


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Shame and philosophy

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3 Shaming Philosophy

4 **Richard Paul Hamilton**

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8 Michael L. Morgan (2008), *On Shame*. London: Routledge (Thinking In Action).

9 Philip Hutchinson (2008), *Philosophy and Shame: An Investigation in the*
10 *Philosophy of Emotions and Ethics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

11 Shame is a ubiquitous and highly intriguing feature of human experience. It can
12 motivate but it can also paralyse. It is something which one can legitimately demand
13 of another, but is not usually experienced as a choice. Perpetrators of atrocities can
14 remain defiantly immune to shame while their victims are racked by it. It would be
15 hard to understand any society or culture without understanding the characteristic
16 occasions upon which shame is expected and where it is mitigated. Yet, one can
17 survey much of the literature in social and political theory over the last century and
18 find barely a footnote to this omnipresent emotional experience. The two books
19 under review aim to rectify this lacuna.

20 These two works have much in common. Both are concerned with the relationship
21 between shame and the great genocides of the last century. Morgan's focus is upon
22 the perpetrators and bystanders while Hutchinson's interest is in the experience of
23 survivors, such as Primo Levi. Both are troubled by philosophers' neglect of shame
24 and look for insight in literature and film. Hutchinson is systematically and militantly
25 atheoretical in his approach; Morgan takes a more elliptical route but it is clear from
26 his frequent references to Wittgensteinian thinkers, such as Stanley Cavell, that he
27 would sympathise with much that Hutchinson writes.

28 Of the two, Hutchinson's book is the more academically substantial. It is as much
29 a contribution to ongoing debates in contemporary analytic philosophy of the
30 emotions as it is a book about shame. Morgan's work is more popular in style and
31 would be well suited to an introductory course on philosophy of the emotions or

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32 perhaps philosophy and film. Taken together, both represent a welcome contribution
33 to the growing literature on philosophy and the emotions.

34 That there is such a growing literature may come as a surprise to some readers,
35 and this is itself indicative. For much of the twentieth century the emotions
36 languished in the philosophical backwaters. If they were discussed at all, it was
37 generally within 'soft' areas such as aesthetics. The dominance of cognitivism in
38 moral and political theory meant that they were given a cursory treatment as non-
39 rational motives or preferences which could supply the fuel but never direct our
40 moral endeavours. This has all changed in the last decade. Developments in the
41 neuro-sciences, challenges to the hegemony of rational choice theory, and the
42 ascendancy of feminism have meant that philosophy can no longer ignore our
43 affective life.

44 Has the increased attention that the emotions have received negated their
45 somewhat disreputable position? In common with Hutchinson, I would say not. One
46 reason why analytic philosophy has eschewed the emotions may be the feeling that
47 the traditional tools of the trade are no match for the job. Analytic philosophers
48 typically approach a problem in the following manner. First, they survey our
49 vernacular usage to find a core cluster of meanings surrounding a concept. Then,
50 using thought experiments that often seem absurd to outsiders, they attempt to
51 isolate the necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of the concept.
52 More often than not, this project is conducted in an atmosphere of hushed reverence
53 for the methods of the natural sciences, which become the gold standard against
54 which philosophers' endeavours are judged. There are of course significant
55 differences between individuals. Some give more weight to philosophical intuitions,
56 while others defer to the latest findings of the natural sciences. Since the demise of
57 so-called Ordinary Language Philosophy what has united all of these approaches is
58 a suspicion towards our vernacular and a preference for theoretical abstraction.

59 Yet, while this method may be appropriate for problems in logic, metaphysics
60 and philosophy of science, it sits badly with phenomena as fine-grained and
61 situation-specific as our emotional lives. I have written elsewhere and at length on
62 the problems faced by traditional analytic philosophy in attempting to analyse love.
63 (Hamilton, 2006) Unsurprisingly, the same problems emerge with other emotions.
64 With a few honourable exceptions, one can only read most contemporary work on
65 philosophy of the emotions as evasions of the central problems.

66 The contours of the current debate were set a decade ago with the publication of
67 Paul Griffith's bombastic *What Emotions Really Are* (1997). The book deals with
68 many topics, philosophical methodology, philosophy of language, philosophy of
69 psychology, even (at a push) moral psychology. But for anyone seeking
70 enlightenment on the book's central topic, the effect is rather like eating a Big
71 Mac: momentary satisfaction followed by a sense of cloying disappointment. The
72 ultimate answer is that emotions *really* are whatever some putative future scientific
73 psychology of the emotions will tell us that they are.

