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**A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE DEVELOPMENT  
OF THE NOTION OF KALOS KAGATHOS  
FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE**

**Dissertation submitted for the Degree of Master of Philosophy**

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**December 2006**

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract	iv
Declaration	v
Acknowledgements	vi
<b>INTRODUCTION</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>CHAPTER 1: The Fish Hook and Some Other Examples</b>	<b>6</b>
The Sun – The Source of Beauty	7
Some Instances of Lack of Beauty: Adolf Hitler and Sharp Practices in Court	9
The Kitchen Knife and the Samurai Sword	10
<b>CHAPTER 2: Homer</b>	<b>17</b>
An Historical Analysis of the Phrase <i>Kalos Kagathos</i>	17
Herman Wankel	17
Felix Bourriott	18
Walter Donlan	19
An Analysis of the Terms <i>Agathos</i> , <i>Arete</i> and Other Related Terms of Value in Homer	19
Homer's Purpose in Writing the <i>Iliad</i>	22
Alasdair MacIntyre	23
E. R. Dodds	24
A.W. H. Adkins	27
Eric Vogelin	27
The Scenery of Homer's <i>Iliad</i>	28
The Elopement	30
The Quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles	32
Paris' Cowardice	33
Phoenix's Advice to Achilles	34
Odysseus' Treatment of Thersites	35
The Gods	36
Odysseus' Return to Ithaca	38
<b>CHAPTER 3: Hesiod</b>	<b>41</b>
An Analysis of the Terms <i>Arete</i> , <i>Panaristos</i> , <i>Dike</i> and Other Related Terms of Value in Hesiod	42
The Use of <i>Agathos</i> by Theognis	47
<i>Dike</i> (Justice)	48
Cornford on <i>Dike</i> and the <i>Tao</i>	52
<b>CHAPTER 4: Solon</b>	<b>55</b>
Solon's Political Contribution to the Marriage of the Beautiful and the Good.	55
Solon's Concept of Justice	55
Some Conclusions	59

<b>CHAPTER 5: Plato</b>	61
Relationship between Plato’s Notion of Perception and Aesthetics	61
The Role of the Good in the Suprasensible and Sensible World	62
Dialectic – A Means to Understanding the Good	63
<i>Kalos Kagathos</i> Personalised	65
<b>CHAPTER 6: Aristotle</b>	67
Communal Concerns	68
The Breathalyser and the Artificial Lake	69
Aristotle on the Kitchen Knife	71
The Middle Way	72
Balancing the Emotions	73
<i>Katharsis</i> in Tragedy	73
<i>Eudaimonia</i> : The Marriage of the Beautiful and the Good	75
Aristotle’s Theory of Causation	75
<b>CONCLUSION: Summing up the Kitchen Knife</b>	78
<b>Endnotes</b>	82
<b>Bibliography</b>	89

## **ABSTRACT**

In this thesis, I shall attempt to show that the Greeks believed in the ideal of a marriage between the beautiful and the good. This important philosophical ideal rests upon the premise that beauty depends upon function, behaviour and the intention of the agent. It is the anti-modernist position. This notion known to the ancient Greeks as *kalos kagathos*, which dates back to the times of Homer, seems to have been forgotten in our times. This study will trace the development of this ideal from Homer to Aristotle. This world view differs from the one we have come to understand under modernism. First, I will cite some examples of how the beauty of anything can be measured by the amount of human goods it contributes to. Following this I shall discuss the marriage of the beautiful and the good within the context of Homeric and Hesiodic literature, and the influence of Solon in the marriage of the beautiful and the good in bringing about increased political stability in the Greece of his times. Finally, I shall comment on the contributions of Plato and Aristotle to the development of this Greek ideal.

## **DECLARATION**

I acknowledge that all the work presented here is my own work. It does not include material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree at any educational establishment. Neither does it include material that has been previously submitted for any of the coursework which I have already completed. To the best of my knowledge, the dissertation contains no previously published material, or any material published by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text of the work.

Signed \_\_\_\_\_

Date \_\_\_\_\_

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## INTRODUCTION

In this thesis I shall be arguing that the question of what constitutes beauty depends upon whether one adopts a modernist or anti-modernist viewpoint. By modernist, I mean that something may be considered beautiful in isolation, regardless of its use, or proposed purpose. By anti-modernist, I mean that beauty must include the thing in its setting, or knowledge of its function.<sup>1</sup>

I shall be arguing the latter viewpoint which originated with the ancient Greeks who believed in the ideal of a marriage between the beautiful and the good. This ideal was known to them as *kalos kagathos*. I shall use the terms “the ideal of *kalos kagathos*,” “the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good” and “the Greek ideal” interchangeably throughout my thesis. This ideal, that we appear to have lost sight of, has its roots in the epics of Homer and developed through the other writers represented in this thesis. I shall argue that the marriage of the beautiful and the good is potentially present in people endeavouring to improve themselves, and their community. This marriage resembles the dialectic of Socrates in the Platonic dialogues. Only one of these investigations yielded a result.<sup>2</sup> However, Socrates was never discouraged. Socrates’s tenacity inspires us to continued attempts at perfecting our own behaviour. The marriage of the beautiful and the good, like all ideals, exists as something we aspire to. Thus it can never be fully ours. This notion differs from the one we have become accustomed to under modernism.

According to Marjorie Harris, some authors believe that Plato holds that “beauty has value only insofar as it promotes “just conduct and true thinking,” which ought to be revealed in the use of a thing or in good behaviour.”<sup>3</sup> If the intended use of a thing is to contribute to human goods, then its beauty will depend upon the degree to which that intention is realised. By human goods, I mean anything that furthers people’s moral and physical development. I shall give various examples of such things and attempt to show they can lose their beauty by being put to an evil use.<sup>4</sup> I shall also argue that objects manufactured with the aim of derogating from human goods lack all beauty because their goal is an evil one. I shall contend that some objects are so obviously conducive to human goods that their beauty is self evident. An example may well be a hand-crocheted garment for a young baby.<sup>5</sup> I shall tie these ideas into



the thought of the various authors covered in this thesis. I shall only consider man-made objects. I shall not deal with natural objects, except in Homer. Lastly, I shall argue that the context of a manufactured object and its intended function are the same thing.

In excluding the purpose for which the object was designed from our consideration, we are left in the position of somebody who did not know what the object was for at all. The question should be, “what is that?” or, “what purpose does that serve?” I shall be arguing that we must seek an explanation of why the object was brought into existence, and, where the use it has been put to already exists; does it have a history within human striving for excellence? The object may still be in the experimental state in which case the inquirer will need to know its intended use. Chapter One begins with a discussion of modern examples of things and activities linked to their function and setting which I shall use to show how the ideal of *kalos kagathos* makes its presence felt in our modern age.

I will be pursuing an extended analogy throughout this thesis of a kitchen knife. A well-made kitchen knife with its comfortable handle and sharp stainless steel blade immediately suggests excellence in both function and setting. The preparation of food is a prerequisite to its human consumption; an undeniable human good. Other examples, like a speech in court, are not so obvious unless we have enough expertise to know whether the presentation is misleading, or in aid of justice. On the other hand, a debate consists of speeches which are designed to win arguments. If the object of this contest is to engender confidence in the speakers and teach them verbal skills, this too is conducive to human goods. However, the Sophists’ art, where winning at all costs is an end in itself,<sup>6</sup> would be an evil exercise because it would deprive someone of their just desserts. I also consider changing attitudes towards achieving various ends; such as capital punishment. Instruments such as the gallows lose their beauty when their function falls from favour. Similar considerations apply to instruments constructed for an evil purpose, such as torture chambers. Such progressive thinking indicates the persistence of the Greek ideal in our times.

Chapter Two examines the *Iliad* as a morality tale. Central to the plot is the scenery of cosmic excellence, such as the rose-fingered dawn and well-made weapons that the epic is set in. This unchanging picture of inanimate perfection serves as a

contrast to the aristocrats in their unrealised human potential. I begin by analysing several terms of value, and their opposites, to show how Homer used them in unfolding a story of infidelity, personal conflict, and war, which culminated in the flourishing of Achilles' character in the expression of compassion. I also include several episodes which depict the stages of Achilles' growth along the way. These episodes all contain moral lessons, such as the advice Phoenix gives to Achilles to resolve his quarrel with Agamemnon. Phoenix says that a kind heart is better than pride. This example actually portends Achilles' compassion. I argue that this virtue ties human behaviour to cosmic and divine paradigms. The ideal of *kalos kagathos* originates in Homer.

Chapter Three discusses Hesiod's farming community eking a bare existence out of bleak and unfertile lands. This setting is the antithesis of the plenteousness of the *Iliad*. The peasant world could only yield a living if people took full advantage of their meagre lot. I shall show how Hesiod taught them to eschew injustice, cooperate with seasonal patterns and engage in wholesome competition in the *agora* to make the best of what they had. Hesiod sought to make people's behaviour imitate nature, which consisted not only in learning more effective ways of earning a living, but also in refining the cooperative social virtues.

In order to do this Hesiod traced a cosmogony of the gods from Kronos down to Zeus, one of whose daughters was *dike*, whose divine role was to report injustice to Zeus. This identification of justice with the gods was a metaphor for people to replicate the divine in their own behaviour. Hesiod's purpose in writing his poetry was to put people in touch with their human nature so that it would blossom into fulfilment. For Hesiod the setting is already present, but without a full awareness of it, such as the part played by the gods and nature: people would not be able to take full advantage of it. They would not be aware of the ideal of *kalos kagathos* and how inviting it into their lives would enrich them. I shall show that Hesiod realised the kitchen knife needed to take some responsibility for its impaired cutting ability.

Chapter Four introduces Solon, an archon who enjoyed the power necessary to innovate behavioural change on a national level. Like Hesiod, Solon thought justice was of divine origin. Unlike Hesiod, who could only encourage people to embrace justice and stay away from the injustice of corrupt judges, Solon changed the laws to

give everyone equal opportunity to better their station in life. Using a thoughtful program of legislative reform, Solon was able to ensure that justice potentially extended through all levels of society. I shall argue that Solon's contribution to human goods was to make it easier for everyone to achieve it without the need to fear oppression. Solon did not make many laws that intruded on people's privacy. They had to invite justice into their lives. The agrarian classes found this when Solon refused to go as far as they wanted in breaking up large tracks of land held by experienced owners. Solon confronted the whole of Greece with the ideal of *kalos kagathos*. He realised the kitchen needed a face-lift. Like Homer he left the improvement of the kitchen knife to those who would be using it.

In the fifth chapter I explore Plato's contribution to the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good in his paradigms of the Sun, the Cave and the Divided Line. The function of these models is to encourage people to explore the suprasensible forms using the structure of the world as a comparison. This was a departure from the work of earlier writers, who were concerned with making one's way in this world. I shall show how Plato ties the function of sight to that of the intellect, which ought to enable us to attain a deeper and richer appreciation of our human nature and the setting in which it is continually maturing. Plato's position is that people will never do what is harmful to them. However, in order to reach this stage they need to be more aware of their human nature and how best to cultivate it. Socrates announces the "good" in *The Republic* when he says, "justice is a human being functioning excellently."<sup>7</sup> He was referring to the master craftsman who would make a perfect kitchen knife every time.

Chapter Six examines Aristotle. Aristotle did not believe in the Platonic forms. For Aristotle the way to a virtuous life lay in the standards of a virtuous community. The agent had to embody the virtue, not simply mimic it. To this end Aristotle developed the Doctrine of the Mean in which he advocated balanced behaviour in all circumstances. I shall discuss how this equilibrium is achieved by way of some examples. Aristotle also considered that the emotions played an important part in human activity. I shall also touch on his treatment for emotional excesses in my discussion of his *Poetics*.

In this introduction, I have indicated that I will use modern examples of things and communal activities to show how the Greek ideal has come down to our modern world. I have also summarised the work of ancient Greek authors and briefly described how the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good developed through various literary stages in ancient Greece.

# **CHAPTER 1**

## **The Fish Hook and Some Other Examples**

In this section I will advance the argument that the ideal of *kalos kagathos* is present in all human endeavours that strive for personal and communal achievement. I shall put forward various examples of things and activities and discuss their functions and settings and how they may lead to the realisation of human goods in the modern world. I will also mention some examples that derogate from the production of human goods.

A fish hook is designed to catch fish for human consumption. There is an eyelet for the line to attach to at the top, a sharp hook to accommodate the bait and a barb on the inside of it to ensure that it stays firmly embedded in the fish's mouth when it bites. The beauty of the hook inheres in its effective function. Some people may focus on the fish suffering, but it is generally accepted that fish cannot be caught in any other way (commercial netting aside) and that any overreaction to the method is overshadowed by the desirability of fish in our diet. In addition to this, angling is a sport pursued by a great number of people all over the world for the sheer pleasure of catching the fish, or for the relaxation that it offers. Moreover, fish is good for us as a source of protein and beneficial dietary components which produce health without which we could not develop other human goods. Thus the suffering the fish may endure is subordinated to the greater human good of furthering health.

Sometimes the object's beauty will be self evident, such as the function of a warm fire in the hearth. However, there will be times when reflection will be necessary. Our view may well change over the course of history. An example of this is a gallows where precise functioning is a must in order to cause instantaneous death. The gallows are a good example because while the technique of its construction may not have changed very much over the course of history, people's view of capital punishment has. Such changes contribute to our evolving idea of what human goods are, and how best to achieve them. Whether an object is beautiful will depend on our view of its function from time to time. The function may remain ideal, but the end it serves may lose favour as we progress in humane thinking. A further example of objects losing favour for similar reasons is the cat-o'-nine tails.

A lot of thought went into the designing of the cat-o'-nine-tails with its over-tied, sun-dried knots. It was very apt for its function. A more enlightened approach to deterring the conduct it was designed to stamp out made it pass into obsolescence. Our sense of beauty can only be refined by the continual use of our imagination in improving the ways we go about achieving human goods: in this case, punishment. As we come to learn more about how human beings function and what drives them we develop a heightened sensitivity and an aversion to cruelty. We become more conscious of the need to find ways of improving our quality of life and realise that, like the Greek ideal, this task is never ending.

A philosopher more in touch with the sensitive virtues in the nineteenth century was Jeremy Bentham, the forerunner in the movement of abolishing cruelty to animals.<sup>8</sup> Many people believed that being cruel to animals did not matter because they could not reason. Bentham rightly pointed out that it is enough that they could suffer. This forced people to think about why cruelty had been tolerated. People sought more satisfactory ways to achieve obedience to the rules flogging was designed to accomplish, i.e. deterrence and punishment. Methods of correction that respected the dignity of wrong-doers presented as more effective. They improved the setting of reform by tempering the punitive and accentuating rehabilitation. In the outlawing of sadistic practices we see the Greek ideal making its presence felt.

Unless this softer approach were adopted, punishment may result in resentment causing people to rebel against society, possibly perpetrating more crime. If the punishment were viewed as just, then an attempt to rehabilitate the offending person is more likely to reform them and contribute to society's betterment. The development of a humane approach to punishment looks forward to the ideal of *kalos kagathos* in the conversion of Achilles from short-sighted sulkiness to compassion. I discuss this story in chapter two on the *Iliad*.

### **The Sun – The Source of Beauty**

Beauty in the dawn of the life-giving sun looks forward to an important motif in Homer which he uses as part of the cosmic perspective of the setting of the *Iliad*. The sun supplies life-sustaining ingredients and also avails us of the means to relate to the world around us, and each other, by providing the medium of sight. The

setting is ideal and has built into it our means of replicating its splendour. With a measured exposure to it, there can be nothing attributed to the sun but goodness as the source of life and sight. This holds good even in the arid and parched regions of the desert, and correspondingly in cold climates, as people's adaptability to nature in all regions shows. This versatility suggests that the Greek ideal is always latent in communal undertakings. However, what the sun enables us to see may well be another matter, as subsequent discussion in this thesis will show.

We may object that the sun causes maladies such as skin cancer. However, it is too much exposure to the sun's rays that is the cause of ailments. Our increasing knowledge of how the human body functions, and of the things that cause it to malfunction, corresponds to our growing awareness of what contributes to our good. This constant accretion of knowledge involves attaining a balance of things that the human body can tolerate and our understanding of its beauty in operation and development. Like the ideal of *kalos kagathos* it is a never ending process.

Similarly, the new born baby is beautiful as a manifestation of the love parents give to each other and is also a new member of the family. We may simply look upon him/her and enjoy the beauty of his/her babyish antics whether crying, feeding or kicking in his/her cradle. We may feel sure that what we see is unspoiled nature in its human reproduction and a joyful addition to the family and the community.

This ought to hold good even if the baby were unwanted or deformed. If parents in that position could be persuaded to refocus on themselves, they too would be able to appreciate the beauty before them in the cradle. Similar considerations ought to apply in respect to the deformed child. Elliott Sober suggests that "It is no more a part of human nature to be healthy than diseased"<sup>9</sup> and MacIntyre reminds us:

Those captivated by appearance and presentation may not be able to identify, let alone understand, examples of the courage and gracefulness of spirit that can be won-hard responses to afflictions of disfigurement and disablement, and this will be a failure to understand the importance of some virtues of acknowledged dependence.<sup>10</sup>

Parents in this position may one day become dependant upon others. At that time, they too will need special care just as the child in their care does at the present time.

The human good here is compassion. The rich opportunity for growth as a family is a further instance of the Greek ideal.

### **Some Instances of Lack of Beauty: Adolf Hitler and Sharp Practices in Court**

Unless we knew the future of the child we would remain captivated by his/her beauty. People may feel revulsion gazing upon an infant Adolf Hitler if they could foresee his nefarious, future deeds, but, as that could not happen, the picture we see before us in the crib is the complete one for now. This would apply even if we knew the child was orphaned, because pity and compassion ought not to affect the child's beauty. It is possible for a whole range of emotions to be felt at the one time, provided they are not the antithesis of each other. For example, it would not be possible to feel love and hate in the same instant. One possibility of us seeing ugliness in such an apparently beautiful baby would be to see it in such films that depict the devil's progeny as a good looking child in the cradle.

Behaviour deviating from the pursuit of the ideal of *kalos kagathos* may be found in an apparently well-executed plea in a law court. The advocate may be endeavouring to persuade the court in an unworthy case. If someone who is able to appreciate persuasive eloquence were in the gallery, they may well be favourably impressed by it. However, at the end of the speech the judge ought to recognise it for a charlatan's attempt to secure an undeserved verdict.

Even after the speech had been rejected, some people in the gallery may still adhere to the view that the speech was beautiful because they are not educated in the judicial process and how it should further its ends. Ignorance of the judicial process would limit their view to an appreciation of the speech as an end in itself. This misuse of oratorical ability had its counterpart in ancient Greece in the Sophists' art of debating for victory at the expense of the truth. This practice was the antithesis of the Greek ideal because human goods are not located in the selfish exercise of trying to obtain profit unjustly. For the Greeks this was an exercise in *hubris*.<sup>11</sup>

However, the judge will realise that the judicial process ought to be directed towards assisting the court to arrive at a just verdict. After hearing the whole of counsel's address, the judge may conclude that it lacks sincerity, or does not reflect the evidence. For him the speech may well lose any of the beauty it may have appeared



to have during the delivery and reveal itself not to assist justice, but rather to impede it. To the judge the charlatan speech would be as ugly and as out of place as a viper in one's parlour.

Both the speech and the snake lack beauty because they are out of their appropriate setting. The snake in the parlour represents a threat to the family, whereas to the herpetologist the reptile in its natural habitat would be beautiful as a properly functioning example of the species. Likewise, the speech may be beautiful in a debating society where eloquence *per se* is highly valued, but lacks beauty because it fails to further the ends of justice. These considerations would apply even in a student moot court because the aim of the pedagogic exercise is to teach future advocates to argue logically in support of their case and to embrace the goods of the legal profession they are preparing to enter. In such a setting the ideal of *kalos kagathos* reveals itself assertively.

### **The Kitchen Knife and the Samurai Sword**

The discussion so far is an attempt to show how we replicate the ideal the Greeks had of the harmony produced when things function according to a design aimed at producing human goods. In considering whether this is so one needs to ask what the end (*telos*) of any given thing, or operation, is. For example, the *telos* of a good kitchen knife is to slice food. A well-made knife will have a well-contoured handle that comfortably fits the hand with a sharp blade properly angled and made out of some durable material that results in easy cutting. In this culinary setting no one would deny that such an instrument is a good knife. It will also be a beautiful knife because of the well-engineered attributes I have ascribed to it.

Let us imagine, however, that our well-constructed knife is a samurai sword. These weapons, too, were well-balanced and made. The difference is that they were created for a caste of Japanese warriors who used them to oppress the peasants and keep them in submission. The samurai trained hard to become accomplished martial artists and used to prey upon people who could not defend themselves against their military prowess. Their swords were designed as instruments of slaughter and carnage. The contemplated end for these swords was not a noble one, but rather an adjunct to the perpetration of murder and thuggery. In this scenario the Greek ideal

is absent. Such behaviour looks forward to the short-sighted theft of Briseis by Agamemnon from Achilles, where the ideal of *kalos kagathos* unravelled because Agamemnon put his own pleasure before the communal good. This was a further exercise of *hubris*.

On the other hand, if people focused on the qualities of the samurai during the Kamakura period (1192–1333) when the samurai developed a deep pride in their military skills and their stoicism, developing unique Japanese arts such as *Sado* and *Ikebana*, they may see the samurai sword as a beautiful symbol. The samurai are said to have followed an unwritten code of conduct which prized bravery, honour and personal integrity above life itself. The sword in this setting would be a symbol of beauty because everyone would agree that striving after these things conduces to human good. The human goods here are patience and the cultivation of inner harmony brought about by a sense of achievement in perfecting activities that others may enjoy and, perhaps, take up.

The samurai sword as a symbol of the warrior caste that produced the beautiful arts I have mentioned represents an age in which arts that conduced to human goods flourished. *Sado* and *Ikebana* encourage precision in human movements and the development of skill by the refining of the virtues of patience and physical coordination. The martial arts, to which the samurai culture contributed, are productive of physical and mental health. For this reason people practise them today. The samurai sword is seen in this setting as beautiful because the observer focuses upon these positive aspects of the earlier samurai culture.

