Abstract
This essay explores the doctrine of divine simplicity (DDS) within the framework of classical theism, addressing its compatibility with the plurality of divine attributes. This essay outlines classical theistic arguments for God's existence that are essential to understanding DDS, and establishes that denial of either DDS or the proof of God's existence implicitly negates the other. The DDS maintains that God is absolutely simple, devoid of parts, and physical or metaphysical, affirming His utter transcendence. However, this essay highlights certain distinct attributes that can be logically assigned to God, such as goodness, knowledge, and power. Consequently, an objection emerges: if God's attributes are distinct, how can He be essentially simple? This essay responds by distinguishing between logical and real distinctions, and introducing analogy as a means to comprehend divine attributes while upholding divine simplicity. In summary, this essay presents and affirms DDS, harmonising it with the other divine attributes through logical distinctions, and demonstrates how analogy allows one to understand the divine attributes while upholding God’s utter simplicity.
Recommended Citation
Martin, Michael. "Divine Simplicity and Naming God." Aristos 7, no. 1, art. 6 (2023): 59-70. https://researchonline.nd.edu.au/aristos/vol7/iss1/6
