondly, there are strong indications that these feelings
of self-appreciation provide the necessary condition for the correlative emotion of empathy—the capacity to appreciate, identify with, and respond to, others. A healthy self-esteem also enables a person to deal constructively with negative emotions and, in particular, their presence in mid-life. Self-esteem and empathy are integral not only to “being healthy” but also to “being moral.” This can be understood either in the sense of primordial moral awareness (“do good and avoid evil”), or as moral reasoning (“this is right or wrong to do”) or as the momentum, especially in one’s affectivity, towards moral integration (“this is the appropriate emotional response to cultivate”). These two components of human identity also offer the platform on which one can construct a theological vision that views self-esteem, empathy and other emotions as necessary ingredients of Christian morality. Underlying these factors, nevertheless, are certain assumptions concerning the human person. That is the next topic.

2. Theological Anthropology in Selected Contemporary Writing

“What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?” The limits of this study has entailed a partial, even cursory examination of the human person. Having acknowledged that fact, there do not appear to be discrepancies in these authors between “theory in use” and any “espoused view” of the person. Nevertheless, there is not a univocal view of the person in the authors just examined. The similarities and variations occur in five main areas—three concern the person, two concern method.

Firstly, there is the matter of perspective and assumptions. In these authors, the human person is portrayed either from a philosophical standpoint (Oakley), or from a psychological point of view (Gilligan, Dominian, Jackson, McDargh) or a blend of these (Callahan). Their dominant concern is either the human flourishing through
virtue or the healthy functioning and psychological development of the human being. Religious considerations or theological argumentation is either not a concern or not in the foreground. Such sources, nevertheless, “may be used as examples of inner human experience, expressions of self-conscious persons” (Callahan, 1991, p. 7).

The psychological foundations of self-esteem and the role of empathy in relation to religious faith and Christian moral development is part of the broader canvas of some (Dominian, Jackson, McDargh) and a specific issue for Shelton and Gelpi. There is also the desire to address the deficiencies of cognitive-structural models of human growth and the need to incorporate the affective dimension (Callaghan, Gilligan, Shelton).

Secondly, the person as a moral self is common to these authors, though with diverse emphases. Some give greater weight to the self-as-individual. For Oakley, it is the search for the full human life through a vision, the practice of virtues and the development of character. Callahan’s spotlight is on the individual self as a moral agent and the “operating processes of conscience as moral decision making” (1991, p. 6). Rather than being a retreat into narcissism, it underlines the truth that the strength of a community’s life rests on the strength of the moral functioning of individual members (1991, p. 10). Gelpi’s concern is the personal responsibility for the shape of one’s emotional life.

Balancing these are authors who place more emphasis on the self-in-relationship. Personhood and identity is inherently and essentially relational. This is true of the treatment of the origins of self-esteem (Dominian, Jackson, McDargh). It is also apparent in the role of empathy as the condition for healthy human interaction and as the necessary soil for human and Christian moral living within the social context of God’s Reign (Shelton). A more restricted account of the relational nature of the moral self in terms of moral reasoning and development is offered by Gilligan. The
self-in- relationship for these authors is a being for whom response to values (in people, relationships, the world) is integral to moral life.

The third aspect of the person is awareness or consciousness of the self. This is the domain of Callahan’s work in that she explores the psychological structure of the person, the “foundations, architecture, and inner ecology of conscience” as a human phenomenon (1991, p. 6). This form of concentrated self-awareness provides the setting for the detailed analysis of the interactions of memory, scenarios, scripts, intellect and the emotions. Gilligan’s has a stronger mix of theory, empirical research and the phenomenon of self-awareness. Gilligan’s approach to self-awareness is not so much with its internal workings but in its relationships with the outer world. It centres on the way of perceiving and evaluating moral situations in so far as it is related to gender and moral development. The core sense of the self as appreciation or self-esteem in a person is elaborated by Dominian, Jackson and McDargh. The correlation between this and empathy as a consciousness of others is taken up by Shelton. Present, too, is the Lonergan model of the different structures of consciousness in which one is present to oneself and one’s acts experientially. This appears as a blend of philosophical and phenomenological method. The unique forms of human self-presence and the human capacity for self-transcendence are embodied in the various forms of conversion. The influence of unconscious emotions and negative states, their emergence into awareness and the need for their conscious acknowledgment and appropriation in affective Conversion is pursued by Gelpi.

The fourth element that emerges is the multidisciplinary character of the writing. Shelton and Gelpi have the mutual enrichment of Psychology, Morality and Theology as a working basis. Oakley draws on other disciplines and tests his philosophical arguments against human experience. Callahan is unapologetic about
the interdisciplinary nature of her work. She refers to the increasing number of books that appear as “blurred genres” in which “social science and the humanities blend-and in which personal knowledge and private experience are explicitly called upon to contribute to the study” (1991, p. 7). One can also see reflected in these authors the variety of approaches in Psychology, their differing normative views of the human and something of their techniques and methods. In these authors one can discern the influence of the major therapeutic schools of Freud, Jung, Winnicott and of the developmental theories of Kohlberg, Gilligan and Erikson.

The fifth topic is **methodology**. In addition to the cross-disciplinary dimension, there is a blend of theory, research and empirical verification. Increasingly, Psychology is not tied to a narrow view of science and of empirical method. There is validity and reliability in methods that seek to analyse and interpret inner psychic experience, personal narratives and which recognise the importance of “meaning and symbolism in human life” (Barnes, 1990, p. 31). For instance, qualitative research has become an acceptable instrument in the behavioural sciences. Running through these authors is a thread symptomatic of a broader trend. The behavioural sciences, in being open to other disciplines, are open to other perspectives and possibilities, i.e., the place of the transcendent, of religion, of the spiritual dimension in the integrated person. Conversely, Theological Anthropology has incorporated (and should continue to do so) many valid insights about human self-understanding from Psychology and the other behavioural sciences.

3. **Comparison and Contrast with Aquinas, Manualists, Post-Manualists**

The third research question is the final concern of this chapter. “What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and of human person in these contemporary authors compared with Aquinas, the Manualists
and post-Manualist authors?” The discussion will be under three headings- - convergences, divergences, evaluative overview.

3.1: Convergences

3.1.1: An affirmative view of the emotions is shared by Aquinas, writers such as Häring Grisez, Peschke and the contemporary authors above. Emotions have a value in themselves, not just as moral motives. Whether positive or negative, emotions can have a constructive or destructive role in personal life. Emotions and affective virtues are integral to one’s character.

