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<title>ERA Philosophy Peer Reviewed Papers and Journal </title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 University of Notre Dame Australia All rights reserved.</copyright>
<link>http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/era_phil_article</link>
<description>Recent documents in ERA Philosophy Peer Reviewed Papers and Journal </description>
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<title>A Critical Review Of Michael Purcell&apos;s Theological Development Of Levinas&apos; Philosophy</title>
<link>http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/era_phil_article/2</link>
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<pubDate>Tue, 07 Jul 2009 23:33:36 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>In this article I will review critically Purcell's attempt to: (i) recognize a method within Levinas' writings; (ii) exploit possibilities in Levinas' philosophy for theological development, especially in relation to the theme of alterity; (iii) redeem the ontological ethically in terms of redefining the meaning of Being; and (iv) develop an ethical theology of the Trinity with the philosophy of Levinas. Further, the critical review will act as a suggestive piece upon Purcell's work, outlining areas in which this thought might be progressed, and identifying lacunae that needs to be addressed.</p>

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<author>Glenn Morrison</author>


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<title>Love as a Contested Concept</title>
<link>http://researchonline.nd.edu.au/era_phil_article/1</link>
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<pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2009 19:03:54 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>The last decade has witnessed a welcome renewal of interest in the emotions across philosophy and the human sciences. Understandably, as one of the most obviously social emotions, love has attracted particular attention.(1) And yet, a curious oversight can be detected in many such discussions. It is this simple observation: people can disagree fundamentally about what love means, and when they do, such disagreements do not stem from misunderstanding or a lack of clarity. Rather, they stem from basic disagreements in values. I will argue that the existence of such fundamental disagreement sets constraints upon what a theorist can say, ex cathedra, about love. For, the types of disagreements we ordinarily engage in are not different in kind from those that engage philosophers. In such circumstances, anything that resembles a philosophical definition will seem at best arbitrarily stipulative and at worst peremptory. Consequently, the idea of a grand theory of love, resting (whether explicitly or implicitly) upon such definitions is chimerical. My main focus will be upon philosophical theories of love, since these wear their assumptions on their sleeves. However, my argument, if correct, has ramification for any theory that rests upon morally neutral definitions of love. Since any empirical investigation makes theoretical assumptions about the nature of the object studied, however tacit or inchoate, the recognition of the concept’s contestability mean that social scientific investigations into love ought to take a hesitant and piecemeal character, eschewing grand generalisation, in favour of a careful piecemeal mapping of the role that love plays in our moral practices.</p>

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<author>Richard P. Hamilton</author>


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