74 Griffith's book produced numerous responses, some advancing his project in
75 different ways, others defending less overtly scientific positions. The best of these
76 responses, notably those of the late Robert Solomon (2003; 2006) and Peter Goldie
77 (2000) recognise that whatever light the sciences may throw upon the emotions,

78 their insights will be dimmed if they are not accompanied by a sensitive
79 appreciation of the contribution of literature and common experience. The works
80 under consideration here both proceed from this recognition.

81 I will begin with a consideration of Morgan's work. His central thesis is that
82 shame is an appropriate response to genocide. By this he does not mean the banal
83 observation that the perpetrators of genocide ought to feel shame. Rather, his point
84 is the bolder one that all of us collectively ought to feel shame at the fact that we
85 live in a genocidal world. Countering suggestions from the psychological and
86 philosophical literature that shame is always a negative emotion, he argues that the
87 appropriate type of shame ought to be a spur to action. He develops this thesis
88 through a consideration of the genre of films devoted to the theme of genocide,
89 starting with Alan Resnais's *Night and Fog*. The central challenge that faces the
90 director of any film about genocide is how to portray its horror without slipping into
91 voyeurism or sentimentality. Much of the adverse critical reaction to *Schindler's*
92 *List* or *Life is Beautiful* focussed upon the manner in which the directors' treatment
93 trivialised the horror of genocide. Notoriously the shower scene in Spielberg's film
94 involved a portrayal of female nudity which many critics (rightly or wrongly)
95 considered exploitative.

96 *Night and Fog* manages to avoid the twin dangers of voyeurism and trivialisation.
97 Made in 1955, a decade after the liberation of the camps, Renais was concerned that
98 they were already fading from memory. The style of the film, with its interspersing
99 of contemporary and newsreel footage, is an attempt, according to Morgan, to
100 shame us out of this process of forgetting. He compares Renais's film with a more
101 recent one, *Ghosts of Rwanda*, which documents in a less artful manner the horrors
102 of this more recent African genocide and more particularly the failures of the
103 international community to live up to its collective post-Holocaust promise.

104 While it is possible to view *Night and Fog* as an historical document, it is not so
105 easy to distance oneself from *Ghosts of Rwanda*. This film, Morgan suggests, leads
106 the viewer to feel not merely sympathy for the victims but a profound sense of
107 shame that such events could occur. This sense of shame is deeply connected to a
108 loss of face. One would like to see oneself as the kind of person who neither
109 perpetrates nor permit genocides and yet genocide has happened once again. Shame,
110 then is 'our own way of seeing ourselves, not through the prism of our actions, but
111 through the prism of how others would see us in terms of our features or actions.'
112 (Morgan 2008: 15).

113 There is, I believe, a central ambivalence in Morgan's account here. His claim is
114 that shame is the appropriate response to the failure of our governments to intervene
115 in Rwanda. This raises a number of questions. It is worth noting that shortly after the
116 Rwandan genocide and ostensibly as a reaction to it, the US and its allies developed
117 a policy of 'humanitarian intervention'. The first fruit of this policy was the NATO
118 bombing of Serbia, in which the US openly supported one party in a civil war, the
119 Kosovar Albanians, against their Serbian compatriots. Emboldened by the success
120 of this operation, the US and its allies launched their crusades against Afghanistan
121 and Iraq. In the latter case, when the chimerical 'Weapons of Mass Destruction'
122 failed to materialise, the pretext rapidly became a humanitarian one.



123 Morgan seems seduced by the liberal illusion that our rulers actually care about
 124 our opinions. Perhaps one may agree that Western governments should have
 125 intervened in Rwanda and possibly also at a time when Saddam Hussein was
 126 butchering the Kurds. The experience of those who opposed the Iraq war
 127 demonstrates that popular opinion is largely irrelevant to those in power except
 128 perhaps for those brief periods when they are canvassing for votes. Election time
 129 comes and goes and a government is returned which carries out policies
 130 indistinguishable from its predecessor. Does Morgan suppose that if the people of
 131 Britain, France and Australia had taken to the streets in the millions, the outcome
 132 would have been different in Rwanda? Anger and frustration seem at least as
 133 obvious an emotional response as shame.