3.1.2: The construal of an emotion suggested by Oakley concurs, in his view, with that of Aquinas (Oakley, 1992, p. 200f, footnote 67). Aquinas’ view of emotions as “interactive value-responses” is developed, from another standpoint, by Häring. This aspect receives little or no attention in Oakley, Callahan or Gilligan. Further, Oakley tends to see emotions as accompanying values already embraced rather than as presenting a specific object to the will precisely as a response to value or disvalue.

3.1.3: The mutual interaction of emotion and intellect in moral reasoning is intricately probed by Callahan in the framework of modern Psychology. Oakley’s treatment of emotions in phronesis is closer to Aquinas in method and context. This line is also pursued by Grisez. It is intriguing to find Callahan talking of emotions providing a filter or of Shelton and Oakley seeing them as indicating “salience.” Emotions direct one’s attention to the specific features of a situation-what to notice, what to enquire about, the “relevant cues” (Shelton, 1990, p. 47; Oakley, 1992, p. 202; also Spohn, 1991, p. 79). This is a more refined version of Aquinas’ notion of “fittingness” (conveniens, consonans) where emotions indicate to the intellect and will what is suited, pertinent, in-tune with this situation and is the appropriate moral
object.

3.1.4: **Self-esteem** and a **sense of inner goodness** is crucial to psychological and moral functioning for these modern writers. This elaborates, in contemporary psychological terms, the place of self-love as the condition on which the moral life is possible for Aquinas, as for Häring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire.

3.1.5: The **constructive potential in moral growth of negative emotions** especially their unconscious form in negative states is the concern of Gelpi. His treatment is consistent with the views of Aquinas on fear, anger, sadness etc. and with the attitudes of Häring and Grisez.

3.1.6: **Self-awareness** and skills in attending to psychic movements is not a modern invention. It is the modern advances in psychological knowledge that offer tools, language and a framework for its exercise to be more probing, accurate and fruitful. The authors in this chapter are a testimony to this. Something of a more philosophical phenomenological method runs through Häring. For all that, this study has earlier uncovered evidence of self-awareness influencing Aquinas’s work, e.g., his insights into the dynamics of love, anger and sadness.

3.1.7: The safeguarding and strengthening of character is a concern common to Oakley, Callahan, Shelton, Aquinas, Peschke, Häring, Grisez and the Manualists (at least in principle). Moral agency is broader than what one does: it reflects and shapes who one has and who one has become. So much so, as Callahan has noted, this can even incorporate the workings of the unconscious mind and affections. Oakley uses similar language of interiorisation when he says that a “person’s emotions are indicators that these values are *really his*” (Oakley, 1992, p. 55).

3.2: **Divergences**

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3.2.1: The predominant area of contrast is the perspective and assumptions concerning the human person. All the authors examined do agree that the human person has a psychological and moral dimension. However, on the one hand, the authors studied in this chapter restrict themselves to a psychological or to an aretaic understanding of the human person. On the other hand, what binds together Aquinas, the Manualist and post-Manualists is their Christian Anthropology. They also see the person as, importantly, a religious being with a radical receptivity for divine revelation and relationship. Aquinas’ treatment of the person is within a synthesis whereby the moral journey is seen with the overall plan of Creation, Providence and Salvation. Its content and configuration is teleological. This is the framework continued in the Manualists and forms the backdrop to the work of Grisez, Maguire and Peschke. Häring’s setting places greater weight to interpersonal invitation and response where the human person “is constitutionally receptive to and capable of response to the divine initiative” (Ruffing, 1993, p. 47).

A consequence of this concerns the Philosophical Psychology used by Aquinas. While he sees the human moral agent in developmental terms (i.e., as growing in virtue), there is a shift in the understanding of the person in terms of faculties and powers. This has its roots in Kant, Transcendental Thomism, Existentialism and psychological theory. The teleological model has been superseded by a redefining of the human person “who is a ‘subject’ of consciousness, one who is autonomous, historical, and self-constituting rather than the static human ‘nature’ of the classic formulation” (Ruffing, 1993, p. 48). There is an accompanying expansion of self-awareness, of being-in-relationship and of human faculties understood as modes of being or relating to the world. Such a portrayal has a strong presence in Häring, is more muted in Grisez, but animates and pervades the sample of contemporary authors already discussed.
3.2.2: The authors from these various periods differ in their treatment of the virtues. The contemporary sample share a concern for the formation of character and an adequate model of moral development. In contrast with Aquinas, Manualists and post-Manualists, overall, there is no attempt, even in Oakley, to address specifically the nature and role of the affective virtues. The closest would be the Christian moral life seen as grounded in affective dispositions built on self-esteem and empathy (Dominian, Jackson and Shelton).

3.2.3: A third point of divergence is the matter of foundational moral awareness. While it is acknowledged that self-esteem and empathy are the building-blocks of ethical consciousness, none of the contemporary authors examined pursue the epistemological question of “affective connaturalitY.” The only exception is Callahan who acknowledges the innate, intuitive appreciation of moral goods (1991, p. 28). It has already be shown that this notion, found incipiently in Aquinas, was developed by John of St. Thomas, neglected by the Manualists, preserved by Maritain then retrieved by Maguire. It is elaborated by Häring and acknowledged by Peschke in terms of the ethics of value. While Oakley and Gilligan address the affective dimension to moral reasoning, they do not examine the appreciative basis of primordial moral experience nor draw on axiological ethics.

3.2.4: The matter of the influence of the emotions on moral imputability also differentiates these various authors. Where this issue is articulated in terms of “impediments to freedom”, it takes centre stage in the Manualists, is one character in a larger cast for Aquinas, Häring, Grisez, Peschke but has a relatively minor role in the contemporary authors already discussed. But if emotions in relation to moral responsibility are seen as facilitating and enhancing freedom and moral development, this is a consistent presence in the contemporary texts as it is in Häring, Grisez, and, earlier, in Aquinas (within the limits of his psychological theory). Allied to this is
the very helpful distinction between Antecedent and Consequent emotions. It persists from Aquinas through the Manuals to the present day as a useful measure for assessing the moral significance of emotions. It is neither acknowledged nor used in any of the writers from the discipline of Psychology nor, surprisingly by Oakley. It should be noted, however, that the four qualities of strength of will enumerated by Oakley do have some resonances with Aquinas’ account of the Consequent emotions and his overall understanding of emotions in the moral life. Overall, then, all authors agree, from Aquinas to the present (the Manualists with some ambivalence), that a person is morally better if actions are done with the right emotion, about the right objects and to the right degree. This is sound psychologically, morally and theologically.