However, to an observer who concentrated on the slaughter and killing, for which the earlier samurai were renowned, the sword would be ugly. It would then remind us of their participation in the rebellion of the 1870s when discontented samurais tried to regain their lost privileged position in society, causing carnage and loss of innocent life. In this alternative view of earlier and later samurai culture the samurai sword would lose its status as a symbol of beauty and become an object of evil.

It is impossible to see a samurai sword as a thing of beauty in this latter context. The setting reflects wanton carnage fired by ignoble motives. The samurais had lost their exalted position in society as a result of changing times and perverted their erstwhile

honourable prowess in martial arts in an attempt to wrongfully wrest from society that which was no longer theirs. It is a perversion of the use of the attributes of other well-made tools, such as the well-made kitchen knife, and designed to serve an evil purpose. This is an example of spurious and superficial beauty being exposed as ugly in its intended evil use. Human goods cannot be realised if some people benefit wrongly at the expense of others. The ideal of *kalos kagathos* is ousted in such activities.

The marriage of the beautiful and the good is not difficult to appreciate in obvious examples such as the kitchen knife. The preparation of food and the art of cooking are human goods. It is, of course, possible to imagine a kitchen knife that does not cut properly, is difficult to sharpen and may well not fit comfortably into the palm of the hand. Such a knife would be considered ugly, whether its use were to aid the preparation of food, or to commit a murder. In the first instance it would be frustrating to use and in the other an object of horror. It would fail to be an ideal knife.

We need to be aware that all well-designed artefacts have their own beauty and should not be compared with unrelated things. Plato sounds this warning in his *Hippias Major* when he has Socrates describe a well-sculptured pot.<sup>12</sup> Socrates says:

If the pot has been fashioned by a good potter so that it is smooth, well-rounded and properly fired, like some very fine pots that there are of the two-handled variety with a capacity of six *choes* – if that's the sort of pot he's asking about, I would agree that it is fine.<sup>13</sup>

Hippias agrees, but says that it is “not up to the standard of fine horses, girls and so on”.<sup>14</sup>

Socrates shows that comparing the pot with horses and girls is a misconceived tack on the part of Hippias by quoting Heraclitus:

Ah, I see, Hippias! We must reply to our inquisitor as follows: “Sir, you are overlooking the correctness of Heraclitus' dictum that 'the finest ape is contemptible compared to man'”. The finest pot, too, is contemptible compared to girls – so says Hippias, and he's an expert.<sup>15</sup>

Socrates concludes that nothing can be fine if at the same time it is contemptible. Hippias threw away an opportunity of progressing the discussion towards discovering what fineness (*kallos*/beauty) is when he ignored the description by Socrates of the well-made pot and compared it to something else rather than pondering its own characteristics. The discussion could then have gone on to show the cohesion of excellences in other things under discussion and how these things create human goods by their contribution to the community. It is the combination of excellences in people and their activities that the Greeks were constantly striving to perfect.

It is conceivable to have two pots side by side, one more aesthetically pleasing than the other. Both pots function in retaining water. The prettier one has an additional function; that of giving aesthetic pleasure which delights the senses with its symmetry and blending colours.

The beautiful and the good may be united and then come apart. In my chapter on Homer I will show that this occurred on several occasions. A kitchen knife used in an attempted robbery may cause a temporary loss of beauty in the knife. One could imagine an intruder in one's house, picking up a kitchen knife and threatening one with it. In a subsequent interview with the police, one may handle and regard the knife with some trepidation.

However, when the knife was returned to the others and the entire set were put to its intended use, the memory of the knife as a threatening weapon would fade. The case would be different in the case of a hatchet which had been used in a murder and exhibited in a museum. For the anti-modernist, that hatchet's beauty would be forever marred because of the use it had been put to and the associations it would conjure up in the eye of the beholder. That particular hatchet would never again be associated with a harmless implement for splitting wood.

We all form mental pictures of the convenience everyday objects mean in our everyday social lives. We have usually seen these things so often we automatically categorise them in their accepted setting. An expert experienced in the use of the object may move on to a consideration of its adaptability to its intended purpose. The accomplished barber will automatically evaluate the efficacy of a razor. The

tailor may assess the features of the sewing machine and the lawyer will be interested in the clients and the library of a practice he intends to purchase. These latter evaluations involve a closer weighing-up of the attributes of the object which is made possible by a deeper knowledge of why it was brought into existence. The callings of these people are honourable and are directed to human goods. Diligent practice of the professions produces excellence in the practitioners and provides a valuable contribution to the community. This looks forward to Hesiod's healthy competition in the *agora*, which ensures ongoing refinement of the artefacts produced there.<sup>16</sup>

The marriage of the beautiful and the good, then, takes place in the setting of the object in question. Like the Greek ideal of *kalos kagathos* it is continually being perfected. The real question is how successful the union is. If the field of human endeavour that it is designed to further is a good, it should follow that an examination of the object will focus on how effectively this end will be achieved by it. Provided that end is conducive to human goods, the object will be beautiful. The opposite impression will be made if an examination of the object's function reveals it to be an evil one.

There is a philosophical controversy as to whether an objective conception of human good exists. Stephen Toulmin points out that we do things because there are good reasons for doing them, but suggests that this does not mean that one knows what "goodness" is.<sup>17</sup> Failure to be able to define 'fineness' is the problem Socrates encountered in the *Hippias Major*. Phillipa Foot allows that some people:

Say that a thing is good because of some fact about it, and another will refuse to take that fact as any 'evidence' at all, for nothing is laid down in the meaning of good which connects it with one piece of evidence rather than another.<sup>18</sup>

Such writers present a possible objection to my thesis. However, my thesis is that with constant attention to improving ways of producing human goods, we continually close the gap between our present methods of achieving social harmony and the ideal we are seeking. No one would deny the human goods served by a well-made knife, or courteous behaviour. The ideal of *kalos kagathos* appears in the fusion of the excellence of the product and behaviour of the agent. It is present in the constant improvement, whether in personal conduct or the manufacture of things for communal consumption.

The manufacturer competes with others to provide the best possible tool to achieve the desired result, e.g. a chainsaw that is comfortable to use and has all possible safety features together with a durable, easy to sharpen cutting chain. This foreshadows the Hesiodic message to his agrarian neighbours. It is through healthy competition in plying his craft in the *agora* that both potter and pot are benefited. The discerning designer will not only judge which is the best one the market offers, but will also question how the tool may be improved. Increased efficiency in getting the job done will result in a human good that had not hitherto been understood. A further example of this is surgery uncovering a discovery of how a disease may be treated. In these pursuits we see the ideal of *kalos kagathos* as a constant, and yet elusive, goal.

We make continual improvements in the various fields of science, surgery and art because of the dedication and imagination of those practicing these disciplines. The developments that I have been describing are instances of human potential being harnessed and accomplished. Human potential appears to be limitless. This belief is foundational to the ideal of *kalos kagathos* flourishing in human communities.

I acknowledge an objection to my theory. Modernists may say that the samurai sword, or the mechanically well-engineered pulleys in a torture chamber used for the dislocation of finger and toe joints, are beautiful. However, the gradual abolition of brutal punishments, coupled with the recognition of human rights at all levels of society in most developed countries, indicates a movement towards a growth of spiritual values that are not compatible with inhumane behaviour. Modernists fail to take into account the function and setting of these things that are productive of carnage and human suffering. They consider the craftsmanship in them without focusing upon the ends that such well engineered features will bring about. This is an incomplete conception of beauty.

In this chapter I have chosen several things and activities to illustrate how the Greek ideal manifests itself in community-based projects and objects. Some, such as the speech in court, and the samurai sword, have needed more detailed investigation than others, whose excellence of function and setting is more obvious. Reflections of this nature lead us into other periods of history and how people strive to achieve their full human potential in them. In the next chapter of this thesis, I shall explore Homer's

call to moral awakening in the aristocratic society of his times. Before exploring some of the motifs of the Homeric literature, I shall look at the origin of the phrase *kalos kagathos* and then at some of the terms of value employed by Homer in teasing out the Greek ideal in the aristocratic society.

## **CHAPTER 2**

### **Homer**

#### **An Historical Analysis of the Phrase *Kalos Kagathos***

To date, there have been only three major publications concerning the origin and meaning of the term *kalos kagathos*. Herman Wankel<sup>19</sup> wrote a dissertation in Germany in 1961, Walter Donlan<sup>20</sup> wrote an article reviewing Wankel's thesis in 1973 and in 1995 Felix Bourriot<sup>21</sup> wrote a two volume work in which he traced the term *kalos kagathos* from Herodotus in the fifth century to Aristotle. It is to the epics of Homer and these authors I now turn.

#### **Herman Wankel**

According to Herman Wankel,<sup>22</sup> the term *kalos kagathos* existed as an attribute of the aristocracy as early as Homer, and during the archaic period was subjected to a *umwertung* (re-evaluation) by the aristocratic poets.<sup>23</sup> His argument is that the poets purged the original meaning of its purely social connotations and it gradually became an ethically and morally charged term. Wankel goes on to say that in the late part of the fifth century the term *kalos kagathos* became a political catchword by the oligarchical elements reacting to those members of society who questioned the aristocratic claim to exclusively use the term.<sup>24</sup>

Wankel drew upon various philological studies of the term from C. Kohnhorn<sup>25</sup> through to W Jaeger's *Paideia*,<sup>26</sup> although his thesis is indebted to the dictum of Jaeger who maintains:

Culture is simply the aristocratic ideal of a nation, increasingly intellectualised.<sup>27</sup>

Wankel also draws upon a theory proposed by Nicolai Hartmann that the concept of aristocracy does not consist merely in political, social and economic pre-eminence, but it represents the inherent ethical tendency of the *aristoi* (nobles) not only *kratein* (to be descended from) but *arista legein* (to select the best).<sup>28</sup> By this, Hartmann meant that the Greek aristocrat, "was not simply the product of a particular class structure, but was also a conspicuous axiological exemplar." He was "even in his basic tendencies somehow already morally in advance."<sup>29</sup>



## Felix Bourriott

An objector to Wankel's thesis, Felix Bourriot, wrote a two volume work in which he traced the term *kalos kagathos* from Herodotus in the fifth century to Aristotle.<sup>30</sup> Bourriot holds that the term came into Attic Greek from Sparta where it described a class of Spartans remarkable for their ability in battle.<sup>31</sup> In the last part of the fifth century the term became associated with "young snobs", such as Alcibiades.<sup>32</sup>

Alcibiades' fine features contrast with Socrates' snub nose<sup>33</sup> and protruding eyes and Thersites' extreme ugliness.<sup>34</sup> Alcibiades' beauty was the physical inheritance of his aristocratic blood. However, his behaviour had been fashioned by the Sophists,<sup>35</sup> such as Protagoras, whose art was to impart the verbal skills necessary to win arguments which rested upon relativistic principles.<sup>36</sup> Glib argument designed to win worldly riches was their profession. Socrates, on the other hand, sought the ideal of *kalos kagathos* in the pursuit of precise knowledge. He boasted that he did not charge any fees.<sup>37</sup> This was a thrust at the Sophists. Thersites' haranguing of the Achaean nobles at Troy when he upbraided them for their *hubris* and *pleonexia* rang of a similar desire to impart human values aimed at the good of all.

The thirty tyrants who were the ruling party considered themselves *kalo kagathoi*. Alcibiades was one of these.<sup>38</sup> In the last decade of the fifth century *kalos kagathos* was used to refer to the bourgeois supporters of the oligarchs of Thermanes.<sup>39</sup> Then in the fourth century *kalos kagathos* assumed two different meanings, one dealing with social status and the other with moral and civic virtue.<sup>40</sup>

According to Bourriot the culmination of the development of the term is to be found in Aristotle's *Eudemonian Ethics*, where it enjoys a special place as the complete moral excellence which can only be achieved by a leisured social and intellectual elite.<sup>41</sup> This is the embodiment of the ideal of the marriage between the beautiful and the good. Bourriot is correct in pointing out that the term as a linguistic label dated from the fifth century and was used by Herodotus. However, I am looking at the moral content of the term and not divorcing the evolution of it from its wider socio/political and philosophical significance.

## Walter Donlan

Walter Donlan also denies that the term was used earlier than the fifth century when the historian Herodotus first used the words *kalos kagathos*.<sup>42</sup> Donlan traces the use of the term *agathos* through the three hundred years or so between the Homeric times and Herodotus. He observes that the traditional claim of the aristocracy to the title *agathoi* was in jeopardy by the last third of the sixth century. Coined money and the rise of mercantile classes had made it possible for people of less than good birth to attain wealth.<sup>43</sup> As wealth was one of the necessary conditions of being *agathos*, people who had hitherto been *kakoi* (bad, non aristocratic, vulgar) were now *agathoi*. According to Donlan, soon after the last third of the sixth century the aristocracy arrogated to themselves the term *kalos*.<sup>44</sup> This is because as a class they generally possessed a physical beauty that people in the lower social classes were deemed not to exhibit.<sup>45</sup>

These three authors have studied the term from an etymological perspective. I am indebted to them for their scholarship. However, I am looking for a deeper unrecognised dimension to the Greek conception of value which I contend started in the Homeric epics. I shall now consider some authors who have examined some terms of value in Homer other than *kalos kagathos*.

I have chosen Alasdair MacIntyre, E.R. Dodds, A.W.H. Adkins and Eric Vogelin, some of whose works I refer to below. The first of these three discussed terms of behavioural value that are essential to my thesis. Homer used these words as a linguistic vehicle to convey to his aristocratic audience the desirability of cultivating the cooperative virtues. Vogelin argues that the Homeric epics provide us with a meditation on the sources of disintegration of Mycenaen civilisation. He argues that in plotting the decline and fall of a society, Homer created the literary means for people to rethink their own lives by replicating cosmic excellence within them.

### **An Analysis of the Terms *Agathos*, *Arete* and Other Related Terms of Value in Homer**

According to MacIntyre, the word *agathos* in Homer meant kingly, courageous or cunning, and so the question, “is he *agathos*?” is the same as the question, “is he kingly, courageous, clever and cunning?” So in the Homeric epics this type of

behaviour is sufficient to entitle a man to be called *agathos*.<sup>46</sup> Adkins agrees with this view. He tells us that Homeric man lived in small social units (*oikoi*) under the headship of a local chieftain denoted by the term *agathos*.<sup>47</sup> The nature of Greek society at the time meant that the head of the *oikos* could not rely upon anyone else for support.<sup>48</sup> Success in this war-like aristocratic function was imperative to maintain the status of *agathos*. Here we see a similarity with the samurai warriors. Their continued *kudos* depended upon success. This was the Greek ideal in its rudimentary stage.

Whilst we assess the beauty of a kitchen knife depending upon its intended use, i.e. either a culinary instrument or a murder weapon, there were no other settings in which the members of the *oikoi* could consider their chieftain. W.H. Auden tells us that provided acts, such as Achilles mistreating the body of Hector, do not affect the outcome of the [Trojan] War they are minor blemishes.<sup>49</sup> According to C.M. Bowra:

The essence of the heroic outlook is the pursuit of honour through action. The great man is he who, being endowed with superior qualities of body and mind, uses them to the utmost and wins the applause of his fellows because he spares no effort and shirks no risk in his desire to make the most of the gifts and to surpass other men in his exercise of them.<sup>50</sup>

So, when Agamemnon intends to steal the slave girl Briseis from Achilles he is still held to be *agathos* by the men he commands, whether he takes her or not, because the term is used in its sociological aristocratic meaning.<sup>51</sup> Such an escapade will not affect Agamemnon's ability to fulfil his social status and functions. As I shall later argue, this action was not so well received by Achilles.

*Arete* in Homeric times was related to fulfilling one's social and professional roles. Failure meant the loss of *arete*, and all other considerations such as courage in battle were immaterial if the *oikos* were overrun. In war, the *agathos* is still the most effective fighter; and it remains *kalon* to succeed, *aischron* to fail.<sup>52</sup> Thus a king's *arete* lies in his ability to command, and a cobbler's in his skill at making shoes. A man has *arete* if he has the *arete* of his particular social function; for instance, if he is a good cobbler he fulfills the *telos* of making good shoes.<sup>53</sup> Aside from the central and enduring attributions of value captured by the terms *agathos* and *arete*, several other words were in popular coinage which also indicated forms of worth and value.

Another Greek term of value in Homeric times is *kalos*. This appears never to have signified any indication of class in Homer.<sup>54</sup> It was a general predicate of beauty and was used of men, women and things, always with the same meaning.<sup>55</sup> It appears to have referred to external physical appearance. *Kalos* like its already mentioned cognate *kalon* attaches to the thing/person as perceived. For instance, a woman of extreme beauty is *kala* no matter whether she is cruel to her servants or not. So long as she fulfills her social function she remains *kala*.

Most commentators seem to agree that the term *esthlos* is a synonym for *agathos* relating to excellence of function.<sup>56</sup> *Esthlos* is used in the *Iliad* of a man who could execute a good throw.<sup>57</sup> Again in the *Iliad*, it was used of horses to mean well bred.<sup>58</sup> Another example of the use of *esthlos* is when Nestor urged Agamemnon to reorganise his troops into fighting units instead of an unruly mass so that he may be able to tell who is *esthlos* and who is *kakos*.<sup>59</sup> It will be seen that the terms of worth described so far relate only to success in action, or pedigree in breeding. There is no suggestion that they describe personality traits recognisable in the quieter cooperative virtues. *Kakos* is the corresponding word of denigration, in the sense that the *kakoi* do not fulfil their social function.

*Aischron*, and its relative *elencheie*, are derogatory terms.<sup>60</sup> *Elencheie* is the state of mind of having done something *aischron* (shameful), it is the condition of an *agathos* who has behaved as a *kakos*. This is illustrated when Odysseus says to Agamemnon:

Now the Greeks are willing to make you most contemptible (*elenchistos*), in the eyes of all mortal men; and they will not fulfill the promise which they made when they were still on the way here from Greece, that they would return home only when they sacked Troy.<sup>61</sup>

He admits that long campaigns are hard, so that the Greeks are to be excused for wanting to go home, but nevertheless maintains that it is *aischron* to remain a long time and return empty handed.<sup>62</sup> Once again “success” is a central determinant of functionality.

*Aischos* (the adjective *aeikelios*, the adverb *aeikelios*) is used to decry breaches of co-operative values.<sup>63</sup> The effect of its use is to draw attention to the condition of anyone being mistreated, such as the serving maids being dragged through the palace in the *Odyssey*.<sup>64</sup> This seems to intimate that there are behavioural values which run

counter to the received “Homeric” view. *Aidos* is a word that is closely related to defeat and *elenchos*. An example is when Hera shouts to the Greeks:

*Aidos*, for shame! Base *elenchea*.<sup>65</sup>

These are the key terms of value in Homer’s *Iliad*.<sup>66</sup>

With the exception of *aeikelios* none of these terms have any connection with the co-operative virtues. In Homeric nobility there is no advancement of human goods except by the sociological fulfillment of one’s situation. I shall be arguing that Homer was mindful of an unexplored dimension to human behaviour and that he developed the cooperative virtues in his epics in the advice given by Nestor to Agamemnon, Phoenix to Achilles and the sensitivity shown by Achilles to Priam.

### **Homer’s Purpose in Writing the *Iliad***

I shall argue that it is the aristocratic behavioural fiction that Homer sought to expose in the *Iliad*. I shall show how the nobles availed themselves of blame-avoiding expressions to maintain their social supremacy. If the aristocrats were to contribute meaningfully to human goods in society, they had first to be made to realize that they ought to consider themselves part of that society with responsibility to develop the co-operative virtues.

A distinction has to be drawn between Homer’s intention in writing the *Iliad* and the social conception of Homeric morality, which provides the sociological backdrop to the times within which the various episodes of the *Iliad* unfold. Homer is teasing out the implication of the moral and political disorder of his times, by pointing out the ruptures and their causes. Homer is pointing to a deeper understanding of the ethical, and abstracting to an order of timeless reality which is reflected in some of the leitmotifs of the *Iliad*. Homer achieves this by using vivid imagery and by tracing the development of Achilles’ personality from the sulk he fell into when Agamemnon stole Briseis from him until he was jolted out of it when Hector killed his cousin Patroclus. The culmination of Achilles’ moral development was shown in the compassion he displayed for Priam when he risked his life to ask Achilles to return Hector’s body to him. Before developing these themes, I shall examine some of the secondary literature written on the Homeric ethics.

My reading of the development of the co-operative virtues in the *Iliad* appears to be at variance with much of the secondary and canonical literature on Homer. The philosophical investigation I am undertaking into the classical texts has not yet been done by these authors, or any others that I am able to locate. However, I am grateful to them for their very rich literature, which I have found of enormous assistance.

### **Alasdair MacIntyre**

In his book *A Short History of Ethics* Alasdair MacIntyre deals with what he calls *The Pre-Philosophical History of "Good" and the Transition to Philosophy* in the second chapter.<sup>67</sup> For MacIntyre, the term *agathos* relates to fulfilment of social function, that of the status a person is born into.<sup>68</sup> MacIntyre correctly observes that in the Homeric epics there is no moral evaluation of the relationship between motivation and action. In other words it is a matter of external 'show'. He says:

The alleged logical gulf between fact and appraisal is not so much one that has been bridged in Homer. It has never been dug. Nor is it clear there is any ground in which to dig.<sup>69</sup>

MacIntyre goes on to say:

And this is to say that Homeric moral predicates are not applied, as moral predicates have been applied in our society, only where the agent could have done other than he did.<sup>70</sup>

In saying that "the alleged gulf" does not make sense in Homer, MacIntyre offers a historicist explanation of the social context in which the terms *agathos* and *arete* are used in Homer. MacIntyre does not deal at all with the meeting of Achilles and Priam, an encounter which is central to my thesis. Had he done so, I suggest he would have accepted that Achilles could well have acted other than he did. Achilles said as much, as I shall later show. As I shall demonstrate, it was Achilles' free choice that made his actions *agathoi* in the extended sense of the word for which I am arguing.