134 This issue touches upon a broader problem with the book. Many of the issues that
 135 Morgan raises touch upon an ongoing debate in contemporary moral philosophy,
 136 namely, the extent and limits of personal and collective responsibility. Although he
 137 never articulates this thought, Morgan seems to be of the persuasion that 'we' are
 138 collectively responsible for the actions of those in power. How this relates to the
 139 personal shame that a careful reflection upon genocide literature ought to elicit is
 140 never spelled out. Nor are we ever told in any detail how this shame is supposed to
 141 translate into political action. This represents a significant failing in the book.

142 Let us put political worries aside for the moment. I will focus instead upon the
 143 broader question of the nature of shame and its relationship to emotions such as
 144 guilt. While some philosophers have treated shame and guilt as interchangeable,
 145 Morgan insists upon their distinctness. His suggestion is that the distinction lies in
 146 the fact that guilt focuses upon our actions rather than ourselves. Shame, he argues,
 147 is more global in character. While one can feel guilt for what one has done, one can
 148 do so without thinking less of oneself. Shame, by contrast, forces one to question
 149 who one is. He further suggests that 'the feeling of guilt lacks the social dimension
 150 that shame requires.' (Morgan, 2008: 46).

151 Morgan is correct to stress the distinction between shame and guilt but mistaken
 152 in the manner in which he draws it. The proper distinction is normative and shame
 153 and guilt are both distinct and interrelated. It is a mistake to regard any complex
 154 emotion as more or less social than another. One distinguishes shame from guilt
 155 partly on the basis of the occasions that typically provoke them and partly by
 156 conventions of appropriateness. Guilt is in the first instance a forensic concept. One
 157 can be guilty without feeling guilty whereas one cannot be ashamed without feeling
 158 shame. Thus, to claim that guilt is less social in character than shame seems odd.

159 Guilt is also closely connected with a sense of personal responsibility. To feel
 160 guilty is to believe, rightly or wrongly, that one has a responsibility for some event
 161 or situation that one considers blameworthy. As both Morgan and Hutchinson
 162 highlight, shame is a distressingly common experience among victims of atrocities
 163 but this need not imply that the victims feel a sense of responsibility for the plight in
 164 which they found themselves. Shame is a common accompaniment to situations in
 165 which one is powerless to prevent oneself or someone close to one from becoming a
 166 victim.

167 I also believe that Morgan is mistaken to draw such a stark dichotomy between
 168 a person's character and her actions. Although it was a common move in

169 twentieth-century moral philosophy to consider actions in isolation from the agents
 170 who perform them (at least for the purpose of analysis), the trend in recent decades
 171 has been to stress the centrality of the person to any account of moral and political
 172 action. Indeed, the renaissance of the emotions is part of this process. At a time
 173 when one could talk, without pain of embarrassment, about actions and their
 174 consequences without reference to the persons whose actions they were or upon
 175 whom their consequences fell, it was relatively easy to disregard the emotions.

176 These questions provide a nice segue into Hutchinson's book, which treats the
 177 evasion of the person as central to some of the theoretical problems in philosophy of
 178 emotions. As mentioned above, of the two works under consideration, Hutchinson's
 179 is the more substantial and is at least as much a contribution to central debates in
 180 moral philosophy and the philosophy of emotions as it is a book about shame.
 181 Hutchinson clearly writes under the influence of Wittgenstein and especially a set of
 182 interpretations of Wittgenstein which stress his therapeutic ambition and his
 183 eschewal of substantive questions. It is a reading associated with *inter alia* Peter
 184 Winch, Gordon Baker, and John McDowell. Many readers less sympathetic to
 185 Wittgenstein, or at least to this particular interpretation, may find this off-putting.
 186 This will doubtless be exacerbated by Hutchinson's frequent insistence that he is not
 187 offering a theory of shame and that his remarks are elucidatory rather than
 188 substantive.

189 Here is not the place to deal with complex questions surrounding the exegesis of
 190 the later Wittgenstein. Suffice to say that there are ample insights into both
 191 shame and the philosophy of the emotions in this book and it would be a pity if
 192 readers did not delve deep enough to find them. My own impression of the work is
 193 that the Wittgensteinian framework is rather like the ladder which Wittgenstein
 194 himself alludes to at the end of the *Tractatus*. The evidence of this book suggests the
 195 emergence of a distinctive philosophical voice in the process of moving beyond its
 196 intellectual origins. It would be a shame if a disdain for Wittgensteinians prevented
 197 readers from seeing the genuine insights that this book has to offer.