3.2.5: There is a contrast among these authors in their perception of moral goodness. There is a significant difference between “good” seen in terms of psychological well-being and healthy functioning, or of aretaic descriptions (as in Oakley) when these are compared with a theological description of responding in love to grace. Vacek argues that one’s relationship with God does not just provide extra motivation. It “makes a difference in the very meaning of what an agent is going” (1994, p. 3). When the same virtuous action of a Christian is compared with that of a non-religious person, it is a different moral act because of the relationship with God. This leaves unresolved the status of moral acts done by someone who is responding from grace whose presence and influence is not consciously appreciated or named in Christian terms.

Two considerations emerge from this. Firstly, Christian authors will tend to give greater attention to the need to reorient and transform the emotions away from egocentricity (Spohn, 1991, p. 84). Hence, the emphasis given to Conversion. Secondly, philosophers and psychologists may have a more detailed insight into the
psychological mechanisms for modifying one’s perceptions, scenarios, emotions. Nevertheless, they do not have the resources, available in a religious tradition, for tutoring and shaping the affections. Paradigm scenarios found in Scripture stories, images, parables, stories of saints and heroes provide the means which, combined with worship and ritual, expand one’s horizon, school the emotions and indicate appropriate feelings responses (Spohn, 1991, p. 84). This is especially the case in the Christian eucharist and the Sacrament of Reconciliation where there is a constant renewal of appropriate emotional dispositions such as sorrow, gratitude, compassion and generosity (Spohn, 1991, p. 84). Particular emotions are ‘schooled’ “by the images of God and Christ, as well as by the language of prayer and liturgical actions” (Spohn, 1991, p. 85f).

3.3: Evaluative Overview

If one surveys Chapters four to seven of this project, a pattern can be seen to emerge. At each stage there has been a deliberate correlation with previous stages. In employing the third research question for each of the four soundings, the correlation has also entailed a process of evaluation. The comparison and contrast between authors inevitably entails an assessment of strengths and weaknesses in relation to each other. Critical assessment is also at work when one attempts to show the meaning or importance (“significance”) of the different understandings of emotions or of the human person. This pattern of cumulative evaluation includes the present chapter. For this reason, this section has the heading “evaluative overview.” Such an approach will avoid the unnecessary repetition of material already presented as it will avoid anticipating the tasks of the final chapter.

This study has been an exercise in both mapping and mining. There has been the search for suitable terrain together with the establishing of landmarks and
boundaries. Then followed the digging into suitable territory in order to expose and extract the hidden resources, some of which were predictable, some of which were unexpected. In general terms, what has this search brought to light?

Firstly, the venture has shown a positive correlation between contemporary writing and Aquinas’ understanding and treatment of the moral significance of the emotions. This is particularly the case in Aquinas’ detailed analysis of the affective virtues and their immanent character as habits of emotional response. Within the confines of his moral psychology which he attempts to transcend through metaphor and styles of language, Aquinas has a balanced and affirmative view of the constructive role of human emotions (negative and positive) in the Christian moral life.

Secondly, there is an overall negative correlation between modern studies and Aquinas, on the one hand, and, on the other, the Manualists’ understanding and treatment of the moral significance of the emotions. The Manualists portray a deterioration towards a stance that is, at times, uncomfortable with, at times, hostile to, the emotions. On the other hand, the Manualists convey a more affirmative approach to the affective virtues as sources of energy and direction in moral activity. There is, consequently, an unresolved tension in the Manualists that emerges as ambivalence towards the emotions in the moral life of the Christian.

Thirdly, amongst authors attempting to renew Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990, there is a palpable shift to an accepting tone and attitude towards the emotions. Overall, one finds a positive correlation between these and contemporary authors. In Maguire, there is the rediscovery of the rich insight of “affective connaturality” with its roots in Aquinas but unfolded by John of St. Thomas. In Grisez, and, the a lesser extent, in Peschke, there is the recovery of some of Aquinas’ material on emotions in relation to practical reason. In Häring, one discovers (for his time) the most
extensive treatment of the emotions in a theological work since Aquinas. He presents an amalgam of modern philosophical insights, an alternative methodology to that of neo-Thomism, and especially highlights emotions as responses to value. The human person is a responding being. Further, moral response carries within it openness to the transcendent, to the religious horizon.

Fourthly, there is an expansion of the understanding of the human person. Aquinas builds his synthesis on the truth of grace building on, or working through, nature. He sees the human person and powers as having a fundamental orientation and capacity for God. Integral to this are human desires, emotions and affectivity. The static, essentialist and metaphysical categories used by Aquinas tend to portray the person (rather, “human nature”) in an ahistorical manner. Contemporary Theological Anthropology has been influenced by social and physical sciences together with modern Philosophy. There has been a shift to a position that is more historical, evolving, contextual, subject-oriented where the human person is characterised by self-awareness and self-direction. There is a better appreciation of the multi-faceted makeup of the person-as spiritual, corporeal, mental, psychological, social. Two aspects impinge insistently on the emotions-the bodily and the relational. While these are part of Aquinas’ construal of the person, modern Psychology has enriched human self-understanding, particularly in the psychosomatic area of human living. It has also enabled human beings to discern more confidently the experiential dimension of grace and of God’s activity.

Finally, what has the selected (and other) contemporary scholarship to offer these various understandings within the Catholic tradition? Perhaps, as been suggested, the most influential contribution is from Psychology. It provides a model (or models) to interpret the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious, to analyse inner psychic activity, to understand psychological defense mechanisms, to
modify emotional responses and behaviour. In particular, it offers techniques for claiming and naming negative emotions and states so that they can become constructive elements in one’s life. These resources were just not available to Aquinas and to Moral Theologians only in this century. For all that, this study has offered a glimpse of how Aquinas, despite his limited Psychology, is able to probe human experience carefully and critically.

The soundings into modern scholarship in this area, then, have shown a noticeable level of mutual confirmation and many points of convergence with Aquinas and Catholic Moral Theology. One must, nevertheless, be conscious of the danger of reductionism. Psychological reductionism can assimilate the spiritual to the natural, i.e., a need for God’s forgiveness is just infantile regression. Or its spiritual counterpart, e.g., illness is due to lack of faith. Psychological reductionism can also reduce being “good” morally to being psychologically “whole” or healthy. Holiness is conformity the Christ the perfect human being. Goodness is moral excellence in imitation of Christ that results from a person’s choices and manner of living virtuously. To adapt Jackson, both holiness and moral goodness “anticipate and seek wholeness” (1989, p. 57).