MacIntyre holds that a man who performs his social function also possesses *arete*. Provided a man is careful enough to perform his social function he cannot lose his *arete*, nor can he be said to cease to be *agathos*. MacIntyre sees Homeric society as a unified one in which evaluation depends upon established criteria of a family of

concepts which presuppose a certain social order. This social order in Homer is characterised by a recognised hierarchy of functions.<sup>71</sup>

MacIntyre recognised society as functioning well with each person fulfilling his/her *arete*, but stopped short of discussing the gradual drawing out and improvement of the inner harmony and excellence of functioning in Homeric individuals. Whilst MacIntyre appears to have contented himself with a historicist account, I argue that Homer went beyond a simple narrative of aristocrats acting as fulfilled *agathoi* should and presented us with a morality tale in which virtues within the reach of everyone, such as compassion, trumped the “external show” of the aristocratic class.

### **E.R. Dodds**

A different approach to Homeric times is taken by E. R. Dodds in his book *The Greeks and the Irrational*.<sup>72</sup> He is dealing with religion and its psychology in Homer. Once again, however, the view is of traditional Homeric aristocratic values. He examines the growth and meaning of the terms *ate* and *moira* in the epics, which enable the agent to escape responsibility. For Dodds these terms justify conduct that may, without some such explanation, fall short of being *agathos*. Thus, when Agamemnon compensated himself for the loss of his own mistress by robbing Achilles of his, he evaded responsibility by saying that the god Zeus had put “wild *ate*”<sup>73</sup> in his understanding.<sup>74</sup> This was a valid excuse because early Greek justice cared nothing for intent – it was the act that mattered.<sup>75</sup> The victim takes the same view of it as the agent.<sup>76</sup> This, indeed, is the position that I set myself against. Agamemnon is abrogating moral responsibility and thrusting blame onto the gods.<sup>77</sup> E. R. Dodds explains that *ate* means a temporary clouding or bewildering of the normal consciousness.<sup>78</sup>

However, this is not the only way in which the term *ate* was used. It involved any mental lapse that could be ascribed to the agency of an external daemon or higher power, as when Glaucus swapped gold armour for bronze.<sup>79</sup> In Homer the source of *ate* is often attributed to demonic agency.<sup>80</sup> This is illustrated in Agamemnon’s dream.<sup>81</sup> Zeus sent a dream to Agamemnon to tell him to prepare his Achaean forces for battle against the Trojans at once, despite knowing from a previous message of the gods that they could not win without Achilles. Zeus told the dream to assume the

identity of Nestor, Agammenon's most valued and trusted councillor. Agammenon was under no illusion that he was asleep in his bed, since the dream figure makes sure to point this out to him: "you are asleep, son of Atreus," says the dream figure.<sup>82</sup> The problem presented to the dreamer in Homeric times was whether the dream figure was being deceptive or not. This difficulty is the same one that Glaucus underwent and always provides an escape route for the dreamer. If things don't work out it is because of the demonic origin or *ate* in the dreamer. In effect the dreamer claims demonic possession, albeit temporarily, which ensured that the *agathos* maintained his status impact.

These errors of judgement caused by *ate*, with the reservations I have described, escaped being described as wickedness, or, indeed, any form of moral imperfection. The result of *ate*, a psychological state induced by the gods, is simply a fact of life. We can see the beginnings of moral judgements, and bad judgements, in the description of *ate* and its effects. For the Greeks, *ate* was a moral buffer between the person or agent and the effect of his actions. Because, as the story goes, he was not acting out of free will when in a state of *ate*, he could not be responsible for anything that occurred.

Another term examined by Dodds is *moira* which he describes as an inexplicable disaster as part of man's "portion" or "lot" in life, meaning simply that they cannot understand why it happened, but since it has happened, evidently it had to "be."<sup>83</sup> *Moira* and *ate* are not synonyms; however, *moira* may follow from past actions performed while the agent was in a state of *ate*. Moreover, Patroclus attributes his death directly to an intermediate agent Euphorbus, and indirectly to Apollo, but from a subjective standpoint to his bad *moira*. Once again, the term *moira* offers yet another source of abrogation of responsibility in the epics. This runs counter to the whole thrust of reasonableness which Homer sets up as a palliative to such thinking. This looks forward to the *Odyssey* when Zeus lamented that it was a bad thing that men should blame the gods for their troubles.<sup>84</sup>

Whilst these terms of justification like *ate* and *moira* remained in vogue, every human act was a result of divine intervention, for better or worse. Doing away with these linguistic havens would mean that an action would have to be judged according



to the amount of human goods it conduced to, much like the samurai sword or the kitchen knife.

This is not to say that the sole function of the divinity was to provide an escape route every time an aristocrat committed an act that he felt he needed to excuse. The gods play a very important role in Homer's morality tale. They inhabit a world where they are conscious of what is appropriate behaviour in all of the circumstances and at all times. There is no question of their determining the outcome of the development of Achilles' character – *ethos*. Instead they provide moral lessons throughout the *Iliad* to encourage Achilles in his moral development through overcoming his implacable rage sufficiently to return to battle right through until he restores equilibrium in returning Hector's body to Priam.

An example of the unfolding of Zeus' plan is when Euphorbus assists Hector by striking Patroclus in the back with a spear. The dying Patroclus says:

*Well may you boast now,  
Hector; for Zeus and Apollo have given  
you victory and have easily overcome me.*<sup>85</sup>

It was the death of Patroclus which jolted Achilles out of his sulking indolence which was replaced by another equally negative emotion. He then redirected his uncontrollable rage to vindicating his beloved Patroclus by killing Hector. It was Hector's death at the hands of Achilles that led to the fulfilment of Zeus' plan when Achilles freely returned Hector's body to Priam, thus literally "coming back to his senses", being reasonable. The importance of Achilles' compassionate action was that it was a completely free choice which is manifest in his words to Priam:

Old man, do not drive me too hard. I have made up my  
mind without your help to give Hector back to you ... do not  
exasperate me now, sir, or I may break the laws of Zeus  
And, suppliant though you are, show you as little consideration  
as I showed Hector in my tent.<sup>86</sup>

Dodds does not deal with the terms *agathos* and *arete*, but observes that in Homer man's highest good is the enjoyment of *time* (honour or public esteem).<sup>87</sup> *Time* is important to Helen when she says to Hector of Paris "Would ... that I had been wife

to a better man – to one who could smart under dishonour (*atime*), and men’s evil speeches.”<sup>88</sup> Helen was reflecting on the hesitation of her beloved to follow Hector into battle. Helen could not admire warrior-like qualities in a man who was not showing them. This failing detracted from anything else she may see in Paris as meritorious.

### **A. W. H. Adkins**

In Adkins, *agathos* and *arete* have their normal meaning.<sup>89</sup> Adkins, together with MacIntyre and Dodds, contented themselves with describing the Homeric epics as an account of what the aristocratic class thought of itself. The authors I have been discussing accurately capture the historic events of the *Iliad*. However, they do not emphasise the link between the disintegration of Achilles’ character wrought by his reaction to Agamemnon’s insult and the healing that took place within him in his compassionate response to Priam’s plea for Hector’s body. In these two episodes we see a departure from and a returning to the ideal of *kalos kagathos*.

### **Eric Vogelin**

An author more sympathetic to my argument is Eric Vogelin, who argues that the epics provide us with a meditation on the sources of disintegration of the Mycenaean civilisation. Homer was not concerned about history *simpliciter*, nor with creating a work of literature, but rather with the Greek experience of order and its symbolisation. He was confronting people with their shortcomings and challenging them to mould their character on the timeless excellences around them. “In expressing a new experience of human existence ... of the nature of order and the causes of disorder, and of the historical decline and fall of a society ...”,<sup>90</sup> Homer created a meditation on social order in which moral value is undergirded by a cosmological viewpoint which places practical reasonableness at the centre stage. One of the literary devices he employs to achieve this is through his dialectic relating to scenery and constancy. It seems that Homer is encouraging people to replicate cosmic excellence in their own lives.

## The Scenery of Homer's *Iliad*

Homer develops an impression of the world with the adjectives he uses to describe the natural phenomena, such as the fruitful earth,<sup>91</sup> dawn spreading her saffron mantle and the ambrosial mysterious night.<sup>92</sup> These adjectives not only describe the dawn and the night, but become them, and are one with them. Homer makes these qualities transcendental properties of the dawn and the night. Thus, they become the quintessence of their quality and beauty. Homer is describing the dawn and the night in a far deeper and more meaningful and beautiful sense than he does the aristocracy.

For the most part Homer is content to describe the aristocracy as *agathoi* and to talk of their *arete* as purely external qualities. And yet he is continually pointing to the ruptures in order associated with the external perspective. These literary devices capture something of the excellence of the cosmos with respect to its order and beauty. The repetition of them is not only an attempt to penetrate people's obstinacy in revealing their superficial behaviour, but also an invitation to implement timeless values in their world. However, people can in their own way replicate cosmic order and beauty in creative activities. In addition to this, the world which Homer creates for his epic poetry to come to fruition is one in which every functional object can be excellently made.<sup>93</sup> The ships are always well benched, seaworthy and fine,<sup>94</sup> the armour always well fitting and shining.<sup>95</sup> The spear is always straight, stout, long and sharp,<sup>96</sup> it fulfils the excellence of the kind of thing it is, its purpose.<sup>97</sup> This complete Homeric setting implies a perfection that pervades the whole of the created order. The world as Homer presents it is a poetic embellishment designed to encourage improved behaviour.

It is in sharp contrast to the aristocratic world and the exculpatory linguistic devices the nobles have set up for themselves. Viewed against the backdrop of the aesthetic qualities of nature's patterns, the aristocrats appear to be lacking the consistent and uncompromising qualities that nature reflects. They tend to give the impression of the kitchen knife in the museum of horrors, effective in the carnage of killing, but apart from that, not contributing to human goods at all.

Homer's well-ordered world is portrayed to us through nature and inanimate things. Nature contains patterns of order that people ought not to interfere with and is an

ever present reminder of the excellence of reality which may serve as a paradigm for both individual and social excellence for humans. Homer depicts the cosmic beauty in phrases like the Heavenly Dawn,<sup>98</sup> the cranes that fly from the onset of Winter,<sup>99</sup> the gods drinking nectar from tankards of gold,<sup>100</sup> and the Star of Summer rising from his bath in the ocean to outshine all other stars.<sup>101</sup> It is perfectly proportioned, and, as Homer continues to remind us, very often beautiful beyond description. It is Homer's mission to show us that we can achieve the same harmony in our individual and social lives.

The inanimate objects in Homer seem to be made according to the pattern of nature. They are the best that Greek patience and skill (*techne*) can produce. The Greeks well knew that in order for something to achieve its *telos* (purpose for which it was made), it had to be well-constructed, it had to have *arete* (excellence), in so far as it is the kind of thing it is. Thus excellence is an attribution of worth which coincides with the term *agathos*. For the Greeks of Homeric times *arete* meant goodness and excellence of any kind, which included "of animals, things, and land ..." <sup>102</sup> These things, including ships and spears and all other tools and utensils, are made by man as well as he is able so that their *arete* combined with the *arete* of the maker produces the best work. The implements were constructed by the craftsman after a deep and practical consideration of achieving the ends they were designed to meet. It is most unlikely that this degree of excellence would have been accomplished during the first attempt. This bespeaks tenacity and perfectionism, and also a continual refinement of vision as to the best way of producing the most effective artefact for the job. This is the same process that brought into being the well-made kitchen knife which shows that the Greeks already had a profound appreciation of beauty in things they created. It was the attention to detail and frequent repetition of this imagery that Homer hoped would encourage the aristocracy to look inward, and upon which model their moral development.

So far I have considered several of the authors contributing to the secondary literature concerning Homer and have attempted to show how the key terms of value, idyllic scenery and artefacts were used in Homeric times. I now move on to the central issues in the *Iliad*.

The cause of the Trojan War, the central issue in the *Iliad*, was brought about by Helen deserting Menelaus for Paris. The Greek ideal had been abandoned. Helen's conduct was improper in several respects. It caused a deep personal loss for Menelaus. It ruptured a family which was the smallest and most socially stable unit in aristocratic society. It was an affront to Menelaus' status as *agathos*. Because the family was a royal family the rupture Helen's conduct produced extended to the entire social fabric of the Achaean kingdom.

In what follows I would like to explore how Homer presents us with a meditation on the sources of personal and social disintegration through the leading stories in the *Iliad*, i.e:

- (1) Paris' elopement with Helen of Argos;
- (2) Achilles' rage after Agammenon steals one of his prizes, which leads to the death in battle of his beloved, Patroclus; and
- (3) Achilles' compassion.

A key set of issues drive the stories contained in the epics. These are:

- (1) the development of virtue within the agent himself;
- (2) the importance of practical reasonableness;
- (3) the opposition of individual desire (the *hyper moron* principle) versus conduct that conduces to communal well-being, and from the gods' point of view; and
- (4) the patterns of disorder at the level of society which are an affront to them and the cosmic order.

I shall attempt to show how these stories will open up a new and extended dimension of human behaviour against which people's actions may be judged.

### **The Elopement**

It is the elopement that causes the outbreak of the war. Helen had put her personal agenda of passion over duty to her family.<sup>103</sup> Helen's passion is represented by the

goddess Aphrodite, which should not deter us from ascribing it fully to Helen herself. Ruth Padell tells us that “*Ate* from Aphrodite made Helen run to Troy. Consequence: widespread war.”<sup>104</sup> For Padell “*ate* marks inner movement, for harm which cannot be seen, but can be inferred from the outward harm it causes.”<sup>105</sup> In all of the elements of Helen’s elopement we see the dangerous consequences caused by people who adopt individualistic perspectives to the detriment of their social and familial obligations.

Menelaus had no choice but to wage war on Troy and vindicate himself by killing Paris. This was caused by the lack of reasonableness brought about by the interference of Paris in the life of Helen and Menelaus. It caused a rent in society that was to tear two countries apart for over nine years of warfare. It also involved the gods because it was an attack on the divinely ordained conception of the communal value of *xenia*.

*Xenia* is a friendly relationship that is characterised by a relationship towards an outsider, in connection with someone from a distant place. Both Paris and Helen violated that friendly relationship by their elopement.<sup>106</sup> Paris and Helen were never punished or brought to account for their elopement nor could they be. Unless Helen stayed with Paris in Troy, the combative environment in which Achilles’ conversion took place could never have happened. Paris realised that it was largely due to his actions that the war had begun and decided to challenge Menelaus to single armed combat to bring it to a finish. No harm was done to Paris, even though he lost the battle. Just in time Athene whisked him away from the battle scene as Menelaus was getting the better of him.<sup>107</sup> They lived happily ever after. They escaped after the Achaeans invaded Troy and razed it to the ground.

The social rupture caused by Paris and Helen became for Homer the literary device in which Homer drew out and refined the deeper human virtue of compassion. Homer separated the beautiful and the good in order for greater harmony amongst all levels of society to develop. The beautiful and the good remained divided until Priam’s historic encounter with Achilles in his tent.

The rupture caused by Paris and Helen was felt at all levels in society. This was the stage upon which he was to have the aristocrat protagonists play out his morality tale.

Agamemnon was to steal Briseis from Achilles and to suffer the indignity of having Achilles reject his overture for peace between the two men. Homer draws out the same theme of a lasting quarrel in this dispute and only turns the tide of Achilles' sulkiness by killing off Patroclus, thus causing Achilles in his anger to slay Hector. In this way Homer replaces one negative emotion with another in his build up to a demonstration of one of the most important and refined of human virtues: compassion. Had Homer permitted Achilles to accept Agamemnon's overtures of gift and apology, the war may well have taken a different course, but the morality tale would have been over.<sup>108</sup> However, in Agamemnon's overture we see the *agathos* considering that his behaviour had been wanting. He was prepared to accept that he had wronged Achilles. He had put the war effort in jeopardy for the sake of a brief dalliance.

### **The Quarrel between Agamemnon and Achilles**

The next story in Homer's morality tale concerns the quarrel between Achilles and Agamemnon. Their feud weakens the Greek army because Achilles refuses to fight. Achilles' beloved Patroclus is killed by Hector, who Achilles later kills in revenge. It is the death of Patroclus that spurs Achilles back into the fray, not because Achilles thinks it is appropriate behaviour, but because of an excess of rage with Hector and grief for his beloved. This causes him to reconcile with Agamemnon and continue with the war.<sup>109</sup>

The characters of the *Iliad* all had a fine sense of justice between themselves, as is shown when Agamemnon intends to steal the slave girl *Briseis* from Achilles. Nestor says to him:

Agamemnon. Forget the privilege of your rank, and do not rob him [Achilles] of the girl.  
The Army gave her to him: let him keep his prize.<sup>110</sup>

Nevertheless Agamemnon steals Briseis, which is a selfish and unreasonable act. He ought to have known that individual desire, if not curbed in accordance with communal well-being, causes social dissension, because he had just seen an example of it in the elopement of Paris and Helen. Again, Achilles should not have sulked the way he did over his loss because in so doing he put the lives of his men in jeopardy. In withdrawing into himself he turned his back on the obligations of his status.

Because of his rank, this affected not only the members of the fighting forces but also their families at home.

While the secondary commentators I have been discussing see this story as being explained in terms of *ate*, *menos* and *moira*, it is clear that Homer is advocating the need for the agent to focus on a socially responsible view of things. One indication of this occurs when Nestor hints very strongly that there is a broader dimension to the status of *agathos* than the external one which, if violated, will cause social and internal chaos for the agent and the other person at whom the unreasonable conduct is aimed.

Nestor not only addresses Agammenon personally but brings in the social dimension of the situation by reminding him that “the army gave her to him.”<sup>111</sup> Agammenon has the *arete* of his particular social function and is thus *agathos*, but Nestor’s exhortation not to deprive Achilles of his prize presages the presence of a future ingredient in the term *agathos*, that of justice, which must also be tied to an account of reasonableness.

In Nestor’s plea to Agammenon, Homer shows that he will be guilty of going beyond the measure and acting *hyper moron*. Agamemnon is forgetting that in order to command others he must have sufficient mastery of himself not to cause social dissension. Agammenon is about to violate that principle, which is to act *hyper moron*. This expression relates to those who through their own fault add to their own destined share of misery,<sup>112</sup> and is derived from the word *moros* meaning destiny or fate.<sup>113</sup> *Hyper* is a preposition, which when used with the accusative case as it is in the expression *hyper moron*, means over or beyond. The expression is frequently used in Homer.<sup>114</sup> The use of this term by Homer further illustrates his just and temperate view on morality. If a person acts *hyper moron* he will be increasing his misery because he will be interfering with not only his own equilibrium, but also with that of society around him. His function as a human being will be less than it could have been and it will be his own fault.

### **Paris’ Cowardice**

I have been attempting to show that we must look beneath the superficial meaning of the text of the *Iliad* to discover Homer’s moral lessons. However, there are some



obvious examples of conduct in the *Iliad* similar to the ones I presented in the opening chapter of this thesis. One of them is Hector's criticism of his brother Paris. Paris was challenged to battle by Menelaus, and avoided the encounter. Hector chided him because of his lack of courage:

How the long-haired Achaeans must laugh when they see us make a champion of a prince because of his good looks, forgetting that he has no strength of mind, no courage, one who was hanging his head in shame.<sup>115</sup>

Hector was haranguing Paris for his cowardliness in his poor performance in his fight with Menelaus. Courage and cowardice are mutually exclusive choices and it is the choice that makes man *agathos* or shameful (*aischron*).

Before he went into battle Paris was a true *agathos*. However, after escaping with his life in a cowardly flight, Paris was *aidos*. This is similar to the kitchen knife that will not cut. It looks the part and it is in its appropriate environment, the kitchen, but it fails to fulfil the *telos* of a good knife. Implicitly, through Homer's eyes, Hector is pointing out that to be *agathos* is much more than having a certain social standing. It requires a motivational structure to behave in a certain way for good reasons.

### **Phoenix's Advice to Achilles**

Another example is found in Phoenix's advice to Achilles. This is the first time that the question of whether virtue can be taught arises in Greek history. Phoenix is trying to get Achilles to reconcile with Agamemnon. He commends Achilles to "keep a check on that proud spirit of yours; for a kind heart is a better thing than pride. Quarrels are deadly. Be reconciled at once; and all the Argives young and old will look up to you the more."<sup>116</sup>

Phoenix was aware that going beyond the measure breaks the bond that ties human order to cosmic and divine paradigms. Phoenix knows that Achilles is capable of behaving better. The justification for his rebuke is obvious and there is no need to delve beneath the obvious story line in this exchange. Here again I draw a parallel with the kitchen knife that is being used inappropriately; i.e. as a murder weapon. It is out of place in its false setting.

## Odysseus' Treatment of Thersites

A further example of inappropriate behaviour is to be found in the treatment of Thersites by Odysseus. Thersites was a bandy-legged little man, the ugliest foot soldier in the army. Thersites' physical appearance is not without significance. Every other attribute of Homeric aristocratic life enjoyed perfect external beauty. Thersites' ugliness clashes with the otherwise perfect setting in which Homer was casting his morality tale. Thersites was continually criticising Achilles and Odysseus. On one occasion he reproaches Agamemnon for always wanting more booty: "My lord, ... what more do you want? Your huts are full of bronze, and since we always give you the first pick when a town is sacked, you have plenty of choicest women in them too ... it ill becomes you as our general to lead the army into trouble through such practices."<sup>117</sup>

Odysseus reprimanded him saying, "Thersites, this may be eloquence but we have had enough of it. It is not for you ... to hold forth with the king's name on your tongue". Odysseus then silenced Thersites by whacking him on the back with the royal sceptre. Thersites was censored because he was not *agathos*. What irritated Odysseus was that he thought Thersites was correct. Usually Homer gives lessons to the aristocracy from on high, from the gods. His purpose in doing so from a lowly soldier on this occasion is a further refinement to his attack upon the bastion of *agathia* monopolised by the aristocracy. Here Homer uncovers a curious paradox. He permits Thersites to reprimand his social betters and even makes Odysseus acknowledge his eloquence. Then he makes Odysseus silence Thersites by violence using the royal sceptre, the symbol of the full force of the nobility. In this exchange one sees the small, but very bright, spark of the beginnings of freedom of speech acknowledged by *Odysseus* whilst he holds the supreme authority of the royal sceptre in his hand. Odysseus shows no reasonableness in his treatment of Thersites; however, his actions are predictable. To anyone but an aristocratic *agathos* Odysseus' conduct would have appeared out of place. On the face of it Thersites was raising a perfectly valid objection to the war being continued. At least he deserved an answer, or would have deserved one, had he raised his objection in times more concerned with considerations other than success at any price.