198 The book begins with a lengthy discussion of Griffiths's *What Emotions Really*
 199 *Are*. Although it is more than ten years since its initial publication, Griffiths's work
 200 is a seminal one. But, as Hutchinson's incisive criticisms make clear, it is hard to
 201 understand why, unless one has a broader understanding of the scientific climate of
 202 much current Anglo-American philosophy. Hutchinson identifies Griffiths as a
 203 particularly strident example of this trend. In keeping with this tradition, Griffiths
 204 compares recent philosophical work on the emotions to the latest putatively
 205 scientific findings and surprisingly enough finds the philosophers wanting. He
 206 argues that the dominant 'cognitivist' theory of the emotions, which analyses
 207 emotions in terms of their distinctive propositional attitudes, is a 'degenerative
 208 research programme' in the Lakatosian sense, before breathlessly proceeding to
 209 outline what alternative scientific programmes have to offer.

210 As Hutchinson suggests, Griffiths's project begs at least as many questions as it
 211 answers. To begin with, it is far from clear that philosophy consists of a series of
 212 'research programmes' whether degenerative or progressive. Moreover, it is unclear
 213 what the rather loose group of thinkers that Griffiths lumps together have in
 214 common, except for a refusal to regard the task of philosophy of the emotions as a



215 quasi-scientific one. They are cognitivist in that they share to some extent a concern
 216 with analysing the characteristic judgements and beliefs that accompany the
 217 emotions, but they vary widely as to the extent they are prepared to assert that this is
 218 all there is to an emotion. At most they share a common conception that the main
 219 contribution of philosophy to understanding the emotions is conceptual rather than
 220 empirical. With some philosophers engaged in conducting poorly constructed
 221 surveys in the name of 'Experimental Philosophy', this is no doubt an unfashionable
 222 view. However, it is useful to be reminded, as Hutchinson does, that many
 223 philosophers continue to resist the idea that philosophy is a poor relation to the
 224 natural and behavioural sciences.

225 Unfortunately, Hutchinson has a tendency to show the same lack of charity
 226 towards his opponents as Griffiths does. I think his critical treatment would have
 227 been more insightful had he had a more subtle appreciation of the basis of Griffiths's
 228 work in philosophy of biology. For instance, Hutchinson attacks Griffiths for using
 229 the concept of 'psychological phenotypes' when dealing with child development
 230 and suggests that this is merely rhetorical posturing without content. This attack can
 231 be seen as badly aimed once one appreciates the programme of developmental
 232 systems theory with which Griffiths is closely associated. Developmental systems
 233 theory is a radical attempt to rethink the nature-nurture dichotomy. In this context, it
 234 is entirely appropriate to consider child development in biological terms without
 235 raising traditional fears of 'biological reductionism'. Properly understood, Devel-
 236 opmental Systems Theory is profoundly non-reductive. It is in fact surprising to find
 237 that a philosopher of biology, whose hallmark is a careful handling of conceptual
 238 distinctions and a rejection of attempts at theory reduction in biology, can be so
 239 slapdash when he turns his attention to human affairs. Indeed it is not always clear
 240 that Griffiths himself fully appreciates the radical nature of the material that he is
 241 dealing with in biology, in a way that other philosophers of biology, such as John
 242 Duprè, clearly do. Some understanding of Griffiths's work in the philosophy of
 243 biology would only have strengthened Hutchinson's case.

244 Hutchinson does a better job when it comes to assessing Griffiths's views in the
 245 philosophy of language. Although few of his arguments are original, he is able to
 246 marshal a powerful series of Wittgensteinian insights against Griffiths's invocation
 247 of natural kinds semantics. Griffiths is right to argue that our current emotional
 248 language is not well understood in terms of Putnam and Kripke's semantic theory,
 249 not because of the inadequacy of our vernacular (as Griffiths claims) but rather
 250 because of the incoherence of that theory. It is unfortunate but Hutchinson is
 251 unlikely to get a fair hearing for his arguments in our current scientific intellectual
 252 climate. As he notes, Putnam himself has long resisted the attempt to interpret his
 253 theory of meaning in essentialist terms, but with little success.