One could go even further and suggest that wholeness “anticipates and seeks goodness.” Psychological approaches to emotions and human affectivity offer a descriptive account of the person that underpins the moral life. More importantly, it is argued by some (e.g., Kagan) that emotions reveal both the need for, and the shape of, a normative structure to human existence if one is to develop as a human being in oneself and in relationships. Emotions as value responses affirm the need for morality and for the need of a personal moral code that balances the subjective with the objective.
The investigative work of this study is now completed. There only remains the task of drawing together the various threads. That is the purpose of the next and final chapter.
Chapter 8

Findings, Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, Postscript

This chapter aims to do five things: to recapitulate the main details of the study’s problem, methodology and textual analysis; to provide a summary of the findings within the three research questions used in this study; to list the conclusions that emerge from the findings; to note some significant implications of the findings and conclusions; finally, to propose some recommendations in the light of the study.

The problem

The problem addressed in this study is in the form of the question:

How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of the emotions in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 when measured against the work of Aquinas and some contemporary authors?

After offering a working definition of an emotion (Chapter two), the study has four focal points: Aquinas’ Treatise on the Passions and his work on the affective virtues (Chapters three and four); representative Moral Manualists just prior to Vatican II (Chapter five); selected Catholic Theologians between 1960 and 1990 (Chapter six); a sample of contemporary writing from Moral Philosophy, Developmental Psychology, Psychology as also from recent theological writing within the Catholic tradition (Chapter seven).
The textual analysis

The study has involved an examination and analysis of these sources using three categories: the moral significance of emotions as human acts; the moral significance of emotions in relation to virtue and character; the understanding of the human person manifest or inferred in the various authors. In the light of this analysis, the study compared, contrasted and evaluated the presentation of these categories in the selected authors. The following three research questions, based on the three selected categories, have been applied to each author as an investigative structure in this study:

1. How do these authors portray the moral significance of the emotions in the Christian moral life in relation to human acts, virtue and character?
2. What is the vision of the human person manifest or inferred in these authors?
3. What is the significance of the different understandings and treatments of the emotions and the human person in these authors?

These questions have been the probes used by the researcher to gain access to the material required to answer the question that encapsulates the central problem of the study.

1. Summary of the Findings in the Study

1.1: The Moral Significance of Emotions as Human Acts

1.1.1: Aquinas: Foundational principles

(i) Emotions have a positive, even indispensable, role in human life.

(ii) Emotions are, to some degree and carefully understood, rational and hence, to a certain extent, are voluntary, viz., they are moral acts.

(iii) Emotions can be disposed to be consonant with right reason (i.e., fitting) and
thus provide the moral object for the will through the positive mutual causality between emotions and the intellect.

(iv) Not all emotions are rational, i.e., in the sense of morally good/right. Some are, in themselves and carefully understood, consonant with right reason (intrinsically good/right, e.g., shame), just as some are, in themselves and carefully defined, opposed to right reason (intrinsically evil/wrong, e.g., some forms of envy).

(v) The governing metaphor used by Aquinas to capture the teleological interdependence of intellect, will and emotions in the workings of practical reason is the *polis* where power is exercised within a community of free subjects. The standard mode of relationship of emotions to mind and will is characterised by collaboration rather than domination (whose appropriate exercise cannot, at times, be excluded).

(vi) In Aquinas’ account of the emotions, evidence emerges of his endeavours to overcome the constraints of language, his mental horizons, his Moral Psychology and his philosophical system. He does this by the use of images, especially the use of a central metaphor, by phenomenological analysis of certain emotions, and by his persistent interest in the bodily resonance of emotions.

**1.1.2: Aquinas: specific emotions (positive and negative)**

(i) It is possible and profitable to investigate Aquinas by using the modern distinction between positive and negative emotions as a hermeneutical tool.

(ii) The moral significance of love lies in its attraction to the good, especially in the form of the dominant attraction that unites a person’s life and orders other emotions and desires. Love also provides the paradigm for the transcendent dimension of certain emotions.

(iii) Pleasure (happiness) as the goal of love through medium of desire, emerges in delight and joy in achieving one’s goal in life. The moral qualities of right and wrong are measured against what promotes or impedes true inner harmony, delight,
joy through the principle of ‘fittingness.’

(iv) Sadness, hatred, fear, and anger can all have an affirmative, even necessary role in moral activity, especially in the realm of self-care.

(v) Aquinas employs a phenomenological method in analysing some emotions, cf., love, sadness, anger.

(vi) Aquinas, while acknowledging their potential to be destructive, sees emotions, whether positive or negative, as having, in principle, a necessary and constructive role in a person’s moral life.

1.1.3: The Manualists

(i) The dominant concern for these authors is the emotions considered as impediments to, even enemies of, the human act or voluntarium.

(ii) The moral significance of emotions in relation to the human act is confined to the discussion of antecedent and consequent emotions, to the influence of various forms of fear as also of habitual impediments and pathological states.

(iii) The restricted context and focus of the Manualists’ treatment results in an ambivalent view of the emotions and their moral significance as human acts. At times, the attitude appears positive, more often is uncomfortable, occasionally is hostile. Overall, the Manualists convey a distorted perception of the emotions and, consequently, of their moral significance in relation to human acts.

1.1.4: Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990

(i) There is the maintenance of the traditional treatment (as in the Manualists) of the emotions and their influence on the voluntarium (Peschke, early Häring, Grisez).

(ii) Rediscovery is apparent in reclaiming the affective component in moral reasoning and in foundational moral awareness and the governing metaphor used by Aquinas to describe the relationship between the intellect and emotions in practical reason (Maguire, Grisez).
(iii) Innovation is evident in the detailed phenomenology of the emotions as responses to value both in basic moral consciousness and in moral reasoning (early Häring).

(iv) There is some degree of commonality in moral epistemology from the shared understanding of connatural knowledge (Peschke, Maguire, Häring, Grisez).

(v) There is an observable lack of development of the normative account of consequent emotions (found in Aquinas) by drawing on Häring’s phenomenological analysis.

(vi) An attitudinal shift to the emotions is apparent in these authors ranging from the muted tone in Peschke, through an audible harmonic in Maguire and Grisez to the dominant motif in Häring.

1.4: Selected contemporary authors

(i) From Moral Philosophy, Oakley attempts to demonstrate the moral significance of emotions through their necessary involvement in achieving certain goods. These values are clear perception, keen judgement, insight and understanding, strength of will, love and friendship and self-worth. All these are characteristics of the practically wise person (*phronimos*). Oakley also analyses the role of emotions in moral reasoning by using the *phronimos* as the benchmark for the rightness of a moral response (in terms of its object and/or intensity). It is the person developed in practical wisdom who has sufficiently habituated affective virtues to perceive ethically salient features in a situation and to respond emotionally to the right objects and to the right degree.

