If we consider how passive cinematic viewers are, voyeuristically ensconced in a darkened theatre, we can see the concern here. If only some films allow for critique of social, political and economic norms in society, and these films are attended by those viewers who are already critical viewers, then how is film more generally a tool for thinking?

If we are to honestly discuss the filmic medium, we must acknowledge the Hollywood blockbusters that stifle imaginative engagement with their narratives and often depict stereotypes. I argue that we need to read Adorno alongside Benjamin, in order to acknowledge the positive as well as negative attributes of films. In doing this we see the need to focus on the critical attitude of the viewer, as well as the moral messages of the film, particularly when we consider what the majority of consumers willingly ingest uncritically. Adorno and Benjamin both offer a historical account of art whereby their aesthetics require audience reception and are linked to experience. The way art is tied to human experience and the world of sensory perception is through language. Language allows the communication of ideas or referents which convey meaning via signs that contain some kind of ‘truth’ in the form of a cognitive component that must be interpreted. While there are many different stories being told in contemporary culture, the focus on the critical thinker, the interpreter of the narrative, is vital.

Interestingly, both supporters and critics of preventive war tend to justify their view through the broader logic of JWT; viz., a conception of what is good for both political communities and individuals, and defending those goods. Supporters point to situations where there is ‘grave and imminent risk’ that a nation will suffer aggression as good reasons to resist the oncoming aggression, whilst critics may argue that to attack another political community on the basis of crimes not yet performed is a breach of the same rights that JWT strives to defend.

The advocate of preventive war does capture a point which should be of very real concern to us today. Situations such as the ongoing tensions between Iran and The United States and her allies are situations where – if the rhetoric is to be believed – an ongoing threat to security and liberty is tolerated, and our being subject to aggression is risked in the interest of the rights of the antagonistic, but not yet aggressive, state. Is such tolerance and risk consistent with the logic of just war? When is the risk of being attacked too great to abstain from declaring war in anticipation?

In this paper I will highlight some of the theoretical and practical difficulties in determining what counts as a grave and imminent threat; focussing especially on the complicating case of ‘imminence’ in the face of so-called ‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’. Secondly, I will argue that not only is the notion of preventive war both inconsistent with the defence of the rights of political communities that JWT defends, but is also forbidden by the proportionality requirement of jus ad bellum. The risk of being subject to aggression is the cost of global peace; and whilst political communities can do a great deal to prevent aggression and be prepared in case it occurs, the demands of just war require that this prevention and preparation stop short of declaring war. We must accept a degree of risk in this area.

There has, however, been a recent shift in the science of climate change acknowledging that, “many profound ethical questions are hidden in scientific and economic arguments about various climate change policy proposals” (Brown D, Tuana N, Averill M, et al. (2006) ‘White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change’, Rock Ethics Institute, Penn State University). We wish to promote an inter-disciplinary approach to the ethical considerations of climate change and situate the debate within a ‘real world’ context to enable people to link evidence and resultant policy to their own moral responsibility as ‘global citizens’. By placing reliable scientific information within a holistic framework, scientific outcomes with a high level of certainty may be conveyed within a wider perspective that includes ethical and social considerations, resulting in a stronger claim for practical outcomes with respect to climate change solutions. This can be used to support policies that are practical as well as moral.

In developing this account I look closely at the nature of human relationships, using Aristotle’s account of friendship as a model. From this I argue that friendship consists of two virtues working in reciprocity in two persons. Finally, I explain how this reciprocity can be understood as luck, and how recognising that a particular type of luck, dependence luck, is inherent to relationships can in fact help to foster the virtues that allow a person to participate in those relationships.

As the twentieth century began to unfold, a series of achievements in science caused a technical anxiety that had hitherto been unknown. Two major developments serve as book-ends to this twentieth-century period of technical anxiety, Einstein’s theories of special and general relativity (1905, 1916) and the completion of the human genome map (2000). At the other end of the century, advances in the genomic sciences produced a technical anxiety over the hereditary risks associated with transgenic species, the moral issues associated with cloning, and the ‘big brother’ risks associated with genetic information.

This paper will make two related claims. First, it will argue that something like Aristotle’s understanding of friendship is required for the formation of moral character, and second, the type of impartial rationality commonly advocated in practical ethics is deficient because it ignores this ontological dimension.

[1] Meacham, S. (1964) ‘The Social Aspects of Nuclear Anxiety.’ American Journal of Psychiatry 120: 837-841.

[2] Funding to the ELSI program exceeds all other funding that had previously been devoted to ethical, legal, and social issues in health care.

Naimo, J. (2010). Ontology that matters: Binding relations. In P. Hanna (ed.), An anthology of philosophical studies, Vol. 5. (pp.261-272). Athens, Greece: Athens Institute for Education and Research.

However, whilst this question is important, the focus that it has been given has, undermined another important question associated with the public exposition of a person’s behaviour: the psychological ramifications it can have on an individual. In this paper I discuss, with reference to a number of recent ‘public outings’ of behaviour, the moral dimension of guilt, and how social perception and guilt can affect self-perception in a way that can be damaging to the individual who is the subject of it. Informed by this account, I examine whether, where the publicising of private activity is argued to be a call to a ‘higher standard’ for public figures, such action is successful, given the overwhelming change to self-perception that can manifest as a result of public shaming. This paper evaluates whether the media can be considered to play a moral-pedagogical function in society, or whether the publicising of private activity represents an unethical crippling of a public figure’s moral-psychological wellbeing and self-perception.