## The Gods

The issues raised in this thesis also pertain to the richer ontology that embraces the divine order in the Homeric epics. I have traced:

- (a) the moral growth of people in the *Iliad*;
- (b) how this moral growth replicates a conception of order (*kosmos*) that embraces the excellence of each natural/manufactured element of the Achaean/Trojan world; and
- (c) that this conception of order has been tied to a notion of human excellence which Homer develops, a rejection of modes of abrogation of responsibility *ate* and *moira* and to the use of reason through rejection of the behavioural excesses *hyper moron* and *hubris*;

However, the gods too play their role in this. In the *Iliad* the Homeric gods are represented as subject to similar levels of passion, disruption and disorder as in the world of human affairs. Indeed, disorders of individuals and disorders of society are reflected in disorder among the gods, and vice versa. Wender tells us that the gods of the *Iliad* are:

Not perhaps very admirable ethically (they lie, cheat, steal, manhandle each other, play favourites and commit adultery rather more than humans do).<sup>118</sup>

Even so, the gods paved the way for Achilles' character to burgeon into compassion. This divine intervention was to continue to a greater extent in Homer's second epic, the *Odyssey*.

In the *Odyssey*, Homer begins a meditation on a new theology by having the gods discuss people's future development. Throughout the *Iliad* people had blamed the gods for evil things that befell him, or they evaded responsibility by attributing their unseemly behaviour to the gods. The new Jovian order articulated at the beginning of the *Odyssey* reflects Homer's penetrating critique of the sources of personal and social disorder in the *Iliad*.<sup>119</sup>

After the Trojan War, order (*kosmos*) had in large part been restored among the Achaeans "all the survivors of the war had reached their homes by now and so put

the perils of battle and the sea behind them.”<sup>120</sup> Only Odysseus was prevented from returning to his home and family in Ithaca by the goddess Calypso. Odysseus was imprisoned on Calypso’s island presided over by Poseidon, the sea god. Poseidon had sworn to “pursue the heroic Odysseus with relentless malice to the day when he reached his own country.”<sup>121</sup> Odysseus was temporarily on safe, dry land and thus free from harassment by Poseidon, but this represented only a temporary haven. The price of his safety was imprisonment by Calypso who puts her infatuation for Odysseus above his right to choose liberty for himself.<sup>122</sup> Odysseus’ plight represented an imperfection in the divine order, particularly when viewed from the perspective of the council of the gods.<sup>123</sup> Calypso was displaying the *hyper moron* principle in detaining Odysseus for her own pleasure.

In the opening of the *Odyssey* a council was convened of all the gods, except Poseidon who had gone to Ethiopia. The purpose of the council was to make people responsible for their fate and not attribute blame for their actions to the gods.<sup>124</sup> It was Zeus’ intention to put an end to people being able to escape responsibility by such manoeuvres captured in our earlier discussion of “*ate*” and “*moira*”. In addressing the council he highlighted Agammon’s return home from the Trojan War:

What a lamentable thing it is that men should blame the gods and regard us as the source of their troubles, when it is their own wickedness that brings them sufferings worse than any which destiny allots them.<sup>125</sup>

Athena then asserted that Aegisthus received the fate that he deserved and consigned all who act like him to a similar fate.<sup>126</sup> Aegisthus had known full well that the habit of laying blame on the gods was not going to work. Common sense and Hermes enabled Aegisthus to foresee a very predictable consequence of his actions. Once again we see the aristocratic verbal defences providing little protection in the royal ranks.

Aegisthus had defied the gods and thus defiled the divine order. Athena judged Aegisthus’ actions as having been his own, and, in so doing, hints at a retrospective judgement of all of the occasions during the *Iliad* when people had sought to evade responsibility for their evil deeds by projecting the cause of them onto the gods. Athena then put forward Odysseus’ cause.<sup>127</sup> In appealing for Odysseus’ freedom

from Calypso, Athena calls him “the wise but unlucky ... who has been parted so long from all his friends.”<sup>128</sup> This was a new beginning for the gods and humankind. Aegisthus, who ignored the divine sanction against committing an act that would rent the fabric of the created order, is no more. His *hubris* and violation of the *hyper moron* principle has brought him to his fate which cannot be undone. The linguistic defences of the *Iliad* were a thing of the past. Whilst Odysseus is still alive “but unlucky” he is still redeemable and does not deserve a fate different from the other warriors who are safe at home with their families. His journey home, beset by all the hardships the gods could put in his way, will afford him the opportunity of blaming them or using the obstacles as stepping stones to character building. Odysseus made the latter choice.

### **Odysseus’ Return to Ithaca**

Odysseus’ desire to return home provides the leitmotif for the gods to assist people in working out the new theology in which people take responsibility for their fate instead of evading that responsibility by ascribing his actions to the gods. This ushers in the inclusion of man’s nature into Homer’s created order, which is not only beautiful to behold but also reflects excellence of function. Odysseus’ desire to return home is the beginning of his awareness of the importance of the cooperative virtues. He has always been *kalos* because of his membership of the aristocracy, but he can only become *agathos* in the sense of the term Homer developed in Achilles by restoring order within himself, his family and his kingdom. In order to command he must first learn to replicate cosmic order.

Throughout the *Odyssey* Odysseus is obedient to the gods, as when he “leaves the animals untouched.”<sup>129</sup> Odysseus does not disobey any of their commands on his journey and pays attention when Circe warns him to steer clear of certain dangers.<sup>130</sup> Circe tells him to ... “fix your mind on getting home ... you may yet reach Ithaca ... but not in comfort.”<sup>131</sup> The journey home is symbolic of the hero having aspired to great deeds and now returning home to share his new found personal development with his family and community.<sup>132</sup> The gods assist him through his trial and tribulations, but it is clear that the decisions he takes on his journey home are of his own free will. It is significant that Odysseus does not blame the gods for any setbacks he has to undergo on his journey. Seen in this light the intercession of the

gods inspiring and illuminating the way home is also an active participation in the cosmic order. Odysseus must often interrupt his journey, but his goal is always before him.<sup>133</sup> He is following the ideal of *kalos kagathos*.

The conception of order that I traced in the unfolding of the morality tale in the *Iliad* is fully developed in the *Odyssey*. Odysseus' journey home is full of constant reminders that he is responsible for his own actions, such as when he chooses to stay with Circe for a whole year.<sup>134</sup> He had to be reminded by his men "master if you are ever going to escape ... it is high time you thought of Ithaca again."<sup>135</sup> The use of the word "escape" hints at an inner reformation; a making over of his order of priorities.

In staying with Calypso Odysseus was indulging a selfish dalliance which was destructive of the familial order he as a father and owner of large estates ought to represent. The beautiful and the good were coming apart. There was a curious parallel between Odysseus' conduct and what was happening at home in Ithaca. Penelope was beleaguered by unwanted suitors who had taken up residence in Odysseus' house and were laying his estate to waste. In addition to this, they were abusing members of his family and his servants. This situation was only possible because Odysseus was absent. Whilst Odysseus was intent on his journey home, he was heading towards restoring the social and political order in Ithaca, and his single-mindedness was also developing human excellence in his own character. Odysseus had no need to escape from Circe because he was her guest and he chose to remain with her. He did, however, need to escape from the complacency into which he had sunk. He needed to stop violating the *hyper moron* principle. Circe's company was pleasant. He and his men had all the comforts of the flesh, continual "feasting on meat galore and mellow wine."<sup>136</sup> We are reminded of other physical enticements when Odysseus "went to the beautiful bed where Circe lay."<sup>137</sup> Odysseus had allowed himself to be sidetracked.

After he took leave of Circe, the gods allowed Odysseus to be tempted in many ways along his journey. Firstly, by way of irresponsibility, secondly in the form of sex. The Sirens tried to make Odysseus forget Ithaca and his wife Penelope, and tempted him into staying with them and giving up his ties to home and family and country. Circe and Calypso boasted their superiority to Penelope, and even offered Odysseus immortality if he would stay with them as a kind of captive lover. The third form of

temptation, violence, was exemplified in the Cyclops.<sup>138</sup> The Cyclopes were sub-human creatures whose interest in Odysseus did not go beyond destroying him and his men. These temptations representing irresponsibility, sex and violence are typical dangers confronting people in the world and are among the principal causes of disharmony in the created order.<sup>139</sup> They must be overcome and extirpated if the moral growth of people is to develop in the created order.

In the new theology set up by the *Odyssey* we see Homer dealing in abstract qualities that are a constant call to people to model their behaviour on the patterns of nature and divine order. He does this by using mythological language and rich imagery to convey the abstract terms of goodness (*agathia*) and justice (*dikaiosyne*), in the excellence of the world he creates. The excellences of the world people inhabit exhibits a perfection that is embedded in an ontology of order which is reminiscent of the divine. In this new theology both people and the gods become inseparably committed to the establishment of divinely created order, which is reflected in the triumphant homecoming of Odysseus, his slaying of the suitors, and his restoration of social and political order in Ithaca. This restitution of social stability brought about by Odysseus with divine help reflects the beauty present in orderly human conduct and assists people to appreciate the human goods which such interaction – not only between individuals, but also various social classes – can bring into being. Such an idyllic state of behaviour frees people up to devote their energies to fruitful enterprises instead of having to waste energy upon being forever on guard against aggressive behaviour in others. Odysseus' return to Ithaca restored the order that had been lost when Paris and Helen went on a frolic of their own. The kitchen knife was back in the kitchen.

In this chapter I have shown how Homer developed the cooperative virtues out of the chaos of adultery and warfare. This journey of Achilles' character was Homer's contribution to the first step in the pursuit of the ideal of *kalos kagathos*. Homer included the involvement of the gods in the aspiration of people to the Greek ideal by assisting Odysseus to arrive home in Ithaca. That his journey was arduous and fraught with obstacles shows how difficult pursuit of the Greek ideal is. His arrival home signifies that the effort is worthwhile.

## CHAPTER 3

### Hesiod

The marriage of the beautiful and the good receives further elaboration in the writings of Hesiod, in that Hesiod democratises the notion of *kalos kagathos*, rejecting its aristocratic pedigree by emphasising that there are excellences among the agrarian and peasant classes. The setting of Hesiod's farming community was very different from the affluence and unchanging natural splendor that provided a divine backdrop to the flourishing of aristocratic society. Hesiod's people toiled in a land that did not easily yield a living.<sup>140</sup> Both respect and worldly success had to be hard-won. I shall now discuss some of the terms of behavioural value Hesiod uses and how he employs them to weave moral lessons into his poetry.

Hesiod wrote roughly contemporaneously with Homer.<sup>141</sup> While Homer produced epics designed as a meditation on the sources of disorder with remedies for such disorder, the poets in Boeotia where Hesiod lived produced works that dealt with topics such as "farming, ethics and metal work."<sup>142</sup> These were handbooks prescribing general forms of behaviour for the agrarian community. They embodied a series of directives for an orderly existence. I am confining myself to the *Theogony* and *Works and Days*.<sup>143</sup> Whilst the *Theogony* deals with order in the world of the gods, *Works and Days* "is really one long hymn to work and prudence."<sup>144</sup>

Hesiod wishes to educate "good advisors"<sup>145</sup> and hopes that people will avail themselves of good advice.<sup>146</sup> He speaks of various crafts in the marketplace and thus he apparently contemplates some sort of apprentice system in which one may learn a craft by a long association with one already proficient in it.<sup>147</sup> This type of education inheres in the relationship between craftsman and pupil and is more intimate than that of neighbour and neighbour because it involves turning the apprentice into a good craftsman. The contribution of the master to the community and to the education of the pupil is twofold. First, he makes it possible for the pupil to earn his living and thus not be a burden on the community, and secondly, he improves the community by adding to it a competent craftsman. In this healthy competition, which Hesiod refers to as good *eris*,<sup>148</sup> we see people striving to better themselves and contribute to human goods by increasing the efficiency of how tasks



are accomplished. Once again we see the function of the kitchen knife being improved.

Just as Homer employed key terms of value, so did Hesiod. The essential difference in the Hesiodic world was that there were no fictive excuses. The only road to success was hard work. No one had it as a birth-right.

### **An Analysis of the Terms *Arete*, *Panaristos*, *Dike* and Other Related Terms of Value in Hesiod.**

*Arete* in Hesiod is related to work. A man has *arete* when his work produces discernible reward. For Hesiod, the work is a means to a certain standing in the agrarian community. This recalls the “outward show” of Homer to the extent that a man of *arete* will be recognised by the fulfillment of his social station. However, Hesiod adds the idea that a man of *arete* must go about his work in a prudent manner. It must be apparent that the work will produce success in the form of honest and planned gain, otherwise the work will be in vain, and not attended by *arete* – it will be *achreios*. The return need not only be in money, but the work must be capable of producing the *telos* it is aimed at; it must be done in the correct season and skillfully. In this sense, the work conforms with the patterns of cosmic order. Thus, Hesiod works backwards from the external results of accumulated riches, to the central and enduring attributions of value in the work that produced them. He says:

But  
if you work, the idle will envy you as you grow  
rich, for fame and renown (*arete*) attend on wealth.<sup>149</sup>

Here, Hesiod uses *arete* to include “fame and renown” in his *Works and Days*. It is the useful member of his agrarian community that is the man of *arete*. Here the *arete* is present in the “fame and renown” that the work has produced. It is the *arete* of working people,<sup>150</sup> which, as I shall argue, goes beyond the external aspects of *arete* depicted in Homer. Hesiod’s working people must aim at being *panaristos*, which implies living a balanced life across the entire spectrum of their existence.

In praising the man who aims to make himself *panaristos*, Hesiod is directing his reader to establish excellence within him/herself. *Aristos* means best<sup>151</sup> and is used in conjunction with proportion (*kairos*)<sup>152</sup> when Hesiod is giving investment advice

regarding the shipping of only a portion of one's goods, the reward of one's labour. Hesiod makes practical reasonableness synonymous with proportion when he says "proportion is best in all things".<sup>153</sup> A man cannot return a profit on every speculative enterprise. However, provided he invests wisely, and is generally successful, he will still be a man of *arete*. Wise investing involves the notion that one should not risk financial ruin. Even if one were successful on several occasions, an informed member of his community would not consider him to be a man of *arete*. This is because it would simply be a matter of time before such behaviour would bring him undone. Practical reasonableness must be apparent in everything people do, and whilst he may be thought to be a man of *arete* in his craft he will lose that characteristic distinction if he is, for example, unwarrantedly rude in company<sup>154</sup> or deports himself as an uncaring family man.<sup>155</sup> These overarching behavioural excellences look forward to Aristotle's *megalopsychos* (great-souled man).

*Panaristos* is the most important key designation of moral worth in Hesiod. It means best of all and appears once<sup>156</sup> in Hesiod to describe a man who considers all things for himself, and then acts.<sup>157</sup> This includes his trade or calling, or his social or familial dealings. The use of *panaristos* occurs in the text as part of Hesiod's haranguing of Perses for having demonstrated a wayward character in cheating him (Hesiod) out of his inheritance. In this further development of the approach to practical reasonableness, Hesiod says:

That man is all together best (*panaristos*) who considers all things himself and marks what will be better afterwards and at the end.<sup>158</sup>

Here Hesiod hints at a sense of *telos*: what is being aimed at. Hesiod considers nothing should be done to excess. Being a workaholic would stifle growth in other areas such as family life. Such a man would no longer merit the designation, *panaristos*. The implication is that there are dimensions to human flourishing that require a plural account of goods and the development of prudential considerations in respect to balancing these goods. Hesiod always concentrates on the individual's development.<sup>159</sup> This appears from the personal nature of his address to his readers. Hesiod's *panaristos*, like *kalos kagathos*, is an ideal to be striven for. Each effort betters the individual and his community. Hesiod's focus on the amelioration of each human being is a non-utilitarian approach because he is not interested in

maximizing the well-being of individuals at the expense of any one person.<sup>160</sup> Hesiod seems to derive the model for his *panaristos* from the Homeric *agathos* because he says that the *panaristos* is all together best.<sup>161</sup>

Hesiod further distinguishes between the *panaristos* and the man who “listens to a good advisor”,<sup>162</sup> whom he designates as good (*esthlos*). Hesiod seems to be the only *panaristos* in his community that can be identified because it is from him that all the farming and ethical advice he gives to his community comes.

Another key attribute of moral work in Hesiod is *deilos*<sup>163</sup> which means worthless. Hesiod uses this terms of “A worthless man who makes now one, and now another his friend.”<sup>164</sup> In the *Iliad*, *deilos* means “cowardly.”<sup>165</sup> The only way a man could lose his worth, or cease to be *agathos* was to act in a cowardly way. It had nothing to do with making a convenience of friends. Hesiod’s use of the word denotes a loss of worth that is tied to constancy of character, and thus goes beyond external behaviour. This can be seen in the shift in meaning of *deilos* between the *Iliad* and the *Works and Days*. Friendship is highly valued in the Hesiodic community. Without it communal flourishing would not be possible. The word *deilos* could also extend to the dilettante who flits from one craft to another without ever mastering any.<sup>166</sup> Such a man deprives himself of the experience necessary to perfect his trade, thus reducing his own capacities together with his ability to contribute to the betterment of the community.<sup>167</sup> He would also risk becoming a burden on the community because of the possibility of being unable to adequately maintain himself or his family if his half-hearted ventures were to fail. Thus Hesiod, inspired as he is with the traditional farming lifestyle, promotes the practical value of avoiding being *deilos*.

*Esthlos* is used in two senses in the *Works and Days*. Firstly it is used of the prosperous (*esthloi*). When Hesiod is calling Persees he says:

Listen to right (*dike*) and do not foster violence (*hubris*): for violence is bad for a poor man. Even the prosperous cannot easily bear its (*hubris*) burden, but is weighed down under it when he has fallen into delusion.<sup>168</sup>

In this sense there is an affinity between the notions of *arete* and *esthlos* in that the worker who possesses *arete* has some material things to show for it. The other occasion on which *esthlos* is found is concerned with the taking of counsel:

And he, again, is good (*esthlos*) who listens to a good advisor.<sup>169</sup>

Typically in Homer, good advisors were not heeded, leading to great disruptions of order. So included in the common attributes of the *esthlos* in Hesiod are these further qualities of achieving material gain in a workmanlike and prudent manner together with the developed capacity to listen and benefit from wise counsel. In this sense Hesiod is progressing beyond the model of self-sufficiency extolled in the received version of Homer.

Hesiod also uses the term *theios* as an attribute of worth, meaning scrupulous when applied to people.<sup>170</sup> When counseling modesty in toilet habits he says “These nights belong to the blessed gods. A scrupulous (*theios*) man who has a wise heart sits down, or goes to the wall of an enclosed Court.”<sup>171</sup> Hesiod’s use of *theios* is a call to people to imitate divine excellence to live up to the image in which Epimetheus had created them. Edith Hamilton tells us that Epimetheus made men upright like gods.<sup>172</sup> The gods are the authors of the cosmic patterns<sup>173</sup> and, according to Hesiod, scrupulosity will ensure participation in their unerring divinity.<sup>174</sup> Scrupulosity, which appears to have played no part in Homeric society, underpins Hesiod’s rural community. Hesiod chooses a very basic example in correct toilet habits and commends the individual to act with a “wise heart”. He chooses this example because here restraint is a deliberate choice, it being permissible to perform one’s toilet habits in public. He hopes that restraint at this level will spread throughout society encouraging similar concessions from other members of the community, thereby contributing to its excellent functioning. As I have argued, Hesiod’s pragmatic and level-headed approach to morality is deeply tied to a concern for practical reasonableness. Judging correctly is an essential component of such practical reasonableness. When Hesiod migrated to Boeotia he must have found farmers using methods that lacked efficiency and working contrary to nature. *Works and Days* is one long exhortation to successful work/farming by copying nature’s patterns and imitating cosmic excellences.

*Krionon* means judging<sup>175</sup> and is used by Hesiod in the sense of following nature: “[He who] does his work without offending the deathless gods, who ‘discerns (*krinei*) the omens’ of birds and avoids transgression.”<sup>176</sup> The gods endow the birds with certain attributes, which if followed by people, will enable them to follow

nature's patterns as the birds do. Thus, by discerning the divine order in nature, man conforms to it in his own moral order, and also in his relationship with nature. Enmeshed in the birds' behaviour is their ability to function excellently on account of their divine design. Hesiod calls some of their actions "omens", which are manifestations of the divine design (*dike*) in the world. This supernatural pattern appears to look forward to the Platonic Forms or Ideas.<sup>177</sup> I shall be arguing that *dike* may be interpreted as meaning "way" and is thus synonymous with the cosmic order. Beauty consists in the orderly function of the created order, and its inhabitants.<sup>178</sup>

Hesiod uses key terms not only to describe excellences from the slant of reasonableness, but also contrasts them with their contraries such as *achreios* which is a derogatory term. It means useless or unprofitable.<sup>179</sup> It occurs once in Hesiod and is used of people's mental activities, whether vocational or social<sup>180</sup>:

But whoever neither thinks for himself nor keeps in mind what another tells him, he is an unprofitable man (*achreios*).<sup>181</sup>

Immediately following this statement, Hesiod says to Perses:

But you at any rate, always remembering my charge, work, high-born Perses, that Hunger may hate you and venerable Demeter richly crowned may love you and fill your barn with food.<sup>182</sup>

Hesiod sees the need to put his brother on the right track as he has sought to acquire riches by dishonest means. Hesiod is trying to convince Perses to contribute to the harmony of the agrarian community by becoming a useful member of it through that which unites its members. To be *achreios* is to oppose the virtue of being *panaristos*. Another denigratory term used by Hesiod is *aegros* which means idle or not working,<sup>183</sup> and Hesiod reminds us that "Both Gods and man are angry with a man who lives idly."<sup>184</sup> Again Hesiod says, "Work is no disgrace; it is idleness which is a disgrace."<sup>185</sup>

*Aidos* in Homer was closely related to defeat, whereas in Hesiod it relates to a man who falls into need because he will not work.<sup>186</sup> *Anaideia* means shamelessness<sup>187</sup> and is used by Hesiod to decry the man who gains wealth by dishonour (*anaideia*) and by deceit (*exapatao*).<sup>188</sup> These two terms are faults which strike as the very core of human behaviour, because they undermine the integrity of Hesiodic society.