(ii) From Developmental Psychology, Gilligan, in contrast to the masculine, objective, emotionally detached approach of Kohlberg, defends an alternative and complementary form of moral reasoning. She argues that care and responsibility in relationships is the feminine manner of construing reality and in constructing and resolving moral conflicts. This entails cultivating certain forms of emotional
response, e.g., loving, care, compassion. Moral reasoning and moral development are understood in a more holistic and collaborative sense, i.e., between the cognitive, affective and corporeal aspects of the person and in a setting of relationships. (iii) The psychological dynamic of reason and emotions is probed by Callahan. Psychologically, emotions are crucial in establishing basic moral responsiveness as they are in animating moral life and shaping one’s moral perspective. Further, embedded as habits and emotional commitments, emotions influence the selection and filtering processes concerning what is ethically salient in particular situations. Morally, thinking and emotion have a collaborative and congruent relationship. Reason judges and tutors emotions; emotions test and tutor reason; emotions can monitor and tutor each other.

1.2: The Moral Significance of Emotions in Relation to Virtue and Character

1.2.1: Aquinas

(i) For Aquinas, participation in Trinitarian life through grace is the existential reality from which the virtues receive their impulse and capacity to seek and respond to God and so arrive at human fulfilment.

(ii) The affective virtues (Fortitude and Temperance), from which emerge emotions morally good in themselves which provide proper objects to the will, are necessary for moral action, growth and integration.

(iii) Affective virtues are immanent as opposed to transitive. They are forms of habituation that modify human affectivity. Their proper function and perfection is to provide the habitual dispositions for a person to make well-ordered, appropriate emotional responses (which may or may not lead to action).

(iv) The mean of the affective virtues is contextual, namely, shaped by a person’s temperament, circumstances and overall moral development. For this reason, Aquinas does not offer a normative account of moderate emotions that emerge from
the affective virtues.

(v) Love, in the form of transforming Charity, gives the affective (and all) virtues their unity, meaning and direction. Virtues for Aquinas are principally strategies and different expressions of love.

(vi) Consonant with his historical context, Aquinas has inadequacies concerning the domain of subjective experience, the psychological structure of the human person, and of the effects of social and cultural conditioning on patterns of evaluation and emotional response. Nevertheless, there are instances of psychological insight and of his affective awareness in his discussion of emotions and the affective virtues.

(vii) Aquinas’ treatment of the emotions mirrors, both in its content and language, the strand in his work where he conveys a more positive view of women as made in the image of God.

(viii) In discussing the emotions and their associated virtues, Aquinas shows an increasing emphasis on the role of human affectivity in his Theological Anthropology while betraying elements of his own refined sensitivity.

1.2.2: Manualists

(i) Their presentation of the affective virtues (nature, divisions, parts of Fortitude and Temperance) replicates, in compressed form, the treatment found in Aquinas.

(ii) While the affective virtues, compared to the emotions, are portrayed in a more positive light, the perception of their principal role as one of restraining the emotions indicates a lingering unease in their regard.

(iii) Such traces of ambivalence, when combined with the summary treatment of the affective virtues, seems to preclude the development of the relationship between emotions, virtue and character in these authors.

1.2.3: Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990

(i) Fundamental response, understood as conversion, is the centrepoint of the moral
life in the selected authors.

(ii) Virtues emerge from this foundational conversion as patterns of response embodied in attitudes, desires, emotions and life-style.

(iii) The traditional affective virtues are re-interpreted as modes of response/responsibility to or between values (Grisez).

(iv) The traditional affective virtues are recast by Peschke and Häring in the form of the call to respond and to be responsible to God and the world.

(v) The later Häring assumes the traditional affective virtues but highlights the eschatological virtues (with their affective components). These manifest the realisation of God’s Reign in persons and communities who are grateful, humble, hopeful, vigilant, joyful and peaceful.

(vi) Moral response, for Peschke and Häring, is centrifugal and inclusive, actualised in a person’s character through expanding horizons of understanding and love for people, cultures and nature.

1.2.4: Selected contemporary authors

(i) The building blocks of the sense of self, self-esteem and of awareness of another (empathy) are in the realm of emotions and affectivity. Without a basic self-esteem and empathy, a human being cannot be moral—either in basic moral awareness or in ongoing moral reasoning (Dominian, Jackson).

(ii) Empathy, as the psychological basis of morality, is the constitutive element in human experience that can be transformed by grace, can receive a new meaning through a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, and can enable a person to respond to Jesus Christ (Shelton).

(iii) Where empathy provides the basic soil, emotions nourish a person’s moral sensitivity, expand moral vision and sustain moral growth (Shelton).

(iv) A morality of the heart is modelled by Jesus Christ in his *kenosis*. Its goal is to share in the work of Christ’s reconciliation and the personal and social
transformation of the world and creation (Shelton).

(v) Affective conversion entails a measure of responsibility for one’s emotional health. It involves the decision to listen to, learn from, and understand negative states and emotions so that their conscious appropriation can lead to deeper personal integration (Gelpi).

1.3: Theological Anthropology: Understandings of the Human Person

1.3.1: Aquinas

(i) The overall teleological structure of the Summa Theologiae around the poles of Exitus/Reditus takes a sharper focus in the Prima Secundae in a theological perspective built on a philosophical anthropology of the human person.

(ii) Aquinas’ metaphysical categories, his cosmic and immanent teleology and his reliance on the various forms of causality provide the analytical structure for his view of the human person and for his division and account of human emotions.

(iii) For Aquinas, the human person, created in the image of God, is self-directing, free and responsible for his/her actions.

(iv) The teleological character of creation is replicated in the immanent teleology of the human powers, in their relationship as distinct yet interdependent. This pattern is exemplified in the emotions in relation to intellect and will.

(v) The human person is a body/spirit reality-captured in the theory of hylomorphism. It is particularly embodied in the structure of human affectivity.

(vi) The human person is a being of desire (orexis), drawn to happiness as life’s goal (found in God alone).

(vii) For Aquinas, the human person is called to participate in the divine life through grace. Human acts (including emotions), the virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit emerge from this transformed state, animating and facilitating the momentum
towards full human flourishing through the achievement of human destiny in union with God. Aquinas offers an integrated anthropological vision.

(viii) Aquinas’ view of the human person is internally consistent and coherent. The person is the focal point on which converge a range of complementary interpretative models, i.e., theological, cosmological, organic, moral, social/political.

1.3.2: The Manualists

(i) These authors follow Aquinas’ overall structural design of the Exitus/Reditus and draw, in summary form, on his ontological and teleological framework (as outlined above).

(ii) In examining the more immediate context, the displacement and recording of material by the Manualists, combined with their pastoral concerns, betray a restricted approach to the human person. Conscience, Law, Sin and Vice take the spotlight. The human subject, designed to develop from interiorised resources, is replaced by the moral agent called to conformity to external benchmarks.