254 Many readers unconcerned with contemporary debates in analytic philosophy of
 255 the emotions will be tempted to skip the first chapter. They will be rewarded by a
 256 chapter that, in my opinion, is the finest of the book. Hutchinson moves from the
 257 pristine climate of contemporary Anglo-American thought into the heady air of
 258 European philosophy. The target here is Giorgio Agamben and the treatment is
 259 much more dialogic in character than his earlier somewhat polemical handling of
 260 Griffiths. As he notes, Agamben has a much greater concern for elucidating the

261 lived experience of shame than in constructing quasi-scientific theories of the
262 emotions.

263 Hutchinson situates Agamben's account of shame, developed over several works,
264 in the context of his broader philosophical and political project. Agamben sees the
265 origins of modernity in the collapse of the Aristotelian distinction between *zoe* and
266 *bios*. In modernity, an attempt is made to base politics upon a bald conception of
267 human nature (*zoe*) and not upon the human beings acting in pursuit of their proper
268 ends (*bios*). The empty formal concept of citizen comes to replace its richer
269 Aristotelian predecessor in modern liberal thought. The problem here, as critics such
270 as Alasdair MacIntyre (1985) have noted, is that we continue to retain the moral
271 categories previously rooted in the Aristotelian framework. Planting them in the
272 poor soil that is contemporary liberal theory leads to a failure to flourish.

273 This analysis has significant consequences for our understanding of guilt and
274 shame. The experience of the *Musselmänner*, those inmates that the system had
275 completely defeated whom Levi and other survivors so vividly describe, speaks to
276 the possibility of reducing a human being into a mere human animal. Agamben
277 further argues that modernity has impoverished our moral discourse in that shame is
278 increasingly assimilated to a legalistic concept of guilt. In this light, he offers an
279 interpretation of a key passage in Primo Levi's *If This is a Man/The Truce* and
280 compares it with a later passage from *The Drowned and the Saved*.

281 Levi is discussing the liberation of the camp by Russian soldiers. He describes a
282 look on the face of the Russians, a look that is all too familiar to the inmates. It is 'a
283 shame we knew so well, the shame that drowned us after the selections, and every
284 time we had to watch, or submit to, some outrage: the shame the Germans did not
285 know, that the just man experiences at another's crimes; the feeling of guilt that
286 such a crime should exist, that it should be introduced irrevocably into the world of
287 things that exist.' (Levi, 2000:118).

288 Commenting on this, Agamben argues that Levi clearly distinguishes the ethical
289 from the juridical. However by the time of his later work, *The Drowned and the
290 Saved*, Levi quotes this passage again and in Agamben's interpretation of it,
291 crucially introduces the expression 'feels remorse'. He suggests that this represents
292 'backsliding' on Levi's part from his earlier insight. Hutchinson takes issue with this
293 interpretation and argues that if there is backsliding taking place it is by Agamben.
294 Rather than attempting to take seriously the experience of this most insightful of
295 survivors, Agamben seeks to pigeonhole Levi's account into his theoretical
296 framework in which shame is always and everywhere the inescapable awareness of
297 one's own subjectivity. Levi's literary and expressive power stems in part from his
298 sensitivity to the conceptual connections within our everyday language. That he
299 resists the legislative pretensions of the philosophers is to his credit. Rather than
300 imposing an arbitrary schema, Levi is aware of the resonances of words and the fact
301 that concepts like guilt, shame, and remorse are related to one another in
302 innumerable ways. One cannot fully understand one of the concepts without
303 understanding the similarities and differences to the others.

304 Hutchinson offers a similarly perceptive analysis of Agamben's use of the
305 testimony of another survivor, Robert Antelme. In a particularly poignant passage,
306 Antelme is describing the death marches at the end of the war. During the march, an



307 Italian student is selected for arbitrary execution. Antelme talks about the student's
 308 demeanour and states that he 'seemed embarrassed' at his selection, going so far as
 309 to remark upon his blushing. In citing this passage Agamben entirely omits the
 310 section about embarrassment. Hutchinson suggests that once again, this reflects his
 311 desire to shoehorn survivor testimony into a pre-existing framework. Rather than
 312 allowing the survivors' accounts to speak for themselves they become merely
 313 vignettes to illustrate Agamben's broader theoretical analysis.

314 In a discussion that many readers will find controversial, Hutchinson identifies
 315 Agamben's (mis)reading of Derrida as the culprit. At its best, Derridean deconstruc-
 316 tion can be an aid to the sluggish imagination, unsettling some of our preconceptions
 317 about the way language must work. At its worst, deconstruction becomes just another
 318 metaphysics of presence. In Agamben's case, this manifests itself in the use of
 319 etymologies to uncover the 'essential' meanings of concepts which then come to
 320 occupy an existence autonomous of those who use them.