In contrasting these terms of conduct, Hesiod is defining the extremes out of which cooperative virtue may emerge. In the received account of Homeric morality, being *agathos* in the aristocratic sense of the word suffices. In Hesiod's world a man cannot achieve "fame and renown" (*arete*) unless he masters his craft. He must also be a responsible member of the community and his family, through the exercise of virtues markedly different from the received account of the Homeric ones, such as generosity: "Give to one who gives, but [do] not give to one who does not give" and "Be friends with the friendly and visit him who visits you."<sup>189</sup> Both of these commendations undergird the goals of Hesiod's rural community and involve friendly interaction tied to the practicable reasonableness which requires consideration for others. Hesiod is arguing for teaching by example. If one were to give to people who do not return the favour, one would be encouraging them to continue in their antisocial behaviour. The same considerations apply to visiting. The man who takes and does not contribute not only weakens the community, but does not develop his own character. Hesiod was well aware that the community can only flourish if each member of it takes responsibility for the quality of his own actions in all aspects of his life. The kitchen knife may well be made of stainless steel and have a good cutting edge, but it does not give proper service if the handle is badly designed.

It is noteworthy that Hesiod does not use the term *agathos*, the central term of aristocratic value in the Homeric literature, closely associated with rank.<sup>190</sup> No one in the Hesiodic community enjoyed rank by birth. Hesiod was struggling to elucidate a new concept of human goodness. Hesiod chose other terms of value, to underscore the cooperative virtues and practical reasonableness.

### **The Use of *Agathos* by Theognis**

The first time *agathos* was used in a moral sense was by Theognis, who is foreshadowing the resolution of the tensions in the Greek concept of value; namely, "what is *agathos*?", which was to be more fully articulated in the works of Plato and Aristotle. Theognis clearly spells out the internalist critique of the received account of his times in the following:

And if good sense could be made and placed in a man, there would never be a base son of a noble (*agathos*) father, since he would heed words of wisdom.<sup>191</sup>

For Theognis the whole of *arete* is summed up in *dikaiosyne*:

Wear yourself out in the pursuit of excellence, let justice be dear to you, and don't let any gain that is shameful win you over.<sup>192</sup>

Again, Theognis claims that anyone who is *dikaios* is *agathos*:

Every man Cyrnus, is *agathos* if he is *dikaios*.<sup>193</sup>

Here Theognis sums up the messages of Homer and Hesiod. Theognis' true *agathos* needs to be *dikaios*. Theognis' *agathos* clearly is closer to that of Hesiod than Homer. In Theognis we see a description of good (*agathos*) which is overarching. Theognis makes the notion of "good" synonymous with the unerring unfolding patterns of nature in all their cosmic splendor. This notion appears to exceed Hesiod's idea of human perfection which he seems to limit to the *panaristos*. Hesiod knew that man can never arrive at eternal perfection, but if he continues to think all things through for himself he will always improve in all aspects of his life. He will thus continue to contribute to human goods in a way that will ensure constant improvement.

For Hesiod, effort is important. All men in his community are born equal. It may well be that Hesiod deliberately avoids the central epithet of aristocratic value, *agathos*, for exactly this reason. Like Homer, his terms which denote internalist moral qualities are different from the aristocratic vocabulary. He even ties humankind to the divinity of the gods by the use of the word "scrupulous" (*theios*), and the sharing of the "omens" of the birds (*ornithas krinon*), again recalling the ability of people to share in the ideal cosmic order if he will follow the patterns of nature.

### ***Dike* (Justice)**

In the *Theogony*, Hesiod used genealogy to tie the history of the gods to the order of nature. Hesiod placed the forces of nature in a cosmic context beside the history of the dynasties of the gods in his development of the ethical forces of the world. While every ethical force is still described as a divine power, it embraces much more than the divinities known to Homer, because Hesiod's mythical system is governed by

*dike* (justice)<sup>194</sup>, a concept he develops in his *Works & Days*<sup>195</sup>, albeit that it began in the *Odyssey*.<sup>196</sup>

Perhaps the most important term of value in Hesiod, *dike* is first found in his *Theogony*.<sup>197</sup> *Dike* is one of Zeus' daughters through his marriage with Themis.<sup>198</sup> It is significant that Zeus, one of whose titles is *Saviour*, would choose the goddess of order to manifest the saving qualities he gave the world in his four daughters. They are emanations and a further dimension of order, who could not have been brought forth without the marriage with Themis.

*Dike* and her siblings *Eunomia* (order), *Horae* (hours) and *Eirene* (peace) mind the works of mortal people and thus they belong to the patterns of cosmic order and justice. The functions of these four daughters overlap and are in constant interplay, for if they were not no one of them could at any time perform her function. *Dike* can only function in an orderly environment and in good time. *Dike* pervades the universe and order on all levels: the divine, the cosmic, the individual and the social. According to Pausanias there was a picture of the beautiful *Dike* dragging the ugly *Adikia* and beating her with her staff.<sup>199</sup>

Vogelin suggests that the gods and men have the same origin (*homothēn gēgāsi*).<sup>200</sup> According to Adkins, "The gods have much more *arete*, *time* and strength than a man. Their immortality is the only important difference between men and gods".<sup>201</sup> These two observations by Vogelin and Adkins would seem to suggest that man can become more god-like by increasing his *arete* and *time*, although he can never achieve their divine status. When *dike* is used with the other terms of value in Hesiod it assumes an over-arching principle that ought to be present in human activities if people are to avoid being *achreios* (useless). More than that it points the way to people's moral fulfillment in a teleological sense.

Gagarin says the term *dike* (justice) may be used to describe the institutionalization of justice as well as to describe the concept of justice.<sup>202</sup> I agree with this contention. Adkins reminds us that the common thread binding the two uses of the word *dike* together was appreciated by Hesiod.<sup>203</sup> Gagarin goes on to say that, "*Dike* does not have any general moral sense."<sup>204</sup> I part company with him here. The virtue of



justice in a human being requires balance in all facets of his/her life, both vocational and moral.<sup>205</sup>

Ideally, the legal process ought to ensure that the same moral balance exists throughout the community. It unfolds in a law court which not only enforces correct behaviour, but also acts as a mentor of it, by recording its decisions so that the community may know what acceptable behaviour is. Elsewhere, Gagarin says:

The *Works and Days* is not a treatise about morality or justice, but rather about prosperity and the necessity of an effective legal process to help achieve it.<sup>206</sup>

Gagarin appears not to have appreciated the Hesiodic message in the *Works and Days*, wherein Hesiod ties well-executed work to the cosmic order of the world people inhabit.<sup>207</sup>

Gagarin apparently fails to grasp that prosperity is the teleology of performing one's craft well. There is a relation between good work, which takes time to achieve, and the accumulation of riches which involves putting the fruit of one's labour aside on a gradual and regular basis so that "soon the little will become great."<sup>208</sup> Gagarin's preoccupation with the fruits of labour as an end in itself shows a very superficial reading of Hesiod's text. Gagarin fails to appreciate that the little "becoming great" refers not only to increased prosperity, but more importantly to improvement in one's good character and ability in exercising one's craft.

Again he says:

The main theme running through the *Work and Days* is prosperity and how to attain it.<sup>209</sup>

It is surprising that Gagarin reaches this view because he sets out the early Greek method of litigation and settling disputes at the institutional level with a close eye to detail:

The process was as follows: when two parties had a dispute over land or other property (cattle, a wife, a murdered kinsman, etc), they could settle the matter by force, *bie*. If however, they desired a peaceful settlement, *dike*, but could not agree to a settlement by themselves, they might agree to look for a third, disinterested person to propose a settlement, *dikazein*. They might agree to abide by the opinion of a particular judge, *dikaspolos*, or they might solicit proposals for settlements, *dikai*, from several people and agree to abide by the one most acceptable to both sides (the "straightest"). In the process, each litigant might

propose his own settlement (*dikazesthai* – presumably in his own interest), and this proposal (or plea) would be his *dike*. The whole process could also be called a *dike*, but it differed from our trial in that neither an individual nor the state, in Homeric society at least, could compel anyone to submit to *dike*.<sup>210</sup>

Gagarin apparently overlooks the many meanings attributed to *dike* in the foregoing passage. Just as prosperity is the *telos* of exercising one's craft well, so *dike* with its socio/cosmic order is the result of well-performed deliberation concerning the rights of others.

Furthermore, according to Gagarin, the oath “appears to have played an important part and was probably sworn by both the judge and the litigants,” although Gagarin acknowledges that “our evidence on this point is avowedly meager.”<sup>211</sup> The swearing of oaths would appear to invite the gods to participate in the litigious process; however, this does not appear to have deterred corruption.<sup>212</sup>

Here Gagarin acknowledges that force is a means to end a dispute; however, for the most part, this paragraph contains peaceful alternatives for the contenders to arrive at a resolution. They could only do this if they turned their mind to the virtue of justice (*dike*). It must also be borne in mind that Hesiod would have been aware of this procedure and counseled people to avoid it wherever they could, probably because he did not have a lot of faith in the level of appreciation of the virtue of justice in the members of his community. It is for that reason he wrote the *Works and Days* and hoped people would apply the precepts he offered in it. Hesiod's hope was that by following the advice in the *Works and Days* people would develop the virtue of justice to such an extent that they could do without turning their disputes over to somebody else.

Hesiod was well aware that no one could be compelled to submit to *dike*, and, in fact, went to great lengths to point out that if one lived a just life one would appreciate the imprudence and hazards of embarking upon litigation.<sup>213</sup> Again, this trades upon the virtue of justice, which a prudent man develops within himself, and its relation to institutional justice. He may decide that he is better off trying to settle with his adversary rather than relying on the vagaries of a disinterested third party, the judge presiding over his dispute and deciding his future. This was especially so in

Hesiod's times when aristocratic judges, susceptible to accepting bribes, represented the only judicial recourse that people in the agrarian community had.<sup>214</sup>

### **Cornford on *Dike* and the *Tao***

Cornford carries his examination of the meaning of *dike* further than Gagarin. He reminds us that *dike* means "way".<sup>215</sup> Cornford has fully appreciated the Hesiodic message. The "way" permeates all aspects of people's lives in the *agora* and at home. Cornford suggests that *dike* is very close to the Chinese *tao*.<sup>216</sup> For the Chinese, *tao* represents the order of the world, which consists of all that is correct and right in the universe: it never deviates from its course. It consequently includes all correct and righteous dealings of men and spirits, which alone promote material happiness in life, no matter whether they are taking place between members of, and in, a community, or in the individual.<sup>217</sup>

The *tao* includes the daily and yearly rotation and revolution of the earth and the two powers of light and darkness, as will be seen in the symbol for *tai chi*, which represent other opposites such as day and night, summer, winter, heat and cold, all of which terms are good in themselves because they are all impersonal parts of the universe working towards the one integrated whole. Cornford tells us that:

*T'ai-sui* is the great year, the planet Jupiter, whose path in the heavens governs the arrangements of the almanac act which is annually published by imperial authority, and gives the various days suitable for the transactions of the various businesses of life. This God thus rules the *tao*, or revolution of the universe, and, as a consequence, the *tao* of human life, which, in order to bestow happiness and prosperity, must fit in with the universal *tao*.<sup>218</sup>

Cornford also points to the correspondence between Hesiod's ordered course of a man's ways and the seasons called *Dike*, *Eunomia* and *Eirene*.<sup>219</sup> It is interesting that the Chinese almanac seems to be undergirded by the same convictions of the unfailing bountifulness of the universe as is Hesiod. People are part of the *tao* because they belong to the universe. Any acts which oppose the *tao* are incorrect, abnormal and unnatural.<sup>220</sup> Just as we are able to judge the functioning of our kitchen knife by the comfort and efficiency of use it affords, so according to the *tao* and Hesiod the efficiency of people can be judged by their cooperation with the universe of which they are a part.

According to Jaeger, Hesiod had a similar understanding of *dike* and urged people to follow the recipe for life that emerges throughout the *Works and Days* so that they would see the value of imitating cosmic order and continually refining the virtue of justice in themselves.<sup>221</sup>

Hesiod believed that the injustice of the aristocratic nobles is already present in their life, like briar seeds in an otherwise well-manicured garden. He hints at *karma*<sup>222</sup> in the following passage, commenting upon the harm to come to “the crooked man” who dragged justice (*dike*) out of the way”.

For pride is evil in a common man.  
Even a noble finds it hard to bear;  
It weights him down and leads him to disgrace.  
... the simpleton must learn  
This fact through suffering. The god of Oaths  
Runs faster than a crooked verdict; when  
Justice is dragged out of the way by men  
Who judge dishonestly and swallow bribes,  
A struggling sound is heard; then she returns  
Back to the city and the homes of men,  
Wrapped in a mist and weeping, and she brings  
Harm to the crooked men who drove her out.<sup>223</sup>

This passage shows the cosmic harmony envisaged by Hesiod. Here Hesiod is describing how the presence of Zeus’ daughter, *Dike*, pervades the affairs of men and he stresses the necessity for her permanent presence in them, in their participation in the cosmic order. In this passage, Hesiod points out that the affairs of people may still function without due regard to *dike*, but only in an anarchical way where nobody benefits on a lasting basis.

Those “crooked men” who have no regard for *dike*, and who drive *dike* out, suffer their fate immediately. It is already present in the social corruption that they have brought about, but more intensely in them, for they are functioning less than excellently.

The Hesiodic terms of worth are not simply reserved for the successful, but include those who have set themselves on the path to becoming successful. This is true for two reasons: firstly, because one cannot in advance place limitations on human

potential; and secondly, because any relaxation of the observance of Hesiod's directives for human flourishing would result in *arete* being lost. Thus, these terms of worth will only apply to people provided they persevere in their quest to become *panaristos*. The same persistence is required of the beginner as of the man who has acquired "fame and renown". This persistence was to stand the agrarian class in good stead in the Solonic reforms that afforded them opportunities to improve their lifestyle.

In this discussion on Hesiod I have developed terms of behavioural value and themes used by him to urge his agrarian neighbours to follow the Greek ideal. I have shown that Hesiod conceived *dike* as a cosmic all-pervading entity that would enter communal life, if invited, by well-executed work and considerate social and familial living. For Hesiod the ideal person was the *panaristos* who thinks out everything for himself. The *panaristos*, like the Greek ideal, serves us as a standard to strive after. It is in the journey that people find the fulfilment Hesiod believes will enmesh the ideal of *kalos kagathos* in their lives. Although no one is capable of achieving this pinnacle of perfection, the *panaristos* is clearly Hesiod's idea of the human embodiment of the ideal of *kalos kagathos*.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **Solon**

#### **Solon's Political Contribution to the Marriage of the Beautiful and the Good.**

In this chapter I examine Solon's contribution to the balancing of economic and social opportunities in the Greece of his times. Vellacott says that Solon's task (B.C.E. 630–B.C.E. 560) was to reform the legislature to ensure greater opportunities for the oppressed lower classes.<sup>224</sup> I shall attempt to show that Solon's reforms were an attempt to fulfil the ideal of the marriage of the beautiful and the good in achieving free interaction between all classes. Whilst Hesiod had focussed on the development of the co-operative virtues,<sup>225</sup> Solon, who was as earnest a moralist as Hesiod,<sup>226</sup> sought to entrench them in the whole of Athenian society by way of legislative change. This embraced reform and reconstruction of the *heliaea* (people's court)<sup>227</sup> by extending membership of it to all free men, the breaking of the absolute political monopoly of the nobles,<sup>228</sup> and paving the way for others to improve upon his work by building legislative discretion into the system.<sup>229</sup>

#### **Solon's Concept of Justice**

According to Vlastos, Solon saw that "justice has a natural, self regulative order" and that he "thinks of justice as a divine power."<sup>230</sup> Solon's paradigm of justice is the sea which he says is "justest when, being itself undisturbed by the winds, it does not disturb anyone or anything."<sup>231</sup> I suggest that Solon is not referring to the winds of change, which are inevitable, but rather to the forces of dissension unleashed by those justly dissatisfied with their lot. The "self regulative order" can only operate if the cause of dissension is removed, which is what Solon aimed at achieving with his reforms. This looks forward to Aristotle's constitutions of the "middle type" which is the superior form of government because in its flexibility it is free to fluctuate between behavioural extremes.

Solon hinted at people receiving divine assistance in their deliberations, replicating as nearly as possible the divine patterns of justice and natural order. Again, this appears to anticipate Aristotle's recipe of flexible behaviour which is brought about by the application of *phronesis*.<sup>232</sup> Solon's reforms were a well thought out

endeavour to ensure observance of the “divine power” in the affairs of men in their dealings with each other outside areas of government, and were intended to enmesh the beauty of cosmic orderliness in human interaction. Apparently, Solon grasped the idea that the virtue of justice needed to be mastered individually before it could be successfully introduced into the instrumentalities of government.

Furthermore, there is a parallel between the Solonic reforms and the Hesiodic exhortations to perform well-executed work. The similarity consists in the opportunity for creative and constructive individual activity in a world where opportunities were to be more justly and evenly distributed. Just as Hesiod had seen work in his agrarian community as a way to replicate cosmic excellence, Solon used the mechanism of laws that preserved personal dignity and distributed opportunity for advancement to everybody.

There is an analogy here between the objects like the kitchen knife and the samurai sword. Solon needed to use imagination to picture how people’s situation could be ameliorated. Thus he had to invent his own “kitchen knife” and put it into its proper setting. This was a far more challenging task than simply having to evaluate the beauty of an object when one is apprised of its function. In introducing means to achieve political equilibrium, Solon was able to bring a certain harmony to human government. A political system creates its own ambience. In looking upon such a system one does not need to ask what purpose it serves. Its appropriateness for the task is self evident to the informed onlooker.

At the beginning of the Sixth Century there was deep and widespread dissatisfaction among the Athenian lower classes.<sup>233</sup> The imbalance in Athenian society caused by the landowners exploiting the agrarian classes, and the privation of those who had bonded themselves personally to secure debt, had caused a discord that was the antithesis of a society functioning excellently and harmoniously. Solon warned:

*Dysnomia* (the opposite of *eunomia*) [good order]<sup>234</sup> causes many *kaka* (disasters to the city), whereas *eunomia* makes all things orderly and appropriate, and often puts fetters on the *adikoi* (unjust); while *eunomia* makes the rough smooth, checks success, brings *hubris* to obscurity and withers the blossoming flowers of *ate* (destruction).<sup>235</sup>

According to Humphreys, “the straightness” of Solon’s laws is given a new definition not found in the earlier sources: it is by being shaped alike for the base and for the prestigious

(*kakos* and *agathos*) that his *thesmoi*<sup>236</sup> will provide a straight judgment in every case. Hesiod had earlier said that the good king will give straight judgments both to locals and to strangers.<sup>237</sup>

The “straightness” of Solon’s laws and the “straight judgments” mentioned by Hesiod also anticipate Aristotle’s *phronesis* directing behavioural excellence in institutionalized justice.<sup>238</sup> The aesthetic nature of “straightness” in the way that these two authors apply the concept is anything but the rigidity implied in the word “straight” which suggests a picture of an unswerving line delineating the distance between two geometrical points, or, perhaps, uncompromising behaviour. Judgments that achieve justice, regardless of the issues at stake and the class of the litigants involved, are beautiful because of their flexibility which fits all disputes. Furthermore, such judgments are aesthetically pleasing because they break down the barriers of prejudice and class distinction which will result in a more egalitarian society. They are a judicial example of people pursuing the ideal of *kalos kagathos*.

Again Solon says:

These things I did by the exercise of my power, blending together force and justice, and I persevered to the end as I promised.<sup>239</sup>

Solon also grasped the need to record and promulgate the law so its content would be available to everybody. Humphreys tells us that “this was the reason for writing laws down: not so much a question of information, but as of fixity. Writing objectified the law, and ensured that it would remain the same in every case.”<sup>240</sup>

Solon was endeavouring to emulate the gods who did not die, but rather lived an unchanging life.<sup>241</sup> Solon knew that the highest human good he could offer his community was a well-balanced legal system in which the rules were adequately promulgated, and his attempts at judicial fairness are apparent. This judicial model attempts to replicate cosmic order in communal human affairs. In endeavouring to emulate the unchanging excellence of the lives of the divinity it must have been evident to Solon that the only aspect in which this could be achieved in the affairs of humankind was the realization that people must be ever vigilant to adapt the rules governing society to changing necessity. The ideal of *kalos kagathos* is reflected in positive change.