(iii) This shift in understanding of human person is evident in the Manualists’ preoccupation with the morality of acts and, consequently, of the emotions as inhibiting rather than promoting freedom and moral growth. It can also be detected in the Manualists’ style of language, in forms of argument resting heavily on authority and on a self-authenticating tradition. It is especially encapsulated in the move from an organic to a mechanical image to act as the governing metaphor representing the relationship between emotions and the deliberative powers in practical reasoning.

(iv) In the Manualists, one can detect an unresolved tension, even conflict, between the residual presence of Aquinas’ organic and developmental understanding of the human person and a subsequent approach that is juridical, mechanical and conformist. There are, arguably, two Theological Anthropologies that seem to be
1.3.3: Renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990

(i) The backdrop for these authors’ treatment of the human person is one of change and of the summons to renew Moral Theology from Vatican II. This is accompanied by a greater openness to, and enrichment from, modern Philosophy and the behavioural sciences together with move from a seminary to a university context.

(ii) The human being is now understood as a ‘person’ rather than as ‘human nature.’ There is no longer a methodology that leans heavily on the metaphysical categories and teleological structures found in Aquinas and the Manualists. For Peschke and Häring, it is the person (individual, social, corporeal, affective, historically grounded) who is the subject of Theological Anthropology.

(iii) The human person has a sense of a self, gives greater weight to experience, is a being-in-relationship, is called to response and dialogue, while being a bearer and revealer of value through various levels of affective awareness (Häring, Maguire).

(iv) The moral life begins with God’s initiative and invitation, calling human beings to respond to values, especially to God as transcendent value and lover and is epitomised in Jesus Christ (Häring, Peschke, Grisez).

(v) This understanding of the person as one who responds to value(s) results in emotions being more readily susceptible to an intelligible and necessary significance in human life, moral reasoning and growth in the affective virtues.

(vi) These selected authors, while differing in emphasis and, at times, in content, do not betray a lack of congruence between their ‘espoused’ theory and their theory ‘in use.’

1.3.4: Selected contemporary authors

(i) These authors differ from the previous authors in this study in their perspective and assumptions concerning the human person. Their concern is not Theological
Anthropology but moral growth through virtue (Moral Philosophy) or psychological health and development (Psychology, Developmental Psychology). Authors such as Dominian, Jackson, McDargh, Shelton, Gelpi incorporate insights from these disciplines in their accounts of religious faith and Christian moral growth.

(ii) The human person as a ‘moral self’ receives different emphases in these authors. Some give greater stress to the self-as-individual (Oakley, Callahan, Gelpi). Others pursue the self-in-relationship (Dominian, Jackson, McDargh, Shelton) especially in the origins of self-esteem and the role of empathy.

(iii) ‘Awareness of the self’ is another characteristic of the person assumed by, or apparent in, these authors. It is seen at work in the detailed mechanism of moral reasoning offered by Callahan, in the emergence of basic self-esteem (Dominian, Jackson, McDargh), in its relationship to empathy (Shelton) and in the self-presence required for on-going conversion (Gelpi).

(iv) The various perspectives on the human person in these authors are illuminated by the interdisciplinary nature of their writing.

(v) In investigating the human person, the behavioural sciences are increasingly open to other disciplines, perspectives and new methodologies, e.g., qualitative research.

1.4: Significance of the Different Understandings and Treatments of the Emotions and of the Human Person

1.4.1: Aquinas and the Manualists

The examination of the Manualists indicates a substantial unanimity amongst them in their understanding of the human person, of the emotions as human acts and of the affective virtues. There are four points of contrast between Aquinas and the Manualists that are important for this study.
Firstly, the restricted context, combined with the selective use of certain aspects of emotions, i.e., as affecting the *voluntarium*, results in the Manualist authors misrepresenting and distorting Aquinas’ understanding of the moral significance of emotions and of the human person. The author of this study detects an internal conflict in the Manualists. This is evident in the terminology, e.g., consequent emotions are seen not as increasing moral goodness but as impediments to the human act. Again, the working assumption of the Manualists is that emotions are obstacles to human and moral well-being. They have difficulty reconciling this with Aquinas’ overall treatment and with human experience. Finally, the Manualists, with their uncomfortable stance to emotions and a comfortable attitude towards affective virtues, seem unable to weave these contrasting strands into a consistent whole. These three considerations are significant indicators of the, at times, incoherent and hence inadequate understanding of the moral significance of the emotions and of the human person in their work.

Secondly, the shift in the dominant metaphor (in Davis) from the organic to the mechanical, from political to despotic rule, is both symptomatic and crucial. From Aquinas’ vision of an harmonious human composite where intellect, will and emotions are designed to collaborate with each other, there is a move to a more dualistic understanding of higher powers whose purpose is to dominate the emotions.

Thirdly, the fear of emotions apparent in the Manualists represents a deeper distrust of the human body. This is associated with a more anxious and pessimistic spirituality emerging from the later medieval period and prevalent up until the middle of the twentieth century.

Fourthly, the conflicting views concerning the emotions and the human person,
especially captured in the change in the governing metaphor, has particular relevance for moral theory. While the Manualists’ preoccupation with individual acts does have its analytical and pastoral benefits, these come at a price. Morality tends to become more nominalistic, a question of obligation and of the divine will rather than a response to, and the intelligible investigation about, the question of happiness. Practical reason inclines more towards Kant’s rational will rather than being the cooperation of intellect, will and emotions through the guidance of the virtues, especially the affective virtues.

1.4.2: Renewing Catholic Theology, Aquinas and Manualists

In the theologians studied, there emerges a confluence of positive attitudes concerning the emotions and the moral life. It revolves around conversion, fundamental option, value, response and the virtues (affective or eschatological). The points of contrast between these authors, Aquinas and the Manualists are encapsulated in three headings.

The first point of contrast is human subjectivity and its dynamics, the role of the unconscious, the place of self-awareness, personal inwardness and depth. These distinguish the selected authors, particularly Häring, from Aquinas and the Manualists. There is an accompanying awareness of the self-in-relationship, both in interpersonal terms and as a participant, with rights and duties, in the social and political world. This provides the foundation for more deliberate accounts of the interpersonal, communitarian, social and environmental contexts within which the human subject lives and develops, a point of contrast with Aquinas and the Manualists.