321 Hutchinson's reading of Derrida is surprisingly sympathetic for one obviously
 322 trained in the Anglo-American tradition and he ably defends him against crass
 323 criticisms such as those notoriously advanced by John Searle. He interprets
 324 Derrida's views on writing as somewhat akin to Wittgenstein's logico-grammatical
 325 observations. Agamben, he argues, mistakenly takes Derrida's observations as the
 326 foundations for a new and more correct theory of meaning. In this, despite the many
 327 differences in outlook and approach, Agamben's project is not that far from the
 328 work of a philosopher like Griffiths who seeks to inform ordinary competent
 329 speakers of the language what our concepts truly mean.

330 In the second half of the book, Hutchinson develops his own account of the
 331 emotions which, in Wittgensteinian spirit, he insists is not a theory. His 'world-
 332 taking cognitivism' is intended to avoid some of the pitfalls in other versions of
 333 cognitivism and make persons and their experiences central to any understanding of
 334 the emotions. Emotions are a feature of the world, but not the disenchanting world
 335 described by the natural sciences. They are rather a feature of a world populated by
 336 language-using beings such as ourselves who are able to take the world to be a
 337 certain way and in doing so recognise the ability of others within that world to so
 338 take it.

339 Cognitivist views of the emotions are often criticised for entailing the absurd
 340 view that one can never be mistaken in one's emotional responses. I have always
 341 thought this an oddly misplaced criticism. On the contrary, unlike the longstanding
 342 view of the emotions within analytic philosophy and psychology as visceral grunts
 343 at the world of varying degrees of articulacy, cognitivist views, properly understood,
 344 open up the prospect of both mistaken and correct emotional responses. Within the
 345 virtue framework that Hutchinson and I broadly share, moral life consists among
 346 other things in training ourselves to respond appropriately to the world we share
 347 with our peers. It is not enough simply to go through the motions or abstractly to
 348 follow rules. We must do so with the appropriate disposition.

349 In this light, to experience shame is to respond to features of our common world
 350 that one takes to appropriately elicit shame. What unites all versions of cognitivism
 351 is the recognition that our emotional responses are truth-apt. In some versions, he
 352 argues, this is interpreted in an overly intellectualised way, as the view that all

353 emotional responses embed propositional judgements. Such a view is open to the
 354 obvious criticism that it ignores the viscerality of many of our emotional responses.
 355 Hutchinson believes that seeing emotions as answerable to the world (a view which
 356 he inherits from Charles Travis) avoids this problem.

357 In the course of developing his view, Hutchinson attempts to dissolve a number
 358 of philosophical problems, most especially the ongoing dispute within philosophy of
 359 emotion regarding the relationship between the viscerality and the intentionality of
 360 the emotions. (Prinz 2004; Deigh 2004) Philosophers have erected elaborate
 361 apparatuses to attempt to reconcile this apparent discrepancy and their usual strategy
 362 in doing so involves 'imbu[ing] something sub-personal with cognitive powers.'
 363 (Hutchinson, 2008:125) He ably demonstrates the problems and absurdities in this
 364 project and the manner in which, once again, it draws us away from persons and the
 365 world they inhabit. The correct response is to look for the solution within this
 366 interpersonal world, rather than in some mysterious computational inner world.

367 Hutchinson's position is a distinctive and interesting one, and it is to be hoped
 368 that he develops it into a broader account of the emotions. Many of his criticisms of
 369 current philosophical treatment of shame could be applied with equal force to work
 370 on love or jealousy. At the very least, Hutchinson may be able to perform the time-
 371 honoured role of a philosophical gadfly urging philosophers not to lose sight of the
 372 human person in their endless pursuit of a chimerical theoretical clarity.

373 Morgan challenges us to feel shame at inhabiting a genocidal world; Hutchison
 374 attempts to shame philosophers into paying attention to the subtleties of the world
 375 we share. Both highlight the importance of film and literature in helping us to
 376 understand our common emotional experience and both are sceptical of the lofty
 377 imperiousness of overly theorised accounts. Both works are written in a lively and
 378 engaging style that is a welcome change from the anodyne technicality or
 379 pretentious bombast of much of the current literature. I fear that they represent a
 380 minority voice on the fringe of the philosophy of emotions, but I hope that it is a
 381 growing one.

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