The Athenians turned to Solon because he lived an orderly life, which they thought equipped him with the vision necessary to rekindle a degree of order in a society driven by *pleonexia/hubris* on the part of the nobles and resentful submission by the members of the rural community.<sup>242</sup> Of himself Solon said:

I long to have money, but am unwilling to possess it unjustly, for retribution assuredly comes afterwards. Wealth which the gods give remains with a man, secure from the lowest foundation to the top, whereas wealth which men honour with violence comes in disorder, an unwilling attendant persuaded by unjust actions, and it is quickly mixed with ruin.<sup>243</sup>

Solon wished to remove economic injustice “without radically affecting the structure of society: *agathoi* and *kakoi* should remain in their appointed place.”<sup>244</sup> His mission was to afford everyone the opportunity to develop to the full extent of his/her capacity. In order to deal with the problem of the landless peasants, Solon encouraged everybody to learn a trade or a craft. Solon’s aim was to increase the importance of the individual and to enhance his bargaining power in the marketplace. Developed personal attributes would render him less susceptible to exploitation. Again, showing how the masses should be treated, Solon said:

And in this way the masses should best follow their leaders, if they are given neither too much freedom nor subjected to too much restraint. For excess breeds insolence, whenever great prosperity comes to men who are not of sound mind.<sup>245</sup>

However, Solon could not please everyone. The peasants thought that Solon’s reforms did not go far enough and, in this, they did not understand the profundity of Solon’s project. They thought that a redistribution of land ownership was the answer to their problems. They appear to have been interested only in the “quick fix” with no regard to the overall effect land redistribution would have on the whole of society. Solon did not want to redistribute ownership of the land, although he was pressured to do so according to Rosivach,<sup>246</sup> because that would have meant destroying the aristocratic class,<sup>247</sup> who were the only ones who knew how to manage tracts of land on a grand scale. The kitchen knife would only continue to operate effectively in experienced hands.

Solon was convinced that *dike* is an inseparable part of the divine world order.<sup>248</sup> For Solon every transgression of justice constituted an imbalance in the cosmic

order. In Solon's eyes *Eunomia* was a goddess like *Dike*. *Eunomia* manifests itself in the peace and harmony of the whole social cosmos.<sup>249</sup> Here Solon shows that he grasps the importance of the virtue of justice which must be present in all individuals and communities if they are to function excellently. According to Vlastos, "the precious right of "straightening crooked judgments" now ceases to be the exclusive privilege of public officials" and is now "everybody's business."<sup>250</sup>

### **Some Conclusions**

Whilst Solon does not appear to have envisaged a democracy, he certainly paved the way for it.<sup>251</sup> Solon appears to have been aware that only people who had developed the virtue of justice within themselves, with its concomitant dignity, could contribute breadth of vision to human affairs.<sup>252</sup> His reforms went a long way toward the instilling of personal dignity in those that had hitherto been deprived of it. The Solonic reforms abolished as many incidents of oppression as possible without upsetting the fundamental balance of society. By sweeping away the occasions of exploitation of the economically oppressed, Solon created the opportunity for them to initiate their own order in society. Providing people with the opportunity to forge their own excellent functioning community is to introduce them to the ideal of *kalos kagathos*. Solon thought that justice could only exist in a community where individuals were free to exercise choice in their private and communal lives.

Solon's contribution to the marriage of the beautiful and the good was to create a more level playing field for people to develop their talents than he had found when entering upon his archonship. Solon made the connection between personal freedom and human dignity. He saw that human dignity would be reflected in the orderly (*cosmic*) behaviour of the individual systematically going about tasks in the community that would benefit it, not only at the regulatory level, but in all facets of society.

The Solonic reforms attempt to replicate the patterns of nature and the divinity where all people are free to attain their full potential. Solon made this possible by ensuring personal freedom and freeing people from the need to expend time avoiding exploitation by others. This approach had been adopted by Hesiod who urged people to spend their time in performing work well, rather than engage in risky and costly

litigation which fostered the development of a mind-set that prevented people from imitating cosmic order in their lives.

Solon realized that order in people's private and social lives must be won for themselves. Solon appears to have been looking forward to Aristotle, when, as Weinberg reminds us, he held:

Each thing, so far as possible, attempts to become as much like the First Cause (or Prime Mover) as its nature permits. Animate beings must act and reproduce and achieve an immortality (an eternity) for their own kind, and all the other things in nature in characteristic ways imitate the Divine Life.<sup>253</sup>

If the basis of society were to change, it was going to have to be as a result of orderly interaction between its constituent classes. Solon went no further than to relieve injustice and to impose restraints upon the monopoly of power by one class. He says:

And those who suffered shameful slavery right here, trembling before the whims of their masters, I set free. These things I did by the exercise of my power, blending together force and justice, and I persevered to the end as I promised. I wrote laws for the lower and upper classes alike, providing a straight legal process for each person.<sup>254</sup>

In this chapter I have endeavoured to show how Solon recognised the right to equal opportunity in the citizens he ruled over. To achieve this, Solon created opportunities for personal/vocational development for everyone. Solon believed that the ideal of *kalos kagathos*, like justice, was an overarching community principle. To this end he made sure that the community was not weakened by reforms that would create control in the hands of those who lacked expertise to exercise it. For example, he left the control of large viable tracts of land with the nobles who knew how to farm them. Solon knew that the Greek ideal could only flourish in a community that was well-balanced.

## **CHAPTER 5**

### **Plato**

In this chapter I shall show how Plato developed paradigms to improve people's ability to use their faculty of reason. Apparently Plato believed that improved intelligence would enable people to attain the ideal of *kalos kagathos*. In Chapter 5 of the *Republic*, Socrates describes the form of the good in the simile of the cave, drawing a parallel between the visible and the intelligible worlds.<sup>255</sup> For Plato, the visible world contains particulars which are objects of sight, whilst the intelligible world is populated by forms (*ideae* or *eidoi*), which are accessible only to the intellect and are not knowable, save by way of abstraction, from the particulars available to us.<sup>256</sup> These forms are perfect patterns of the changing particulars of our world of appearances and reflect the Greek ideal.

The sun enjoys primacy of position in the visible world whilst the good occupies a corresponding one in the intelligible world. The sun's light, which is not sight, but which facilitates it, carries impressions of the visible world to the eye. Light is not only the vehicle of perception, but also the cause of all growth in the sensible world. It is part of the universal good present in all things, while remaining separate from them. The faculty of sight is the initial move towards the realisation of people's true nature, a reflexive action which responds involuntarily to light. This level of perception provides only an incomplete understanding of the nature of things in the sensible realm. Plato wanted to encourage people to realise the fullness of their human potential by meditating on the forms of the suprasensible world.<sup>257</sup>

#### **Relationship between Plato's Notion of Perception and Aesthetics**

Plato's doctrines of perception and aesthetics are very closely linked. Intellectual perception involves the mastery of suprasensible concepts growing out of the perception of the mundane world. This higher level of perception is not available to everybody, either because of a lack of intellect, or perhaps inclination. Everyone with the faculty of sight is able to understand something of the sensible world. It is composed of a hierarchy of existence dependant upon the life-giving source we receive from the sun. The gradually developing awareness of the way in which the

world functions, and the realisation that without the sun it would not be able to function, is the path to our understanding the world's beauty.

This awareness that everything is dependent upon the sun may blossom into an appreciation of how everything in the world is inter-dependant for its existence on other things. The world and all the living things that it contains are a gigantic food chain with one creature preying on another. Apparently ugly creatures like crocodiles and reptiles reveal their special beauty in their adaptability for the niche they inhabit. Plato tells us that this faculty of knowledge is the beginning of understanding the intelligible world.<sup>258</sup> He equates the good, which he sees as an overarching form, with the sun, and the faculty of sight with the faculty of knowledge. Once the faculty of knowledge has been awakened in the inquirer, he/she will seek to ask questions, which, according to Plato, will lead him/her to an appreciation of the forms.

The tyro's introduction to the forms is the ability of the human brain to absorb and collate facts into a workable body of knowledge comprised of earthly particulars. This process requires a sifting and organising of empirical data, which is discerned in the sensible world through the human senses of perception of sight, hearing, tactility, smell and taste. The data so collected does not constitute a useful body of knowledge about the object under scrutiny until the intellect decides what is sought to be known about the object in question. For example, the botanist may wish to know how each part of the plant enables it to survive and flourish as a whole, whereas the poet may see it as a representation of beauty or revelation. The philosopher ought to ask why it is there.

### **The Role of the Good in the Suprasensible and Sensible World**

The foregoing process appears to bring intelligibility to "objects of thought" and the power of knowing to the mind. According to Plato, for Socrates the source of this intelligibility of the "objects of knowledge" and of their being was the good, "yet the good was not itself that reality, but, rather, beyond it, and superior to it in dignity and power".<sup>259</sup> Socrates demonstrated his conviction by drawing an analogy from the sun and its relationship with the eye's power of sight. He said, "Moreover, though the sun is not itself sight, it is the cause of sight, and is seen by the sight it causes".<sup>260</sup>

The quest of the Platonic dialogues was the true meaning of any expression he chose to examine, such as fineness.<sup>261</sup> Socrates thought that excellence in human behaviour, which he describes as justice, was the *telos* of the good life. This could only be achieved by the search for precise knowledge in whatever investigation people were undertaking at the time. Plato further elaborated the simile of the sun by the analogy of the Divided Line, the purpose of which was to demonstrate that we can know but little of objects in the sensible world if our knowledge does not extend beyond their appearance.<sup>262</sup>

### **Dialectic – A Means to Understanding the Good**

There is a correlation between the sensible and the supersensible realms with *noesis*, or dialectic, representing the utmost pure form of knowledge in the supersensible realm.<sup>263</sup> I shall demonstrate how an appreciation of the beautiful in the sensible world is the only way that people may aspire to the good. The journey of the intellect is thus to locate the good in each object of the sensible world. According to Plato, only then will the world, and all that is in it, be fully understood. A marriage of the beautiful and the good must take place in the human intellect for people to attain their potential of *kalos kagathos*.

Dialectic, or *Noesis*, like the sun, is the medium to increased understanding of the world and the celestial realm where the forms dwell. The dialectic is the ultimate, the *summa bonum*, a full understanding of which will always be out of reach of the human intellect, but which, nevertheless, draws us to it in an ever increasing intellectual/emotional development. By engaging in *noesis* people generate human goods because they are striving to continually refine their intellect. Dialectic pervades the whole gamut of human existence. It is present at each level of the hierarchy of human goods. It must be taught to those who have not been called to examine it by themselves by philosophers who have. This appears in the Socratic dialogues where Socrates often alludes to the various worldly callings, such as carpentry and ship building, in his bid to ascertain precision in the use of various words.<sup>264</sup> This quest, like all ideals, involves searching for meanings beyond those commonly accepted in the sensible world.

In the simile of the cave, Plato lays further emphasis on the distinction between knowledge of objects in the visible world and the consequent illusion with which it limits the mind. The escaped prisoner going from the shadows on the wall to being bathed in the sun's rays is a didactic metaphor for our own epistemological journey. This simile further points up the role of the good in the visible world as the overarching cause of all existing things. It also provides the medium for people to appreciate the true nature of things because it exists also in people in the form of an intellectual impetus to fulfil their own true natures. The recognition of the good comes by degrees and it is a development of the appreciation of the beautiful.<sup>265</sup> Beauty is the terrestrial vehicle that takes us to the good. It will take, however, meditation on the inner essence of the things of the sensible world before people will see their connection with the ultimate source of the good. In this metaphor the good is the sun, which is not only the source of light, but also the cause of our ability to perceive the created order.

All things on earth need the sun's light and warmth to exist. For example, plants have the ability to synthesise organic compounds from carbon dioxide and water using light energy absorbed by chlorophyll. There is a corresponding process in certain bacteria. Vitamin A is absorbed into animate bodies through the sun's rays. This process shows that the sun is the source of all life, which is the good. Beauty consists in the clarity and consonance of the orderly hierarchical structure of these life forms. It is an understanding of how living things work that leads us to appreciate their beauty, which brings us to the source of their existence, the light from the sun which Plato appears to equate with "The good, reality and source of truth".<sup>266</sup> The image of the ideal kitchen knife will then be in full view.

The good, then, is an overweening principle that exists independently of the created order and beyond it. It would seem to follow that Plato<sup>267</sup> is obliged to admit that we will never know the true nature of things. This looks forward to Kant's philosophy which says, "We can know *a priori* of things only what we ourselves put into them".<sup>268</sup> However, in accordance with our pursuit of the Greek ideal we must continue to evolve towards the fulfilment of our true nature which is to seek precise knowledge. This appears to be Plato's position also. I argue this from the methodology Socrates uses in his interrogative quest for the meaning of virtue and

the precise meaning of words in the Socratic dialogues. Frederick Copleston points out that in most of the dialogues the quest yields no result.<sup>269</sup> The only success story is in the *Protagoras* in which the conclusion reached was that virtue could be taught.<sup>270</sup> The lesson to be learnt is that Socrates never gives up his search. He is faithful to it even unto death.<sup>271</sup>

It can be seen that Plato recognises the good in the created order and its hierarchical nature in the material world by comparing it to the sun. Both the sun and the good share common attributes. They are the centre and the source of the created order and for all practical purposes the sun, like the good, is inextinguishable.

In Plato's philosophy there are gradients of beauty all of which participate in a supreme or universal beauty, which is the source of all earthly beauty. For example, we see beauty in our kitchen knife, with its ideally shaped handle which comfortably fits the hand, and excellent cutting blade. But this is a different beauty from that of a person whose classical features display the physical particulars of integrity, proportion and clarity and encourage us to further investigate as to whether he/she possesses the softer charms and quiet virtues which may define him/her as an accomplished and morally developed person.

### ***Kalos Kagathos Personalised***

The morally developed person is described as the 'truly good' man by Tredennick and Waterfield who have synthesized the following list of qualities that the *kalos kagathos* embodies from various passages throughout the *Memoirs* of Xenophon:

1. freedom (as opposed to slavishness) as a result of self-discipline;
2. certain knowledge and a certain degree of education;
3. the ability to make good friends and get on with people;
4. the ability to do good things to friends (and harm to enemies);
5. the ability to manage one's estate and, if need be, one's country;
6. the ability to do good to one's country; and
7. the traditional virtues, such as wisdom, justice, self control and piety.<sup>272</sup>

In Socrates' case, there is an eighth item: the ability to teach and make others truly good.<sup>273</sup> Socrates possessed this latter quality because he put the search for human



goods above even life itself. In the face of his judges he maintained his belief in his mission to educate those who would listen to him. He said:

The truth of the matter is this, gentleman. Where a man has taken up his stand, either because it seems best to him or in obedience to his orders, there I believe he is bound to remain and face the danger, taking no account of death or anything else before dishonour.<sup>274</sup>

Tredennick and Waterfield point out that, “Xenophon did not invent the phrase (though the abstract noun *kalokagathia*, ‘true goodness’, first occurs in his Works).”<sup>275</sup>

In this chapter, I have argued that Plato invited people to meditate upon the Greek ideal by fixing their attention on the suprasensible forms. The mental journey that Plato bids us to undertake is similar to the Socratic quest for precise meaning. We may never arrive at the goal, but diligent involvement in the journey is reward enough. Continued application to personal improvement is participation in the Greek ideal which will take a lifetime to perfect. Full knowledge of the forms is no more possible than a complete mastery of the ideal of *kalos kagathos*.

## **CHAPTER 6**

### **Aristotle**

Plato's philosophy was built around a distinction between the suprasensible and sensible worlds; the latter could only be fully understood with a knowledge of the former. Aristotle's approach was somewhat different. He did not believe in extramundane models. Aristotle's philosophy was grounded in anthropocentric considerations. For him human goods were to be found in the practical deliberation on matters that were available to human senses. The perfect kitchen knife was not an extraterrestrial entity; it was to come into view in our world of experience.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle did not base his moral philosophy on a suprasensible plane. In his translation of the *Poetics*, Malcolm Heath centres Aristotle's philosophical system in "The pleasure we take in looking at things and assimilating information through our senses".<sup>276</sup> I shall only be covering Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and his *Poetics* in this thesis. Both works are concerned with human behaviour, and the possibility of achieving a degree of excellence in it. It is in applying themselves to achieving these behavioural excellences that people will make a progressive contribution to human goods through their improved behaviour. Aristotle combines guides for good behaviour where he advocates appropriate control of emotion with exposure to emotional excess as a cure for inability to control emotion. This twofold approach to behavioural equilibrium is aimed at the individual achieving the ideal of *kalos kagathos* within himself.

Nussbaum puts the Aristotelian position very nicely when she sets out to consider ... "who the person of practical wisdom is and how he deliberates, how the Platonic aspiration to universality, precision, and stable control is met and criticised in Aristotle's more yielding and flexible conception of responsive perception."<sup>277</sup> Aristotle uses the term "*phronesis*" which involves flexibility and freedom of choice in making decisions. Nussbaum goes on to say that "Aristotle claims that practical deliberation must be anthropocentric, concerning itself with the *human good* rather than with the *good simpliciter*."<sup>278</sup> Practical deliberation can be practised either in community, or individually. Firstly, I shall discuss Aristotle's conviction that politics is the most esteemed human study.

## Communal Concerns

In Book 1 of the *Nichomachean Ethics* Aristotle held that the “absolute good” in human behaviour is to be found in the government.<sup>279</sup> The highest human good is the study of politics because it controls “what subjects are to be taught in states, which of these the different sections of the population are to learn, and up to what point.”<sup>280</sup> “It consists in knowing how to organise the community for the best.”<sup>281</sup> According to Joad, Aristotle insists that the specific good of a state “is to be sought in something beyond a state; namely, in that of the individuals who comprise the state.”<sup>282</sup>

Aristotle begins with people’s place in society at the beginning of the *Nichomachean Ethics* because most people have enough natural ability to belong to and to contribute to a community and thus contribute to the good of all people.<sup>283</sup> He regarded people as political animals by nature. Aristotle then argues that the absolute good for man is directed at the improvement of the community, which for him would seem to mean that selfishness is the antithesis of the good. Further support for this conclusion by Aristotle is his claim that morally correct acts consist in that which receives approbation of the community.<sup>284</sup>

An important theme in the *Nichomachean Ethics* is the method by which we attain the human good by developing proficiency in the study of politics and in other areas of human endeavour. Aristotle announces his approach in the closing sentence of Chapter 2 of book 1 of the *Nichomachean Ethics* when he says:

But what is good for a nation or a city has a higher, a diviner quality. Such being the matters we seek to investigate, the investigation may fairly be represented as the study of politics.<sup>285</sup>

In placing “the absolutely good” in the deliberative sector of the community, Aristotle recognises an overriding good that the community is obliged to seek and pursue, which would appear to be some action which acts upon the community, but only while people are deliberating in community.<sup>286</sup> This may consist in finding newer and more efficient ways to alleviate poverty and ignorance and so on.

These activities apply to benefiting the general standard of living in the community and protecting its members in the face of adversity. The appropriate forum for such deliberation in Aristotle’s times was the *agora* where all free male citizens could

contribute to discussion about correcting society's ills and finding better ways to progress activities within it. This is a further example of the coming together of the beautiful and the good. It involves a quest for human good in community, the extent of which cannot be completely plotted at the time of the deliberation. It is the quest for the *kalos kagathos*.

Scholars disagree whether Aristotle says that we do not deliberate about ends, but rather about the means to get there.<sup>287</sup> I suggest we deliberate about ends. An example may be the desire to achieve a certain level of prosperity within a fixed period of time. The sum decided upon is the result of some deliberation after we consider why we need it, and how much will fulfil that need. Pondering effective means to achieve the financial goal will then follow. The human good here is moderation in the time we spend acquiring worldly wealth and achieving a balance in our overall use of time.

### **The Breathalyser and the Artificial Lake**

When deliberating upon a question concerning the community, the aim is either to decide upon the course of action to remedy a social ill or something which has outlived its usefulness. An example may be amending the Road Traffic Act to detect drunken drivers, such as the regulation and continued improvement of breathalyser equipment. Driving with an excess of alcohol in the bloodstream distorts judgement and thus puts other members of the community at risk. It is ugly behaviour which stands out against the background of law and order.

The deliberation may be of an open ended nature, such as how the construction of an artificial lake for irrigation purposes may impact upon environmental issues. In this latter example, the goal is not known. It will depend upon the evidence collected and whether it discloses any other issues to be resolved. Both of these examples acknowledge the existence of the good. In the former, the parameters of the social goal are already identified and the task is to implement it in a workable way in the legal procedure.

The idea of detecting breath alcohol would have taken shape in some sector of the community and then been given to a scientist to perfect. The notion constitutes a human good, or aim. It is only the scientist that is able to realise the aim in its

complete form, because only he or she understands the necessary principles to build the machine. The scientist's faithful adherence to these principles in achieving the task exhibit beauty in persistence in a quest to further human goods.

Once this has been achieved, the breathalyser has to fit into enforceable laws. The parliamentary draftsman achieves his end by having regard to legal principles, making sure that his legislation does not exceed the power given to him by the parliament. He needs to observe the beauty of the English language by choosing precise words to achieve his aim. The goods generated by effective drunken driving laws are as self evident as the well-crafted kitchen knife.

The committee considering the question of the lake is dealing with open-ended issues. Here a balance between a known aspect of the question, i.e. how much water the artificial lake will deliver to a region deficient in water, is capable of calculation, but the impact of creating the lake has yet to be determined. Such questions as the presence of rare flora and fauna and the need to preserve them in the region are the obvious ones. The difference between this inquiry and the breathalyser is that side issues may emerge, such as the life cycle of an unknown plant or animal. In our first example the good is identified and in this one it is being sought after.

These undertakings involve speculative thinking, not only about those aspects of human life that I have discussed, but also as to how they will impact upon individual freedom. We need to have regard for the ethical considerations of how far the state ought to interfere with people's right to educate themselves and enjoy their leisure. However, John Locke's minimalist approach of government interference in citizen's affairs needs to be continually reviewed in the light of increased technology.<sup>288</sup> In his times there were no cars to become lethal weapons in the hands of drunken drivers. These examples are fairly illustrative of how human goods are generated pursuant to Aristotelian principles in communal issues. I will now briefly consider Aristotle's thoughts on the development of the individual.

The community can only operate effectively if it is made up of well-balanced people. Aristotle's thoughts as to how individuals may aspire to that level of functioning are tied to his conception of "happiness", which is achieved in self sufficiency.<sup>289</sup> For Aristotle self-sufficiency is the *telos* of human life:

It is a generally accepted view that the final good is self-sufficient. By 'self-sufficient' is meant not what is sufficient for one's self living the life of a solitary but includes parents, wife and children, friends and fellow-citizens in general. For man is a social animal. A self-sufficient thing then, we take to be one which on its own footing tends to make life desirable and lacking in nothing. And we regard happiness as such a thing.<sup>290</sup>

Aristotle further qualifies happiness when he says:

There is another condition of happiness; it cannot be achieved in less than a complete lifetime. One swallow does not make a summer, neither does one fine day. And one day, or indeed any brief period of felicity, does not make a man entirely and perfectly happy.<sup>291</sup>

The foregoing passages sum up Aristotle's concept of "human good". It is important to notice that Aristotle does not define happiness. He leaves that to be discovered by each individual when they are fully rational, which means "to function well as a human being."<sup>292</sup> Aristotle advocates a balanced life in all things.