A second point of divergence concerns aspects of morality. There is a significant
difference between the moral epistemologies found in the selected modern Moral Theologians and in the Manualists. This centres on the role of emotions in foundational moral awareness and in on-going practical reasoning. Further, the modern authors exhibit a shift in moral theory from the legal and voluntarist approach in the Manuals to one based on conversion, interiorisation and virtue. This is both a rediscovery of Aquinas and an advance on him through the added stress on social responsibility and on eschatological considerations. Again, moral agency is an important point of divergence. All the modern Moralists studied in this project see moral agency as focussed on the person and on the imitation of Christ. Peschke and Grisez do this while incorporating teleological categories and final and efficient causality. Conversely, Häring pursues the same perspective through the categories of invitation, response and exemplary causality.

Finally, moral vision and vocation are another consideration. The modern account is Christocentric, with the Christian vocation understood as the following of Christ and the cooperation with Him in responsibility in the religious realm and in and for the world. Growth in affective virtue is not primarily for self-fulfilment. It is an eschatological goal of being God’s co-workers in affirming and promoting God’s reign and the fulfilment of creation. This is a significant advance on Aquinas and the Manualists.

1.4.3: Selected contemporary authors, renewing Catholic Theology, Aquinas, and the Manualists

This investigation has uncovered important points of convergence amongst the various authors from different periods. All, except the Manualists, share an unambiguously affirmative view of the emotions (both positive and negative) and their constructive potential in moral living. The construal of an emotion is common
to Oakley and Aquinas, is further developed by Häring, but is not the concern of the other contemporary authors. The mutual interaction of emotions and intellect in moral reasoning is explained, in initial form, by Aquinas, is elaborated by Oakley and receives intricate probing from Callahan. Contemporary Psychology, Aquinas and modern theologians agree on the importance of self-esteem, a sense of inner goodness and the place of self-love as the necessary conditions for the moral life. The psychological context of some authors shows the presence of a more finely honed self-awareness and skills in attending to psychic movements. This is evident in a phenomenological form in Häring and even, at times, in Aquinas. The constructive potential of negative emotions in moral integration is acknowledged and elaborated by Gelpi while being consistent with the views of Aquinas, Häring and Grisez. Finally, all authors, from Aquinas through the Manualists to representative theologians and contemporary authors, see the safeguarding and strengthening of character as crucial in the moral life.

Conversely, there are five areas of divergence within this sweep of authors. Perspectives about the human person range from the psychological, the aretaic to the Christian Anthropology that binds together Aquinas, the Manualists and Catholic theological writing. Again, while all authors share a concern for the formation of character, there is no attempt in the selected contemporary authors to pursue the Catholic tradition’s concern for the nature and role of the affective virtues. Thirdly, the matter of foundational moral awareness and of affective connaturality is more evident in Catholic theological discussion than in the selected contemporary works. Fourthly, the impact of emotions on moral imputability differentiates the authors. Emotions as impediments to freedom is central for the Manualists. Emotions as facilitating freedom and moral goodness is a working assumption of the modern texts, as it is of Häring, Grisez and Aquinas. The helpful distinction between antecedent and consequent emotions is overlooked by the contemporary authors.
Finally, moral goodness has different connotations when seen from a psychological perspective, or from that of virtue theory and lastly from the point of view of a theologian where it is responding to love under the influence of grace.

Overall, the significance of these varied understandings of the moral significance of the emotions can be summed up in three observations. There is a positive correlation between contemporary writing and the understanding and treatment of the emotions and their moral significance found in Aquinas and renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990. Secondly, modern studies (within and beyond the Catholic tradition) together with Aquinas have an overall negative correlation with the Manualists’ view of the moral significance of the emotions. Finally, this project has uncovered, in these authors, the trajectory of an expanding understanding of the human person. It is a movement from the essentialist, metaphysical categories used to describe human nature to those more oriented to the person as subject, a being who is historical, developing, self-aware, psychosomatic, relational, social and cosmic.

2. Conclusions of the Study

The conclusions that emerge from the findings of this study can be formulated in the light of the principal research question. What is the response to the focal question of this study, namely:

   How adequate is the treatment of the moral significance of the emotions in Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990 when measured against the work of Aquinas and some contemporary authors?

The response is fourfold and is based on certain distinctions within Catholic Moral Theology 1960-1990.
1. The Manualists c. 1960 display an understanding of the moral significance of the emotions that lacks coherence and adequacy when assessed in the light of Aquinas’ account and of contemporary writing within and beyond the Catholic tradition.

2. From the investigation of representative authors, it can be said that renewing Catholic Theology 1960-1990 contains an understanding of the moral significance of the emotions that has a substantial degree of coherence and adequacy. By collating the material dispersed amongst these authors, it can also be argued that it needs to be supplemented by insights from contemporary authors from other disciplines.

3. This study has brought to light the quality of Aquinas’ treatment and understanding of the moral significance of the emotions. His account is internally consistent and coherent. Measured within that framework, it is substantially adequate. Measured against contemporary writing, its deficiencies, though not substantive, are more conspicuous yet understandable.

4. Closer examination reveals that regrettably, within the period 1960-1990, Catholic Moral Theology, in general, seems to have failed to recognise or failed to have capitalised on the expanding understanding and appreciation of the moral significance of the emotions. This untapped resource has emerged through a rediscovery of Aquinas and through investigations in modern scholarship within and beyond the Catholic theological tradition.

3. Implications of the Study

1. This study has uncovered a significant level of mutual confirmation and many important points of convergence between Aquinas, modern theologians and contemporary writing in adjacent disciplines on the moral significance of emotions
and human affectivity. The various treatments need to be blended into a more systematic and integrated account of the emotions in the Christian moral life. This should be buttressed by a Theological Anthropology that combines contemporary understandings of the human person, a congruent Moral Psychology and a Theology of the emotions and of human affectivity.

2. Aquinas attempts to portray the task of Fortitude and Temperance as virtues meant to assist a person to include, in an appropriate manner, emotional experience in moral life and moral reasoning. He sees the function of the affective virtues not as checking one’s emotions but as integrating them for one’s happiness. The contextual nature of Aquinas’ account has repercussions for contemporary life. With a greater emphasis on human relationships in recent times, a re-interpretation has been proposed for the cardinal virtues. It has been suggested that the virtues are meant to develop relationships rather than individual powers or faculties. Hence, as a relational being, one is called to fidelity to others (Fortitude) and, in relation to oneself, to exercise self-care (Temperance) (Keenan, 1995, p. 709ff; 1998, p. 139ff). This use of language and categories reflecting advances in human self-understanding fosters a creative interaction between enduring insights from the past and contemporary experience.