### **Aristotle on the Kitchen Knife**

Aristotle tells us that the best life is the one lived in harmony with one's fellows.<sup>293</sup> Nussbaum explains that this entails the application of *phronesis* in our lives. Nussbaum reminds us, "how the Platonic aspiration to universality, precision, and stable control is met and criticised in Aristotle's more 'yielding' and flexible conception of responsive perception."<sup>294</sup> This distinction clarifies the fluid nature of Aristotle's recipe for the good life. Aristotle sees beauty in behavioural adaptability. This appears to involve a mastery of all the human virtues with *phronesis* acting as an over-arching governor in all cases. Thus, the middle way is a dynamic involvement in life acting in an appropriate manner on all occasions. This is the continual thought going into improving the design of the kitchen knife.

Aristotle's virtuous man resembles an adept golfer. For the golfer, each club possesses a range of possibilities. The player may grip down the shaft a little and punch the shot, producing a low trajectory or they may play a distance shot with a full swing. There are an infinite number of variations in between these two possibilities. The seasoned player will need to take into account weather conditions, whether the green is dry or wet, the wind, and so on. In the same way Aristotle's virtuous man needs to cultivate a similar flexibility in all virtues that go to make up excellence in human behaviour.

## The Middle Way

The theme of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is the pathway to human happiness in which he examines various virtues such as courage, modesty, temperance and justice, to name a few. Aristotle examines these virtues by placing them at the mid-point between behavioural extremes. For example, courage is the mean of timidity and recklessness. Extreme points of conduct are brought about by an excess of emotion. A timid person takes fright easily and is unable to break out of his behavioural prison because he fears the consequences of the unknown. Usually he will take no risks. If he finds himself suddenly in danger he may be behaviourally paralysed. On the other hand, the reckless person behaves with too much abandon, foregoing reason to act upon the spur of the moment. He catapults himself into dangerous situations without considering the consequences.

Choosing the middle path between these two extremes involves the employment of practical wisdom which will result in a toning down of emotional excess.<sup>295</sup> Nussbaum reminds us that "practical wisdom uses rules only as summaries and guides and must be flexible, ready for surprise, prepared to be resourceful at improvisation".<sup>296</sup> However, the task will not be achieved quickly: it will take a complete lifetime.<sup>297</sup>

These directives ought to enable the agent to decide upon appropriate action in all circumstances. An example is to be found in a potential bar room brawl situation. The prudent individual exercising practical reason will withdraw from such a scene, provided withdrawal is possible. He will only engage in physical violence if it is absolutely necessary to protect himself or somebody else for whom he is responsible. Aristotle advises that to err on the side of caution is the preferred course. An analysis of the range of emotions and the commingling of them with the exercise of reason in this predicament will be revealing. It is reasonable to suppose that a peaceful agent would feel apprehensive of being threatened or insulted. It may even approach fear. A prudent person would start thinking of a way to neutralise the situation immediately he saw it coming upon him. He would realise that the disparagement that he may suffer at the hands of the onlookers would be of no account. Far more important would be the possibility of suffering physical damage or being taken in charge for disorderly conduct. He would realise that virtuous

behaviour depends upon his acting as a self-sufficient individual in a situation not of his making, rather than getting caught up in the madness of the moment. The reckless agent would cast all care to one side, and, if he were of a pugilistic bent, engage in the brawl. His reaction would abandon reason. The timid person on the other hand would simply feel fear and would be unable to reason out the alternatives. He would be gripped with panic, which, too, involves an excess of emotion to the detriment of prudence.<sup>298</sup> Aristotle uses the same approach to examine the other virtues.

### **Balancing the Emotions**

In order to achieve behavioural equilibrium we must learn to exercise the faculty of reason. This will depend upon the control we can exert over our emotions. David Bostock tells us that in Aristotle “Each virtue is associated with a particular feeling or emotion ...” and “The virtuous disposition is one which involves a harmony between emotion and reason: both pull in the same direction.”<sup>299</sup> Emotions are sometimes an appropriate reaction to a situation and may be an end in themselves, such as tears at the loss of a loved one.<sup>300</sup> This behaviour is the release of grief which must be worked through so the agent can return to living a balanced life. Reason will only serve the mourner after the first and full impact of the loss has been softened by the passage of time. Grief of this type is regarded as normal in our community and the support of family and friends usually aid the mourner to get over the loss. A sort of cleansing takes place as the mourner is gradually able to integrate his/her memory of the loved one into its proper place, i.e. the past. Reason dictates that life must go on without the loved one, and thus balance between emotion and reason is slowly restored. The cleansing process has been brought about by the support of family/friends, the fading of the initial shock of the loss and the relegation of the memory to an appropriate place in the mental life of the mourner.

### ***Katharsis* in Tragedy**

In *The Tragedians* Aristotle describes the healing (*katharsis*) process as the ... “effecting through pity and fear the purification of such emotions”.<sup>301</sup> Malcolm Heath tells us that Aristotle held that emotions were not irrational impulses.<sup>302</sup> The emotions are grounded in our understanding which means they are an interpretation



of any given situation that may arise and thus are capable of ethical evaluation.<sup>303</sup> Heath cites the following passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* which demonstrates the close link between emotion and virtue:

For example, fear, confidence, desire, anger, pity and in general pleasure and distress can be experienced in greater or lesser degree and in both cases wrongly. To feel them at the right time, in response to the right things, with regard to the right people, for the right reason and in the right way – that is the mean and the optimum, which is the characteristic of virtue.<sup>304</sup>

From the brief reference to the emotions in the *Poetics* it appears that Aristotle believes that by subjecting people prone to an excess of emotion to that excess in others, such as in actors on the stage, the tendency to emotional excess in ordinary life will be released. Removal of such excess may restore the sufferer to a healthy balance which is pleasurable.<sup>305</sup> Cottingham holds that, “The predominant Aristotelian conception of the good life involved the harmonious flourishing of all our human capacities, under the broad guidance of reason”.<sup>306</sup> Lillie tells us that, “The mean is as a prudent man would determine it. The ability of a prudent man is not the theoretical ability of the philosopher, but the practical ability of the man of experience.”<sup>307</sup>

Subjecting people to an excess of what causes their imbalance received further attention in the *Politics* in which Aristotle observed that music which stimulated the frenzy of the followers of the cult of Dionysus could have a calming (*kathartic*) effect:

The emotion which effects some minds violently exists in all, but in different degrees, e.g. pity and fear, and also enthusiasm; for some people are prone to this disturbance, and we can observe the effect of sacred music on such people: whenever they make use of songs which arouse the mind to frenzy, they are calmed and attain as it were healing and *katharsis*. Necessarily precisely the same effect applies to those prone to pity or fear or, in general, any other emotion, and to others to the extent that each is susceptible to such things: for all there occurs *katharsis* and pleasurable relief.<sup>308</sup>

Aristotle’s views on how to redress an imbalance of emotion are more robustly presented than his view of how people can develop moral dispositions. He presents these cures for uncontrolled emotions against the backdrop of an orderly literary device which William Barrett explains as:

A drama ... must have a beginning, middle, and end. The action begins at a certain point, rises towards a climax, and then falls to a denouement ... his structure must be an intelligible whole in which each part develops logically out of what went before.<sup>309</sup>

Thus Aristotle brings order out of behavioural chaos by the cleansing ingredients of pity and fear presented in a literary work which invites the audience to replicate its order in their own lives.

### ***Eudaimonia: The Marriage of the Beautiful and the Good***

A large number of the books of the *Nichomachean Ethics* are devoted to a consideration of various virtues such as courage, temperance, sobriety and so on, until we arrive in book 10 at a consideration of the 'contemplative' life. For Aristotle the contemplative life consists in study for its own sake. Aristotle points out that the contemplative person will be happy only if he has mastered all of the other virtues and is able to enjoy the society of his fellow beings in friendship and the family.

Such a person will have achieved an appreciation of Aristotle's notion of the "human good" and will have done so by functioning excellently, or flourishing in all aspects of his life. His actions will reflect proportionate, or beautiful, behaviour and he will be on the way to achieving the status of *kalos kagathos*. It is to be noted that the *kalos* never becomes the *agathos* during one's life for, according to Aristotle, a person can only be happy at the end of a well-lived life. It seems to follow that a person could not be called *kalos kagathos* at any other time than after a life well-lived. This is because a person is not in a frozen setting like the knife in the kitchen, which although capable of improvement may be beautiful at any given time.

### **Aristotle's Theory of Causation**

Before leaving Aristotle I should like to set out his theory of causation which for him explains how things like the kitchen knife come into existence:

Causes are spoken of in four ways, of which one cause we say to be the substance and the essence (for the 'why' is referred to the extreme term, and the cause and principle is the primary 'why'), and the second is the matter and substrate, and the third is that from which comes the beginning of the change, and the fourth is the opposite cause to this, the 'wherefore' and the good (for this is the end of all coming into being and change)...<sup>310</sup>

It appears Aristotle means them to be understood as follows.

- (a) The material cause is the material from which an object such as a bed is made.
- (b) The formal cause is the shape into which the material enters. It is possible that during manufacture the carpenter will improve the design. Similarly, craftsmen may improve the design over long periods. This will certainly alter the formal cause as it was originally imagined and may affect the quality of the final cause. Like his teaching on ethics, the Aristotelian pattern of causes does not occur rigidly one after the other, but rather as a constant unpredictable and interactive interplay.

In designing the bed we need to think of the need to provide comfort for an effective sleep. Another step in planning will include the need for it to complement furniture so as to combine with the ambience of a pleasant restful bedroom. This excellence of function and a pleasing aesthetic appeal makes the bed beautiful in two aspects.

- (c) The efficient cause is the carpenter who makes the bed; and
- (d) The final cause is the finished product.

For Aristotle these appear to be the necessary steps that must be completed in order to bring anything into existence. In retracing the steps of the coming into being of the object we ought to be able to work out whether the designer's intention for the object was to contribute to human goods or not. Sometimes the intention of the object is manifest from its obvious function, such our well-designed kitchen knife.

Martin Heidegger analyses the Aristotelian model of causality as follows: "The four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each other, of being responsible for something else."<sup>311</sup> He gives an example of a chalice which is "indebted" to the silver out of which it is made and says that the sacrificial vessel "is at the same time indebted to the aspect of chaliceness."<sup>312</sup> Heidegger says that both the silver and the aspect in which the silver appears are in their respective ways co-responsible for the sacrificial vessel.<sup>313</sup>

The four causes must interact to bring forth the completed product. However, it is only the efficient cause (the craftsman) who determines whether the article will be beautiful or not. This is decided at the formal cause stage. The craftsman will then “give it realisation in some material”<sup>314</sup> so that the formal, efficient and final causes are the form of the finished product in different stages of actualisation.<sup>315</sup> The interaction of all the causes commences when the craftsman begins to deliberate about the construction of the object. There will be no point in his deciding to make a bed without settling on what he is going to make it out of, the need for it to produce a comfortable rest/sleep and the pleasing outward appearance of it as a complimenting piece of bedroom furniture. The dispositions identified by Aristotle did not receive much attention in Western philosophy until the times of Aquinas. He used them as his basis for natural law. Heidegger claims that our modern technological society is incapable of understanding Aristotle’s interpretation of causation. This is because people no longer have control over what they produce.<sup>316</sup> Heidegger states that the Aristotelian theory of causation in our age “might apply to the techniques of the hand craftsman, but that it simply does not fit modern machine powered technology.” This is because “technology, like Aristotle’s theory of causation, is a mode of revealing, but the revealing never simply comes to an end. It consists of manifold interlocking paths which we are unable to trace.”<sup>317</sup>

In this chapter I have explained how Aristotle’s precepts may be applied to modern life. Apparently, Heidegger is correct when he says the revealing “never similarly comes to an end.”<sup>318</sup> However, just because an ideal is not easily implemented, that does not mean it cannot be held. The task the Greeks set us is still before us. The beauty of a world that is always revealing itself sets us a perpetual challenge to try to understand it. The enthusiasm that each generation brings to unravelling its hidden mysteries ensures the ideal of *kalos kagathos* will continue to beckon us to higher levels of achievement.

# CONCLUSION

## Summing up the Kitchen Knife

In conclusion, I shall attempt to draw together the various themes I have presented as illustrative of people aspiring to the ideal of *kalos kagathos*. I have advanced the view that anti-modernist philosophy evaluates things and activities in their setting and according to their function. Their beauty depends upon the degree to which they further human goods. The beauty of some things is obvious, such as our well-made kitchen knife. On the other hand, the speech in court needs to be heard right through before the intention behind it is revealed. Likewise the example of the samurai sword shows that there are occasions when we need to acquire a knowledge of function before contribution to human goods can be assessed.

However, our idea of an appropriate function may change over time. The gallows example shows this. It is an ugly spectacle because our social values no longer accept capital punishment. The emphasis is now on rehabilitation after a fitting punishment. The principal function of the justice system is towards community integration and the reform of the individual. Perfecting the design of the kitchen knife is an ongoing process. It will require the cooperation of all the people that will use it.

The cooperative virtues had their beginnings in Homer. In the *Iliad*, Homer challenged the received account of aristocratic behaviour. Using negative emotions and behaviour such as adultery, sulkiness, anger and revenge, Homer penetrated the “external show” of Achilles’ behaviour and brought forth a compassionate man. This psychological journey was taken in a world of cosmic orderliness, natural splendour, well-made utensils and handsome, well-dressed people. The constancy of this scenery and the interference of the gods in human affairs was the idyllic setting in which Homer unfolded his rich and spirited morality tale. Achilles’ compassion reflected the functional excellence of the Homeric natural setting. The kitchen was ideally designed; partly by nature and partly by people’s perfectionism in making their appurtenances. Homer supplied the blueprints for the ideal kitchen knife in the *Iliad* and the return of Odysseus to Ithaca.

Hesiod's Boeotia, with its "bleak and unfertile uplands" is in stark contrast to the blemishless Homeric world. In Hesiod's agrarian world there were no *agathoi*. Best of all was the *panaristos*, who was the Hesiodic parody of perfection. More numerous were the *esthloi*. Success depended upon hard work and following Hesiod's advice in his *Works & Days*. This included instructions on farming in accordance with nature, methods for making tools, social behaviour; even hints on choosing a suitable wife. Hesiod was concerned with justice in his rural world, which he conceived as an over-arching entity pervading the whole of human existence. Justice, which inhered in nature's patterns, had to be striven for in human affairs.

Hesiod's idea of justice comes through in his reprimand of his brother Perses, who had swindled him out of his inheritance by bribing the judges. He talks of the ideal system of justice giving the same judgement to locals and strangers alike. It is significant that Hesiod personalises justice in the daughter of Zeus. Justice as a virtue is attainable by people, but only with perpetual effort. Hesiod's ideal farmer functions appropriately at all times. Hesiod's contribution to the marriage of the beautiful and the good was to improve the community by emphasising the value of co-operative behaviour, both with one's neighbours and with the cycles of nature, as ways of "how best to live in a difficult world." The components of the kitchen knife were all to hand, but the blade needed a little honing.

Solon was the most powerful of the historical figures in my thesis. He controlled the whole of Greece. Solon introduced wide-ranging legislative reform aimed at neutralising the stranglehold the rich had on them and to create more opportunities for all. The peasants were now free to sell their labour, without fear of being sold into slavery, and were encouraged to learn a trade to increase their economic viability. For Solon, too, *dike* had a divine dimension. He believed that every transgression of justice resulted in an imbalance to the cosmic harmony. Solon's work did not focus just on personal development. He remodelled the kitchen. Whether his people chose to resemble the well-made kitchen knife was a choice he left to them.

Both Plato and Aristotle were concerned with the development of practical reasonableness. Socrates's continual questions were directed at discovering a

common element in whatever expression was under discussion, such as “fineness” in the *Hippias Major*. We see the same theme in Plato’s Doctrine of the Forms and the metaphors I have discussed. Continued examination of objects in this sensible world ought ultimately reveal their true nature. The need for persistence is emphasised in the poor success rate in the Platonic dialogues. For Plato, this effort represented people functioning at their highest level in which they would be in balance with their own nature and environment. Success in the quest was not important. This is a far cry from Homer’s *agathos*. The form of the kitchen knife was not going to reveal the excellence of its design easily. Like the ideal of *kalos kagathos* it is inaccessible, but irresistible.

Aristotle, too, was concerned with individual development. However, he believed that the answer to man’s fulfilment did not involve recourse to extramundane forms. Although he devoted the majority of his *Nicomachean Ethics* to personal development, he is quite clear in Book 1 that he thinks the pursuit of politics is the highest form of human activity. This is because it involves the orderly functioning of the community. Aristotle taught that if people do not get the beginnings of ethical behaviour in the family, they should find them in the community. Thus, it is the community that educates and to the community that one must continually contribute. The ideal of *kalos kagathos* can only be present in the complete individual who is master of all the virtues and also a respected community member.

I would like to finish with a few comments on the work of John Cottingham. He holds that, “The Socratic model of striving for philosophical wisdom by careful logical analysis is now seen as narrow, cramped and confined ... we have to burst the restricting bonds of analytic rationality.” In Chapter 4 of his *Philosophy and the Good Life*, Cottingham challenges the sufficiency of Plato’s teaching on *akrasia* (lack of self-control) by introducing psychotherapeutic and psychoanalytic considerations. His point is that the more technical knowledge we amass about ourselves the more uncertain we become as to the extent of our personal freedom. However, this ought not to deter us from a continual striving to becoming more caring members of our communities and developing an increased respect for our own self worth. The other authors I have been discussing think that reason in the cooperative virtues provides a formula for human happiness. However, Cottingham

observes that since the development of sciences such as psychotherapy our way forward is more complex. Our job to go on searching for an ethics that will result in excellent, functioning behaviour in all circumstances. It is in that pursuit that we will bring about the marriage of the beautiful and the good.



## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>1</sup> I recognise that ‘anti-modernist’ is not a widely used term and I apologise for its ugliness but it captures well the point I want to make.
- <sup>2</sup> (I will quote the first names of authors where the publisher has provided them, otherwise I will use initials). Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy – Vol 1. Greece and Rome* (London: Continuum, 2003) 139. In the *Protagoras* Socrates proved that virtue is knowledge and can be taught.
- <sup>3</sup> Marjorie S. Harris, ‘Beauty and the Good’. *The Philosophical Review*, 39: 5 (1930) 480.
- <sup>4</sup> In this thesis “thing” and “object” shall have the same meaning.
- <sup>5</sup> According to Navone, “The attractiveness of beauty consists in whatever is good for us.” Navone goes on to say that, “Beauty has a subtle power of attracting or calling us. The Greeks recognized this when they named the beautiful to *kalon* from the verb *kaleo* meaning to call or beckon”. John Navone, S. J. *Toward a Theology of Beauty* (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1996) 26.
- <sup>6</sup> Plato, *Gorgias* (trans.) Walter Hamilton (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1971) 452.
- <sup>7</sup> Plato, *The Republic* (trans.) Desmond Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1974) 335 c.
- <sup>8</sup> Bentham, J. 1781, *An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation* (New York: Hafner Press) 1948, 310–311.
- <sup>9</sup> Elliott Sober, ‘Evolution, Pollution Thinking, and Essentialism’, *Philosophy of Science*, 47: 3 (1980): 379.
- <sup>10</sup> Alisdair MacIntyre, *Dependant Rational Animals – Why Human Beings Need the Virtues* (Illinois: Open Court, 1999) 138.
- <sup>11</sup> Hubris was a term that meant wanton acts, outrageous, insolence, excessive behaviour. H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996) 1841.
- <sup>12</sup> Plato, *Hippias Major*. (trans.) Robin Waterfield (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1974) 288 d.
- <sup>13</sup> Plato, *Hippias Major*. .288 e.
- <sup>14</sup> Plato, *Hippias Major*. .288 e.
- <sup>15</sup> Plato, *Hippias Major*. .289 a.
- <sup>16</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days* (trans.) H. G. Evelyn-White (London: Harvard University Press, 2002).
- <sup>17</sup> Stephen Toulmin, *An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics* (London: Cambridge at the University Press, 1968) 22.
- <sup>18</sup> Phillipa Foot, *Moral Beliefs* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967) 84.
- <sup>19</sup> Herman Wankel, ‘Kalos kai Agathos’ (Ph. D. thesis, University of Wurzburg, 1961)
- <sup>20</sup> Walter Donlan, ‘The Origin of Kalos Kagathos’ [sic], *The American Journal of Philology*, 94: 4 (1973): 374.
- <sup>21</sup> Bourriot, F. 1995, Kalos Kagathos – Kalo Kagathia – d’un terme d’propagande Sophists a une social et philosophique – *Etude d’histoire athenienne* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1995).
- <sup>22</sup> See generally Wankel, *Kalos Kagathos*.
- <sup>23</sup> Wankel, *Kalos Kagathos*, 12–13.
- <sup>24</sup> Wankel, *Kalos Kagathos*, 14.
- <sup>25</sup> C. Kohnhorn, *Kalo Kagathia*, (Graecorum, ex locis Xenophontis adumbrate; Progr. Neisse, 1850) 3–13.
- <sup>26</sup> Werner Jaeger, *Paideia: The Ideals of Greek Culture – Vol. 1* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967) 4.
- <sup>27</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 4.
- <sup>28</sup> Nicolai Hartmann, *Ethik*, (Berlin: W. De Gruyter) 391–401.
- <sup>29</sup> Wankel, *Kalos Kagathos*, 16.
- <sup>30</sup> Bourriot, *Kalos Kagathia – Kalo Kagathia*.
- <sup>31</sup> D.L. Cairns, ‘Kalokagathia’, *The Classical Review*, 47: 1(1997): 74–76.
- <sup>32</sup> Alcibiades was a politician in Athens after the Peloponnesian War.
- <sup>33</sup> Plato, *Theaetetus* (trans.) R.A.H. Waterfield (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1987) 143.e.
- <sup>34</sup> Homer, *The Iliad* (trans.) A.T. Murray (London: Harvard University Press, 2001) 2.216–219.
- <sup>35</sup> Plato, *Protagoras* (trans.) W.K.C. Guthrie (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1956) 8.
- <sup>36</sup> Plato, *Protagoras*, 13.
- <sup>37</sup> Plato, *The Apology* (trans.) H. Tredennick ‘and others’ (London: Penguin Books Limited, 2003) 19.