3. This study has highlighted the necessary interdependence of Psychology, Morality, Spirituality and Theology in understanding the human person and in promoting authentic development. One aspect of this is the need for ongoing interdisciplinary dialogue and mutual criticism. Solid underpinnings from the behavioural sciences are needed for theological understandings of the person and for any Moral Psychology. Conversely, one needs to be aware of the limits of therapeutic and developmental theories in Psychology which cannot fully account for moral and affective response, especially of a religious character, as in the process of
conversion. Nor can they account for the person who is psychologically flawed or underdeveloped on the cognitive-structural scale but who, by responding in love to God’s love to the best of their ability, is advancing in moral goodness and holiness.

4. This investigation has underlined the central place of Jesus Christ, particularly the role of his human affectivity, empathy and emotional responses in revealing the inner life of God. Jesus’ self-appropriation means that there is no part of himself (including negative emotions and states) that he has not faced and embraced. The goal of Christian moral integration is, having been created in God’s image, that we grow in the likeness of Christ, especially of his affectivity and compassionate love.

5. It is clearer from this project that Christian morality, by acknowledging and incorporating the emotions and affectivity, confirms and nourishes the relational aspects of human existence. Emotions, self-esteem, basic trust, empathy are the building blocks of what MacMurray describes as the “...capacity for communion, that capacity for entering into free and equal personal relations (which) is the thing that makes us human” (McDargh, 1983, p. 358). They are also crucial in providing the possibility of moral response and in initiating and sustaining the movement of the human person as a relational being from self-absorption to self-transcendence.

6. Emotions provide a point of convergence for the moral and spiritual dimensions of human experience. They encapsulate what Taylor refers to as the “affirmation of ordinary life” (Taylor, 1989, p. 211ff) and give sharper focus and grounding to morality considered as the daily task of transformation and integration of the total person.

7. The relationship between Spirituality and Morality is further highlighted by the interconnection of moral action and spiritual disposition, particularly by the
significance of emotions, perception and enduring dispositions to respond and act in
certain ways. Further work needs to be done on how emotions sustain a spirituality,
support moral commitment, are “socially formed through language and custom”
(Spohn, 1991, p. 85) and especially how specifically Christian emotions are formed
within the Christian community.

4. Recommendations of the Study

1. There is an evident need for the cultivation and interchange of interdisciplinary
perspectives on the psychological, moral and spiritual significance of emotions both
at level of conferences, journals and books.

2. There is the need for Moral Theologians to develop a synthesis of the largely
untapped resources concerning emotions and the moral life.

3. Greater attention needs to be given to the moral significance of the emotions and
the affective life in the teaching of Moral Theology.

Postscript

It is with the heart that one sees rightly; what is essential is invisible to the eye

_The Little Prince:_ Antoine de Saint-Exupéry

Daniel Goleman opens _Emotional Intelligence_ (1995) with the story of Gary and
Mary Jane Chauncey and their 11 year old daughter Andrea, confined to a
wheelchair by cerebral palsy. They are all passengers on a train that crashed in a
river in Louisiana. The Chauncey’s first thought was for their daughter. As waters
engulfed the train, they managed to push Andrea through a window to rescuers.
They then perished.

Such accounts of parental or family sacrifice are repeated often, as in tragedies such as the killings at Port Arthur in Tasmania. There, a man threw himself across his wife during the hail of bullets. He died, she survived. Goleman sees such acts of altruistic love, overriding the powerful impulse for personal survival, as testimonies to the purpose and potency of emotions in human life. “It suggests that our deepest feelings, our passions and longings, are essential guides, and that our species owes much of its existence to their power in human affairs” (1995, p. 3f). Emotions guide, strengthen and animate us to face situations and tasks “too important to leave to intellect alone-danger, painful loss, persisting towards a goal despite frustrations, bonding with a mate, building a family” (Goleman, 1995, p. 4).

Schopenhauer probes this phenomenon further in his paper “The Foundations of Morality.” “How is it that a human being can so participate in the danger of another, that forgetting his own self-protection, he moves spontaneously to the other’s rescue?” (Campbell, 1990, p. 41). Schopenhauer’s reply is that this instinctive response wells up from the very core of our being. “It is a metaphysical impulse that is deeper than the experience of separateness. You realize you and the other are one” (Campbell, 1990, p. 41).

These two insights seem to encapsulate the moral significance of the emotions. It is one’s emotions that express and ensure the essential relationships that make a person human through responding to and for each other and one’s world. Further, these instantaneous reactions, often without deliberation, are, at certain key moments, moral statements-about one’s true character, values and fundamental attitudes. This is behaviour by which one cannot help but be inspired, and warrants admiration, praise and imitation. Such self-transcending emotional responses, defining a person
and engaging one’s deepest freedom, are arguably the most profoundly human acts a person can perform. Could one even say that human beings are most rational, most moral when they seek what is true and good by acting spontaneously, without deliberation, even without conscious choice? Whether one sees this as a mystery or a paradox it marks an appropriate point at which to close this study.

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ABSTRACT

This is a comparative study of the moral significance of emotions in Catholic Moral Theology. It is done with reference to Thomas Aquinas, to selected Manualist authors immediately prior to Vatican II, to representative Catholic theologians 1960-1990 and to a sample of contemporary writers from other disciplines. The project argues five points.

Firstly, Aquinas sees emotions as designed to have a necessary and constructive significance in moral reasoning and moral development. In their habituated form as affective virtues, they enable a person to have the right emotional responses in terms of their object and intensity.

Secondly, the Manualists, by a selective use of Aquinas’ material and by restricting their discussion to emotions considered as impediments to the human act, distort Aquinas’ treatment. Despite a positive approach to the affective virtues, the Manualists’ ambivalent attitude to the emotions (ranging from uncomfortable to hostile) results in an inconsistent and, at times, incoherent account.

Thirdly, authors such as Haring, Peschke, Grisez and Maguire, representing renewing Catholic Moral Theology after Vatican II, combine two strands. One is retrieval, from within the Catholic tradition, of the positive moral significance of emotions together with the affective character of primordial moral awareness. The other strand is discovery, from within modern thought, particularly of insights from personalism and axiological ethics. This is especially evident in Haring, for whom the human person is a relational being whose emotions are responses to value (in its various forms) and have social and religious significance.
Fourthly, contemporary Moral Philosophy (Oakley), Psychology and Developmental Psychology (Callahan, Gilligan, Dominian, McDargh) generally confirm and, at times, supplement the understanding of emotions found in Aquinas and renewing Catholic Theology. Shelton and Gelpi (from within the Catholic tradition) use such sources to examine the place of empathy and affective Conversion in moral existence.

Finally, closer investigation reveals that regrettably, within the period 1960-1990, Catholic Moral Theology, in general, seems to have failed to recognise or failed to have capitalised on the expanding understanding and appreciation of the moral significance of the emotions retrieved from Aquinas or developed by modern scholarship within and beyond the Catholic theological tradition.