- <sup>38</sup> Cairns, *Kalokagathia*, p. 75.
- <sup>39</sup> Cairns, *Kalokagathia*, 75. These oligarchs similarly arrogated to themselves the title because they considered that now they were the aristocrats.
- <sup>40</sup> Cairns, *Kalokagathia*, 75.
- <sup>41</sup> Cairns, *Kalokagathia*, 75.
- <sup>42</sup> Donlan, 'The Origin of Kalos Kagaqos', 374.
- <sup>43</sup> C. M. Bowra, *The Greek Experience* (New York: Mentor Books, 1957) 89.
- <sup>44</sup> Donlan, 'The Origin of Kalos Kagaqos', 372.
- <sup>45</sup> Donlan, 'The Origin of Kalos Kagaqos', 372.
- <sup>46</sup> Alisdair MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (London: Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1966) 6.
- <sup>47</sup> A.W.H. Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece – From Homer to the End of the Fifth Century* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972) 11.
- <sup>48</sup> A.W.H. Adkins, 'Friendship and Self Sufficiency in Homer and Aristotle', *The Classical Quarterly*, 13: 1 (1963): 30–45.
- <sup>49</sup> W.H. Auden, *The Portable Greek Reader* (New York: The Viking Press, 1955) 19.
- <sup>50</sup> Bowra, *The Greek Experience*, 33.
- <sup>51</sup> *Il.* 1.269 – 273.
- <sup>52</sup> Adkins, *Moral Values*, 60.
- <sup>53</sup> MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, 8.
- <sup>54</sup> Donlan. 'The Origin of Kalos Kagaqos', 367.
- <sup>55</sup> Donlan, 'The Origin of Kalos Kagaqos', 368.
- <sup>56</sup> A.W.H. Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility – A Study in Greek Values* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960) 32.
- <sup>57</sup> *Il.* 15.283.
- <sup>58</sup> *Il.* 23.348.
- <sup>59</sup> *Il.* 2.365.
- <sup>60</sup> Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, 33.
- <sup>61</sup> *Il.* 2.284 ff.
- <sup>62</sup> *Il.* 2.284 ff.
- <sup>63</sup> Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, 41.
- <sup>64</sup> Homer, *The Odyssey* (trans.) A. T. Murray (London: Harvard University Press, 2002) 16.108 ff.
- <sup>65</sup> *Il.* 5. 787.
- <sup>66</sup> Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, 45.
- <sup>67</sup> MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, 5 *et seq.*
- <sup>68</sup> MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, 5.
- <sup>69</sup> MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, 7.
- <sup>70</sup> MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, 7.
- <sup>71</sup> MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics*, 7.
- <sup>72</sup> E.R. Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951).
- <sup>73</sup> *Il.* 19.270-271.
- <sup>74</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 3.
- <sup>75</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 3.
- <sup>76</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 3.
- <sup>77</sup> *Il.* 19.136.
- <sup>78</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 5.
- <sup>79</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 4.
- <sup>80</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 5.
- <sup>81</sup> *Il.* 2.1.
- <sup>82</sup> *Il.* 2.23.
- <sup>83</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 6.
- <sup>84</sup> *Od.* 1.26.
- <sup>85</sup> *Il.* 16.843 ff.
- <sup>86</sup> *Il.* 24.557 ff.
- <sup>87</sup> Dodds, *The Greeks and the Irrational*, 17.
- <sup>88</sup> *Il.* 6.351.
- <sup>89</sup> Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, 31.
- <sup>90</sup> Eric Vogelin, *The World of the Polis – Order in History, Vol II* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976) 67.
- <sup>91</sup> *Il.* 3.242.

- <sup>92</sup> *Il.* 8.1.
- <sup>93</sup> *Il.* 3.445. [Paris and Helen] lay down together on a well-made wooden bed.
- <sup>94</sup> *Il.* 7.86.
- <sup>95</sup> *Il.* 4.416.
- <sup>96</sup> Homer, *The Iliad* (trans.) E.V. Rieu (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1963) XIX.
- <sup>97</sup> *Il.*, p. 72. Last, he took up a powerful spear, which was fitted to his grip.
- <sup>98</sup> *Il.* 248.
- <sup>99</sup> *Il.* 3.4.
- <sup>100</sup> *Il.* 4.3.
- <sup>101</sup> *Il.* 5.5.
- <sup>102</sup> H. G. Liddell and R. Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*. 9<sup>th</sup> ed. (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996) 238.
- <sup>103</sup> Richard Gaskin, ‘Do Homeric Heroes Make Real Decisions’, *The Classical Quarterly*, 40: 1 (1990): 12.
- <sup>104</sup> Ruth Padell, *Whom Gods Destroy – Elements of Greek and Tragic Madness* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1995) 175.
- <sup>105</sup> Padell, *Whom Gods Destroy*, 174.
- <sup>106</sup> Thomas Brian Mooney ‘Perspectives on the Philosophy of Love and Friendship in Ancient Greece: Homer to Plato’ (Ph. D Thesis, La Trobe University, 1993) 76.
- <sup>107</sup> *Il.* 3.380 – 383.
- <sup>108</sup> *Il.* 9.378.
- <sup>109</sup> Homer, *The Iliad*, IX.
- <sup>110</sup> *Il.* 1.273.
- <sup>111</sup> *Il.* 1.273.
- <sup>112</sup> Liddell & Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 1147.
- <sup>113</sup> Liddell & Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 1147.
- <sup>114</sup> Liddell & Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, 1853.
- <sup>115</sup> *Il.* 3.43 ff.
- <sup>116</sup> *Il.* 9.252 ff.
- <sup>117</sup> *Il.* 2.77-78.
- <sup>118</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days* (trans.) Dorothy Wender (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1973) 16.
- <sup>119</sup> *Od.* 1.31 ff.
- <sup>120</sup> *Od.* 1.9.
- <sup>121</sup> *Od.* 1.18 ff.
- <sup>122</sup> *Od.* 1.12 ff.
- <sup>123</sup> *Od.* 1.27 ff.
- <sup>124</sup> *Od.* 1.31 ff.
- <sup>125</sup> *Od.* 1.31 ff.
- <sup>126</sup> *Od.* 1.45 ff.
- <sup>127</sup> Howard W. Clarke, *The Art of the Odyssey* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall Inc, 1967) 10.
- <sup>128</sup> *Od.* 1.16.
- <sup>129</sup> *Od.* 12.125 – The Sun’s Cattle on the Island of Thrinacia
- <sup>130</sup> *Od.* 12.53, *Od.* 12.84 – The Sirens, the Drifting Rocks and Scylla.
- <sup>131</sup> *Od.* 12.137.
- <sup>132</sup> Odysseus’ participation in the Trojan War.
- <sup>133</sup> Clarke, *The Art of the Odyssey*, 5.
- <sup>134</sup> *Od.* 10.467.
- <sup>135</sup> *Od.* 10.470 ff.
- <sup>136</sup> *Od.* 10.474 ff.
- <sup>137</sup> *Od.* 10.476.
- <sup>138</sup> *Od.* 9.103 ff.
- <sup>139</sup> Clarke, *The Art of the Odyssey*, 48.
- <sup>140</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days* (trans.) Hugh G. Evelyn-White (London: Harvard University Press, 2002) lines 631–640.
- <sup>141</sup> Fritz Graf, *Greek Mythology – An Introduction* (Maryland: The John Hopkins University Press, 1987) 77.
- <sup>142</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 11.
- <sup>143</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 11.
- <sup>144</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 19.
- <sup>145</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 295.

- <sup>146</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 295.
- <sup>147</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 5, lines 23–25.
- <sup>148</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 3, line 12.
- <sup>149</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 27, lines 31–313.
- <sup>150</sup> Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility*, 71.
- <sup>151</sup> Superlative of *agathos*, best in birth and rank. *Il.* 4.260. Evelyn-White, *Works and Days*, 53, line 694.
- <sup>152</sup> *Due measure, proportion, fitness* (not in Homer), Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 859. That *kairos* does not occur in Homer is significant because, in the aristocratic world, proportion was no part of moral behaviour. Being *agathos* was a matter of external show.
- <sup>153</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 53, line 694.
- <sup>154</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 27, line 331.
- <sup>155</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 27, lines 332–333.
- <sup>156</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 293.
- <sup>157</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, lines 294–295. Whilst Hesiod talks of all things (*panta*) I suggest that given the limitations of human ability to perceive only a limited number of the facets of any given situation, he must be read as meaning taking into consideration as much as possible.
- <sup>158</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 292–294.
- <sup>159</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 29, “call your friend to a feast”, line 344. Hesiod’s text is studded with these direct forms of address to his reader.
- <sup>160</sup> John Skorupski, ‘Ethics’, In *The Blackwell Companion to Philosophy* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003) 211.
- <sup>161</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 293.
- <sup>162</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 295.
- <sup>163</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 374.
- <sup>164</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 55, line 713.
- <sup>165</sup> *Il.* 13.278 cited in Liddell & Scott, p. 374.
- <sup>166</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 59, “When you are building a house, do not leave it rough-hewn”, lines 746–747.
- <sup>167</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, “fill your barn with food” lines 300–301. “Both gods and men are angry with a man who lives idle, for in nature he is like the stingless drones who waste the labour of the bees, eating without working; lines 302–305.
- <sup>168</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 19, lines 211–214
- <sup>169</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 295.
- <sup>170</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 788.
- <sup>171</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 57, lines 730–731.
- <sup>172</sup> Edith Hamilton, *Mythology – Timeless Tales of Gods and Heroes* (New York: Penguin Books Limited, 1969) 68–69.
- <sup>173</sup> F. M. Cornford, *Principium Sapientiae – The Origins of Greek Philosophical Thought* (New York: Harper & Roe, 1965) 77.
- <sup>174</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 57, lines 725–726.
- <sup>175</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 996.
- <sup>176</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 65, line 828.
- <sup>177</sup> Plato, *The Republic* (trans.) D. Lee (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1974) 310.
- <sup>178</sup> G. S. Kirk, *Myth – Its Meaning and Functions in Ancient and Other Cultures* (Cambridge: University Press, 1998) 226–227.
- <sup>179</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 297.
- <sup>180</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, line 292.
- <sup>181</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, lines 295–297.
- <sup>182</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, lines 297–301.
- <sup>183</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 28.
- <sup>184</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25 lines 302–303.
- <sup>185</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 27, line 311.
- <sup>186</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 27, lines 317–318.
- <sup>187</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 105.
- <sup>188</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 586.
- <sup>189</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 29, lines 353–355.
- <sup>190</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 4.
- <sup>191</sup> D. E. Gerber, (trans.) *Theognis* (London: Harvard University Press, 2003) lines 436–439.

- <sup>192</sup> Gerber, *Theognis*, lines 465–466.
- <sup>193</sup> Adkins, *Moral Values*, 42.
- <sup>194</sup> Whilst justice relates to order, and right in Homer. Liddle and Scott (p. 430) say it only applies between the members of the aristocracy: II p. 358. In Hesiod it is personified: “and justice who attends the works of men”: Wender, *Works and Days*, 52, line 902. Justice (*Dike*) was one of Zeus’ daughters. By attending to the “works of men”, *Dike* ensures that the work is done well, and in a workmanlike manner.
- <sup>195</sup> D.J. Stuart, ‘Hesiod and the Birth of Reason’, *The Antioch Review*, 26: 2 (1966): 213–231.
- <sup>196</sup> *Od.* 1.31 ff.
- <sup>197</sup> Hesiod, *Theogony* (trans.) H. G. Evelyn-White (London: Harvard University Press, 2002) line 903.
- <sup>198</sup> The goddess of order. See Robert Graves, *The Greek Myths* (The Folio Society Vol. II, 2003) 698.
- <sup>199</sup> Pausanias, *Description of Greece* (trans.) J. G. Fraser (London: Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1913) 5.18.2.
- <sup>200</sup> Eric Vogelin, *The World of the Polis – Order in History, Vol II* (Batten Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976) 144.
- <sup>201</sup> A.W.H. Adkins, *From the Many to the One* (London: Constable & Company Limited, 1970) 33.
- <sup>202</sup> Michael Gagarin, ‘Dike in the Works & Days’, *Classical Philology*, 68: 2 (1973): 81.
- <sup>203</sup> Adkins, *Moral Values*, 24.
- <sup>204</sup> Gagarin, *Dike in the Works and Days*, 81.
- <sup>205</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 25, lines 293–294.
- <sup>206</sup> Gagarin, *Dike in the Works and Days*, 81.
- <sup>207</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 73.
- <sup>208</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 29, line 362.
- <sup>209</sup> Gagarin, *Dike in the Works and Days*, 88.
- <sup>210</sup> Gagarin, *Dike in the Works and Days*, 83.
- <sup>211</sup> Gagarin, *Dike in the Works and Days*, 83.
- <sup>212</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 19, lines 217–224.
- <sup>213</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 5, lines 26–31.
- <sup>214</sup> Voeglin, *The World of the Polis*, 129.
- <sup>215</sup> F.M. Cornford, ‘*From Religion to Philosophy*’ (New York: Harper & Roe, 1957) 174.
- <sup>216</sup> Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 174.
- <sup>217</sup> Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 174.
- <sup>218</sup> Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 174.
- <sup>219</sup> Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy*, 174.
- <sup>220</sup> Jan Jakob Maria De Groot, *Religion of the Chinese* (New York: Macmillan, 1910) 45.
- <sup>221</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 73.
- <sup>222</sup> Destiny or fate, the Doctrine of Inevitable Consequence. J. Butterfield ‘& Others,’ *Collins English Dictionary*. 6<sup>th</sup> Ed. (Glasgow: Harper Collins Publishers, 2003) 886.
- <sup>223</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 19, lines 217–224.
- <sup>224</sup> Aeschylus, *The Oresteian Trilogy* (trans.) P. Vellacott (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Limited, 1956) 19.
- <sup>225</sup> Adkins, *Moral Values*, 32.
- <sup>226</sup> Gregory Vlastos, ‘Solonian Justice’, *Classical Philology*, 41: 2 (1946) 66.
- <sup>227</sup> P. Bradley, *Ancient Greece – Using Evidence* (Rydalmer: Hodder Education, 1988) 91.
- <sup>228</sup> Bradley, *Ancient Greece*, 90.
- <sup>229</sup> Bradley, *Ancient Greece*, 91.
- <sup>230</sup> Vlastos, *Solonian Justice*, 65.
- <sup>231</sup> Gregory Vlastos, ‘Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies’, *Classical Philology*, 42: 3 (1947) 156.
- <sup>232</sup> David Bostock, *Aristotle’s Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 89.
- <sup>233</sup> A. Andrews, ‘*The Greek Tyrants*’ (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1974) 78.
- <sup>234</sup> Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 723.
- <sup>235</sup> Adkins, *Moral Values*, 48.
- <sup>236</sup> That which is laid down, law, ordinance. Liddell and Scott, *Greek – English Lexicon*, 795.
- <sup>237</sup> Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 19, line 225.
- <sup>238</sup> Bostock, *Aristotle’s Ethics*, 89.
- <sup>239</sup> D. E. Gerber, (trans.) *Solon* (London: Harvard University Press, 2003) 159, lines 13–15.
- <sup>240</sup> S.C. Humphreys, ‘The Discourse of Law in Archaic and Classical Greece’, *Law and History Review*, 6: 2 (1988) 469.

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- <sup>241</sup> Kirk, *Myth*, 122–125.
- <sup>242</sup> Bradley, *Ancient Greece*, 84.
- <sup>243</sup> Gerber, *Solon*, 129, lines 6–12.
- <sup>244</sup> Adkins, *Moral Values*, 52.
- <sup>245</sup> Gerber, *Solon*, 123.
- <sup>246</sup> Vincent J. Rosivach, ‘Redistribution of Land in Solon’, Fragment. 34 West, *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 112 (1992) 153.
- <sup>247</sup> Gerber, *Solon*, 157: “it gives me no pleasure ... to share the country’s rich land equally between the lower and upper classes.”
- <sup>248</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 140.
- <sup>249</sup> Jaeger, *Paideia*, 142.
- <sup>250</sup> Vlastos, *Solonian Justice*, 72.
- <sup>251</sup> Terence Irwin, *Classical Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) 44.
- <sup>252</sup> Irwin, *Classical Thought*, 36.
- <sup>253</sup> Julius R Weinberg, *A Short History of Medieval Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 16.
- <sup>254</sup> Gerber, *Solon*, 159.
- <sup>255</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.507a.
- <sup>256</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.507a
- <sup>257</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 7. 507b et seq.
- <sup>258</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 7. 508b.
- <sup>259</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.509 b.
- <sup>260</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.508 b.
- <sup>261</sup> Plato, *Hippias Major*.
- <sup>262</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.509 c.
- <sup>263</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.509 c.
- <sup>264</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 1.332 d–333 a.
- <sup>265</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.514 b.
- <sup>266</sup> Plato, *The Republic*, 6.509 b.
- <sup>267</sup> Essential differences are unknown to us. (De Veritate, Q. 4A.1AD.8)
- <sup>268</sup> N. Kemp-Smith (trans.) *The Critique of Pure Reason* (New York: William Benton, 1966) 75.
- <sup>269</sup> F.C. Copleston, *A History of Medieval Philosophy – Vol. 1* (London: Methuen & Co Limited, 1972) 139.
- <sup>270</sup> Plato, *Protagoras*, 27 et seq.
- <sup>271</sup> Plato, *Crito* (trans.) H. Tredennick ‘and others’ (London: Penguin Books Limited, 2003) 54d
- <sup>272</sup> Xenophon, *Conversations of Socrates* (trans.) H. Tredennick & R. Waterfield (London: Penguin Books Limited, 1990) 59.
- <sup>273</sup> Xenophon, *Conversations of Socrates*, 60.
- <sup>274</sup> Plato, *The Apology* (trans.) H. Tredennick, & R. Waterfield, (London: Penguin Books Limited, 2003) 28 d.
- <sup>275</sup> Xenophon, *Conversations of Socrates*, 60.
- <sup>276</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics* (trans.) M. Heath (Middlesex: Penguin Books Limited, 1996) ix.
- <sup>277</sup> Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness – Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001) 291.
- <sup>278</sup> Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, 291.
- <sup>279</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics* (trans.) H. Rackham (London: Harvard University Press, 2003) 1.ii.1.
- <sup>280</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.ii.6.
- <sup>281</sup> Gerard J Hughes, *Aristotle on Ethics* (London: Routledge, 2001) 15.
- <sup>282</sup> C.E.M. Joad, *Guide to the Philosophy of Morals and Politics* (London: Victor Gollancz Limited, 1948) 89.
- <sup>283</sup> Martha Craven Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire – Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) 10.
- <sup>284</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.iv.7.
- <sup>285</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.ii.8.
- <sup>286</sup> This view looks forward to *Rousseau’s General Will*. Jean Jacques Rousseau held that, “The General Will alone can direct the State according to the object for which it was constituted, i.e. the common good.” J.J. Rousseau, *The Social Contract* (Melbourne: E.W. Cole, 1762) 72.
- <sup>287</sup> Hughes, *Aristotle on Ethics*, 103.

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- <sup>288</sup> Locke, J. 1690, *An Essay Concerning the True Original Extent and End of Civil Government* (London: William Benton, 1960) Chapter 2.6.
- <sup>289</sup> Alisdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2003) 89.
- <sup>290</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.vii.6–7.
- <sup>291</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.vii.16.
- <sup>292</sup> A. J. Lisska, *Aquinas' Theory of Natural Law – An Analytic Reconstruction* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) 144.
- <sup>293</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 2.ii.7.
- <sup>294</sup> Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, 291.
- <sup>295</sup> John Finnis, *Natural Law and Natural Rights* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001) 101.
- <sup>296</sup> Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness*, 305.
- <sup>297</sup> Aristotle, *The Nichomachean Ethics*, 1.vii.16.
- <sup>298</sup> I have chosen to look at courage and no other virtues here because of word limitations.
- <sup>299</sup> David Bostock, *Aristotle's Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) 45.
- <sup>300</sup> Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire*, 92.
- <sup>301</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, 71.
- <sup>302</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, XXXVIII.
- <sup>303</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, xxx.
- <sup>304</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, II.vi.10-11.
- <sup>305</sup> Aristotle, *Poetics*, XL.
- <sup>306</sup> John Cottingham, *Philosophy and the Good Life – Reason and the Passions in Greek, Cartesian and Psycho Analytic Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 40.
- <sup>307</sup> W. Lillie, *An Introduction to Ethics* (London: Methuen & Co Limited, 1948) 321.
- <sup>308</sup> Aristotle, *The Politics* (trans.) T. A. Sinclair (Middlesex: Penguin Books Limited, 1964) 8.1342a, 4-15.
- <sup>309</sup> William Barrett, *Irrational Man* (New York: Anchor Books, 1990) 50–51.
- <sup>310</sup> Aristotle, *The Metaphysics* (trans.) H. Lawson-Tancred (London: Penguin Books Limited, 2004) 983 b.
- <sup>311</sup> Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Harper & Roe, 1977) 7.
- <sup>312</sup> Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, 7.
- <sup>313</sup> Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, 7.
- <sup>314</sup> C.E.M. Joad, *Guide to Philosophy* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1948) 184.
- <sup>315</sup> Joad, *Guide to Philosophy*, 184.
- <sup>316</sup> Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, 309.
- <sup>317</sup> Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology*, 13–16.
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